Maoliang Ye (Updated in November 2014)

Rm. 512a, Mingde Main Building Office: 86-10-62519408 59 Zhongguancun Street Fax: 86-10-62511343 Renmin University of China Email: maoliang.ye at gmail.com Beijing, 100872, China http://hanqing.ruc.edu.cn/faculty/maoliangye.htm

Education Ph.D., Public Policy, Harvard University, 2007-2012

Thesis title: “Gradualism in Coordination and Trust Building”

Advisors and References: Raj Chetty (main advisor) Brigitte Madrian (main advisor) Bloomberg Professor of Economics Aetna Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management Department of Economics J. F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Erzo F.P. Luttmer Alberto Alesina Professor of Economics Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy Department of Economics Department of Economics Dartmouth College Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Iris Bohnet Professor of Public Policy J. F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [email protected]

M.Phil., Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005-2007 M.E., Information and Communication Engineering, Tsinghua University, 2002-2005 B.E., Communication Engineering, Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) University, 1998-2002

Employment 2012- Assistant Professor, Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China 2008-2009 Research Assistant (part-time), for Prof Lily L. Tsai, MIT Political Science 2008 Summer Short Term Consultant, World Bank Group 2006 Summer Research Assistant, for Prof Hongbin Li, CUHK

Research Fields Public Economics, Experimental & Behavioral Economics, Labor Economics Development Economics, Political Economy

Teaching Labor Economics (graduate level; evaluation 2012 Fall: 91/100, 16 students); Advanced Microeconometrics (graduate level; evaluation 2014 Spring: 94/100, 5 students) Experimental & Behavioral Economics (graduate level; evaluation 2014 Spring: 93/100, 6 students)

Current Research Interests Pro-social behavior (public goods, cooperation, coordination, trust), team incentives Subjective well-being (e.g., happiness, life satisfaction, mental well-being) Social preferences (e.g., altruism, reciprocity, inequity/equity aversion, social status) Economic and political psychology/attitudes (e.g., inequality, fairness, redistribution) Income distribution and inequality, charity and redistribution Political economy of media

Working Papers 1. “Does Money Buy Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China” (with Hongbin Li, Pak-wai Liu and Junsen Zhang)  Cited by: De Neve, J. E., & Oswald, A. J. (2012). Estimating the influence of life satisfaction and positive affect on later income using sibling fixed effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(49), 19953-19958.  Other citations on Scholar Google  Abstract: Whether money makes people happy is a fundamental question in economics. This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of income on happiness, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of this kind that draws on twins data. We control for the crucial genetic factors and family background by using unique Chinese twins data in a within-twin-pair fixed-effects model. We likewise use the instrumental variable fixed-effects method to correct the measurement error bias. The results are robust after we consider the potential biases of within-twin-pair estimates, the various measures of income and wealth, and the possibility of reverse causality. We find that income has a large positive effect on happiness: Beyond the effect of genes and family background, the pattern that the rich are happier than the poor is partly driven by the higher income of the former per se. We further examine the cross effect of the income of twin siblings and find evidence that twins have a preference of inequality aversion towards their siblings. Our findings help us understand the inequality of subjective well-being in the context of economic development and transition, and present important implications for China and for other fast-growing and highly unequal countries.  Presentations: Harvard, Peking University, CUFE, Renmin University (2x: School of Labor, School of Economics), SHUFE, IEA 2011, APPAM 2011, Zhejiang University Labor Conference 2013, Shanghai Jiaotong University Development Conference 2013, China Meeting of Econometric Society 2013, Xiamen University Labor Conference 2013

2. “One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?” (with Sam Asher and Plamen Nikolov; first author)  Abstract: This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model with level-k thinking, we conduct a multiple-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link coordination experiment in the laboratory to study the effect of gradualism – increasing the required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – on group coordination performances in high-stake projects. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, as well as starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stakes over time (the Gradualism treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully with high stakes in the Gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. We also find evidence that supports the belief-based learning model. These findings point to a simple mechanism for promoting successful voluntary coordination when other mechanisms, such as communication and information feedback, are absent or limited.  Presentations: Harvard, HBS, Perking University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, SHUFE, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Zhejiang University, SWUFE, UIBE, Southeast University, Sun Yat-sen Univesrity, UNNC, Renmin University, ESA (Zurich and Prague), Chinese Meeting of the Econometric Society 2013, Xiamen University Experimental Economics Workshop (2012, 2013), Princeton Graduate Conference on Psychology and Policy Making 2012, APSA 2011, IEA 2011, CES 2011, PCS 2011

3. “Does Gradualism Build Cooperation? Theory and A Finitely Repeated Investment Experiment”  Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gradualism -- increasing the stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake of investment immediately – in cooperation building using a finitely repeated binary trust (investment) experiment. The theoretical predictions build on a behavioral repeated-game model with incomplete information about the type (either rational or reciprocal) of trustees. The experimental results find that gradualism helps build high-stake cooperation in the investment relationship: The initial investment rate of trustors is the same in the big bang and gradualism treatments, whereas the higher initial reciprocation rate of the trustees in the gradualism treatment leads to higher rates of subsequent investment and successful mutual cooperation. However, the rates of investment, reciprocation and mutual cooperation for all treatments sharply decrease in the end (“end-of-game” effect).  Presentations: Peking University, Xiamen University, Zhejiang University, ESA (New York, Hawaii), CES 2012, EPCS 2013, Xiamen University Experimental Economics Workshop 2012, CUFE-Birmingham Workshop on Experimental and Behavioural Economics and Finance 2013

4. “Gradualism, Weakest Link and Information: Evidence from Coordination Experiments”  Presentations: ESA (Tuscon), Harvard, MIT, SEA 2011, RES 2012  Originally Essay #2 in Ph.D. dissertation. Updated version coming soon with new experiments.

5. “Disparity in Preference for Redistribution between Political Elites and the Public in China” (with Weihua An)  Abstract: Whether China can successfully reduce the soaring income inequality largely depends on whether political elites (Chinese Communist Party members and officials) are willing to pushing forward redistributive policies. On the one hand, we expect that lack of credible pressure from the public and the highly selective process of being a political elite both demotivate political elites to prioritize redistribution. On the other hand, the indoctrination of communist ideology, nominally democratic elements such as parties and legislatures, and the prosperity of Internet and social media may press the political elites to represent the public and endorse redistribution. Hence, it is not clear to what extent the political elites will support redistribution as compared to the public. In this paper we analyze data from the Chinese General Social Survey to answer this question empirically. We find that political elites prefer both less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditures than the public, and such a lower preference for redistribution is pervasive for both older and younger Political elites. We also find that the disparity in preference for progressive taxation disappears once perceptions of fairness are controlled for while the disparity in preference for redistributive expenditures persists even when all covariates are controlled for. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analysis. Our study offers new perspectives to understand inequality, redistribution and policy making in the context of developing and authoritarian countries.  Presentations: Harvard, Yonsei University, Harvard IQSS Conference on Data and Social Policy 2010, Tsinghua Conference on Public Finance Issues in China 2011, APPAM 2011, ACES 2013, Xiamen University Institution Conference 2013, MPSA 2013

6. “Parental Preferences, Production Technologies, and Provision for Progeny” (with Junjian Yi)  Abstract: This paper theoretically explores the implications of the recent development of human capital production technologies (Cunha and Heckman, 2007, AER) in the intrahousehold human capital investment in children (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1982, JPE). When credit constraint is not binding, parents adopt a reinforcing intrahousehold investment strategy. When credit constraint is binding, the parental strategy is determined by the trade-off between the degree of parental aversion to inequality and the degree of complementarity between prenatal endowments and family investments. The observed investment pattern of reinforcement or compensation does not necessarily reveal the underlying preference or technological parameters. Our theoretical results call for new empirical methods to separately identify the preference and technological parameters.

7. “The Long-term Effect of Early Adversity on Mental Well-being: Evidence from the 1959-1961 Great Famine in China” (with Qianping Ren)  Abstract: This paper, using a difference-in-difference method with the variation of birth cohorts and regional excess death rates, tries to quantify the effects of the 1959-1961 Great Famine in China on physical health and mental well-being of the survivors, which we use height, BMI, depression, stress, restlessness, feeling of difficulty, perception of the meaning of life, happiness, and life satisfaction as the proxies. We find that, exposure to the Great Famine in childhood caused significantly negative effects on both the physical and mental health. An increase in BMI in women with prenatal famine exposure is found as well. Our falsification test shows there is no difference in the above outcomes between the two cohorts born in 1963-1964 and 1965, which validates our difference-in-difference method. Our findings clearly show the long-term impact of adverse events such as famine in childhood on not only physical health but also mental well-being. Moreover, the negative effects on mental well-being hold even after we control for physical health and labor market outcomes, which indicates the mental damage caused to those experiencing adverse events in childhood, as suggested by the psychological trauma theory from psychology.

8. “Does Donation Make People Happy? Evidence from the Wenchuan Earthquake in China” (with Qianping Ren)  Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of donation on happiness using the 2010 wave of the China Family Panel Study (CFPS). We take advantage of a particular event, the Wenchuan Earthquake, which induced a large number of donations among all Chinese and allows our study. We use two measures of donation behavior: donation for victims of the Wenchuan Earthquake, and donation for general purposes. To solve the endogeneity problem, we use the ratio of donation in the community the respondent lives in as the instrumental variable. We also employ the propensity score matching method for robustness checks. All results show that donation has a significant positive effect on happiness.

Works in Progress (research design or preliminary results available upon request) 1. “Effort Provision and Team Incentives: An Experimental Approach” (with Richard Freeman and Xiaofei Pan) 2. “Intra-team Incentives and Inter-team Competitions: An Experimental Study” (with Richard Freeman and Xiaofei Pan) 3. “More Education, More Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China” (with Junjian Yi and Junsen Zhang) 4. “Democracy and Happiness: Evidence from Rural Elections in China” (with Yongzheng Liu)  Abstract: It has long been believed by politicians and political scientists that better governance, particularly democracy, breeds happy people. By using individual survey data from the Chinese Household Income Project, this paper examines how an important reform of local governance—village election—in the world’s most populous areas has affected the happiness of the residents in rural China. We find that while whether or not the villages have implemented election has no significant impacts on the happiness of the residents, peoples in the villages where the cadres of the villages were nominated and elected directly by villagers’ representatives tend to exhibit higher level of happiness. This implies that introducing democratization itself does not necessarily bring up an improvement of the happiness of the residents, instead, it appears to be more relevant on how exactly the democratization mechanism is structured. Furthermore, we investigate the channels through which the village election has exerted its impacts on the happiness of the residents at both individual and village level. In particular, we find evidence that direct nomination of cadres (i) improves individuals’ trust on the “benevolent” behaviors of the elected cadres; (ii) improves the accountability of the elected cadres in the sense that they tend to pay more attention on balancing the different interests of the villagers and tend to spend more on welfare expenditure. It is all these channels that contribute to the happiness-improving effect of the direct nomination in the election.

5. “One Tiger In the Cage, More Flies in the Sky: An Experiment on Hierarchy and Conditional Corruption in China” (with Zheng Lei) 6. “Information, Perception of Policy Justice, and Preference for Redistribution: An Experiment in China under Authoritarian Context”

Honors and Awards 1．Youth Grant for Humanities and Social Sciences Research, Ministry of Education (教育部人文社 会科学研究一般项目青年基金）, 2014 2．Research Support for International Social Science Journal Publication (人文社会科学国际期刊论 文发表培育项目), Renmin University of China, 2013 3．Research Foundation for New Faculty (新教师启动金项目), Renmin University of China, 2013 4．Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University, 2011-2012 5．Graduate Conference Grant, Royal Economic Society, 2012 6．Research Grant, IQSS, Harvard University, 2010-2011, 2011-2012 7．Graduate Travel Grant, IQSS, Harvard University, 2011 8．Graduate Conference Grant, American Political Science Association, 2011 9．Ezra F. Vogel and Fairbank Center Graduate Research Fund, Harvard University, 2009 10. Pre-doctoral Fellowship, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2007-2009

Professional Activities Membership: American Economic Association, Royal Economic Society, Western Economic Association International, Economic Science Association, Southern Economic Association, Association of Comparative Economic Studies, Chinese Economist Society, American Political Science Association, Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management, Public Choice Society, Society for Judgment and Decision Making

Referee: Journal of Public Economics (2x), Social Choice and Welfare, China Economic Review, etc.

Invited Talks 2015: School of Economics, SHUFE, Shanghai (scheduled) School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University (scheduled)

2014: School of Economics, Renmin University of China Guanghua School of Management, Peking University National School of Development, Peking University University of Nottingham at Ningbo China, Ningbo School of Economics, Zhejiang University Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar, SHUFE, Shanghai

2013: School of Public Affairs, Xiamen University Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, China School of International Trade and Economics, UIBE, Beijing Experimental Econ and Behavioral Finance Workshop, CUFE-Birmingham International Workshop on Experimental Economics, SWUFE (Chengdu) School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China Department of Public Administration, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea Zhejiang University Experimental Economics Lab Zhejiang Gongshan University Antai School of Economics, Shanghai Jiaotong University School of Economics, Shanghai University of Economics and Finance School of Economics, Fudan University School of Public Economics and Public Administration, SHUFE School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China Guanghua School of Management, Peking University School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University Experimental Economics Workshop, Xiamen University China Center for Human Capital and Labor Market Research, CUFE (Beijing)

2011: Workshop on Social Networks and Social Capital, Harvard University MIT Political Economy Breakfast Public Finance Seminar, School of Finance, Renmin University of China Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy Harvard Public Finance/Labor Lunch Seminar Behavioral Ethics Camp in Negotiation and Decision Making, HBS

2010: Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy Harvard Public Finance/Labor Lunch Seminar

2009: Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy Harvard Development Lunch Seminar

Conference Presentations 2014: Experimental Economics International Workshop, Xiamen Univ. (scheduled) Economic Science Association European Meeting, Prague, Czech Republic Economic Science Association World Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA

2013: Experimental Economics International Workshop, WISE, Xiamen, China International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics, WISE, Xiamen International Workshop on Experimental Political Science, Guangzhou, China Economic Science Association World Meeting, Zurich 1st Biennial Conference of China Development Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong U. Chinese Meeting of the Econometric Society, Beijing, China Chinese Economist Society Annual Conference, Chengdu, China International Conference on China’s Labor Market in an Era of Economic Transitions & Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou International Workshop on Economic Analysis of Institutions, Xiamen International Conference on The Pacific Rim Economies: Institutions, Transition and Development, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Zurich

2012: Experimental Economics International Workshop, Xiamen University Economic Science Association International Meeting, New York Princeton Graduate Conference on Psychology and Policy Maki​ ng, Princeton Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, UK

2011: Southern Economic Association Annual Conference, Washington D.C. Economic Science Association North-American Conference, Tucson Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Fall Conference,D.C. American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Seattle International Economic Association Congress, Beijing, China Conference on Public Finance Issues in China, Beijing, China Chinese Economists Society Annual Conference, Beijing, China Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, Texas

2010: IQSS Student Conference on Data and Social Policy, Harvard University

Discussant at Conferences

2013: International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics, Xiamen Univ. Chinese Meeting of the Econometric Society, Beijing, China International Conference on China’s Labor Market in an Era of Economic Transitions & Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Zurich The Third Annual Conference on Chinese Economy, CUHK (Hong Kong)

2011: Chinese Economists Society Annual Conference, Beijing, China Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, Texas