State Politics in Jammu & Kashmir: Role of the All

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STATE POLITICS IN JAMMU & KASHMIR: ROLE OF THE ALL PARTIES HURRIYAT CONFERENCE

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science

BY MOHD AMIN MIR

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. IQBALUR REHMAN (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 2012-2013

Department of Political Science TELEPHONES : ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY Chairman : (0571) 2701720 ALIGARH – 202 002 AMU PABX : 700916/700920-21-22 Chairman : 1561 Office : 1560 FAX : 0571-700528

Dated…………………………

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I certify that Mr. Mohd Amin Mir has completed his thesis entitled “State Politics in Jammu & Kashmir: Role of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference” under my supervision and is, in my opinion, suitable for submission for the award of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

(DR. IQBALUR REHMAN) (Supervisor) ABSTRACT

Kashmir conflict has resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan. It has unleashed huge miseries to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It has consumed huge resources (human as well as economic) of both the countries. Much worse is that it still persists as a real threat to the stability and peace in South Asia. Jammu and Kashmir had been constructed as a conflict during the colonial era. The formation of India and Pakistan out of British India had heavy cost for the political future of Jammu and Kashmir. The text of history was manipulated in a way that both India and Pakistan interpreted it in their own themes of national discourse. While India claims that Kashmir is its Atoot Ang (integral part) Pakistan claims it is her Shah Rag (jugular vein). The result was Indian and Pakistan administered Kashmir. The thesis is entitled “State Politics in Jammu & Kashmir: Role of The All Parties Hurriyat Conference”. To know the role of APHC, it is necessary to understand the Kashmir conflict from the historical context. This historical understanding is necessary to understand the subsequent political developments in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir to which this thesis deals. The most momentous incident in Indian part of Kashmir is the eruption of militancy in early 1990s. One of the fallouts of militancy in Kashmir was the emergence of new political actors. The most important among them is the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a separatist organization. Thus, APHC has roots in the history itself. It played not so significant role but of late it has revived itself. Its significance has increased because militancy in Kashmir has diminished to a significant level which in turn has left space for non-violent resistance. This study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, “Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Background” analyses the formation of modern Jammu and Kashmir as a political region through a critical exposition of its history. Jammu and Kashmir has been mostly under foreign domination since ancient times; bet it Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs or finally Dogras. The Treaty of

Amritsar between British India and Dogra ruler, Raja Gulab Singh, led to the formation of present Jammu and Kashmir. This treaty also gave princely status to the state. In this chapter, the focus is on Dogra rule and its nature. Dogra rule essentially was communal in nature apart from being authoritarian. The Muslim majority community was not only denied basic rights but their entire religious and cultural identity was subverted. They were discriminated in social, political, economic and religious spheres. Dogras made Kashmiri Pandit Community in Valley to be on top places of state administration, i.e. from revenue to education and all other important places. Only a few elite Muslims got jobs in the state administration and maximum population worked as peasants and most times they worked not on their own land, but on the land owned by some Kashmiri Hindu or Dogra. The Dogra state also banned certain Muslim religious practices like cow-slaughter, ban on Azan (call for prayer) and converted many mosques, shrines and other sacred places of Muslims into stores for grains and ammunition. This continuous denial of rights and exploitation of Muslims of the state, finally lead to their assertion against the repressive Dogra regime. They launched the freedom struggle initially under the banner of Reading Room Party and later, the National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah became the vanguard against the communal and oppressive Dogra Raj. While challenging the exploitative and communal rule of Dogras, religion became the force of mobilization for the Muslim community, because basically religion was the basis of exploitation. While Muslims of the state were fighting for their rights, certain important political developments occurred with regard to India’s future destiny. One of these developments was the arrival of the Cabinet Mission to India, to discuss with the representatives of the India the question of Indian Independence. However, after the failure of Cabinet Mission to reach at any consensus, the British Government in 1947 declared its plan to partition the India.

The partition was executed on the basis of the two-nation theory. The Muslim provinces were merged to create the dominion of Pakistan and the provinces with majority of Hindu population were joined together to form the dominion of India. But this scheme of partitioning did not apply to the five hundred and sixty five (565) Princely States such as Jammu and Kashmir. The British Government announced their plan that these States were free to decide up on their future. However, the rulers of these Princely States were advised by the Crown to take economic factors, geographical contiguity, the aspirations of their people and similar other factors into consideration while taking the decision vis-à-vis accession. The accession was amicably settled with regard to all the States except the State of Hyderabad, Junagard and Kashmir. Hyderabad and Junagard were non-Muslim majority States with Muslim rulers. Kashmir’s status was converse to both of them-The Kashmir State had a Hindu ruler but an overwhelming majority of the Muslim population- While former two states joined the dominion of India, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir did not accede to either India or Pakistan but showed his interest in independence of the state. However, the tribal invasion led Maharaja to sign the instrument of Accession with the Indian Union on October 26, 1947. The deed of accession, however, became controversial, as on one hand, Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor-General of India, put a question mark on the legitimacy of this relation by communicating to the Maharaja that acceptance remains provisional subject to ratification of people of the state. On the other hand, Both Kashmiris and Pakistanis contest this decision of accession as non-binding and unfair as the populace had already rebelled against the ruler before he could decide the fate of the State. The Kashmir dispute got recognition at an international level when India in 1948 took the matter to the United Nation’s Security Council. The UN Security Council, through its Resolutions no. 47 (1948), 51 (1948), 80 (1950) and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, declared that accession of

Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial Plebiscite. Thus, it is clear that the roots of Kashmir problem lie in the partition of British India, the way religious politics has been used in the partition and the denial of Plebiscite (as guaranteed by UN, demanded by sizeable chunk of Kashmiris and promised by Indian State). This historical understanding is necessary to understand the subsequent political developments in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. The Second chapter, “Growth of Militancy: an Analysis of Historical- Politico Factors” deals with the rise of militancy in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir in early 1990s. The study locates the roots of militancy in the failure of Indian state to respect the original constitutional relationship between Indian Union and State Government. The instrument of accession which formed the basis of relationship between Indian Union and State Government accorded special status to the state as it restricted the jurisdiction of Indian Union over external affairs, defense and communications. This special status was ratified by the Constituent Assembly of India by inclusion of an Article in the Indian Constitution, drafted first as Article 306-A and then finalized as Article 370. Article 370 became the constitutional symbol for Indian Union and Kashmir Government. However, The post Nehru period witnessed major constitutional changes in Centre-State relations which were mainly manifested in the form of extension of Emergency Provisions (Article 356 and 357) to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, change in Nomenclature from Prime Minister to Chief Minister and Sadr-e-Riyat (Head of State) to Governor. Also the right to nominate Governor was entrusted to President instead of State Assembly. This policy of integration naturally had a backlash in the Kashmir and sowed the seeds of alienation. Secondly, the failure of democracy and subversion of democratic institutions… rigging of elections, removal of elected governments and installment of puppet governments, absence of opposition, Grassroot democracy, etc. are responsible for the rise of militancy in Kashmir. Besides these factors, it was found that economic underdevelopment, poor

4 governance, unemployment and support of Pakistan are responsible for the rise of militancy in Kashmir. This chapter documents that the most important factor for the rise of militancy in Kashmir is the presence of separatist tendencies in the State from very beginning. The growth of such tendencies took place during the crucial years of Sheikh Abdullah when he was sacked from power in 1953. Sheikh’s removal was followed by the growth of separatist groups. Plebiscite Front (PF) was the leading which functioned from 1955-1976. It was followed by a large number of small and big separatist groups like People’s League, Al-Fatah, and Jama’at-i-Islami etc. These groups claimed that accession of State to India is a temporary and provisional and demanded resolution of Kashmir Issue according to Plebiscite. These groups organized resistance against Indian State from time to time. However, these separatist groups could not pose any serious challenge during the life time of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah but they kept the sentiment of separatism alive in Kashmir. The most turning-point is the election 1987 which is considered to be watershed in the political history of Kashmir. In this election a new political alliance called Muslim United Front (MUF) participated. It was an alliance of various organizations in which Jama’at-i-Islami enjoyed the dominant position. The main objective of MUF was to fight the NC-Congress alliance in the polls. For both NC and MUF, polls had assumed a sort of a character of a referendum for their respective political positions. However, these elections were massively rigged by the Congress Party at Centre in collusion with the NC in the state, to prevent any victory by the MUF which was considered too dangerous by the Indian State. MUF was not only defeated but its leaders were arrested and tortured. Now, there is a wide consensus in the literature and political commentators that the seeds of militancy were sown in the Srinagar Central Jail, where hundreds of political activists and leaders of the MUF were languishing in the aftermath of the 1987 State Assembly Elections. The rigging of elections led this politically conscious generation of Muslims to take up different path of demanding their rights. This generation

5 was also emboldened by the success of Afgan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union to go for armed rebellion. Thus, there was growth of various militant outfits in the post-election period to fight the illegal government and in a broader sense the very fundamentals of Indian rule. Youth, who earlier contested elections and campaigned for MUF, joined these groups in thousands like Yasin Malik who campaigned for MUF became the Chief of JKLF, Mohammad Yusuf Shah (the defeated MLA from Amira Kadal Constituency, Srinagar) became Syed Salah-u-Din, presently Supreme Commander of United Jihad Council (UJC)-a Muzaffarabad based conglomerate of various militant outfits that are active in Kashmir. Initially, the armed movement was led by JKLF which was advocating an independent, secular and democratic Jammu and Kashmir based on pre- 1947 geography. Later, the movement was hijacked by other militant outfits like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF) and several others which were demanding accession to Pakistan. Thus, armed movement split along two ideological lines: one pressing for independence and the other demanding accession to Pakistan. The third chapter, “Formation of All Parties Hurriyat Conference” deals with the formation, ideology, objectives and organizational structure of APHC, causes of split and efforts of reunification. This chapter is the chief concern of this study which shall be read in the light of the preceding two chapters; especially the second chapter is a precursor to the circumstances which led to the birth of APHC. When militancy erupted in Kashmir, there was a growth of various militant outfits to fight against Indian rule. The situation became in early nineties chaotic and the mayhem of emergent armed movement needed a political platform to negotiate on the gains made on military front. As there was a complete breakdown of political process, both militant outfits and remnant political outfits of erstwhile MUF felt the need to streamline the ‘armed movement’. An important attempt in this direction was made by the formation of ‘Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir’ (THK) by MUF veterans and other separatists like Syed Ali Geelani, Mian Abdul Qayoom,

Qazi Nisar and Molvi Abass Ansari. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir which came into being in 1991 was a union of several Parties which disputed India’s control on the state since 1947 and were the adherents of pro-Pakistan stance. Thus, THK was an amalgam of different people with same feeling to Pakistan. However, THK could not provide a sustainable platform to meet the growing expectations of its founding fathers as some of its leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Obviously, it was liquidated and fresh attempts were made at having a broad based separatist organization and the formation of new party was just the culmination of that urge. On December 27, 1992 Mohammad Umar Farooq, Mirwaiz of Kashmir, called a meeting of various religious, social and political organizations, at Mirwaiz Manzil, Srinagar, to launch a joint political platform. The meeting consented to have a common political platform under the name of ‘All Parties Hurriyat (freedom) Conference’. Hence, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) came into existence in July 1993- the year when constitution of APHC was finally approved and adopted- as a political amalgam to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of MUF and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir (THK). APHC is a conglomerate of almost thirty organizations which resolved to harness armed rebellion and channelize it for a political process. On the one hand, APHC gave a political platform to the militants to settle down their inter-group conflicts, on the other hand, it attempted to internationalize the Kashmir Issue at different international forums. In a very short time, it achieved a fair deal of success to create an international space for itself, owing to its popularity and the active backing it received from the Pakistan. For example, the APHC enjoys an observer’s status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). According to the APHC, Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory and India’s control on it is not justified. It supports the Pakistani claim that Jammu and Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of partition’ and needs to be solved as per the aspirations of the people of the State. The APHC had distanced itself from participating in elections affirming that the elections under the Indian

Constitution would deliver no results. Its slogan is ‘no election, no selection, only solution’. Its Constitution abides them for seeking and demanding the resolution of the dispute either through right to self-determination or a negotiated solution that may be agreed by India, Pakistan and people of Kashmir. Soon after the emergence of APHC, it witnessed clashes within its ranks on many issues. Fielding of proxy candidates in 2002 elections by People’s Conference, Hurriyat’s approach regarding the boycott campaign in the absence of Syed Ali Geelani and dilution of avowed stand that the UN Resolutions form the necessary basis of Kashmir, were some of the issues of contention in various constituents of the APHC. It made cleavage among the APHC and the amalgam got divided into two factions what came to be known as APHC (G) APHC (M). Subsequently one group was labeled as moderate group. This group held negotiations with the Indian Union, supported a bilateral dialogue process between India and Pakistan and also accepted some other resolutions like General Parvaiz Mushrraf’s Four Point Formula, Something is better than nothing became their new slogan instead of Right to Self-Determination as envisaged by various UN resolutions on Kashmir problem. The prominent figures of this group are Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Prof. Abdul Gani Bhat and Molvi Abas Ansari. However, the other group labeled as hardliner, remained steadfast on their stand viz-a-viz Kashmir issue, i.e. Right to Self-Determination as the only solution to Kashmir issue as guaranteed by the UN. The hardliner group of the Hurriyat Conference always vehemently criticized the policies and programmes of the APHC (M). The prominent persons of this group included Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mohammad Ashraf Sharie, Masrat Alam Bhat and Gulam Nabi Sumbji. Both factions are working separately with separate Executive Councils and offices. Many attempts were made to bridge the gap between the two factions but without any success. The other aspect of this chapter is the comparative study of Tehreek-i- Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir (THJK) and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which are two important constituents of APHC, their ideological

8 orientations, techniques of mass mobilizations, their utility in expanding mass bass and their role in Kashmir politics. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir headed by Syed Ali Shah Geelani is an outgrowth of Jama’at-i-Islami which came into existence on August 2004. It wants the establishment of an Islamic system of governance (Shari’ah) in Kashmir and supports accession of State to Pakistan. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat’s steadfast stand and anti-India-programmes expanded its support base. It played an effective role in shifting the Kashmir movement to new and young generation in the last couple of years. This organization has a distinction of promoting Islamic tendencies and leanings and produced Islamic leadership on the forefront and the centre stage. The use of religious identity for political mobilization resulted into the failure of Tehreek- i-Hurriyat to reach other regions of the State like Jammu, Ladakh. On the other hand, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front was formed on May, 1977 in London by Amanullah Khan. It was the first broad based armed organization which played very important role during armed rebellion by mobilizing support of local people and international community for the independence. It began armed struggle with an idea of an independent, secular, democratic Jammu and Kashmir based on pre-1947 geography. However, JKLF got divided into two groups- Kashmir based unit led by Yasin Malik and Pakistan based unit led by Amanullah Khan- when its leader Yasin Malik, once the staunch supporter of armed struggle, renounced armed struggle after his release from jail in 1994 and adopted Gandhian method of non-violence and democratic ways to mobilize international community and people of the state. Yasin Malik’s Safr- e-Azadi (Journey for freedom) is one such example. The study of these two constituents reveals that there are ideological as well as methodological differences within constituents of APHC. It as points out that APHC is an amalgam of various parties in which there are maximum differences instead of maximum similarities. The fourth chapter, “All Parties Hurriyat Conference: Engagement with the Indian Government and the New Political Developments in Kashmir” traces the role of APHC in the form of its negotiations with the Indian state.

Some sort of dialogue process between New Delhi and APHC (M) did happen during the Vajpayee Government (2002-2005). It was the first time that New Delhi held dialogue with Hurriyat which manifests the recognition of the Hurriyat as an important stakeholder in Kashmir issue. However, one important faction that had chosen to remain outside the dialogue process was APHC (G), because according to them ‘dialogue under the Indian Constitution and without any proper agenda is a futile exercise and wastage of time’. This dialogue process was carried forward by Manmohan Singh led Government in 2006 when it called Round-Table Conferences, though mainstream parties participated in conferences like National Conference (NC) but APHC stayed away from the conference by calling it ‘premature’. Nevertheless, The Conferences led to the formation of Five Working Groups but only one Working Group has submitted its report and its recommendations also remained on paper. This dialogue process was supposed to normalize Kashmir and to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiri people. All this dialogue process happened in the era of PDP rule. The formation of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) by Mufti Mohammad Syed, Former Home Minister of India in 2000 is one of the important political developments in Kashmir. This party became a new political player in the 2002 Assembly Elections and formed coalition government with the Congress. Under PDP rule Kashmir saw a lot of social reconstruction for example Special Operation Group (SOG) was disbanded. Normalization of hearts and minds was undertaken like Srinagar-Muzafarrabad bus service was opened for the people of Kashmir. The PDP’s rule saw a new wave of protests over the Amarnath Land Row (2008) which changed the entire political equation in Jammu and Kashmir. Apart from falling of PDP-Congress coalition government and imposition of Governor’s rule, it came as a blessing in disguise and reactivated both the factions of the APHC. There was resentment in population across the Valley over the transfer of land to the Shrine Board. This resentment was channelized by Hurriyat which compelled the government to revoke the order

10 regarding the transfer of land to the Shrine Board. Amarnath Land Row led to the emergence of many other things which can be summarized as a) Kashmir Valley saw huge mobilization which resulted in development of political consciousness and further alienation from Indian State. b) A new development emerged in the sense that Kashmir’s resistance movement got transformed from armed rebellion to the non-violence resistance. c) Attachment to land was seen as a highest desire for nation.

After this land row, Jammu and Kashmir saw an Assembly Elections in November-December 2008, which led to the change of government; NC- Congress formed a coalition government while Hurriyat boycotted the election. The change in government was seen as a hope for peace, but soon this peace was shattered by the new form of protest known as ‘stone pelting’. These protests began over the violation of human rights like Shopian rape and murder (2009), fake encounters like Machail encounter (2010). During these protests APHC assumed a new role and adopted new moderate techniques to pressurize Indian State into the resolution of the Kashmir problem. This forced Indian State to send an All Parties Delegation to Kashmir and announce some new mechanisms of resolution like Interlocutors. It revived democratic ways of addressing the political problem of Kashmir. This chapter brings out that APHC has emerged as a strong party legitimized by the support of the people in Kashmir’s political scene after Amarnath Land Row as it put certain demands before the Indian State like demilitarization, revocation of AFSPA over which first time national debate started. One important development within APHC was also shown that some of its factions began to fight elections like Sajad Gani Lone’s People’s Conference participated in 2008 Assembly elections, some have started talking about daily issues and argue for the involvement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir in any dialogue process between India and Pakistan like APHC (M).

The last chapter titled “Multiple Paths to Peace” deals with different conflict-resolution methods existing in Jammu and Kashmir. These include the resolution of some mainstream political parties like National Conference’s Autonomy, People’s Democratic Party’s Self-Rule as well as separatist groups like JKLF’s Independence, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat’s Accession to Pakistan, Lone’s Achievable Nationhood. NC’ autonomy envisages the restoration of pre-1953 autonomy. PDP’s Self-Rule document is more or less similar to the demand of the autonomy with only difference that it talks of economic integration of two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Sajad Lone’s Achievable Nationhood is seen as a much realistic solution to the Kashmir problem as it provides a solution while keeping in view all complexities associated with the conflict. It calls it ‘Homeland Model’ where a shared notion of sovereignty between India and Pakistan is visualized. However, an analysis of these proposals reveals that there are certain common themes in all these proposals like autonomy, cross- border mechanisms, demilitarization, and financial autonomy etc. Thus, these proposals advocate more or less greater autonomy for the State which seems much-demanded solution for Kashmir Issue. Other proposals are suggested by JKLF and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, JKLF stands for Independence not less than complete independence of both parts of erstwhile J&K. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat demands right to Self-Determination as per UN resolutions. However, right to self-determination as per UN resolutions rules out the possibility of a separate nation- in UN resolutions the choice is either India or Pakistan- for the people of Jammu and Kashmir or it simply denies the choice called as Azadi, famous in the vocabulary of the protests in Jammu and Kashmir. It also manifests contradiction in Hurriyat camp about the future political status of the Jammu and Kashmir. The existence of a number of pathways to peace in Jammu and Kashmir, points toward the complexity of the problem. However, it is found that there is a need of some peace building measures like restoration of democracy, zero tolerance to human rights, cross-border cooperation in various sectors, economic development, employment etc. though this may not be the ultimate

12 solution to the issue, it may prepare some ground for arriving at a solution and meanwhile relieve the people of the State from day to day violence and turmoil. And a broad acceptance of any solution lies in its acceptance by all the three parties-India, Pakistan and Kashmir. All these parties shall agree. This only can end the conflict and provide lasting peace in South Asia.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement Page No. List of Abbreviations i-ii Preface iii-vii

CHAPTER 1 1-21 Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Background 1.1 Introduction 1-2 1.2 Treaty of Amritsar: Formation of present Jammu and Kashmir 2-3 1.3 Dogra Rule and its Nature 3-5 1.4 Birth of Kashmiri Nationalist Struggle 5-8 1.4.1 Formation of Muslim conference 8-10 1.4.2 From Muslim conference to National conference 10-12 1.5 Partition of British India and Emergence of Jammu and Kashmir 12-18 as a Dispute 1.6 International Mediation: UN and the Promise of Plebiscite 18-21

CHAPTER 2 22-49 Growth of Militancy: An Analysis of Historical-Politico Factors 2.1 Erosion of Autonomy 23-26 2.2 Failure of Democratic Process 26-29 2.3 Separatist Movement 29-42 2.3.1 Plebiscite front 29-31 2.3.2 Action committee 31-33 2.3.3 Jama’at-i-Islami 34-37 2.3.4 Al-Fatah 37-39 2.3.5 Peoples League 39-42 2.4 Muslim United Front and Election 1987 42-46 2.5 Eruption of Militancy 47-49

CHAPTER 3 50-88 Formation of All Parties Hurriyat Conference 3.1 Brief history of APHC 50-55 3.2 Ideology, Objectives and Structure of APHC 55-57 3.3 Split of APHC and Efforts for Unity 58-64 3.4 Emergence of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat 64-76 3.4.1 Goals and Techniques of Mobilization 71-74 3.4.2 Impact on Jammu and Kashmir Politics 75-76 3.5 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 76-88 3.5.1 Ideology 79-80 3.5.2 Aims and Objectives 80-81 3.5.3 Split of JKLF 81-82 3.5.4 Methods of Political Mobilization 82-88

CHAPTER 4 89-112 All Parties Hurriyat Conference: Engagement with the Indian Government and the New Political Developments in Kashmir 4.1 Efforts by the Indian state to engage Hurriyat 89-91 4.1.1 Dialogue Process under Vajpayee Government 91-94 4.1.2 Dialogue Process under Manmohan Singh Government 94-95 4.1.2.1 Working Group on Confidence Building Measures 95-98 4.2 Formation of PDP and Beginning of the Reconciliation 98-100 4.3 Protest Movements: Revival of Hurriyat 100-105 4.4 Indian Union’s Response: All party Delegation and Interlocution 105-109 4.5 Achievements of Hurriyat 109-112

CHAPTER 5 113-134 Multiple Paths to Peace 5.1 Self Rule 114-118 5.1.1 Broad Contours of Self-Rule 115-117 5.2 Achievable Nationhood 118-123 5.2.1 Vision of Achievable Nationhood 119-123 5.3 Autonomy 123-128 5.4 Independence 128 5.5 Accession to Pakistan 129-130 5.6 Commonalities among the above Proposals 131-134

CONCLUSION 135-138

BIBLIOGRAPHY 139-151

APPENDICES i-xv ACKNOWLEGEMENT

At the outset, all praises go to Almighty Allah for His Mercy and Magnanimity. It gives me immense pleasure to express my deep sense of gratitude to my esteemed supervisor and mentor Dr. Iqbalur Rehman, Associate Professor of Department of Political Science, AMU, for his generous, inspiring guidance, extensive cooperation and consistent encouragement because of which I did not lose heart even at difficult stages. His extraordinary desire to see students flourish will always be a source of inspiration for me. I am thankful to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Department for their generous assistance as well as for their best wishes. I would like to express my thanks to my revered Chairman, Prof. A. R. Vijapur for his timely suggestions and help at various phases of this project. This work would have been more challenging and less accurate without the constant help, guidance and encouragement of Dr. Arshi Khan, Dr. Aftab Alam, Dr. Khurram and more importantly Dr. Sheikh Showket of Central University of Kashmir. I will always be thankful to them for their kind attitude throughout the preparation of this work. I acknowledge and express my thanks for getting necessary material for my research work from various institutions. I am thankful to the staff of Maulana Azad Library (Aligarh Muslim University), Seminar Library of the Department of Political Science, Allama Iqbal Library, University of Kashmir, Library of Jammu University, Jawaharlal Nehru University library and Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi. I am grateful to the personalities I interviewed, who shared their knowledge and experience with me. Special thanks goes to Syed Ali Shah Geelani- Chairman of APHC (G), Mirwaiz Umar Farooq of APHC (M), Advocate Mian Abdul Qayoom, President of Kashmir Bar Association, Yasin Malik, Chairman of JKLF, Shabir Shah, Chairman of PFP and their office bearers besides others who helped me in the preparation of the given work directly or indirectly. My special thanks go to my parents (Mr. Bashir Ahmad Mir and Mrs. Mukhtiya Begum), brother (Mir Sajad), sisters (Afiya and Mubeena) and my cousins especially Sureed and Mukhtar whose blessings have remained a constant source of enlightenment in all my academic endeavors. My heart also goes for special thanks to all my friends and well wishers especially Idris, Tariq, Tehseen, Nadeem, Jameel, Mohsin, Tausif, Ajaz, Mehraj, Faheem, Aashiq Kilora, Fayaz, Dr. Hilal, Bilal, Javaid, Akthar, G. M. Rather, Manzoor Bhai, Iftikhar, Irfan and Ayaz for their company, cooperation and encouragement which was inevitable for the given work. I hope that this work would make a substantative and original contribution to the study of All Parties Hurriyat Conference- a separatist organization and in a broader sense to the separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir.

MOHD AMIN MIR LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AAC : Awami Action Committee AC : Action Committee AF : Al-Fatah AFDL : Algerian Front De Liberation AFSPA : Armed Forces Special Powers Act APHC : All Parties Hurriyat Conference APHC (G) : All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Geelani Group) APHC (M) : All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Mirwaiz Group) AU : Al-Umar BJP : Bhartiya Janta Party CBI : Central Bureau of Investigation CBMs : Confidence Building Measures CC : Constitutional Committee CCS : Cabinet Committee on Security CMP : Common Minimum Programme CPI : Communist Party of India CRPF : Central Reserve Police Force DFP : Democratic Freedom Party GJAK : Greater Jammu and Kashmir HM : Hizbul MujahideenC HRC : Holy Relic Committee IAJK : Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir IAS : Indian Administrative Service IJT : Islami Jamiat-e-Talba IPS : Indian Police Service ISL : Islamic Student League JKJI : Jammu Kashmir Jama’at-i-Islami JKLF : Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front JKMC : Jammu Kashmir National Conference JKNC : Jammu Kashmir National Conference

KBA : Kashmir Bar Association LOC : Line of Control MJF : Muslim Janbaz Force MUF : Muslim United Front NDA : National Democratic Alliance NHRC : National Human Rights Commission NLF : National Liberation Front OIC : Organization of the Islamic Conference PAK : Pakistan Administered Kashmir PDP : Peoples Democratic Party PF : Plebiscite Front PL : People’s League POTA : Prevention of Terrorism Act PSA : Public Safety Act PTA : Preferential Trade Agreement RAC : Regional Autonomy Committee RSS : Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh SAC : State Autonomy Committee SASB : Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board SC : Screening Committee SHRC : State Human Rights Commission SOG : Special Operation Group THJK : Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu Kashmir THK : Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir UJC : United Jihad Council UNCIP : United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan UNO : United Nations Organization UPA : United Progressive Alliance USIP : United States Institute of Peace WG : Working Group

CHAPTER 1 1. JAMMU AND KASHMIR: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction The State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) lies in North-Western part of Indian subcontinent. Bounded on Northeast by the Tibet, it is surrounded by the Indian states of Himachel Pradesh and Punjab on the South; on the Northwest by Afghanistan and on the West by Pakistan. Just after partition of British India, a major demographic and geographic change occurred in the state when India and Pakistan fought first war over it, which divided Kashmir into Indian administered Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir. Since then it has been a bone of contention between these two countries and a number of wars were fought on it. The area which is the subject of this study is the Indian administered Kashmir. It is officially called as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir consists of three distinct regions; Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. Srinagar is the summer capital and Jammu is the winter capital of the State. Kashmir Valley is known as ‘Paradise on Earth’ is famous for its beautiful mountainous landscape. Jammu’s numerous shrines attract thousands of Hindu pilgrims every year. Ladakh, also known as ‘Little Tibet’ is renowned for its remote mountainous beauty and Buddhist culture. Kashmir has history of 6000 years, intermittently ruled by outsiders. The history of Kashmir is mainly divided into four periods: the early period of Hindu and Buddhist Kings chronicled in the famous Raj Tarangini; the medieval period that was ruled by the Muslims is known as Salateen-i-Kashmir (1310-1585); the period of the Mughals, known as the Padshahi-i-Chagatai or Shahan-i-Mughlia (1585-1718); and the period of the Pathans known as the Shahan-i-Durani (1718-1819).1 It was in 1819 AD when Kashmir passed in the hands of new masters- the Sikhs.

1 Lawrence, Walter R., The Valley of Kashmir, Gulshan Publications, (Srinagar, 2002), p. 179

The Sikhs ruled over Kashmir for 27 years (1819-1846). It was Maharaja Ranjit Singh who brought Kashmir under the Sikh rule in 1819. However, the Anglo-Sikh war (10th February, 1846) led to the eclipse of Sikh empire and the British took over the State and sold it to Maharaja Gulab Singh (Dogra Rule 1846-1947) under the agreement known as ‘Treaty of Amritsar’

1.2 Treaty of Amritsar: Formation of Present Jammu & Kashmir State The Treaty of Amritsar was signed between East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh, The Hindu Chieftain from Jammu, on March 16, 1846. By this treaty Kashmir was sold to Gulab Singh for cash payment of seventy-five lakhs of rupees (Nanakshahee).2 The same treaty recognized Gulab Singh as the Maharaja (King) of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Thus, was founded the present State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Treaty of Amritsar occupies an important place in the political history of Jammu and Kashmir. This treaty formed the present Jammu and Kashmir as a political unit as well as during the freedom movement, the Treaty became a potent argument in the hands of Kashmiri people. They challenged the very authenticity of the Treaty on humanitarian grounds and claimed that neither the people nor their political freedom could be purchased for a paltry sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees. However, the Maharaja justified his absolute power to rule over the state and its people on the ground that he is unquestioned sovereign as recognized by the Treaty itself.3 In short, Dogra Maharaja considered Kashmir as his purchased property. This treaty should be seen in the way British governed the undivided India; direct and indirect rule. The British India was divided into two parts: one where British ruled directly and second, Princely states- where they ruled indirectly through the local Indian Princes. Kashmir’s princely status comes through this treaty. The people of the Princely States were in an ambiguous

2 Treaty of Amritsar, Article III 3 Khan, G.H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Light and Life Publishers, (New Delhi, 1980), p. 3

2 position, apart from being under the rule of their local prince; they also had to show the loyalty towards the British. Thus, their loyalty was fragmented and differentiated into different levels and they used their identity and loyalty according to the prevailing condition. The Princes were themselves divided not only on ideology but also owing to race, religion and upbringing. The efforts and steps taken by the Princes to concede representative and responsible government varied from state to state. The princes adopted repressive policy in many states, Jammu and Kashmir was one such Princely state which had come under the British Empire with the ‘Treaty of Amritsar’ signed in 1846 between the British and the Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh.

1.3 Dogra Rule and its Nature The Dogra state was a feudal state, as the feudal character of the state was evident in the claim of its ruler that the land in state belonged to him. The Jagirdari system (landlordism) rendered people propertyless and choked freedom of the people. Every department was infested with corruption. The Jagirdar (Landlord) was “the judge, the administrator and the police”.4 The Dogra period is also notorious for ‘Beggar’ (the forced labour), the people were dragged out of their homes and were asked to carry military provisions to distant places like Gilgit and Ladakh. They were neither paid nor given any ration during this period.5 Many died due to starvation or harsh weather on way to or from these far off places of northern Kashmir. In Dogra State, the Muslim6 majority community was discriminated in every sphere of life- social, economic, political and religious. Muslims were discriminated in government services as well because the Hindus had a monopoly in these services. The share of the Muslim representation in the state services was far less than they actually deserve. In 1931, the Muslim share in

4 Khan, G.H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., p. 13 5 Sufi, G. M. D., Kashmir Being A History of Kashmir- From the Earliest Times to Our Own, Vol. II, Capital Publishing House, (New Delhi, 1996), P. 810 6 According to Census of India 1931, The Muslim constituted 80% of the total population of the state, quoted in Kashmir’s Struggle for Independence 1931-1939, by Ganai, Mohammad Yusuf, Mohsin Publications, (Srinagar, 2003), p. 11

3 the state services was not more than 15% percent. The Revenue Department that had dealings with the Muslim masses was, from top to bottom, monopolized by the non-Muslims.7 The non-Muslim officials not only mal- treated the Muslim masses but also fatted themselves on illegal exactions known as nazrana and rasum imposed particularly on the Muslim peasantry.8 Politically, the Muslims were deprived of all basic rights and civil liberties. The right to freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of association were made unlawful. Even holding of a private meeting or religious meeting was prohibited.9 There has been a provincial as well as communal bias in the policies adopted by the government. The peasants of Kashmir Valley had no property rights of land while the peasants of Jammu region enjoyed full property rights of land. The transfer of Jagirs from Muslim to Non-Muslim subjects remained a dominant feature of the Dogra rule. The Muslim subjects also suffered from various religious discriminations. Several mosques, shrines, and other sacred places were confiscated by the state and converted into store houses for grains and ammunition.10 With regard to change of religion, a Muslim converted to Hinduism was not deprived of his right to property and guardianship over his children, whereas in case of a Hindu converted to Islam all such rights were lost to him. The slaughter of cows was declared an unlawful act by the state. Anyone found guilty of having slaughtered a cow was awarded life imprisonment (which was later on reduced to seven years). Ruthless treatment was meted out to the Muslims even if they were suspected of having committed the crime.11 Thus, during Dogra rule, there was an entire subversion of politics and communalization. Not only was the Muslim majority denied the basic rights by the Dogra State but their entire religious and cultural identity was subverted. Before concluding this discussion it is worthwhile to

7 Lawrence, Walter R., The Valley of Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 400-401 8 Ibid., p. 415 9 Khan, G.H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., p. 121 10 Ganai, Mohammad Yusuf ‘Kashmir’s Struggle for Independence 1931-1939, Op. Cit., p. 14 11 Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., pp. 121-122

4 quote the observations of a contemporary political analyst, Prem Nath Bazaz on the nature of the Dogra Raj: “Speaking generally and from the bourgeois point of view, the Dogra rule has been a Hindu Raj. Muslims have not been treated fairly by which I mean as fairly as the Hindus. Firstly, because contrary to the professions of treating all classes equally, it must be candidly admitted, that Muslims were dealt severely in certain respects only because they were Muslims”.12

1.4 Birth of Kashmiri Nationalist Struggle The oppression by Dogra rule saw a continuous resistance from the Kashmiri Muslims but this resistance was suppressed by Dogra state from time to time and an organized struggle took time. There emerged from time to time some discordant voices against oppressive measures and attempts were made to initiate a well-organized freedom movement. Many youth from the Muslim community who had gone outside for education had returned by early thirties. They were exposed to the socio-political movements led by people outside Kashmir. Upon reaching home, they also started activities aimed at empowering their co-religionists. They established Reading Room Party13 at Fateh Kadal and elected Mr. Mohammad Rajab as president and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah14 as its secretary.15 It was during this period (1930s) that certain incidents involving desecration of Islamic symbols, took place which gave an orientation to the nascent movement in Jammu and Kashmir.16 The five important incidents that took place at that time provided the spark needed to stir up the flames of the revolt in the state.17 Firstly, a leading landlord in Udhampur embraced Islam causing unrest among Dogras in the

12 Bazaz, Prem Nath, Inside Kashmir, Kashmir Publishing Co., (Srinagar, 1941), p. 250 13 Reading Room Party was the first platform for the freedom struggle started in Kashmir. It was established in September 1930 by young graduates of Aligarh Muslim University in Fateh Kadal Srinagar, Quoted in ‘Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective’, by Mattu, Abdul Majeed, M/S Ali Mohammad & Sons, (Srinagar, 2002), p.19 14 Sheikh Abdullah was one of several young Kashmiri Muslims educated in British India who, upon return to Kashmir Valley in early 1930s, launched a struggle to free their people from the despotic rule of Dogra State. 15 Hassnain, F. M., Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, Rima Publishing House, (New Delhi, 2002), p. 36 16 Jan, Asifa, Protest Movement in Kashmir, Zeba Publications, (Srinagar, 2005), p. 58 17 Saraf, Mohammad Yusuf, Kashmir’s Fight For Freedom, Vol. II, Feroz Sons Ltd., (Lahore, 2005), p. 361

5 state; second incident took place in Jammu, when a police officer forbade the Eid prayers to be held in a particular ground; third incident took place on April 29, 1931 in Jammu when a sub-inspector of police, Babu Khem Chand, tried to stop the Imam, Moulvi Ataullah Shah Bukhari, from reading ‘Khutba’ in which the Imam spoke of Pharaoh as a cruel and tyrant king; fourth incident took place in Srinagar on June 20, 1931 when pages of the Holy Quran were found in a public latrine, the fifth incident took place in the Central Jail Jammu on July 4, 1931, a head constable of Maharaja’s police named Lambha Ram was enraged over some issue with Fazldad who was a Muslim constable, working under his command. Ram rolled up and threw off Fazl’s bedding. In this action a copy of Punj-Sura (A collection of five chapters of Holy Quran) fell upon the ground.18 These incidents roused the religious sentiments of the Maharaja’s Muslim subjects. There were protests, demonstrations in Jammu province and when the news of the jail incident reached Srinagar, it further inflamed the public sentiment.19 These protests were spearheaded by some educated youth who have organized themselves under the banner of Reading Room Party. Mirwaiz (head priest) of Kashmir, Molvi Mohammad Yousuf Shah also extended his support to these protests.20 Both the religious leadership and the educated youth worked together for some time to mobilize the Muslim masses.21 It was during these days that a leadership was born among the Muslims of Kashmir. The Reading Room Party called a meeting on June 20, 1931 at the office of the Anju-mani- Nusrat-ul-Islam,22 where Ghulam Ahmad Ashai, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Moulvi Mohammad Yousuf Shah, Mirwaiz Hamdani and Syed Hassan Shah Jalali were selected as the representatives of the Muslims of Kashmir to deal

18 Ibid., pp. 362-363 19 Ibid., p. 366 20 Jan, Asifa, Protest Movement in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 59 21 Ibid., p. 59 22 It was the earliest and most important socio-religious organization, which was founded by Late Mirwaiz of Kashmir, Moulvi Rasool Shah in 1905. The main objective of Anjuman (Association) was the socio-religious welfare of the Muslim community of Kashmir. Quoted in Khan, G.H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., p. 60

6 with all socio-political matters.23 In order to introduce the representatives to the people, a public meeting was held at Khanqah-i-Mulla24 on June 21, 1931. The meeting was attended by 30,000 people.25 In this meeting, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and other leaders took a public oath on the Holy Quran promising to work faithfully for the promotion of Muslim interests.26 Reading Room Party and its ongoing struggle, thus, shall be seen as a result of the exposed and educated youth of Kashmir who were conscious of their political existence and the role of Sheikh Abdullah and his leadership shall be seen as vital to the resistance. It was under these circumstances that an important event occurred in the political history of Kashmir. Just at the time when the meeting was about to end, a non-Kashmiri Muslim named Abdul Qadir27 came to the podium and after seeking the permission, made a fiery speech.28 He spoke against the Maharaja and his unjust rule. Qadir asked people to rise in revolt against the Maharaja and overthrow his unjust regime. Four days later, on June 25 he was arrested on the charge of inciting communal and racial strife. The arrest of Qadir created a great stir in the valley with people demanding his release.29 The trial of Abdul Qadir started on July 6, 1931 in the Session Court Srinagar, but was postponed due to the presence of large crowd during the hearings.30 Anticipating trouble due to growing interest of common people in the court hearings, the authorities ordered further proceedings to be held in camera at special court room in Central Jail Srinagar. On July 13, 1931, the judgment was to be pronounced at the Central Jail Srinagar. An estimated four to five thousand Muslims had assembled outside the jail demanding permission

23 Ibid., p. 129 24 It is a Shrine built in memory of Syed Ali Hamdani, the saint who brought Islam to Kashmir. It is situated at Fateh Kadal, Srinagar. 25 Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., p. 129 26 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Showket Kitaab Ghar, (Srinagar, 2006), pp. 30-31 27 Abdul Qadir Khan was an employee of an English army officer Major Butt, of the Yorkshire Regiment posted at Peshawar, Quoted in Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir, Op. Cit. p.130 28 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., pp. 84-85 29 Ibid., p. 86 30 Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir-1931-1940, Op. Cit., p. 131

7 to enter the compound. At this stage, Molvi Mohammad Abdullah (Qadir’s advocate) advised people to maintain peace and abide by the orders of the authorities. This pacified the crowd and they waited silently outside for news from the courtroom.31 When the people started Zuhr Prayer, the District Magistrate, the City Munsif, the Superintendent of Police and Assistant Superintendent of Police arrived in cars outside the Central Jail. No sooner did they came out of their vehicles, people started raising anti-government and pro- Qadir slogans.32 Maharaja’s Governor ordered the armed police to open fire in which some twenty two demonstrators were killed and hundreds others were injured. The day July 31, 1931 became the ‘Martyrs Day’ in the Kashmir history, the official beginning of a struggle for independence against autocratic rule of Dogras.33

1.4.1 Formation of Muslim Conference Like the revolt 1857 in India, the mass uprising of 1931 occurred unplanned, without any long term political or social goals in sight. But it was a catalyst that the Reading Room Party transformed into a political party called the ‘Muslim Conference’.34 The chief objectives of Muslim Conference were: 1. Organization of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir. 2. Maintenance and strengthening the unity of the Muslims. 3. Protecting the political rights of the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir. 4. Struggle for the moral, educational, cultural and economic reformation and progress of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir.35 The causes for the formation of Muslim Conference have been contestable since its inception. While the Muslim Conference members held that it was aimed at the establishment of a secular and responsible government without jeopardizing the legitimate rights of the Minorities, the right wing of

31 Saraf, Mohammad Yusuf, Kashmir’s Fight For Freedom, Vol. II, Op. Cit., P. 376 32 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., p. 88 33 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., p. 95 34 Devdas, David, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Viking, Penguin, (New Delhi, 2007), p. 30 35 Hassnain, F. M., Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 77

Hindu organizations like Hindu Yuvak Sabha suspected Muslim communalism in its formation.36 Some scholars, however, agree that the causes of emergence of Muslim Conference were rooted in the repressive policies of Dogra rulers and Hindu landlords. Therefore, Muslim Conference came into existence in 1932 to plead for responsible government. The inaugural session of the Muslim Conference was held on 14, 15 and 16 October 1932 in the historic Pather Masjid, Srinagar under the Presidentship of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. It was a unique political development in the sense that Muslim Conference became the only political platform which drew an overwhelming support of the entire Muslim community in the state. The Conference drafted the constitution and also adopted a party flag which consisted of green cloth with a crescent and star. The flag hoisting ceremony was performed on 14 by Wallullah Zain-ul-Abedin, a representative of All India Kashmir Committee. The session was attended by about three lakh men, women and children who turned the pendal into a place of pilgrimage.37 The Muslim Conference led the movement from 1932 to1939 which constitutes a very vital period in the annals of the freedom struggle in the state. It was Muslim by nomenclature but not strictly in character. Speaking on the political character of the movement, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah said, “Our movement is not directed against the minorities. I assure all my countrymen, be they Hindus or Sikhs, that we shall always try to redress their grievances but they must also respect our just rights”.38 In fact, the Muslim Conference had not positioned itself as anti-Pandit organization; some prominent non-Muslims were also associated with the party- Sardar Budh Singh, a Sikh leader from Jammu, was one such member. He had been sacked as the head of a district administration for insisting the Maharaja to pay for ‘Beggars’. This had made him so popular that the Muslim Conference invited him in the summer of 1932 to address a function on the Prophet Mohammad’s birth anniversary.39 Though

36 Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940, Op. Cit., pp. 324-325 37 Rashid, Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, Vol. I, Muhafiz, (Srinagar, 1973), p. 259 38 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., pp. 188-189 39 Devdas, David, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 35

Muslim Conference avowedly reiterated its belief in secularism time and again40 but the fears of Hindus could not be assuaged.41 Therefore, its social base could not take an all Jammu and Kashmir character. Muslim Conference shall not be seen as a communal organization. The problem is that in Kashmir, Muslims were the only subjects who were discriminated on the ground of their religious identity. Their resistance against a Hindu Dogra state is seen as a communal driven struggle. The facts are otherwise and it is the state that was communal in essence. As a result any response to it will be logically seen as communal. But it should not be overlooked that Kashmiris political assertion starts with the demand of rights and these rights were denied solely because they were Muslims. Also, after the communal machinations by the state after 1931 protest incident, Kashmiri Muslims began to assert their Muslim identity more sharply and struggle for their rights through a certain programmes.

1.4.2 From Muslim Conference to National Conference In the closing years of the third decade of the 20th century differences cropped up among Muslim Conference leaders over the issue of secularization of the organization sparked by the inclusion of Kashmiri Pandits into the party fold. This was the beginning of factional politics among anti-Dogra forces. On the one hand, the politics of the non-Muslims began as a reaction to the mass movement launched by Muslims against economic injustice and political servility of the Dogra rule.42 On the other hand, Sheikh Abdullah came closer to the ideological position of the Indian National Congress and was greatly influenced by Jawahar Lal Nehru and other nationalist leaders of India.43 Besides it, the policy of state to create division among the leaders and rank and file of the Muslim Conference, the desire of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to widen the social base of the party also played role in the formation of National

40 Singh, Khushwant, Flames of the Chinar, Penguin Books, (New Delhi, 1993), p. 35 41 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., p. 161 42 Khan, G. H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir1931-1940, Op. Cit., p, 165 43 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., pp. 209-210

Conference. This resulted in the conversion of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into the ‘Jammu and Kashmir National Conference’ (JKNC) on June 11, 1939.44 For doing this, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was characterized as a communalist in Kashmir, a communist in Jammu and a nationalist in India.45 Some even alleged that “Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah would exploit anybody for his personal ends but was never anybody’s man, not was ever dependable and he could shift and re-shift his loyalties in no time.” 46 Whatever the reasons, National Conference functioned smoothly and enjoyed a dominant role in the Kashmir Valley up to 1941 when the Muslim Conference (formed in 1932) was rejuvenated on the plea that the Hindus were not liberal enough to see the liquidation of the autocratic rule of the Hindu Maharaja. Gohar Rehman was given the responsibility to revive the Muslim Conference, Choudhry Ghulam Abbass (who had earlier co-sponsored with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the proposal for conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference) also proved instrumental in reviving it on the ground that the National Conference did not represent Jammu Muslims very effectively and the increasingly pro-Congress orientation of the later organization.47 Thus, the National Conference and the Muslim Conference became two different parties. On the one hand, the Muslim Conference had the full sympathy of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League and it also accepted the Muslim League’s resolution for the creation of Pakistan. On the other hand, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah (leader of the National Conference) invited Jawahar Lal Nehru to Kashmir, who spent ten days touring the Valley in 1940.48 Pandit Nehru’s visit to Kashmir was considered a turning point in the political life of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in particular and freedom

44 Verma, P. S., Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, Vikas Publishing House, (Delhi,1994), p. 18 45 Ibid., p.20 46 Korbel, Josef, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 1954), p. 107 47 Abass, Choduri Gulam, Kashmekash, Kashmir Studies Foundation, (Srinagar, 2001) pp. 180-185 48 Teng, M. K; Koul, R. K; Koul, S., (edt.), Kashmir Constitutional History and Document, Light and Life Publishers, (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 87-88

11 movement in the state in general. Consequently, Sheikh Abdullah decided to go the whole hug with the Congress.49 Later on, Sheikh Abdullah was also elected president of the ‘All India State’s Peoples Conference’ and hence the ideology of the National Conference was brought in conformity with that of the Indian National Congress.50 Besides influence of Nehru and Congress, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was influenced by the communist ideology as well. Several close associates and party colleagues of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah notably, G. M. Sadiq, D. P. Dhar and G. L. Dogra had communist leanings.51 So, under the communist influence National Conference issued its elaborate manifesto titled ‘Naya Kashmir’ or ‘New Kashmir’ in 1944. The New Kashmir proposal was revolutionary in its economic and social implications. During 1946, National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah launched historically famous ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’ on the pattern of the ‘Quit India Movement’ started by the Indian National Congress52 on May 15, 1946.This was also supported by Chaudary Ghulam Abass (leader of the Muslim Conference). However, both Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Chaudary Ghulam Abass were arrested and imprisoned.

1.5 Partition of British India and Emergence of Jammu and Kashmir as a Dispute After World War II, the Labour Government came to power in England. On February 17, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence had announced in the Parliament that British Government would send a Cabinet Mission to India to discuss with the representatives of India the question of Indian Independence. In 1946, the Cabinet Mission arrived in India. Its objective was to try to reach a compromise between Congress and Muslim League. A compromise proposing a decentralized state with much power given to local governments won initial

49 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., p. 253 50 Raina, Dina Nath, Unhappy Kashmir-The Hidden Story, Reliance Publishing House, (New Delhi, 1990), pp. 30-31 51 Birdwood, Lord, Two Nations and Kashmir, Gulshan Publication Books, (Srinagar, 2005), p. 266 52 Devdas, David, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 51

12 acceptance, but Nehru was unwilling to accept such a decentralized state and Jinnah soon returned to demanding an independent Pakistan.53 After the failure of Cabinet Mission to reach any solution to the Indian problem, the British government in 1947 declared its plan to partition the India.54 The partition plan was executed on the basis of ‘two nation theory’. The Muslim majority provinces were merged to create the dominion of Pakistan and the provinces with majority of Hindu population were joined together to form the dominion of India.55 Thus, the British partitioned the territory mainly on the basis of communal majority; contagious Muslim majority areas were assigned to Pakistan, while as, the contagious non-Muslim majority territories were assigned to India. But this scheme of partitioning did not apply to the five hundred and sixty five (565) Princely States such as Kashmir which till that time had enjoyed ‘semi-autonomous status’ under the British rule. The British Government announced their plan that these states were free to decide up on their future. The rulers were advised by the Crown to take economic factors, geographical contiguity, the aspirations of their people and similar other factors into consideration while taking the decision vis-à-vis accession.56 The last Viceroy of pre-partition India had further urged upon the rulers of states that the accession must take place, if possible, before August 15, 1947.The accession was amicably settled with regard to all the princely states except the State of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. Hyderabad and Junagadh were non-Muslim majority states with Muslim rulers. Kashmir’s status was converse to both of them. The Himalayan state had a Hindu ruler but an overwhelming majority of the Muslim population.57 Hyderabad decided to remain independent for the time being and Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on September 15, 1947. However, within months after Independence, the Union of

53 Stanley, Wolpert, A New History of India, Oxford University Press, (USA, 2008), pp. 341- 344 54 Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, (Delhi, 1989), p. 145 55 Menon, V. P., Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longman, (Madras, 1995), p. 80 56 Mattu, Abdul Majeed, Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective, Op. Cit., pp. 32-33 57 Lamb, Alastair, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948, Roxford Books, (London, 1997), p. 15

India ruled by Congress Government forcefully integrated both these states in to the Indian Union.58 Till 15th of August 1947, the people of Jammu and Kashmir were hopeful that they would enjoy freedom like the people of India and Pakistan. However, The Muslim Conference was in favour of accession to Pakistan, it also adopted a resolution on July 19, 1947 deciding to accede to Pakistan. The main provisions were:  The meeting of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference convention expresses its satisfaction and congratulates the Quad-i-Azam, M.A. Jinnah for his achievements (of creation of Pakistan).  The people of the Indian States expected that they would walk hand in hand with the people of British India in the attainment of freedom. On the partition of India, the people of British India have obtained independence but the announcement of June 3, 1947 has strengthened the hands of the Indian Princes and unless the Princes respond to the call of the time, the future of the people of Indian States is very dark.59 The convention of the Muslim Conference had arrived at the conclusion that keeping in view the geographical conditions, 80% Muslim population, the passage of all rivers of the state into Pakistan, the language, cultural and racial, economic connection of the people and the proximity of the borders of the State with Pakistan are facts which made it necessary that the Jammu and Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. The resolution further made it clear that, “If the Kashmir Government ignores this demand of the Muslim Conference under some internal or external influence and decides in favour of accession to the Indian Constituent Assembly, the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir shall oppose this move tooth and nail.”60 The National Conference was opposed to holding of this convention and made frantic efforts to see that it was not held.61 Besides, the Muslim Conference and the National Conference, the other

58 Wirsing, Robert G., India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution, Macmillan, (London, 2000), p. 172 59 Mattu, Abdul Majeed, Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective, Op. Cit., p. 28 60 Ibid., pp. 28-29 61 Ibid., p. 29

14 political parties in the state were the Kashmir Socialist Party, the Praja Parishad Party, the Kashmir Democratic Union and Kisan Mazdoor Conference. The Kashmir Socialist Party announced in September 1947, after careful consideration of options facing Jammu and Kashmir that “In the best interests of the poor and backward people accession to Pakistan is desirable”.62 The Kisan Mazdoor Conference also agreed in September 1947 that the state should cede to Pakistan due to its majority Muslim population and the fact that the three main highways and all the rivers of the state flow into Pakistan. Praja Parishad favoured the separation of Ladakh and Jammu from the state and their merger with the Indian Union.63 The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, however, did not accede either to India or Pakistan but wanted to remain independent. While struggling for seeking recognition to his political desire, Maharaja Hari Singh, in an effort through his Prime Minister, Pandit Ram Chand Kak, had sent an identical telegram to the Government of Pakistan and India, offering a Standstill Agreement. The Government of Pakistan agreed ‘to have a standstill agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. But the Government of India wanted to negotiate a ‘Standstill Agreement’ between Kashmir Government and Indian Dominion, in Delhi. However, India never concluded Standstill Agreement with the Kashmir government.64 By this time the communal situation in Jammu had deteriorated rapidly. The activists of various fanatic Hindu organizations had managed to enter Jammu. They in connivance with the Dogra forces, resorted to ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population there. Muslims were displaced and murdered from Jammu and many survivors made their way to the western side of the partition line into the Punjab (Pakistan).65 At the same time, Maharaja’s government ordered all the Muslims in the Jagir to hand over their fire arms and ammunition to the authorities. Initially, these instructions were complied with

62 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, J. V. Press, (New Delhi, 1988) p.16 63 Mattu, Abdul Majeed, Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective, Op. Cit., pp. 30-31 64 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 16-17 65 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Op. Cit., p. 455

15 in some villages but when the same weapons started turning up in Hindu and Sikh hands, there was an inevitable reaction.66 Fresh supplies of weapons were sought from across the Pakistan frontier. The major source of armaments in Pakistan has been traditionally the tribal tracts of the North-West Frontier- Province (now Khyber Pakhtun Khwa). The area has a long history of both arms smuggling and local arms manufacturing. The religious affinity and blood relations across the frontier in now Pakistan territory were natural direct contacts between the Poonch residents and tribal leaders along the Pakistan- Afghanistan border. By the beginning of September 1947, bands of men from Poonch, some equipped with weapons obtained from the frontier or from the other sources in Pakistan, had already come into conflict with Jammu & Kashmir state forces throughout the Poonch Jagir and in Mirpur district of Jammu to its immediate south.67 Hearing the massacre of their co-religionists in Jammu by fanatic Hindus, the small groups of volunteers from Pakistan territory on the west bank of the river Jehlum were provoked to join the Jammu Muslims. They might also have begun to be reinforced at this early stage by few Pathan tribesmen from frontier.68 Hence, they (Poonch Muslims and tribal people) stood in revolt against the Dogra Army on October 22, 1947. Tribal people came to the aid of the people of Muzafarabad and a regular fight against the Dogra troops ensued. Although many of the raiders were motivated by the prospect of pillage, they were led by experienced military leaders familiar with terrain and equipped with modern arms.69 It soon became clear that the attack had precise strategic aims. After taking the town of Muzaffarabad, the raiders headed straight for Srinagar, the heart of Kashmir Valley. Almost meeting no resistance from the Maharaja’s forces they rapidly captured the town of Baramullah.70 The situation in the Valley became horrible. Everybody was seen

66 Ibid., p. 434 67 Ibid., p. 398 68 Ibid, pp. 123-124 69 Jha, Prem Nath, The Origins of a Dispute : Kashmir 1947, Oxford University Press, (New Delhi, 2003), p. 25 70 Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Vistaar Publications, (New Delhi, 2003), p. 35

terror-stricken. The most spectacular achievement was sabotage Srinagar’s power supply. This made Maharaja to conclude that he was in serious trouble. In his autobiography, his son, Dr. Karan Singh has recalled what happened: “On that fateful day I was virtually alone in the palace while my father and members of the staff were attending the Darbar in the beautiful hall at the city palace on the Jhelum with its richly decorated peppier mashie ceilinghe… Suddenly the lights went out- the invaders had captured and destroyed the only power house. . . After a few minutes the eerie silence was broken by the sudden blood-chilling howl of Jackals. Weirdly the cacophony hen rose and fell, then rose again into mad crescendo. Death and destruction were fast approaching Srinagar; our smug world had collapsed around us”.71

Unmindful of what would happen to his helpless subjects, the Maharaja for his own safety left the Valley for Jammu on October 25, 1947. On October 26, the Maharaja wrote a letter to the Governor-General of India mentioning that despite his desire to remain independent of both the Indian Dominion and the Dominion of Pakistan in the light of the geographical location of his State in the map of Asia, the unforeseen emergency generated by the tribal raid on his State had left no option for him except to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. The Maharaja had, at the same time, sent an Instrument of Accession duly signed by him for the acceptance by the Government of India. He had also expressed his willingness for setting up of an Interim Government, asking Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to carry on the responsibilities in co-operation with his Prime Minister during the period of emergency.72 The Governor-General of India while conveying the acceptance of the Instrument of Accession to the Maharaja said: “In consistence with our policy that in case of any state where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of the accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. It is my Government’s wish that as soon as the law and order has been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”73

71 Mattu, Abdul Majid, The Prolonged Agony (Kashmir Saga), Gulshan Publications, (Srinagar, 2004), p. 47 72 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 18 73 Lakhanpal, P. N., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, International Books, (Delhi, 1995), p. 57

This is also corroborated by the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru when he, in his broadcast on All India Radio on November 2, 1947 announced: “We have decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. The pledge we have given and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world, we will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the U.N. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict.”74

Thus, Maharaja signed the ‘Instrument of Accession’ with India, paving the way for the Indian Army to land in Kashmir. Three hundred and thirty men of the First Sikh Battalion were flown in to block a major invasion by North- West Frontier tribesmen who were moving rapidly towards Srinagar, the summer capital. Six months later, Pakistan sent its troops into Kashmir in May 1948, which led to the first India-Pakistan War. Since then, State’s accession became an element of great controversy between India and Pakistan. For India, the accession is legal, constitutional, perfect and unchallenged. Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan branded Kashmir’s accession as an act based on ‘fraud and violence’ and therefore, not ‘bonafide’.75

1.6 International Mediation: UN and the Promise of Plebiscite The Kashmir dispute got recognition at the international level when India in 1948 took the matter to the United Nations’ Security Council, demanding that Pakistan stop its aggression, withdraw its troops and deny access through Pakistan to tribal invaders fighting against Kashmir. The Council passed its first resolution on the matter on January 17, 1948, in which it expressed the strong opinion, ‘that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting’ in Kashmir and noted with satisfaction that they desired that the future of Kashmir “should be decided

74 Menon, V. P., Integration of Indian States, Op. Cit., p. 406 75 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Viva Publications, (New Delhi, 2004), p. 61

18 through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite.”76 Three days later, the Council passed another resolution to create the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the facts and play a mediatory role in Kashmir in order to restore order and hold a plebiscite in Kashmir in cooperation with both governments. India rejected the resolution on the ground that it raised doubts about the legality of accession.77 Following this, the Commission passed resolution on August 15, 1948, the resolution was split up in three parts- Part I concerned itself with the cease-fire, Part II with the truce agreement and Part-III with plebiscite. In this resolution, the Commission asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir. The Indian withdrawal was to follow that of Pakistan. Although India was allowed to retain a certain number of forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the state. Pakistan did not accept the resolution as it demanded balanced and synchronized withdrawal of both armies of India and Pakistan. After this, on December 11, 1948 another resolution was adopted. Some of the important provisions of the resolution are as follows: 1) The question of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided by the free and impartial Plebiscite. 2) The plebiscite was contingent on a ceasefire in accordance with the provision of Part-1 and Part II of the Commission’s resolution passed on August 13, 1948. 3) Appointment of Plebiscite Administrator who would be nominated by the Secretary General of United Nations in consultation with the Commission. 4) a) After the cease-fire and when the Commission was satisfied about the restoration of peaceful conditions, it would in consultation with the government of India and the Plebiscite Administrator to determine the final disposal of Indian armed forces.

76 Karbel, Josef, Kashmir Dispute after Six Years, International Organization, Vol. 7. No. 4, (Nov. 1953), p. 500 77 Nayar, Kuldip, ‘Kashmir: Re-reading its past in order to proffer a practical solution’ in ‘Kashmir from Autonomy to Azadi’ compiled by Wani, G. M., Valley Book House, (Srinagar 1996), pp. 31-33

b) As regards the areas under Pakistan, final disposal of the troops in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator.78 It is important to note that India and Pakistan had accepted the UN mediated proposals and both countries came to accept a UN mediated cease- fire line later renamed LOC (line of control) and UN Observer’s Group to supervise it from January 1, 1949. This cease-fire line divides the State into two political units, Indian administered Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir. After the cease-fire, UN Commission failed to convince for withdrawal of troops from the State. However, the Security Council President, McNaughton, in order to remove the deadlock, proposed that India and Pakistan forces would be withdrawn and both the Azad Kashmir troops and the state forces were to be reduced. India rejected the proposal but India’s rejection did not deter the Security Council from adopting McNaughton’s Proposal in a resolution dated, March 14, 1950.79 When the Commission failed to persuade India for Plebiscite, it recommended its own dissolution and appointed Sir Owen Dixon as UN mediator on March 27, 1950. He made two proposals: a) to hold the plebiscite by sections or areas. b) To partition the state according to the known wishes of the inhabitants and holding a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley.80 Following this, in disregard of the United Nations pending discussions on Kashmir, India held elections in Kashmir in 1951 and projected the Assembly election in its part of Kashmir as a substitute to the UN sponsored plebiscite. In response to this development, the Security Council at the insistence of Pakistan passed a resolution (March 30, 1951) denying the authority of Constituent Assembly to decide the future of the state and

78 Koul, S. N., Internationalization of Kashmir Issue, Rajat Publications, (New Delhi, 2002), pp. 36-37 79 Gupta, Sisir, ‘Kashmir: A Study in India- Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, (Bombay, 1966), pp. 203-204 80 Nayar, Kuldip, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Sub-continent, Vikas Publishing House, (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 73-74

20 reminded the parties that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to be made in accordance with the will of the people of State. As a consequence, neither India nor Pakistan withdrew their forces from the state, thereby splitting Kashmir in two parts- Pakistan and Indian administered Kashmir depicted on today’s maps, thus, setting the stage for the longest dispute in the history of United Nations. Since then, Kashmir has been caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand, India claims Kashmir as its ‘Atoot Ang’ (integral part) , on the other hand, Pakistan claims that it is her ‘Shah Rag’ (jugular vein). After a perusal of history of Jammu and Kashmir, especially in the context of colonial rule of British, it is clear that the roots of Kashmir problem lie in the hasty partition of British India, the way religious politics has been used in the partition and the denial of Plebiscite (as guaranteed by UN, demanded by Kashmiris and promised by Indian state). This historical understanding is necessary to understand the subsequent political developments in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir. Any effort that has been made to solve the problem in Indian part of Kashmir has been influenced by its history. Thus, the root cause of the Kashmir problem lies in this historical period itself.

CHAPTER 2 2. GROWTH OF MILITANCY: AN ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL-POLITICO FACTORS

Kashmir’s accession to India has been controversial as it occurred in special circumstances. As shown in the first chapter, it was India who took it to international mediation through UN and India’s first Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) promised to solve this dispute and integrate amicably Kashmir through the democratic technique of plebiscite. However, after living many years in peace, the Kashmiri movement took an unfortunate turn in late 1980s- armed resistance began which resulted in huge violence, killings and destruction- Here, at this juncture various questions arise, such as why after 40 years of living within India, the people of Kashmir rose against the sovereignty of India in the state? If they wanted to secede, why did they help to repel invaders in 1947 whose ostensible mission was to liberate them? Why did the movement turn violent? What were the factors responsible for the outbreak of armed resistance? What was the role of Indian State? etc., it is never easy to answer these obvious questions and many scholars have continuously tried to grapple with these questions and look for answers. Sumit Ganguly, a noted scholar, traces the alienation of Kashmiris from the period of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the outbreaks of insurgency and argues that the continuous shrinking of democratic spaces and the vacuum left by Secular National Conference (NC) led to the ethno-religious mobilization in the late 1980s. Ganguly shows in his work that the situation in Kashmir from 1962 to 1965 was almost like the situation in late 1980s but still mobilization didn’t take place in 1960s. The presence of Sheikh Abdullah in the picture of Kashmir politics was a big factor till 1980s which prevented any other voice to be raised. Death of Sheikh in 1982 and inexperience of Farooq Abdullah created a space for other forces to capitalize and one such forces were the young and radical militant groups like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which became an attraction for most of the youth at

22 that time. Also the strong centralizing tendency of Indian Prime Ministers after Jawahar Lal Nehru, be they Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi, led them to look at very movement for greater autonomy as a possible secessionist movement. This led Indira Gandhi to have strong and tough administrators like Jagmohan Malhotra, to be appointed as Governor in J&K only to prevent rising of any secessionist voice.1

2.1 Erosion of Autonomy The Instrument of Accession which formed the basis of Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship with India accorded the state a special status, which was not granted to other former princely states. Legally, India’s jurisdiction only extended to external affairs, defense and communications (the three areas agreed in the Instrument of Accession, for further details see Appendix I). This special status was ratified by inclusion of an Article in the Indian Constitution, drafted first as Article 306-A and then finalized as Article 370.2 Article 370 restricted Indian Parliament’s legislative power with regard to Jammu and Kashmir to external affairs, defense and communications. Other provisions of the Indian Constitution could be extended to the state only prior to the concurrence of the State Government and subject to ratification by the Constituent Assembly. Article 370 was the only article deals with the constitutional relationship of the Jammu and Kashmir State with the Indian Union. Thus, Kashmir was allowed to have its own constitution, flag, and political titles such as Wazir-i-Azam (Prime Minister) instead of Chief Minister for the elected head of the government and Sadar-i-Riyasat instead of Governor for the head of the state.3 Soon after Article 370 found place in the Constitution of India, a great hue and cry was raised against the special status accorded to Jammu and

1 Ganguly, Sumit, The Crisis in Kashmir- Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 38-42 2 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Viva Publications, (New Delhi, 2004), pp. 73-78 3 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Manohar Publications, (New Delhi, 2000), p.76

Kashmir by the forces of communalism, reaction and other anti-autonomy forces in India and in the Jammu province of the State itself. The main contention of these forces was that Article 370 should immediately be repealed and Jammu and Kashmir be brought to the level of equality, in its constitutional relationship of Indian Union, with the rest of the country. These forces urged upon the total merger of the state with the Union of India. This sort of political behavior on their part gave a rude shock to the people in general and their leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in particular, who was mainly responsible to have supported the accession of the State to the Indian Union. Sheikh Abdullah criticized the stand of those whose contention was to apply the Indian Constitution to the state in toto as ‘unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy’.4 He resisted every move or attempt which aimed at undoing with the autonomy of the state. Thus, controversy over the centre-state relations in the due course of time assumed various dimensions. However, the government of India and Jammu and Kashmir agreed to hold a meeting for the settlement of differences regarding the centre-state relations on July 24, 1952 in Delhi. As a result of the meeting, the representatives of both the governments signed an agreement called ‘Delhi Agreement’5 (See Appendix II). However, this agreement could not satisfy the government of India’s hunger for wrenching more and more powers from the state. Sheikh Abdullah, the main stumbling block in the way of closer constitutional integration of the state with the union of India and the staunch defender of the state’s autonomy was, finally, removed from the seat of power and put behind the bars. After the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed as the Prime Minister of the state. He followed centre’s line of action. Much integration took place during his tenure. In 1954, the Constituent Assembly formally ratified the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir which was

4 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, J. V. Press, (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 38-40 5 Anand, A. S., The Development of Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Light and Life Publications, (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 149-150

24 intended to legitimize the Instrument of Accession, signed by Hari Singh in 1947. This measure was also meant to end all discussions on plebiscite.6 Thus, the erosion of autonomy soon began after the Delhi Agreement rather Delhi Agreement was itself a great blow to autonomy as several provisions of Indian Constitution like Articles 52, 352, Union flag etc were applied to the state. In 1954, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 was issued by the President of India extending the centre’s jurisdiction to all subjects under the Union list and the residuary powers. In 1958, through a constitutional amendment Jammu and Kashmir was brought under the purview of central administrative agencies. Economic enterprises and banks were staffed by non-Muslims from outside the state. In 1960, the jurisdiction of the Election Commission of India and the Supreme Court extended to the state. In 1964-65, Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. These provisions empowered the central government to dismiss state government and intervene in the affairs of the state.7 The other constitutional changes struck by the Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act 1965 related to the change of the Title ‘Sadar-i-Riyasat’ to “Governor” and that of the ‘Prime Minister’ to the ‘Chief Minister’ and of bringing the Judges of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at par with the Judges of High Courts in other States of India. The same Amendment Act also brought the State employees at par with the employees of other States of India in matters of promotion, demotion, dismissal, etc. The Act further introduced the direct elections of the members of the Lok Sabha from the State and extended various other Central Labour Laws to the State. Thus, it can be said that though Article 370 remained on the Statute book but its substance was considerably deleted. All this was done with the approval and participation of local political leaders/elites.

6 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 94 7 Anand, A. S., The Development of Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 133

While this process of closer integration of the State was very much lauded and appreciated by forces of anti-autonomy, there was mounting discontent in the Valley against these measures and moves of constitutional integration of the State with Centre. Plebiscite Front (PF) President, Afzal Beig and Awami Action Committee (AAC) Chief, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq gave a joint call to observe a protest day in Kashmir on January15, 1965 against ‘unconstitutional and undemocratic measures adopted by India to grab Kashmir completely.’8 Thus, the erosion of State’s special status given under the Article 370 through various means like extension of Central Laws through Presidential Orders, induction of more bureaucrats from Central Services such as IAS and IPS in state administration, bringing the State’s Independent Election Commission under the Election Commission of India, inculcated in the minds of Kashmiris fear of losing their separate Kashmiri identity. Kashmiris had historically resisted any attempt to threaten their identity in any form. They did not forgive even their co-religionists, the Mughals, for invading Kashmir and thus, threatening their identity (Kashmiriyat). Thus, the measures which were supposed to bring about integration of Kashmir with Union of India, served as seeds of alienation and isolation among the Kashmiris.9

2.2 Failure of Democratic Process One of the important causes of militancy in Kashmir is the denial of democracy to the people of Jammu & Kashmir. The electoral history of Kashmir was one of rigging, fraud, manipulation and other mal-practices. In all the three elections of 1951, 1957 and 1962 there was widespread misuse of official machinery. In this regard, P. N. Bazaz writes “On all the three occasions the government machinery was completely and unhesitatingly used in support of the ruling party, opponents were disqualified on frivolous grounds, the few dauntless candidates who dared to stand for the contest were mercilessly beaten or kidnapped ‘peace brigade’ men were employed to intimidate voters and whenever strong arm methods failed, the ballot boxes were

8 Puri,Balraj, Jammu and Kashmir- Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalization, Sterling Publishers, (New Delhi, 1981), p. 155 9 Mir, Sayed Qasim, My Life and Times, Allied Publishers, (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 134-136

tempered with enabling polling officers to declare the victory of the NC party men.”10 In a letter of March 1962, Pt. Nehru wrote to Bakshi, “It would strengthen your position much more if you lost a few seats to bonafide opponents.”11

Democratically elected leaders were removed through central intervention like Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and put behind the bars on 1953 and Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. This political act introduced a tradition of imposing a man of Delhi Darbar on the people of Jammu and Kashmir, which was in complete negation of democratic traditions. This tradition continued for many years in the state. It is generally believed that this tradition proved one dominant factor in convincing the people of Jammu & Kashmir that the Government of India will never allow democracy to function in the state and thus, feeling of alienation started gaining weight in the Kashmir.12 In a sensitive border State, democracy was indispensible but national integration was given more preference over democracy in the border state. Balraj Puri, an expert on Kashmir politics, quotes Nehru’s words in his book, “We have gambled at the international stage on Kashmir, We can’t afford to lose it. At the movement we are there at the point of bayonet. Till things improve democracy and morality can wait.”13 Opposition parties were threatened and intimidated, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had created a personalized structure of power and assumed the leadership of the cabinet, legislature and party. He raised a ‘Peace Brigade’ which performed the duty of intimidating and threatening his adversaries.14 . The Indian government used its own laws to vindicate its corrupt actions in the State, Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution “empowers the centre to dismiss elected governments of India’s states in the event of a breakdown of law and order and to assume their legislative mandate” On

10 Bazaz, Prem Nath., Kashmir in Crucible, Pamposh Publications, (New Delhi, 1967), p. 87 11 Akbar, M. J., Kashmir Behind The Vale, Viking, (New Delhi, 1991), p. 159 12 Sharma, Y. R., Political Dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir, Radha Krishna Anand & CO., (Jammu, 2002), p. 473 13 Puri, Balraj, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, Orient Longman, (New Delhi, 1993), p. 47 14 Sadasivam, S. N., Party and Democracy in India, McGraw Publishers, (New Delhi, 1977), p. 118

27 multiple occasions Indian government misused these articles, declared democratically-elected governments void and installed governments that were sympathetic to its interests like on July 2, 1984, Farooq Abdullah, the then Chief Minister of state, was told by the new Governor Jagmohan that his party had lost its majority in the State following the defection of 13 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), 12 belonging to the NC and one independent. The democratic traditions require that the question of loss of confidence should always be tested on the floor of the house, however, the Governor neither asked the outgoing Chief Minister to prove his majority in the house nor dissolved the Assembly to order fresh elections which was the constitutional procedure. The puppet government of G.M. Shah was installed after engineering a split in the NC by the Congress. All the defectors were made ministers in the Shah government. Jagmohan was specially called in to do the job as the outgoing Governor B. K. Nehru refused to perform this unholy act. The toppling of a duly elected government not only stultified the democratic process but also hurt regional aspirations of the Kashmiris. Destabilization of Farooq Abdullah’s government had caused strong resentment among the people of Kashmir against the central government. It spread a wave of protest, people cried ‘Jagmohan, hai hai’(Jagmohan down, down).15 The people felt betrayed. As Mir Qasim wrote, “Mr. Jagmohan’s unconstitutional act was another nail in the coffin of the Kashmiris faith in Indian democracy and law.”16 The clock has been put back thirty years.’ Said, Tavleen Singh, “Kashmir has been reminded that no matter how much it feels that it belongs to the mainstream of India, no matter how often its chief minister asserts that he is Indian, it will always be special, always be suspect.”17 Thus, the legitimate rights of people to elect their representatives, to have free and fair elections, frequent changes of Chief Ministers, Governor

15 Singh, Tavleen, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, Penguin Publications, (New Delhi, 1995), p. 68 16 Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, Op. Cit., p. 163 17 Singh, Tavleen, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, Op. Cit., p. 74

28 rule, toppling of elected government and most importantly central intervention dramatically eroded democracy in Kashmir. Besides erosion of special status and denial of democracy, economic underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, lack of good governance, regional tensions and incitement of Pakistan are the chief stimulants that played upon the minds of Kashmiris to seek independence from India. However, the most important factor is the existence of separatist movement ever since from 1947. The above mentioned factors only enhanced the separatist movement. As shown in the first chapter, Jammu and Kashmir is a historical problem. There were manipulations and negotiations to solve this dispute but Indian Union did not succeed completely to address the proper historical context of the problem. It resorted to nation building techniques to integrate Kashmir. In opposition to India’s integrationist policies certain sections of People of Jammu and Kashmir resisted from the beginning.

2.3 Separatist Movement 2.3.1 Plebiscite Front Secessionist sentiment remained alive in Kashmir ever since 1947.The period between 1953 and 1975 constitutes one of the most crucial phases of Kashmir history, as it was during this period that Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who earlier paved way for Kashmir’s accession to India and became its main advocate, opted for an extreme step by launching the Plebiscite Front (PF) (Mahaz-e-Rai-Shumari) to oppose the accession.18 After Delhi Agreement, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah showed interest in independence of Kashmir and it was not well taken by the Union government and Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and arrested on August 9, 1953 on the charges that he has become a tool of foreign conspiracies designed to undermine Kashmir’s ties with India.19 Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beig, close

18 Verma, P. S., Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, Vikas Publications, (Delhi, 1994), p. 49 19 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Aatish-i-Chinar, Showket Kitaab Ghar, (Srinagar, 2006), p. 601

29 colleague of Sheikh Abdullah, launched Plebiscite Front (PF) on August 9, 1955 exactly two years after Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal and detention. Plebiscite Front sought respect for civil liberties, an inclusive political system and above all, the resolution of the Self-determination question through a referendum under the auspices of United Nations or through an India-Pakistan peace process with the participation of Jammu and Kashmir’s diverse political forces.20 The Plebiscite Front described the Indian Army as the army of occupation,21 and considered Kashmir’s accession to India temporary. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah did not formally join the Plebiscite Front but acted as its patron22, campaigning across the Valley for the Front’s slogan ‘the Right to Self-determination.’’23 Towards the close of year 1963 on December 26, whole Valley was shocked to know that the Holy Relic of Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W) was stolen from the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar. After intense public agitation the Relic was restored to its place on January 9, 1964. The Holy Relic movement of 1963 provided an opportunity to the Plebiscite Front to remain in limelight in Kashmir Politics as the party forged an alliance with the Action Committee (AC) of Molvi Farooq to lead the people of Valley.24 On February 5, 1965, Sheikh Abdullah along with Begum Abdullah and Mohammad Afzal Beig, left for a tour of Europe and West Asia including a pilgrimage to Mecca. However, the Government of India took offence at his meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai at Algiers where they both happened to be on a visit at the same time. The Indian government threatened to cancel his passport if he did not return immediately. He and Beig were arrested as soon as they landed in Delhi on May 8, 1965. In Kashmir a wave of anger swept across the whole Valley against the action taken by

20 Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Vistaar Publications, (New Delhi, 2003), p. 297 21 Mattu, Abdul Majeed, Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective, M/S Ali Mohammad & Sons, (Srinagar, 2002), p. 75 22 Singh, Narender, Political Awakening in Kashmir, H K Publications, (Delhi, 1992), p. 87 23 Devdas, David, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Viking, Penguin, (New Delhi, 2007), p. 104 24 Singh, Narender, Political Awakening in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 87

Government of India against Kashmiri leaders. Throughout Valley reaction was widespread and violent, preceded by strong wave of repression and arrest of number of leaders and workers of the Plebiscite Front.25 However, the space was fulfilled by the student community who got involved in freedom movement in a big way.26 A whole new generation of youth inspired by the slogans of the Plebiscite Front got involved in the struggle for Right to Self- determination. In this way Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the Front had created such a mass uprising that moved beyond the control of those who had initiated it.27 The Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front which had spearheaded a separatist movement for about two decades became the first casualty as a result of the Indira-Abdullah Accord 1975.28 After the Accord, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah assumed the power and dissolved the ‘Plebiscite Front’ (precondition of Accord laid by New Delhi) on July 5, 1975 and merged it into the newly revived National Conference which in the changed context adopted the pro- accession policy for which the Sheikh Abdullah had to face accusations in Kashmir Valley.

2.3.2 Action Committee The year 1964 was the beginning of profound changes in the political scenario of Jammu and Kashmir. The theft of Holy Relic preserved at Hazratbal Shrine at Srinagar, sent a wave of deep indignation throughout the state and caused widespread dismay and resentment among the people. The episode became one of the most crucial moments in Kashmir politics and history. Separatists and secessionist sentiments received a new lease of life and

25 Verma, P. S., Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, Op. Cit., p. 50 26 Hindustan Times, June 20, 1967 27 Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, Op. Cit., pp. 326-327 28 Indira-Abdullah Accord was signed between the leader of National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, in 1975. The Accord recognized accession as final and provided for a review of laws enacted with respect to Kashmir after Abdullah’s dismissal, with the condition to receive Delhi’s assent. This Accord also led Sheikh Abdullah’s assumption of office of Chief Minister of the State.

31 a climate of hostility against India resurfaced.29 The Holy Relic Committee (HRC) presided by Mirwaiz Molvi Mohammad Farooq, was jointly formed by Muslim clerics and separatist parties for restoration of the Holy Relic.30 The agitation started spontaneously without any particular leadership and any organization orchestrating it. It was Mr. J. N. Sadhu (then working as correspondent with the Daily Indian Express)31 who actually suggested that newsman should write that the agitation was being spearheaded by an Action Committee. When this news appeared in New Delhi newspapers, the people in Kashmir owned the name of ‘Action Committee’ (AC).32 Thus, the Holy Relic Committee was converted into Action Committee (AC). The Action Committee (AC) established its branches in all parts of the Valley outside Srinagar and became a ‘coalition of opposition parties’. It contained elements from the Plebiscite Front and the followers of Mirwaiz Molvi Farooq. The Political Conference headed by Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Karra also lent its support to the Committee.33 Taking the full advantage of the unrest, the Action Committee (AC) oriented the mass sentiment into an anti-India feeling. In this way the dormant mass aspiration for the right to self-determination got further galvanized.34 The Action Committee under the leadership of Mirwaiz Farooq gained ground and succeeded in bringing concerted action of masses on the streets of the Valley. The mounting discontent that government of India witnessed in the Valley convinced them to reorient their Kashmir policy.35 Sheikh Abdullah was set free and was allowed to visit Pakistan along with Mirza Afzal Beig and Moulana Syed Masoodi. They proceeded to Pakistan with Mr. Nehru’s proposal for confederation between India, Pakistan and Kashmir, which the

29 Singh, Narender, Political Awakening in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 92 30 Giyasu-ud-din, Peer, Understanding the Kashmir Insurgency, Jay Kay Book House, (Jammu Tawi, 1992), p. 35. 31 Bhat, Sonaullah, Kashmir in Flames, Ali Mohammad & Sons, (Srinagar, 1981), p. 87 32 Ibid., p. 87 33 Giyasu-ud-Din, Peer, Understanding the Kashmir Insurgency, Op. Cit., p. 93 34 Ibid., p. 36 35 Lamb, Alastair, Kashmir- A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, Oxford University Press, (Pakistan, 1994), p.207

President of Pakistan, Mohammad Ayub Khan plainly rejected.36 However, shortly after his return from Pakistan in June 1964, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his colleagues realized the importance of a political stage, the need to revitalize the party (Plebiscite Front) and took back the initiative from the Action Committee which had captured the political platform during and after Holy Relic Movement.37 These people even refused to recognize the Action Committee as an independent political platform organized for the right to self-determination and plebiscite in Kashmir. It was considered imperative by these people to curtail the influence of Mirwaiz and he was asked to “limit his activities to religious affairs”, as he was not only gaining popularity among the masses but was openly interpreting the right to self-determination as accession to Pakistan.38 This was not liked by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his associates and consequently, it resulted into the split in the Action Committee. Moulvi Farooq announced setting up a separate political party with ‘Awami Action Committee’ (AAC) as its name in the month of June 1964, which also laid stress on the right to self-determination to the people of Kashmir.39 The Holy Relic Action Committee leaders were surprised over it and Molvi Farooq was accused of causing discord among Muslims by floating his separate organization.40

36 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, Friends not Masters, Oxford University Press, (London, 1967), p. 128 37 Patriot, June 16, 1964 38 The Times of India, August 6, 1964 39 Singh, Narender, Political Awakening in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p.95 40 Bhat, Sonaullah, Kashmir in Flames, Op. Cit., p. 103

2.3.3 Jama’at-i-Islami After the partition of the Indian sub-continent, the Kashmir chapter of the Jama’at-i-Islami 41severed its ties with its Pakistan as well as Indian units. The decision was necessitated by the disputed nature of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Jama’at like other political parties, offers a well thought out socio- economic and political programme. A study of its election manifestos reveals that the Jama’at stands committed to play a forceful and fearless oppositional role in the Assembly till it has assumed the power to rule, to play an effective oppositional role in the Assembly with a view to end the political uncertainty in the state and to ensure the preservation of its identity, to expose all such conspiracies in and outside the Assembly as would dangerously and unconstitutionally, be practiced to convert the majority character of the state into minority one and oppose any such measure as will permit the settlement of non-state subjects in the state, to present its constructive suggestions for the purpose of bringing about good relations between India and Pakistan and in this respect, pursue both the countries to settle down all their disputes amicably for ensuring a peaceful future, to continue its efforts to make Jammu and Kashmir a welfare state and to strongly oppose all such measures as will damage the character and injure the faith of the people thereof. The Jama’at pledges to organize the people of the state against all evils such as the manufacture of wine and its sale, unethical programmes of radio, television and cinema, bhung cultivation, unsound educational curriculum, obscene literature and a system of co-education and co-employment.42 Thus, Jama’at-I-

41 It is a movement launched by Syed Abu Ala Maudodi in 1941, had influenced modern Muslims in the sub-continent and Jammu and Kashmir is no exception in this regard. In Jammu and Kashmir it was established in 1942 at Shopian by Moulvi Ghulam Ahmad Ahrar in collaboration with other likeminded persons (like Pir Saad-ud-Din, Qari Saif-u- Din, Dr. G. H Rasool and Syed Mohammad Shafi). After the partition, like the Jama’at-i- Islami Pakistan and Jama’at-i-Islami Hind, Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir came into existence with separate heads and constitution, Quoted, Malhotra, Jagmohan., My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Allied Publishers, (New Delhi, 1991), pp. 176-177 42 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 469

Islami wants to establish a new social, economic and political structure in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The most important and controversial issue in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir has been the issue of accession of the state with the Indian Union. Jama’at-i-Islami, the largest cadre based socio-religious political organization of the state, is of the opinion that the issue of the future status of the State is yet to be resolved in accordance with the commitments made by the Government of India with the people of the state and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.43 The party maintains that State’s accession with India was temporary and conditional and the final decision has to be made by the people of Jammu and Kashmir through an internationally monitored Plebiscite. Accordingly, it maintains that the people of Kashmir must be given the opportunity to exercise right to self-determination through which they will decide either to continue with India or accede with Pakistan and thus, resolve the issue for all times.44 However, the party is silent over the option of ‘Complete Independence’ as pleaded by another organization, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). In 1975, the Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK) strongly condemned the Indira-Abdullah Accord, arguing that this was a gross violation of the U.N. resolutions. It argued that India had no right, according to international law, to bury the issue of the disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir by signing a pact with a single individual. Instead, it said that only solution to the issue was to take into account the wishes of the people of the state. Jama’at which is basically an Islamist organization that had been working in social, educational, and religious fields began to take active part in Kashmir politics before the 1975 Accord. Jama’at adopted the democratic way of seceding from the Indian Union and therefore, resorted to participation in elections. In the Assembly elections of 1971 Jama’at candidates won (5) seats out of twenty two (22) it contested.45

43 Kashmiri, Ashique, Tareekh-e-Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu wa Kashmir, Vol. II, New Kashmir Press, (Srinagar, 1982), pp. 281-285 44 Saifu-ud-Din, Quari, Vadiya Purkhar, Chinar Publication, (Srinagar, 1992), pp. 59-62 45 Mir Qasim, MY Life and Times, Op. Cit., p. 133

During emergency in 1975, the Jama’at-i-Islami was declared a banned organization. Its offices were sealed, its leaders incarcerated and a large number of schools (with approximately 550 teachers and 25000 students) were forcibly closed down on the grounds of spreading communal hatred and practicing anti-national activities, the charge Jama’at vehemently denied and contested. The ban on Jama’at-i-Islami was lifted two years later, when in 1977 Janta Party came into power at the Centre. Following this, the Jama’at-i-Islami once again geared its efforts, holding large public meetings all over the state and brought a large number of people under its influence. 46 Jama’at continued to take part in the State Assembly and Parliamentary elections to highlight the Kashmir issue. Within and outside the Assembly its members repeatedly raised the question of disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir, asserting that India had failed to abide by its promises made to the international community and the people of Jammu and Kashmir to hold a plebiscite in the disputed territory.47 For instance Syed Ali Geelani (member of Jama’at-i-Islami) in the State Legislative Assembly speaking on the Governor’s address on September 12, 1977 categorically stated that “accession of Kashmir to India made in 1947, under extra-ordinary circumstances was temporary and provisional”.48 During a public meeting organized by the workers of the party in the main Chowk of Baramulla on July 1984, the two leaders of the party Syed Ali Geelani and Ghulam Mohammad Shafi challenged the accession of the State with the Union of India and declared the accession as disputed. They demanded that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined in the light of resolutions passed by the United Nations from time to time.49 The press statements of the Islamist organization as well as the public pronouncements of its leaders suggest that the organization has taken a stand that it wants “peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute”. The

46 Jan, Tarikh; Sarvar, Ghulam, Kashmir Problem-Change and Response, , Institute of Policy Studies, (Islamabad ,1990), p. 317 47 Geelani, Syed Ali Shah, Mulati-i-Muzloom, Tulu Publisher, (Srinagar, 1998), p. 336 48 Official Report, Mubhisat Jammu and Kashmir Kanonsaz Assembly, Phala Ijlas, September/October 1977, Vol.1, No. 3, Monday, 12th September, 1977, pp. 50-51 49 Press Conference by Syed Ali Geelani as quoted in ‘Azan’ in August, 1984

36 organization also wants as its leaders assert, to see both Pakistan and India as free, prosperous and peaceful neighboring nations.50

2.3.4 Al-Fatah Al-Fatah (AF), Kashmir’s first guerrilla organization, commenced its activities in 1965.51 By 1969, it had become state wide covert organization with a well-planned strategy of economic and militant subversion to undermine the Indian authority in the state.52 It started its guerrilla activities for the “freedom of Kashmir” and for this the youth were trained at the organizations hide outs like the one at Barsu (a village located fourteen miles south-east of Srinagar).53 The main organizer and leader of Al-Fatah was Ghulam Rasool Zerger. The other prominent members were Nazir Ahmad Wani, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, Dr. Farooq Ahmad Bhatt, Farooq Rehmani, Dr. Abdul Alla, Abdul Hai Baderwahi, Hamidullah Bhat, Nissar Mir, Shaban Vakil and G.A.Naikoo. Mohammad Altaf Khan (Alias Azam Inquilabi) also joined the group on later stage. The group secured the support of some young men for its cause notable amongst them was Mian Sarwar who, on his own, had earlier set up an organization called Students Revolutionary Council.54 Before the emergence of Al-Fatah, Kashmiris had not tested covert activities or guerrilla warfare against the rule of New Delhi. Al-Fatah was an expression of disappointment of youth with the political leadership of Kashmir at that time. They were inspired by revolutionary movements of Hungary and Cuba. The much publicized adventures of the Cuban revolutionary, Che-Guevara55 seem to have a great influence on the organization of the Al-Fatah, particularly its leader Zerger.

50 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson Longman, (New Delhi, 2007), p. 46 51 David, Devdas., In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 111 52 Malhotra, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 159 53 Bhat, Sonaullah, Kashmir in Flames, Op. Cit., p.153 54 Malhotra, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 159-160 55 He was born in Rosario in Argentine. He was a doctor by profession, but he decided to join the Cuba Revolution. In 1965 he became a guerrilla leader of Bolvivia (Spanish)

Al-Fatah had formulated three phase strategy: firstly, recruitment and training; secondly, commission of violent crisis in order to subvert law and order and lastly, espionage to collect information about military dispositions, movements of troops and artillery, strategic military roads and secret military documents.56 Key members of Al-Fatah were carefully trained and furnished with regular guidance, funds, arms and explosives from Pakistan. Before undertaking any operation they were first to establish a secure base where they could meet without fear of detection and where they could lie low after an operation. The members were given code names and many of them were not aware of the real identity of each other.57 During the 1970s Kashmir Students Federation, Youngman’s League and some other student organizations were associated with the Al-Fatah.58 Thus, plebiscite movement was spearheaded by Kashmiri youth who organized themselves under Al-Fatah, Jammu and Kashmir Students and Youngman’s League to fight for the right to self-determination. The manifestos of these organizations included reference to the U.N Resolutions on Kashmir, Lord Mountbatten’s assurance and Jawaharlal Nehru’s promises for holding plebiscite in Kashmir.59 Al-Fatah reportedly was responsible for the three major incidents of militancy in Kashmir, namely attacking and killing of constable Charan Dass of Border Security Force (BSF) at Nawakadal Bridge in February, dacoity on April 1970 at Tehsil Education Office, Pulwama from which about 72000 were looted and Hazratbal bank dacoity on January 1971, during the course of which rupees 97000 were reportedly looted.60 Al-Fatah by its activities wanted to create a popular support for any large scale insurgency against the New Delhi’s rule in Kashmir. However, the organization was busted and its members apprehended. Headquarter of the group, which was located in a safe house in Barsu, Pulwama, was also raided by police. Subsequently, police arrested many people who were told to be associated with

56 Malhotra, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 159-160 57 Sharma, B. L., Kashmir Awakes, Vikas Publications, (Delhi, 1971), p. 229 58 Bhat, Sonaullah., Kashmir in Flames, Op. Cit., p. 153 59 Mattu, Abdul Majeed, Kashmir Issue-A Historical Perspective, Op. Cit., p. 76 60 Malhotra, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 160

38 the organization. They included two magistrates, three doctors and six professors.61

2.3.5 People’s League Amidst the protests against ‘Beig-Parthasarthi dialogue’62 the government arrested large number of political activists including Shabir Shah and S. Hamid (the then General Secretary and the President of Young Men’s League respectively) on October 3, 1974 and were detained in Central Jail Srinagar till 25 October 1974.63 In Jail, Shabir Shah met Nazir Ahmad Wani (AL-Fatah) and Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi (Al-Fatah), Abdul Majid Pathan (Youth League), Altaf Khan Alias Azam Inqilabi (Students Islamic League), G.Q.Hagroo and others, all of whom decided to merge their identities into one common platform. All these groups were against the accession of Kashmir with India. As a result of it, they managed to form Jammu and Kashmir People’s League in collaboration with pro-Pakistan youth groups like Young Men’s League (Student Wing of Plebiscite Front), Students Youth League (pro-Molvi Farooq Group) and Islamic Student Organization.64 On October 3, 1974, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi was named its chairman (became the first president of People’s League) and Abdul Majeed Bhat as its General Secretary.65 The Jammu and Kashmir People’s League branded the dialogue as a malicious design to sell the innocent Kashmiris for petty selfish gains. Its workers decided to continue their struggle for the right to self-determination. People’s

61 Bhat, Sonaullah, Kashmir in Flames, Op. Cit., p.153 62 The dialogue between Mirza Afzal Beig on behalf of Jammu and Kashmir and G. Parthasarthi on behalf of Government of India was contested by many Separatist Parties in Kashmir, which finally led to the Kashmir Accord 1975. It is also known as Indira- Abdullah Accord and Beg-Parthasarthi Accord. This accord conceded that the Instrument of Accession as ratified by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly under Bakshi Ghulam Mohmmad was no longer subject to challenge. It is believed that 1975 Accord became public one year before it was signed, so, it was challenged by various separatist Parties in Kashmir that India has no right to bury the issue by signing a pact with a single individual. 63 Personal interview with Fazal-ul-Huq Querishi, Executive Member of APHC (M), Hurriyat Office, Rajbagh, Srinagar, June 22, 2009 64 Sreedhar, K. Santhanam; Saxena,Sudhir, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir, Institute of Defense and Analysis, (New Delhi, 2000), p. 191 65 David, Devdas, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 276

League which comprised of pro-independence and pro-Pakistan leaders was formed just one year before ‘Accord 1975’ which had become public before it was signed. It is believed that ‘Accord 1975’ compelled many pro-freedom leaders to converge on the umbrella of People’s League (PL). Commented on the situation, a PL member and veteran pro-freedom activist, Late Fazl-ul-Haq, (Executive member of a Mirwaiz faction of APHC) told this researcher that “the PL decided to fight against accession of Kashmir with India after people of Kashmir were disappointed by the Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s treason”. In fact, the People’s League played a vital role in mobilizing the Kashmiri youth against the ‘Kashmir Accord’ or ‘Indira-Abdullah Accord’. The efforts of People’s League resulted into protests and demonstrations at many places in Kashmir against the Accord.66 During 1979-88 the leadership of Jammu and Kashmir People’s League passed to younger people like Shabir Shah, Farooq Rehmani, Mukhtar Ahmad Waza and Imtiyaz Ahmad. The League had been opposed to any negotiation with the Government of India without the inclusion of Pakistan as the third party in the issue. In 1979, it constituted a war cell with the purpose to pursue the plan of ‘liberating Kashmir within three years’. In the first year the youth had to be recruited, in the second year arms training were to be given for launching guerrilla warfare and in the third year the organization had decided to wage a liberation struggle.67 However, a senior league leader, Shabir Shah was arrested from Anantnag in 1976. With the result, the war cell plan was dumped. Shabir Shah was released in 1978. He along with other leaders of the People’s League revitalized his organization, motivated the youth and extended its influence to Pulwama, Tral, Sopore, Doda, Bandipora, Srinagar and Budgam area of the state.68

66 Personal interview with Fazal-ul-Huq Querishi, Executive Member of APHC (M), Hurriyat Office, Rajbagh, Srinagar, June 22, 2009 67 Sreedhar, K Santhanam; Saxena,Sudhar., Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 191-192 68 Ibid.,

In 1981, Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (IJT), the student wing of Jama’at-i- Islami, was founded by Sheikh Tajamm-ul-Islam.69 The main objective of the Talba was to free the State of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian occupation or dominance. In order to achieve this political goal, the Talba believes that Islam is the answer to the Kashmir issue. In other words, only an Islamic revolution for islamization of the state as a sovereign entity could resolve the long standing dispute between India and Pakistan. Thus, the establishment of an Islamic order in Kashmir being the political goal of the Talba can be realized under the guidance of Islamic ideology. In this sense, it may not be incorrect to say that like the Jama’at, the Talba also makes religion as the basis of its politics.70 In 1981, Islami Jamiat-e-Talba planned to hold an International Islamic Conference in Srinagar. The People’s League declared its support to the IJT’s plan to organize the event in Srinagar. The Government, however, did not allow the conduct of the event and arrested leadership and several activists of the IJT.71 In the early March of 1982, the People’s League launched an anti-liquor campaign in south Kashmir district of Anantnag. The campaign gained mass support in the area forcing the people associated with the business to close down the shops. The government swung into action and arrested Shabir Shah and other political activists associated with the League. In October 1983, when an international cricket match was scheduled between the West Indies and India in Srinagar, People’s League and Islami Jamiat-e-Talba decided to stop the match and created disturbances both within and outside the playground on October 13, 1983. They argued that ‘the state of Jammu and Kashmir was not an integral part of India and hence no international event could be held in the disputed territory’.

69 Khan G H, Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 471 70 Ibid., 71 Sikand, Yoginder, The Emergence and Development of Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940-1990) Modern Asian Studies, Volume 36, Issue 03, July 2002, pp. 736-738

From time to time, People’s League took many steps to keep the disputed character of the J&K state alive. It, along with other secessionist groups, also called on the voters to boycott the Parliamentary elections of 1989. The turnout of voters in the Valley, according to an official report, remained only 4%.72

2.4 Muslim United Front (MUF) and Election 1987 After the 1975 Accord, the political scenario of Kashmir changed altogether. During the 1980s anti-India feelings were steadily reinforced and organizations like Jama’at-i-Islami and People’s League emerged as dominant forces to reckon with. On the other hand, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in1984 by her bodyguard and Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister after his mother’s assassination. Rajiv made a policy to accommodate regional forces, not only in Kashmir but also in the Punjab and Assam. Rajiv Gandhi offered a Congress-NC alliance. Farooq Abdullah, who had previously rejected Mrs. Gandhi’s offer of an alliance, accepted the offer and was appointed as Chief Minister in National Conference-Congress coalition government. The Assembly election was scheduled for the following year. However, overnight Farooq was transformed from hero to traitor in the Kashmiri mind, writes Tavleen Singh, “People could not understand how a man who had been treated the way he was by Delhi, and especially by the Gandhi family, could now be crawling to them for accords and alliances.”73 He was charged with betraying his father’s fifty year legacy of pride, says M J Akbar, it (alliance) created a vacuum where the National Conference had existed and extremists stepped into that vacuum.74 Amongst those who entered the political vacuum were the collection of political parties which have organized themselves under the banner of Muslim United Front (MUF) which was formally launched in Srinagar on the first day of ‘Muharram’ (first month of Islamic calendar) in September 1986 avowedly

72 Sumantra, Bose, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Op. Cit., p. 96 73 Tavleen, Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, Op. Cit., p. 98 74 Akbar, M. J., Kashmir: Behind the Vale, Viking, (New Delhi), 1991, p.213

42 for protecting the political and religious rights of Muslim community in the state.75 The main objective of MUF was to fight the NC-Congress alliance in the polls.76 For both NC and MUF, polls had assumed a sort of a character of a referendum for their respective political positions.77 Muslim United Front (MUF) was an improvised ‘ad hoc bloc’ of diverse groups with ‘no real unifying ideology, consisting of ‘educated youth, illiterate, working-class people and farmers who express their anger at Abdullah’s family rule, government corruption and lack of economic development.’78 The major fundamental groups which came together under the banner of the MUF were Jama’at-i-Islami, the Ummat-i-Islami led by Qazi Nisar and Molvi Abass Ansari’s Anjuman-i-Itehed-ul-Muslimeen. Other constituents of the MUF were Islamic Study Circle, Muslim Education Trust, Muslim Welfare Society, Islami Jamiat-i-Talba, Idara-i-Tahqiqat. Kashmir youth formed the bulk of its cadre, many of them from rich peasantry or orchard-owing classes and prosperous business groups.79 It was an alliance of pro-freedom organizations and the Jama’at-i-Islami enjoyed the dominant position in it. As the assembly elections of 1987 approached, some more groups including the People’s Conference of Abdul Gani Lone and the Awami National Conference of Gulam Mohammad Shah also joined the MUF. Pertinent to mention that the Mirwaiz Molvi Farooq of Awami Action Committee was not the part of MUF as he had entered into an accord with Dr. Farooq Abdullah (popularly known as Double Farooq Accord) in previous elections. It is widely believed that the Accord persisted even during these elections. The popularity of MUF increased in the Valley and the election symbol allotted to it -Ink-pot and Pen- became catch word in every family. Yasin Malik, an MUF activist and now the JKLF chief says, ‘the MUF ideology was

75 Swami, Praveen, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947- 2004, Rutledge, (London, 2007), p. 76 76 Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Op. Cit., p. 45 77 Swami, Praveen, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, Op. Cit., p. 59 78 Bose,Sumantra, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Op. Cit., p. 48 79 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 47

43 discussed in every home and every nook and corner of the state. The streets were flooded with the display of green flags of the Front.’80 About the popularity of MUF, Khem Lata Wakhloo, a prominent NC member from the Pandit community of Kashmir says that, ‘in 1987 there was only one voice on the lips of the people, that in a democracy we would bring the party of our choice to power, a party that will meet the aspirations of the people and heed their grievances’.81 When the election was held on March 23, 1987, there was nearly 75% participation, the highest ever recorded in the state, with nearly 80% overall voting in the Valley.82 However, elections held were alleged massively rigged. In constituencies where elections were manipulated, the polling agents of the opposition candidates were arrested and beaten up not only by the police but also by the National Conference candidates.83 In these elections the National Conference won 38 seats and its coalition partner Congress 28, Bhartiya Janata Party 2, and Independent 4, the MUF won only 4 seats and secured 30% of the total votes polled. In fact, there was a general consensus in the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies that National Conference-Congress resorted to large scale rigging.84An eyewitness report published in popular national magazine suggested that various practices of manipulation were used during the voting and subsequent counting process. These include “rigging and strong-arm tactics all over the Valley,” ‘entire ballet boxes (being) pre-stamped in favour of NC’, ‘massive booth-capturing by NC gangs, numerous citizens ‘simply not being allowed to vote’, and to government nominated supervisors ‘stopping the counting as soon as they saw opposition candidates taking lead’. Meanwhile, the administration worked blatantly in favour of the NC-Congress alliance’,

80 Personal interview with Yasin Malik, Chairman JKLF, Srinagar, April 21, 2009 81 Wakhlu, Khemlata; Wakhlu O. N., Kashmir Behind the White Curtain, Konarak Publishers, (New Delhi, 1992), p. 321 82 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 137 83 Puri, Balraj, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, Op. Cit., p. 53 84 The Times of India, January 10, 1990

44 and the police refused to listen to any complaint’.85 The report on the elections also states that it was openly rigged. Tavleen Singh writes that ‘the rigging was blatant’, in the constituency of Handwara, for instance, Abdul Gani Lone’s traditional bastion, as soon as counting began on March 26, Lone’s counting agents were thrown out of the counting station by the police.’’86 Commenting on the rigging of elections, I. K. Gujral, (who later on became Prime Minister of India) said, it was surprising to hear one of the Congress ministers saying, that “what is wrong in rigging when the secessionists have to be kept out in the national interest”.87 The large scale rigging in 1987 elections has been regarded as the breaking point in the Kashmir’s relation with the union of India. Dr. Qazi Nisar, a MUF leader said, “I believe in Indian constitution. How long can people like us keep getting votes by exploiting Islam? We have to prove that we can do something concrete, but this kind of thing simply makes people lose faith in the constitution”.88 Similarly, Abdul Gani Lone, the chairman of People’s Conference, a pro-Indian party turned to separatist camp after formation of MUF, questioned in despair, ‘If people are not allowed to vote, where will their venom go but into expression of anti-national sentiment’.89 The common Kashmiri reaction was reflected by a shocked Srinagar lawyer and MUF voter, who said, ‘I don’t even pray regularly but….If you take my vote away, I lose all faith in Indian democracy.’90 It was not the first time elections were rigged in Jammu and Kashmir. The reason why 1987 elections have that much impact on the minds of Kashmiris is that in those elections newly constituted Muslim United Front (MUF) had made a serious bid to capture power through popular vote. The

85 Badhar, Inderjit, A Tarnished Triumph, India Today, Volume XII, Number 7, April 15 , 1987, pp. 76-78 86 Singh, Tavleen, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, Op. Cit., p.102 87 The Times of India, October 13, 1986 88 A Tarnished Triumph, India Today, Op. Cit., 89 Ibid., 90 Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir-Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Op. Cit., p. 94

Kashmiris perceived the denial of their right to fair and free election as the final humiliation.91 Although, MUF lost the election they gained a lot of public sympathy for their cause. People believed that Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, and Farooq Abdullah worked together to betray their verdict by resorting to such a massive rigging. As the anger against the rigging mounted, people began to identify bad administration, corruption in the system and eventually the rigging in the elections as a direct consequence of New Delhi’s unbridled powers to intervene in the affairs of the state. Let down in the mass rigging in the elections, the people began to question the effects of accession to India on the society of Kashmir. 92 Immediately after winning the elections, the coalition government used different coercive methods to suppress their political opponents especially those having some connections with the MUF. Almost all the candidates of the MUF who were ‘defeated’ were arrested along with their prominent supporters soon after the results were declared. Some of them were arrested right inside the counting halls and were beaten up publicly by the police and National Conference candidates jointly.93 Thus, manipulation of the election disappointed the Kashmiris, says Mir Abdul Aziz, ‘we were trying to change the political framework by democratic and peaceful methods, but we have failed in this, therefore we should take up guns’.94 Abdul Gani Lone who lost the 1987 elections and became a leading member of the separatist movement till his death drew the following conclusions from the elections; “It was this that motivated the young generation to say ‘to hell with the democratic process and all that this is about and they said ‘let us go for the armed struggle’. It was the flash point. The thought was there, the motivation was there, the urge was there, the demand was there and the opposition was there. The situation became ripe and the elections provided a flash point.”95

91 Tikku, M. K., Genesis of the Problem, Hindustan Times, August 13, 1991 92 Wakhlu, Khemlata; Wakhlu, O.N., Kashmir Behind the White Curtain, Op. Cit., p.323 93 Devdas, David, In Search of Future-The Story of Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 154 94 Schofield,Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 138 95 Widmalm, Sten, The Rise and fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 11 (Nov. 1997), p. 1021

2.5 Eruption of Militancy Post 1987 elections witnessed a radically changed political landscape of Kashmir. Bandhs, marches, protests, boycotts and shutdowns, anti-India slogans gained ascendency. A generation of youth that felt disillusioned with the democratic system took recourse to guns. The young generation used to say that “the bullets will deliver where the ballot had failed, slaves have no right to vote in the democratic set-up of India and we were left with no option but to pick up the guns”.96 The most momentous incident in Kashmir history is the eruption of militancy in early 1990s. Eruption of militancy was catalyzed and inspired also by events in Afghanistan and Punjab. Success of Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union emboldened Kashmiris to go for guerrilla warfare. There is a wide consensus now in the literature and even among Kashmiri politicians and commentators that the seeds of insurgency were sown in 1987 in the main prison of the Kashmir Valley-Srinagar Central Jail- where hundreds of political activists and leaders of the Muslim United Front(MUF) were languishing in the aftermath of March 1987 State Assembly Elections. According to one author, the first generation of Kashmiri militants was created in the police stations, interrogation centers and jails.97 Many MUF leaders who contested or campaigned in 1987 election became the Chiefs and senior Commanders of various militant outfits. For instance, Mohammad Yousuf Shah (the defeated MLA from Amira Kadal constituency) became Syed Salah- u-Din. Today he heads Kashmir’s largest and long surviving militant outfit, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). He is also Supreme Commander of United Jihad Council (UJC), a Muzaffarabad based conglomerate of various militant outfits that are active in this part of Kashmir. Mohammad Yasin Malik, who campaigned for MUF candidates in 1987, became the Chief of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Initially, the militancy was an indigenous underground movement led by JKLF. It soon developed into a mass movement for Azadi (Independence).

96 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 47 97 Ibid., p. 47

Later non-Kashmiri militants, mostly Mujahideen who were disengaged from Afghanistan after Russian withdrawal, also began to arrive in Kashmir. Their involvement added a new dimension to the Kashmir problem, turning it into what they called a global Jihad98 (religious holy war of Muslims). However, the important development that took place in the early nineties was that the movement split along two ideological lines: one pressing for independence like JKLF and the other demanding accession to Pakistan like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).99 In the aftermath of the 1987 elections, militant groups dominated the centre stage of the separatist movement. In order to remain relevant amidst the popularity of gun in Kashmir, almost all the contemporary political parties sought to justify the use of violence to achieve targets. Families and peer groups competed for the chance to cross over to other side of the border for arms training. Children would carry placards with slogans like ‘Mujahidin Quom Zinda Bad’ jotted on them. A new vocabulary of violence depicted militants as ‘freedom fighters’ and security forces as ‘occupational forces.’ Curfews were described as ‘Martial Law’ and Martyr’s graveyards became ‘places of pilgrimages’ called Kabar-i-Shaheed.100 In this context, it would be unreal to hold that the militancy in Kashmir is the result of infiltration of secessionists engineered by Pakistan. No doubt, Pakistan trained infiltrators are there but they are not only troublemakers. There is something more in it. The seeds of militancy in Kashmir were sown in the very beginning, the manner in which the Dogras ruled the state and subjected the Muslims to repression, depression and exploitation, the manner in which Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with India, the empty promise of Plebiscite, erosion of powers enshrined in Article 370 of the Constitution of India which gives Jammu and Kashmir a special status, the

98 The literal meaning of Jihad is ‘to struggle’ or ‘to strive’, but now it is more associated with violent Islamist struggles. Jihadi (plural Jihadis) refers to Islami militants engaged in a violent struggle that is set in religious geography rather than nationalistic one and has pan-Islamic goals. 99 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 145 100 Ibid., p. 150

48 manner in which subsequent elections to Parliament and State Assembly were held, and politics of convenience and corruption, paved the way for a steady growth and development of militancy in the Valley. However, the most important factor for the rise of militancy is the presence of separatist tendencies. The growth of such tendencies took place during the crucial years of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, when he was sacked from power in 1953. Sheikh’s removal was followed by the growth of secessionist groups like Plebiscite Front, JKLF, People’s League and Al-Fatah etc. However, the sentiment of separatism was in dormant till 1987. The rigged election of 1987 provided the spark needed to stir up the flames of the armed revolt in the state. It is surprising, that such stalwarts like Nehru and Indira Gandhi failed to inspire confidence among the people of Kashmir, in spite of their Kashmiri origin. Disgusted, majority of the Kashmiri youth crossed over the border to get training in the use of arms and ammunition in order to wage a war against the authority which in their opinion had no legitimacy to rule over them. They did not realize that Pakistan is no friend of theirs and the irony is that, neither the Union Government nor the State Government could prevent them from falling into Pakistan’s trap.

CHAPTER 3 3. FORMATION OF ALL PARTIES HURRIYAT CONFERENCE

3.1 A Brief History of APHC The 1987 election is considered to be a watershed in the political history of Kashmir. In this election, MUF (Muslim United Front) was defeated. MUF was a party which fought elections to the Assembly and thereby shall be seen as a party who had faith in democracy and rule of law though its political mobilization techniques and ideals of justice were influenced by Islamic values. This party was defeated through a centrally managed rigging of Assembly elections which led this politically conscious generation of Muslims to take up a different path of demanding their rights. The same people who contested elections and believed in constitutionalism now became the worst enemies of any false notion of democracy. In post election period, Kashmir witnessed rise of various militant outfits to fight the illegal government and in a broader sense the very fundamentals of Indian rule. Youth, who had earlier formed and campaigned for MUF, formed and joined these militant groups in thousands. As there was a complete breakdown of political process, both militant organizations and remnant political outfits of erstwhile MUF felt the need to streamline the ‘resistance movement’. An important attempt in this direction was made by the formation of ‘Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir’ (THK) by MUF veterans and other separatists like Syed Ali Geelani, Mian Abdul Qayoom, Dr. Qazi Nisar and Moulvi Abbas Ansari. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir (THK), which came into being in 1991 had 10 constituents and was headed by Qayoom. The THK’s members were: Jama’at-i-Islami, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Muslim Conference, Islamic Student’s League, Mahaz-e-Azadi, Muslim Khavateen Markaz, Bar Association, Itehad-ul- Muslimeen, Dukhtaran-i-Milat and Jamiat-i-Ahlihadees.1

1 Personal interview with Mian Abdul Qayoom, President of Kashmir Bar Association, High Court, Srinagar, November 23, 2008.

All these organizations except JKLF were motivated by Islam. Some organizations were openly in favour of accession to Pakistan. Jama’at-i- Islami’s politics was purely based on the logic of partition and favoured the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. It has organized different religious activities under the guise of schools. Jama’at has been at the forefront when it comes to opposition to Indian rule. Other organizations were not as organized and affective as jama’at. However, their political leanings were no different from that of jama’at. Only JKLF was a pro-freedom organization which had a clear vision of independent and a united Jammu and Kashmir.2 Their idea of Jammu and Kashmir comprised of a pre-1947 Kashmir ruled by Maharaja. Their politics was secular while showing due regard to the ethnic and cultural identities of the people. The JKLF was formed before 1987 and one of its founders Maqbool Bhat3 was hanged in Tihar Jail in 1984, on the charges of killing a CID officer. Among the constituents of THK, the Islamic Students League also favoured accession to Pakistan. This party comprised of the youth motivated by pan-Islamic propaganda. Another organization which like ISL favored accession to Pakistan was Mahaz-i-Azadi led by Inaytullah Andrabi. This party favored such accession on the criteria of geographical contiguity and Islamic identity. The Muslim Conference led by Abdul Gani Bhatt was also in favour of accession to Pakistan and this party had a strong resemblance in ideology with Muslim Conference of Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) which has been in power there for a long time.4

2 Ibid., 3 Maqbool Bhat was one of the founders of JKLF and an ardent proponent of armed struggle against India. His death as well as his whole life was surrounded by many controversies as everyone has a story to tell about Maqbool Bhat. Indian state convicted him for anti- national activities and he was hanged in Tihar jail. His dead body till now has not been handed over to his relatives which creates more confusion with the verdict. Maqbool is still revered in Kashmir as one of the Martyrs who sacrificed his life for the freedom of his people and is regarded as Baba-e-Qoum (father of the nation) in Kashmir. Maqbool day is celebrated on 11th feburuary every year in Kashmir even now with fervor and enthusiasm. 4 Personal Interview with Prof. Abdul Gani Bhat, Executive Member of APHC (M), Hurriyat Office Rajbagh, Srinagar, November 29, 2008.

Thus, THK was an amalgam of different people with same feeling to Pakistan. Except JKLF, each organization more or less favored Pakistan purely because there was a huge political and military support by Pakistan to overthrow the control of Indian state and accede this part of Kashmir to Pakistan. However, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir could not provide a sustainable political platform to meet the growing expectations of its founding fathers and people at large, as some of its leaders were arrested and imprisoned.5 Obviously, it was liquidated and fresh attempts were made at having a broad based separatist organization and the formation of new party was just the culmination of that urge. The first such attempt was made by Mirwaiz Mohammad Umar Farooq who called a meeting of various religious, social and political organizations on December 27, 1992 at Mirwaiz Manzil, Srinagar, to launch a joint political platform.6 A Screening Committee (SC) of eight members, under the Chairmanship of M. M. Mubarki, was appointed to look into the pros and cons of this organization. This committee put forward a report. After considering the report of the SC, the Assembly of Representatives on March 8, 1993 decided to have a common political platform under the name of ‘All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference’(APHC). A committee was appointed to draft a constitution for the APHC which consisted of: 1. Jenab Justice (retd.) Mufti Bahaudin Farooqi, Ex-Chief Justice of J & K High Court, Chairman 2. Jenab Nazir Ahmad Ronga, Advocate, Convener 3. Jenab M. Muzaffar Jan, (retd.) District and Sessions Judge, Member 4. Jenab Mian Abdul Qayoom, Advocate, Member 5. Jenab Shabir Ahmad Siddiqi, Member 6. Jenab Firdous Aasmi, Member 7. Jenab Peer Hafizullah Mukhdoomi, Member

5 Mattu, Abdul Majid, The Prolonged Agony (Kashmir Saga), Gulshan Publishers, (Srinagar, 2004), p. 79 6 Personal interview with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Chairman of both, Awami Action Committee and APHC (M), Hazratbal, Srinagar, December 15, 2008.

8. Jenab Ghulam Rasool Wani, Member 9. Jenab Shahid-ul-Islam, Advocate, Member.7 The draft constitution prepared by the Committee was considered by the Assembly of Representatives in their meeting held on July 31, 1993 and was finally approved and adopted. 8 Hence, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) came into existence in July 1993 as a political amalgam to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of MUF and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat. All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) conglomerate constituted almost thirty political and religious organizations which resolved to harness discontent and channelize it for a political process.9 The disparate groups that agreed to form All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) on March 17, 1993 were: Awami Action Committee; Jama’at-i-Islami; Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference; Muslim Conference; Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF); People’s League; Itihad-ul-Muslimeen; All Jammu and Kashmir Employee’s Confederation; Employees and Workers Confederation (Istiaq Group); Anjuman-i-Tableeg-ul- Islam; Liberation Council; Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith; Kashmir Bazme Tawheed; Jamiat-e-Hamdania; Kashmir Bar Association; Political Conference; Tehreek-i- Hurriyat Kashmiri; Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Islam; Anjuman-i-Auquaf-i-Jamia Masjid; Muslim Khawateen Markaz; Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Committee; Jammu and Kashmir People’s Basic Rights (Protection) Committee; Employees and Workers Confederation (Aasmi Group); Students Islamic League; Islamic Study Circle; Auquaf Jama Masjid; Jammu and Kashmir Muslim League; Jammu and Kashmir Mahaz-i-Azadi; Mahaz-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir; Dukhtaran-i-Milat; People’s Political Front; Khalafat-i- Islamia Jammu and Kashmir; Khawateen-e-Kashmir; and Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Auquaf Trust.

7 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Manohar Publishers, (New Delhi, 2000), pp. 329-30 8 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Op. Cit., pp. 329-30 9 Habibullah, Wajahat, My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospects of Enduring Peace, United States Institute of Peace Press, (Washington, D.C., 2008), P. 82

On the one hand, APHC gave a political platform to the militants to settle down their intergroup conflicts and on the other hand, it attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue at different forums.10 In a very short span of time, the organization achieved a fair deal of success to create an international space for itself, owing to its popularity and the active backing it received from the Pakistan. For example, the APHC enjoys an observer’s status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); the OIC also has a contact group on Kashmir.11 The creation of APHC gave birth to too many theories about the motives of the organization. Some believed it be the handiwork of Indian Intelligence agencies to give a ‘Safety Valve’ to the secessionist forces in state, where in they can ventilate their grievances peacefully.12 Another version claims that the Hurriyat is a creation of the US interests in Kashmir and was formed through the efforts of a Washington-based think-tank, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) under the then presidentship of Robert Oakley, a former US ambassador to Pakistan.13 Certain developments do indicate that it had an active backing from US official sources, particularly the US embassy in India (when a prominent Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone was injured during a security force action in the early Nineties, he was reportedly rushed to New Delhi and was visited each day by officials from the US embassy).14 Still some others hold that it emerged to give political platform to the militant groups and plead their case politically.15 Notwithstanding, the above mentioned theories about its creation, the APHC, as Victoria Shoefield had rightly pointed out, emerged to give the militants a united political platform through which they

10 Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, The Birth of Hurriyat as a Political Platform, Greater Kashmir, February 1, 2007 11 Kashmir Live, All Parties Hurriyat Conference by Tariq Bhat, see,www.expressindia.com 12 www.puja.instablogs.com 13 All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Kashmir Herald, Vol. 1, No. 12, May 2002 14 Ibid., 15 War, Hilal Ahmad, The Great Disclosures, Secrets Unmasked, Manas Publicaions, (New Delhi, 2006) p. 294

54 could voice their grievances, but their constitution does not permit them to consider a solution which lay within the existing framework of Indian Union.16

3.2 Ideology, Objectives and Structure of APHC

Ideology According to Hurriyat Conference, Jammu and Kashmir is a ‘disputed territory’ and India’s control on it is not justified. It supports the Pakistani claim that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of partition’ and needs to be solved as per aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.17 Although, the various components of the Hurriyat Conference differed over whether they wanted independence or unification of the state with Pakistan, but they had at least one common objective: that the people should be given the ‘right to choose’.18 The APHC had distanced itself from participating in elections affirming that the elections under the Indian Constitution would deliver no results. Its slogan was and continues to be ‘no election, no selection, only solution’ (for details see Appendix III). It seeks this solution through the grant of ‘Right to Self-Determination’ to the people of state and tirelessly reminds the Indian leadership of the promises that the first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru had made on the floor of the Indian Parliament, that the people of Kashmir would decide their destiny through a Plebiscite- stance that the United Nations endorsed through its resolutions.19 It, however, time and again insisted that it cannot take part in any form of elections meant for power within the ambit of Indian Constitution. As its Constitution abides them for seeking and demanding the resolution of the dispute either through right to self-determination or a negotiated solution that may be agreed by India, Pakistan and people of Kashmir provided that such solution reflects the will of the people of Kashmir

16 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Viva Books, (New Delhi, 2004) pp, 159-60 17 Geelani, Syed Ali, Nawai-i-Hurriyat, Maizan Publication, (Srinagar, 1995), p. 63 18 Ibid., p. 160 19 Joshi, Arun, Eyewitness Kashmir-Teetering on Nuclear War, Marshall Cavendish, (Singapore, 2004), p. 221

55 and they recognize that, there are three parties of dispute namely India, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Objectives

The APHC through different techniques has mobilized people for what it calls the final settlement of the Kashmir issue.20 In an atmosphere of violence, the political space vacated by the mainstream parties was occupied by APHC.21 Ever since its formation, the objectives and Constitution of APHC has modified by only some of its members. But the objectives of the organization as contained in the original constitution of the conglomerate are as: 1. To struggle peacefully to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir the exercise of the right to self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter and the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, however, the exercise of the right to self-determination shall also include the right to independence.22 2. To make endeavors for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute amongst all the three parties to the dispute (India, Pakistan and people of the Jammu and Kashmir) under the auspices of UN or any other friendly countries, provided that such settlement reflects the will and aspirations of the people of the state. 3. To provide the ongoing struggle in the state before the nations and governments of the world in its proper perspective as being a struggle directed against the forcible and fraudulent occupation of the state by India and for the achievement of the right to self-determination of its people. 4. To make endeavors, keeping in view the Muslim Majority character of the state, for promoting the build-up of a society based on Islamic values, while safeguarding the rights and interests of the non-Muslims.

20 Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, The Birth of Hurriyat as a Political Platform, Op. Cit., 21 Ibid., 22 As per the United Nations Resolutions on Kashmir, the people of Kashmir should be given the right to decide whether they want to remain with India or be a part of Pakistan.

5. To make endeavors for the achievement of any objective which may be ancillary or incidental to the objectives specified above.23

Structure of the Organization

As per the Constitution of APHC, the structure of the organization24 is as follows: Executive Council: The executive powers of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference shall be vested in the Executive Council. The Executive Council shall consist of seven members. The Executive Council shall choose one member of the Council to be the Chairman of the APHC. The Chairman shall hold the office for two years. He shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of the Executive Council. He may at any time resign from his office by submitting his resignation to the Executive Council. General Council: It had more than 23 parties and organizations as members, including traders and employees union. While the membership of the Executive Council as per the constitution cannot be increased, the General Council can accommodate more members if deemed so or if any party or organization seeks membership. Quorum: The quorum for the meeting shall be four members of the Executive Council. Official Spokesman: The Executive Council may appoint one of its members to act as its official spokesman who shall, whenever it is necessary to do so, explain the official viewpoint pertaining to the All Parties Hurriyat Conference including its policies and programmes. Finance: The Executive Council shall also act as the Finance Committee of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference.

23 APHC Constitution framed in 1993 24 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Op. Cit., pp. 331-34

3.3 Split of APHC and Efforts for Unity The high hopes that were pinned on the ability of APHC to steer the separatist movement during the troubled times proved short lived. Towards the end of the previous century, the differences within the APHC constituents started deepening due to its inconsistent ideologies and methodologies. Ever since its formation in 1993, APHC adopted its own constitution and it was mandatory upon constituent parties to follow it in letter and spirit. Soon after its emergence the APHC suffered first setback when Shabir Shah became controversial for his meeting with Prime Minister, V. P. Singh in May 1996 and former United States ambassador in India, Frank Wisner on August 1996.25 He was suspended from the Executive Council for the independent stance that he had adopted in conducting private discussions.26 His disillusionment with the Hurriyat’s achievements stemmed from the fact that his eight-point27 programme for reform which he had submitted to the organization received a cold shoulder.28 Thus, APHC witnessed intermittent allegations and counter allegations of constitutional violations among its factions. Victoria Schofield observed that Hurriyat was actually going through a metamorphosis in its hierarchy in 1997. The differences within the Hurriyat became more visible when Syed Ali

25 Sreedhar, K. Santhanam; Saxena, Sudhir, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir, Thousand Oakas, (New Delhi, 2002), p. 194 26 Schofield,Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 203 27 Shabir Shah’s eight point proposal is:-1. All Constituents of Hurriyat Conference should dissolve its party activities and unite in the single Hurriyat Conference. 2. The new Hurriyat Conference will work according to its 1993 Constitution that will advocate right to Self-determination. No solution acceptable under Indian Constitution. 3. The people of Ladakh and Jammu should be given proper representation in APHC, So that it becomes broad based party. 4. Joint strategy should be worked out immediately for safe return of Kashmiri Migrant Pandits. 5. Joint public institutions should be established for the welfare of orphans, widows and oppressed people. 6. The exact relationship between the political leadership and underground militant organizations should be defined. 7. APHC should encourage democratic ways and methods whereby the intellectuals, journalists, writers and scholars feel free to explain their views and opinion on the ongoing struggle. 8. APHC should take concrete steps to create awareness about one just cause within and outside India. Those organizations which are working for the cause of Kashmir in the Pakistan or any other country will come under Hurriyat Conference. 28 Personal interview with Shabir Shah, Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, Sanathnager, Srinagar, July 21, 2009.

Geelani took over the Chairmanship from the Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. Although the change of leadership was treated as a normal transition of power from one office holder to another, very soon it became evident that there was an internal wrangle after Mirwaiz Umar Farooq had offered unconditional talks to the Central Government which was, however, denied.29 The Hurriyat got divided at a critical juncture when the People’s Conference veteran Abdul Gani Lone developed differences with Islamists. Much to the dismay of the Islamists, he used to say, “Kashmir cannot be allowed to be used as a battle ground by those seeking the Islamic flag on the Red Fort or the White House.”30 Also Lone was eager to suggest that the post 9/11 world had no place for guns in Kashmir: “Guns can’t provide a solution and we should not fall into the trap of the extremist forces.”31 Geelani, however, turned down Lone’s plea for confining Kashmir Issue only at political level. Geelani, in order to sideline the secular elements, wanted to make Hurriyat both political as well as religious, which gave rise to clashes between them.32 The issue of a possible future for the state outside the sovereignty of India too has generated an internal divide with Geelani and some others openly espousing accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and the JKLF demanding an independent status for the state.33 While dissension within the amalgam is fought out in public under the façade of ideological causes, the element of individual ego clashes invariably appeared in the conflicting statements of warring leaders. The election for the Chairman in year 2000 gave rise to these ego clashes that have continued to simmer till date. The main protagonists in this clash have been Syed Ali Shah Geelani and the People’s Conference leader Abdul Gani Lone. The two have clashed over the role of foreign mercenaries in the ongoing movement and over

29 Schofield Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 202 30 Speech delivered by Ab. Gani Lone, Quoted in Joshi, Arun, Eyewitness Kashmir, Op. Cit., pp. 236-37 31 Joshi, Arun, Eyewitness Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 236 32 Personal interview with Syed Ali Geelani, Chairman of both Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir and APHC (G), Senior Rokun (Member) of Jama’at-i-Islami, Hyderpora Srinagar, November 27, 2008. 33 All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Kashmir Herald , Op. Cit.,

59 the status of the crisis, with Abdul Gani Lone terming it as a political issue and Syed Ali Geelani terming it as a religious issue.34 Moreover, rumours persisted that APHC was also attempting to rethink its election strategy prior to September-October, 2002 election to the State Legislative Assembly. Its Executive Council was split between those who wanted to contest elections in order to prevent Farooq Abdullah or his son and heir apparent, Omar Abdullah, from perpetuating the National Conference’s tenure of office and those who were still refusing to do so because of the requirement to recognize the State’s allegiance to the Indian Union.35 Although Hurriyat did not participate but the elections gave another blow when the centrist leader Abdul Gani Lone’s party (the People’s Conference) fielded proxy candidate named Sofi Ghulam Mohi-u-din, as an independent candidate from the Langate Constituency of Kupwara, in North Kashmir, during 2002 assembly election. However, People’s Conference denied the allegation and called it Sofi’s personal move and in this back drop he was expelled from the People’s Conference. APHC’s failure to act against the People’s Conference and the moderate’s unwillingness to boycott campaign against the 2002 elections incensed many elements within the conglomerate.36 Syed Ali Geelani, after his release from prison, also expressed his dissatisfaction with the Hurriyat’s inability to effectively campaign against participation in the assembly election. He was also not happy with the Hurriyat’s decision, not to expel the People’s Conference representative from the Executive Council, for fielding a proxy candidate who after winning election joined the coalition government. Geelani began his assault at a meeting in Srinagar on June 28, 2002, he called upon the APHC either to mend its ways or be prepared for the emergence of a rival. "The ball is now in the court of the Hurriyat," Geelani said, "and if it expels the People's Conference at this

34 Ibid., 35 Victoria, Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 239 36 Swami, Praveen, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, Taylor and Francis Groups, (London and New York, 2007), p. 215

60 moment, we are ready to extend our support to it afresh."37 The Hurriyat, however, refused to reopen the issue. These fissures within the Hurriyat Conference culminated in its formal split on September 7, 2003, when Geelani suddenly announced that 13 of the 23 members of the APHC General Council had passed a resolution of no-confidence against the then Chairman, Molvi Abbas Ansari and elected Masrat Alam of Muslim League as its new interim chief.38 Since September 8, 2003, the APHC has been divided into two factions, one led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and other by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a former Amir of Jama’at-i-Islami. Like old city of Srinagar is considered as stronghold of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Baramulla district is considered as stronghold of Syed Ali Geelani.39 Besides, Yasin Malik of JKLF, among the first batches of youth to join militant movement in Kashmir, has refused to align with either of the Hurriyat Conferences.40 Thus, Hurriyat Conference is confronted with a very serious challenge. It does not have any definite political stand. It has been suffering from inherent contradictions and has been wavering between negotiated settlements to Azadi. It has as many leaders as its constituents with no cohesive bond. The party has very weak organizational structure. It even has no district units.

Efforts for Unity

Like the Indian National Congress of pre-1947 era, the APHC has remained divided for long into Moderates and Extremists. There were ideological as well as methodological differences between the two factions. However, the two factions started operating independently even as the Mirwaiz faction of Hurriyat Conference engaged itself in a dialogue process with the

37 Swami, Praveen, The Battle Within, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 15, August 1, 2003, pp. 32- 33 38 Decline of the Hurriyat and After, The Hindu, September 25, 2003 39 Sidhu,Waheguru Pal Singh; Asif, Bashra; Sami, Cyrus, Kashmir-New Voices, New Approaches, (edt.), Lynne Rienner Publishers, (Boulder London, 2006), p. 22 40 Decline of the Hurriyat and After, The Hindu , Op. Cit.,

Government of India.41 Geelani maintains that there was no scope for bilateral talks in the constitution of All Parties Hurriyat Conference. He says that the constitution of Hurriyat Conference only allows tripartite talks, involving India, Pakistan and the genuine representatives of the aspirations of the people of Kashmir.42 It seems that the former Pakistan President, General Musharraf’s advice to Hurriyat leaders during their separate meetings with him had its impact. There were indications that the main leaders in the two factions are in a mood to unite. The suggestions made by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, to constitute Coordination Committee (CC) for working out modalities for reunification is seen as a positive development. To bring the two factions together, President of Kashmir Bar Association (KBA), Mian Abdul Qayoom played a pro-active role. He constituted a four-member team of senior lawyers and had assigned it the job of bringing the divided houses of Hurriyat together. However, the team after making efforts for six months did not succeed in its efforts. 43 In 2004 Kashmir Bar Association (KBA) as part of its renewed strategy, set up a multi- party forum under the banner of ‘Itihadi Forces’ (unity forces) to forge unity between divided Hurriyat, comprising of Jama’at-i-Islami, People’s League, JKLF, DFP and Jamiat-i-Ahlihadees, the forum made efforts for about one year, but again the unification could not become a reality.44 After this, Itihadi Forces altogether gave up its efforts. However, at individual level Shabir Shah (President of Democratic Freedom Party) and Asiya Andrabi (Chairperson of Dukhtaran-i-Millat), though intermittently continued their efforts to forge unity but without any success.45 The Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi also

41 Ather, Parvaiz, Is unity among Hurriyat factions in jeopardy?, Kashmir Times, June 26, 2005 42 Personal interview with Syed Ali Geelani, Chairman of both Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir and APHC (G), Senior Rokun (Member) of Jama’at-i-Islami, Hyderpora, Srinagar, December 15, 2009. 43 Muhammad, Z. G., Kashmir in War and Diplomacy, Gulshan Books, (Srinagar 2007), pp. 139-40 44 Personal interview with Mian Abdul Qayoom, President of Kashmir Bar Association, High Court, Srinagar, January 23, 2010. 45 Personal interview with Asiya Andrabi, Chairperson of Dukhtaran-i-Millat, Soura, Srinagar, January 23, 2010

62 chipped in with its efforts at least twice so far, but without any positive results.46 Divisions and controversies made the Hurriyat lose its mass appeal which was evident by the poor response of people to its strike calls. However, during the year 2008, the controversy of Shri Amarnath Land Row47 came as a blessing in disguise and reactivated both the factions of the organization. It also brought the two factions closer and the leaders were seen on a common platform for the first time after their split in 2003.48 Mirwaiz along with senior separatist leaders of his group visited the Uptown Hyderpora, residence of Syed Ali Geelani, for talks about the reunification and strategy regarding the Sri Amarnath Shrine Issue which continued for over six hours. The meeting concluded that the unification should be based on three main points: 1. To solve the Kashmir issue through the right to self-determination or tripartite talks. 2. To make six member committee-three members from each faction of Hurriyat-to draft the unification plan. 3. To solve the Shrine Board issue. The agreement was signed by six members viz Syed Ali Geelani, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Mohammad Ashraf Sharie, Ghulam Nabi Sumbji, Shabir Ahmad Shah and Musrat Alam Bhat.49 Hurriyat Conference (M) also agreed to work under the committee constituted on Amarnath Shrine Board by Hurriyat Conference (G), which would explore legal options of the case (See Appendix IV). On the other hand, the Kashmir Bar Association was ready to join the Hurriyat if the factions unite and to work on a single platform for the resolution of Kashmir issue.50 Henceforth, the two factions of Hurriyat worked under the umbrella of Coordination Committee- an amalgam of many groups

46 Parvaiz, Ather, Is Unity Among Hurriyat Factions in Jeopardy? Op. Cit., 47 On June 26, 2008, the State government transferred 99 acres of forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) in Kashmir Valley Which caused demonstrations, protests in Kashmir valley against the land transfer and protests from Jammu region supporting it. 48 Kashmir Times, June 20, 2008 49 Agreement document signed at Geelani’s residence at Hyderpora on June 19, 2008 50 Kashmir Times, June 20, 2008

63 like APHC (M), APHC (G), Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Traders Union, Civil Society and Kashmir Bar Association etc against land transfer, which did spearhead the movement for a long time.51 It is no wonder that the masses that were earlier disgusted with the Hurriyat rejoiced over the unity gestures and the people’s participation in the Hurriyat meetings registered an upward trend. But the honeymoon period was not to last long. The state assembly polls held in November-December 2008 again exposed the inherent ideological and personal differences of the Hurriyat leadership. More surprising was, however, the unprecedented mass participation in the elections. This was most probably for two reasons: Firstly, Hurriyat factions failed to offer a concrete programme except to perpetuate its old strategies. Secondly, people started making a difference between the short term developmental issues and the long term political goals. Therefore, they supported mainstream political parties like National Conference, People’s Democratic Party, who promised immediate solutions to day to day problems, as well as separatist leadership which lead the fight to achieve people’s right to self-determination. Thus, unless Hurriyat is able to remove its ideological and personal differences by producing a concrete common programme with a mass appeal, its lasting unity seems to be a distant dream.

3.4 Emergence of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jama’at-i-Islami, which was founded by Moulana Abu Aa’la Moudoodi, emerged as an important socio-religious organization in the contemporary history of the sub-continent in general and Jammu and Kashmir in particular. The Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK) was established as an independent organization in 1952. The JIJK presented itself as an organization committed to establishing an Islamic State in Kashmir based on the Islamic law, the shari’at, but using democratic means of peaceful persuasion for

51 Personal interview with Masrat Aalam, Chairman of Muslim League, Executive Member of APHC (G), Downtown, Srinagar, February 21, 2011

64 attaining its goals.52 This was stressed in its Constitution adopted in 1953. Article 2(c) of its Constitution lays down that, ‘the Jama’at shall use democratic and constitutional methods, while working for the reform and righteous revolution.53 The most important and controversial issue in Kashmir politics has been the issue of accession of the state to India. The Jama’at is of opinion that Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed state. The accession of the state to India is temporary and as such subject to the ratification by the people. This condition has, the Jama’at holds, been recognized by the United Nations also. On this basis the Jama’at-i-Islami maintains that the people of Kashmir still retain the right to self-determination.54 Up to 1997, Jama’at-Islami placed Kashmir issue on the front burner and acted as vanguard for seeking its final settlement in accordance with the UN Resolutions. In 1997, Ghulam Mohammad Bhat was elected as new Amir (chief) of Jama’at. Bhat is considered to be the pioneer of reviewing and renewing the Jama’at’s policy over Kashmir issue. As per this, Jama’at decided to put Kashmir Issue on the second priority. During his tenure as Amir this policy got strengthened and prevailed with the support of some members of Jama’at’s executive council.55 The other faction emerged as strong opponent of this new strategy. They called this shift ‘retreat and betrayal’ and informed about their apprehensions to executive council and other lower cadres of the organization. This opinion was spearheaded by Syed Ali Geelani, the Jama’at member and a veteran political figure of Jammu and Kashmir, who enjoys a strong sway over the cadres of Jama’at-i-Islami. In the backdrop of these developments within the Jama’at, Geelani was called back from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as representative of Jama’at on the reasons of

52 Sikand, Yoginder, Changing course of Kashmiri Struggle, From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, January 20, 2001 53 Ibid., 54 Khan, G. H., Government and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, J. V. Press, (New Delhi, 1988) p. 468 55 Personal interview with Mohammad Ashraf Sharie, General Secretary of Tehreek-i- Hurriyat and Member of Jama’at-i-Islami, Srinagar, November 25, 2009

65 deteriorating health.56 However, Syed Ali Geelani denounced the reason of deteriorating health and stated it as the part of new thinking and shift in policy and strategy. The matter created chaos and ambiguity within the Jama’at. Later on, Jama’at reviewed its decision and sent back Geelani as its representative in All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). This was an unprecedented development in the history of Jama’at which deepened the polarization within the organization. The opinion within Jama’at got divided. On the one hand, Geelani was of the view that “Jama’at must act as a vanguard in the movement aimed at solving Kashmir issue which cannot be treated as having secondary importance. If it happened, Geelani opined, it will be against the manifesto and spirit of the constitution of the Jama’at, it will be the betrayal with the huge sacrifices made by the people of the state in which Jama’at has a major share”. On the other hand, this argument couldn’t convince the other leadership of Jama’at who discarded it as the personal view of Geelani. They were of the opinion that “Kashmir issue is the concern of the whole nation and not of Jama’at only”. Jama’at, they argued, cannot afford to act as vanguard for the resolution of Kashmir issue but will act like other political, religious organizations of the state”.57 Jama’at came under heavy criticism from within and outside its cadre base. The issue caught limelight and was debated in local, national and international media. The change in Jama’at’s policy was described by many as the organization’s U turn on insurgency in Kashmir and the strategy for the safety of lives and property of Jama’at workers.58 On the other hand, Syed Ali Geelani maintained that “Jama’at is an Islamic movement and a cadre based organization. It must be clear to everyone that Islam has come to flourish whether Jama’at survives or not. Contribution of such a movement is not assessed by the escape routes it adopts and number of workers it manages

56 Personal interview with Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, Ex-Amir Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Falha-i-Aam Trust, Office Nowgam Bypass, Srinagar, November 25, 2009 57 Personal interview with Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, Ex-Amir Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Falha-i-Aam Trust, Office Nowgam Bypass, Srinagar, July 17, 2010 58 Hussain, Sheikh Showket, Facets of Resurgent Kashmir, Kashmir Institute, (Srinagar, 2008), p. 90

66 to save but with reference to its adherence to the ideals for which it stands.”59 Efforts to rectify the situation drew a blank. Several Executive Council (Majlis- e-Shoora) meetings were held to sort out the differences but they could not make any headway. The differences within the Jama’at led to the creation of Tehreek-i- Hurriyat. When Nazir Ahmad Kashani was elected the new ‘Amir’ 60 in 2003, the Executive Council of Jama’at granted permission to Syed Ali Geelani to float a separate organization in order to work for the resolution of Kashmir issue.61 Hence, on August 1, 2004 an agreement was signed by both the parties which read as: 1. That, Syed Ali Geelani is hereby granted permission to form an independent organization in order to work for the resolution of Kashmir issue with effective and peaceful ways and means. The status and basic Jama’at membership of Syed Ali Geelani will remain intact. 2. That, on demand Geelani Sahib will be provided some required man power, whose membership in Jama’at will remain intact. 3. That, Jama’at-i-Islami will remain a constituent of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (G) and sent its representative in it. 4. That, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and Jama’at-i-Islami will work with cooperation and will refrain from confrontation. 5. That, in case of any confrontation, the issues and matters will be settled by mutual negotiations and comprehension. 6. That, the supporters and members of Jama’at will take part in newly formed organization, however, cannot attain any designation and post in the said organization.62 This agreement was signed by fifteen Executive Council members of Jama’at-i-Islami. In the light of this agreement Syed Ali Geelani floated his own ‘Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir’ (THJK) on August 7, 2004,

59 Hussain, Sheikh Showket, Facets of Resurgent Kashmir, Op. Cit., p. 90 60 The leader of the Jama’at is known as Amir 61 Personal interview with Nazir Ahmad Kashani, Ex-Amir Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Soura, Srinagar, July 20 , 2010 62 Agreement copy of Jama’at and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat

67 which also became the key constituent of his APHC (G), with support from his parent organization, Jama’at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir. Geelani became the first Chairman of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and senior Jama’at member, Mohammad Ashraf Sharie of Kupwara, had been nominated its General Secretary. The top brass and many prominent members of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat have been among Jama’at cadres. Though it was born out of Jama’at-i-Islami, it is now a separate organization with its own constitution. The fact, however, remains that both the organizations resemble in almost all aspects and are quite similar in ideology and programmas. The only difference is that Tehreek-i- Hurriyat lays full emphasis on seeking resolution of Kashmir issue, whereas Jama’at-i-Islami holds on to ‘Iqamat-i-Deen’ and at the same time advocates the speedy resolution of Kashmir dispute. While highlighting the relations between the two organizations, Geelani clarified that ‘for the expansion of the regular organizational structure in near future the doors of the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat would remain open even for those who are/were not the activists of Jama’at-i-Islami.’63 Regarding his decision of creating a new party over the Islamist Jama’at-i-Islami, Geelani said “the need had arisen for the constitution of a purely political organization. He remarked that although Iqamat-i-Deen (establishment of Islamic system) should be the unambiguous objective of Jama’at-i-Islami but the preoccupation of the fundamentally religious organization with a host of non-political programmas was a matter of deep concern. While clarifying the relations between the Jama’at and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, he stated that the new organization would operate as the Jama’at’s sister concern and would draw its membership from the Jama’at’s rank and file, which according to him was present in every nook and corner of the state. Furthermore, he strongly asserted that it (Tehreek-i- Hurriyat) would not be a breakaway faction’’ and as a new political outfit will support the political slogan (Referendum) of Hurriyat ‘G’ which aims at the resolution of Kashmir problem as per the aspirations of its people. It is worth mentioning here that Hurriyat ‘G’ aspires to see the solution of the conflict as

63 Daily Excelsior, August 8, 2004

68 per the resolutions passed by the United Nation’s Security Council since 1948.64 The organization has been emphasizing that plebiscite had been promised to the people of Jammu and Kashmir by Indian leadership which had in fact taken this matter to the UN. Being the staunch supporter of Referendum and having conceptualized the resistance movement around the UN resolutions, Geelani while highlighting the significance of UN resolutions said ‘that the UN had passed as many as 18 resolutions in the last 56 years which called for a referendum in Jammu and Kashmir.’ Struggling for Jammu and Kashmir’s freedom from India and the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa would be the main objectives of Geelani’s new political outfit. “Jab tak Islam ka nizam naafiz nahi hota, hamari jodujahad jaari rahe gi”65 (Until the rule of Islam prevails, we will continue our struggle). Needless to mention that Jama’at’s main objective is to see the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa, therefore, the two organizations are very intimately related to each other sharing the same goal while differing only in their modus operandi.

Organizational Structure Tehreek-i-Hurriyat has its own constitution which was adopted in August 2004.66 The document comprises of 26 Articles with clauses and sub- clauses. As per the Constitution the structure of the organization is as follows: Nomenclature: Article 1 says the organization will be known by the name of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu Kashmir. Central and Sub-Central Structure: Article 6 says that Tehreek-i-Hurriyat will work on consultative lines and the organization will comprise of unit systems at Central, Provincial, District, Tehsil and Block level. The Central

64 As per the United Nations Resolutions on Kashmir, the people of Kashmir should be given the right to decide whether they want to remain with India or be a part of Pakistan. 65 Personal interview with Syed Ali Geelani, Chairman of both Tehrrek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir and APHC (G), Senior Rokun (Member) of Jama’at-i-Islami, Hyderpora Srinagar, October 15, 2010 66 Constitution of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir Article, 2

69 structure would comprise of Chairman, General Secretary and an Executive Council (Majlis-e-Shoora). Chairman: The Constitution lays down that the head of the organization would be called as ‘Chairman’ and every member would have an obligation to follow him in letter and spirit.67 The Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the THJK constitution deal with the qualification of the Chairman, procedure of his election and his responsibilities and jurisdiction respectively in detail. The chairman would be assisted by an executive council consisting of ten members,68 each holding the office for the period of three years.69 The Executive Council as per the constitution will be called Majlis-e-Shoora. Quorum: The quorum for the meeting in the Majlis-e-Shoura is five members. Finance: Articles 19, 20 and 21 deal with the financial system of the organization. It lays down certain resources where from the income for the Bait-ul-Maal70 can be collected. Moreover, the articles lay down the procedure to maintain the accounts of the promised amount to be paid by the members and the sympathizers of the organization and assistance from subordinate Bait- ul-Maals. The profit earned on account of publication of books, income earned from the assets of the organization, general donations, and charity is also recorded under these Articles. There is a provision for the audit and Bait-ul- Maal is subjected to audit every year by a professional auditor. Membership: Article 5 says that every citizen of Jammu and Kashmir irrespective of sex, color, creed and language can become the member of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat; even non-Muslims can become the supporters of Tehreek- i-Hurriyat. The organization has its own system of accountability and works on the democratic lines. There is ample scope for dissent and complaints against any

67 Ibid., Article 7 68 Ibid., Article 18 (b) 69 Ibid., Article 11 70 Bait-ul-Maal is an Arabic term that is translated as ‘House of Money’ or ‘House of Wealth’. It is a financial institution which is responsible for administration of taxes and distribution of revenues for public work in Islamic State.

70 person belonging to the organization and decisions are taken after debates and discussions.71 The constitution is flexible and can be amended by a simple majority except Article 3 (which elaborates the faith and goals of the organization, i.e. Islam, Azadi and Unity of Ummah) and Article 4 (which reads that the course of action will be purely peaceful, political and democratic in nature) which constitute its basic structure.72

3.4.1 Goals and Techniques of Mobilization The main objective of the organization is to pursue for an Islamic system of governance (Shari’ah) in Kashmir i.e. Islam should govern the lives of the people in political thought, socio-economic system, culture etc. The organization aims at the settlement of the Kashmir conflict through the resolutions passed by the United Nations and therefore conceptualizes the resistance movement around the doctrine of the Right to Self-determination as guaranteed by the United Nations. Thus, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat strives for freedom under the shades of Islamic beliefs and in the light of its historical perspective on the Kashmir. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat has set three goals to strive for: a. Islam: That Islam is a complete way of life, source of inspirations, injunctions and principles. b. Freedom: That Tehreek-i-Hurriyat considers Jammu and Kashmir a disputed territory and will seek and press for the resolution of this dispute in peaceful and democratic manner, according to aspirations of people through the right to self-determination. c. Unity among Ummah: Tehreek-i-Hurriyat believes that whole Muslim Ummah (Worldwide Muslim community) is like a single body and therefore, will strive for strengthening of unity in Ummah on Islamic principles.73

71 Ibid., Article 22 72 Ibid., Article 25 73 Ibid., Article 3

According to Geelani, “the creed of socialism and secularism should not touch our lives and we must be totally governed by the Quran and the Sunnah (precedent of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) and we must fight against anti- Islamic forces that come under the garb of Nationalists, Secularists, Racists, Linguistic Chauvinists and so on”. The party still rules out dialogue with New Delhi until the Parliamentary Resolution of 1995 (declaring Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India and pledging to retrieve Azad Kashmir from Pakistan) is revoked, Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is repealed in the state and demilitarization from the state.74 Right from its formation, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat has emerged as a staunch Islamist organization. It aims to launch a full-fledged campaign against forces that are, what they call, hell-bent upon harming Islam and Muslims all over the world. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat uses several tools and techniques to mobilize the people of the state to achieve its objectives. Some important techniques are: Literature Distribution: Tehreek-i-Hurriyat is publishing extensive literature that comprehensively deals with different dimensions of its ideology and programmes. Its founding father, Syed Ali Geelani writes in Urdu. He has written a large number of books and pamphlets explaining his programme and ideology. In order to popularize these books and pamphlets Tehreek-i-Hurriyat has adopted different tactics like they have their own Maktabs (book shops) where they sell such literature on lower rates or even distribute it free of cost. Many workers of the party voluntarily move from door to door to introduce their literature to different sections of the society. It is the literature of the party which has been responsible for bringing many people to the fold of the party. It helps THJK to become a broad based party. Mosques: The leaders of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat use the mosques to propagate its ideology. They fully utilize Friday congregations to persuade the people to

74 Personal interview with Syed Ali Geelani, Chairman of both Tehrrek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir and APHC (G), Senior Rokun (Member) of Jama’at-i-Islami, Hyderpora Srinagar, November 15, 2010

72 fight for their right to self-determination and follow Islam in every field of their lives.75 Funeral Processions: Besides mosques, the leaders of THJK often offer Namaz-i-Jenaz (funeral prayers) of militants (locally known as Mujahideen) who are killed while fighting various security agencies of the state. During these gatherings the leaders frequently highlight the human rights violations by the military and paramilitary forces and the importance of right to self- determination. Strikes and Protests: The other important techniques Tehreek-i-Hurriyat uses for mass mobilization are strikes and protests. According to Geelani, “Strikes and protests are the only weapons in the hands of the oppressed nation to fight against oppression and for their rights.”76 By these strikes and protests the party tries to aware the national and international community about the nature of Kashmir dispute. In 2009, the organization gave District wise strikes and demonstration calls against the land occupation by Indian Forces in different parts of the state. The programme started on October 23, 2009 from District Shopian. Meetings (Ijtimas): One of the most important mobilizing methods of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat is regular ijtimas (meetings) which are held weekly, monthly and yearly basis at unit, tehsil and district levels respectively. These meetings are attended by general public and are addressed by party leaders. The party also organizes seminars, discussions and speeches in which different sections of the society are invited. Print and Electronic Media: the services of both the print and the electronic media particularly local news papers and TV channels are used by the party to propagate its ideology and programmes within and outside the Valley. For this

75 Personal interview with Yasin Malik, Chairman JKLF, Maisuma, Srinagar, November 17, 2010 76 Rising Kashmir, Greater Kashmir, May 6, 2009

73 same purpose, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat also established its own website (http://www.jkth.org).77 Calendars: By the year 2009, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat has come up with a calendar having references to the history of Jammu and Kashmir Dispute. These calendars also mention incidents of Human rights violations committed by Indian forces in the state. They also contain excerpts from Geelani’s addresses and writings. Bait-ul-Maal: The Tehreek-i-Hurriyat derives its main income from its own treasuries (Bait-ul-Maal) established at every unit of the organization. These have the following sources of income: i. Zakat and other charities ii. Obligatory contributions of its members iii. Sale of hides of the sacrificed animals on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha iv. The profit of the sales of their books and pamphlets.78 Thus, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat was created in backdrop of the division in the Jama’at-i-Islami. It strives for establishment of Islamic order in every aspect of life. It considers Kashmir dispute as an obstacle in establishment of Islamic order and exerts every effort for the resolution of the dispute on political levels. Though the organization believes that the most comprehensive and amicable solution of this dispute lies in right to self-determination but it has consistently expressed its willingness to engage in tripartite talks meant to reach a solution to the problem. The negotiations must be, however, between India, Pakistan and the genuine representatives of the aspirations of people of Kashmir. It however, rejects all old and new proposals and roadmaps or any other out of box solution.

77 Personal interview with Rajab Mohammad Kalwal, Member of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, Hyderpora, Srinagar, December 15, 2010 78 Personal interview with Mohammad Ashraf Sharie, General Secretary of Tehreek-i- Hurriyat and Member of Jama’at-i-Islami, Srinagar, May 21, 2010

3.4.2 Impact on Jammu and Kashmir Politics Tehreek-i-Hurriyat is an outgrowth of Jama’at-i-Islami as the heavy damage inflicted on Jama’at during militancy forced it to reorient its Kashmir policy. Jama’at believed that the political issues deserve exclusive attention and demand forceful and fearless articulation. Education and social arenas at the same time demand equal attention thus can’t be sacrificed for the political expediencies. The policy adopted by Jama’at made people to feel that it wanted to work on Ikhwannnul Muslimin79 pattern where members of different caliber and potential are assigned work in line with their priorities without jeopardizing the functions and performance of other arenas. Some analysts believe that the formation of organizations like Islamic Study Circle and Tehreek-i-Hurriyat from parent organization (Jama’at-i- Islami) was in pursuance of the same belief. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat launched itself openly against so called ‘Indian occupation’ with the result it occupied the centre stage within the separatist camp. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat managed to gain the support of the onetime staunch supporters of Jama’at as the same were not satisfied with the new modus operandi of the Jama’at. Nevertheless, the involvement of Tehreek- i-Hurriyat, mainly with the anti-India programmes galvanized support from a huge number of youngsters in general and considerable number of Jama’at-i- Islami sympathizers in particular. This gave rise to differences and infighting within Jama’at cadres which surfaces many times. The top brass of Jama’at tries hard to prevent such tendencies. The youth from the Jama’at cadres and also outside it are more attracted towards the policies and programmes of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat more particularly with Geelani for his stand against India and mainstream politicians.80 It has played a vital role in shifting the Kashmir movement to new and young generation in last couple of years. This is considered a big achievement regarding the ongoing movement. This organization has a distinction of promoting Islamic tendencies and leanings and

79 It is an Islamist transnational movement and it is considered as the largest Islamic Political group and most influential Islamist Movement in Arab Countries. It was founded in 1928 in Egypt by school teacher named Hassan al-Banna. 80 Mustafa, Sema, Like Him or Not, Geelani Counts, Greater Kashmir, October 25, 2010

75 producing pro-Islamic leadership on the forefront and centre stage. It encouraged different ways of resistance like stone pelting.

3.5 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was formed on May 29, 1977 in London (Birmingham) by Amanullah Khan. Amanullah Khan was able to bring about rapid expansion of the organization and its branches were soon set up in Pakistan, Denmark, Holland, Saudia Arabia, UAE, Germany, France and the USA.81 The growth and formation of JKLF can be traced from the different organizations which had been working and were in fray since the separatist tendencies have surfaced in J&K state. Its historical antecedents could be rightly traced from a decision taken by Plebiscite Front (PF) on August 1965 which decided to form an organized guerilla organization patterned along the lines of Algerian Front De Liberation (AFDL). The organization was named as National Liberation Front (NLF). NLF became popular in J&K. It had to undergo an official Jihad for the liberation of J&K.82 Finally, this organization was structured, Major Amanullah was made the head of armed wing of organization, while Amanullah Khan was made head of political wing, the finance wing was headed by Mir Ahmad and Mohd Maqbool Bhat was made responsible for coordination between these bodies. The heads of these four wings together constituted NLF’s Central Committee.83 At the NLF’s Central Committee meeting, it was resolved that one who would like to become a member of the Organization would have to sign a membership agreement in his own blood, and take an oath to lay his life for the organization and its objectives. They also agreed on an anthem of NLF which reads as follows.84 “Ek haal ek umang, guerrilla jang guerrilla jang Azadi ka ek hi dang, guerrilla jang guerrilla jang”

81 Swami, Praveen, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947- 2004, Op. Cit., p. 130 82 Ibid., p. 107 83 Ibid., 84 Sahni, Sati, Kashmir Underground, Har Anand, (New Delhi, 1999), p. 55

Translation: (Our one objective one desire, guerrilla war, there is only one way to freedom, guerilla war.) In 1965, Mohd Maqbool Bhat and some others including Major Amanullah secretly crossed into Indian administered J&K and remained underground for four months. They organized secret cells and drained locally existed workers for struggle. Maqbool Bhat and some of his workers were arrested on September 16, 1966 and several persons were also arrested from Srinagar, Hindwara, Baramullah, Sopore and Trehgam (The native place of Maqbool Bhatt). They were tried for sabotage and murder. They were tried by Special Court which held its proceedings in a jail in Srinagar where accused were lodged as an extra caution. Mr. Bhat tried to defend his actions in the armed struggle. He said: “I could not reconcile to the new political set up brought about in Kashmir after Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest in 1953. The Sheikh Abdullah’s successor Bakshi Gulam Mohd had much against the wishes of the average people of Kashmir, added some more laws to armory of repression. Any citizen could be detained in prison for five years. Therefore, I became a resistant rebel of the system which is not of Kashmir, not for Kashmiris and not by Kashmiris”.85

But his arguments were rejected and on August 18, 1968, Maqbool Bhat and Khawaja Mir Ahmad was awarded death sentence while subedar Kala Khan, a member who was also arrested with Bhat, was sentenced transportation for life. Maqbool Bhat’s arrest put the NLF’s activities in J&K at risk. State government became vigilant of their activities and one can observe that government started to reckon their whereabouts, support base and their activities at national and international sphere. A number of university teachers sympathetic to NLF were also arrested.86 The Plebiscite Front reacted to the setback faced by the Front and demanded that NLF should disband itself for making an opportunistic attempts like resorting to armed struggle at the stage when time was not ripe and the armed strategies were in infancy.87 Maqbool

85 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p.115 86 Noorani, A. G., Contours of Militancy, Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 20, October 13, 2000 87 Sahni, Sati, Kashmir Underground, Op. Cit., p. 57

Bhat, who was awarded death sentence by Indian Court, escaped from prison along Mir Ahmad and Ghulam Yasin.88 Due to their escape from heavily guarded jail they became famous in the valley. A cash reward of Rs. 10,000 was announced for their arrest. Government also announced that any one giving them shelter would be tried and sentenced for seven years imprisonment. But inspite of these announcements they were safely transported to Pakistan administered Kashmir. On January 30, 1971, an Indian Airline Plane ‘Ganga’ was hijacked by the two Kashmiri youths namely Ashraf Querishi and Hashim Querishi. The plane was diverted safely to Lahore and twenty six passengers were allowed to leave and it was subsequently blown up. Maqbool Bhat came into the limelight by meeting the hijackers and claiming responsibility for the hijacking. The two Kashmiris were first treated like heroes but later were dubbed as Indian agents and subsequently arrested by the Pakistan authorities. Consequently, Pakistan argued that the hijacking was ‘sting operation’ planned by Indian intelligence.89 The direct consequence of hijacking incident was that India banned flights between the West and East Pakistan which strained relations between the two wings of Pakistan prior to the outbreak of war in the year1971. Maqbool Bhat’s dealings with the hijackers were regarded as a demonstration of his commitment to Freedom Struggle of Kashmir and no action was taken against him in Pakistan Administered Kashmir.90 In 1976, Maqbool Bhat returned to the Valley and started training and preparing the youth for the armed struggle. But he was rearrested on June 7, 1976 along with other two guerrillas Hamid Bhat and Reyaz Dar at Langate, Handwara. Maqbool Bhat was shifted to Tihar Jail (Delhi) and other two were imprisoned in the Jammu Central Jail. This time he could not manage to escape from Jail and was tried and received the

88 Swami, Praveen, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947- 2004, Op. Cit., p. 108 89 Lamb, Alastair, Kashmir- A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Oxford University Press, (Pakistan, 1994), p. 290 90 Schofield Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p.116

78 second death sentence of his life.91 Amanullah Khan moved to England and started mobilization in and around England. He took the charge of the Organization as General Secretary and operated from England. He decided to change the name of the organization. Amanullah Khan had narrated to Victoria Schofield, in an interview that “we changed the name of NLF, because I could not run an organization in England which had armed struggle as an objective”. Therefore, the organization was changed to Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).92

3.5.1 Ideology JKLF maintains the position that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is not a ‘territorial dispute’ between India and Pakistan rather it is the question of ‘people’ of Jammu and Kashmir. JKLF did not accept Jammu & Kashmir as a constitutional or integral part of any country. “No country, group, political party, assembly has the right to determine future political or constitutional status of Jammu & Kashmir or any part of it,” holds the party.93 JKLF believes that only Kashmiris or their duly elected representatives have the right to decide about their future constitutional, political, social and economic system for the ‘country’ (of Jammu & Kashmir) and its relationship with the foreign countries (including India and Pakistan). For the JKLF, the best solution to the Kashmir issue is the re-unification of all parts of the divided state and offer of full sovereignty and independence with a right to become a member of United Nations. Ideologically, JKLF was following the secular Kashmiri nationalism which is in line with the syncretic culture of Kashmir. JKLF articulated the vision of an independent state based on federal parliamentary political system consisting of the five federating units, namely Kashmir, Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit & Baltistan enjoying autonomy with elected

91 Mir, Tahir Ahmad, Maqbool Bhat Trehgram Se Tihar Tak, Srinagar, 2008, p. 23 92 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p.116 93 JKLF’S Document Titled as JKLF’s Mission (original)

Provincial Governments. Each province could be subdivided into districts and these districts would have their own internal arrangements. At the centre, there would be a bicameral legislature based on ‘Proportional Representation’. The constitution would provide equal social, economic and political rights to religious and ethnic minorities. A neutral foreign policy was advocated for the proposed Independent Jammu and Kashmir State on the Swiss pattern, with friendly relations with both India and Pakistan.94 So far the socio-economic programme is concerned, JKLF strongly recommends the ‘Naya Kashmir’ manifesto, adopted by the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) in the early forties which is proposed on egalitarianism and social justice. The republic envisioned by JKLF would develop economic cooperation and trade links with both India and Pakistan. They believe that Kashmir is self-sufficient. The economic potentials of Kashmir like power generation, tourism, forests, cottage industries, fruits, minerals, seri-culture and heavy skilled and unskilled manpower working abroad etc. are such that within a decade after independence, with proper planning, Kashmir can surely become the most prosperous country in the entire region.95

3.5.2 Aims and Objectives of JKLF Following are the objectives and aims of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front: 1. To struggle against foreign occupation, gain independence and attain an honorable position amongst free nations of the world. Struggle to establish a political and social infrastructure based on the values of democracy, public welfare and social justice in the country. 2. To evolve and practice political strategies which meet modern day demands for national liberation.

94 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Op. Cit., pp. 169-170 95 Khan, Amanullah, Win Win Solution for Kashmir, http://www.jklf.org

3. To fight on all fronts, which have been declared legitimate for the subjugated nations (under alien domination) by the United Nations. 4. To provide moral and material support to Kashmiri Organizations working for complete independence of the State. 5. To project the Kashmir issue and the liberation movement as a question of national independence at the international level and to acquire support from international community and public opinion for our movement. 6. To uproot all racial, communal, regional, linguistic and class prejudices if they exist amongst any people in the state and to promote unity, friendship and equality amongst them. 7. To establish effective communication channels amongst the currently cut- off but patriotic people in the divided parts of the state. 8. To take steps to inform the Kashmiris specially the younger generation, of the historical background of the issue and the true nature and history of Liberation Movement including the geographical and historical facts and economic potentials of Jammu-Kashmir. 9. To take steps to unite and organize all the patriotic Kashmiri people wherever they may be residing under the banner of the JKLF.96

3.5.3 Split of JKLF Yasin Malik, once a staunch supporter of armed struggle, adopted the methods and principles of non-violence as one of his motivating forces since 1994. This caused a rift between Amanullah Khan, senior leader of JKLF, and Yasin Malik which led to the split between its IAJK and PAK based wings in September 1995. Amanullah Khan based in Rawalpindi, summarily disbanded almost entire Kashmir Valley unit. Amanullah Khan justified the split by saying that “unfortunately, our organization is practically divided into two groups; our basic difference was Yasin Malik’s offer of unilateral ceasefire without informing us”. At the end of year 1995, Amanullah Khan removed Yasin Malik as President of JKLF; in return Yasin Malik expelled Amanullah

96 http://www.jklf.org

Khan as Chairman from the JKLF (Kashmir based units). Following the Khan’s announcement almost the entire JKLF organization IAJK, barring a few individuals rallied behind Yasin Malik and Hurriyat Conference recognized Malik as the legitimate leader of the JKLF movement. Many people from POK were also supportive of Malik. The significance of split was perhaps more generational than anything else. The split was only organizational whereas their ideology and objectives remained same for both the factions. The splinter group of JKLF (Yasin Malik Group) formed in 1995 came under the leadership of Yasin Malik.97 It was during the confinement in Agra Prison, Yasin Malik, according to him, read many books on philosophy, psychology, poetry (of Rumi, Iqbal, Faiz) and biographies of Yasir Arafat, M. A. Jinnah and Nilson Mandela. The life and achievements of Arafat, Ghandhiji, and Jinnah had greatly inspired and motivated him. When Yasin Malik was asked about why JKLF first triggered insurgency and later abandoned it? He admitted that “JKLF was the author of armed struggle in Kashmir and if today international community wants to discuss the Kashmir issue it is because of that struggle which had been started by JKLF. We resorted to unilateral ceasefire (and resultantly) today Kashmiri people have an argument before the international community”.98

3.5.4 Methods of Political Mobilization The state of Jammu and Kashmir had witnessed politics of protest and separatism earlier but it was used to be in defense of perceived threat to the identity and it generally manifested itself either in form of Hartals or demonstrations. Even some times some minor rebel groups like Al-Fatah were also formed but these could not survive for long as they failed to mobilize large

97 Yasin Malik was born in 1966 at Maisuma, Srinagar. His quest for Freedom began in 1984 when he was at the age of 18 years, as a student leader giving sermons for freedom. In 1987 he was campaigning for Syed Mohammad Yousuf Shah of Muslim United Front in elections. But after rigging of elections he was arrested, beaten and tortured. This changed his life to such an extent that he picked up the gun and became bitter enemy of false notion of democracy rather challenged Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. 98 Greater Kashmir, August 23, 2005

82 scale mass-support. It was for the first time in post 1947 era, that Kashmiri Separatist movement under the banner of JKLF received a huge support from people in the 90’s. The JKLF activities can be understood in three stages: A) Non-violent protest phase (1988) B) Violent Uprising phase (1989-94) C) Moderate political phase (1994 to the present)

A. Non-Violent Protest Phase The rigged elections of 1987 led loss of faith in Indian democracy and mass resistance to the Indian rule in Kashmir (for more details see chapter second). This phase is characterized by massive protests and extensive mass mobilization which was on account of a very ‘strong wave of alienation’ doing rounds in the lives of Kashmiris. More or less similar alienation in different context was put to use by Sheikh Abdullah against a different set of actors in pre-independence era, but now was the turn of JKLF. The slogans like “Hum Kya Chahte? Azadi” (what do we want? independence) “Hai Haq Hamara Azadi” (Azadi is our right) and “Jab tak na hogi rai sumari jung hamari jari hai” (we will fight till world recognize our right to plebiscite), were echoed throughout Kashmir. JKLF flags fluttered on the houses, trees in every town and village across the Kashmir Valley. The situation became uncontrollable and India was finding it difficult to tackle the uprising owing to its mass character as workers, lawyers, engineers, school teachers, doctors, engineers, former MLA’s and Jammu and Kashmir police joined and supported the movement. In the absence of any alternative channels of collective action, the shrines and mosques emerged as the focal point of popular mobilization and resistance. The JKLF also tied to mobilize international support for Kashmir’s independence by focusing on human rights violations. Although the absence of a charismatic leadership posed little difficulty in the mass mobilization, yet JKLF received mass support during this phase.

B. Violent Uprisings (1989-94) During this phase JKLF prominently remained focused on armed and militant activities besides massive political mobilization at the grassroot level. During this phase JKLF made a strategy which could be divided into four components; a) establishing an organizational base and devising military strategy, b) pursuit of international support, c) mobilizing popular support and d) its rationale of resorting to violence.99 The Front leaders Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Majid Wani, Javid Mir, and Yasin Malik forming the HAJY group, lead the JKLF in Valley. Amanullah Khan, the chairman, headed the Central Committee- the supreme policy making body- was located at Muzaffarabad. Three Sub-Committees were constituted who supervised military, political and diplomatic activities and made to operate the Front’s strategy and guidance to military operations in the J&K state. The armed strategy was devised jointly by JKLF leadership in the Valley and Muzaffarabad. Azad Kashmir (Pakistan administered Kashmir) supplied weapons, holding training camps and provided sanctuary. Amanullah Khan and Javid Mir openly admitted supply of weapons to the militant ranks in Kashmir valley from Azad Kashmir.100 Members of the Front used violence most effectively to achieve the immediate political objectives of paralyzing the state apparatus and de-legitimizing the political institutions which had appropriated the space for articulating the political aspirations of Kashmiris. They sought to defy the state authority, transfer people’s allegiance and loyalty to themselves, attack the state symbols and render every state institution that could potentially meet their political challenge dysfunctional. A series of demonstrations took place on various issues such as on the hike in power tarrif and the demand for a ban on Salman Rashdie’s Satanic Verses. The systematic campaign challenged and replaced the official state symbols with an alternative calendar of public events, Bandhs were organized on Indian Independence Day and Republic Day, the Accession day 27 October, was denounced as a day of occupation, the death anniversary

99 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Op. Cit., pp. 169-170 100 Ibid., pp.170-171

84 of Maqbool Bhat was celebrated in glaring contrast to Sheikh Abdullah’s death anniversary which was observed as black day and was termed as ‘Yomi najat’ (day of deliverance). They targeted the Police, Centre Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and intelligence organizations. They sought to neutralize the police force by attacking police stations in Srinagar with impunity and killed police officers and stigmatized as traitors, hated by the society and neglected by the senior officers who did not mourn their colleague’s death nor accord any state honour. The second step in their strategy was to neutralize the political activities. When the Lok Sabha bye-elections were to be held on November 18, 1989, Front activists gave a call for boycott elections. A large number of polling officers refused to perform duties and government school buildings used as polling stations were set on fire. A civil curfew was imposed on the polling day and a coffin was placed outside the polling booth in Baramullah with a placard which said “It is for the first man who casts his vote.’’ The administration did nothing. The official estimate of average voting in Anantnang and Baramullah were 2.11 and 3. 47 percent respectively, although as per the reports of local media, it was 1 percent and in some polling booths no votes were casted. The people of Jammu and Kashmir felt that their pride has been restored by the militant activities of the Front. However, from the 1990’s Front began losing its leading role as the Government of India responded with iron fist and the Pakistan Government changed its policies.101 Consequently, by the end of the year most of the JKLF’s top leadership had either been killed or imprisoned.

C. Moderate Political Phase The independence movement spearheaded by JKLF evoked a massive public response mainly because of the slogans of Kashmiriyat and Azadi. These slogans expressed the desire of the people of Kashmir for independence,

101 Because JKLF was struggling for re-unification of both parts of Kashmir and for what it called complete independence of Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. So, Pakistan tried to marginalize JKLF by promoting various other militant outfits like Hizbul Mujahideen which were in favour of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.

85 identity, autonomy and dignity. With the passage of time, the local character and secular ideology of the Front, gave way to radical jihadist outfits mainly for Pakistan’s interest. The mushroom growth of organizations dither the attention, attraction as well as division in support basis. The Front’s strength of leadership was decimated by combat deaths and arrests and continued to suffer grievously from Indian Security Forces since 1993. With the complete take- over of the movement by pro-Pakistan groups like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), JKLF lost almost its military ascendancy.102 In the year 1994 Yasin Malik was released from prison and he renounced the armed struggle and called for unilateral ceasefire. It was a unique step which got him appreciated at the national level but it was severely criticized by the rank and file of other organizations and also by Pakistan. Most of the members of the Front felt that the violent insurgency was no longer furthering the cause and decided to proceed under Malik on the political and diplomatic fronts. This branch of JKLF joined All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in the hope of giving greater voice to the cause. Malik’s branch of JKLF, though aligned with APHC, maintains the core ideology of the founding fathers of JKLF. It was realized by JKLF that the armed phase of struggle provided very less space for the political mobilization of the masses. During this phase JKLF tried to reactivate its position by vigorous legacy of sacrifices.103 During its moderate phase, Front’s political involvement entails letter writing campaigns, memoranda, distribution of literature, strikes, fasts, protests, press conferences and other assorted means of disseminating their aims and objectives. The Front attends international seminars, meets with dignitaries, briefs diplomats, corresponds with the international organizations and engages in other means of keeping channels open to foreign Governments. Front also involved itself in various constructive programmes on humanitarian grounds to reactivate its organizational basis. Front organized

102 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Op. Cit., p. 165 103 Bose, Sumantra, The Challenge in Kashmir: Self-Determination and a Just Peace, Sage Publications, (New Delhi, 1997), p.135

86 blood donation camps for the victims of Gujarat earthquake in Jammu and Kashmir. Another important step was election boycott. They said that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are yet to exercise their right to self- determination; elections cannot provide an alternative to self-determination and Azadi. Thus, they continuously campaigned for boycott of elections in Kashmir, urges people not to participate in elections. Another step taken by JKLF was a series of peaceful demonstrations. In December 1994, a non-violent march to United Nations Organizations Office, in Srinagar, on occasion of Human Rights Day was taken. In the recent uprisings of 2008-10, JKLF continued its protest movement in peaceful ways. It did support the Hurriyat Conference in issuing the commonly called ‘Protest Calenders’ and led protest marches from their Central Office many times in the past three years. Its leadership Yasin Malik was slapped with Public Safety Act (PSA) in all the three protest seasons and its principle pocket (Maisuma, Srinagar) has remained a fierce of street marches and demonstrations. From the above, it is clear that the mushroom growth of militant organizations led to the formation of APHC to provide political patronage and help to various militant outfits to settle down their inter-group conflicts and to internationalize the Kashmir issue at various forums. Soon after its formation, APHC got divided into two factions one led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and other led by Syed Ali Geelani. There are ideological and methodological differences within the various constituents of APHC. Some constituents of it like Tehreek-i-Hurriyat demands accession to Pakistan while the main proponent of the armed struggle (JKLF) demands Azadi or independence. However, though the various components of the APHC differed whether they wanted independence or unification of the state with Pakistan but they had at least one objective; that the people should be given the “right to choose”.104 Barring JKLF all these parties have used religious identity for political mobilization. This has resulted in their failure to reach to other religious communities and other regions especially Jammu and Ladakh. Moreover, one

104 Syed Ali Gilani, Nawai-i-Hurriyat, Op. Cit., p. 63

87 important development was also seen i.e. the departure of JKLF from armed resistance to non-violent resistance as its leader, Yasin Malik renounced armed struggle after his release from jail in 1994 and adopted Gandhian methods of non-violence and democratic ways to mobilize people of the Kashmir, Yasin Malik’s Safr-e- Azadi105 (journey for freedom) is one such example. After his release from jail, he claimed to have read Gandhi and was influenced by his theory of non-violence and Satyagraha.

105 JKLF under the leadership of Yasin Malik started Safr-e-Azadi (Journey for freedom) from Kokernag (Anantnag) and went across almost all the areas of Kashmir. It was an innovative method, rallies were held at various places and people were asked to plead for the inclusion of Kashmiri people in the peace process. People had been galvanized- emotionally, politically and socially by the overall motives or goals enhanced by the JKLF through this method of mass mobilization.

CHAPTER 4 4. ALL PARTIES HURRIYAT CONFERENCE: ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KASHMIR

Indian State has consistently looked at Kashmir as an internal problem. Any demand for Azadi or self-determination has been seen as heretic or a violation of the Indian state’s national integrity. There has been a clear understanding that Kashmir is an integral part of India and on this there can be no compromise. Given this paradigm of the Indian state, a separatist group continued to survive in Kashmir. This group known as Hurriyat Conference, has received different treatment from the Indian state. There have been many efforts to alienate them politically. Of late, there have been intermittent efforts to engage them. In response to this, Hurriyat has also followed the same policy. Within the separatist camp, there are some who have moderated their stand and held dialogue with New Delhi while few have not compromised. Along with this process of engagement and disengagement, certain political developments emerged in Kashmir. There has been a shift from militant resistance to non-violent resistance. People have abandoned arms and started picking up stones to express their demand for self-determination.

4.1 Efforts by the Indian State to Engage Hurriyat Indian state has used both military and democratic processes to control and construct peace in Kashmir. Military forces have been empowered by exemplary laws like AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act).1 In the early 1990s, Indian state’s focus primarily was to control insurgency. It has tried every military tactic to eliminate armed opposition. During this period, Kashmir was under Governor’s rule and no political process was allowed to exist. However,

1 AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) was introduced in Kashmir in 1990. It provides security forces extraordinary powers to shoot, search and arrest without warrant, all under immunity from prosecution in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of powers conferred by this Act 89 when the military action became successful, Indian state tried to revive political institutions to bring democracy and progress in Kashmir. It is under the banner of ‘normalcy’ that such processes were carried. But this ‘normalcy’ was supposed to the normalization of Kashmiri minds. To attain democracy and integration in Kashmir such efforts were made. The efforts known as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have been introduced in Kashmir by the Indian state. Infact, Indian state has followed a two- way strategy to tackle the issue of Kashmir. On an international level, it has tried to use diplomatic tools to engage with Pakistan and on internal side, it has introduced some confidence building measures to gain the legitimacy of Kashmiris. One such effort in the internal side has been the establishment of ‘The State Autonomy Committee’ (SAC) in 1996 to look into the issue of autonomy for Kashmir.2 The report of the Committee recommended that only defense, foreign affairs and communication had to be given to the Central Government leaving the rest of the powers to the State Government as was the case before 1953.3 But, owing to the domestic party politics of Indian society this report was overlooked. Among the national parties, BJP strongly opposes any demand for autonomy for Kashmir. The state BJP President, D K Kotwal, opposed it resolutely and insisted that ‘Farooq is trying to divert attention from his failures. Leave alone autonomy, we will not rest till Article 370 is abrogated.4 It (BJP) has made clear that Kashmir needs to be integrated further and any devolution of power will sow the seeds of separatism and hence, further harm the integrity of Indian nation. Congress has a double policy and responds to the mood of the vote bank when it comes to any such demand for autonomy. It succumbs to the pressure of electoral politics to decide on any issue of importance like Kashmir. The Hurriyat Conference also rejected autonomy as a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Syed Ali

2 State Autonomy Committee was set up by Farooq Abdullah’s government in 1996 and submitted its report on 1996. 3 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Viva publication, (New Delhi, 2003), p. 229 4 Behera,Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Manohar Publications, (New Delhi, 2000), p. 259 90

Shah Geelani, the then Chairman of the APHC, said that the struggle for the right to self-determination and for a permanent solution to the problem would continue.5 However, much before this autonomy debate, there has been devolution of power in Jammu and Kashmir. It was in May 1995, that the Government of India passed the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council Act which created Autonomous Councils in Leh and Kargil along with an inter-council district to promote coordination and communal harmony.6 Apart from this devolution of power, the electoral process was revived in Jammu and Kashmir. As a prelude to this stage, the government released top political activists including Shabir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Gani Lone7 and many militant leaders were also released to gain the confidence of the people. In October 1996 State Assembly elections were held in which Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference has emerged as the key player among all other political parties. The Indian State also made efforts to engage separatists in a dialogue. The entire process was thought to normalize Kashmir and bring it back into the mainstream democratic institutions.

4.1.1 Dialogue Process under Vajpayee Government During the Vajpayee Government, efforts were made to engage militant and separatist groups in a dialogue. In this regard, a major peace initiative was carried in 2000 when K.C Pant, a noted Politician and former Congress Cabinet Minister, was appointed as the Chief interlocutor to hold discussions with the various groups in the state. Pant extended an invitation not only to the APHC leaders but also to other politicians from Kashmir who were committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.8 The APHC leaders rejected the invitation on the ground that Pakistan was not included. An eight member Kashmir Committee

5 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p.230 6 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson Longman, (New Delhi, 2007), p. 118 7 Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the Unending War, Op. Cit., p. 166 8 Sharma, Y. R., Political Dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir, Radha Krishna Anand, & Co. (Jammu, 2002), pp. 501-502 91

(KC) headed by former Law Minister, Ram Jetmalani, was also set up. However, this committee was dissolved and N N Vohra (Presently Governor of J&K) was appointed as the interlocutor for NDA government. All this interlocution was aimed to engage the militant groups and Hurriyat in a dialogue process. However, A dramatic change came in July 2000 when Hizbul Mujahideen (Militant group in Kashmir) declared cease-fire which was accepted and reciprocated by the Government of India. The cease-fire was soon followed by talks in Srinagar between the militant groups and the Indian government. But the talks collapsed when the Indian government refused to include Pakistan as demanded by Hizbul Mujahideen, Thus, the cease- fire was called off on May 2001.9 However, the Indian government was persisting with the attempts to start a dialogue in the spirit, described by Prime Minister Vajpayee, of insaniyat (humanity). In November, he stated that ‘combat operations’ would not be carried out against militants during the Ramadan (month of fasting for Muslims).10 This cease-fire was extended but hope that it would jump-start a political process was dashed by the APHC’s rejection of talks, as it wanted Pakistan should be included in talks as well, (a condition unacceptable to India). Both the cease-fire and dialogue initiatives were impeded by divisions among Kashmiri militants and political groups as Hizbul Mujahideen’s cease-fire announcement in 2000 drew strong criticism from other militant groups in Kashmir.11 Despite these obstacles, some sort of dialogue process between New Delhi and some Kashmiri separatist groups did happen in the years following the collapsed cease-fire. In this direction one important development in the separatist politics in Kashmir happened when Prime Minister Vajpayee’s special representative, N. N Vohra (who is presently Governor of the state) held talks with Kashmiri separatist leaders and direct talks between APHC (M) and the

9 Joshi, Arun, Eyewitness Kashmir-Teetering on Nuclear War, Marshall Cavendish, (Singapore, 2004), p. 229 10 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict-India, Pakistan and the unending war, Op. Cit., p.232 11 The Guardian, July 31, 2000 92

Indian government took place for first time in January 2004.12 In January 2004, N. N. Vohra was retained in the same capacity by the Congress-led national government elected in May 2004. Efforts to promote dialogue have been helped by several militants abandoning the armed struggle. Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah, Firdous Syeed- the famous ex-fighters, now surrendered militants- opted for dialogue and political struggle instead of the guns. Meanwhile one faction of APHC led by its then Chairman Molvi Abass Ansari and its members comprised Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Bilal Gani Lone, Abdul Gani Bhat, Fazal Haque Qurashi, held two round table talks in L K Advani’s office (the then Deputy Prime Minister) on 22 January and 27 March 2004 under the Indian constitution.13 But one major group that had chosen to remain outside the dialogue process was APHC (G)14, because according to them “dialogue under the Indian constitution and without any proper agenda, is a futile exercise and wastage of time”. Hence forth, on June 2, 2005 a nine-member delegation of APHC (M) including Mirwaiz and Yasin Malik traveled to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan by Srinagar- Muzaffarabad Bus service. During their two week visit they met with prominent political leaders from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir,15 but the United Jihad Council (a conglomerate of different militant organizations led by Hizbul Mujahideen Chief, Syed Salahuddin) had officially rejected an invitation to meet the visiting Hurriyat leaders.16 The new approach of Hurriyat was also evident from their selection of a modified vocabulary to present their discourse. For example, they started talking about a ‘place of honour and dignity’ instead of right to self- determination and Azadi.17 Soon after, APHC faction led by Mirwaiz welcomed

12 Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh; Asif , Bashra; Cyrus, Sami; Kashmir-New Voices, New Approaches,( edt.), Lynne Rienner Publishers, (Boulder London, 2006), p. 209 13 Advani, L. K., My Country My Life, Rupa & Co, (New Delhi, 2008), pp. 287-288 14 Ibid., 15 Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh; Asif , Bashra; Cyrus, Sami, Kashmir-New Voices, New Approaches,( edt.), Op. Cit., p.263 16 Greater Kashmir, April 2005 17 Muhammad, Z. G., Kashmir in War and Diplomacy, Gulshan Publications, (Srinagar, 2007), p. 130 93 the Four-Point Formula18 of General Parvaiz Musharraf (the proposal was also welcomed by Dr Farooq Abdullah of National Conference and Mufti Mohammad Syeed of People’s Democratic Party).19 The formula was, however, strongly rejected by the Geelani faction. Geelani became unhappy with the new discourse of the Pakistan leadership as well as APHC leaders led by Mirwaiz. The United Jihad Council too expressed its disapproval and disappointment. The spokesman of the UJC said nothing short of the right to self-determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir was acceptable.20

4.1.2 Dialogue Process under Manmohan Singh Government The dialogue process was carried forward during the Manmohan Singh-led UPA Government. It started with Round -Table Conferences in February 2006 in which both the pro-freedom and pro-Indian political leaders of Kashmir were invited. However, the Hurriyat Conference declined the offer of the Manmohan Singh and stayed away from the conference by calling it “premature”.21 But the mainstream parties like NC, PDP participated in the conference where several issues were discussed without any concrete results. Criticizing this talk-process, APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said in his Friday sermon: “We had some apprehensions about the Round-Table Conference and the apprehensions came true. This Conference was like a seminar and failed to yield any result for the permanent solution of the Kashmir dispute, it is necessary that India, Pakistan and people from both parts of Kashmir should be involved in talks. A series of talks and agreements between Srinagar and New Delhi have failed,”22

18 Parvaiz Musharraf, former President of Pakistan, proposed a “four-point solution” to the Kashmir issue on December 5, 2006 in an interview with NDTV (an Indian television channel). His formula includes: soft or porous borders in Kashmir (but no change of borders); autonomy or “self-governance” within each region of Kashmir; phased demilitarization of all regions; and finally, a “joint supervisory mechanism,” with representatives from India, Pakistan and all parts of Kashmir, to oversee the plan’s implementation. For details see Pervaiz Musharraf’s book’ ’In the Line of Fire’’ 19 Matto, Amitabh; Kak, Kapil; Jacop, Happymon, (edt.), India and Pakistan-Pathways Ahead, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd. 2007, p. 8 20 Tribune News Service, December 6, 2005 21 Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh; Asif , Bashra; Cyrus, Sami, Kashmir-New Voices, New Approaches, (edt.), Op. Cit., p. 264 22 Muslim Observer, June 1, 2006 94

Notwithstanding, the criticism earned by the talk process, Indian government seems determined to continue the same. “During the second Round T-able Conference in Srinagar in 24-25 May 2006, Indian Prime Minister announced setting up of five Working Groups (WGs) to further the dialogue process in the region. While the first WG focuses on CBMs, the second focuses on strengthening relations across LOC, the third one deal with economic development of the State, the fourth WG aims at providing good governance to people and the fifth one aims at strengthening Center-State relations.23 I am here referring the recommendations of a working group which submitted its report.

4.1.2.1 Working Group on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) This group under the Chairmanship of Mohammad Hamid Ansari was formed to look into certain problems in Kashmir and also provide the remedies for those problems. It was established after the announcement made by Manmohan Singh (PM) in the Round Table Conference held in Srinagar on 24 and 25 May, 2006. The Working Group submitted its report in January, 2007.

Agenda The group had the following agenda before it: 1. Measures to improve the condition of the people affected by militancy. 2. Schemes to rehabilitate all orphans and widows affected by militancy. 3. Issues relating to the relaxation of conditions for those who have foresworn militancy. 4. An effective rehabilitation policy including employment for Kashmiri Pandit migrants. 5. An approach concerning issues relating to the return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled by Pakistan. 6. Measures to preserve and protect the unique cultural and religious heritage of the State.24

23 Behera, Navnita Chadha, Demystifying Kashmir, Op. Cit., p.142 24 Report of Working Group, pp.1-2 95

Methodology adopted by the Group It followed the method of discussion and consensus between the members of the groups to arrive at the final recommendations. The group held a series of discussions with State and National political parties. It also visited the migrant camps and finally, in the light of all the experiences, tried to arrive at a consensus.25

Recommendations of the Working Group In the light of its agenda, following were the recommendations made by the Working Group: A. Following measures are needed to improve the conditions of people affected by militancy: 1) The necessity of curbing human rights violations. Prime Minister’s commitment for ‘zero tolerance’ of human rights violation was appreciated. The need to strengthen the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) and revitalize its functioning was asserted. The state Human Rights Commission shall be strengthened on the lines of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and it shall be provided with investigative machinery. Also, its recommendations shall be obligatory and in case of non-acceptance of its recommendations, the reasons for a speaking order shall be given. An empowered committee shall be established to report regularly on the action taken by the Government on the recommendations of the commission. 2) All the victims of the militants shall be provided relief and assistance. An order of preference was given to the affected in terms of their loyalty and proximity to the state. For example, the first beneficiaries of relief were considered to those victims who are associated with military, paramilitary or police. Then, those who were not connected with militancy. 3) Termination of exceptional laws and maintenance of law and order through normal laws. It was recommended that laws like AFSPA and Disturbed

25 Ibid., pp. 2-3 96

Areas Act violate the fundamental rights of citizens and adversely affect the public and hence, these shall be scrapped. 26 B. Following schemes and measures were recommended for the rehabilitation of the orphans and widows affected by militancy: 1. Complete data of widows and orphans affected by militancy shall be collected for making their rehabilitation effective. A social cell shall be set up for the identification and rehabilitation of widows and orphans. 2. Relief to victims shall be speedy and reach them directly. 3. Administrative delays and malpractices in reaching relief to the concerned shall be curbed.27 C. Measures relating to rehabilitation of militants who have given up militancy consisted of providing them a hope of a dignified life and a general amnesty to those who are languishing in jails. D. For rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits, following measures were recommended: 1. The right of the migrant Pandits to return to their original place of inhabitance. 2. Besides, job opportunities for Pandits, safety of Pandit property from illegal occupation and other necessary measures for their safe return. 28 E. The approach for the return of the youth from the Pakistan controlled Kashmir shall involve the classification of their infiltration and their identification which may involve their numbers and other criteria for their return.29 F. A comprehensive policy on the preservation of the cultural and religious heritage shall be made. For this comprehensive plans and autonomous institutions shall be made. Besides these, there were other recommendations of the Group. As this group was the result of the Round-Table Conferences, its recommendation has very less meaning for the Hurriyat Conference. However, it was a positive development in the sense as it somehow got the attention of the Moderate faction

26 Ibid., pp. 6-8 27 Ibid., pp. 8-9 28 Ibid., pp. 10-11 29 Ibid., p.12-13 97 of the Hurriyat. But the recommendations of this group mostly remained on paper. Also, there were other groups which looked at different aspects: some focused on the economic development of Kashmir, some on the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) across Line of Control (LOC) and so on. All this dialogue process flourished in an era where militancy had waned down and when there was a change in the electoral politics in Kashmir. The dialogue process happened in the era of PDP rule.

4.2 Formation of PDP and Beginning of the Reconciliation The formation of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was a landmark development in the political scene of Kashmir. For the first time a prominent Congress leader and former Home Minister of India , Mufti Mohammad Syed, became instrumental in establishing a regional political party namely People’s Democratic Party (PDP), in the state. This party became a new political player in the 2002 Assembly elections and emerged as a coalition partner of the Congress with a Common Minimum Programme (CMP).The CMP had the following goals to achieve: a. To heal the physical, psychological and emotional wounds inflicted by 14 years of militancy. To revive the political process, hold consolidations, dialogues and evolve a broad based consensus on the restoration of peace. b. To revive all cases of detainees being held without trial for long periods. c. Investigations of all cases of custodial killings and human rights violations d. Special schemes to be worked out to rehabilitate former militants, widows and victims of militancy. e. Disbanding of SOG (Special operation group) and POTA and setting up of Commission to reform the police administration.30 As PDP patron, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became the chief minister of coalition government. Kashmir saw a lot of social reconstruction. During this period, Special Operation Group (SOG) was disbanded and normalization of hearts and minds was undertaken. One of the important developments in this

30 Mainstream, November 2, 2002, p.3 98 coalition era was the resumption of dialogue between different political shades in Kashmir and Central Government. The peace process gained momentum when the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was opened for the passengers of Jammu and Kashmir. PDP was a kind of relief from the main political party -National Conference. People began to feel some sort of trust. Peace building was the major effort of the Indian state during this period. However, the most important development during Mufti’s regime was the holding of Municipal Election in 2005, after a gap of twenty-seven years. PDP succeeded in mobilizing masses especially in the rural areas. Legislature became the subject of new debates and discussion. Two bills during this period were important owing to the uproar they caused in Kashmir: Permanent Resident Bill and Ban on Inter-District Recruitment.

Permanent Resident Bill This bill was aimed at restricting women from getting married outside. A permanent resident of Kashmir (woman) will lose her permanent resident status in case she marries a non-permanent resident. This bill was introduced in 2004 by PDP.31 It started with a judgment by the State High Court pending before it from 1979, declared that the daughter of permanent resident will not lose her status if she marries outside the state.32 In other words, if she marries a non-permanent resident she will continue to retain the status of a permanent resident. This bill was supported by the PDP and it got the support of other parties also. It was highly patriarchal and parochial. One political scientist, Rekha Chowdhary, termed it as a deliberate attempt which involved the rights of women. She remarks in the case of this bill; “The discourse on the rights of woman was subordinated to the discourse on the Kashmiri versus regional/national/Hindu identity”33

31 Chowdhary, Rekha, Identity Politics and Regional Polarisation in J & K, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No. 19, May 8, 2010, p. 15 32 Ibid., 33 Ibid., 99

Choudhary sees in this bill a deliberate attempt to subject women to communal designs of identity and is deeply patriarchal and parochial. It is the women who are supposed to bear the burden of preserving the communal identity. Another controversial bill has been the Inter-District Recruitment Bill. This bill has been moved on the ground that inter-district recruitment shall be banned. This demand was asserted by Panthers Party. The motivation is to cater to the demands arising from many districts on the grounds of backwardness. The idea is to take at pace all the districts.34 These bills created uproar and were seen as assertion of identities. The attempt was seen as involving the polarization of different regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Broadly, the emergence of Peoples Democratic Party was seen as a positive change in Kashmir’s political history. This period saw lot of positive efforts which resulted in some positive changes. Normalization and development were two processes during this period. However, PDP’s rule saw a new wave of resistance in Kashmir. It began with the agitation of Amarnath Land Transfer. Kashmir valley has witnessed a series of non-violent protests over a number of issues ranging from land row to human rights violations by armed forces. This has revived the defunct and divided Hurriyat. In particular, Geelani’s faction has emerged as the formidable representative of the Kashmiri separatist movement.

4.3 Protest Movements: Revival of Hurriyat Amarnath Land Row This issue began in late June 2008 over diversion of 800 kanals (one kanal is one-eighth of an acre or one third of a hectare) of forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB)35 for the Amarnath Yatra by the PDP-

34 Ibid., pp. 17-18 35 Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) was constituted by an Act of the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature in 2000, to manage Shri Amarnathji Shrine in South Kashmir to which lahks of Hindu pilgrims pay obeisance every year in summer season. 100

Congress coalition government.36 As the word about land being transferred permanently to the Board spread in the Valley, it triggered spontaneous agitation throughout Kashmir Valley. People poured onto the streets raising pro-freedom and anti-India slogans demanding that land be taken back from the board.37 The land agitation united both Hurriyat factions and they found the time apt to bury their differences aside. They constituted a joint Coordination Committee (CC) to spearhead the agitation against what they termed ‘land grabbing’ by government. They launched protest movement across Valley with the main thrust on the environmental impact that the controversial land transfer deal would have.38 There were month long protests and demonstrations throughout Valley against land transfer. Thus, Hurriyat leaders managed to mobilize the tremendous support of Kashmiris in Valley against ‘land grabbing’ by government. These protests brought together farmers, laborers, students, lawyers, activists, etc., and infact every section of the society.39 Violence erupted soon after people started protests, leading to many deaths of unarmed protesters by security forces which worsened the situation further in the valley. These human rights violations led to upsurge in the Azadi sentiment.40 The apparent cause or the trigger was soon relegated to irrelevance and over-taken by the larger context of ‘Azaadi’. The PDP gauged mood of the people and withdrew from the coalition government. As agitation continued, Ghulam Nabi Azad, the then Chief Minister, succumbed and cancelled the land transfer order after the newly appointed Governor N N Vohra announced that Board does not need the land and the state was placed under Governor’s rule for six months.41 But by then the land transfer had become what senior separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani called a ‘non-

36 Navlakha, Gautam, Jammu and Kashmir: Winning a Battle only to Lose the War? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 45, November 8, 2008, p. 43 37 Malik, Javaid, From Azadi to Elections, Greater Kashmir, January 5, 2009 38 Safvi, S. Zafar Mehdi, Jam-Kash Showdown: Clash of Vested Interests, Epilogue, Vol. 2, Issue 9, September, 2008, p. 36 39 Ibid., 40 Malik, Javaid, From Azadi to Elections, Op. Cit., 41 Ibid., 101 issue’.42 The Hurriyat leaders had declared that land to the Shrine Board was no longer main issue; their objective is Right to Self-determination.43 As the political developments were taking place in the Kashmir Valley, Jammu started protest over the revocation of land transfer. They formed a coalition of parties under the banner of Amarnath Sanghharsh Samiti. Suffron forces in Jammu resorted to extreme steps-blocking the Srinagar-Jammu highway,44 and cutting the essential supplies to the Valley. With economic blockade, they virtually declared war against Kashmir Valley. Jammuites started attacking local Muslims and Kashmiri truck drivers at will, besides razing mosques and other Muslim structures, police virtually gave them free hand to commit communal crimes.45 The economic blockade created unrest and resentment among the people of Kashmir Valley and the pro-freedom leadership gave a call for “Muzaffarabad46 Chalo’ for August 11. The call evoked massive response as thousands of people marched towards Muzaffarabad with pro-freedom leaders leading the front, shouting slogans like Teri Mandi Meri Mandi Rawalpandi (your market, our market is Rawalpandi), Jeewa Jeewa Pakistan (long live Pakistan). The march was foiled by the state with the help of army. At Seelu Baramullah, the march was fired upon killing many people including a prominent leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz (a senior separatist leader).47

State Response: Extreme and Mild Repression in Valley and Jammu During these protests state used double standard, while dealing with public protests in Kashmir Valley and Jammu. Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti, spearheading agitation in Jammu for restoration of 800 kanals land to Shri

42 Roy, Arundhati, Azadi: It’s the only thing Kashmiri wants. Denial is delusion, Outlook 1st September 2008, p.15 43 Puri, Balraj, Beyond Land, Greater Kashmir, September 3, 2008 44 It is the only road which connects the valley with the rest of India. 45 Safvi, S. Zafar Mehdi, Jam-Kash Showdown: Clash of Vested Interests, Op. Cit., p. 36 46 It was only rout which was connecting Kashmir with outside world before partition but after partition of India, this route was closed when Kashmir got divided between Pakistan and Indian administered parts. 47 Malik, Javaid, From Azadi to Elections, Op. Cit., 102

Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) was dealt with utmost caution but on the contrary, the state apparatus used excessive force in Valley and killed innocent people without any fear. According to the Srinagar-based J&K Coalition of Civil Society, between 22 June and 12 September, 57 persons were killed and at least 1,500 injured (of whom nearly 600 suffered bullet injuries). And even doctors, ambulances and hospitals were attacked by the security forces.48 Muzamil Jaleel, journalist from Srinagar, cited specific cases in Srinagar of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) targeting ambulances ferrying the injured and, “in one instance, they opened fire at the entrance to a hospital’s casualty ward”.49 What is intriguing is the fact that while the entire J&K region was declared as “disturbed”, in areas where the Shri Amarnath Samiti led agitation was taking place in Jammu division, the security forces waited for the executive magistrate to issue orders to open fire, but in the Valley no such procedure was followed.50 Not a single security force personnel died in Kashmir Valley at the hands of protestors. Whereas in Jammu, while the security forces exercised restraint, two policemen, Zafar Javed and Zakir Husain, were lynched by a mob. Besides, the death toll of 13 in Jammu, seven were Muslims. Of the six Hindus who died, two committed suicide and four were shot dead by security forces.51 It shows that communalism has made deep inroads in the state administration. The said approach strengthens the deep-seated alienation in Kashmir valley particularly in the youths who played instrumental role to organize the demonstrations; it also strengthened the hold of separatists in the Valley. The participation of youth has gave separatist politics a more aggressive and radical form. There is a renewed assertion of the goal of “self-determination”. On the other hand, it widened the gulf between the two state regions and further deepened the already existing mistrust.

48 Navlakha, Gautam, Jammu and Kashmir: Winning a Battle only to Lose the War? Op. Cit., p. 43 49 Noorani, A. G., Why Jammu Erupts, Frontline, Volume 25-Issue 19 ,Sep. 13-26, 2008, p. 84 50 Tribune Dated August 7, 2008 51 Navlakha, Gautam, Jammu and Kashmir: Winning a Battle only to Lose the War? Op. Cit., p. 46 103

Many things emerged during Amarnath Land Row, apart from the fall of coalition government and imposition of Governor’s rule. These can be summarized as: 1. Kashmir Valley saw huge mobilization which resulted in development of political consciousness of people as well as deep alienation from Indian State. 2. A new development emerged in the sense that Kashmir’s resistance took a new form. Armed violence culminated in the popular demands. In this sense, democratic political spaces were revived in Kashmir. 3. Attachment to land was seen as a highest desire for nation. 4. The only bad repercussion of this protest was the polarization of two regions of Jammu and Kashmir on religious lines; Jammu imposed an economic blockade on Kashmir and Muslims were targeted. This was seen as communal divide between Jammu and Kashmir. However, Kashmir Valley remained peaceful to its religious minorities.

Shopian and Machail Incidents As Amarnath Issue led to the fall of Coalition Government and imposition of Governor’s rule, elections for Assembly were held in 2009 in which people participated massively despite the boycott call of the leaders who were leading the Azadi movement. National Conference and Congress made a coalition government. Thirty eight year old, Omar Abdullah assumed the charge as the youngest Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, bringing new hope for the troubled state.52 The change in government was seen as a hope for peace and development. However, soon this peace looked fragile; when on May 29, Aasiya Jan, 17, a schoolgirl, and her sister-in-law, Neelofar in Shopian, in South Kashmir were raped and murdered. Finger of suspicion pointed towards the police. After some administrative action, a judicial enquiry by a retired High Court Judge also confirmed the suspicion. News of the

52 Bukhari, Shujaat, Hope in the air, Frontline Volume 26-Issue 02- January 17-30, 2009 pp. 35-38 104 tragedy spread like wildfire all over the State. It gave a fresh lease of life to the protest movement which led to month-long shutdowns and Hartals, as Shopian district observed shutdown 102 days. These protests brought the Hurriyat Conference into limelight by providing leadership to people demanding their rights and in the larger context ‘Azadi’. Again in 2010 Kashmir Valley boiled with the issue of killing of three innocent civilians in a fake encounter in Machail, in Kupwara district, by army. It led to widespread protests all over the Valley. It was during the protest against the Machail fake encounter, that the killing of 17-year-old Tufail Mattoo took place which triggered the phase of protests and violence.53 It led to vicious cycle of killings which further deteriorated the situation. These incidents of grave human rights violations were seriously protested in Kashmir which led to a month long protests. These protests were powerful in the sense that youth of Kashmir had taken stones in their hands to fight the bullets of security forces.

4.4 Indian Union’s Response: All Party Delegation and Interlocution While Kashmir kept boiling, Central government sent an all party delegation under Home Minister, P. Chidambaram to assess the ground situation in the state.54 Its aim was to talk to all shades of opinion in Kashmir. The delegation was sent while Indian Prime Minister maintained that there would be zero tolerance for human rights violation in Kashmir. The delegation arrived and invited all the representatives and political players in Jammu and Kashmir for talks. Mainstream parties participated in the talks and advocated their proposals for the resolution of Kashmir issue, National Conference advocated autonomy as the final resolution of Kashmir issue, PDP (People’ Democratic Party) supported Self-Rule as final solution.55 Hurriyat Conference rejected invitation for talks. However, five members of delegation urged Syed Ali Shah Geelani at his

53 Chowdhary, Rekha, The Second Uprising, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No 39, September 25, 2010, p. 10 54 Chidambaram to Lead All-Party Team to J & K, The Hindu, September 18, 2010 55 Shujaat, Bukhri, All Party Delegation Meets Kashmiri Leaders, The Hindu, September 20, 2010 105 residence to restore normalcy in Valley, he told delegation once New Delhi accepts his five point formula56 normalcy would be restored.57 Though Moderate faction of Hurriyat also boycotted to meet the delegation, it presented a memorandum to the delegation58 (See appendix V). While reaching Delhi back, the delegation gave many suggestions to the government, the government called a meeting of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) - highest decision making body on security issues- The Committee announced eight point plan for Jammu and Kashmir to defuse the crises in Kashmir. Following are the eight point plan announced by CCS. 1. Appoint a group of interlocutors under the chairmanship of an Eminent person to begin the process of a sustained dialogue with all sections of the people of Jammu & Kashmir, including political parties/groups, youth and student organizations, civil society organizations and other stakeholders. 2. Advise the State Government to immediately release all students and youth detained or arrested for stone pelting or similar violations of law and to withdraw the charges against such students and youth. 3. Advise the State Government to immediately review the cases of all PSA (Public Safety Act) detenues and withdraw the detention orders in appropriate cases. 4. Request the State Government to immediately convene a meeting of the Unified Command and to review the deployment of security forces in the Kashmir Valley especially in Srinagar, with particular reference to de-scaling the number of bunkers, check-points etc. in Srinagar and other towns and to review the notification of areas as ‘disturbed areas’. 5. Grant ex-gratia relief to the families of the deceased persons at Rs. 5 lakhs per person killed in the civil disturbances since June 11, 2010.

56 Five point formula presented by Syed Geelani to the Indian Government are 1.Acknowledgement by India, Kashmir as a dispute 2. Demilitarization 3. Release of political prisoners 4. Punishment to the security personnel involved in the civilian killings and 5. End the killings and arrests. 57 Accept 5-Point Formula to Restore Normalcy: Geelani to APD, Greater Kashmir, September 20, 2010 58 Memorandum to the All Party Delegation, Greater Kashmir, September 21, 2010 106

6. Appoint two Special Task Forces, one each for Jammu region and Ladakh region to examine the developmental needs of the two regions, with particular reference to deficiencies in infrastructure and make suitable recommendations. 59 Besides these political initiatives the central government appointed an expert committee under the Chairmanship of C. Rangarajan, who is the Chairman of Economic Advisory Panel to the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh after the summer unrest 2010 in Kashmir, to formulate a job plan for Jammu and Kashmir. The expert committee suggested several flagship schemes which were aimed to address the problem of unemployment.60 However, the most important development in the aftermath of unrest was the appointment of the interlocutors as part of New Delhi’s eight point package to cool the tempers and ‘workout a political settlement of the Kashmir issue.’ The team consists of journalist Dileep Padgaonkar, academician Radha Kumar and former Central Information Commissioner M.M Ansari.61 The Group of Interlocutors held extensive deliberations with the political parties, civil society and other stake-holders of the state. The group submitted its report on October 12, 2011, proposing a “New Compact” with the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the report focuses on three components — political, economic and social and cultural. Under the political component, the report deals with Centre-State relations and internal devolution of powers, and suggests a road map listing confidence-building measures. It favours amendment of the Public Safety Act (PSA), review of Disturbed Areas Act and re-appraisal of application of controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). It recommended deletion of the word “temporary” from the heading of Article 370 and from the title of Part XXI of the Constitution and suggested replacing it with the word “Special” as it has been used for rest of the States under Article 371. It recommended the setting up of a Constitutional Committee (CC), to review all Central Acts and Articles of the Constitution of India extended

59 Shujaat Bukhari, Reaching Out, Frontline Volume 27 –Issue 21, October, 9-22, 2010, pp. 28-32 60 Ali, Muddasir, Focus on Skill Development, Greater Kashmir, March 4, 2011 61 Maqbool Umer, Political, Apolitical Groups set up, Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2011 107 to the State after the signing of the 1952 Agreement (Delhi Agreement). The report favoured resumption of the dialogue process between the Centre and Hurriyat Conference “at the earliest opportunity”. It expressed the hope that such a dialogue should yield visible outcomes and be made uninterruptible. Some other recommendations include speedy implementation of the recommendations of the Prime Minister's working group on CBMs (as discussed earlier), in particular making the return of all Kashmiris, mainly Pandits, a part of State policy; facilitating the return of Kashmiris stranded across the LOC, establishing a judicial commission to look into unmarked graves, speeding up human rights and the rule of law reforms.62 The interlocutors have advocated drawing a fresh financial arrangement between the Centre and the state to achieve J&K’s economic self-reliance. In this regard, the report propounds that a special set-up be created for hilly, backward and remote areas and also for socially disadvantaged groups. Also, it has asked for institutionalized cooperation between the two parts of erstwhile princely state of J&K to ensure “hassle-free” movement of people, goods and services across the LOC and on International Border. 63 The mainstream parties hailed these initiatives of Central Government to defuse the crises in Kashmir and to find a solution for the Kashmir issue. The separatist camp rejected these initiatives. According to chairman of moderate faction of Hurriyat conference, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, “recommendations, committees, sub-committees are wastage of time. It is not a matter of recommendations, there is need of political will for solving Kashmir dispute,” Mirwaiz further said, “Some CBMs can create a situation for political dialogue but not solution. AFSPA, demilitarization, trade, economic incentives can only be CBMs not the solution.”Mirwaiz also reiterated the stand of the amalgam that Kashmir issue has to be resolved through tripartite dialogue or through United Nations resolutions.64 According to Chairman of hardliner faction of Hurriyat conference, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, “This is mere time-buying tactics adopted by

62 Report of Interlocutors, pp. 39-51 63 Report of Interlocutors, pp. 64-84 64 Maqbool, Zahid, Separatists Not Impressed, Greater Kashmir, May 25, 2012 108

India. We will not bow down to the economic packages by the New Delhi. Our youth did not sacrifice their lives for the economic packages,” commenting on the report of interlocutors he said the report has ignored the aspirations and historical aspect of Kashmir issue.65

4.5 Achievements of Hurriyat These protests saw the rise of new political developments in Jammu and Kashmir. On the one hand, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) emerged as a strong party legitimized by the support of the people. On the other hand, Indian Union made some efforts to placate the separatist sentiment in Jammu and Kashmir. APHC’s importance increased after the Amarnath Land Issue. It provided leadership to the masses which succeeded in forcing the government in withdrawing the land transfer. Not only this, it also played an important role in 2009 (Shopian rape and murder case) and 2010 (Machial fake encounter) protests. It issued calendars which delineated the progamme of protest. Mosques and Friday prayers were used for the mobilization of the masses. Demands were presented to the Indian Government on a number of matters. Though, it was laid down that the broader goal of protests is the achievement of independence. But these protests were used to protest against the imprisonment of youth under undemocratic laws like Public Security Act (PSA) and the killings of civilians. Among the APHC, it was Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Tehreek-i-Hurriyat that became powerful. Geelani was seen as an icon of the ‘freedom struggle’ by most young people in Kashmir. Notwithstanding, his hardline pro-Pakistan views and uncompromising stand on the Kashmir issue, he consolidated the pro-freedom sentiment that was revived after the killing of a teenager, Tufail Mattoo.66 Geelani assumed immense influence during these protests. His calendars, which laid down the programme for protest, succeeded for months.

65 Shujaat Bukhari, Omar Hails Centre’s 8-Point Formula, The Hindu, September 25, 2010 66 Bukhari, Shujaat, Key Players, Frontline, Volume 27-Issue 19, September 11-14, 2010, pp. 41-42 109

It is according to this calendar that people observe a total hartal, partial half- day hartal, protest march, etc. People also rely on these calendars for their daily activities such as buying essential goods or attending offices and educational institutions. There has been an intense display of pro-Azadi sentiment on the street. The new slogan ‘Go India Go’ reflects the strong anti- India emotions that are being asserted with a new vigour.67 In all these protests, he argued for non-violence. This shall be seen as a new kind of development where hardliner separatists took democratic means to realize the goal of a nation. However, Geelani shifted from merger with Pakistan to a tacit support for independence to Kashmir. One thing Kashmir’s separatists have understood, in common, are that armed violence has to be discouraged and abandoned in order to achieve the goal of independence. That is why the hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani, argued for peaceful protests and maintenance of communal harmony. And even United Jihad Council (UJC), an amalgam of militant organizations, quickly sensed the prevailing situation and announced to restrain from their militant activities.68 It strengthened the pro-freedom leadership to make decision freely. The pro-freedom leadership also rose to the occasion by shunning their traditional differences and assembling at joint platform to confront the challenge. Geelani presented the demands to the Indian government which came to be known as ‘Five-Point Formula’ to end the crisis in Kashmir. The demands included acknowledgement by India -Kashmir as an international dispute, start the process of demilitarization, release of political prisoners, punish the security personnel allegedly involved in the civilian killings, and end the killings and arrests.69 Other parties of APHC also emerged powerful and tried to take advantage of the mass alienation. Not only JKLF and Omar Farooq’s Hurriyat

67 Chowdhary, Rekha, The Second Uprising, Op. Cit., p.10 68 Ershad, Mahmud, The Reemergence of Kashmiri Intifada, Greater Kashmir, September 16, 2008 69 Protests Will Intensify, Warns Geelani, The Hindu, September 9, 2010 110 faction, but even the mainstream parties like PDP emerged as frontrunners in these circumstances. In all the demands raised amounted to the following: 1. Repeal of draconian laws like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act. 2. Speeding up of the Army’s restoration of lands, it has occupied. 3. Release of political prisoners. 4. Ensuring zero-tolerance of human rights abuses. 5. Restoration of civil liberties, including the right to assemble peaceably without arms. 6. Promotion of cultural and academic exchanges across the LOC. 7. Freedom of movement across the Line of Control; end to the barter trade and implementation of the eminently sensible proposals made by Haseeb A. Drabu, Chairman & CEO of J&K Bank. 8. Replacement of the bus travel arrangement with the rahdari permit of old.70

Thus, we see, of late, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) has emerged as an important political force in Jammu and Kashmir. The recent phase of protests revived the defunct and divided Hurriyat. The Hurriyat has increased its influence considerably and spearheaded all recent protests and provided leadership to the masses during these protests. However, certain important developments were also seen in Hurriyat Camp. While some of its member parties like Sajad Lone’s People’s Conference have fought elections (2008), some have softened its stand on the issue of Azadi, like Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s faction accepted Parwaiz Mushrraf’s four point formula and even held dialogue with Indian Union in absence of Pakistan. But some continue to hold on to extreme demands like Syed Ali Shah’s faction still demands right to self-determination. This stand of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, increased support- base of his party throughout the Valley and emerged as the most influential separatist group in the contemporary political history of Kashmir. Besides

70 Noorani, A. G., Agenda For Kashmir, Frontline Volume 26- Issue 25: December 05-18, 2009, pp. 90-91

111 these developments within Hurriyat, Elections 2008 again exposed the inherent ideological and personal differences of the Hurriyat camp. More surprising was the unprecedented mass participation in the elections despite Hurriyat’s boycott call. This was most probably for two reasons: Firstly, Hurriyat factions failed to produce a concrete mass programme except, to perpetuate its old strategies. Secondly, people started making a difference between the short term developmental issues and the long term political goals. Therefore, they supported mainstream political parties, who promised immediate solutions to day to day problems, as well as separatist leadership which lead movement to achieve right to self-determination. Thus, unless Hurriyat is able to remove its ideological and personal differences by producing a concrete mass appealing programme, its objective i.e., right to self-determination seems a distant dream.

112

CHAPTER 5 5. MULTIPLE PATHS TO PEACE

The Kashmir dispute is one of the oldest unresolved international disputes in the world today. Kashmir is also a nuclear flash-point1 between two South Asia’s nuclear powers- India and Pakistan. The conflicting history of India and Pakistan has resulted in four wars. Three of these wars were fought over Kashmir. For India, the problem of Kashmir is its internal problem and if there is something to be settled, that is about Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). For Pakistan it is the cause of denial of ‘right to self-determination’ of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan rejects the Indian contention that the UN resolutions, calling for plebiscite in Kashmir have been superseded by Shimla Agreement.2 Indian charge is that Pakistan is guilty of violating the Shimla Agreement, as the latter has been training militants of Kashmir. ‘A war hysteria, in fact, is currently part of the ongoing scenario in Kashmir and both sides are moving up battle ready forces, tanks and artillery pieces.3 The South Asian Region is widely considered to be one of the most dangerously unstable regions in the world with the two nuclear-armed countries, India and Pakistan, in conflict over a number of outstanding issues. India and Pakistan, the two major powers of south Asian region, are bound to play a determining role for future prospects of the whole region. Hence, the Kashmir conflict, the major bone of contention between two countries, which has major repercussions on the politics of whole region, becomes prime concern for both states. The conflict should be solved sooner or later, and sooner the better. Unless the conflict is not solved they will not be able to

1 Ganguly, Sumit, The Kashmir Question; Retrospect and Prospect, Frank Cass and Company, (London, 2003), p.128 2 The Shimla Agreement, signed between India and Pakistan in July 1972, followed from the war between the two countries in 1971 that led to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Apart from laying down the principles of future mutual relations, it bound the two countries “to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations”. It also cemented the Line of Control along Kashmir as something close to a permanent border, effectively subsuming Kashmir within the priorities of the two nations. 3 Shelton, U. Kodikara, South Asia Journal, March 4, 1990, p. 156 113 divert their resources for the development of their countries and to all round development of the whole region. A number of solutions have been offered; some offered from the beginning of the dispute and some have emerged in the meantime. In other words, multiple solutions are offered to end this conflict. Even within All Parties Hurriyat Conference, new solutions have been presented. However, it should be noted, that there is no short cut to the resolution of such an intricate conflict as Jammu and Kashmir. Realistically speaking, all pathways to the resolution of J&K conflict could be blocked if the basic principle of fairness and justice is not taken into account.

5.1 Self-Rule The 2002 state assembly elections were preceded by some unique political developments in the state of J&K. For the first time, a prominent Congress leader and former Home Minister of India, Mufti Mohammad Syed, became instrumental in establishing a regional political party, namely People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the state. This political party suggested Self-Rule framework for the resolution of Kashmir issue. The essence of Self-Rule lies in trying to suggest a creative framework for resolution of the issue without compromising the sovereignty of the two nation states involved. The party stressed that the dispute could not be resolved on the basis of exclusively intrastate level initiatives and hence requires a combination of intrastate measures with interstate and supra state measures. It insists that Self-Rule is a “formulation that would integrate the region without disturbing the extant sovereign authority over delimited territorial space”.4 According to the PDP founder, ‘Self-Rule is the best possible solution of Kashmir Issue, without affecting the sovereignty of both India and Pakistan’.5 Self-Rule considers demilitarization and other related efforts like the rolling back of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) as the first steps towards peace-building.

4 Jammu & Kashmir: The Self-Rule Framework For Resolution, Jammu & Kashmir People’s Democratic Party, (Srinagar, 2008). PP, 2-3 5 The Hindu, October 26, 2008 114

By suggesting Self-Rule, PDP presented itself as a reformist, pro-people party, occupying a middle ground between the APHC and the NC.

5.1.1 Broad Contours of Self-Rule Regional Council: The centerpiece of governance structure under Self-Rule is the cross border institution of Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. The Regional Council will replace the existing Upper House of State Assembly and will be a kind of a regional Senate. Members of Regional Council will be from J&K and Pakistan administered Kashmir. At present the State Assembly holds 20 seats for representatives across the Line of Control (LoC). These will be given up and replaced by the same number of seats in the Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. This will serve as a major cross border institution which will ensure long-term coordination of matters and interests relating to the state.6 Within J&K, there are certain regional issues that have the potential of snowballing into a dangerous situation. Occasionally, voices are raised from Ladakh and Jammu for trifurcation of the State. The Self-Rule subscribes to the belief that trifurcation of the State is not a solution for the alleged discrimination suffered by the people living in the regions of Jammu and Ladakh. The document explains that it is better “to ensure that all the regions share a sense of equal and equitable empowerment.”7 For it, Self-Rule advocates the promotion of genuine sub-regional political and economic empowerment. The document identified three basic requirements for efficient policy towards constructive regionalization: a) Building and strengthening of regional decision-making powers. b) Effective institution-building, as structures of sub-regional democracy. The document specifies that this may be achieved by creating sub-regional councils as a third tier of the legislative system. Thus, a federal system of government is envisaged which means that powers and responsibilities will be divided between the legislative assembly

6 Choudhary, Zafar, Peoples Democratic Party: Self-Rule for Lasting Kashmir Solution, Epilogue, Volume 2, Issue 11, December, 2008, pp. 23-24 7 Jammu & Kashmir: The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution, Op. Cit., P. 23 115 and the sub-regional councils. c) Creation of economic networks. The document conveys that from the top-down, bottom-up and horizontal perspectives, a region is the best level for utilization of money and execution of economic policies. Stabilization and redistribution may remain with the region while the local functions may be transferred to the local level of government.8 Economic Integration: An important component of Self-Rule is the economic integration of two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. For economic integration, Self-Rule suggests the establishment of a common economic space and institution of dual currency. “The process of economic integration of the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can start with the easiest form of economic integration, a Preferential Trade Agreement”, says the document. In the PTA, the two countries, India and Pakistan would offer tariff reductions, or eliminations confined to the geographical boundaries of ‘Greater Jammu & Kashmir’ and restrict it to some product categories. Stage second would be to make GJAK a free trade area, with no tariffs or barriers between two parts of Jammu and Kashmir, while maintaining their own external tariff on imports from the rest of the world including India and Pakistan. GJAK will set a common external tariff on imports from India and Pakistan. This could be later applied to rest of the world.9 Further, instead of looking for the monetary union, a new system of ‘Dual Currency’ will be created, where the Indian and Pakistani rupees are both made legitimate legal tenders in the geographical areas of GJAK. A better description of this system is a ‘circulation of two currencies’ in Jammu and Kashmir. It is being proposed that Indian and Pakistani rupees should be the medium of exchange in Jammu and Kashmir. To be more precise, it means, allowing circulation of Pakistani rupee in the Indian part of Kashmir and circulation of Indian rupee in the Pakistan administered Kashmir. This has to be done if we want across the line of control trade to flourish, the document says.

8 Ibid., pp. 24-25 9 Ibid., PP. 26-27 116

Constitutional Restructuring: For Self-Rule, to function effectively there is a need of restructuring the constitutional relationship of the state with the Indian Union. The document expresses “Self-rule cannot exist without constitutional safeguards”. As the constitutional position stands today, Article 356 undermines the core of Self- Rule and has to be made non-applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, Article 249 applied to the State in amended form, should be rolled back so that the Parliament cannot exercise legislative jurisdiction over a matter that otherwise falls under the State jurisdiction.10 Sixth Amendment of the constitution of the state that undermines its original scheme of a comprehensive and accountable executive (inclusive of the Head of the State) a critical component of Self-rule will have to be repealed. Prior to this amendment, the State Legislature elected Sadar-e- Riyasat, the head of the State. The provision, limiting the powers of state legislature, has been added to Article 368 which deals with the powers of the Parliament to amend the constitution of India and not the power of state legislature to amend its own constitution. The provision is, therefore, totally and grossly out of place and ultra virus. The state legislature’s constitutional power of amendment is the core of empowerment or Self-Rule of the state and this cannot be destroyed by an Order passed under Article 370. All India Service Act 1951 and Article 312 be rolled back and the local human resources are provided clear and unhindered opportunity to develop their full potential and be trusted to manage the affairs of the State. Self-Rule also envisages that the Head of the State be elected from the regions of Jammu and Kashmir by rotation. This shall give to the people of all the regions an equal and equitable sense and feeling of empowerment and shall strengthen their bonds.11

10 Choudary, Zafar, Peoples Democratic Party: Self-Rule for Lasting Kashmir Solution, Op. Cit., p. 24 11 Jammu & Kashmir: The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution, Op. Cit.,, PP. 32-37 117

5.2 Achievable Nationhood Sajad Gani Lone, Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference which was a constituent of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), presented a ‘Vision Document’ for the resolution of Kashmir conflict, the document is titled as “Achievable Nationhood.” Achievable Nationhood accords utmost importance to the sentiments of the people.12 It theorizes extensively on the psychological aspect of the Kashmir issue.13 In its opinion, the sentiments of the people should have weight above and over everything else. So, it proposes that an ‘Independent Homeland Model’ be made the reference point model into which Indian and Pakistani claims be adjusted. This, the document believes, will satisfy the collective yearning of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for recognition as active political players for their own life. In this way the internal aspect of peace- building will be dealt with. The process of accommodating Indian and Pakistani claims would deal with the external aspect of building and maintenance of peace. The document strongly believes that improvement in cross-LoC relationships, particularly trade can be a vital aspect of peace- building. An economic union of the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir, which the document sees as the next logical step, will only help in strengthening peace and stability. Demilitarization of the part of Jammu and Kashmir, under Indian control as well as under Pakistani control, is thought of as an essential pre-requisite for peace by the document. Respect for human rights, release of political prisoners, identification rather than a process of selection and rearing of leadership in the State, rehabilitation of the victims of violence and setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission are some other measures suggested by the document as harbingers of peace.14

12 Lone, Sajad, Achievable Nationhood: A Vision Document on Resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir Conflict, Jammu & Kashmir People’s Conference, (Srinagar, 2006) p. 147; See also www.achieveablenationhood.com 13 Ibid., pp. 145 & 146 14 Ibid., pp. 149-162 118

The concept of earned sovereignty is seen as a remedy for the political hurdles in the path of peace. Earned sovereignty, as developed in the recent state practices, entails the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from state to a sub-state entity under international supervision. 15

5.2.1 Vision of Achievable Nationhood Political Vision: Achievable Nationhood envisions “a sovereign state which is as a rule a single state in which one single political authority viz. the government represents the state internally and externally. The government would have complete internal independence to deal with internal affairs and external independence to deal with external affairs.”16 Jammu and Kashmir shall be a democracy and would have a Right to Independence. It shall have an independent election commission, a separate flag and a right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory. It shall have a right and the capacity to enter into relationships with other states. It shall be free to choose its own economic system in accordance with the will of the people without any external interference. It shall have its own currency, central bank and foreign exchange reserves. It shall have the independence to raise an army and air force for the purposes of self-defense.17 This vision is termed ‘Independent Homeland Model’ and the document makes provisions to accommodate Indian and Pakistani claims, thereby diluting the model and creating achievable overlaps. Independent institutions of executive, legislature (which will inter alia have the power to monitor and legislate upon relationships with India and Pakistan) and judiciary are envisioned.18 A proposal is made in favour of the concept of earned sovereignty through which Jammu and Kashmir can benefit from progressive and conditional

15 Ibid., pp. 259-160 16 Ibid., pp. 165-166 17 Ibid., pp. 166-170 18 Ibid., p. 229 119 devolution of sovereign powers and authority from India and Pakistan under international supervision.19 Relationships with India and Pakistan: Achievable Nationhood proposes a system of shared sovereignty between India and the Indian Administered Kashmir. Under this system, Foreign Affairs and Defense will be the responsibility of India and all other matters will be the responsibility of the government of Jammu and Kashmir. An identical system is proposed to govern the relationship between Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. The document also lists propositions governing the relationship between Pakistan and Indian Administered Kashmir as well as India and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. The Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950, is deemed an inspiration to define the contours of these relationships. It is proposed that the State of Pakistan, as a token of appreciation for the historical bond exhibited by the people of the State of Indian Administered Kashmir should, on a non-reciprocal basis, give the state subjects of Indian Administered Kashmir in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of its territory and should grant concessions and contracts relating to such development.20 Pakistan should also grant these state subjects the same privileges that it gives to its nationals in matters of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, employment and other privileges of similar nature.21 The document further proposes that an identical relationship should be worked out between India and the part of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani control. The part of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control should grant similar privileges to the nationals of the state of Pakistan only to the extent of level of independence of the government and subject to Indian interests. Cross-LOC Relationships: The territory and people of J&K were separated into two parts in 1947 courtesy a war which they neither started nor instigated. This forced division has always been a source of great pain and sorrow for the

19 Ibid., pp. 262-263 20 Ibid., pp. 225-226 21 Ibid., pp. 225-226 120 people of the State. Any document claiming to address the grievances of the people of the State must take cognizance of the psychological impact of this disconnection. Achievable Nationhood is in almost full convergence with the Self-Rule document on the issue of the importance of economic ties in cross-LoC relationships and visualizes an option, which it dubs “the new state of affairs”, of creating a complete economic union of the two parts of the State by employing a phased approach. The document itself says that “the objective of the economic union is to create a single unified economic territory of ‘J&K economic union’ out of two distinct political and geographical territories of Jammu and Kashmir under India and Pakistan. The ‘J&K Economic Union’ would be an economically boundary-less Jammu and Kashmir.”22 In addition to this, the document also deliberates upon joint immigration control of the movement of residents of the two parts across the LoC. It also envisions a joint management of natural resources.23 Further, the document lays emphasis on cooperation, coordination and consultation on such issues as tourism, demographic data, education, social welfare, IT and communication, civil aviation, health, environment, sporting and cultural activities, forest policy, human rights laws and policies, scientific research, research and preservation of archaeological and heritage sites, development of museums, archives and libraries, multi-nodal transport strategy to facilitate cross-LoC movement of commercial and private transport and integrated border management.24 Achievable Nationhood also recommends the establishment of two sets of legislature, one each for the part of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian and Pakistani control. It also recommends the establishment of two sets of executive and judiciary on the same pattern. To coordinate executive and legislative functions of the two parts, the document recommends a joint

22 Ibid., p. 219 23 Ibid., p. 223 24 Ibid., p. 224 121 institution which would frame a hierarchical structure of a mix of political and bureaucratic institutions needed to run the joint operation of various sectors.25 Economic Vision: Achievable Nationhood terms the new system which will evolve out of its eclectic model as “the new state of affairs”. In the new state of affairs, the union of the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir will primarily be an economic union. This union will be a separate customs territory with free movement of goods, services, capital and labour between the two parts. In the new state of affairs, internal trade barriers will be removed and external trade barriers will be harmonized. There will be acceptance as legal tender of both Indian and the Pakistani currencies.26 Minority Rights and Protection: Achievable Nationhood endorses a right to return and a right to reclaim property for all the residents of Jammu and Kashmir who have migrated since 1947, mainly due to violence to different parts of India, Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir itself.27 It lays particular emphasis on the right to return and the right to reclaim property of the people displaced due to violence since 1989, a majority of whom is Kashmiri Pandits.28 Vision for the Regions: Achievable Nationhood sees regional aspirations as basically ethnic aspirations of the majority group in a particular region and warns that accommodating the aspirations of an ethnic group and mistaking it for regional aspirations would be the beginning of a new conflict, created by not catering to the aspirations of the other ethnic minorities in that region.29 To solve the problem of identifying a unit for accommodating aspirations, the document suggests a district as a viable option. It identifies two options which could be made available to the districts: i) Opt out: A district where the majority feels that their rights are better protected by not being a part of J&K should be allowed to opt out. This should be done in a spirit of civility and democracy. A district marooned

25 Ibid., pp. 229-230 26 Ibid., pp. 219-222 27 Ibid., p. 232 28 Ibid., p. 160 29 Ibid., pp. 156-157 122

at the end of a part of a region with no link to J&K as a result of other districts opting out would have to be a part of the opting out entity. Similarly, a district landlocked between other districts who want to be part of J&K would have to continue to be a part of J&K. ii) Devolution of Power: The districts could be empowered with administrative autonomy, so that they enjoy a higher degree of power in the decision-making process. This would mean devolving more power to the districts. The ethnic groups would have to make the choice of either accepting more power in a new devolved system or still exercise the option of opting out of the union of J&K.30 In sum up, we can say that Lone’s Model for the resolution of Kashmir conflict talks about shared sovereignty between India and Indian administered Kashmir, Pakistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir. The most important aspects of this model are. First of all, Indian and Pakistani Governments will have jurisdiction over defense and foreign affairs in their respective parts of Kashmir. Secondly, both sides of the Jammu and Kashmir State (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other making it “a neutral, peace zone”. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a Jammu and Kashmir Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for movement of residents within the whole state, Joint management of natural resources and cooperation, coordination and consultation in various other sectors. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, Indian administered Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir).

5.3 Autonomy The post-accession politics of Jammu and Kashmir has always revolved around the issue of autonomy in terms of special constitutional status of the state consistent to the instrument of accession. According to Instrument of Accession, Indian Union can make laws over three subjects namely, Defense,

30 Ibid., p. 157 123

Foreign Affairs and Communications of the state. The terms and conditions of accession were subsequently incorporated in Article 370 of the Indian constitution which was adopted on November 26, 1949 and came into force on January 26, 1950. The special status which was ratified by Article 370 was soon eroded. The dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 led to a major reversal in this direction. Instead of autonomy and special status, the emphasis was now placed on constitutional integration of the state. The process of integration initiated in 1954 and almost accomplished by the beginning of the decade of 1970s brought Jammu and Kashmir, in many ways, at par with other states of India. This is obvious from the fact that out of 395 Articles of the Indian constitution 260 have been applied to the state.31 The process of erosion of special status and integration of state has been discussed in second chapter of this dissertation. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the founder of National Conference and man who was instrumental in accession of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, had contested the process of constitutional integration and had raised the issue of autonomy while negotiating for his return to power. After assuming office in 1975, he had appointed a Committee to study the prospect of reviewing the parliamentary laws extended to the state in post-1953 period. Nothing much came out of it because the Committee failed to evolve a consensus. The issue, however, continued to be voiced by the National Conference (NC) in the subsequent period, though it was only in mid 1990s that political thinking began in a big way. In its first Central Working Committee meeting held on 1994 after a gap of five years, the party held the Union of India responsible for destroying the original constitutional arrangement of the state and for alienating the people of Kashmir.32 It passed a resolution which asserted that ‘the time has come when this state of affairs

31 Report of the State Autonomy Committee, Government of Jammu & Kashmir Press, April 1999, p. 86 32 Chowdhary, Rekha, Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXV No. 30, July 22, 2000, p. 2599 124 should be reviewed in order to restore autonomy to its pristine and original form.’33 The National Conference has been advocating the restoration of autonomy which it believes will be crucial to the resolution of the current dispute. The party reiterated that under the Instrument of Accession, the division between Centre and State was clearly demarcated with all the powers of the legislation resting with the state other than those concerning defense, external affairs and communication. It alleged that over the years the autonomy had “evaporated unconstitutionally” which it claims is the reason for the discontent of the people. In 1996, the National Conference government appointed the State Autonomy Committee (SAC) and the Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) to examine the issue of autonomy. The former was entrusted with the inter-state aspect, i.e., the relationship between the Central Government and Jammu and Kashmir; the other was responsible for intra-state aspect, particularly the relationship between the state’s three regions: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. Some of the important recommendations of State Autonomy Committee (SAC) are as follows: 1. That the word ‘temporary’ be deleted from the title of part XXI as the heading of Article 370 of the constitution of India. It should be replaced with ‘special’. Thus, defending Article 370 against future assaults against it. 2. Matters in the Union list not connected with the three subjects of defense, foreign affairs and communication and/or ancillary thereto but made applicable should be excluded from their application of the state. 3. Since elections to the state legislature are held under laws made by the state legislature, Article 324 should continue to apply in the manner and way it was applicable in 1950/1954. 4. The imposition of a state of emergency shall be subject to the state government’s concurrence provided that this request for the concurrence of the government of the state shall be subject to whatever decision the state

33 Ibid., 125

assembly shall take within two months (failing which) the proclamation of emergency shall be deemed to have been revoked. 5. A separate chapter on Fundamental Rights needs to be included in Jammu & Kashmir constitution. 6. All amendments in the constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, insofar, as they relate to superintendence, direction and control of elections to the state legislature and to the state High Court and relating to the nomenclature of the Head of the state and State Executive, mode of appointment of the Head of the State and other consequential amendments should be replaced.34 The report of the SAC was made public in 1999 and was discussed in a special session of the State Legislative Assembly on June 26, 2000. The session concluded with the ‘Autonomy Resolution’ demanding that the Union and the state government take positive and effective steps for implementing the report. However, the resolution triggered a controversy with many apprehensions expressed against its pre-1953 status. While forces like the RSS and the BJP saw sinister designs of secessionism in the report, others dreaded its consequences for the national integration with similar demands pouring in from other states.35 The Union Cabinet, in response to these apprehensions, summarily rejected the Report. The debate on autonomy, however, is still on. The National Conference has decided to start a national awareness campaign on the report and the government of Jammu and Kashmir has constituted a group of ministers to discuss the issue The major source of objection to autonomy lies within Jammu and Kashmir itself. Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh feel that any increase in powers of state led to domination by Kashmir over two regions of Jammu and Ladakh.36 The popular feeling of deprivation and discrimination in these regions especially in Jammu has resulted in the periodic regional agitations dating back to the early fifties. It was in the above context that the

34 SAC Report, p. 13 35 Chowdhary, Rekha, Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads, Op. Cit., p. 2599 36 Koithara, Verghese, Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens, Sage Publications, ( New Delhi, 2004), p. 289 126 state government in the past set up four commissions to analyze the contentious regional issues. It was due to these regional sensibilities that National Conference after assuming power appointed the Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) along with the State Autonomy Committee (SAC). The issue of autonomy in the state is complex in nature. It not only involves the question of evolving the fair principles of centre-state relations but also the question of internal devolution of power and inter-regional relations. The issues of state autonomy and the regional autonomy are, in fact, interconnected. It is not possible to achieve the one without aiming at the other. The politics of autonomy, however, somehow has failed to carry this logic forward. Yet, it is difficult to dismiss the discourse on autonomy as of no significance for the people of Kashmir especially when it addresses the question of alienation. Alienation in Kashmir is a deep-rooted political response of the common Kashmiris to the distortion that has taken in the politics of Kashmir in the last 50 years. Much of the distortion was a consequence of the central intervention in the politics of the state that started with the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from power in 1953. Successive central governments were directly or indirectly responsible for encouraging political vandalism that took place in the state after 1953.37 The autonomy discourse had the potential of changing the terms of political discourse in Kashmir. The autonomy has substantial appeal to end alienation in Kashmir. According to Farooq Abdullah, ‘autonomy is essential for healthy centre-state relationship. He also maintained that autonomy is the only possible option to fulfill the aspirations of people and only mechanism to resolve the tangle and end alienation in Kashmir. According to Sumit Ganguly, ‘at the national level, New Delhi must move towards restoring Kashmir’s compromised autonomy’.38 Most of the grievances of Kashmiri people have emanated because they have not been treated properly by the state authorities,

37 Chowdhary, Rekha, Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads, Op. Cit., pp. 2601-2602 38 Ganguly, Sumit, “An Opportunity for Peace in Kashmir?” Current History (Philadelphia), Vol. 96, No. 614, December 1997, p. 418 127 primarily those belonging to New Delhi. With minimal central control in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir, a positive change could be brought in the region.

5.4 Independence Another proposal for the resolution of Kashmir issue is Independence option. This proposal is based on the assumption that, since Kashmir is the bone of contention between India and Pakistan, denial to both would be the easiest way out of the stalemate. Under this option, the pre-partition status of Jammu and Kashmir is to be restored and an independent state would be established. This proposal is mainly advocated by the JKLF. JKLF advocates for ‘a united, neutral, secular, federal republic’ of Jammu and Kashmir encompassing the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the former princely state. JKLF articulated the vision of an independent state based on a federal, parliamentary and democratic political system. Each of five federating units, namely, Kashmir valley, Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baldistan would enjoy internal autonomy with elected provincial governments. At the centre there will be a bicameral parliament, the members of lower house would be proportionate to the population of each unit elected through adult franchise and upper house would have an equal number of elected members from all units.39 According to JKLF the state constitution would provide equal social, economic and political rights to religious and ethnic minorities. A neutral position was advocated for the Independent Jammu and Kashmir State on the Swiss pattern, with friendly relations with both India and Pakistan.40 Thus, JKLF wants independence from both India and Pakistan and continues to argue for a separate state for the people of Jammu and Kashmir as they are naturally, politically, historically and ethnically separate.

39 Behera, Navnita Chadha, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, Manohar Publications, (New Delhi, 2000), p. 170 40 Khan, Amanullah, Kashmir Tangle-The Only Way Out, Frontier Post, December 6,1995, for more details see his book, Free Kashmir, (Karachi, 1970) 128

5.5 Accession to Pakistan Syed Ali Geelani, Chairman of Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir which is the most dominant separatist organization in Kashmir today, offers his own solution. From an ardent supporter of armed resistance, Geelani has come to believe that the solution can come only at the political level.41 He sees, Kashmir is not simply a border dispute between India and Pakistan, but as people living there facing repression and death while fighting for their basic human rights which includes right to political self-determination.42 Though India and Pakistan are responsible for the conflict and miseries to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, they are denied a role in its resolution. For Geelani, all three parties to the dispute—India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir—must agree on a political solution of the problem.43 The end of the dispute will end not only the miseries and brutalities to the people of Kashmir but will be also in the interest of the Pakistan and India. They will be able to use their resources for development of their people. Citing history, Geelani suggests that the people of Jammu and Kashmir be allowed to exercise the right to determine their own political future. In such a referendum, they should be allowed to choose to join either India or Pakistan. Geelani is strongly opposed to the suggestion of the JKLF that they be allowed a third option, i.e. independent state.44 Geelani argues that such an option has not been envisaged in the various United Nations resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir. He writes that inclusion of the third option would only suit India and would probably enable it to annex the whole of Jammu and Kashmir through the backdoor. In the event of a referendum in which the third option was allowed, India might be able to actually win, because there would be a division in the votes of Kashmiri Muslims between supporters of Pakistan and advocates of an independent Jammu and Kashmir, while the Hindus and Buddhists of the province, along with the Muslims of Poonch, Rajouri and Jammu, who are

41 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 2, Al-Huda Publishing House, (Srinagar, 1993), P. 14 42 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 2, Op. Cit., P. 332 43 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 1, Op. Cit., P. 333 44 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 1, Op. Cit., P.101 129 culturally closer to them than to the Kashmiri Muslims, would probably vote en bloc for India.45 Moreover, he says an independent Kashmir based on Kashmiri nationalism (Kashmiriyat) shall only serve the interests of those, inimical to Muslim unity who seeks to 'create narrow divisions within the Muslim ummah (worldwide community) on the basis of regional and cultural differences'.46 Invoking the logic of pan Islamism and subscribing to the partition theory of British India, he conceptualizes all Muslims as one nation. Hence, an independent Jammu and Kashmir bereft of Pakistan would be a profound violation of Islam itself. In other words, he has no understanding of the modern nation-state as a secular and independent state. Invoking Muslim identity he appreciates the role of Pakistan in helping Kashmiri rise against Indian tyranny. Besides above proposals there are many other proposals for the resolution of Kashmir conflict. There have been around 70 proposals that have been lingering on since 1947. This means on an average more than one new conflict resolution model every year. Some proposals like Plebiscite for entire state under international auspices like United Nations, Partition of state along communal lines, Dixon Plan, that envisages virtual division of the state (According to the plan the regions about which there was no doubt wished to accede to India (Jammu, Ladakh) or to Pakistan (Muslim majority areas which are called Azad Kashmir. A plebiscite was to be conducted in those areas falling under the last category. Another proposal suggests integration of Jammu and Ladakh with India and Azad Kashmir with Pakistan and independence for Kashmir Valley with such independence guaranteed by both India and Pakistan.47

45 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 1, Op. Cit., P. 412 46 Geelani, Syed Ali, Rudad-i-Qafas, Vol. 1, Op. Cit., P. 412 47 Choudary, Zafar, Options in Kashmir, Epilogue, Vol. 5, Issue 2, February 2011, pp. 24-39 130

5.6 Commonalities Among the Above Proposals What are the commonalities among the proposals which I have discussed above? As a starting point, I would like to state that there are certain common themes among these proposals. The most common thing among these proposals is the issue of autonomy. While some of the proposals discuss the issue at length, some do not. But all of these proposals realize the need to give greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir like Sajad Lone’s Achievable Nationhood talks about the shared sovereignty between India and Indian administered Kashmir. Under this system, defense and foreign affairs would be the responsibilities of Indian State and all other matters would vest to the Jammu and Kashmir government. Self-Rule of PDP advocates that internal sovereignty must belong to the state and external sovereignty belongs to Centre and Autonomy Proposal of N C wants restoration of pre-1953 position of the state except JKLF which demands independence, not less than complete independence. The other key common thing in these proposals is that all of them realize the need for cross border mechanisms for deliberating, consulting and deciding on a variety of issues concerning to both sides of Jammu and Kashmir. Like Self-Rule proposes institution of Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. This will serve as a major cross border institution, which will ensure long-term coordination of matters and interests relating to the state. Self-Rule also advocates the economic integration of two parts of Kashmir like free flow of trade, services etc. Achievable Nationhood also emphasizes upon the cross- border relationships. It advocates the economic union of the two parts of Kashmir. It also envisions a joint management of natural resources. Further, it lays emphasis over cooperation, coordination and consultation on such issues as tourism, demographic data, education, social welfare, IT and communication, civil aviation, health, environment, sporting and cultural activities, forest policy, human rights laws and policies etc. The third important common factor in these proposals is the emphasis given to sub- regional problems and aspirations. For example, Self-Rule

131 advocates for establishment of sub-regional councils for regional aspirations. Achievable Nationhood also subscribes to the accommodation of aspirations of different regions of the State. The fourth issue which was addressed by most of these proposals is the much debated issue of demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir. Demilitarization of the part of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control as well as the part of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani control is thought of as an essential pre-requisite for peace by the Achievable Nationhood. Self-Rule also considers demilitarization and other related efforts like the rolling back of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act), as the first steps towards peace- building. The fifth common factor seems to be the need to give the state more autonomy in financial matters, recruitment to the civil services, etc. Therefore, it is obvious from the above discussion that almost all the proposals discussed above advocate autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir. So, there is a need to restore Article 370 to its pristine form under which the Centre enjoyed powers only on three subjects of defense, communications and foreign affairs and leave rest powers to the State. According to Sumit Ganguly, “at the national level, New Delhi must move toward restoring Kashmir’s compromised autonomy.’’48 Greater autonomy to the state seems to be the much-demanded solution for Kashmir. Looking at the present situation and analyzing other possibilities, this is the best solution one offer for the present situation. However, it overlooks the fact that other part of Kashmir is also important in resolving the dispute. As shown in the previous chapters, historical complexities are important so far as Kashmir is concerned. Any solution offered to Kashmir issue should address such historical complexities. That is why solutions like Achievable Nationhood and Self-Rule become important. It addresses the problem by taking whole Jammu and Kashmir as one unit while at the same time taking present scenario

48 Ganguly, Sumit, An Opportunity for Peace in Kashmir? Op. Cit., p. 418

132 into consideration regarding the Indian part of Kashmir. Therefore, autonomy should be restored immediately and at the same time efforts shall be made for certain confidence-building measures in the state. Free and fair elections should be held in the state no matter in which direction the mandate of the people goes. Unless people of the state are assured of free and fair elections, any effort on solving the present crises would be futile. In the present thesis, one of the causes of militancy was the denial of democracy to the people of Kashmir. Therefore, it is of utmost important to restore democracy by ensuring free and fair elections in the state, minimizing the security forces in Kashmir and granting basic human rights to the Kashmiris, showing zero tolerance for human rights violations, relieving them from daily frisking, and focus on creating more employment and education opportunity for Kashmiris. The other measures can be, strengthening relationship across the LoC through trade, tourism, pilgrimage, etc., promoting economic development, ensuring good governance, while this may not be the ultimate solution to this issue, it may well prepare some ground for a better solution and meanwhile relieve the people of the region from their day-to-day turmoil. Kashmir dispute basically involves three parties namely, India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Pakistan and India are the two main parties according to the UN resolutions. The third party is the Kashmiris whose right to self- determination has been recognized in UN resolutions. Therefore, Pakistan and India, on their own, cannot decide the future of the State by excluding Kashmiris from any such process of conflict resolution. It is now evident that for solving the Kashmir dispute in any durable manner, a viable solution would have to include the full support of the Kashmiri people. Any solution to Kashmir can create larger peace in the region. The fruits of the resolution would be long lasting as it will end enmities on a number of issues. It will stop the mad arms race and create better chances of economic integration and development. It is an age of globalization where conflicts have more costs. Any sincere effort will be in the interest of not only India and Pakistan but whole South Asia. It will also help in resolving other disputes in the whole south

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Asian region. Not only this, South Asia as a region can function as an important regional block by being the home to two largest growing economies of the world. In short, there is a dire need of solving Kashmir dispute in the larger interest of humanity.

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CONCLUSION

Generally speaking all political formations, movements and parties are products of historical situations. All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) which emerged in 1993 could not be an exception to this phenomenon. It has emerged as an important political force particularly Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir (THJK) led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani in the contemporary political history of Jammu and Kashmir. The most momentous incident in the political history of Kashmir is the eruption of armed insurgency in early 1990s. The study assigns it to the failure of Indian State to respect the original constitutional relationship with Jammu and Kashmir by abrogating autonomy of the State, subversion of democratic process and institutions and so on. All this co-existed with a demand for the solution of Kashmir conflict in the form of Plebiscite Front, Al-Fatah, and Jama’at-i-Islami and so on. The rigging of 1987 election proved the immediate cause; it is here that people began to challenge physically the sovereignty of the Indian Union over the state. JKLF was the first militant organization to oppose with arms while advocating an independent, secular, democratic Jammu and Kashmir based on pre-1947 geography. However, later the armed movement was hijacked by other militant organizations like Hizbul Mujahudeen (HM), Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF) and Al-Umar (AU) etc. to further the cause of Pakistan by destabilizing Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Amid this armed struggle, various socio-political and religious organizations amalgamated under the banner of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in 1993 to channelize the armed movement and provide a political platform to it. Regarding the accession of the State with the Indian Union, APHC challenges its legality. It is of the view that the accession was conditional and temporary. It maintains that the issue should be resolved either through plebiscite under the supervision of UN or through tripartite dialogue among India, Pakistan and people of Kashmir.

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APHC has grown with internal conflict. It witnessed clashes within its ranks on many issues. Fielding of proxy candidates in 2002 elections by People’s Conference, Hurriyat’s approach regarding the boycott campaign in the elections in the absence of Syed Ali Shah Geelani and dilution of avowed stand that the UN resolutions form the necessary basis of Kashmir conflict, were some of issues of contention in various constituents of the APHC. It made cleavage among the APHC and therefore, the amalgam got divided into two factions what came to be known as APHC (G) and APHC (M). Subsequently, one group was labeled as moderate group. This group held negotiations with the Indian Union, supported a bilateral dialogue process between India and Pakistan and also accepted some other resolutions like General Parvaiz Mushrraf’s Four Point Formula. Something is better than nothing, realism or something between everything and nothing, became their new slogans instead of Right to Self-Determination as envisaged by various UN resolutions on Kashmir problem. The prominent figures of this group are Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Prof. Abdul Gani Bhat and Molvi Abas Ansari. However, the other group labeled as hardliner, remained steadfast on their stand viz-a-viz Kashmir issue, i.e. Right to Self-Determination as the only solution to Kashmir issue as guaranteed by the UN. The hardliner group of the Hurriyat Conference always vehemently criticized the policies and programmes of the APHC (M). The prominent persons of this group included Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mohammad Ashraf Sharie, Masrat Alam Bhat and Gulam Nabi Sumbji. Thus, both factions are working separately with separate Executive Councils and offices. Many attempts were made to bridge the gap between the two factions but without any success. Soon after the split of APHC, differences also erupted within the ranks of Jama’at-i-Islami regarding its policy towards Kashmir issue. One group was of the opinion that Jama’at can not afford to work for the Kashmir Issue on the forefront and therefore, will struggle only in the manner the other organizations and groups are doing. The other group spearheaded by Syed Ali Geelani was of the opinion that Jama’at should act at the vanguard of the freedom movement.

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The differences between the two groups deepened and eventually resulted in the creation of the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir in 2004. Thus, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat is an outgrowth of Jama’at-Islami rather it is the political front of Jama’at. Besides the broad division in APHC, there are differences in ideology and methodological ways of mass mobilizations in the various constituents of APHC. Tehreek-i-Hurriyat wants the establishment of an Islamic System of Governance (Shar’iah) in Kashmir and accession to Pakistan while Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) seeks the establishment of an independent, secular and democratic state in Kashmir on the basis of pre-1947 geography. This represents a major difference regarding the political future of Kashmir in Hurriyat camp. All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) failed to sustain itself as a united front as it witnessed clashes and subsequent divisions within itself and got divided at a crucial juncture. It has also communalized the issue owing to its failure to reach to other parts of state, Jammu and Ladakh. These two regions of the state do not have their representation in APHC. It is mainly confined to Kashmir Valley and has assumed a communal colour. This shows the limitation of resistance in Jammu and Kashmir. Despite these failures and challenges, it was found that the role of APHC has increased because of the recent changes in the political scenario of Jammu and Kashmir. In the recent protest movements over a number of issues like human rights violations, it has increased its role by providing leadership to the masses during these protests movements. By analyzing various solutions provided by APHC as well as mainstream political parties, it is found that there are diverse views regarding the solution of Kashmir problem. The existence of various views represents differences not only in separatist camp but also other political forces about the political future of the state. It is also found that some peace-building measures are necessary before arriving at any solution. However, the broader acceptance of any solution lies in its acceptance by all the three parties-India, Pakistan and

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Kashmir. All these three parties shall agree. This only can end the conflict and provide lasting peace in South Asia. In conclusion, it can be said that APHC is an amalgam of many parties with maximum differences instead of maximum similarities. Unless, Hurriyat is able to remove its ideological and personal differences by producing a concrete common programme with a mass appeal, its effective role in Kashmir problem seems to be a distant dream.

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 Bhattacharjea, Ajit, Alternative Vision of Restoring Peace in Kashmir, Mainstream, Vol. XLII, No. 9, February 21, 2004.  Bukhari, Shujaat , Reaching Out, Frontline Volume 27 –Issue 21 October, 9-22, 2010.  Bukhari, Shujaat, Fire in the Valley, Frontline, Volume 26, Issue 13, June 20, 2009.  Bukhari, Shujaat, Hope in the Air, Frontline, Volume 26-Issue 02- January 17-30, 2009.  Bukhari, Shujaat, Key Players, Frontline, Volume 27-Issue 19, September 11-14, 2010.  Bukhari, Shujaat, Shadow on Talks, Frontline, Volume 26, Issue 26, January 1, 2010.  Chandhoke, Neera, When is Secession Justified? The Context of Kashmir, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No. 46, November 13, 2010.  Choudary, Zafar, Options in Kashmir, Epilogue, Vol. 5, Issue 2, February, 2011.  Choudary, Zafar, Peoples Democratic Party: Self-Rule for Lasting Kashmir Solution, Epilogue, Volume 2, Issue 11, December, 2008.  Chowdhary, Rekha, Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXV, No. 30, July 22, 2000.  Chowdhary, Rekha, Identity Politics and Regional Polarization in J & K, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No. 19, May 8, 2010.  Chowdhary, Rekha, Separatist Sentiments and Deepening of Democracy, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, January 17, 2009.  Chowdhary, Rekha, The Second Uprising, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No. 39, September 25, 2010.  Chowdhary, Rekha; Kumar, Ashutosh, Regional Autonomy Committee Report for J&K: A Critique, Mainstream, Vol. XXXIII, No. 34, August 12, 2000.  Ganguly, Sumit, An Opportunity for Peace in Kashmir? Current History (Philadelphia), Vol. 96, No. 614, December, 1997.

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 Ganguly, Sumit, Avoiding War in Kashmir, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, Winter, 1990.  Ganguly, Sumit, Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, July-August, 2006.  Ganguly, Sumit; Bajpai, Kanti, India and the Crisis in Kashmir, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 5, May, 1994.  Hurriyat at Crossroads, Economic and Political Weekly, July 19, 2003.  Hurriyat’s Move, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 48, November 29, 2003.  Jalal, Ayesha, Kashmir Scars: A Terrible Beauty is Torn, The New Republic, July 13, 1990.  Korbel, Josef, Kashmir Dispute after Six Years, International Organization, Vol. 7, No. 4, Nov. 1953.  Korbel, Josef, The Kashmir Dispute and the United Nations, International Organization, Vol. 3, No. 2, May, 1949.  Kumar, Radha, Untying the Kashmir Knot, World Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring, 2002.  Navlakha, Gautam, Jammu and Kashmir: Winning a Battle only to Lose the War? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 45, November 8, 2008.  Navlakha, Gautam, Kashmir Roundtable Conference: Turnaround or Downturn, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLI, No. 11, March 18, 2006.  Navlakha, Gautam, Kashmir- Unilateral Cease Fire; Cause for Concern, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXV, No. 49, December 2, 2010.  Navlakha, Gautam, Kashmir: An Idea Which Cannot be Suppressed, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, January 29, 2000.  Navlakha, Gautam, Kashmir: Resistance or Agitational Terrorism? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No. 20, May 15, 2010.  Noorani, A. G., A Flawed Inquiry, Frontline, Volume 26, Issue 17, August 15, 2009.

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 Noorani, A. G., Agenda for Kashmir, Frontline Volume 26, Issue 25: December 05-18, 2009.  Noorani, A. G., Contours of Militancy, Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 20, October 13, 2000.  Noorani, A. G., Kashmir Elections under Delhi-Sponsored Terrorists, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 31, August 3, 1996.  Noorani, A. G., Why Jammu Erupts, Frontline, Volume 25, Issue 19, September 26, 2008.  Punjabi, Riyaz, Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir: An Overview, Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 7, Issue 4, July-August, 2000.  Puri, Balraj, Azadi, Autonomy and Self-Rule vs Freedom, Mainstream, Vol. XLVII, No. 52, December 12, 2009.  Puri, Balraj, Independence, Autonomy and Freedom in Kashmir? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 12, March 22, 2008.  Puri, Balraj, Politics of the Elections in Kashmir, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 8, February 25, 1967.  Puri, Balraj, Problems and Prospects of Federalization: The Case of Jammu and Kashmir, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 20 May 16, 1981.  Puri, Balraj, Sidelining the Separatists, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLI, No. 38, September 23, 2006.  Puri, Luv, For a Durable Solution in Kashmir, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XL, No. 39, September 24, 2005.  Ray, Aswini, K., From Autonomy to Self-Determination, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 49, December 8, 2001.  Roy, Arundhati, Azadi: It’s the Only Thing The Kashmiri Wants. Denial is Delusion, Outlook, September 1st, 2008.  Safvi, S. Zafar Mehdi, Jam-Kash Showdown: Clash of Vested Interests, Epilogue, Vol. 2, Issue 9, September, 2008.

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 Sikand, Yoginder, The Emergence and Development of the Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir 1940-1990, Modern Asian Studies, Volume 36, Issue 3, July 2002.  Sikand,Yoginder, Changing course of Kashmiri Struggle, From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad? Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, January 20, 2001.  Singh, Teja, Restoration of Autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, Mainstream, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 21, May 13, 2000.  Swami, Praveen, Another Season of Hope, Frontline, Volume 18, Issue 14, July 07-20, 2001.  Swami, Praveen, Hubris and Downfall, Frontline, Volume 25, Number 15, August 1, 2008.  Swami, Praveen, Martyrs Sans Cause, Frontline, Volume 24, Number 2, February 9, 2007.  Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari, Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter 1996-1997.  Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari, Secessionist Movement, Mobilization and Political Institutions, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, Winter 2001-2002.  Widmalm, Sten, The Rise and fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir, Asian Survey. Vol. 37, No.11, Nov. 1997.

News Papers  Accept 5-Point Formula to Restore Normalcy: Geelani to APD, Greater Kashmir, September 20, 2010.  Ali, Muddasir, Focus on Skill Development, Greater Kashmir, March 4, 2011.  Bajpai, K. Shankar, The Wider Lessons From J & K, The Hindu, September 1, 2008.  Bajpai, Kanti, Is Secession the Answer? The Hindu, September 6, 2008.

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 Bukhari, Shujaat, Omer Hails Centre’s 8-Point Formula, The Hindu, September 25, 2010.  Bukhri, Shujaat, All Party Delegation Meets Kashmiri Leaders, The Hindu, September 20, 2010.  Chidambaram to Lead All-Party Team to J & K, The Hindu, September 18, 2010.  Decline of the Hurriyat and After, The Hindu, September 25, 2003.  Dr. Singh Jitender, Confusion in Kashmir Separatist Camp, The Daily Excelsior, September 7, 2003.  Ershad, Mahmud, The Reemergence of Kashmiri Intifada, Greater Kashmir, September 16, 2008.  Kashmir: Intikhabi Tareekh - Iss Hammam Main Koon Nanga Nahie, Kashmir Uzma, May 2, 2009.  Kumar, Radha, Starting an informed debate on Kashmir, The Hindu, July 3, 2012.  Malik, Javaid, From Azadi to Elections, Greater Kashmir, January 5, 2009.  Maqbool Umer, Political, Apolitical Groups set up, Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2011.  Maqbool, Zahid, Separatists not Impressed, Greater Kashmir, May 25, 2012.  Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, Mobilizing Public Opinion-I, Greater Kashmir, February 16, 2007.  Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, Mobilizing Public Opinion-II, Greater Kashmir, February 17, 2007.  Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, The Birth of Hurriyat as a Political Platform, Greater Kashmir, February 1st, 2007.  Mustafa, Sema, Like Him or Not, Geelani Counts, Greater Kashmir, October 25, 2010.  Noorani, A. G., The Hurriyat Must Unite For Azadi in Kashmir-The Hurriyat’s Crises, The Dawn, December 6, 2008.

150

 Parvaiz, Ather, Is Unity Among Hurriyat Factions in Jeopardy? Kashmir Times, June 26, 2005.  Protests Will Intensify, Warns Geelani, The Hindu, September 9, 2010.  Puri, Balraj, Beyond Land, Greater Kashmir, September 3, 2008.  Puri, Balraj, Decline of the Hurriyat and after, The Hindu, September 25, 2003.  The Hurriyat Meltdown, The Hindu, September 17, 2003.  The Hurriyat Says, Nothing New in PM’s Offer For Talks, The Hindu, October 11, 2008.  Tikku, M. K., Genesis of the Problem, The Hindustan Times, August 13, 1991.

WEBLIOGRAPHY http://www.expressindia.com. http://www.jklf.org http://www.jkth.org http://www.kashmirlive/APHC.html. http://www.achieveablenationhood.com

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Appendix-I

Source: Troubled Kashmir by Mahander M. Gupta

Appendix-II

The Delhi Agreement, 1952

In view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters than those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, The Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all States other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself.

It was agreed between the two Governments that in accordance with Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have their domicile in Jammu and Kashmir shall be regarded as citizens of India, but the State Legislature was given powers to make laws for conferring special rights and privileges on the ‘state subjects’ in view of the ‘State Subject Notifications of 1927 and 1932: the State Legislature was also empowered to make laws for the ‘State Subjects’ who had gone to Pakistan on account of the communal disturbances of 1947, in the event of their return to Kashmir;

As the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he does in other Units of India, Article 52 to 62 of the Constitution relating to him should be applicable to the State. It was further agreed that the power to grant reprieves, pardons and remission of sentences etc; would also vest in the President of India.

The Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag In addition to the Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government that the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; It was also recognized that the Union flag should have the same status and position in Jammu and Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons connected with the freedom struggle in the State, the need for continuance of the State flag was recognized.

There was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-Riyasat; though the Sadar-i- Riyasat was to be elected by the State Legislature, he had to be recognized by the President of India before his installation as such; in other Indian States the Head of the State was appointed by the President and was as such his nominee but the person to be appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the Government of that State; no person who is not acceptable to the State Government can be thrust on the State as the Head. The difference in the case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in the first place be elected by the State Legislature itself instead of being a nominee of the Government and President of India. With regard to the powers and functions of the following argument was mutually agreed upon.

The Head of the State shall be a person recognized by the President of the Union on the recommendations of the Legislature of the State;

He shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;

He may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;

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Subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office;

Provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold the office until his office.

With regard to the fundamental rights, some basic principles agreed between the parties were enunciated; it was accepted that the people of the State were to have fundamental rights. But in the view of the peculiar position in which the State was placed, the whole Chapter relating to ‘Fundamental Rights’ of the Indian Constitution could not be made applicable to the State, the question which remained to be determined was whether the Chapter on fundamental rights should form a part of the State Constitution of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State;

With regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was accepted that for the time being, owing to the existence of the Board of Judicial Advisers in the State, which was the highest judicial authority in the state, the Supreme Court should have only appellate jurisdiction

There was a great deal of discussion with regard to the ‘Emergency Powers’ the Government of India insisted on the application of Article 352, empowering the President to proclaim a general emergency in the State; the State Government argued that in the exercise of its powers over defense (item 1 on the Union List), in the event of war or external aggression, the Government of India would have full authority to take steps and proclaim emergency but the State delegation was, however, averse to the President exercising the power to proclaim a general emergency on account of internal disturbance.

In order to meet the viewpoint of the State’s delegation, the Government of India agreed to the modification of Article 352 in its application to Kashmir by the addition of the following words:

“But in regard to internal disturbance at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State”

At the end of clause (I)

Both the parties agreed that the application of Article 356, dealing with suspension of the State Constitution and 360, dealing with financial emergency, was not necessary.

The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly discussed this arrangement and finally adopted a motion of approach on August 21, 1952.

The agreement was discussed in the Union Parliament on August 7, 1952 and accepted.

This arrangement was later on known as the ‘Delhi Agreement, 1952’.

Source: Troubled Kashmir by Mahander M. Gupta

Appendix-III

WHITE PAPER ON ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR

The state of Jammu and Kashmir covers an area of 84,471 square miles. Of this area India occupies 49,560 square miles and Pakistan controls the rest. The state, lying between 32-17´ and 36-58´ North latitude and 73-6´ and 80-30´ East longitude is surrounded by China, Tibet, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. There is no doubt that it is of great strategic importance because it has survived despite the many threats from Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism. Mahnaz Ispahani, an expert in South Asian geopolitics, stated that "with the partition of the sub-continent, Kashmir itself became of even greater strategic value than in imperial times."

The 20th century dawned and the world witnessed struggles against autocracy, feudalism and colonialism. The winds of these revolutions crossed the peaks of the Himalayas and touched Kashmir. Repressed for years, the Kashmiri people were already frustrated. In the year 1924, these sentiments came to the fore in the form of a memorandum, which was presented to Lord Reading, Viceroy of India, upon his arrival in Kashmir.

In 1931, the people's dissatisfaction with the condition under which they lived erupted and soon took the form of a popular movement. This movement resulted in the end of feudal rule in 1947. But this, in and of itself, did not bring freedom to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact from 1947 onwards a new chapter of slavery was added to the history of this state. The British Empires closed its show in the subcontinent and sailed lock, stocked and barreled, back to England; but with the end of the British Raj came a period of neo-colonial rule.

It was 9.00 a.m. on October 27, 1947, when Indian troops officially started landing at the Srinagar airfield. In the words of British historian, Alastair Lamb, "From their arrival on October 27, 1947 to the present day, Indian troops continued to occupy a larger proportion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir despite the increasingly manifest opposition of the majority of the population to their presence." To give legality to the invasion of a sovereign country, India adopted various methods. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was designated as a princely state within the British Indian Empire. With the lapsing of the British Paramountcy in the princely states, the state of Jammu and Kashmir became independent by "default." This gave the Maharaja the option of joining either of the two countries. This was a requirement under the rules of the British transfer of power in the Indian subcontinent or what is called the Indian Independence Act.

The Act was enthusiastically welcomed by Quaid-I-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. In his words, "constitutionally and legally the Indian states will be independent sovereign states on termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or remain independent." Jinnah's stand was in accordance with the law. But Congress' leadership was averse to the idea and to them lapsed Paramountcy meant reversion to Independent status. The devotees of Congress felt jittery over the granting of independent status to any of the princely states. Professor Gowher Rizvi, MacArthur Fell, professor of International Relations at Oxford University, put it this way: "The states were compelled to accede to one or the other dominion in accordance with the broad principles of Partition itself: Muslim majority states located in territories contiguous with Pakistan would accede to Pakistan and the rest would go to India . . . in these circumstances Kashmir too would easily be disposed of. Over seventy-five percent of the population was Muslim (according to the 1942 census, of a total population of 40,021,616, Muslims accounted for 31,000,000 and Hindus 809,000 approximately) the

v state was adjacent to Pakistan and irrespective of the wish of the ruler, the state would be integrated with Pakistan."

When the Maharaja requested a standstill agreement from Pakistan, it agreed. But India rejected his request outright. India adopted various tactics to lend credibility to its invasion of Kashmir. On January 1, 1948, India took the issue to the United Nations. The UN adopted two resolutions, on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. These resolutions granted the right to self-determination through a plebiscite, to be held under the supervision of a UN-appointed plebiscite administrator. Both India and Pakistan accepted this resolution.

Mahatma Gandhi said, ". . . the will of Kashmiris is the supreme law in Kashmir." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said in Parliament, "From the very beginning it has been our declared wish that the people of Kashmir should themselves decide their future. We will continue to adhere to our policy whatever happens. In a pursuance of our policy, we agreed to hold a plebiscite provided the condition necessary for its peaceful conduct were fulfilled." Nehru reiterated this stand on a number of occasions. He once reminded the president, Dr. Rajinder Prasad, "We are committed to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir, whatever it might be. We are committed secondly to a plebiscite. If the people of Kashmir decide to remove or do away with their old ruler, we must accept that decision in view of our repeated assurances to that effect. If they want to leave India, that also we have to accept because of our assurance. We could of course want this done in the proper way and having due regard to constitutional proprieties."

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, second series, volume 18, April 1-July 15, 1952. Ed. S. Gopal: "Plebiscite was not a foreign phenomenon to the process of India's partition. The fact of the matter, however, was that the plebiscite policy had been established long before the Kashmir crises erupted in October 1947. It was an inherent part of the process by which the British Indian Empire was partitioned between two successor Dominions."

Why did India take the issue to the United Nations? There was no sincerity of purpose nor did it have the intention of allowing the people of Kashmir to exercise their right to self-determination. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Professor and Chairman of the Department of International Studies at Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, expressed the following perspective: "The simple answer seems to be the initial Indian attempts were to enforce a military solution in Kashmir, but failed to throw tribesmen out of Kashmir territory and to annihilate the Acadia Kashmir forces. It was the failure of the Indian army to enforce a quick military solution because of the strong resistance of the Azad Kashmir forces which prompted India to take the case to the United Nations. This could be one of the reasons, I believe, that India wanted to buy time to consolidate its position in Kashmir and then follow its plan of annexation."

To forge ahead with its plan of annexation, to be defiant in the face of the intensity of the UN resolution, and to back-track from its commitment of granting the rights to self-determination, India has enacted the modern drama of forcing a process of "rigged elections and sham democracy," in the words of a senior Indian journalist, Tavleen Singh, upon the Kashmiri people.

The first elections were held in September 1951 and 73 or 75 members of this Assembly ran uncontested. The electorate boycotted the whole affair. The assembly was to " . . . determine the future shape and affiliation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir." India's intelligence Chief, Mr. B.N. Mullick, exposed the government's method of rigging the election: "Nomination papers of most of those who could form an opposition were rejected."

By no acceptable standard was the Constituent Assembly a representative body. Justice Mufti Bahudin Farooqi characterized the members as "nodding goats of Sheikh Abdullah." Most of the members of this Constituent Assembly were semi-literate. In the words of historian M.S. Pampori, "Most of this Constitution-making body was chosen if not from illiterates, then from semi-literates who could not understand even the definition of the Constitution, not to speak of its language and implications." Noted jurist of the Bombay High Court, A.G. Noorani, recently wrote in The Statesman, that "Sheikh Abdullah rigged the polls with merciless efficiency, drawing grateful applause from Nehru. His advice to the Sheikh's successor, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, was not to refrain from rigging, but to leave just a few seats for the Opposition and thus provide a fig-leaf to cover the nudity of ravaged credibility. The advice was repeated later by one of Indira Gandhi's closest advisors . . . "

The words of Syed Mubarik Shah Naqshbandi, delivered at the State People's Convention at Srinagar in 1968, are as relevant today as they were then. He said, " . . . the resolutions passed by the Security Council had vested the people of J&K with the right to a plebiscite, and these resolutions could not be abrogated except by an agreement between India, Pakistan, and the people of Jammu and Kashmir." India, which had taken the issue to the UN, has never moved for amending or dropping the resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Therefore India is fully aware that the Constituent Assembly has no authority to ratify the accession of the state to India, as it has attempted to do. Indeed, on March 30, 1951, the UN Security Council confirmed this and emphasized the irrelevance of the Constituent Assembly in deciding the future of Kashmir.

It is absolutely clear that there is no moral or legal leg upon which the State Constitution can stand much less upon which the elections from 1951 can be justified. Indeed, the 1951 elections, as well as the recent ones, are a naked attempt to hoodwink international opinion and divert attention from the primary issue and that is: settling the status of Kashmir in accordance with the resolutions passed by the United Nations.

Even senior members of the Indian intelligentsia have ridiculed these elections as fraudulent. G.M. Sadiq, a member of Bakhshi Gulam Mohammed's cabinet, stated that "In the recent by-elections to the Charar-I- Sharif Assembly Constituency the ruling party managed, despite the withdrawal of opposition candidates, to pull in over 90 percent of the votes. These undemocratic practices permeate even election to the local bodies. In the elections held in November 1957 to the Town Area communities of the six towns in the valley, 78 nomination papers out of 81 belonging to the opposition were rejected on the flimsiest grounds." The elections during the time of G.M. Sadiq were no different from those held during the Abdullah or Bakhshi rule. Commissioner Abdul Khaliq in fact declared all 16 candidates of the Sadiq Congress elected as they were unopposed.

In the 1977 elections, the National Conference party won 48 seats in a house of 76. The Janata Party, which ruled in New Delhi, won 13 seats; Congress 12, and the Jama’at-i-Islami won one. The National Conference ferociously contested the Government of India's official stand on Kashmir, stating that the issue of accession had yet to be settled. In scores of speeches, Sheikh Abdullah and his lieutenants pronounced that "This election was in fact an anti-India vote."

In 1983, another sham election was held in Jammu and Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah returned to power with active help from various levels of the Government of India. In 1988, Parliamentary elections were held in Kashmir. Only two percent of the electorate turned out to vote.

In the post 1989 period, the people's movement for the right to self-determination assumed new dimensions. After exhausting all peaceful options to make India honour its word, a section of Kashmiri youth took up arms against India's illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. These young men nursed the sapling of Kashmir's freedom struggle with their warm blood. Thousands of them attained martyrdom;

vii thousands were maimed and disabled. The youth in particular, along with countless thousands made immense sacrifices to attain the cherished goal of freedom. According to a conservative estimate, more than fifty thousand people have been killed by Indian forces in Kashmir since 1989.

It was as if Kashmir had been transformed into a vast cemetery. Under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr. Paula R. Newberg wrote: "Srinagar, once known for shimmering lakes, ornate house boats, and majestic Himalayan peaks, is now a city of cemeteries. Along its meandering lanes and riverbanks, Kashmiris bury their dead and mark their calendars by atrocities that kill their children . . . Since 1989, the number of dead has reached tens of thousands, the exact number unknown. Mostly boys and men, they have died for their religious beliefs, their political beliefs or because they were in the way. The circumstances of birth have become the accidents of death."

To perpetuate its occupation of Kashmir, the Indian Government has deployed more than half a million soldiers and a quarter of a million paramilitary forces. In 1993, the London-based Observer indicated that the army/civilian ratio was as high as one to eight. The Observer . . . "It is difficult to count uniformed men in Kashmir. Indian newspapers occasionally print government figures that indicate as few as 150,000; but officials in Kashmir, foreign diplomats and journalists have always assumed that this is the number of regular army only in or near the valley. Paramilitary troops account for 100,000 to 400,000 more men, depending on seasons, political events and the seriousness of military engagements. Even though the most visible of the security forces in urban areas parade in full light of day, those in hills are harder to find. By the beginning of 1995, over 400,000 troops were reportedly deployed in Kashmir, including eight army divisions and other independent brigades across the state."

Jane's Intelligence Review reports that "at least fifty-six of 148 battalions of Border Security Forces - each including one thousand men - are engaged in Kashmir. Thirty-nine in the valley and seven in Doda District are involved in counter-insurgency operations. Ten along the line of control are involved in border security operations." Indian sources suggest that more BSF battalions have been deployed in the last year. The Central Reserve Police Force has the second largest presence. It was substantially increased in the summer of 1994 to as many as eighteen battalions each of the Territorial Army, the National Indo- Tibetan Border Police, the National Security Guards and the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police. Since the summer of 1994, between three and thirty battalions of Rashtriya rifles, trained by the Army, were on duty a week later in Srinagar and Udhampur Doda Consistencies. If one looks at the number of security forces in one constituency and number of voters, the ratio is nearly one to one. Nowhere else in the world have elections been marshaled in this manner.

Not satisfied with the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and paramilitary personnel to subjugate the people of Kashmir, India introduced bands of renegades--hard-core criminals and hoodlums--to add to the miseries that already characterizes daily life in Kashmir. These renegades who operate under the direct command of the Indian army and Border Security Forces have been programmed to kill freedom-lovers, eliminate journalists, knife political activists and butcher human rights activists. They have killed thousands of people, plundered thousands of houses, raped hundreds of women and looted the natural wealth of Kashmir. One such famous renegade is Kuka Parray, who has had a change of career: once a smuggler of Kashmir's timber resources, he now leads a band of thugs under the banner of India.

Veteran journalist A.G. Noorani called these renegades the "vigilantes hired to kill." He wrote, "The technique of state sponsored terrorism was tried out not only in Punjab but also in the Northeast. The experiment in Kashmir is on a far larger and more ruinous scale." With regard to the coalition between the army and the renegades he wrote, " . . . it is no longer a state secret to be admitted in private. It is a public scandal." Mr. Bairaj Puri said that this is " . . . not an outside import into the valley but entirely conceived and produced by New Delhi."

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In its report on "India's Secret Army in Kashmir" (May of 1996) Human Rights Watch/Asia states, "Officials in Kashmir routinely claim that the detainee was killed in an 'encounter' with the security forces . . . Security legislation has increased the likelihood of such abuses by authorizing the security forces to shoot to kill and to destroy civilian property. Under these laws, the security forces are protected from persecution for human rights violations . . . There is no question that civil and security officials in Kashmir are aware of the widespread use of torture. Petitions pending before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court provide ample documentation, including medical evidence, of the systematic use of torture."

To stage the drama of a political process, these armed gangsters were made to launch parties and to participate in the sham elections. The role conceived by the army and other intelligence agencies for these renegades even ruffled the feathers of pro-India politicians.

From Farooq Abdullah to Taj Mohuddin, these politicians made fervent demands to the government of India to disarm the renegade forces. Commenting on the role of the renegades in the sham elections of May 1996, Taj Mohuddin, a Congress party candidate, said "the Election Commission has shut its eyes. I have lost my faith in the set-up. He even threatened self-immolation if the Government did not disarm the renegades." Janata Dal candidate from Anantnag Maqbool Dar also made repeated demands that they be disarmed, even after he was inducted as a State Minister of Home Affairs in New Delhi. Only after agencies sponsoring these elements prevailed upon him did he backtrack on this demand.

The lack of credibility of these elections--held under the shadow of guns, both with the army and these hired killers under the government's wing--has been exposed by politicians pushing the interests of New Delhi in Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah, who has earned the dubious distinction of defending India's policy of arson, rape, plunder and killing in many international forum also pronounced these elections as "Farcical and rigged." Gulam Rasool Kar, another Indian protégé in Kashmir, and president of the National Conference, demanded repolling in seventy booths. Indian Home Minister, Mr. Inderjit Gupta, while talking to the press in August of 1996, and as reported by the BBC India Service, said " . . . in Jammu and Kashmir all elections held to date were rigged to serve the interests of successive Congress governments."

The May 1996 elections in Jammu and Kashmir were not only farcical but were also a blemish on the concept of democracy. It was an election without voters or candidates. To enact the drama of elections, the Indian government had to invent candidates as well. This was done with the help of its intelligence agencies. Most of the candidates were armed mercenaries, working in conjunction with Indian security forces. Even politicians who have been holding a brief in Kashmir for India disassociated themselves from these sham elections. The state Janata Dal leader had expressed concern over the party high command decision to field party candidates. In an interview with The Kashmir Times, 4th April 1996, it was reported that he had already communicated to the party high command that the atmosphere was not conducive to hold elections and participate in them. Another politician holding a brief for India in Kashmir, Congress party candidate Mian Bashir Ahmad, told The Kashmir Times, 6th April 1996: "The coming elections will be marred by large scale rigging and there was every likelihood that the electorate would not be allowed to exercise their right of franchise freely and fairly." He added, "the situation was not conducive for the holding of elections." Even the National Conference, which plays India's card in Kashmir, stayed away from these polls.

How can one claim to have democractic elections without the people's participation? It was said by the people to have been "a big joke." The government of India failed to even rope in employees and was forced to import election staff from outside the state. On 14th April, The Sunday Times of India published that "About 46,000 employees will be deployed on election duty at 6,190 polling stations spread across six constituencies. The majority of these employees will be central government staff from Delhi. These employees would be handling 4.4 million voters in 14 districts of the state. The Union Home Ministry and

ix the DOPT are coordinating election duty of the employees. Each polling booth will be manned by five persons which includes one Urdu speaker. The government will provide a personal security of at least two persons to each of the employees . . . A circular by the Department of Personnel and Ttraining (DOPT) to the employees who are short listed by the Union Government for Kashmir duty will be given one month's basic salary . . . before their trip to the troubled state." They were also given insurance of Rupee five hundred thousand.

The All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) boycotted these sham elections. The adverse attitude of the general public towards these elections was pointed out by The Hindustan Times on 15th April 1996: "Unnoticed by casual onlookers, parliamentary candidates enjoy bullet-proof cars . . . escort vehicles piloting them up and down Kashmir is indeed a luxury for them. But that is hardly enthusing the people in the Valley. They continue to remain indifferent."

At election time, the government imposed a virtual ban on the publication of newspapers in the Kashmir valley. First, all the newspaper editors were summoned by the State Home Department, and were asked to strictly follow the code of conduct drawn up by the Government. This was followed by the issuance of a circular which imposed a restriction on the reporting of facts. In order to make newsmen tow the Government line, journalists were kidnapped and turned into hostages by the mercenaries working under direct command of the Indian Defence Ministry. Reporters working from New Delhi who ventured to file reports in violation of the restrictions earned the wrath of the Government: many received threatening phone calls from the State Information Department. Essentially, the Government's objective was to prevent the message of the APHC from reaching the people.

The entire state had been converted into a battle ground, with barracks, army and other forces dotting every nook and corner of Kashmir. It made free expression impossible. The holding of public rallies and meetings remain banned.

In order to educate people about the implications of the farcical elections, the APHC launched a mass contact programme by going door to door. To prevent this, Indian authorities made attempts on the lives of the APHC leaders. On May 9, in Sopore, the leaders were fired upon. In Narabal, a land mine was detonated near where some leaders had gathered. This left only one option for expressing dissent against the atrocities and elections. They began to observe shut-downs, wheel jams, and hartals (strikes).

When the APHC called a strike, the response was overwhelming. The Kashmir Times (22nd May 1996) reported, "the city wore a deserted look with people preferring to remain indoors. All the shops, business establishments, government and semi-government offices besides banks were closed. Transport was off the roads."

On 23rd May 1996, polling was held in Anantnag and Baramulla. The Kashmir Times described it as a "Tamasha," a joke. Sabina Inderjit of The Times of India wrote, "A polling station about 20 km. from here . . . wore a deserted look with no civilians about except a group of security personnel . . . A short drive ahead, hordes of people were seen trekking on the highway, under the watchful eyes of the army . . . a group from Hatiwara village in Anantnag alleged: The army came at 5 a.m. and threatened us that if we did not vote, we would be killed and our house burnt down." The case was the same at Bijbihara, Pampore, and Pulwama. "Arthur Max of The Associated Press, described the scene: "[Baramulla] Indian Army troops herded Kashmiris to the polls yesterday for the rebellious state's first elections in seven years, forcing Kashmiris to participate in an Indian government election they want no part of . . . soldiers roused villagers and townspeople from their homes soon after dawn and escorted them to the polling stations . . . in nearby Sopore, hundreds of people gathered in a square and shouted independence slogans, defying orders to vote . . . At Delina . . . a half dozen soldiers herded a line of men towards a polling

x station. Wearing camouflage helmets, the soldiers blew whistles and waved sticks to keep the men moving."

Resident Mohammad Shafi said, "the army came early in the morning and dragged people from their houses. But we gathered all the men, women, boys and girls to come here, we will not vote. We do not want to be with India. They have destroyed our lives. We want only freedom."

Reporting from Baramulla, John F. Burns wrote for The New York Times, 24th May 1996: "Indian troops moved into villages and urban neighborhoods, across the vale of Kashmir at dawn today (23rd May 1996) herded the villagers from their beds to vote . . . but after widespread allegations that tens of thousands of troops were deployed to force Muslims to vote at a gunpoint, the message India wanted to send to the world appeared likely to be lost or at least heavily muffled." His headline read. "A showcase election in a Muslim state becomes a show of force by New Delhi." The Washington Post carried a picture of women shouting anti-India slogans outside the polling place. Similar reports were carried in newspapers all over the world.

Indian authorities at New Delhi, their agents at Srinagar, and Indian diplomats unnerved with these reports started a campaign against newsmen from various parts of the world and called these reports "exaggerations." But Indian mediamen were telling the same story. Ajith Pillai of The Outlook reported, " . . . in village after village this correspondent visited, the story was the same. Crowds of people squatted outside polling stations like herds of sheep." Ritu Sarin of The Indian Express reported, "Three persons were killed when BSF jawans and armed renegades opened fire in a crowded market. Two among the dead were brothers: Yusuf Altaf (15) and Tahi Altaf (14). Their shattered father sat in a room full of mourners . . . He said that even if his two sons had not been killed, nobody in his neighborhood would have cast their vote on 30th May." He announced, "If there is death on one side, and a ballot box on the other, we would choose death."

In the month of September, India has started the process all over again, having called for state assembly elections in Kashmir. The outcome has been no different than it was in May.

For centuries Kashmiris have lived under suppression and subjugation. The worst hit by this has been the Kashmiri Muslim. In the words of the Muslim Conference leader, the late Chowdhary Ghulam Abbas, "The condition of Muslims in all respects was very bad . . . Poverty, penury, helplessness and humiliation was their destiny. They earned livelihoods from menial jobs." A Kashmiri Muslim was all along discriminated against by Hindus, who were in a minority, but were always hand in glove with the ruling Hindu elite. Sir Walter Lawrence, who was appointed as the settlement Commissioner by Maharaja Ranbir Singh writes in his book, The valley of Kashmir, "in recent times there were very few Pundits who were not in receipt of pay from the state, and the number of offices was legion." But though this generosity in the matter of office establishment was an enormous boon to the Pundit class, it was a curse and a misfortune to the Muslims of Kashmir; for " . . . the Pundit does not value a post for its pay, but rather for its perquisite." The laws were discriminatory against Muslims, and there was no aspect of life for which Muslims were untaxed. William Moorcraft writes about Dogra rule: "The murder of a native by a Sikh is punishable by a fine to the government from sixteen to twenty rupees . . . [from this amount] four rupees were paid to the family of the deceased if he was a Hindu and two rupees if he was a Mohammedan."

Source: The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Srinagar, Kashmir

Appendix-IV

Source: Agreement Document Signed at Geelani’s Residence at Hyderpora on June 19, 2008.

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Appendix-V

Text of the Joint Memorandum submitted by Mirwaiz Umar and Yasin Malik Memorandum to the All Party Delegation

"Let me say clearly that we accept the basic proposition that the future of Kashmir is going to be decided finally by the goodwill and pleasure of her people. The goodwill and pleasure of this Parliament is of no importance in this matter, not because this Parliament does not have the strength to decide the question of Kashmir but because any kind of imposition would be against the principles that this Parliament holds”. "Kashmir is very close to our minds and hearts and if by some decree or adverse fortune, ceases to be a part of India, it will be a wrench and a pain and torment for us. If, however, the people of Kashmir do not wish to remain with us, let them go by all means. We will not keep them against their will, however painful it may be to us… However sad we may feel about leaving we are not going to stay against the wishes of the people. We are not going to impose ourselves on them on the point of the bayonet." Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech to the Indian Parliament, August 7, 1952 "When a question becomes an international question like the Kashmir question, this Parliament can take many steps, of course, but it cannot solve the international part of it... the accession of Kashmir to India... was in that sense complete, not subject to anything except subject to the goodwill of the people of Kashmir... It is a very important thing and by that declaration we are going to stand. It is left to their decision... Now it is before an international forum and how can I or this Parliament take it away? Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech to the Indian Parliament, 25th March 1952 The All-Party Delegation from Delhi comes to Srinagar on the heels of some of the most vexed circumstances that Jammu & Kashmir has faced. The assault on the life and dignity of the average Kashmiri has been relentless. Daily life in our homes and streets has been turned into a nightmare as an entire population is treated as hostages on their own soil. Just a simple act of stepping out of our own houses has been turned into an act fraught with danger, threat and menace with unprecedented prolongation of the brutal curfew, ruthless persecution, topped up by some of the most uncivilized acts by a nation that claims to abide by democratic practice and the rule of law. The blockading of food, fuel and medical supplies with even life-saving drugs and ambulances being prevented from reaching their destinations, nocturnal raids and illegal detention of children and teenagers, clampdown on the local media and thrashing of media persons in recent days, is clearly an attempt at bullying and humiliating the Kashmiri population with base and inhuman tactics employed earlier only by rogue regimes in some notorious instances of international shame like in Kampuchea, Bosnia Palestine and Sri Lanka. We cannot help but feel that we Kashmiris have been corralled into a concentration camp of concertina wires, jack-booted surveillance and vengeful assault by the Indian State, which deliberately chooses to deny this part of its ‘claimed’ nation the constitutional guarantee of ‘the Right to Life’. And we have not even begun talking yet about the more than 100 Kashmiri youngsters senselessly but brutally killed by the Indian security forces in just over 100 days. It follows the thousands of lives already lost over the past decades due to the unresolved Kashmir Dispute. All this Precipitates Your Visit Today. We had hoped the 21st Century would offer our children a new world of opportunities. Indeed, both Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh gave us reason to hope for an honourable and lasting solution to the Kashmir Dispute through their multiple public declarations on Kashmir. We believe these statements represented not only their personal or partisan views but a commitment on behalf of the Indian people which your delegation today now represents. We started this decade with the intention of engaging in a meaningful process to resolve the Kashmir Issue and we continue to be committed to that objective. However, for the people of Jammu & Kashmir, this first decade of the century has only been one of continued human misery, unfulfilled promises, false

xiii hopes and failed efforts to resolve the issue. Failure has bred cynicism and destroyed hope. In recent times, the struggle in Kashmir has transformed from a violent to a non-violent movement and the new generation has adopted the mode of democratic protest rather than the gun to voice its aspiration. It leaves us shocked and resentful that rather than listening to and engaging with this call from the streets of Kashmir, India is responding to it with bullets and violence. We are at a threshold and it is vital that a new generation of Kashmiris should not be pushed to the wall. Dialogue and negotiation must come to the front, not a new chapter of violence and instability. Nobody will gain and we will all lose, if such a situation develops. The passage of time over the past 63 years has, in fact, made the Kashmir Problem more, rather than less, intractable. Allowing this dispute to fester will only extract increasing human costs from the people of Jammu & Kashmir and, for that matter, the people of India and Pakistan. Frankly, today we hope to make a break from the past. What we have seen for the last 63 years and what we are seeing in the current bloodshed is an aggregation of failed approaches. Above all we are seeing a failure to develop and evolve a sustainable, purposeful, results-oriented process of dialogue and negotiation aimed at tangibly resolving core issues rather than dealing with the crisis of the day. We are concerned that domestic politicking in India has again started to create hurdles on the way to developing a meaningful process of negotiation. This has been a phenomenon right from the inception of the Kashmir Conflict. Due to domestic politics in both India and Pakistan, the windows for working towards a solution to Kashmir have been narrowed or interrupted and, as a result, the people of Jammu & Kashmir have had to suffer dearly. It is disconcerting that today the BJP has taken a hard line on Kashmir. This is the same party whose veteran leader Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee went to Lahore and declared from the base of Minar- e-Pakistan: "It is my dream and wish to resolve the Kashmir Issue." This is the same BJP who initiated peace talks with the then united APHC under the chairmanship of Syed Ali Shah Geelani. This is the same party that engaged Hizbul Mujahideen in a cease-fire and talks process in the summer of 2000. This is the same BJP that declared a unilateral cease-fire in the Month of Ramadhan and then offered talks "under the constitution of Insaniyat". This is the same BJP whose Prime Minister Vajpayee laid out an inspiring agenda on Kashmir from Kumarakom on January 2, 2001: "We shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Rather, we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region". We are now disheartened to see the same party advocating a contrary view as the principal Opposition in the Indian Parliament. It is time to develop a peace process on Kashmir that is immune to domestic politics and power tussles, both in India and Pakistan. On many occasions, in 2004 and again in 2006 from Amritsar, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh talked boldly about engaging in an irreversible process of dialogue to reach a political solution on Kashmir. We are concerned that the recent statements of the Prime Minister suggest that the Kashmir Problem is being seen as a matter of unemployment and that conditions are being imposed on the dialogue process. For an entire generation, more than 20 years, we have engaged in multiple exercises of dialogue and talks with the Government of India. We took risks to do so and some amongst us sacrificed their lives to tread the path of peacemaking, while others amongst us paid with our credibility. we give some suggestions with a view to generating a favourable political climate for a purposeful dialogue like (a) revocation of draconian laws, (b) release of political prisoners (c) withdrawal of troops and (d) zero tolerance for human rights etc but these suggestions were not taken seriously. We are now wary that your visit today, however well-intentioned, represents only an effort at short-term crisis management and that there is no clear commitment nor path towards effective resolution of the Kashmir Issue and addressing the aspirations and interests of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. We have seen in the past that it is only when a major crisis erupts that visible efforts are made to engage and understand our aspirations. And as soon as the immediate crisis subsides, the demonstrated and inherent political complacency and negligence is restored.

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Today in light of the concerns expressed above and to voice our unequivocal condemnation of the killings of our children and youth, we choose not to meet with your delegation Today, we ask not for unilateral political concessions but rather a joint commitment to a meaningful process that guarantees results. We believe this is possible only if serious efforts are made to create a conducive environment for dialogue by removal of the harsh and repressive measures that are in force here, to suppress our aspirations and our fundamental democratic rights. We look forward to entering into a dialogue based on the following shared commitments: To create a beginning and to sustain the process of dialogue we need to create a process in which all views and options – most of all Kashmiri aspirations will be considered and explored before arriving at an acceptable solution. Let resolving the Kashmir Dispute in accordance with aspirations of the people of Jammu & Kashmir become a Common Minimum Programme shared by all political parties in India and in Pakistan. Achieving a solution to the Kashmir Issue should now rise above vote bank politics and be taken up as a national agenda shared by all, worked for by all, and risked for by all major political parties of India. Let the Government of India act on the suggestions given by the Kashmiris and facilitate to establish and empower an official body, a Kashmir Committee, consisting of senior representatives of all major Indian political parties to develop and enter into a process of engagement with the representatives of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Let this process be transparent designed to deliver a negotiated solution to the Kashmir Issue that is mutually worked towards by and acceptable to all parties concerned. We believe that a similar Kashmir Committee, bringing together all political forces, should also be established in Pakistan. We will advocate to the political parties in Pakistan that this be done. This will ensure that all major political forces in India and Pakistan are on board with the peace process and it will help institutionalize and sustain the process to resolve the Kashmir Problem. We must render the process immune from domestic politics and tendencies to act as spoilers. On our part we are ready and willing to engage and sustain a meaningful and irreversible process of dialogue designed to avoid the failures of the past and to jointly develop and implement a solution to the Kashmir Dispute that is acceptable to all sides – India, Pakistan and above all the people of J&K. Sincerely,

SD/ SD/ Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Muhammad Yasin Malik All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front

Source: Greater Kashmir Dated September 20, 2010.