Maoliang Ye (Updated in November 2014)

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Maoliang Ye (Updated in November 2014) Maoliang Ye (Updated in November 2014) Rm. 512a, Mingde Main Building Office: 86-10-62519408 59 Zhongguancun Street Fax: 86-10-62511343 Renmin University of China Email: maoliang.ye at gmail.com Beijing, 100872, China http://hanqing.ruc.edu.cn/faculty/maoliangye.htm Education Ph.D., Public Policy, Harvard University, 2007-2012 Thesis title: “Gradualism in Coordination and Trust Building” Advisors and References: Raj Chetty (main advisor) Brigitte Madrian (main advisor) Bloomberg Professor of Economics Aetna Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Management Department of Economics J. F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Erzo F.P. Luttmer Alberto Alesina Professor of Economics Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy Department of Economics Department of Economics Dartmouth College Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Iris Bohnet Professor of Public Policy J. F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [email protected] M.Phil., Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005-2007 M.E., Information and Communication Engineering, Tsinghua University, 2002-2005 B.E., Communication Engineering, Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) University, 1998-2002 Employment 2012- Assistant Professor, Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China 2008-2009 Research Assistant (part-time), for Prof Lily L. Tsai, MIT Political Science 2008 Summer Short Term Consultant, World Bank Group 2006 Summer Research Assistant, for Prof Hongbin Li, CUHK Research Fields Public Economics, Experimental & Behavioral Economics, Labor Economics Development Economics, Political Economy Teaching Labor Economics (graduate level; evaluation 2012 Fall: 91/100, 16 students); Advanced Microeconometrics (graduate level; evaluation 2014 Spring: 94/100, 5 students) Experimental & Behavioral Economics (graduate level; evaluation 2014 Spring: 93/100, 6 students) Current Research Interests Pro-social behavior (public goods, cooperation, coordination, trust), team incentives Subjective well-being (e.g., happiness, life satisfaction, mental well-being) Social preferences (e.g., altruism, reciprocity, inequity/equity aversion, social status) Economic and political psychology/attitudes (e.g., inequality, fairness, redistribution) Income distribution and inequality, charity and redistribution Political economy of media Working Papers 1. “Does Money Buy Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China” (with Hongbin Li, Pak-wai Liu and Junsen Zhang) Cited by: De Neve, J. E., & Oswald, A. J. (2012). Estimating the influence of life satisfaction and positive affect on later income using sibling fixed effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(49), 19953-19958. Other citations on Scholar Google Abstract: Whether money makes people happy is a fundamental question in economics. This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of income on happiness, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of this kind that draws on twins data. We control for the crucial genetic factors and family background by using unique Chinese twins data in a within-twin-pair fixed-effects model. We likewise use the instrumental variable fixed-effects method to correct the measurement error bias. The results are robust after we consider the potential biases of within-twin-pair estimates, the various measures of income and wealth, and the possibility of reverse causality. We find that income has a large positive effect on happiness: Beyond the effect of genes and family background, the pattern that the rich are happier than the poor is partly driven by the higher income of the former per se. We further examine the cross effect of the income of twin siblings and find evidence that twins have a preference of inequality aversion towards their siblings. Our findings help us understand the inequality of subjective well-being in the context of economic development and transition, and present important implications for China and for other fast-growing and highly unequal countries. Presentations: Harvard, Peking University, CUFE, Renmin University (2x: School of Labor, School of Economics), SHUFE, IEA 2011, APPAM 2011, Zhejiang University Labor Conference 2013, Shanghai Jiaotong University Development Conference 2013, China Meeting of Econometric Society 2013, Xiamen University Labor Conference 2013 2. “One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?” (with Sam Asher and Plamen Nikolov; first author) Abstract: This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model with level-k thinking, we conduct a multiple-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link coordination experiment in the laboratory to study the effect of gradualism – increasing the required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – on group coordination performances in high-stake projects. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, as well as starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stakes over time (the Gradualism treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully with high stakes in the Gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. We also find evidence that supports the belief-based learning model. These findings point to a simple mechanism for promoting successful voluntary coordination when other mechanisms, such as communication and information feedback, are absent or limited. Presentations: Harvard, HBS, Perking University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, SHUFE, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Zhejiang University, SWUFE, UIBE, Southeast University, Sun Yat-sen Univesrity, UNNC, Renmin University, ESA (Zurich and Prague), Chinese Meeting of the Econometric Society 2013, Xiamen University Experimental Economics Workshop (2012, 2013), Princeton Graduate Conference on Psychology and Policy Making 2012, APSA 2011, IEA 2011, CES 2011, PCS 2011 3. “Does Gradualism Build Cooperation? Theory and A Finitely Repeated Investment Experiment” Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gradualism -- increasing the stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake of investment immediately – in cooperation building using a finitely repeated binary trust (investment) experiment. The theoretical predictions build on a behavioral repeated-game model with incomplete information about the type (either rational or reciprocal) of trustees. The experimental results find that gradualism helps build high-stake cooperation in the investment relationship: The initial investment rate of trustors is the same in the big bang and gradualism treatments, whereas the higher initial reciprocation rate of the trustees in the gradualism treatment leads to higher rates of subsequent investment and successful mutual cooperation. However, the rates of investment, reciprocation and mutual cooperation for all treatments sharply decrease in the end (“end-of-game” effect). Presentations: Peking University, Xiamen University, Zhejiang University, ESA (New York, Hawaii), CES 2012, EPCS 2013, Xiamen University Experimental Economics Workshop 2012, CUFE-Birmingham Workshop on Experimental and Behavioural Economics and Finance 2013 4. “Gradualism, Weakest Link and Information: Evidence from Coordination Experiments” Presentations: ESA (Tuscon), Harvard, MIT, SEA 2011, RES 2012 Originally Essay #2 in Ph.D. dissertation. Updated version coming soon with new experiments. 5. “Disparity in Preference for Redistribution between Political Elites and the Public in China” (with Weihua An) Abstract: Whether China can successfully reduce the soaring income inequality largely depends on whether political elites (Chinese Communist Party members and officials) are willing to pushing forward redistributive policies. On the one hand, we expect that lack of credible pressure from the public and the highly selective process of being a political elite both demotivate political elites to prioritize redistribution. On the other hand, the indoctrination of communist ideology, nominally democratic elements such as parties and legislatures, and the prosperity of Internet and social media may press the political elites to represent the public and endorse redistribution. Hence, it is not clear to what extent the political elites will support redistribution as compared to the public. In this paper we analyze data from the Chinese General Social Survey to answer this question empirically. We find that political elites prefer both less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditures than the public, and such a lower preference for redistribution is pervasive for both older and younger Political elites. We also find that the disparity in preference for progressive taxation disappears once perceptions of fairness are controlled for while the disparity in preference for redistributive expenditures persists even when all covariates are controlled for. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analysis. Our study offers new perspectives to understand inequality, redistribution and policy making in the context of developing and authoritarian countries. Presentations: Harvard, Yonsei University, Harvard IQSS Conference on Data and Social Policy 2010, Tsinghua Conference
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