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THE CHANGING IMAGE OF IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT OF POST-SOVIET IN 2004-2012

Tamar Gamkrelidze

EUCACIS Online Paper

No. 8 July 2019

PhD Support Programme The EU, Central Asia and the Caucasus in the International System About EUCACIS “The EU, Central Asia and the Caucasus in the International System” (EUCACIS) is a PhD Support Programme for Postgraduates and Doctoral Researchers in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, organized by the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) and the Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE). Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and the programme Erasmus+, it offers scholarships for three years to excellent postgraduates who are working on a doctoral thesis in political science, contemporary history or economics on a topic related to its thematic focus at a university or academy of sciences in the Southern Caucasus or Central Asia (including , the Kashmir region in India and the autonomous region Xinjiang in China). It is the objective of the EUCACIS programme to EUCACIS.eu provide intensive PhD research training for its participants to bring them closer to international standards, to support them until they submit their doctoral theses, and to help them establish their own networks with other young researchers in the target regions and in . This will be achieved through four international conferences, four PhD schools, two research training stays and continuous online coaching.

About IEP Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the field of European integration as a non-profit organisation. It is one of Germany’s leading research institutes on foreign and European policy. IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, IEP’s task include scientific analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration. www.iep-berlin.de

About CIFE The Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE) is a private institution of higher education and research, founded in 1954 with its head office in Nice and branch offices in Berlin, Brussels and Istanbul. It receives special funding in the framework of the Jean Monnet Programme of the . Students from all continents enroll in its programmes and work as senior officials, consultants and academic experts after graduation. www.cife.eu

About the Series EUCACIS Online Paper comprise research and policy papers on topics related to the thematic focus of the programme, written by fellows of the EUCACIS PhD Support Programme and members of the wider EUCACIS network. It aims at making the debates within the network, notably during the EUCACIS conferences and PhD schools, accessible to a wider public. The papers are available on the programme website: www.eucacis.eu About the Author Tamar Gamkrelidze is a PhD student in political science at Ilia State University as well as an alumna of DAAD, Academic Swiss Caucasus Net, Erasmus Mundus EUROEAST, and Open Society Institute scholarship networks. Currently, Tamar is EUCACIS Fellow and an editor at the European Journal of Transformation Studies. In 2010 she obtained her master’s degree in European Studies from Maastricht University. Earlier, Tamar worked as a RTA Assistant (EC Resident Twinning Advisor) at the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. For some time she was also a freelance journalist writing mainly on Georgia’s foreign relations. Her research interests lie in the fields of identity studies, EU external affairs, EU integration, and discourse theory.

Editorial team

Publishers: Prof. Dr Mathias Jopp, Head of International Programmes, IEP PD Dr Matthias Waechter, Director General, CIFE

Editors: Dr Susann Heinecke, Programme Manager EUCACIS, CIFE Janny Schulz, Programme Manager EUCACIS, IEP

Layout: Sophia Klumpp, IEP Fabian Weber, IEP

Place of publication: Berlin

ISSN: 2627-7204

Internet: www.eucacis.eu

Email: [email protected]

Hashtag: #EUCACIS

published in July 2019 4 EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 1 Within theframework ofthisresearch 464speechesby development ofGeorgia European asaroadmap project for the Introduction recognition ofGeorgia’s independence by even dangerous to engage in for the EU. The Georgia seemed distant, uninteresting and Union (EU)were takenup, butnow post-soviet relations between Georgia andtheEuropean was never tangible. After independence, the Soviet occupation, theEuropean alternative Europe asaroadmap for development, butdueto initiative. hasalwaysThe country leanedtowards of thecountry enemytransformation ofRussiainto theprimary to miscalculations andmistakesresulting inthe initiatives. This approach collapsed in2008due inforeign engagement ofitasapartner policy of from domesticaffairsandan politicsforesawstate-driven anexclusion Russia into/from theEuropean project. These ofinclusionandexclusion tactics of a skilful of peaceful coexistence withRussiaentailed Georgia’sthis paperfindsthat initialprogram contrastIn to mostliterature onthistopic, neighbour? chief antagonist to thenorthern Russia, lead to the allocation of a role of the initially aimedfor peaceful coexistence with a war withRussiain2008. consequences for Georgia, whichculminated in and Europe meant a number of unintended bold andprovocative choice between Russia of influence oftheRussian Federation. Sucha generally considered asbelonging to thesphere whichwasnot aneasydecisionfor acountry Georgia according to European standards. was It oftheSoviet pastandto transformlegacy (UNM) government inorder to overcome the andtheUnited NationalSaakashvili Movement This was politicaldirection takenby President available meansofdeveloping thecountry. promote theroadmap to Europe astheonly beginning ofGeorgian politicsthat strongly Georgia’s European isnotanew project Why could Georgia’s European project,which The Revolution the Rose in2003marks such as ‘Russia’,such ‘Kremlin’, ‘Europe’, ‘EU’, ‘integration’. speeches were located inasearch by typing engine keywords the Saakashvili’s Presidential of the Library. Relevant parts President are Saakashvili analyzed whichwere provided by 1 .

greatest possibleeconomic integration withthe the closestpossiblepoliticalassociation andthe perspective, thegoalofthesedocuments was institutionalized over time. From the Georgian instruments etc., whichhave beeninitiated and initiatives, recommendations, reports, programs, single document, butonvariousagreements, the Eastern Partnership in2009. European Policy Neighbourhood in2004andby approximation strategy was followed by the countries. was toCaucasian alsoextended otherSouth Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1996, which was theadaptation ofthePartnership and significant milestone inEU-Georgian relations relations on , 1992. was followed by theestablishment ofdiplomatic of a political dialogue, which the start marked the European Community onMarch 23,1992 5 4 3 2 family.” should never have been separated from, our family ofdemocratic nations, thefamilywe in ourhistorical destiny to jointheEuropean Georgians “are andshouldremain anation united President openlystated Saakashvili that decided to Georgia bring backto Europe. RevolutionRose in2003–theUNMgovernment Revolution” democratization processes.” post to Mechanism support Reaction “Rose mission, and employed the Commission’s Rapid andDefencea European Policy Security (ESDP) Representative for Caucasus, the South launched country. response, In theEU “appointed aSpecial for development internal and external of the European astheonlypoliticalagenda project with the UNM government, hegemonized the The European isnotbasedona project The relationship intensified the onlyafter caucasus/conflict-resolution-south-caucasus-eu-s-role. caucasus/conflict-resolution-south-caucasus-eu-s-role. 26, 2018,https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/ casus: The EU’s Role,” (Europe and Central Asia), accessed July Group,International Crisis “ConflictSouth Resolution in Cau- Saakashvili’s Presidential Library. Assembly” (speech,September25,2013),archives of the Georgia at the 68th session of the United Nations General Saakashvili, Mikheil “Address by thePres Ibid. 11_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom. 2017, Commission Press Database), Release accessed July 24 European Relations,(European Commission, EU-Georgia 4 For thisend, thePresident, together 3

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-95- 2 Another dn of ident 5 This EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 5 , “Speech delivered by Mikheil by “Speech delivered Saakashvili Mikheil Saakashvili, - 4, 2004), archi (speech, February John Hopkinsat University” Library. Presidential of the Saakashvili’s ves The European project was founded founded projectwas European The with Building good neighbourlyrelations Targets of exclusion politics were actors who were politics of exclusion Targets on peaceful premises. It prioritizedgood premises. peaceful on The partnership with its neighbours. relations cooperatively work “to was goal government’s with all our partners lasting security advance to had Russia Out neighbours, all of stability.”9 and region, in the its influence due to a special status the international by de factowhich was accepted it was government the Georgian For community. not a fine line between walk it had to clear that a member of and becoming angering Moscow challenging, task was The family. the European in stay to Georgia for the only way but it was fate. of its own charge with the Kremlin as an cooperation Russia meant but not as an actor in internal external partner, status a had already Russia time, By that politics. be manoeuvred. and this had to of an antagonist important it was do that, solve In to to order of Russian issues: withdrawal main internal two of military restoration and Georgia bases from 9 Russia as a strategic partner: 2004-2006 Russia as a strategic commitment of Georgian authorities. Official authorities. of Georgian commitment in practical and reportsdocuments resulted of Europe the presence increased and initiatives presence This politics. internal in player a as every permeated aspect economic of political, of the an exclusion led to and and social life Russia as an legacySoviet consequently, and, actor. internal Incompatibility project. the with threatened objectives the and value and hostility towards the main criteria of the project were system the for threats the though Even exclusion. for project ranged of the European implementation state of ineffectiveness to corruption from proclaimed Russia was 2008, by institutions, of the as a primary enemy, even antagonist, of project and of the statehood European of the initial version did the However, Georgia. exclude to project in 2004 intend as launched Russia as an actor? - . 7

8 These two components were were components two These 6 petition? Tension between State-Building between and Modernization Tension petition? 4 (2008): 694. 36, no. Paper Nationalities Projects”, - (Eu Union: External Action Plan, Action, EU/Georgia European Externalropean Action Service) July 24 2017, http:// accessed eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/ georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf. statements “Joint Mikheil Saakashvili Ashton, and Catherine of the 16, 2011), archives (speech, November the media” for Library. Presidential Saakashvili’s Vicken Cheterian, “Georgia’s : Change or Re Rose Revolution: “Georgia’s Cheterian, Vicken The UNM government was an architect, a an architect, was UNM government The Similarly to the EU, Russia was also part also Russia was of the EU, Similarly to The project had a foreign policy component, project a foreign had The major force and driver behind the progress progress the behind and driver major force though even transformation Georgia’s towards institutions support the European from of success The role. essential an played also on the highly dependent the project was tightly intertwined, as progress in European in European intertwined,tightly as progress of the modernization required integration directed the project was Hence, the country. such issues all internal almost handling towards budget problems, institutional as corruption, conflictsterritorial deficit, and social division – hindering the development factors were that of the country and the EU integration the internal and external dimension of Georgian external and the internal dimension of Georgian in the conflicts on politics: because of its role territoryGeorgian of its influence and because as a legacy level the national on politics at of its Union. Inof the Soviet the framework not government project, the Georgian European of external change the balance to only wanted diminish but also to of Europe in favour powers developments on the internal influence Russia’s institutions and makingby the country’s European. more processes 7 8 6 such as “the joining of Western-dominated Western-dominated “the joining of such as and the organisations” or regional international with in the relations component normalization namely component, internal Russia, but also an the bring it up to to modernise“to Georgia West.” of the level EU, which could only be achieved through the through achieved only be could which EU, on based state Georgian of the consolidation documents These principles. democratic liberal the EU and both between relations regulated certaina and—to Georgia within Georgia, of the the rest to relation degree—Georgia’s world. 6 EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 11 10 in Russiaitself.” on itsborders isasource for ofstability peace believedto theKremlin.Saakashvili that “peace because aprosperous Georgia was ofinterest positive role inthedevelopment ofthecountry who was toa strategic expected play a partner politics. The role allocated to Russiawas oneof to exclude itfrom theinternal dimensionofthe inorder projects in twoto mainexternal beable the UNM government wanted to include Russia the territorial integrity ofthe country. Hence, plan to normalize therelations withRussia. seemed determined toSaakashvili follow the ofEurope.in theproject Nevertheless, to engageinitsdevelopment and, respectively, up onitshegemonicambitionstowards Georgia, difficulties asitaimed topersuadeRussia to give peaceful control endingofhisthirteen-year of way, Aslan Abashidze was manoeuvred into a bythe crisis bringing Abashidze to Russia. This Council chief,Security IgorIvanov, whodefused Georgia. Instead, theKremlinsent theNational theregion connecting bridges withtherest of and closeallyofRussia, when heblewoffthe Aslan Abashidze, toGonio support alocalleader basesandpersonnel stationed in its military inMay 2004,Russiarestrained from using Georgian internal affairs.in thecrisis During cooperate by staying away from meddlinginto was highbecauseRussiaseemedready to with Russiawas ofkeyimportance. relations withthoseregions, thecooperation bases and troops. Hence, in order to regulate one feature: thepresence oftheRussianmilitary from region to region. All four, however, shared the Kremlinvariedinitsform,anddegree type elites. military theyreceivedThe support from with Russianpoliticaland contacts direct All fourAdjara had andSamtskhe-Javakheti. Ossetia, South by Russia:, supported deal withself-proclaimed regions that were government in2004was fragile andhadto The enthusiasm amongGeorgian authorities The state asinherited by theUNM ves ofthe Saakashvili’s Presidential Library. University”at JohnHopkins (speech, February 4,2004),archi- Saakashvili, Mikheil Saakashvili “Speech delivered by Mikheil 2005), archives oftheSaakashvili’s Presidential Library. Assembly oftheCouncil ofEurope”tary 26, (speech,Janyry Saakashvili, Mikheil -H.EPresident“Remarks to theParliamen- 10 This missionwaswith riddled 11 threatened force andimaginative diplomacy” were effective andthat mixof “through askilful Georgia’s politicsofpersuasiontowards Russia President. There was impression anincorrect that confidence inthe UNMgovernment andthe The success inAdjara, however, generated false Javakheti andAdjaraJavakheti by theendof2007. This bases andpersonnelfrom , Samtskhe- 2005: Russia agreed to pull out its military level yieldedaresult in political andmilitary meetings andnegotiations at thedomestic Ajara inMay 2004 16 15 14 13 Ibid. 12 of Abkhazia base in Gudauta located in the breakaway region a regular international monitoring ofthemilitary region) (Adjara). andGonio Georgia insisted on (Samtskhe-Javakheti located inAkhalkalaki stationed in bases Tbilisi aswell asoftwo military (Group of Russian Troops in the Trans Caucasus) focused headquarter onaclosure oftheGRVZ Georgian government pushed this process and bases from Georgia withina3-year period. The 2005,RussiaagreedIn to pulloutitsmilitary significant success of the UNM government. OssetiaandusheroutRussia. and South it was possible to regain control over Abkhazia Russia.” by the international obligations undertaken forcontinued years functioning inviolation of that “[the base]had notabandonedandhas the Georgian Government was concerned base in Gudauta in 2001, closure of the military engagement onthisissue This wishful thinking was fuelledbyThis another wishfulthinking In spite ofmanyIn difficulties, U.S.andEU ments/insight/articles/eav012804.shtml. accessed May 05,2010,http://www.eurasianet.org/depart as Litmus Test for Georgian-Russian Relations,” Eurasia.net, Igor Torbakov, Issue Withdrawal Military “Moscow Views php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=595&info_id=6054. zia,” accessed May 102016,http://belgium.mfa.gov.ge/index. - republic ofAbkha signed between Russia andtheso-called the treaty base in Gudauta on the creation of a joint military of Foreign“Statement of the Ministry AffairsGeorgia of on article.php?id=12472. zia” (Civil.ge), accessed July242017,http://www.civil.ge/eng/ , “Moscow Comments- onGudautaBaseinAbkha s-ajara-success-repeatable-elsewhere-in-georgia.pdf. 24 2017,https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/saakashvili- table Elsewhere in Georgia?,” (Europe accessed Briefing), July Group,International Crisis “Saakashvili’s Ajara Success:- Repea 15

14 . Even thoughRussiareported 12 by President Saakashvili. 16 aswell asnumerous 13 - , EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 7 - In September 20 21 That is the reason why, after the opening why, is the reason That 22 Defense Minister Okruashvili’s remark was particularly was remark non- Minister Okruashvili’s Defense if you “even on April 20, 2006, when he said that diplomatic Russia it can to – feces this expression export me for – excuse Ministry Foreign the Russian incident that After there.” be sold Aprilon 26 Moscow to Ambassador Georgia’s the summoned comment. Okruashvili’s over protest and expressed Mikheil Saakashvili’s President “Georgian Mikheil Saakashvili, 23, (speech, February City Hall” Tbilisi at conference news Library. Presidential of the Saakashvili’s 2007), archives Change or Re Rose Revolution: “Georgia’s Cheterian, Vicken State-Building between and Modernization Tension petition? 4 (2008): 693. 36, no. Paper Nationalities Projects”, President Saakashvili tried to deescalate Saakashvili deescalate tried to President the situation through continued inclusion of inclusion continued through the situation and “talks formally and Russia in negotiations explained he occasions, several On informally.” of the UNM political the foundation that anti- was not anti-Russian—it was order an apparent was Nevertheless, there Soviet. because Russia in his discourse contradiction “was Union of the Soviet as a legal successor with failure, past, with the Soviet synonymous behind leave to wanted Georgia with all that […].” of the Occupation Museum in Tbilisi in 2006 on Tbilisi Museum in of the Occupation 20 21 22 between Russia and Georgia. In the 2006, March Georgia. and Russia between Agency a ban imposed Consumer Russian State on an import wines. and Moldovan of Georgian met with criticism and harsh was move This side. the Georgian rhetoric from 2006, the situation further2006, the situation when escalated Russian four authorities arrested the Georgian In 2007, multiple charges. on espionage officers one Russian helicopters, by violations air space anti-aircraft Georgia’s by downed of which was in Tensions reported. were system, partand Abkhazia in these were of daily routine crisis yielded a diplomatic events These regions. In such circumstances, countries. the between Saakashvili changed his politics by President conflictualthe smoothening on solely focusing dialogue with the resumption and situation part of the the exclusive Russia. Although politics dramatically inclusion-exclusion engage to Saakashvili still wanted increased, confrontations despite with the Kremlin. Hence, to in 2007, he continued and an embargo calling by Putin Vladimir his counterpartpraise “good- to have in order “historic figure” him a with neighbourly and principled relations in “improvements maintain as to as well Russia” relations.” Georgian-Russian

19 18 By reaching the By reaching 17 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b63-georgia- the-javakheti-region-s-integration-challenges.pdf. the-javakheti-region-s-integration-challenges.pdf. of Georgia “The of the President address Mikheil Saakashvili, (speech, Academy” Defense the Builder National in the David Presidential of the Saakashvili’s 07, 2012), archives August Library. Mikheil Saakashvili, “President Saakashvili hails” (speech, May (speech, May Saakashvili hails” “President Mikheil Saakashvili, Library. Presidential of the Saakashvili’s 31, 2005), archives Javakheti Region’s The “Georgia: International Crisis Group, July 26, accessed Briefing),” Challenges (Europe Integration 2018, Relations between Georgia and Russia were and Russia were Georgia Relations between In early 2008, Russia reinforced the In early 2008, Russia reinforced never easy, but during the period from 2004 to 2004 to but during the period from easy, never parties2006, the two a maintain managed to certain led to which dialogue with each other, tension, which of first signs The improvements. were relationship, damaged the significantly observed of 2006. In in the beginning January exploded gas pipeline, Tbilisi 2006, Mozdok, a in North crisis an energy Ossetia, which stirred agreement, the exclusion-inclusion tactics the exclusion-inclusion agreement, and inclusion, dialogue Through triumphed. one of address managed to the government two After Georgians. issues for the most crucial Russia finally agreed presence, of years hundred implied This and troops. pull out its bases to the Kremlin which of leverage the elimination the country further. disintegrate use to could Despite these incidents, hopes and expectations these incidents, Despite government the central high that remained the region authority its over reinforce would politics of persuasion and inclusion. through President Saakashvili and his government were were Saakashvili and his government President of the importance and implications aware well the country for and its people. of the agreement of its military withdrawal bases per agreement. achievement. a delusive this was Unfortunately, in connection obvious to became more This of the the resumption goal, another national South Ossetia over control government’s central and Abkhazia. regarded Summer 2004 can be of of the implementation as the beginning and between Georgia when the fight goal, that surrounding and Tskhinvali in Russia erupted and escalated severely situation The areas. skirmishes into both sides, between resulted which left 27 civilians and 17 soldiers dead. 19 17 18 Russia as an antagonist: 2006-2008 Russia as an antagonist: event was much celebrated within the country celebrated much was event as a victory UNM politics. of 8 EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 26 Ibid. 25 24 23 occupation.” that museumisaboutSoviet, notRussian, “Tbilisi DayIndependence ofGeorgia, hehadto clarify efficient nation State.” managedto transformcountry itselfinto “an for Russiaasitwas thefirsttimethat a Caucasian “this was anideologically“this dangerous project” by regional standards. believed Saakashvili that that blossomedinto a “beacon ofdemocracy” incarnated asuccessful ofafailedstate journey According to theofficialnarrative, Georgia about Russia’s motivation to attack Georgia. at community homeandabroad,the expert differentwhich was notvery from opinionsof definedofficiallineofa clearly arguments, and, inparticular, thePresident. There was and3)theGeorgian politicalleadership country building, 2)theEuro-Atlantic integration ofthe athreatcarried to: 1)theprogress instate from Georgian sovereignty, Russiaallegedly wanted to achieve since independence. Apart that Georgiait asanantithesis ofeverything an enemy of Georgia and its people by depicting Russia. neighbourwas declared as The northern “Other”. emerged asadreadful threat for Georgia, asthe image of Russia dramatically changed; it re- of politicaldialogueirreversibly. As aresult, the 2008 damaging the relations and thechannels between the two countries over Ossetia in South eventually conflict culminated into openmilitary the events that unfolded in2006. This standstill for politicaldialogue were closed by 2007 due to key to thesuccess ofdiplomacy. The channels conversationa direct withRussia,whichisthe Kremlin proved unavailing dueto theabsence of The officialpositionmadeaU-turn towards The UNMpoliticsto easethetensions withthe Presidential Library. (speech, September 25, 2013), archives of the Saakashvili’s the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly” Saakashvili, Mikheil “Address by the at Library. August 07,2012),archives oftheSaakashvili’s Presidential in theDavid theBuilderNational Defense Academy” (speech, Saakashvili, Mikheil address ofthePresident“The ofGeorgia 2007), archives oftheSaakashvili’s Presidential Library. news conference at Tbilisi Hall” City (speech,February 23, Saakashvili, Mikheil “Georgian President Saakashvili’s Mikheil 24 23 26 Saakashvili was certain was certain Saakashvili 25

anomaly—the Georgian government.” Space sphere, isone bigspiritual withonlyone who hadallegedlysaidthat Post-Soviet“the used to quote Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov government andthePresident. Saakashvili of the European in Georgia, project the UNM the Kremlinspecificallytargeted thearchitects occupation.” as “an embargo, awar, aninvasion, andan all possiblemeasures againstGeorgia such scenario in the region, Russia allegedly used set suchaprecedent. order In to avoid such a is thereason why Russiacould notletGeorgia before they would bear all their fruits.” convinced that reforms“the hadto becrushed European project.President was Saakashvili Georgia’s progress achieved inpursuingthe President claimedthat Russiaaimedto reverse influence and “move towards Europe.” could result inleaving theRussiansphere of thesamereforms,space to undertake which and mobilize othercountries inthepost-Soviet on othercountries intheregion.could inspire It progress because it could have a spillover effect that President Putin saw thethreat inGeorgia’s 33 32 31 30 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 2012 ofthenarrative:Radicalization 2008- of ourpeople”—were becoming more intense. NATO inourregion—progress basedonthewill “efforts to roll backtheadvances oftheEUand the reason why—in Saakashvili’s view—Russia’s was to stop ourEuro integration” insisted thatSaakashvili Russia’s “objective 2006. A “constructive partner” complete opposite oftheimagecreated 2004- The image of Russia in 2006-2012 is the 2005), archives oftheSaakashvili’s Presidential Library. Assembly oftheCouncil ofEurope”tary 26, (speech,Janyry Saakashvili Mikheil -H.EPresident“Remarks to the Parliamen- Presidential Library. versity” (lecture, May 18,2012),archives oftheSaakashvili’s A Test Case for thePost-Soviet World at the Princeton Uni- Saakashvili, Mikheil “Georgian Democratic Transformation: Library. August 07,2012)archives oftheSaakashvili’s Presidential in the David the Builder National Defense Academy”, (speech, Saakashvili, Mikheil address ofthePresident“The ofGeorgia 28 With the thosehostileactivities, 33 willingto have 31 andthat 32

29 27 This is This That 30

EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 9 - of Georgian territories by adopting by territories of Georgian 37 Russia was proclaimed the number-one- proclaimed Russia was 38 Mikheil Saakashvili, “Georgian Law on ‘Occupied Territo ‘Occupied on Law “Georgian Mikheil Saakashvili, ries,” October 23, 2008, https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/ ries,” files/2015/03/Law-Occupied-Territories--English.pdf. President Saakashvili and his government Saakashvili and his government President politics of the inclusion-exclusion failure The corruption and in fighting success The By 2012, the image of Russia was at an all- at By was image of Russia 2012, the put a lot of trust in the politics of transformation put a lot of trust in the politics of transformation the purpose of for partner” “a into “the enemy” of President the though Even reality. new a building his efforts some successes, achieve to managed Instead failed. problems territorial address to breakaway over territorial control of restoring territories to lost more in 2008, Georgia regimes Russia within these regions. Georgia’s affected Russia strongly towards It project. believe to mistake a was European the include Russia into possible to it was that the same time aiming project while at European For politics. internal Georgia’s it from exclude to project European the government, Georgian the irreconcilable be two to and Russia proved not co-exist. could that alternatives prioritiesmain the of one of legacy, Soviet the affected project, negatively the European with the Kremlin. Such turn of the relations “a strategic of the initial status affected events Russia because the UNM to allocated partner” prioritize the continued decided to government project over of the European implementation with establishing good neighbourly relations a law on “Occupied Territories” on October on 23, Territories” “Occupied on a law 2008. 37 38 Ibid. relations between Georgia and Russia, whereas Russia, whereas and Georgia between relations servednot as a of Europeanization politics tensions. of as an instigator but remedy, had though there Even in Georgia. time low detrimental on the debate been an ongoing since building state of Russia in Georgian role the first it was of the country, the independence officially government Georgian the that time military exercising state “a be Russia to declared occupation” Conclusion enemy of Georgia and the Georgian people at at people and the Georgian of Georgia enemy the political level.

36 with “the imperial fantasies” which which “theimperial fantasies” with 34 35 Mikheil Saakashvili, “The address of the President of Georgia of Georgia “The of the President address Mikheil Saakashvili, (speech, Academy” Defense the Builder National in the David Presidential of the Saakashvili’s 07, 2012), archives August Library. at Georgia of President the by “Address MikheilSaakashvili, Assembly” General Nations United the of session 68th the Saakashvili’s the of archives 2013), 25, September (speech, Library. Presidential The Story,” Hate A Putin: and Georgian “The Levy, J. Clifford. July 26, 2018, http://www.nytimes. accessed Times, York New com/2009/04/19/weekinreview/19levy.html?mcubz=3. After the war in 2008, all channels of directof channels all 2008, in war the After contact between Georgia and Russia were and Russia were contact Georgia between on in zeroed politics Georgian shut down. the for blaming and shaming of the Kremlin the disrespect of and for aggression continued UNM government The order. the international occupation” “creeping the by concerned was vicinity in the territories of Southof Georgian through Ossetia and Abkhazia, which proceeded In other words, “borderization.” of the process without the territories grabbing Russia was and thus fences fixing the by a war staging territories for additional Georgian demarcating the narrative such circumstances, Due to itself. at times. and unfiltered radical became rather mocked Mr Putin “Saakashvili have is said to his height.” to as a reference ‘Lili-Putin’ as This allegation was never confirmed, but its confirmed, never was allegation This no chance was there that indicated existence the between dialogue a of resumption the for and mutual tension Aggravated presidents. two the of feature defining the now was antagonism should be fought against—the “common “common against—the be fought should If 2006, the official in “we.” the for struggle” neither with Russia associated narrative Union, this was nor with the Soviet occupation from repositioned Russia was in 2008. reversed partner who did an antagonist a strategic to Georgia of the statehood but threaten nothing realization the hinder importantly, most and, the project and the plan for of the European Russia became Georgia, For future. European of the the enemy outside,” “constitutive a be included not project, which could European in it because the very of Russia signified essence Kremlin The idea. European the to opposition an almost for culprit a responsible into evolved all misfortunes of the countrybecause of its post-Soviet over influence regain alleged goal to countries. 34 35 36 peace at its borders turned into “the Russian turned into its borders at peace aggressor” 10 EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 political views, preferences and choices. from its “sphere ofinfluence” for itsalternative when itcould threaten and punish acountry shown that theKremlinstilllives inSoviet reality approval from theGeorgian side, hasclearly Chairman’s seat allegedlywithoutaprior of Parliament Gavrilov took theParliamentary unfolding the Russianmember onJune20after The recent of events, string which started pursue itsdeclared pro-European aspiration. independent state or/and Georgia ceases to accepting Georgia asan the Kremlinstarts ofGeorgianalways reality unless beapart and challengesinrelations withRussia will accumulated in Russia. his fortune The problems led by , the billionaire who engagement” government the “cooperative” nomenklatura—nor and “pro- representativeShevardnadze—a ofthe soviet neither the “balanced” and “cautious” Eduard has happenedto be “suitable” for theKremlin, Georgian presidents/leaders andgovernments politics that might appeaseRussia.Noneofthe pro-European Georgia there cannotbeideal with Russiashows that for anindependent and relations oflessthanperfect The longhistory guarantee for theterritorial integrity ofGeorgia. concessions in the European are project not a over thebreakaway regions isessential, but forand respect liberal values. The control institutions, effective democratic governance, state. European Being meansefficient state to grow into afull-fledgedliberal democratic driven European for project Georgia ifitintends to acontinued implementation ofthestate- exclusion politicsfailed, there isnoalternative Territories.”on “Occupied law community, asismoststrongly expressed inthe enemy of European Georgia and of the “we” subsequent institutionalization ofRussiaasan Russia. This and resulted inthe re-emergence aggravated thetensions between Georgia and to thecountry, theUNM’s choice for Europe it. Thus, instead ofbringing peace andstability Georgia’s Europeanization was notathreat to partner.” could notconvince It theKremlin that government failedto transform Russiainto “a oftheEuropeanpriorities project, theGeorgian toRussia. Due thefailure to reconcile the Even thoughSaakashvili’s inclusion- prosperity inGeorgiaprosperity inthelongrun. implementation shouldensure progress and anditscautious current situation inthecountry inclusion-exclusion politics in line with the elaboration ofthe andregular re-adjustment the European standards. Therefore, further towardsthe country the approximation to have proved progress efficient inmaking in effective insolvingtheRussianissue, butthey inclusion-exclusion politicshave notbeen peace and independence ofGeorgia. The occupied territories, butitwillat leastensure concretetaking measures toward thisend. membership inEuropean institutionsthrough and7.Seek andareasector inthecountry; coherent Europeanization ofeachandevery the European through project and principled the Kremlin;6.Ensure continued hegemony of notgive5. Do inontheobstaclescreated by information campaign at theinternational level; the Kremlin’s provocations through arobust to avoid alonewithRussia;4. beingleft Tackle EU andtheUSat thedomesticlevel inorder with Russia; 3. Increase the presence of the up being lured union back in the Soviet-style Avoid romanticizing Russiainorder to notend to claimGeorgia backhasnotceded yet; 2. of Georgia for granted becauseRussia’s ambition governments: nottaketheindependence 1.Do forfrom current history andfuture Georgian Unfortunately, backthe thiswillnotbring Therefore, there are lessonsto belearned EUCACIS Online Paper No. 8 - The Changing Image of Russia in the European Project of Post-Soviet Georgia in 2004-2012 11 https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/ L. A. Mitchell, “Compromising democracy: “Compromising Mitchell, L. A. 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