DOCSLIB.ORG

Syria's Geographical Position, Sandwiched Between Lebanon

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Syria's Geographical Position, Sandwiched Between Lebanon 1996 DirectTalksBetweenSyriaandIsrael–Infitah:SyrianPolicyofOpeningupthe Economy–External:aCloudontheHorizon–AgriculturePerformsWell Syria’s geographical position, sandwiched between Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, continued to shape political developments in 1994 and 1995. The main issue re- mained the prospects of a bilateral peace agreement between Syria and Israel hanging on an Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory on the Golan Heights, occupiedsince1967. President Hafez al-Assad is one of the Arab world’s longest serving leaders, and he has repeatedly shown his ability patiently to maintain pressure over a long time. Assad criticised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Jor- dan for making agreements with Israel in 1994, but he repeatedly emphasised thatSyriawillnotactivelyopposethem. US BrokeredTalks In a series of direct talks between Syria and Israel, brokered by the US, both sides failed to even approach a compromise on the peace issue, and instead de- cided to discuss possible security arrangements in the Golan Heights area if Is- rael withdrew. Damascus continued to insist that a demilitarised zone (DMZ) be the same size on both sides of any new frontier, while the Israelis insisted that the DMZ be nine times larger on the Syrian side due to its far greater terri- tory than Israel’s. The Israeli government also expressed fears over the future controlofthewatertableundertheHeights. In December 1994 General Ehud Barak of Israel and General Hikmat Shihabi of Syria held an unprecedented meeting to discuss mutual security concerns on the Golan Heights. This broke up without success as the Syrians reiterated their insistence that Israel adhere to UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425 demanding Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and from south Leb- anon. In January 1995 Israel and Syria resumed direct talks in Washington, though once again there was no progress. In April 1995 the US administration’s negotiator Dennis Ross held yet another round of talks with Syrian officials, and once again they were without progress. In June Damascus denied rumours that a deal on the Golan was imminent, underlining their view that while Syria wanted peace, and wanted the Israelis off the Golan, they were not under pres- sureoftimeandcouldaffordtowait. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_0�� 1996 223 However, there was more progress in relations with other countries. In No- vember 1994 the Russian Foreign Minister visited Damascus, signalling a new phase in Syrian-Russian relations. Moscow hoped that it could regain some of its former influence in the Middle East by exerting its influence over Damascus in the sphere of the Middle East peace process. This was in part dictated by Syria’s US$2 billion debt to Russia, which will grow to US$10 billion by 2015. Meanwhile, relations with Europe improved when the European Union (EU) lifted its eight-year arms embargo on Syria in November 1994. However, short- ageoffinancepreventedanynewcontractsfrombeingsigned. DomesticScene President Assad showed no sign of loosening his tight grip on political life. In August 1994 Assad’s Ba’ath Party candidates won 167 of the 250 seats of the Peo- ple’s Assembly (parliament) up for election. Although the results were no sur- prise, the fact that 10 of the 13 independent candidates returned from Damas- cus were successful businessmen underlined the growing desire of Syria’s business community to adopt a more direct role in politics. This was principally to ensure that the government continues on its policy of infitah – opening up of theeconomy. SlowEconomicGains The economy performed relatively well in 1994 and early 1995 and there were no signs that Syria would be forced to apply International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescribed measures. Annual GDP growth recorded a very respectable 8 per cent in 1994, though this was down from 10 per cent the previous year. The gov- ernment managed to rein in inflation to 18 per cent, down from 25 per cent in 1993.Afurtherfallto12percentwasforecastfor1995. The private sector built on the successes of 1992 and 1993, but called for more liberalisation measures to allow further progress. The government managed to address problems in power generation, and investments over previous years in the telecommunications system showed fruit. Inward investment into the country had been impressive since the government passed the ground-break- ing Investment Law 10 in 1991. Most of the more than US$3 billion invested in power stations, a new telephone network and new sewage system originated amongSyrianemigrésbasedintheGulfandtheWest. However, Syria’s external debt remained a major cloud on the horizon. The country owed US$16.513 billion, a sum roughly equivalent to it’s GDP. Most of the debt – some US$12.456 billion – was owed to the former Soviet Union (FSU) coun- tries (mainly Russia), while around US$430 million was owed to the World Bank. Although Damascus didnot make any moves towards repayment to the Soviet.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks Openings and Obstacles
    The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks Openings and Obstacles DENNIS ROSS January 2021 he Middle East will not be a priority in the Biden administration’s approach to foreign policy. But the T Iranian nuclear program will require a response.* With the Iranian parliament having adopted legislation mandating uranium enrichment to 20 percent and suspension of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections if sanctions are not lifted by February 2020 in response to the targeted killing of Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh— and with Iran now having accumulated twelve times the low-enriched uranium permitted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the administration will have to deal with the Iranian challenge.1 To be sure, the nuclear program and its potential to make Iran a nuclear weapons state are not the only challenges the Islamic Republic poses: the regime’s ballistic missile program and destabilizing and aggressive behavior in the region threaten conflicts that can escalate both vertically and horizontally. But it is the nuclear program that is most pressing. *The author would like to thank a number of his Washington Institute colleagues—Katherine Bauer, Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, Barbara Leaf, Matthew Levitt, David Makovsky, David Pollock, Robert Satloff, and Michael Singh—for the helpful comments they provided as he prepared this paper. He also wants to give special thanks to several people outside the Institute—Robert Einhorn, Richard Nephew, David Petraeus, Norman Roule, and Karim Sadjadpour—for the thoughtful comments
    [Show full text]
  • Peace Between Israel and the Palestinians Appears to Be As Elusive As Ever. Following the Most Recent Collapse of American-Broke
    38 REVIVING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: HISTORICAL LES- SONS FOR THE MARCH 2015 ISRAELI ELECTIONS Elijah Jatovsky Lessons derived from the successes that led to the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization highlight modern criteria by which a debilitated Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be revitalized. Writ- ten in the run-up to the March 2015 Israeli elections, this article examines a scenario for the emergence of a security-credentialed leadership of the Israeli Center-Left. Such leadership did not in fact emerge in this election cycle. However, should this occur in the future, this paper proposes a Plan A, whereby Israel submits a generous two-state deal to the Palestinians based roughly on that of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s offer in 2008. Should Palestinians find this offer unacceptable whether due to reservations on borders, Jerusalem or refugees, this paper proposes a Plan B by which Israel would conduct a staged, unilateral withdrawal from large areas of the West Bank to preserve the viability of a two-state solution. INTRODUCTION Peace between Israel and the Palestinians appears to be as elusive as ever. Following the most recent collapse of American-brokered negotiations in April 2014, Palestinians announced they would revert to pursuing statehood through the United Nations (UN), a move Israel vehemently opposes. A UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on some form of a proposal calling for an end to “Israeli occupation in the West Bank” by 2016 is expected later this month.1 In July 2014, a two-month war between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Israel broke out, claiming the lives of over 2,100 Gazans (this number encompassing both combatants and civilians), 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians—the low number of Israeli civilians credited to Israel’s sophisti- cated anti-missile Iron Dome system.
    [Show full text]
  • The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Past, Present, and Future by Dennis Ross
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 312 The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Past, Present, and Future by Dennis Ross Mar 20, 2001 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dennis Ross Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama, is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis ver the past twelve years a revolution has taken place in the landscape of peacemaking in the Middle East. O Twelve years ago, direct negotiations were non-existent and there was no peace process. While negotiations themselves do not ensure an agreement, their total absence ensures that there can be no resolution. The United States has borne the burden of trying to create dialogue. Before the 1990s, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected and denied one another. Although it conducted covert conversations with Jordan, Israel could only communicate in the open with one Arab country Egypt. Israel also lacked diplomatic relations with a large part of the world, including the Soviet Union, China, and India. The Madrid peace conference in 1991 broke the taboos of holding any meeting at all, and enabled discussion to occur. While there has been a change in the landscape of peacemaking, there has not been a comparable revolution in attitudes. A First Lesson: No Alternative But PeaceAmong the series of lessons to be learned from the past twelve years, the first lesson is that, notwithstanding today's dilemmas, for the Israelis and the Palestinians there is no alternative to the pursuit of peace. This is not only because the two sides crossed the threshold of mutual recognition in 1993, making it very unlikely they could revert to mutual rejection and denial.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel
    UNiteD StateS iNStitUte of peaCe www.usip.org SpeCial REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Frederic C. Hof Commissioned in mid-2008 by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, this report builds upon two previous groundbreaking works by the author that deal with the obstacles to Syrian- Israeli peace and propose potential ways around them: a 1999 Middle East Insight monograph that defined the Mapping peace between phrase “line of June 4, 1967” in its Israeli-Syrian context, and a 2002 Israel-Syria “Treaty of Peace” drafted for the International Crisis Group. Both works are published Syria and israel online at www.usip.org as companion pieces to this report and expand upon a concept first broached by the author in his 1999 monograph: a Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve under Syrian sovereignty that Summary would protect key water resources and facilitate Syrian- • Syrian-Israeli “proximity” peace talks orchestrated by Turkey in 2008 revived a Israeli people-to-people contacts. long-dormant track of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the talks were sus- Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, Ltd., an Arlington, pended because of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, Israeli-Syrian peace Virginia, international business consulting firm. He directed might well facilitate a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact- Finding Committee in 2001. • Syria’s “bottom line” for peace with Israel is the return of all the land seized from it by Israel in June 1967.
    [Show full text]
  • H 980 Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Palestine
    Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, H 980 West Bank, and Palestine BACKGROUND: The headings Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank are established without a geographic qualifier. This instruction sheet describes subject heading practice for these places and for entities located within them, as well as usage of the headings Palestine and Palestinian National Authority. 1. Geographic subdivision. Assign Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and West Bank directly after topics without interposing the name of any larger geographic entity. Examples: 650 #0 $a Law $z Gaza Strip. 650 #0 $a Land settlement $z Golan Heights. 650 #0 $a City planning $z Jerusalem. 650 #0 $a Public health $z West Bank. Divide localities that are entirely within the boundaries of the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, or West Bank through those headings. Examples: 650 #0 $a Jews $z Gaza Strip $z Gaza. 650 #0 $a Pottery $z West Bank $z Jericho. 2. Subject headings for entities within Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank. Qualify subject headings for geographic features or other entities that are located entirely within one of these places by the appropriate territory or city. Examples: 151 ## $a Via Dolorosa (Jerusalem) 151 ## $a Shatti (Gaza Strip : Refugee camp) 151 ## $a Qanah River Cave (West Bank) Note: The practice for qualifying subject headings for entities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip differs from the practice for name headings. Name headings for jurisdictions in those locations are not qualified. Subject Headings Manual H 980 Page 1 June 2013 H 980 Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Palestine 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel's Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked
    Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions Updated July 14, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46433 SUMMARY R46433 Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank July 14, 2020 Areas: Frequently Asked Questions Jim Zanotti Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has stated his intent for Israel to annex parts Specialist in Middle of the West Bank in 2020. Annexation could raise issues for Congress, and varying Eastern Affairs congressional views on the subject have contributed to debate about implications for U.S.-Israel relations. Congress may conduct additional oversight of Trump Administration actions and could modify or place conditions on U.S. funding for Israel, the Palestinians, and various international organizations. While the West Bank has been under Israeli military administration since its capture from Jordan in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, its status has been different from Israel proper (the territory Israel controlled before the war). Israel’s government has a mandate—based on the May 2020 power-sharing agreement between Netanyahu and Defense Minister Benny Gantz—to bring the matter of annexation to a cabinet and/or Knesset vote as early as July 1, 2020, provided that it is done in coordination with the United States. Palestinian leaders strongly oppose annexation, partly because it could undermine their hopes for a viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity. Israeli annexation could thus have significant consequences for future U.S. efforts to secure a negotiated Israeli- Palestinian peace. In addition to the specific territorial and administrative impact of annexation, it could more broadly affect Palestinian national aspirations and the future of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel’s efforts to reconcile its actions with its self-proclaimed identity as both a Jewish and a democratic state, and Israeli and Palestinian security concerns.
    [Show full text]
  • The Flaw in Trump's Maximum Pressure Campaign Toward Iran
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds The Flaw in Trump’s Maximum Pressure Campaign Toward Iran by Dennis Ross, Dana Stroul Aug 29, 2019 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dennis Ross Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama, is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute. Dana Stroul Dana Stroul was the Shelly and Michael Kassen Fellow in The Washington Institute's Beth and David Geduld Program on Arab Politics. Articles & Testimony Tehran won’t change its behavior without the prospect of real economic relief, coupled with the threat of meaningful consequences for bringing the region to the brink of war. he Trump administration says its maximum-pressure campaign on Iran is working. If only that were true. The T administration has consistently made the argument that economic sanctions would deprive the Iranian regime of money and that less money would mean less bad behavior and more concessions at the negotiating table. Bargaining with Iran is not the same as a closing a real estate deal, however. The inescapable conclusion, after surveying the region’s conflicts, is that a U.S. strategy based exclusively on starving Tehran of money cannot by itself compel changes in Iran’s regional behavior... Read the full article on the Washington Post website. Washington Post View/Print Page as PDF SHARE EMAIL ALERTS Sign Up TO TOP RECOMMENDED BRIEF ANALYSIS Cairo Acts on its Fears of Radicalization after Afghanistan Sep 24, 2021 ◆ Haisam Hassanein ARTICLES & TESTIMONY Transatlantic Cooperation on Countering Global Violent Extremism Sep 22, 2021 ◆ Matthew Levitt BRIEF ANALYSIS Fearing the Aftermath of the Elections: Will the Power Keg in Iraq Ignite? Sep 22, 2021 ◆ Munqith Dagher TOPICS Energy and Economics Terrorism U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict
    Lost Opportunities for Jerome Slater Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict Israel and Syria, 1948–2001 Until the year 2000, during which both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian negotiating pro- cesses collapsed, it appeared that the overall Arab-Israeli conºict was ªnally going to be settled, thus bringing to a peaceful resolution one of the most en- during and dangerous regional conºicts in recent history.The Israeli-Egyptian conºict had concluded with the signing of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, the Israeli-Jordanian conºict had formally ended in 1994 (though there had been a de facto peace between those two countries since the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), and both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conºicts seemedLost Opportunities for Peace on the verge of settlement. Yet by the end of 2000, both sets of negotiations had collapsed, leading to the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s prime minister in February 2001, and mounting Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2001 and 2002.What went wrong? Much attention has been focused on the lost 1 opportunity for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but surprisingly little atten- tion has been paid to the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace process.In fact, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations came much closer to producing a comprehen- Jerome Slater is University Research Scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo.Since serving as a Fulbright scholar in Israel in 1989, he has written widely on the Arab-Israeli conºict for professional journals such as the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations and Political Science Quarterly.
    [Show full text]
  • The President's Syria Conundrum | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds The President's Syria Conundrum by Dennis Ross Mar 15, 2017 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dennis Ross Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama, is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony In deciding whether to cooperate with Russia militarily, the U.S. administration must consider the Kremlin's ties to Iran and its Shiite proxies, and the associated risks of fueling future Sunni jihadist movements. orging a coherent policy on Syria would tax any administration. One critical priority is defeating ISIS in a way F that neither leaves a vacuum nor fosters deeper sectarian differences after liberating Raqqa. Another is managing Turkey's opposition to our arming and use of the Kurdish People's Protection Forces in fighting ISIS -- and making sure that Turkey does not confront the Kurds instead of the so-called Islamic State. And, of course, this says nothing about the efforts to bring to an end the war that the Assad regime has largely inflicted on the Syrian people. In this connection, Russia with the help of Turkey has worked out a tenuous ceasefire in Syria; the odds of its holding and turning into a real political process are poor. Assad has killed too many Syrians for any significant part of the opposition to accept his long-term presence. And yet the Russians remain wedded to the Assad regime and inclined to believe they can bludgeon Syrian rebel forces into submission. Perhaps that will change. It should.
    [Show full text]
  • Creating a Peaceful Place of War: Revisiting the Golan Heights Border Region
    Creating a Peaceful Place of War: Revisiting the Golan Heights Border Region Mori Ram Abstract Ever since its conquest from Syria in the 1967 War, the Golan Heights has held great importance within the Israeli national landscape. With its towering altitude and attractive scenery, this border region holds special significance that relates to its various exploitative potential on the one hand, and a meta-historical claim as the boundary of a Jewish homeland on the other. My paper will discuss the Zionist territorial discourse surrounding the assimilation process of the Golan Heights. By studying the merits of its inclusion into the Israeli territorial narrative one can locate an interesting dialectic: The Golan Heights plays a quintessential role in the Zionist aspiration to become a part of a “normal” Europe, but it is also a major iconic landmark in the regional conflict between Israel and Syria. Thus, it juxtaposes two geopolitical imaginations that epitomize Israel’s inherent paradox – a desire to be included in Europe and the engagement in a Middle Eastern conflict. Introduction The Golan Heights is an elevated plateau located on Israel’s northeastern borders with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Occupied by Israel from Syria during the final stages of the 1967 War, the Heights have held great importance within the Israeli national landscape. After the Israeli occupation, the Golan Heights were transformed into an internationally illegal borderland region. Yet despite being a contested area, it has acquired a unique status in the eyes of many Israelis. Especially known for its cool climate, open spaces and natural tourist attractions such as Mount Hermon, Israel’s only ski resort, the Heights offer wide varieties of leisure activities, such as the “Golan trail” inaugurated in 2007 after it became clear that the state sponsored “Israel’s National Trail” would not include the Golan Heights.
    [Show full text]
  • Dennis Ross 5-12-04.Pdf
    The Mershon Center: Ambassador Dennis Ross Page 1 of 2 Ambassador Dennis Ross National Security Speaker Series Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:30 p.m. * Mershon Center Invitation Only 7:30 p.m. * OSU-Hillel Tickets Required Ambassador Dennis Ross is director and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For more than twelve years, Ambassador Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process and in dealing directly with the parties in negotiations. A highly skilled diplomat, Ambassador Ross was this country's point man on the peace process in both the Bush and Clinton administrations. He was instrumental in assisting Israelis and Palestinians in reaching the 1995 Interim Agreement; he also successfully brokered the Hebron Accord in 1997, facilitated the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, and intensively worked to bring Israel and Syria together. A scholar and diplomat with more than two decades of experience in Soviet and Middle East policy, Ambassador Ross worked closely with Secretaries of State James Baker, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright. Prior to his service as special Middle East coordinator under President Clinton, Ross served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning office in the first Bush administration. In that position, he played a prominent role in developing U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and its integration into NATO, arms control negotiations, and the development of the Gulf War coalition. He served as director of Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council staff during the Reagan administration, and as deputy director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment.
    [Show full text]
  • Shulem Deen Roberta Kaplan Prof. Steven Gimbel Ambassador Dennis Ross Dan Ephron
    CENTRAL QUEENS YM & YWHA LIBRARY EVENTS: AUTHORS & FILMS! 67-09 108 Street, Forest Hills NY 11375 Sunday & Mondays afternoons (718) 268-5011 x151 or [email protected] Suggested donation: $5 m/$8nm (except where noted) www.cqy.org 19th Annual Author’s Cafe SHULEM DEEN A Benefit for the Hevesi Jewish Heritage Library AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS ALL WHO GO DO NOT RETURN: A Memoir Monday, October 26, 1:30 p.m. DOOMED TO SUCCEED: The U.S./Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama Shulem Deen was raised to believe that questions are dangerous. As a member of one of the most Sunday, October 25 at 3 p.m. insular Hasidic sects, Shulem Deen knew little about the At the Forest Hills Jewish Center outside world. By 18 he was in an arranged marriage and by age 30, he had five children. Deen’s first transgression— For almost three decades, Ambassador Dennis Ross has turning on the radio—was small, but his curiosity led him to been one of the leading figures in Middle East peace the library and then, the internet. Soon he began a feverish negotiations. In his new book, Ambassador Ross tells the inquiry into his religious beliefs, until his faith unraveled inside story of the close but troubled relationship between the entirely. Now a heretic, he feared being discovered, and U.S. and Israel. He was lead U.S. negotiator at Camp David ostracized from the only world he knew, as well as losing and at Oslo, as well as Special Assistant to President Barack those he loves most: his five children.
    [Show full text]