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APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER on HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES in PHILOSOPHY APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Volume 10, Number 2 Spring 2011 FROM THE GUEST EDITOR, EDUARDO GARCÍA-RAMÍREZ FROM THE CO-EDITOR, CARLOS ALBERTO SÁNCHEZ ARTICLES JOSÉ JORGE MENDOZA “The Political Philosophy of Unauthorized Immigration” CARLOS MONTEMAYOR “Engagement and Universality in Latin American Philosophy” EDUARDO GARCÍA-RAMÍREZ “On the Invisibility Problem of Latin American Philosophy” GUILLERMO HURTADO “Paths of Ontology” MIGUEL ÁNGEL FERNÁNDEZ “Wright on the Cognitive Role of Entitlements” SUBMISSIONS CONTRIBUTORS © 2011 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy Bernie J. Canteñs and Carlos A. Sánchez, Co-Editors Spring 2011 Volume 10, Number 2 Eduardo García-Ramírez) and two from members of the ROM THE UEST DITOR Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at UNAM (Miguel Ángel F G E Fernández and Guillermo Hurtado), where AAMPh’s fourth annual meeting will take place this spring. The papers by Montemayor and García-Ramírez are directly concerned with Eduardo García-Ramírez the practice of philosophy in Latin America and its relation with Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México the broader International Arena. These papers give us an idea of what and how some Latin American philosophers think about This issue of the Newsletter is dedicated to the American their own profession. Fernandez and Hurtado discuss traditional Association of Mexican Philosophers (AAMPh). The AAMPh was philosophical problems within the disciplines of epistemology constituted in a meeting that became its first Annual Conference and ontology. These papers in turn give us an idea of the at MIT in 2008. Agustín Rayo envisioned this first meeting as an philosophical work that gets done in Latin America. opportunity for Mexican philosophers working in the United Guillermo Hurtado offers an argumentative and States (many of whom were graduate students at that time) methodological guide through the history of ontology as a to know each other better and share their philosophical work. philosophical discipline. Hurtado distinguishes among five An important goal of AAMPh was, and still is, the creation of different “paths” through which the discipline has been a philosophical community by means of philosophical work advanced: from the very coining of the Latin term in the and social interaction. In its meetings the members who have seventeenth century, when ontology was thought to be the not had the experience yet get acquainted with the practice of purest and most general philosophical discipline, all the way philosophy outside of the seminar room. Thus, part of the goal to the more contemporary view defended by Edmund Husserl of this philosophical community is to improve the philosophical according to which ontology is to be divided by regions of abilities of those Mexican philosophers working in the U.S. philosophical interest (e.g., persons, material objects, etc.). A soccer game figured prominently in Rayo’s organization Hurtado shows how each one of these paths has led to different of the first conference and, since then, became a staple of the results without ever reaching the expected goal: to give an AAMPh annual meeting. It turns out that the soccer game actually account of being. Hurtado accurately describes how each one fostered more communication among the participants. The MIT of these five paths of ontology relate to each other and forcefully meeting was such a success, and all attendants were so pleased argues that ontology, as the central philosophical discipline it with it, that a second meeting, organized by Sergio Gallegos at purports to be, will not reach its goal unless its paths are traveled City College of New York, and a third one, organized by Carlos in what can be seen as an interconnected voyage. Montemayor at San Francisco State University, coalesced and Miguel Fernández discusses a proposal by Crispin Wright expanded the organization. The third conference at SFSU had according to which a necessary condition for having perceptual a simultaneous session at the Pacific APA and AAMPh has the warrant for believing that p is that one has an antecedent goal of increasing its presence at regular meetings of the APA entitlement to assume that one’s perceptual systems operate and other professional philosophical organizations. reliably. Fernández argues that Wright’s is a novel version of the The fourth annual conference will take place in Mexico old thought that epistemic warrant is subject to higher-order City at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas of UNAM, an epistemic conditions. Fernández presents two different versions institution with which most members of AAMPh have a strong of Wright’s central argument (the argument from subjective connection. Organized by the current president of AAMPh, indistinguishability) and argues that both fail to establish the Eduardo García-Ramírez, the conference will continue the conclusion that Wright aims at. One interpretation, Fernández tradition of allowing new AAMPh members to get to know argues, leads to the second-order thesis that an antecedent other members better and share their current work. It will entitlement to assume that one’s perceptual systems operate also be an opportunity to discuss issues concerning the future reliably is a necessary condition for having perceptual warrant of the organization. AAMPh wants to increase its contact with for believing that one has perceptual warrant for believing that other Latino philosophers and with philosophers in general. p; which is not the original first-order thesis that Wright argues Eventually, AAMPh may become a forum for philosophers to for. The other interpretation is shown to reach the desired discuss pressing issues in the profession and share their work first-order conclusion, but at the cost of adjusting the original in a more open fashion. AAMPh is particularly interested in argument in such a way that its first premise loses plausibility. interacting with underrepresented groups in philosophy and in Fernández points out that the second-order and the first-order articulating a better and more meaningful exchange of ideas thesis that each interpretation respectively entail, correspond between philosophy in Latin America and the English-speaking to two distinct cognitive roles that entitlements are required to world. play in two different theoretical projects that Wright pursues. This issue of the Newsletter includes four different essays, Fernández argues that these roles can only be coherently two from members of the AAMPh (Carlos Montemayor and integrated in a single epistemological outlook if the analogue — APA Newsletter, Spring 2011, Volume 10, Number 2 — of the KK-principle for warrant is assumed. He argues that groundbreaking work in liberation philosophy. This perspective Wright needs such distinctively internalist tenet, yet offers no relies on two Dusselian principles, the “solidarity principle” and argument for it. the “critical legitimacy or democracy principle”: the first “rests Carlos Montemayor considers two distinct yet closely on the premise that in order to understand or pinpoint the failure related metaphilosophical problems: a methodological debate of a system or institution we need to first locate its victims, those on how philosophical inquiry should be carried out and a who suffer the brunt of its exclusion and oppression,” and the practical one, which has permeated the philosophical tradition second “goes beyond formal equality to include respect for the in Latin America, of whether the practice of philosophy should alterity of the excluded and oppressed.” Mendoza concludes aim at being universal or regional. Montemayor describes by emphasizing that the “immigration problem” is “an ethico- the lack of an accepted methodology, even in general terms, political problem and not an enforcement problem,” which within philosophy. Montemayor illustrates this by appealing to means that it “is a problem whose solution is not found in the current debate involving what is now known as “empirical developing better and more efficient deterrents or establishing philosophy.” He argues that this new trend in contemporary more and harsher restrictions, but by discovering and addressing philosophy has shown that philosophical inquiry does not rest the root of human exploitation and alienation that gives rise to upon an accepted rigorous methodology, but that, contrary the problem of unauthorized immigration in the first place.” to its expectations, it has failed to provide an acceptable, Considering the current state of public and academic debate philosophically (or even psychologically) relevant methodology. on this issue, this is truly a timely meditation. Montemayor ties this methodological debate with the metaphilosophical one about philosophical practice by showing how the former offers an important insight into the nature of philosophy: that it is not, by its own nature, a discipline that can ARTICLES be guided by single methodological norm. Following Jose Gaos’ ideas on the nature of philosophy, Montemayor recommends that the philosophical practice be concerned first and foremost with engaging the community from where it stems and finding The Political Philosophy of Unauthorized what is philosophically universal within it. Immigration In the last paper, Eduardo García-Ramírez addresses the so-called “problem of invisibility” within Latin American José Jorge Mendoza philosophy. García-Ramírez takes invisibility
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