China's Changing Family Structure

Home , Demographic history, Deng Zeqi, Han Chinese subgroups, Suicide in China, The Battle of China, The Dark Forest

China’s Changing Family Structure DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Edited by Nicholas Eberstadt SEPTEMBER 2019

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE China’s Changing Family Structure

DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Edited by Nicholas Eberstadt

SEPTEMBER 2019

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2019 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents

Introduction...... 1 Nicholas Eberstadt

Modeling the Future of China’s Changing Family Structure to 2100...... 23 Ashton M. Verdery

Dynamics and Policy Implications of Family Households and Elderly Living Arrangements in China...... 79 Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian

Household Change and Intergenerational Transfers in China: What Lies Ahead?...... 102 Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong

Changing Family and Marital Structure in China: Emotional Strain at Cultural and Individual Levels...... 116 David E. Scharff

China’s Demographic Trends: How Will They Matter?...... 126 Jacqueline Deal and Michael Szonyi

About the Authors...... 149

iii

Introduction

Nicholas Eberstadt

I that China’s vast administrative apparatus was nominally supposed to provide to ordinary people. he family is the fundamental unit of society: its In China, family is recognized as the key to survival Tmost basic building block. It is the foundation in bad times and the key to prosperity in good times, for all the more complex arrangements humanity a fact of life so obvious for most Chinese that it has managed to devise since the beginning of the his- hardly bears belaboring. The family—and one’s own torical era: national economies; kingdoms, states, membership in a family—is a thing in China to be and empires; civilizations. The family, indeed, is the celebrated and revered. single human organization absolutely indispensable Today, however, over 2,500 years of family tra- to the perpetuation of our species; so it has been since dition in China is on an unavoidable collision the emergence of our kind, and—absent some future course with 21st-century China’s new demographic dystopia beyond current imagining—so it looks to be realities. The initial impact has already taken until our end. place—and the reverberations promise to play While the family is necessarily central to all the out for generations to come, with oscillations of world’s great traditions, the argument can be made increasing magnitude. The demographic forces that the institutions of family and kin enjoy an espe- transforming the Chinese family are extraordi- cially prominent role in the Chinese way. For mil- nary and historically unprecedented. It is not too lennia, Chinese philosophy and metaphysics have much to say they may leave Chinese family struc- imparted a special place to the family in their think- ture all but unrecognizable before the end of ing about the universals and eternity; indeed, the this century. Confucian tendency directly links the family (and Curiously, while a small library of studies has been one’s obligations to virtuous conduct therein) to published over the past four decades on population celestial harmony. Family, kin, and clan are accorded change in modern China, little has been written on a correspondingly impressive priority in the honored the bearing of these changes on the Chinese family literature, histories, and other aspects of culture from itself. This cross-disciplinary volume is an explor- the Sinosphere. atory foray into that intellectual terra incognita. In And in more pedestrian terms, the extended the following pages, we attempt to describe the demo- Chinese family has served, as long as writing and graphic dimensions of the changes in family struc- memory recall, as the main bulwark against the ture already underway, and visible out to the horizon, risks and threats from an uncertain and often dan- and to examine some of the implications for China’s gerous world—notwithstanding the protections people, economy, and role in the world.

1 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

II about kinship or extended familial networks in large populations. One of the few is the Church of Jesus Since the pivotal December 1978 Chinese Commu- Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), which diligently nist Party (CCP) Plenum at which Deng Xiaoping strives to reconstruct the family trees of its adher- determined contemporary China’s new economic ents. There is an overarching reason for these efforts, direction, China has substantially developed and of course: To LDS faithful, a new convert’s embrace modernized its official statistical apparatus. It has of Mormonism promises eternal salvation to gen- likewise trained a sizable cadre of world-class demog- tile ancestors in the convert’s lineage for all genera- raphers and population specialists now at work in the tions past. Thus, an exception that actually proves a nation’s universities, research institutes, and govern- rule, the rule being that authorities collect the demo- ment administrative organs. Despite this far-reaching graphic information they deem to be relevant to their upgrade of statistical and research capabilities, fam- interests and purposes—and that detailed informa- ily structure remains something like a demographic tion on family structure and kinship has not been blind spot for Chinese academics and policymakers. judged worthy of collection by those criteria in most This should not surprise; the same is true all around places and times. the world. Official statistics have always served pur- For modern China, this statistical blind spot turns poses of the state, and information about family and out to be portentous. Not only is China arguably kin networks has seldom been regarded as bearing an especially family-centric culture and not only is directly on the fortunes of governments. The earli- Beijing a regime that requires “policy information” est forays into political demographics in both East for its unusually assertive and far-reaching vision of and West—the population censuses conducted in government social control, but in recent decades, rad- East Asia and the Mediterranean thousands of years ical changes in demographic patterns have been qui- ago—were organized to facilitate taxation and mil- etly overturning the realities of family order—with itary mobilization. Thus, the original focus on head results that still remain to be reckoned. counts of individuals and tallies of households, a The main driver of China’s revolutionary demo- focus that continues to this day. graphic pressures recasting national family pat- Of course, vastly more demographic information terns is of course the pronounced decline in is at the disposal of the modern scholar or admin- childbearing since the death of Mao. It is generally istrator: vital statistics on birth, death, marriage, believed that all-China fertility levels fell below and divorce; information on migration and urban- replacement level in the early 1990s and that lev- ization; detailed data on population composition by els have been well below replacement for at least age, sex, and a whole panoply of social and economic a quarter century—with especially low levels of characteristics. But at the heart of this vast compi- fertility prevailing in China’s urban centers. Expert lation of data lies the same age-old taxonomic clas- opinion is divided over the demographic impact of sification system: information on the individual or China’s coercive population control program—the information on the household. The living arrange- One-Child Policy in force from 1981 until 2015—in ments revealed in household data, to be sure, cast this decline.1 some important light on family patterns. But the But while this debate involves important questions overlap between household and family is obviously about the recent Chinese past, it has little bearing imperfect—and household data can tell us nothing on current birth patterns. Even though Beijing raised directly about extended families, kinship networks, birth quotas to a “two-child norm,” and then subse- and other critical aspects of family patterns that quently suspended anti-natal efforts altogether in matter greatly to real people. 2018, it appears that national birth levels have con- Exceptionally few authorities or institutions trou- tinued to slump,2 apparently due to a shift in popular ble themselves to gather information systematically attitudes about family size.

2 INTRODUCTION

Other demographic factors, of course, are shap- that are underway now and expected to unfold in the ing the national contours of China’s new family pat- decades ahead. The problem is that it is impossible to terns: among these, marriage and divorce trends, sex draw any direct quantitative inferences about current ratios at birth, and parity progression ratios—that is, or prospective patterns and trends in extended family the proportion of Chinese adults who end up with structure for China due to the aforementioned blind no children, one child, and more than one child at spot in Beijing’s official demographic statistics. these low overall levels of fertility. (I am taking as a Consequently, until now, there has been basi- given here the continuance of low, stable, and declin- cally no quantitative scholarly or policy research on ing levels of mortality—a condition that could never the evolution of Chinese kinship networks in either be taken for granted until the very most recent phase China or the West. In the pathbreaking first chapter of China’s long history.) But more than anything of this volume, however, Professor Ashton Verdery of else, it is steep and persistent sub-replacement fer- Penn State University takes a major step toward fill- tility that is setting the “new normal” for the scope ing this void. and scale of consanguineous kinship networks in Verdery’s method is simulation. Although Chinese 21st-century China. population data cast no direct light on extended fam- Schematically, consider the simple if extreme ily structure, they can be used to illuminate those pat- example of an only child begotten by only children. terns and trends indirectly. Using available official Such a young man or woman would not only have demographic information, modeling techniques can no siblings; he or she would have no cousins, uncles, “build” notional families, whose patterns and dynam- or aunts, either—only direct lineal ancestors. Such ics change over time in accordance with reported a “4-2-1” family type emerges after just two gener- existing, observable population data and with ations. Continue this pattern an additional gener- assumed trends projected for the future. ation, and an “8-4-2-1” family type arises, in which Perhaps the most valuable tool to date for such there are eight times as many great-grandparents family structure modeling is the SOCSIM demo- as great-grandchildren (possibly more living great- graphic software program, originally developed by grandparents than great-grandchildren as well) and Professor Eugene Hammel and colleagues in the no second cousins by blood. 1970s.4 The SOCSIM programming is complex and Yet to say such hypothetical family types are demanding and requires highly detailed “inputs” for extreme is not to say they are unheard of in China its simulations. Starting with an initial assumed pop- today. Far from it. In China’s very largest cities— ulation of some given number of individuals for Year places such as Beijing and Shanghai, the epicenters Zero, the model simulates the life course for those of national political and economic power—fertility individuals and their descendants—including mar- levels already appear to have been far below replace- riage, childbearing, death, and the development of ment for over four decades and to have been in the family ties—in “Monte Carlo” fashion, using the pop- vicinity of one birth per woman per lifetime since ulation’s general vital schedules and distributions to the mid-1980s—which is to say, for more than a gen- assign an “outcome” to each person in the popula- eration.3 In these metropolises, the “4-2-1” family is tion and then to sum those outcomes to obtain total already a familiar fixture, and the same is increasingly national patterns. true of other urban locales. For many, a kinless China An additional virtue of this model is that it can zoom will be the future, and for almost everyone else, the in on family patterns for its simulated individuals at extended Chinese family promises to be rather less different points over their life course. For example, it extended than today. can report the numbers and proportions of men and Unfortunately, such broad generalizations, true women with living parents, siblings, aunts, cousins, though they may be, fail to offer any precise indications spouses, and children in any given calendar year for of the dimensions of the changes in family networks 20-year-olds, 50-year-olds, 80-year-olds, and so forth.

3 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Verdery deploys an updated version of SOCSIM twentysomethings and thirtysomethings and not just to generate a “national” population composed of the currently unborn. extended families (two-generation family trees, On the other hand, Chinese childbearing pat- with grandparents, cousins, etc.) for China. By begin- terns are making siblings, cousins, uncles, and aunts ning his simulation in 1800, Verdery runs through increasingly scarce. They are also making living chil- roughly six generations of notional Chinese fami- dren much more scarce for adults—especially men. In lies by the time he gets results for 1950—the initial 2010, according to Verdery’s simulations, most Chi- year under consideration in his investigation, since nese men and women in their 40s had two or more it is the starting point for the comprehensive World children; by 2050, many adults will still have two chil- Population Prospects database from the UN Popula- dren, but they will constitute a minority. tion Division (UNPD). The share of adult men with no children at all is Verdery’s “families” replicate the UNPD’s esti- on track to rise sharply. Verdery estimates that just mates of actual national Chinese trends in mortal- 5 percent of men 40 and older had no living children ity, fertility, population growth, and age structure for in 1990—but that fraction would eventually approach 1950–2010 rather well—affording confidence that his 20 percent. By 2050 nearly one in four Chinese men simulated version of Chinese family structure approx- in their 40s would have no living children—but fewer imates the true version for those decades rather than one in 25 women in their 40s would be child- well, and likewise confidence that his projections to less. The discrepancy is due to the gender imbalance 2050 should comport closely to what the UNPD’s in births that arose during the era of the One-Child “medium variant” assumptions about impending Policy, which turns into gender imbalances in the Chinese trajectories for fertility, mortality, and inter- marriage market—the “excess males” of that era national migration would mean for the actual Chi- becoming the “unmarriageable males” of tomor- nese families of tomorrow. (Verdery reports in detail row in a society where out-of-marriage childbearing in his appendix on his simulation results for China for remains highly stigmatized. 1980–2060.) Regarding siblings, Verdery estimates that one in Verdery’s simulations cannot tell us anything eight Chinese of all ages had no brothers or sisters directly about the qualitative characteristics of family in 1990, a fraction that would rise to one in three relations in China (what we might broadly describe by 2050 and eventually peak at over two in five. as the tenor of family life). What he does show, and From a low of under 6 percent in 1990, the share of stunningly, is the sea change in temporal availability sibling-less Chinese age 40–44 would rise to nearly of blood kin now underway in China. 44 percent in 2050. “Whereas most Chinese adults On the one hand, thanks to China’s sustained in 1990 had three or more living siblings, almost reductions in mortality since the 1960s, many more none are expected to have so many by 2050,” writes Chinese adults will be likely to have living parents. Verdery. Further, “by 2050, the experience of hav- Whereas few Chinese in their late 40s had two living ing no living siblings becomes nearly constant across parents in 1990, almost half their counterparts are all age groups (and the life course), a generality of projected to have two living parents by 2050, at which Chinese society that may have no parallel in other time these simulations suggest it will be quite unusual societies.” Also note that although many Chinese in for Chinese 40-somethings to have lost both parents. their 60s stand to have living parents in 2050, most By 2050, in fact, almost half of Chinese in their 60s of these 60-somethings are projected to have only would have at least one living parent, as would one one living sibling or none at all—accentuating the in eight Chinese in their 70s. Among other things, impending burdens of eldercare that await many in these numbers point to the enormous obligations of the China to come. eldercare that are rapidly approaching for rising gen- Verdery’s simulations point to a radical atrophy of erations in China, obligations that will fall on today’s extended family (cousins, uncles, and aunts) in China

4 INTRODUCTION

in the years ahead. In 1990, a generation ago, about large countries.” He further judges, “This collapse 95 percent of men and women in their 20s had 10 or in family structure is enormous, and future research more cousins; by 2050, Verdery projects fewer than should take into account its potential effects on the 15 percent will. Whereas practically no young adults functioning of the Chinese economy and society.” in China had no cousins at all in 1990, about 5 percent Verdery’s chapter represents a great advance in of Chinese twentysomethings would be cousin-less. scholarly and policy understanding about the out- Writes Verdery: look for Chinese family structure and demands careful study by those seriously interested in this topic. I project that 7.6 percent of individuals under age 40 A few initial comments on this hallmark study may will have no living cousins by 2050. As these cohorts be in order. without cousins age, they become commonplace in First, bear in mind Verdery’s caution that his sim- Chinese society overall. By 2100, my model holds ulation is a necessarily simplified presentation of that 8.8 percent of all Chinese, regardless of age, will extended kinship networks. Less biologically imme- have no living cousins. diate family members—second and third cousins, for example—also have long figured in the familial A similar trend is afoot for availability of living networks essential to economic and social life in aunts and uncles. Families without cousins, uncles, or China. Further, close and trusted friends who are not aunts mark a startling departure from Chinese tradi- biologically related have also long played a promi- tion. Verdery comments that “a substantial fraction of nent role in the quintessentially Chinese tradition of the young adult population will be without cousins by social networks known as guanxi. This may prove to 2050, which my model suggests is a new family form be a pivotal matter for China’s future and is a point to that has not previously existed in China.” which I return later. Not surprisingly, the atrophy of extended fam- Second, demographic simulation models have ily networks coincides in China with a steep pro- some limits in illuminating the dimensions of kin- jected rise in the kinless population. In the decades ship network change, both in China and elsewhere. ahead, the rise in adults with no living spouse or chil- As a sheer computational proposition, for example, it dren is due entirely to an explosion in kinless-ness would be extraordinarily difficult to take into account among men; kinless-ness for women is in fact domestic migration in such models. We know that projected to decline. Verdery’s simulations suggest there are pronounced differentials in fertility between that about 2 percent of Chinese men 50 and older urban and rural China, that hundreds of millions of have neither living wives nor children today, a share peasants have moved to urban China since the 1980s, that would eventually reach 8 percent. And since that many more are likely to do so in coming decades, China is a rapidly aging society, this means total num- and that urban life has tended to transform family and bers of the kinless stand to accelerate even more fertility patterns for such migrants from the coun- swiftly. Including living siblings as a criterion for tryside. The situation is further complicated by the kinless-ness substantially reduces the head count of CCP’s hukou system of social control through identity persons (read: men) so affected. But it by no means and residence papers, which has relegated most but eliminates the phenomenon—begging the question of not all rural migrants in cities and towns to a nether- what life will be like for these millions of older men world where they are provisionally tolerated but not without immediate family networks. granted full local rights to social services, movement Verdery concludes, “The family network results I for their dependents, and the like.5 have presented reflect a best guess about how China’s Expecting these complexities to be taken into family structure will change over the 21st century,” account in kinship network modeling may be unrea- and those same results “point to a collapse in Chinese sonable at this time. Verdery’s work, and future work family relations that may be unprecedented in other by other students of China’s population, may be used

5 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

in conjunction with, for example, urbanization pro- his simulations. We will know more about the cur- jections to hint at the cleavages between urban and rent status of the flight from marriage in China when rural kinship patterns, to guess about the distribu- the results of the upcoming 2020 population census tion of kinless-ness between country and city, and so are available. on. But for now, China’s extended family patterns are One final point from Verdery’s simulations merits quantifiable only at the national level. mention. Some of the seemingly unprecedented dis- Third, Verdery’s projections for future family ruptions on the horizon for the Chinese family are trends in China obviously depend on the assumptions not new at all in the mirror of Chinese history. Stud- built into the data that his model inputs—in this case, ies in historical demography by Professor Wang Feng, mainly those of the UNPD’s 2015 revision of its World who contributes a chapter to this volume on a sep- Population Prospects project (“medium variant” ver- arate topic, and many other scholars have demon- sion). The UNPD’s work is good, but its researchers strated, for example, that imperial China perennially do not have the gift of prophecy. As Verdery warns, faced an “excess male” and “unmarriageable men” there could be a reversal in China’s dramatic fertil- problem due to the heinous but long-prevalent prac- ity declines—although as he also cautions, even this tice of female infanticide.9 The Communist era may would not appreciably affect his projected results for be the first period in China’s (quantifiable) demo- the coming generation. graphic history in which universal marriage for men No less compelling a scenario would be what we was not only a norm but also something close to the might call a “downside” departure from the assump- reality. By 2005 nearly 97 percent of Chinese men in tions modeled into Verdery’s projections. After all, their early 40s were married (or had been married at for more than a generation, East Asia and Southeast some point). Asia have been subject to a “flight from marriage,”6 as This return to the historically familiar circum- Professor Gavin W. Jones of the University of Sin- stance of “bare branches,” however, follows a time gapore has termed it. Successive cohorts of young when near-universal male marriage was really taking women are postponing mean age at marriage, and place in China. By the same token, the atrophy of the a growing share of these same women are staying extended family in China in the decades ahead stands unmarried for life. to be all the more dramatic because the numbers of This flight from marriage has made great inroads living blood relatives reached ahistorical heights in in Japan (where about a fifth of women in their early the 1990s thanks to massive reductions in mortality 40s were never married as of 2015) and South Korea after the Liberation, which meant many more sur- (where one in nine women that same age in 2015 had viving kin. The possible role of the quite exceptional never been married). The same is true in the Sino- “demographic moment” at the end of the 20th cen- sphere, in places like Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong tury in fashioning popular expectations about family Kong.7 In 2016, according to the UNPD’s World Mar- in China for generations ahead is worth considering, riage Data 2017 online database, over 16 percent and I will return to it. of Hong Kong women in their early 40s had never been married; for China in 2013, the corresponding proportion was 0.6 percent.8 Why should we assume III Mainland China will be forever immune from this particular social change? Household composition patterns cast light on only Any serious embrace of a flight from marriage by one component of an extended kinship network, but Chinese women could have significant consequences they reveal information that even the most detailed for the future of extended family networks—with a and accurate genealogical accounting cannot. A lin- “collapse in Chinese family relations” considerably eage chart tells nothing about the actual interper- more dramatic than the ones Verdery traces out in sonal bonds between family members, only their

6 INTRODUCTION

bloodlines. A child from any given extended fam- those 20 years by almost the same amount that ily may never have met his or her living cousins or one-generation households gained. By 2010 there grandparents—or for that matter, his or her father or were nearly twice as many one-generation homes in mother. By contrast, a household is defined by com- China as three-generation homes, and the disparity mon living arrangements—implying close and inti- is no doubt even greater today. Interestingly, trends mate contact and (for better or worse) familiarity and in the rise of one-generation homes and the fall of established relations. two-generation homes were rather similar in rural The family household is crucial to an overall and urban China, despite the socioeconomic differ- appraisal of the family’s functions and contributions ences separating them. in society. And because it is so central to social life, On the other hand, while three-generation homes governments collect a fair amount of demographic declined as a fraction of all urban households, they data on it, as already noted. rose in the countryside. Fertility differentials and In the second chapter, Professor Zeng Yi of Duke migration patterns help explain this rural-urban University and Peking University and Wang Zhen- divide. Fertility levels are far lower in cities than the glian, senior research scientist at Duke University, countryside. As a matter of sheer arithmetic, a “short- explore recent and prospective changes in family age” of children and grandchildren in urban areas household structure and their implications for pol- limits the prospects for three-generation households. icy. Zeng and Wang focus on the living arrangements By contrast, three-generation homes are a matter of for older persons—an apposite emphasis considering necessity in rural areas, where many parents have that China is on course for rapid and pervasive popu- departed for the cities for employment opportuni- lation aging over the decades ahead. ties, but hukou restrictions forbid them from bringing Leading authorities on the demographics of the their children along; in such cases, grandparents Chinese household, these authors are also leaders provide care for China’s tens of millions of rural in the techniques of demographic projection. Their “left-behind children.” PROFAMY program, which they use in this study, is Zeng and Wang devote much of their attention in arguably the most sophisticated demographic soft- this chapter to the family arrangements of older Chi- ware yet available for detailed examination of house- nese men and women, detailing household struc- hold and living arrangement patterns, and it has ture for these seniors by sex, residence (rural versus been applied effectively in studies on China, the urban), and age (over 65, 65–79, and over 80). Note United States, and other countries. that their data for this portion of their chapter exam- Since the 1930s, the mean size of Chinese house- ine living arrangements on a population basis—that holds has gradually declined, a trend that promises to is, the head count approach—rather than the distri- continue. Urban households tend to be smaller than bution of household types, as in the earlier portion rural ones in China, as elsewhere. Affluence and edu- of their study. cation track with smaller household size; at the same Zeng and Wang show that a major nationwide time, as is true the world over, poorer and less edu- retreat is underway in multigenerational living cated homes are apparently getting smaller, too. arrangements for the elderly. By 2010 slightly over half Zeng and Wang demonstrate that the fastest- of Chinese men 65 or older were no longer living in growing household type in China is the one-generation homes with their children. The proportion was lower home—typically a married couple or an individ- for their female counterparts, but nevertheless nearly ual living alone. One-generation homes accounted 45 percent of seniors were living apart from their for 14 percent of Chinese homes in 1990 but 34 per- descendants. (It is quite possible the returns from the cent by 2010. The rise of the one-generation home 2020 China census will report that share is now a clear has come at the expense of two-generation house- majority.) We should emphasize that the fraction of holds, whose share of total households fell over seniors in one-generation homes is consistently and

7 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

substantially higher in China than the average for Zeng and Wang regard the precarious familial persons of all ages—far higher—and that this holds circumstances of China’s rapidly growing popula- true for both sexes, for rural and urban areas, and for tion of elders and oldest-old as a problem requiring every older age cohort under consideration. urgent policy attention. They argue, persuasively, The situation for the oldest-old—those 80 and that a household-focused analysis is better suited over—is particularly striking. Nationally, the propor- to identifying needs and social risks than the tra- tion of one-person homes was dramatically higher for ditional head count approach. They warn of the 80-somethings than for the population as a whole. special disadvantages that elderly women in China The same is true for one-generation homes. While face and advocate a much greater eye to their social there are some differences between male and female welfare. They project that empty-nest elders 65 and patterns and between rural and urban patterns, the older will account for three times as great a share of trends are clear: Many more very old Chinese are liv- the Chinese population as in 2010 and that empty ing only with their spouse or all alone. nesters 80 or older will account for an astonish- The rise of the oldest-old living alone in China is ing seven times more of the national population in noteworthy, and in some measure surely also con- 2050 than in 2010. cerning. The conventional sociological explanation Perhaps most intriguingly, they propose a policy for the worldwide rise of the one-person home is that for China to “promote co-residence or nearby living it reflects a revealed preference—namely, a strong arrangements between the elderly and their children,” demand for independence and autonomy. It may seem citing benefits to both seniors and their children, as plausible enough to coordinate that storyline with suggested in findings from the China Longitudinal the proliferation of octogenarians and nonagenari- Healthy Longevity Survey. They make the case that ans living on their own in urban China, where health such outcomes are achievable: and other social services are relatively available and where many elderly can get by financially mainly on Given the . . . Confucian tradition of filial piety, we the pensions offered to relatively privilegedex-cadres believe it is socially realistic and possible to adopt or state-owned enterprise employees. It is a differ- a policy to promote co-residence or nearby liv- ent situation in the countryside, where government ing arrangements between the elderly and their pension and health care guarantees are still minimal children in China. This theoretical speculation is and the options for supplemental resources are either supported by many years of successful implemen- depending on support from family members who live tations in promoting the three-generation family elsewhere or the unforgiving prospect of scratching households in Singapore, where more than half the out earnings from manual labor. (The rural 80-plus elderly think co-residence with their children is pre- population is contemporary China’s least-educated ferred and should be considered as a standard of group: By the estimates of the Wittgenstein Centre on successful aging. Global Demography and Human Capital, mean years of schooling for this cohort was just over two and The urgency of preparing China for expo- a half years.10) nentially increasing numbers of empty-nest and While the proliferation of one-generation-only live-alone seniors appears even more acute if we homes for urban seniors may be attributed to the fam- consider two additional factors. The first is the bur- ily nucleation that seems to attend modern economic den of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, debilitat- development almost everywhere, it is difficult not to ing and extraordinarily care-intensive afflictions view the rapid increase in rural China’s population of for which at present there are no cures. Since the live-alone elderly and extreme elderly with trepida- risk of Alzheimer’s increases with age, an explosion tion—for this would appear to be a manifestly vulnera- of China’s live-alone 80-plus population portends ble group, at high risk of poverty, hardship, and disaster. human tragedy on a terrible scale.

8 INTRODUCTION

The second is the possibility that the middle-aged help legitimize this tool and simultaneously encour- sons and daughters of this future China will be less age its use for projects other than reengineering the dutiful than their forebears today. A change in mores Chinese family? among the grown-ups who were once “Little Emper- ors” is not hard to imagine, thousands of years of Confucian tradition notwithstanding. The Sinosphere IV has witnessed major changes in family norms and values over the past two generations, and a decline in The first two chapters in this volume outline some filial piety might be just one more. of the quantitative dimensions of current and pro- Beijing is already contemplating just such an even- spective changes in Chinese family structure. The tuality. It has criminalized financial abandonment next three explore some of the implications of these of parents in need and in 2013 mandated that grown momentous trends. In the third chapter, Professors children spend time with their elders.11 But such pen- Wang Feng of the University of California, Irvine, alties and strictures look more like a rear-guard action and Fudan University; Shen Ke of Fudan; and Cai to stem a flowing tide than aforward-oriented strat- Yong of the University of North Carolina exam- egy to cope with the new challenges of the future. ine some of the economic ramifications of China’s Just how would China manage to implement the changing family dynamics. sort of forward-looking policy that Zeng and Wang The aperture for Wang, Shen, and Cai’s study is advocate? Official exhortation and positive propa- the system of National Transfer Accounts (NTA). gandizing can only be expected to change facts on the Pioneered by the demographic economist Ronald D. ground so much. Singapore may have registered some Lee, NTA is a framework for examining the earnings successes in fostering intergenerational co-residence, and consumption patterns of individuals over the life but it is an extremely wealthy city-state in which cycle, as well as the components and magnitudes of the overwhelming majority of the population lives intergenerational resource transfers. The NTA proj- in government-owned housing; it has incentivized ect’s international network of research teams now co-residence by building the country’s housing stock covers more than 60 countries, one of which is China. to accommodate co-residence.12 Even Sino-optimists (Shen is the lead researcher on NTA’s China team.) must recognize that China will not have the pocket- Relying on NTA estimates for China, Wang, Shen, and book for comparable measures by 2050, much less in Cai analyze the current status of household trans- the decades immediately ahead. fers in China, place the Chinese situation in interna- One possible instrument is the social credit sys- tional perspective, speculate about the outlook for tem that Beijing is currently unveiling, a nationwide the future, and offer some broad prescriptions to cope surveillance program relying on big data and artifi- with impending changes. cial intelligence to assign all Chinese a “reputation Wang, Shen, and Cai frame their study against score” that will reward or penalize in accordance with recent developments in Chinese family patterns. how Beijing regards each subject’s behavior.13 Critics (Both Wang and Cai are internationally regarded fear this system, once rolled out, will function as an demographers.) They underscore the difference ultra-Orwellian form of market-based totalitarianism between norm and reality in Chinese family structure: and will serve as a more comprehensively intrusive instrument for social control than any previously pos- Despite the strong preference, even idealization, sessed by any regime. of multigenerational co-residence in the Chinese One wonders: Will the social credit system be culture . . . high infant and adult mortality rates wielded to induce grown-up children to live with and effectively made such an ideal beyond the reach support their elderly parents? Could such soft induce- of most. It was only with the rapid decline in mor- ments succeed in this purpose? And if so, might this tality and continued high fertility that the ideal of

9 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

large multigenerational households became a demo- intergenerational support, this exposition implicitly graphic possibility for the masses in China. alerts us that big changes could possibly be in the making that could take national trends off the “base- They further point to signs of rapid shifts in roman- line” posited by authoritative research institutions tic mores and behavior in China today, including: such as the UNPD and the US Census Bureau—or, for that matter, by those who rely on those same report[s] that the cohabitation rate exceeded 20 per- projections for their prognoses. (By the way, this is cent for cohorts born after 1977. For those who got worth keeping in mind for all assessments of future married after 2000, 30 percent cohabitated before implications of changing family structure patterns marriage, a level roughly similar to other industrial- for China, not just those in the economic realm.) ized societies. In Shanghai, a 2013 survey of people Wang, Shen, and Cai use 2009 as the baseline for born in the 1980s shows nearly half of those who were their estimates of life-cycle resource transfers. They married had premarital cohabitation experience. calculate absolute per capita net transfer from both public and private sources for persons age 0–90 for And they bid us to take heed of every calendar year. By way of context, 2009 was arguably an unusual two societal forces that have accompanied China’s year economically and demographically, even by con- recent economic boom: massive migration and temporary Chinese standards. China’s 2009 house- urbanization and rapid expansion of tertiary educa- hold savings rates were strongly positive and indeed tion. Between 1980 and 2015, China’s urban popu- exceptionally high—an extraordinary 38 percent lation increased from about 20 percent of the total according to Organisation for Economic Co-operation population to 56 percent. . . . and Development data.14 And by no coincidence, Migration often involves young people moving 2009 was also just about the peak of China’s “demo- away from their parents and, in many cases, young graphic dividend” era, with working-age population parents moving away from their children and oth- (15–64 years of age) accounting for nearly 73 percent ers in the family who stay behind in the country- of the national population total and median age still side, as most Chinese migrants are the so-called a relatively youthful 35 years as of 2010, according to floating population. . . . the UNPD.15 Urban life has multiple effects on marriage, fertil- According to their calculations, people under 20 ity, and living arrangements, as urban residents marry in China depended strongly on net resource transfers later, have lower fertility rates, and have smaller and for their sustenance in 2009, as did people in their 50s simpler households than rural residents do. . . . and older. In and of itself, this is not surprising. Quite Higher education expanded at the same rapid the contrary: It is more or less a typical life-cycle pat- pace as migration and urbanization. In roughly one tern for all modern societies. But the composition of decade, between 1998 and 2009, annual college those sustaining transfers was somewhat distinctive: admission increased sixfold, from one million to 6.3 million. . . . The gross tertiary education enroll- Private transfers are much more common than pub- ment ratio more than tripled, from 10.5 percent in lic transfers are for those age 0-22. . . . 1998 to 37.5 percent in 2014. Expansion in higher Compared to more developed countries, education directly affects marital age and indirectly China’s private transfers play a more important role affects attitudes and behaviors toward marriage, than public transfers do. For instance, in Sweden, employment, childbearing, and living arrangements. while intra-household transfers and public transfers are about equal for young dependents on a per cap- As a prologue to their examination of cur- ita basis, public transfers finance almost the entire rent patterns of life-cycle resource flows and life-cycle deficits for older dependents.

10 INTRODUCTION

Further, there was a chasm between urban and rural Looking to the future, and referring to the extant China with respect to public support for older residents: hukou system of rural-urban discrimination, Wang, Shen, and Cai write: In urban China, according to China’s 2010 census, 66.3 percent of those age 60 and over report pension It is simply unthinkable, however, that nearly half of as their main source of income. In rural China, the China’s population, those who are still classified as corresponding number is only 4.6 percent. In con- rural or agricultural, will continue to live in a socially trast, 41.2 percent of the rural elderly report labor divided society and that they can continue to count income as their main source of income, and 47.7 per- on their weakened if not diminishing kin network as cent rely on intrafamilial transfers. The correspond- their main source of old-age support. And this is what ing numbers for urban China were only 6.6 and we see in the current pattern of transfers in China. 22.4 percent, respectively. . . . By their late 70s, fewer than one in four urban Any move to ease the plight of rural seniors in elderly report family transfer as their main source of China will likely involve big increases in government income, whereas in the countryside, nearly 8 in 10 outlays. But with the coming surge in Chinese seniors, reported so. the (likely) slump in household savings rates in a graying population, and the atrophy and fragmentation of Wang, Shen, and Cai corroborate the risks for older kinship networks, the outlook for old-age support in rural Chinese indicated by Zeng and Wang’s chap- China appears to be surprisingly clouded, especially ter and provide enhanced detail. Rural seniors are considering China’s world-beating economic reputa- strikingly disadvantaged in the public health system. tion. Warn Wang, Shen, and Cai: Roughly twice as much government health spending accrued to urban 70-somethings as rural ones in Slowdown in the Chinese economic growth, and 2009. And the even “more pronounced disparity is in an even more drastic slowdown in government old-age support, in the form of pensions, for which revenue growth, will only make these challenges per capita public transfer varies by almost seven to more daunting. one in 2009.” . . . The family institution in China, which has Despite the lack of government support for rural undergone tremendous but less noticed changes seniors, Wang, Shen, and Cai show that persons in the past two decades, will continue to drive in their mid-70s and older were far more likely to China’s economic and social transformation for be living alone in 2010 than any younger age groups. decades to come. Indeed, persons in their early 80s were roughly three times as likely to be living alone as persons Wang, Shen, and Cai offer a rigorous look at one 20 years younger. One in six rural 80-somethings aspect of the economic implications of Chinese family were on their own in 2010. That at-risk group structure change. But of course, they cannot cover the stands to increase ominously in the decades imme- entire horizon in a single chapter. (Zeng and Wang’s diately ahead. chapter points to one additional economic impact But that trend should not allow us to forget the of household evolution in China: With a more rapid rural left-behind children who are also casualties of increase in households than population, economic recent changes in family structure and living arrange- demand, also known as consumption, will increase ments in modern China. This disadvantaged group faster than head count alone would suggest for hous- comprises a significant fraction of China’s rising gen- ing, energy, transportation, and so on.) eration (although estimates of the group’s prevalence A more wide-ranging exploration of the economic are quite sensitive to the specific definition of “left implications of changing family structure in China behind” that enumerators choose). is not only possible but warranted. Literature on the

11 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

economics of the family provides a well-established and working with (mainly professional and urban) intellectual platform for some of the inquiry in order, Chinese patients. Because psychiatrists serve but there could be much more. From the microeco- patients in need, Scharff’s insights are drawn from nomic side, it would be well to think more about the interacting with Chinese men and women who are influence of changing kinship networks and house- experiencing some form of emotional crisis. His hold composition patterns on, for example, the trans- insight into this world of suffering and longing action costs and risk perceptions that condition amounts to a particularly informative aperture on economic activity in China. From the macro side, we life in China today. should want to know how these changes affect sav- In Scharff’s retelling, two important things about ings, investment, trade, economic innovation, and the traditional Chinese family changed in the early other mainstay indicators of modern economic devel- Communist period: opment in China—and more. The relative neglect of such questions in recent The status of women was greatly enhanced, as in decades by the Western economics profession is Mao’s aphorism, “Women hold up half the sky.” surely related to the paucity of well-behaved data sets And sex, while being for procreation, was still offi- on China family questions, given the well-trained cially denigrated—except for high-ranking CCP modern Westerns economist’s dependence on such officials. For instance, Mao’s licentious life is data sets as tools of their trade. Can additional quan- well-documented. titative demographic work remedy this deficiency? Or do we need pioneers with high professional risk In his estimate, Mao’s Cultural Revolution not only tolerance to lay open the fields that others will even- occasioned millions of deaths and hundreds of mil- tually settle and make fruitful? lions of disrupted lives but also caused long-lasting trauma for untold millions in China. Furthermore:

V The Cultural Revolution was a time of national and individual trauma. It continues to haunt China and The family is our “haven in a heartless world,”16 its families. But because people cannot talk about it, as the late public intellectual Christopher Lasch it has passed from the directly traumatized gener- famously put it, the refuge central to our emo- ation to the current young generation without dia- tional life, our mentality, and our higher aspirations. logue or understanding, still taking its toll on young Changing family dynamics perforce affect emotional families in ways they do not understand. and psychological life in China, as in all communities populated by our highly social species. Interpersonal After Mao’s death, relationships powerfully shape human well-being, for good or for ill. Understanding how changing fam- The Confucian ethic had quickly come back because ily structure affects emotionalwell-being in China there was nothing else dormant in the Chinese mind. today is no less important than taking the measure But this time, it was not uncontested emotionally. of its material impact—even though the former may And because Deng urged people to develop econom- elude easy quantification. ically, a new consumer individualism caused families One discipline that systematically addresses indi- and individuals to quickly become entrepreneurially viduals’ state of mind in any population is psychia- out for themselves. . . . try. In the fourth chapter of this volume, Professor The opening up had barely begun when the One- David E. Scharff of the International Psychother- Child Policy was imposed throughout China. . . . For apy Institute reflects on his experiences from the family, the effect was to block the return to the old many years of teaching family psychiatry in China ethic of large, male-dominated families.

12 INTRODUCTION

There were immediate effects. Many of the girls changes trigger problems, but also unique coping were abandoned or put up for adoption to allow the strategies developed by Chinese couples and fam- family to select for boys. This led to the long-term ilies. For instance, the concept of “the distance is disastrous excess of males, a devastating conse- one hot soup,” which means that an ideal distance quence for those men who now cannot find wives in between a couple and their parents is the distance a society where having a (male) heir to extend the over which one can bring a hot soup from one fam- line is still paramount. . . . ily to the other without having the soup go cold. It has turned out that families with an “only girl” The phrase illustrates how Chinese couples nego- often do better. Girls are more loyal to their parents tiate boundaries with their parents while enjoying and more likely to care for them in their old age. But the benefits of larger families. other problems ensued. Scharff illustrates some of the features of cri- Scharff enumerates some of the difficulties that he sis and coping with two case studies from his own sees: the pressure of being an only child, emotional practice in China: patients he calls “Brittany” and isolation, left-behind children, out-of-quota children “Clover.” (invisible in the state registration system because their births would have incurred penalties for their Fourteen-year-old Brittany was brought to see me parents), and more. because she was refusing to go to school, staying at He also points to the calamity of premature death home in her room, hearing voices, and fearing that all of a child in the context of a one-child family—an the children at school were against her. . . . event that means, in addition to any and all financial The hallucinatory “voices” Brittany heard (and hardships, the end of the family lineage for too many because of which she had been wrongly diagnosed current Chinese families: as psychotic) were actually the embodiment of her parents’ fights, leaving her to feel that she had to There are also the more than a million couples whose stay home to protect her mother, a pressure she only child has died, leaving them with emotional and could not bear. . . . financial despair. In a country with no social safety Brittany’s alcoholic father had experienced quite net and no child to take care of the parents in their a lot of trauma growing up. . . . advancing age, there is little hope they can survive . . . In addition to his alcoholism, this financial above the poverty line. pressure was part of the family’s suffering. . . . Britney’s so-called psychotic illness expressed The social background to some of the pressures several common cultural elements: the trauma atten- in family life in China are similar to those in other dant on the family through the generations, the pres- developing countries, including pronounced and sures in which people doing business in China find rapid urbanization and industrialization. But Scharff themselves frequently, the denigration of women as the clinician believes China is a special case in part of her father’s relying on his wife without feeling important respects. He quotes a Chinese colleague he had to pay attention to her, and the empowerment from Fudan University: of the one child in the Chinese family, in which the child has an exaggerated and pampered sense of her Chinese families and couples are now fac- power and importance. ing unique conditions of family structure and . . . Fourteen-year-old Clover was obsessed with social-economic changes, which are not found the idea of suicide and had formed a “suicide club” in other countries and probably in the history of at school. Her mother, who taught in the same highly mankind. The “4-2-1” family and the “left-behind competitive high school, was devastated that the children” are just two prominent examples. These other teachers knew of Clover’s difficulty, when the

13 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

mother had not. Clover went to school, but her nights problems are a time bomb, comparable to the one were spent on her cell phone, so that she never got posed by the pollution that besets modern China, enough sleep and became a mystery to her parents. spoiling its air, water, and farmlands.” Clover lived in quite a loving family. . . . Yet while his professional experiences offer “a dire . . . Clover kept feeling guilty that she was letting warning about the future of China’s families,” he also her parents down by not being studious enough and underscores the reasons for hope: wanting to just play. In this intervention, when the mother confronted The emphasis on trauma and difficulty that I have her “loss of face” over Clover’s situation, the crisis stressed should be balanced by describing what we so cracked things open, letting family members find frequently see as strengths and resources in Chinese each other and begin to communicate emotionally. families and marriages, just as we do in the West. Once the parents recognized the enormous pres- . . . For every family that seems hopeless caught sure they were putting on Clover, her mother admit- in the consequences of social change and inherited ted that she had not always obeyed her own parents trauma, such as Brittany’s family, we encountered a when she was a child and that she had loved to play family like Clover’s who has the will and the tools for and have fantasies herself. . . . growth and change. As the family began to talk about the parents’ histories (which did not involve impingement from the Scharff is surely correct when he concludes, Cultural Revolution), we could see the pressure in “The situation with the family is, therefore, one of the family begin to dissipate. Clover announced that many crucial issues in modern China, but it is one she was no longer interested in suicide, discarding it that has received almost no attention in the press the way another child might discard an interest in a or academic circles.” The immediate question that superhero, and the family began finding new avenues comes to mind is: Why? What accounts for such for emotional communication. pervasive neglect (or as a psychiatrist might put it, avoidance and denial)? Scharff holds that “China’s young people are often A more-than-passing, strange inattention to the deeply divided emotionally about the idea of fam- tumult and trials of the contemporary family is ily. This will determine both the structure and inner apparent in not only academic and policy circles but struggles of future families because the psychology virtually all the humanities as well. Modern China’s they develop shapes the ideologies they will live by.” world of arts and letters seems somehow to have He cautions: more or less overlooked the drama and the passion of the recent earthquake in national family patterns. The younger generations are certainly going to have To be sure, novelist Ma Jian (whose work is mixed feelings about whether to form marriages and banned in China) wrote a scathing denunciation families at all. . . . of the One-Child Policy in The Dark Road,17 and . . . There is already more separation and divorce Nobel Laureate in Literature Mo Yan (whose work than anyone predicted a few years ago. Even more is allowed to be sold widely inside China) produced surprising is the number of young people who do not his own absurdist critique of the official population want to marry. control program in Frog.18 Yet apart from these works and perhaps some lesser-known exceptions, the saga He notes, “We cannot tell how many more young of the modern Chinese family seems to be strangely people will be raised with the narcissistic themes absent from contemporary China’s film, stage, song, of self-indulgence, which represent an escape from and fiction. social and family pressures.” In Scharff’s judgment, Perhaps one reason for the paucity of cultural China’s “employment, education, and mental health offerings about the revolution in the Chinese family

14 INTRODUCTION

is that this is all too new—and confusing—for a pop- Liu’s fantasy takes us into a currently unimaginable ular reckoning. Perhaps another has to do with the universe. But Scharff’s work is grounded in clinical fact that China is a closed society, and the current observation. If he is correct, greater disruptions may regime ensures such themes remain dangerous for lie in store for China’s coming family structure than artists to explore. demographers and economists currently assume—at Under other totalitarian governments—in partic- a psychic cost none can yet describe. ular, the old Soviet bloc states—artists sometimes avoided such strictures by indulging in science fiction, pretending to speak of faraway places in the VI distant future when they were really thinking about the here and now. So it may be that Liu Cixin’s mus- In the final chapter, Jacqueline Deal, president of the ings about the family in his runaway bestselling tril- Long Term Strategy Group, and Professor Michael ogy The Three-Body Problem19 might not actually Szonyi of Harvard University speculate about the concern an embattled Planet Earth centuries from coming political and national security ramifications now, after all. of China’s changing family patterns. It is rigorous Liu is light on details, but in his saga humanity speculation: Deal is a strategist steeped in Chinese endures a catastrophe known afterward as the Great affairs, and Szonyi is a professor of Chinese history Ravine, and on the other side of it, human families as and director of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Stud- we know them are a thing of the past. In one passage, ies in Cambridge, Massachusetts. a protagonist from our day and age is awakened from Deal and Szonyi eschew sensationalism about hibernation by a kind nurse helping reorient him: China’s future. A deep familiarity with China’s long history undergirds their implicit view that Chinese Still standing and fixing him with her charming eyes, society and its institutions are adaptable and resil- she said something that shocked him: “There are no ient, capable of weathering challenges that outsid- homes now. No one has them. Marriage, family, they ers regard as insurmountable. State mechanisms went away after the Great Ravine. That will be the of social control are formidable in China, notwith- first thing you’ll have to get used to.” standing the long tradition of local rebellion and the “That first thing is something I won’t be able to regular demise of old dynasties in the face of those get used to.” ambitious upstarts who eventually become the new “Oh, I don’t know. In history class I learned that emperors. They write: marriage and family had already begun to disinte- grate in your own time. Lots of people didn’t want to Our analysis shows that some of the most dire pre- be tied down. They wanted free lives.”20 dictions about the impact of the ongoing demographic transition in the PRC [People’s Republic of Later, in an immensely evocative passage, a woman China] are not well-grounded in historical, cultural, of the Crisis Era contemplates a charismatic Chinese or contemporary precedent. . . . space fleet officer also awakened after centuries of Our assessment suggests that the CCP will hibernation: face significant challenges in the years to come. The magnitude of these challenges will depend For some reason she felt a certain attachment to him. on not just demographic developments but also She had left her father when she was very young, intervening variables such as the economic situa- certainly not anything unusual for a child of that tion and the cohesiveness of the CCP itself, both era. Fatherly love was something ancient. But in this of which will in turn also be affected by demo- ancient soldier from the twenty-first century, she graphic trends. had come to understand it.21

15 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Given the extraordinarily ambitious role of the • College graduates with jobs/total college gradu- state in China, and its unique reach into family units, ates (college graduate employment ratio), and Deal and Szonyi’s analysis begins with the CCP, its objectives, and its instruments for effecting them: • 18- to 35-year-olds with spouses/total 18- to 35-year-olds (youth marriage ratio).” Because we appreciate the seriousness with which the CCP leadership has approached demography Note, however, there is no ratio for monitoring over the past several decades, we take our bearings family structure in China. This is a point to which initially from the work of the Chinese demographers I return. who have shaped elite thinking. . . . Demography in While Deal and Szonyi note “that the possibility the PRC has thus long been tied to the CCP’s mod- of rapid demographic reversal and return to his- ernization agenda. torical fertility levels is effectively nil,” they also regard some of the current commentary about Chi- “Chinese planners,” explain Deal and Szonyi, nese demographic change as overblown. They take today rely on “a new set of paradigmatic [demo- particular issue with the “bare branches” thesis, graphic] ratios to guide policymaking. They now perhaps most closely associated with scholars seek to not just regulate the raw number of births Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer,22 which con- but also develop more precise measures to influ- tends a surplus of unmarriageable men in China ence these ratios.” The official ratios Chinese poli- (and elsewhere) may contribute to domestic or even cymakers pay attention to indicate the breathtaking international instability. range and depth of the interventions Beijing intends in Chinese life. Deal and Szonyi enumerate these The weakness of the “bare branches” argument is ratios: that it is based on a poor understanding of Chinese history. The historical evidence suggests that dis- • “Non-working-age population/working-age popu- torted sex ratios (due to female infanticide) have lation (dependency ratio), been a perennial, even regular, feature of Chinese society. Concubinage and polygamy by the rich fur- • Young and entrepreneurial ratio/total population ther reduced the availability of marriage partners (entrepreneurialism ratio), for poor men. Historically, many Chinese men never married. . . . • Households with complex structure/total house- . . . During the Maoist and early reform periods, holds (complex kinship ratio), universal male marriage, which had never been a reality before, became the norm. • Elderly without adult children/total elderly (social Viewed in this light, the recent distortion in the welfare provisioning ratio), sex ratio and the prospect of large numbers of bare branches is actually nothing more than a return to • Urban population/unit area (urban vulnerability historical norms. . . . ratio), . . . But the evidence simply does not support the notion that the distorted sex ratios have created a • Local ethnic minority/local Han population (eth- historically unprecedented situation that is likely to nic vulnerability ratio), lead to dramatic and large-scale social unrest.

• Youth suitable for military service/total youth Deal and Szonyi provide an illuminating over- (military recruitment ratio), view of the implications for Chinese state power of demographic change—and of the relative importance

16 INTRODUCTION

of changing family trends in the overall panoply of guanxi, for example, and the more recent rise of demographic changes, addressing economic, military, e-commerce in China. and social implications separately. The crucial element in such substitutes is trust—a With regard to economic performance, Deal and quantity in China that at least historically has typi- Szonyi put their finger on the potentially adverse role cally been in scarce supply outside the family. One of shrinking kinship networks: of the obvious potentialities for improving social trust in China would be a shift to rule of law, but The PRC is distinguished by its relatively low vari- as Deal and Szonyi wryly observe, “This sort of sys- ance in household size. In other countries, many temic legal reform is unlikely in the medium term households have no children, and many others have because Chinese political elites have explicitly ruled two or more children. But in the PRC, a large and it out.” growing number of households have one child only, Can the CCP decree something approximating and a large and growing number of households have trust into the population below it? We may be about no children. . . . So even at similar overall fertility to find out: It is not impossible that the emerging rates, people in the PRC will have fewer kinship ties social credit system will be utilized to try to instill this than people elsewhere. fragile social bond that, until now, has always been Why should fewer kinship ties matter to the intrinsically volitional and spontaneous. A state-led PRC’s economic prospects? Small family-owned and plan to manufacture and enforce personal trust family-operated businesses have been an important would be a social experiment on the scale to rival element in the PRC’s economic dynamism. . . . Trust the ill-fated One-Child Policy—but if any modern based on kinship relations mattered and continues government were to dare such an undertaking, it to matter a great deal to economic success in China. would be Beijing’s. Sociological research suggests that kinship The other economic issue Deal and Szonyi flag networks serve as a kind of informal institution is old-age support. They broadly concur with Wang, that plays the role more formal institutions do in Shen, and Cai’s assessment in this volume and argue Western economies. . . . that impending changes in the family will mean Again, this is not to say that no one in the PRC “greater state involvement” in income and health can successfully build a business without relying arrangements for the elderly. on kinship networks. But if in the aggregate kinship ties contribute to business growth in the PRC, then To support these transfers, the state will need to the shrinking and even disappearance of kinship impose higher levels of taxation and other extraction ties—what we might call a decline in the complex and play a larger redistributive role. If the CCP does kinship ratio—will necessarily have negative conse- not come up with an adequate solution to the prob- quences for the economy. To determine the overall lem of intergenerational transfer, this could have impact of these negative consequences, one would serious implications for its legitimacy that go well have to quantify the significance of these ties—which beyond the maintenance of the elderly itself. is all but impossible—and explore the alternatives to kinship as the basis for trust. However, they judge:

Functional substitutes for kinship networks will The challenge of providing support for an aging pop- be essential to Chinese economic performance in ulation will likely not create impossible tensions. . . . the decades ahead. Deal and Szonyi recognize substi- Inequality in the distribution of transfers will fac- tutes that already exist: the traditional “native-place tor into the popular reaction to them. . . . If transfers associations” that offer a sort ofnon-consanguineous are inadequate, dissatisfaction with this situation may be mitigated by the fact that many elderly people

17 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

inhabit relatively rural areas where health care costs for military service—the PLA recruitment ratio— are much lower. Furthermore, elderly residents in makes clear that the situation is more complex. rural areas are more atomized and less likely to organize in protest or opposition. Changing family structure may affect the quality of recruits, too. In their review of the role of demography in Chinese military thinking, Deal and Szonyi suggest PLA academics . . . have also opined on the spiri- that the geographic distribution of the national pop- tual deficiencies of military-age youth in the PRC ulation may be the top concern for defense planners: today. They specifically blame theOne-Child Policy for producing a generation of only children Chinese military planners have long worried about who have grown up as spoiled narcissists. They protecting coastal eastern cities and economic cen- also cite the impact of the PRC’s recent economic ters from seaborne invasions or air strikes. This growth, which has made today’s youth relatively concern has intensified as the PRC’s economic devel- soft and ill-prepared for any kind of deprivation or opment has entailed mass migration from rural to hardship. Whether or not this is a fair judgment, it urban areas. . . . raises the potential for internecine conflict, as the Today, urbanization has rendered the PRC even PLA’s senior generation, tested by the Cultural more vulnerable to strategic bombing. While cities in Revolution, trains and leads a cohort of millennials. the PRC are less dense than cities elsewhere due to Chinese real estate investment trends that encour- One security question pertaining to family change, age sprawl, they are still not evenly distributed already noted in certain other studies,23 will be its around the country. impact on casualty aversion. Deal and Szonyi speculate, “Worries about the character of singleton soldiers— Defense planners in the world’s most populous and the casualty tolerance of their parents—may also country have no concerns per se about manpower discourage the leadership [in Beijing] from initiating totals, but they worry about human capital: war.” They point out that the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy 2013 textbook warns that the PRC’s ‘warfare Since at least 2003, when the PRC’s Central Mil- endurance capacity’ has dropped in recent years.” itary Commission launched the Strategic Project As for social control, the unintended consequences for Talented People, PLA [People’s Liberation of the state’s “outsized role in the affairs of individual Army] leaders have recognized a need to improve Chinese people and their family lives” has not dimin- the education and skills level, or suzhi, of its per- ished Beijing’s appetite for further interventions sonnel. Where the equivalent of a ninth-grade in this realm. In fact, as Deal and Szonyi observe, education sufficed for most officers entering the the opposite is true: “Even if past Chinese demo- PLA in the past, the demands of joint, informa- graphic policies have caused or exacerbated some tized operations in the 21st century require offi- of today’s challenges, the CCP stands ready to use cers with postsecondary degrees, an experienced new population-centered tools to address emerging and technically capable noncommissioned officer problems in ways that serve the party’s goals.” They corps, and even a proportion of college-educated highlight a 2017 CCP Central Committee and State enlisted personnel. Council document, which, for the first time, issues “a The PLA’s concern with suzhi raises the ques- national plan focused on the PRC’s youth population”: tion of the selectivity of its conscription and recruitment processes. Even if there is no risk of A broad range of tools will be used for this purpose, an absolute shortfall in recruits, thinking about including curricular initiatives, matchmaking ser- the proportion of total youth who are suitable vices, scholarships, innovation awards, and subsidies

18 INTRODUCTION

for overseas volunteer service or service in Western conclusion is that the leadership holds that demo- China. While most of the discussion focuses on posi- graphic factors will mitigate the political conse- tive incentives, the report also mentions psychologi- quences of an economic slowdown. Whether these cal counseling, behavioral correction, and even penal perceptions are accurate is another question. camps. Technology figures prominently, as the CCP Deal and Szonyi’s chapter is likely to remain intends to extend its new social credit system to the standard reference on the topic for some time. include a “youth credit system” that will “guide young They are careful to emphasize that their informed people in practicing the concept of integrity.” . . . speculations are not conclusive; speculation about Finally . . . the plan includes a description of the future never can be. At the same time, two the “correct family concept,” which entails general points of speculation in their rich study merit addi- “respect for the elderly” and “neighborhood solidar- tional comment here. ity.” In the absence of a state-sponsored social secu- The first has to do with the distinction between rity system, the document gestures toward greater historical norms and modern expectations. Deal and collective responsibility for the aging population, Szonyi are surely correct that China’s coming bride who may or may not be supported by their own shortage is reminiscent of a familiar pattern from the family members. Chinese past. By the same token, today’s decline in living extended family members thus far involves a New tools of persuasion and coercion, in other return to totals familiar in the past, before the mod- words, may be Beijing’s own answer to dealing with ern Chinese health explosion, although such net- some of the emerging demographic problems for works will be heading into uncharted territory in the which outsiders cannot seem to imagine policy solu- decades ahead. tions (as with the potential of the social credit system, Yet there are important differences between that alluded to above for some of its other possible uses). past and today. For one thing, tomorrow’s “bare “By all accounts,” conclude Deal and Szonyi, “the branches” look less likely than their historical pre- CCP leadership is well aware of the various demo- decessors to have kin—siblings, cousins, nieces, and graphic challenges facing China. The party has good nephews—and thus may face fundamentally new data, based on the work of census takers and profes- standards of social isolation due to the “4-2-1” atrophy sional demographers with economics and defense of extended family relations. For another, whereas the subspecialties.” They write: prospect of dying unmarried and without issue was the perennial and immutable fate of a sizable portion Our interviews with leading population policy offi- of China’s manhood in bygone times, today’s pro- cials suggest confidence that the government has spective “bare branches” are being raised in a society more accurate knowledge of the PRC’s true demo- where near-universal male marriage is a fresh mem- graphic situation than is typically assumed. But these ory. Moreover, they know their marital misfortunes interviews, as well as public statements, give the are an aberration, in no sense “natural” in today’s impression that the CCP leadership is also highly world, where only a relative handful of countries face confident about its capacity to influence demo- an appreciable “marriage squeeze”—none of them as graphic factors. We think there is potential overcon- severe as China’s.24 fidence, and this may have serious consequences. . . . Modern expectations could perhaps make for new The decline of kinship-based social networks, the and historically unfamiliar social and political impli- resulting atomization of the population, and the rel- cations for China’s next vast army of unmarriage- ative susceptibility to government intervention of able males. Deal and Szonyi are hardly incognizant of the available substitutes to those networks will mean this risk, but they judge it to be low. They may well that social unrest is less likely to expand rapidly. Our be right. But there remains another possibility—and

19 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

that other possible outcome perhaps deserves some From our own temporally and experientially con- extended consideration. strained vantage point, we may not fully appreciate A second point of speculation, related to the first, the enormity of the changes that have already over- is the potentiality of “strategic surprise” for Beijing’s taken the Chinese family. In imperial times, Chinese leadership due to dramatic changes in the Chinese had over 200 different terms for relatives in one’s family structure. Deal and Szonyi maintain that chang- line.26 Today most of these terms have fallen into dis- ing family structure is on the CCP’s radar screen, and use and are unknown to many ( just as many in the they adduce the 2017 youth development plan as evi- US are unaware that the name Cooper means “barrel dence of this. Perhaps so. But there is as yet scant maker,” Tanner “leatherworker,” and so on). Does this research on changing family structure in China’s aca- matter? Not to Chinese today, since this tradition is demic and policy circles and, as noted already, no pol- largely forgotten—but we cannot run the experiment icy metrics or collection of official statistical data to in an alternative history where this did not occur and support such metrics. compare the differences with today. The consequences of social, economic, and politi- Nor may we entirely appreciate the enormity of the cal risks tend to be greatest for states when they are changes that are already underway. In Japan at this not prepared for them. It may be worth devoting fur- writing, there is a conspicuous disinterest in sex with ther thought to what a “strategic surprise” from fam- others on the part of a growing share of young men ily change might look like in China and what it could and women. The first “marriages” between men and mean for Beijing. video game avatars have already been consummated, and “marriage” between humans and sex robots may not be far away. Can we say with confidence that all VII this—and more—cannot happen anywhere else on the planet? The analysis and informed speculation in this vol- Indeed, with continuing increases in affluence and ume has been tightly tethered to empirical facts, as is material capabilities, the family at large might increas- proper for an exploration in social science and policy ingly be treated as a social construct rather than a research. If the studies in this volume are revisited in biological lifeline, ever more sculpted by and contin- the distant future, it is possible that the shortcomings gent upon the unbridled quest for personal autonomy. in our work will not have to do so much with the lim- In such a world, blood lineage would matter less and its of our early-21st-century data sources and quan- less, and conscious selection of others would matter titative techniques, but rather with the limits of our more and more, in the formation of “families.” As a imaginations—that is to say, with our sheer inability matter of fact, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe had a to contemplate the changes that may be impressed on premonition to this very effect two centuries ago; it is Chinese daily life and family life tomorrow. hinted at in his novel titled Die Wahlverwandtschaften, Half a century ago, Simon S. Kuznets, who would conventionally translated as “Elective Affinities,” but be awarded the 1971 Nobel Prize in Economic equally well as “Kin by Choice.” Sciences, remarked that the 19th-century authors It is difficult to think deeply about such a human most prescient about the material conditions that future, let alone to work through exactly what society, would characterize the 20th century were not econo- economy, and politics might look like in it. Presum- mists, but rather science fiction writers.25 The econo- ably some great elixir of trust in others outside the mists of that day lacked the imagination necessary to bloodline would have to prevail and permeate daily understand the radically altered facts of life for their life. But what else? Here we leave the domain that descendants. We should want to wonder whether we scholarly research can illuminate and enter the realm may not be in a similar situation today as we think where science fiction may be our best guide—at least about where the Chinese family is headed. for now.

20 INTRODUCTION

Notes

1. Martin King White, Wang Feng, and Cai Yong, “Challenging Myths About China’s One-Child Policy,” China Journal, no. 74 (July 2015): 144–59, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/681664; Daniel Goodkind, “The Astonishing Population Averted by China’s Birth Restrictions: Estimates, Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions,” Demography 54, no. 4 (August 2017): 1375–400, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-017-0595-x; and Wang Feng et al., “Is Demography Just a Numerical Exercise? Num-� bers, Politics, and Legacies of China’s One-Child Policy,” Demography 55, no. 2 (April 2018): 693–719, https://link.springer.com/ article/10.1007/s13524-018-0658-7. 2. Sidney Leng, “China’s Birth Rate Falls Again, with 2018 Producing the Fewest Babies Since 1961, Official Data Shows,”South China Morning Post, January 21, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2182963/chinas-birth-rate-falls-again- 2018-producing-fewest-babies. 3. National Bureau of Statistics of China and East-West Center, “Fertility Estimates for Provinces of China, 1975–2000,” July 2007, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/popfertilityestimateschina.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32272. 4. Eugene A. Hammel, The SOCSIM Demographic-Sociological Microsimulation Program: Operating Manual (Berkeley, CA: Insti- tute of International Studies, 1976). 5. Nicholas Eberstadt and Alex Coblin, Urbanization with Chinese Characteristics: Domestic Migration and Urban Growth in Con- temporary China, American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming. 6. Gavin W. Jones, “The ‘Flight from Marriage’ in South-East and East Asia,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 36, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 93–119, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41603982. 7. UN Population Division, World Marriage Data 2017, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/theme/marriage-unions/WMD2017.asp. 8. UN Population Division, World Marriage Data 2017. 9. James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 10. Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, Human Capital Data Explorer, 2018, http://dataexplorer. wittgensteincentre.org/wcde-v2/. 11. Edward Wong, “A Chinese Virtue Is Now the Law,” New York Times, July 2, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/world/ asia/filial-piety-once-a-virtue-in-china-is-now-the-law.html. 12. Economist, “Why 80% of Singaporeans Live in Government-Built Flats,” July 6, 2017, https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/07/06/ why-80-of-singaporeans-live-in-government-built-flats. 13. See, for example, Mirjam Meissner, “China’s Social Credit System: A Big-Data Enabled Approach to Market Regulation with Broad Implications for Doing Business in China,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, May 24, 2017, https://www.merics.org/sites/ default/files/2017-09/China%20Monitor_39_SOCS_EN.pdf. 14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Household Savings, 2019, https://data.oecd.org/hha/household- savings.htm. 15. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/. 16. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York: Basic Books, 1978). 17. Ma Jian, The Dark Road, trans. Flora Drew (New York: Penguin Books, 2014). 18. Mo Yan, Frog, trans. Howard Goldblatt (New York: Penguin Books, 2016). 19. Liu Cixin, The Three-Body Problem, trans. Ken Liu (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2014); Liu Cixin, The Dark Forest, trans. Joel Martinsen (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2015); and Liu Cixin, Death’s End, trans. Ken Liu (New York: Tom Doherty Associ- ates, 2016). 20. Liu, The Dark Forest, 318. 21. Liu, The Dark Forest, 410.

21 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

22. Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 23. Nicholas Eberstadt, China’s Demographic Outlook to 2040 and Its Implications: An Overview, American Enterprise Institute, January 22, 2019, http://www.aei.org/publication/chinas-demographic-outlook-to-2040-and-its-implications-an-overview/. 24. Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Global War Against Baby Girls,” New Atlantis, no. 33 (Fall 2011): 3–18, https://www.thenewatlantis.com/ publications/the-global-war-against-baby-girls. 25. Robert W. Fogel, “Reconsidering Expectations of Economic Growth After World War II from the Perspective of 2004” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, February 2005), https://www.nber.org/papers/w11125.pdf. 26. Chao Yuen Ren, “Chinese Terms of Address,” Language 32, no. 1 (January–March 1956): 217–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 410666.

22 Modeling the Future of China’s Changing Family Structure to 2100

Ashton M. Verdery

hina’s population, estimated to contain some contemporary Chinese demography is its highly C 1.42 billion people in 2018, is expected to peak unbalanced sex ratios, in which men exceed women at 1.44 billion and then begin declining by 2030.1 This by a substantial fraction.8 This constrains marriage turnaround will mark a crucial juncture in a remark- rates for men9 and limits future population growth able demographic history, one that portends dra- prospects.10 matic shifts in Chinese family structure over the next The net impact of China’s changing demography century. For almost 2,000 years, Chinese demogra- has been studied from many angles, but its effects on phy could be characterized as a homeostatic system, family structure are underexplored. Some authors in which births barely exceeded deaths and average argue that features of the demographic transition, annual growth was negligible.2 Evidence of this sta- particularly China’s rapid mortality decline before a sis can be seen in the growth from an estimated pop- fertility decline, can temporarily raise the number of ulation size of 74 million in 2 AD to 544 million in living siblings that members of the population have. 1950, which implies an average annual net addition of This is because in prior cohorts, many children would just over one person per thousand living individuals have died during infancy, while in later ones, fewer over the millennia.3 Since 1950, however, the Chi- children are born.11 nese population has exploded, driven by massive life For instance, according to model life tables, for expectancy gains associated with a compressed mor- every 100 men born in China in 1950, only slightly tality transition.4 more than 79 of them were expected to live to age 5, Chinese fertility began to decline in the 1970s while 94 percent of men born in 1980 were expected at a pace among the highest ever observed. This to live as long.12 Whether such differences are enough reduction was unmatched in other large countries. to offset China’s rapid pace of fertility decline, how- By the 1990s, Chinese fertility had fallen below ever, is debatable. In either case, the persistence of replacement,5 where it has remained since. Over low fertility in China for the past several decades and this period, until December 2015, the Chinese gov- its skewed sex ratio imbalance in favor of surplus ernment imposed a variety of fertility control mea- men make for interesting questions about how the sures,6 most notoriously the One-Child Policy that country’s family structure might change in the com- limited how many children most citizens could have ing decades. and imposed hardship on millions. However, there Recent research documents that family availabil- is substantial skepticism and debate about such ity is a highly salient factor for the health and well- policies’ effects on fertility compared to broader being of older adults in China and that having sons socioeconomic development.7 A unique feature of compared to daughters may be disadvantageous.13

23 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

What will the process of aging look like in China when Outline of the Chapter large numbers of parents are dependent on only one living child? What will happen when that child is I organize the chapter in the following way. First, I substantially more likely to be a son than a daugh- discuss my micro-simulation approach and contrast it ter? How will a projected shortage of marriage-age with other means of understanding China’s changing women, and thus unmarried sons, interact with family structure. Compared to my micro-simulation, these trends? How will declining numbers of siblings these other means do not offer as much flexibility and extended kinship ties affect the economy given in incorporating dynamic demographic processes that “the essence of Chinese economic organization and do not reliably model future family struc- is familism”?14 tures. Next, I outline the data sources that com- With little expectation for future fertility rate prise the key parameters underlying my demographic increases even without the One-Child Policy,15 we can micro-simulation, including how I define com- expect a long-term increase in the numbers of older plex rates such as age-, parity-, and marital status– adults with only one or no living children, middle-aged specific chances of bearing children. adults with no living siblings, and younger adults While discussing data sources, I present some with no aunts or uncles and few cousins. Marriage results obtained through simulation, comparing them squeezes may limit the number of spouses available against the input parameters. For instance, I use his- to men,16 which in turn could lead to increasing sex torical and projected estimates of life expectancies at differentiation in the experience of family in China. birth from numerous sources and model life tables to Combining these factors, a substantial portion of the obtain input parameters that reflect monthly period-, Chinese population—and a massive count of people age-, and sex-specific probabilities of death. I com- in numeric terms—may lack living family members pare annual estimates of life expectancy at birth in the coming decades. These patterns may be unique derived from the results of the simulation model among other Asian countries. against the input life expectancy at birth parameters In this chapter, I use demographic micro-simulation to determine if the original rates are recovered and methods to investigate how China’s changing demog- thereby gauge aspects of model validity. Simulation raphy might affect its family structure. I draw on a model results that successfully reproduce the vari- wealth of historical and projected demographic rates ous demographic input parameters suggest that the to develop and validate a simulation model that trans- model is valid with respect to the basic demographic lates demographic processes and unique features of processes and increase confidence in the validity of China’s demography—such as its low rates of nonmar- the family and kinship network results. ital childbearing, its relatively high first-order parity I also conduct another validation step, wherein I progression but low rates of second and higher-order compare aspects of the simulation results to empiri- births resulting in low childlessness even with low cal data about family structure in China derived from fertility, and its deeply skewed sex ratios at birth— estimates that are nationally representative of the into expected kinship networks that I examine over older adult population. Next, I discuss the key mea- time. I focus on the population’s shifting distribu- sures in understanding changes in family structure in tion of family ties, the increasing prevalence of those China. I then present results and discuss their implica- without living family members, and age and sex dif- tions for Chinese society. After this, I offer additional ferences in these trends. I also compare China to its context regarding these results by comparing the sim- neighbors in terms of its current family structure and ulated results to available empirical data from China its likely future. and other countries in East, South, and Southeast Asia. I conclude by reflecting on how simulation modeling of demographic processes can help overcome data limitations—historical and contemporary—and

24 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

reveal the future of family and kinship structures in such as SOCSIM, in which every person in the sim- dynamic societies. ulation is either there at the beginning or born into the simulation and in which all marriages occur among population members, constrained by the pool Approach of available spouses. The second is open simulation methods, in which the simulation model creates a I use a demographic micro-simulation approach to new spouse whenever a marriage occurs.21 Although create a dynamic model of Chinese kinship networks. implementing closed demographic micro-simulation Demographic micro-simulation is a computational models is more complex because of the possible con- method that simulates the behavior of a population straints they place on marriage and, potentially, fertil- of hypothetical individuals as they are born, live, and ity rates, they are more realistic in terms of modeling die according to specified probabilities consistent extended kinship networks because each population with underlying demographic rates. During their lives, member has a specific kinship history. simulated individuals can give birth, cohabit, marry, Demographic micro-simulation is the most popu- divorce, and remarry while the simulation program lar approach to studying long-run changes in kinship tracks primary kinship links between individuals networks.22 However, other approaches exist, includ- through marriage and parental ties. ing using empirical data from censuses and surveys23 In the simulation for this chapter, I assume that or using mathematical models of expected kin counts no individuals migrate in or out of the population to based on stationary demographic rates.24 Neither of maintain computational feasibility, although migra- these alternative approaches, however, is satisfaction can also be studied with micro-simulation. tory to understand China’s changing family networks. Although there are many Chinese migrants in the Empirical data on historical Chinese family struc- world, only 0.69 percent of Chinese citizens lived out- ture are limited to genealogies from specific classes side of China in 2015.17 or provinces with debatable validity and coverage.25 I calculate kin network results using established Moreover, there are no clear means of projecting methods.18 Using the tracked primary kin ties, I calcu- future family structures from such empirical data. late close and extended kinship networks in a hypo- On the other hand, mathematical models, while thetical population that experiences demographic providing elegant solutions to future kinship distri- shifts consistent with the historical Chinese experi- butions, require that researchers assume unchanging ence and the most likely future envisioned by popula- demographic rates in such a way as to obscure pre- tion forecasters. To do this, I develop a set of methods cisely what is interesting about the Chinese case: its for translating societal-level period rates—for exam- compressed mortality transition and even more rapid ple, the total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy at fertility decline. Alternative forms of studying future birth, or the crude divorce rate—into individual prob- population compositions, such as multidimensional abilities of each event’s occurrence during annual cohort-component population projection meth- time steps. ods that have recently been used to project national I use the SOCSIM demographic micro-simulation trajectories of human capital,26 are not applicable program.19 SOCSIM can be accessed freely through to studying kinship because they do not account the University of California, Berkeley’s Department of for relationships between people. Given the limita- Demography.20 (All code to run the simulation used tions of other available approaches, demographic in this chapter is available on request.) micro-simulation is the most effective and appropri- In general, there are two types of demographic ate technique for modeling China’s changing family micro-simulation models. The first is closed models, structures.

25 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Sources of Data demographic process, how I turn those statistics into input parameters used in the simulation, and how I begin the simulation in 1800 with a hypotheti- closely the results of the simulation model match the cal population of 50,000 individuals that has an input parameters when I calculate vital statistics on age-sex distribution consistent with a high-mortality, the population history of the simulated individuals. high-fertility society. I obtained this population by simulating a random starting population for 100 years Period-, Age-, and Sex-Specific Mortality Prob- according to the Chinese fertility and male and female abilities. SOCSIM requires the specification of mortality rates of 1800. The average age of this popu- period-, age-, and sex-specific mortality probabili- lation is 25.0. Most importantly, it has the characteris- ties to parameterize its death function. I obtain these tics of slow growth that would be implied by China’s by translating levels of life expectancy at birth into long-run demographic homeostasis over the past sev- age-specific mortality probabilities that reflect the eral millennia and a highly skewed sex ratio owing to likelihood of dying in each single year of age (i.e., nqx), pervasive levels of female infanticide prevalent in his- using the United Nations’ Far East Asian model life torical China. These features are consistent with what tables.28 Model life tables are a tabular representation is known about historical Chinese populations.27 of mortality based on sex-specific and regional mor- Given these features, this initial population is an tality profiles; the Far East Asian model life table is acceptable starting point that will eventually converge appropriate for China.29 An advantage of model life to an accurate representation of the pre-demographic tables is that they give single-age probabilities of death transition Chinese age and sex structure. To ensure at different levels of life expectancy at birth, so they computational tractability, the initial population I use offer a ready means of translating widely available lacks a kinship structure. The initial years of the sim- demographic statistics on China’s historical, contem- ulation are thus inaccurate with respect to kinship porary, and projected life expectancy at birth directly networks, but, as the simulated population evolves into probabilities that can be used in SOCSIM. through individual births, marriages, and deaths, it Before 1950, unfortunately, data on sex-specific life takes on the social connectivity that would be seen in expectancy at birth for China were scarce. To derive a realistic population. these rates, I begin with reported male life expec- In demographic micro-simulation work, the ini- tancies at birth covering 1800–1950 compiled from tial population structure does not typically matter if different regions of China, such as Beijing or Liaon- the focal period for the analysis is sufficiently far past ing, at different periods.30 James Lee and Wang Feng the simulation starting point. Such is the case in the acknowledge that their report of Liaoning’s life expec- present chapter, where I focus on kinship results after tancy at birth from 1792 to 1867 is based on expec- 1950—once numerous generations have lived and tancy at 1 sui, approximately 6 months old, and thus died—by which time I assume that family structures that true life expectancy at birth in this period is “sev- are reasonable approximations of Chinese kinship eral years lower.” I subtract four years from this value networks in that period. Given these factors, there is to compensate for this. When there are multiple esti- little reason for concern about biased estimates aris- mates for a given year, I take the mean reported value. ing from the initial population structure. Subsequent Throughout the 1800s, China was known for hav- validation efforts confirm this supposition. ing higher rates of mortality in the first year of life I use various sources to obtain historical, contem- for women compared to men because of infanticide porary, and projected vital rates that I use as input practices.31 However, UN estimates hold that, by parameters in the demographic micro-simulation 1950, life expectancy for Chinese women was nearly model to simulate this initial population’s growth three years higher than that of Chinese men.32 Thus, from 1800 to 2100. In the remainder of this sec- to obtain pre-1950 data on female life expectancy at tion, I review the sources of data I draw on for each birth, I linearly interpolate the closing of a negative

26 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

10-year female-to-male life expectancy gap in 1800 and a lower rate of second and higher-order births to a plus-three-year female-to-male life expectancy than in other countries. Such a fertility profile will gap in 1950. By subtracting the interpolated gap affect family structure, especially sibling ties and any in life expectancies from the observed male lev- other kin types that are created by the existence of els over this period, I derive historical estimates of siblings (e.g., aunts, uncles, and cousins). female life expectancy at birth, which I then translate A secondary feature of Chinese fertility is its low into age-specific probabilities of death for girls and rates of nonmarital childbearing. Accounting for this women using model life tables. feature means that marriage rates will exert a profound After 1950, reasonable estimates of life expectancy influence on fertility. This feature is also important to at birth are available for both sexes, so in these years account for in the process of modeling Chinese fam- I use the UN sex-specific historical estimates of life ily structure to the extent that I am interested in the expectancy at birth and model life tables to parame- rates of people who lack both spouses and children: terize death probabilities from 1950 to 2010 and their If having a spouse is the primary determinant of hav- projected median variants between 2011 and 2100.33 ing a child, then not accounting for the tendency for The UN estimates are available in only five-year peri- nearly all births to occur in marriages would lead to ods, so I linearly interpolate between missing years underestimation of such individuals. Because of these for the entire series. Of course, this appears as though features, I must model Chinese fertility using period, some important demographic events, such as the age, and parity birth rates. mortality and fertility shocks associated with the fam- I obtain period-, age-, parity-, and status-specific ine and Great Leap Forward in 1959–62, are smoothed fertility rates through a process of decomposing TFR out, although some evidence of their impacts can be data. I obtain TFR data from several sources. From seen (especially in the fertility rates). 1800 to 1949, I use data compiled by the Gapminder Figure 1 shows the results of the procedures Foundation,35 which has levels consistent with other described in the prior paragraphs. First, the mark- estimates provided.36 From 1950 to 2010, I use esti- ers (hollow triangles for men and hollow circles for mates from the United Nations’ World Population Pros- women) show the life expectancy at birth data that I pects: 2015 Revision,37 and I use its projections from translated to age- and sex-specific mortality probabil- 2011 to 2100. These estimates and projections do not ities and used as input parameters in the simulation. differ substantially from those available in the more The closing of the female-to-male life expectancy gap recent World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision.38 over the 1800s and the rapid rise of life expectancies To accomplish the decomposition of TFR data into for both sexes beginning in 1950 are two prominent age-, parity-, and status-specific fertility schedules, I features. Second, the lines (blue for men and red for take the following steps. First, I fit a regression model women) show estimates of life expectancy at birth to data from the Human Fertility Collection,39 which that I calculated based on the simulated population measures the contribution that each age and birth 34 of individuals. The simulation output matches the order makes to TFR—that is, TFR = SaSpFap. I stan- input parameters closely, which is a testament to the dardize these contributions so that I have a measure micro-simulation model’s ability to replicate mor- of each interacted age and birth order’s proportionate tality processes and increases my confidence in the contribution to TFR, and then I fit an ordinary least validity of the kinship results. squares regression model that estimates the effects of single years of age by parity by TFR level to the Chi- Period-, Age-, Parity-, and Status-Specific Fer- nese time series. tility Rates. An important component of the Chi- Because the Human Fertility Collection’s data for nese fertility profile is that few women are childless, China come from the 1990s and later, when the coun- even though overall fertility is low. This tendency is try’s age and parity schedule had taken on its contem- reflected in a comparably higher rate of first births porary characteristics, I use data from Hong Kong

27 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 1. Input and Output Life Expectancy at Birth Data over the Period of the Simulation, by Sex

100 Input Women Input Men Output Women Output Men 80

40 Life Expectancy at Birth 20

0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20502100

when modeling fertility before 1970 and from China occurs outside of marriage, which is consistent with after 1970. I tested the effects of using only the Chi- descriptions of the Chinese and other East Asian con- nese time series for the duration of the simulation. texts40 and with historical estimates in recent and his- However, I found that the fit age and parity schedule torical UN “Demographic Yearbooks.”41 Specifically, of China as a whole cannot sustain the high fertility I assume that 99 percent of births occur in marriage rates seen before 1970. before 1960 and that the level of marital childbear- Hong Kong is the best available substitute in this ing declines linearly from that point until it reaches case. This regression fit the data well, explaining 90 percent in 2100. I obtain period-, age-, parity-, nearly all the variance. Adding period or data-type and status-specific rates by multiplying the period, controls added little additional explanatory power. age, and parity rates predicted from the regression Using the coefficients I fit, I can translate any given model by the assumed proportion of fertility owing to TFR into age by parity rates by multiplying the pre- each marital status (married versus single, widowed, dicted proportion at that age and parity by the TFR. or divorced). Children born outside of marriage are To ensure positive predicted age- and parity-specific probabilistically assigned a random father in the sim- rates, I add the minimum to the entire series in cases ulation, as if the couple were cohabiting. in which the predicted proportions are below zero One challenge of simulating fertility rates accord- and rescale to proportions. Empirically, this happened ing to specified age, parity, and marital statuses is that rarely and only for ages near menarche or menopause. these rates are derived from a descriptive model and I then adjust the modeled age by parity rates to are not prescriptive of actual behaviors. For instance, account for marital status. I assume that little fertility if the population has no married women, then any

28 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

degree of fertility that owes to the behavior of mar- the focal years of my family network analyses, I am ried women would be missing, and the desired total confident that this decision did not bias my estimates fertility would not be achieved, potentially leading to of kinship networks. a population crash. More generally, any imbalance in Figure 2 shows the input and output TFR data I use population sizes between women of different ages, in my demographic micro-simulation. The simulation parities, or marital statuses will cause the simulated model closely approximates the high fertility rates population to achieve different TFRs than the target seen in China throughout the 1800s, and it closely parameters input into the model.42 This feature of approximates the decline and then spike in fertil- TFRs owes to there being a weighted average of births ity in the 1950s and 1960s. The model also captures divided by population sizes. China’s rapid fertility decline from the 1970s to 1990s, To account for this issue, I use a method that I call even mimicking the brief spike in the early 1990s, and “dynamic compositional scaling.” With dynamic com- it achieves the same TFRs that are expected by the positional scaling, I adjust the predicted age-, parity-, UN Population Division from 2000 to 2100. Although and status-specific fertility rates to account for the dif- the rates obtained from the simulation output do ferential sizes of each group achieved by the simula- not precisely match the simulation inputs, most tion in each year. For example, if more married women notably by attaining a slightly lower TFR before and than single women are in childbearing ages but the tar- after China’s fertility transition, I am confident that get is that each group accounts for 50 percent of the the model performs adequately to analyze China’s fertility, I would adjust married women’s rates down changing family structure. and single women’s rates upward. That is, if the age-, parity-, and marital status–specific rate is Faps, then I Period-, Age-, and Sex-Specific First Marriage compute a rescaled rate as Raps = Faps(1/(naps/Snaps)), Rates. China has long been characterized by substan- where naps indicates the number of people at a given tial sex disparities in marriage rates, in which female age, parity, and status. In other words, I multiply the marriage occurred at young ages and was nearly uni- group-specific fertility rate by the inverse of the fertile versal and male marriage was more restricted, hap- population’s proportion. pening over a greater age span and, for a substantial If no population members are in that group— fraction of men, not at all.43 The parameterization of for example, divorced 14-year-olds with parity two marriage rates in a demographic micro-simulation plus—I set the rate to zero. This example is simply is complex because many factors can affect whether illustrative; the predicted rate for 14-year-olds with two individuals get married. I first discuss the basic two or more prior children from my model of age- and operation of the marriage market, and then I review parity-specific rates is close to zero, even at high TFRs. how different period-, age-, andsex-specific marriage I cap rescaled fertility rates at a maximum level of 1.0. parameters are input into the micro-simulation and Treating the data in this way allows me to main- the sources of these data. After this, I examine how tain target input fertility rates and target propor- closely the simulation output corresponded to the tionate contributions of individuals of different marriage inputs. ages, parities, and marital statuses while avoiding I simulate the Chinese marriage market as a two- population crashes. I implement dynamic compo- queue system in which both women and men begin sitional scaling for each year of the simulation over searching for available mates according to age- and 1851–2100. Before 1850, I simulate the model without sex-specific heterosexual marriage schedules. I model accounting for marital status or parity to ensure that it such that each marriage seeker attempts to find a the population develops a marital status and parity spouse who fulfills his or her sex-specific preference structure before imposing constraints on the fertility about spousal age. Men prefer spouses to be younger performance of people by those groupings. Given the than themselves, while women prefer men who amount of time that elapses between this year and are older.

29 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 2. Input and Output Total Fertility Rate Data over the Period of the Simulation

4 Total Fertility Rate 2 Input Output

0 1800 1850 1900 195020002050 2100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations; Ferenc Ajus, “Documentation for Children per Woman (Total Fertility Rate) for Countries and Territories,” Gapminder, 2009, https://www.gapminder.org/documentation/documentation/gapdoc008_v2.pdf; and UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.

In each year, I define an ideal sex difference equiv- In addition to the definition of partner prefer- alent to the difference in estimates of mean ages of ences, I use two additional sex-specific parameters marriage. For instance, if the mean ages of marriage to control age- and sex-specific first marriage rates were 22 for women and 24 for men, then the ideal over time: mean ages of first marriage and the pro- partner for a man seeking a bride would be a woman portion of ever married. Using these rates, I attempt who is two years younger than himself. Of course, not to approximate the empirical realities of marriage in all marriages are ideal. For this reason, I cause pref- China based on historical estimates and future pro- erences for each potential partner to decline as the jections discussed in the next paragraph. I assume partner’s age differs from the ideal difference, with a no women marry before age 14 and no men before greater penalty for couples with less than the ideal age age 18. difference than for those with greater than the ideal From those ages to the mean age of marriage in a age difference. given year, simulated individuals seek marriage part- (1/(b –a )) In the prior example in which a 24-year-old man ners with a probability pr(seek|s) = 1 – (1 – ys) s s , would most likely marry a 22-year-old woman, if the where ys is my estimate of the sex-specific propor- man were evaluating two women, a 21-year-old and tion of the population that tries to get married by the a 23-year-old, he would prefer the former two times mean age of marriage, bs is my estimate of the mean as much as the latter. I prohibit any potential mar- age of marriage for sex s (see next paragraph), and as riages in which the groom would be 30 or more years is the first eligible age of marriage for each sex (age 14 older than the bride. All marriage seekers rank poten- for women and age 18 for men). For ys, I use a value of tial mates according to their preferences. The jointly 0.75 for women and 0.65 for men to capture the likeli- determined best matches become married. hood that older-age marriages raise the mean age and

30 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

that women more often than men get married before began the simulation from a population of unmarried the mean age. individuals (i.e., one that lacked any sort of kinship After the mean age of marriage, until age 50, indi- structure). In those early years, therefore, individu- viduals seek partners with a different probability: als of all ages are becoming married, which raises the (1/(50 – b )) pr(seek|s) = 1 – (1 – Ws) s , where Ws is my esti- mean age substantially. After this initial spell, how- mate of the proportion of each sex married by age 50. ever, the simulation achieves its target mean ages of After age 50, unmarried men have a 9 in 1,000 proba- marriage defined by the input parameters and main- bility of seeking a partner at each age, while women tains this congruence throughout much of the histor- have a 6 in 1,000 probability. These low rates imply ical period. that approximately a third of the remaining unmar- Although there are some divergences, such as ried men and a quarter of the remaining unmarried the results for men being too high in the late 1800s women at age 50 will attempt to marry by age 100, if driven by a brief marriage squeeze, the general trends they live that long. and age discrepancies are reproduced until the late To definetime-varying input parameters for the 20th century. In that period, however, when mean sex-specific mean ages of marriage (bs) and propor- ages of marriage begin to rise rapidly in the input tions married by age 50 (Ws), I draw on data from parameters, the simulation results do not keep up. several sources and make some assumptions about Part of this discrepancy owes to a theoretical differ- future trajectories. I use mean ages of first marriage ence in measurement: The input parameter is not a from 1800 to 2015 that are based on estimates from true period rate, which is why, for instance, there is a two sources.44 Projecting into the future, I assume gap between the input and output in the slight drop in that recently observed increases in mean age of first mean ages in 1980–2000. marriage for both sexes continue, with mean ages hit- Despite these differences, the simulation model ting 27 for women and 29 for men in 2060. I then lin- can maintain the same general trends (rising mean early interpolate and extrapolate these trajectories to ages of marriage) and the target age discrepancies fill in missing years. between sexes in the mean age of marriage from the To find the proportion of ever married by age present into the future. Notably, the model does 50, I use data on the proportion of men never mar- achieve ever-married rates that are comparable ried by age 40,45 averaging across reports for differ- to the input parameters. Thus, while the marriage ent regions of China, and assume that the proportion model does not exactly replicate the Chinese experi- of men married by age 50 is 3 percent higher, which ence in terms of mean ages of marriage, it performs is consistent with the few years for which both esti- well enough to enhance my confidence in the simu- mates are available. For most of the simulated years, lation results. I assume that the proportion of women married by age 50 is 6 percent higher than the proportion of men Period Anniversary Divorce Rates and Period married by age 40, also consistent with available esti- Sex Remarriage Rates. Crude divorce rates in China mates. As end points on the series, I assume that the have risen dramatically since the late 1970s, with proportion of ever married by age 50 in 2100 for men especially prominent increases since 2000.46 I simu- is 0.95, while the proportion ever married for women late probabilities of divorce in the micro-simulation in that year is 0.98. I then linearly interpolate between on the basis of each couple’s duration of marriage missing years. (i.e., marriage anniversary). Obtaining valid time Figure 3 shows the mean ages of marriage input series of period anniversary divorce rates is challeng- into the simulation model and obtained from the ing, so, without available data, I model it using relative simulation results. In the initial years of the simula- crude divorce rates (to control the level of divorce) tion, the mean age of marriage in the output data is and what I take to be a characteristic curve of divorce substantially higher than in the input data because I risks by duration of marriage.

31 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 3. Input and Output Mean Ages of Marriage Data over the Period of the Simulation, by Sex

Input Women Input Men Output Women Output Men 30

20 Mean Age of First Marriage

15 1800 1850 1900 195020002050 2100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations; Mattias Lindgren, “Documentation for Age at First Marriage of Women for Countries and Territories. Data Set 009. Version 1,” 2009, https://www.gapminder.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/gapdoc009.pdf; and UN Depart- ment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Marriage Data,” 2015, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/theme/marriage-unions/WMD2015.shtml.

First, I obtain a schedule of divorce by duration were zero in 1800 and will hit three in 2100, and then of marriage (i.e., marriage anniversary) from multi- I linearly interpolate between those assumptions and ple decrement life table estimates of divorce in the all observed estimates. United States in 2010–12.47 This anniversary sched- Figure 4 shows the simulation’s input and output ule of divorce is nearly indistinguishable from a crude divorce rate data. From 1800 until approximately median schedule across Organisation for Economic 2010, the simulation model replicates my assumptions Co-operation and Development countries48 and about the historical Chinese experience nearly exactly. appears similar to trajectories obtained in recent Chi- Crude divorce rates rise slowly, then fall slightly, before nese cohorts,49 so I take it to be a characteristic curve beginning a dramatic rise in the mid-1980s. Unfor- that is applicable to the Chinese case. tunately, the simulation results in slightly too much Second, to develop dynamic period anniversary divorce from the present until the end of the mod- divorce rates, I scale this anniversary schedule by the eled period, with a maximal discrepancy of about one relative difference in China’s crude divorce rates in divorce per thousand people too many. each period of the simulation compared to observed Even though these modeled divorce rates are values in 2010. Calibration of the simulation sug- slightly too high, divorce rates overall in China are gested that this procedure yielded crude divorce rates low, and the simulation results replicate my assump- that were approximately four times too high, so in all tions about the trends used in the input parameters. years I divide the period anniversary risks of divorce For these reasons, I am confident that divorce rate by four. The crude divorce rate data I draw on come discrepancies between the simulation model and the from two sources.50 I assume that crude divorce rates empirical context will not greatly bias any estimates

32 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 4. Input and Output Crude Divorce Rate Data over the Period of the Simulation, by Sex

3 e

Input Output ce Rat

2 Crude Divor 1

0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20502100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations; UN Statistics Division, “United Nations Demographic Yearbooks,” 2016, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ demographic/products/dyb/DYBNat/; and Qingbin Wang and Qin Zhou, “China’s Divorce and Remarriage Rates: Trends and Regional Disparities,” Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 51, no. 4 (April 30, 2010): 257–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/10502551003597949.

of family structure that I obtain from the simulation. at birth, owing to substantial prenatal sex selection The most consequential biases will be in the existence and sex-specific stopping rules.52 In the simulation, I of spouses, particularly for older adults since divorce probabilistically assign each child a sex such that the tends to occur several years after marriage. I find no proportion of births that are men in each year is con- evidence that the elevated divorce rates seen in the sistent with the United Nations’ historical and pro- simulation affected estimates of childbearing. jected male-to-female sex ratio at birth estimates for Remarriage rates have increased over the past China: p = r/(1 + r), where p is the annually assigned several decades in China, more than tripling from proportion of men at birth and r is the time-varying approximately 3 percent in 1985 to approximately UN estimate of the male-to-female sex ratio at birth. 10 percent in 2007, when they appeared to level The UN estimates assume that China’s currently off.51 For model simplicity and in recognition of Chi- elevated sex ratios at birth peaked in 2005 and will lin- na’s potential marriage squeeze creating heightened early return to pre-1980 levels by 2055, where they will demand for previously married women, I set remar- remain until 2100. Such estimates are consistent with riage rates such that 60 percent of men and 75 percent recent work on China that shows sex ratio increases of women try to remarry within 10 years of becoming leveling off around 2005 and a decline in proportion widowed or divorced. I have not evaluated whether of male births in the more developed Eastern prov- the simulation can replicate this input parameter. inces, possibly reflecting a government crackdown on sex-selective abortions.53 Period Sex Ratios at Birth. Since the early 1980s, In Figure 5, I evaluate whether the simulation China has had a high and rising proportion of men model replicates the sex structure of the Chinese

33 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 5. Input and Output Percentage Men or Women over the Period of the Simulation, by Births and Total Population

45 centage r

Pe UN Estimate Percentage Population Women UN Estimate Percentage 40 Births Men Output Percentage Population Women Output Percentage Births Men 35 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20502100

population by considering the proportion of men at only available from 1950 to 2100. The simulation birth (a model input) and the United Nations’ histor- model begins from an initial state, in which the pop- ical and projected estimates of the proportion of the ulation is heavily skewed toward men owing to high total population that is female.54 While the latter is levels of female infanticide. not precisely a model input, it is still a useful bench- Although the 1800s results in terms of sex ratios are mark for evaluation because its historical estimates perhaps unrealistic, they are not overly consequential are based on observed population structure, and its for the simulation’s focal period. As can be seen, even projected values are based on many of the model though the proportion of women at the beginning of inputs I use regarding fertility, mortality, and sex ratio the simulation and through the 1800s is low, the pro- at birth. Inputs regarding the proportion of men at portion of women in the population grows steadily birth are available over the entire period I consider. and hits appropriate levels in the early 1900s. During Throughout the duration of the simulation, the input the period when UN estimates are available, the sim- sex ratio at birth is approximately replicated by the ulated population has a sex composition that is nearly simulation output. identical to the estimates. Indeed, even the slight rise Owing to stochastic variability, the output sex in the proportion of women documented in the UN ratios jump around the model input slightly before estimates for 1950–65, which may indicate a longer 1980, but, from 1980 to 2055 when sex ratios in China trend of a rising share of women, is captured accu- rose and fell dramatically, the model replicates this rately by the simulation. The model’s ability to repli- experience nearly exactly. Estimates of the propor- cate key features of the sex ratio imbalance in China tion of China’s total population that are women are increases its validity for kinship evaluation.

34 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 6. Input and Output Proportion of the Population by Age Group over the Period of the Simulation

centag e UN Estimate (Target) 0–19 r

Pe UN Estimate (Target) 20–69 UN Estimate (Target) 70 Plus 20 Output 0–19 Output 20–69 Output 70 Plus 0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20502100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations; and UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.

Population by Age Group. As an additional check The largest discrepancy in estimated composition on the validity of the simulation results, I use his- is between the youthful and middle-aged shares in torical estimates and the projected composition of 1950–75; however, these differences are minor. The China’s population by broad categories of age from close replication of historical and projected estimates World Population Prospects.55 I focus on three broad of the population structure by age greatly increases age groups—under 20, 20–69, and over 70—for ana- my confidence in the model’s results. Looking across lytical simplicity and because of their correspondence years in which World Population Prospects data are to potentially dependent versus working ages. Nota- available, 1950–2100, I find a correlation of 0.94 when bly, the projected values I use for this validation are comparing the series of annual 10-year birth cohorts derived from the same fertility and mortality assump- between the numbers of people in the simulation tions that I use as inputs to the simulation model, so results and in the United Nations’ historical and pro- substantial deviations from the historical or projected jected estimates. trends could indicate errors in the simulation. Figure 6 shows the proportions in each age group Total Population Size. The final aspect of China’s obtained through the micro-simulation model and demography that I consider is its total population the historical and projected estimates (points marked size. Because the simulation is based on a smaller as “Target”). As can be seen, during the period that population than China’s (i.e., it was started from a World Population Prospects data are available, from population of 50,000 individuals), I use total popula- 1950, the simulation results closely match the his- tion size estimates and projections from the United torical estimates and expected future trajectories. Nations to scale the simulation results upward.56 For

35 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 7. Input and Output Total Population Sizes over the Period of the Simulation

1.5

1.25 )

1 UN Estimate Output 0.75

0.5 Total Population (Billions 0.25

0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20502100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations; and UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. instance, this scaling allows me to clearly estimate notable discrepancies are that the simulated pop- the numbers of people who have different types of ulation grew slightly more quickly than the actual family structure. Chinese experience in the 1950s and is projected to To scale the simulated population size, I first stan- shrink slightly more quickly than the United Nations’ dardize the simulated population size to be a ratio of assumptions in the latter half of the 21st century. The the level it achieved in 2015. For instance, the simu- former divergence will unlikely affect the simulation lated population has 414,886 living individuals in 2015 results with respect to family structure estimates, and 348,738 and 417,645, respectively, in 1990 and while the latter may affect estimated frequencies by 2030. Based on these numbers, I calculate the ratios as undercounting. Thus, my estimates of counts of dif- 0.8406 and 1.0067. I then multiply the simulated pop- ferent types of individuals by family structure in the ulation’s size ratio in each year against the observed future Chinese population, discussed in the next sec- population size of China in 2015 (1.376 billion). This tion, may be underestimates. However, I do not expect procedure allows me to compute, for instance, a sim- that these population size distinctions will affect my ulated population size of 1.157 billion in 1990 and estimates of proportions. 1.385 billion in 2030. After scaling the simulated population sizes, I use the same procedures to calculate Comparison of Simulated Kin Distributions any age- or sex-specific frequencies by multiplying to Empirical Kin Distributions. I next consider the simulated population’s proportionate composi- how the simulated kinship data compare to avail- tion by the scaled population size. able empirical estimates of Chinese kinship struc- Figure 7 shows that the population size trends ture. Unfortunately, full estimates of Chinese kinship achieved by the simulation model closely replicate structure are not available, but there are recent esti- the historical and projected UN estimates. The most mates of kin availability for older adults in China.57

36 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Table 1. Comparing Percentages of Adults Age 45 and Above Without Different Kin Types in the Simulation Against Empirical Estimates E. Spouse or Partner D. Spouse and or Partner No Child B. Spouse and and A. Sibling or Partner C. Child No Child No Sibling

Empirical Estimates, 2011 10.3 14.8 3.3 1.4 0.2 Simulation, 2010 9.1 22.5 6.9 3.1 0.2

Difference –1.2 7.8 3.6 1.7 0.0

Note: In the empirical estimates, spouses and partners are combined, whereas the simulation results examine only spouses. Source: Empirical estimates come from Zhou Zhangjun, Ashton Verdery, and Rachel Margolis, “No Spouse, No Son, No Daughter, No Kin in Contemporary China: Differences in Health, Wealth, and Economic Support,” Journal of Gerontology (April 24, 2018): Table 1.

The Zhou Zhangjun, Ashton Verdery, and Rachel Mar- overcounting the percentage of the population with- golis results are nationally representative of the non- out a spouse or partner by 7.8 percent. Although this institutionalized Chinese population age 45 and above discrepancy is moderately large, at least part of it may in 2011. They are derived from the China Health and be explained by the fact that the simulation examines Retirement Longitudinal Study.58 those without spouses, while the empirical estimates I focus on comparing the percentages that are pre- are for those without spouses or partners. However, sented in the Zhou, Verdery, and Margolis paper and cohabitation, especially among older adults, is rare in that can be calculated in the simulation results for China,59 so this discrepancy more likely owes to a lim- five categories of lacking access to different types and itation of the simulation. combinations of kin: those with no spouse or partner, As shown in Figures 3 and 4, which compare the those with no living siblings, those with no living chil- simulation results and the model’s parameter inputs dren, those with no spouse or partner and no living dealing with nuptiality, marriage is the most challeng- children, and those with no spouse or partner, no living factor to simulate. For instance, the model over- ing children, and no living siblings. The Zhou, Verd- states the rate of divorce, which contributes to an ery, and Margolis results look at spouses and partners, overestimate of the population prevalence of lacking whereas in my simulation I examine only spouses. a living spouse shown in Table 1. Column C presents Despite this discrepancy, comparing the simulation the discrepancy between the simulated and empiri- results to empirical data is useful to get a sense of the cal estimates of the percentage of older adults with- model’s validity. out children. It shows a small discrepancy, with the Table 1 shows the comparison between the empir- simulation slightly overstating the likelihood of being ical data and the simulation results. Column A shows without a living child by 3.6 percent. that the simulation results slightly undercount the Column D presents the combined likelihood of percentage of older adults with no living siblings, being without a spouse or partner or child, which but the discrepancy between the simulation and the builds on recent work on kinless-ness around the nationally representative estimates is small, with world.60 The discrepancy between the simulation a difference of only 1.2 percent. Column B shows a results and the empirical estimates is small at only larger discrepancy between the simulation results 1.7 percent. Likewise, as shown in Column D, there and the empirical estimates, with the simulation is no discrepancy between the simulation results and

37 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

the empirical data in terms of the percentage of older comparators in terms of the birth cohort patterns in adults simultaneously lacking multiple kin types. lacking different kin types for men and women. I also Taken together, the results in Table 1 indicate a great reflect on what the simulation results indicate may be deal of concordance between the simulation results different about China in the coming decades, making and what can be gleaned from empirical data. it a unique case compared to these other countries. I present many of the results in the same format as in Figure 8, which graphs China’s age and sex struc- Results ture as a population pyramid. The data in Figure 8 are based on UN estimates of China’s population struc- To examine how China’s changing demography is ture in 1990, 2010, and 2050.63 The number of men in expected to affect its family and kinship networks, I each five-year age group is shown with blue bars on first consider how the population will change in terms the left of the figure, while the number of women in of access to living family members defined by close each age group is shown with red bars on the right of kin ties such as parents and children, tying changes the figure. in demographic rates to differences in access to such In subsequent figures, I use shading in the age family by sex and age. I then consider the popula- bands to convey population size with different num- tion’s distribution in terms of number of siblings, bers of available kin. Ages ascend vertically so that which are a particularly interesting kin type to exam- those under 5 years old are shown at the bottom of ine in the Chinese context owing to the One-Child the graph, while those age 95 plus are shown at the Policy and the national tendency for women to have top. Each bar’s distance from the center indicates few higher-order births. I explore how the experi- the relative magnitude of its population size. It is ence of having siblings in China is changing across the helpful to keep Figure 8 in mind when reading sub- life course and over time. After this, I look at some sequent figures, because it helps contextualize how extended kin, particularly cousins, aunts, and uncles. the simulation produces slight differences in the Then, I examine changes in the sex patterning age structure compared to what is estimated by the of who has spouses, which I expect to be strongly United Nations. affected by a potential marriage squeeze because of For instance, comparing the results from 1990 the excess of Chinese men owing to disparities in in Figure 8 and subsequent pyramids, it is evident sex ratios at birth, the preference for men to marry that birth cohorts begin shrinking in the simulation women younger than themselves, and the soon-to-be model slightly before the UN estimates pinpoint shrinking population. Next, I zoom in on the experi- that they began shrinking in China, which is why the ence of older adults, those at least 50 years old, focus- age 0–4 cohort is larger than the age 5–9 cohort in ing on who has access to the types of family ties that Figure 8’s panel dealing with 1990, while the reverse are most likely to provide eldercare: spouses, chil- is true in subsequent pyramids. Similarly, there is dren, and siblings. In this analysis, I examine kinless- slightly more spikiness between age groups in the ness,61 which I define by considering those who have subsequent pyramids than in Figure 8, which likely neither a spouse nor any children and those who do owes to simulating a smaller population than the not have a spouse, any children, or any siblings. 1.4 billion individuals in China today. Despite these Finally, I compare a subset of the simulation results differences, however, there are broad similarities in for China against empirical estimates from a broad set the general shapes. of comparator countries in East, South, and Southeast Asia. To make these comparisons, I focus on older Parents. Figure 9 shows three population pyra- adults, for whom data on kinship structure are avail- mids that simultaneously visualize changes in Chi- able and have previously been analyzed,62 and I assess na’s population structure and its family networks. differences between the simulation results and the The pyramids are read similarly as Figure 8, but

38 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 8. Population Pyramids for China in 1990 to 2050, by Sex and Age, Using UN Estimates

1990 2010 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions)

2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Population (Millions)

Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.

these are based on the simulated data. An arrow and even fewer survived childhood in the 1930s and helps trace the 1981–85 birth cohort as it ages, first 1940s. The 2010 and 2050 pyramids show a filling in of 20 years between 1990 and 2010 and then an addi- the age structure associated with population growth tional 40 years to 2050. Over this period, the sim- from the demographic transition and the effects of ulated population ages substantially. Changes in China’s rapid fertility decline since the 1970s. Such the age structure are driven by historical declines changes also lead to an increasingly feminine popula- in mortality and China’s rapid population growth tion in old age, as men are more likely than women to during the demographic transition. die throughout the life course. In 1990, there were few old people, not because In terms of family networks, a broad shift occurs elderly mortality was high but because few were born wherein the experience of having one or no living

39 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 9. Changes in the Population Distribution of Numbers of Living Parents from 1990 to 2050, by Sex and Age 1990 2010 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions) 2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 Dark Blue/Red: 0 Living Parents 35–39 30–34 Light Blue/Red: 1 Living Parent 25–29 Lightest Blue/Red: 2 Living Parents 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Population (Millions)

Source: Author’s calculations.

parents becomes more and more concentrated in the have children in the simulation model, I have grayed older age groups. For instance, few 45–49-year-olds in out those age groups. In contrast to parents, the age 1990 had two living parents, and just short of half had patterning of having living children in China does none, but, by 2050, the simulation projection expects not appear to be changing as dramatically. The that these tendencies will reverse. This dramatic shift changes in these pyramids instead are concentrated owes to mortality decline, especially at middle and in the distribution of numbers of children and sex older ages.64 differentiation therein. In 1990, nearly everyone over age 35 had at least Children. Figure 10 plots the population distri- some children, and most had at least two. But, by bution according to numbers of living children. 2010, substantial fractions of the population are pro- Because those younger than 15 years old cannot jected to have only one living child, and a large share

40 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 10. Changes in the Population Distribution of Numbers of Living Children from 1990 to 2050, by Sex and Age

1990 2010 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions) 2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 Dark Blue/Red: 0 Living Children 30–34 Light Blue/Red: 1 Living Child 25–29 20–24 Lightest Blue/Red: 2 or More 15–19 Living Children 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Population (Millions)

Source: Author’s calculations.

of men have none. In 2050, I project on the basis of will not emerge. The high prevalence of female mar- my micro-simulation that these tendencies will con- riage, and its young incidence, will combine with tinue and that the male experience of lacking any chil- the near-universal pattern of female childbearing to dren will become a common phenomenon. mitigate these tendencies. My simulation estimates Generations of men, from the oldest ages to the that the share of women over age 40 who have no peak childbearing years and beyond, will not have living children will actually decline owing to China’s living children. For instance, of those men age 40 continued mortality reduction (not shown). Later, I plus, I simulate that the share of the population consider those who have spouses and the percentage that has no children will almost quadruple from the of older adults without living kin, which are drivers 5.3 percent seen in 1990 to a peak of 19.7 percent in and consequences of these trends in numbers with- 2075 (not shown). For women, however, this pattern out children.

41 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 11. Changes in the Population Distribution of Numbers of Living Siblings from 1990 to 2050, by Sex and Age 1990 2010 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions) 2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 Dark Blue/Red: 0 Living Siblings 35–39 30–34 Light Blue/Red: 1 Living Sibling 25–29 Lightest Blue/Red: 2 or More 20–24 15–19 Living Siblings 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Population (Millions)

Source: Author’s calculations.

Siblings. Figure 11 shows how the distribution of none by 2100. The simulation results indicate that the sibling counts is changing in China. Owing to the percentage of 40–44-year-olds without living siblings nation’s rapid fertility decline since the 1970s and the has been rising since it hit a low of 5.5 percent in 1990 drop in higher parity births, substantial numbers of (the 1950–54 birth cohort) and will eventually peak at younger Chinese individuals begin to have no living 43.8 percent in 2050 (the 2010–14 birth cohort) before siblings between 1990 and 2010. Forty years later, by retreating again to 37.2 percent in 2100 (the 2060–64 2050, my simulation model expects that a lack of sib- birth cohort). lings becomes a general Chinese experience. Given the One-Child Policy and low levels of sec- In 1990, 12.4 percent of the entire population had ond and higher-order births, these numbers may no siblings, but I expect that 33.9 percent will have no seem surprising. For instance, readers may expect siblings by 2050 and an eventual 44.3 percent will have that even more people will have no living siblings.

42 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 12. Changes in the Proportion of China’s Population Without Living Siblings from 1900 to 2100, by 20-Year Age Groups

1 Ages 0–19 Ages 20–39 Ages 40–59 0.8 Ages 60–79 Ages 80+

0.6

0.4

0.2 Proportion Without Living Siblings

0 1900 1950 2000 20502100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations.

However, this result owes to two features. First, a sub- by 20-year age groups. In 1900, because of low child stantial fraction of couples in China have more than survivorship and the elongated age span of childbear- one child. Second, counts of siblings are bilateral, ing, many young adults did not have living siblings. so, for instance, each sibling dyad counts twice. (For Improvements in young-adult mortality in the early instance, in a population in which two mothers have 1900s changed these patterns such that by 1950, few one child each and one mother has two children, only young adults had no living siblings, then slightly more half the population would have no siblings.) than half of middle-aged adults had none, and finally In addition to increases in China’s population almost all the elderly population had none. In either without any living siblings, my simulation model case, however, siblinghood was strongly affected by projects substantial reductions in its population mortality patterns such that the experience of having with many siblings: Whereas most Chinese adults in no living siblings was highly age graded. 1990 had three or more living siblings, almost none This state of affairs persisted for a long time. A are expected to have so many by 2050. This collapse person could expect to have the highest likelihood of in family structure is enormous, and future research having siblings as a young person and the lowest like- should take into account its potential effects on the lihood as an older adult. However, this system of fam- functioning of the Chinese economy and society in a ily relations changed rapidly from 1950, first because context in which “the family rather than the state still declining mortality reduced the likelihood of hav- has to meet most social security needs.”65 ing no living siblings in older ages and then because To further contextualize the collapse of Chi- declining fertility, especially of higher-order births, na’s sibling structure, Figure 12 presents the chang- increased the chances of never having had siblings. ing share of the population without living siblings The present era is still one of transition, in which

43 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 13. Changes in the Population Distribution of Numbers of Living Cousins Between 2010 and 2050, by Sex and Age

2010 2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions)

Dark Blue/Red: 0 Living Cousins Light Blue/Red: 1–9 Living Cousins Lightest Blue/Red: 10 or More Living Cousins

Source: Author’s calculations.

about half of both the oldest and youngest age groups In Figure 13, the cousinship rates for 2010 show that have no living siblings while other age groups still most individuals in contemporary China are mem- have low prevalence of this phenomenon. bers of family groups in which the dominant experi- However, by 2050, the experience of having no liv- ence is to have large sets of cousins of at least 10 or ing siblings becomes nearly constant across all age more. Only the youngest, all of whose cousins may not groups (and the life course), a generality of Chinese have been born, and the oldest, who have experienced society that may have no parallel in other societies. cousin mortality, deviate from this pattern. By con- Based on my micro-simulation model and expert UN trast, in 2050, the experience of having large numbers assessments of vital rate trajectories in China, I proj- of cousins is concentrated in the middle and older age ect that this state of affairs, in which many individu- groups. For those under 40, and especially those under als of all ages have no living siblings, will persist from 30 years old, the dominant experience is to have one to 2050 through 2100. four cousins. In addition, a new family form emerges: Whereas only 0.9 percent of those under age 40 had no Extended Family: Cousins, Aunts, and Uncles. I living cousins in 2010, I project that 7.6 percent of indi- next consider some extended kin ties. Cousin, aunt, viduals under 40 will have no living cousins by 2050. and uncle ties are predicated on the existence of sib- As these cohorts without cousins age, they become lings, so I expect that the dramatic changes in counts commonplace in Chinese society overall. By 2100, my of living siblings seen in the prior section will also model holds that 8.8 percent of all Chinese, regardless affect the availability of these ties in profound ways. of age, will have no living cousins. Figures 13 and 14 show only two pyramids, contrast- Figure 14 shows a similar set of results for aunts ing the distributions of counts of living cousins (Fig- and uncles. In all years, few older adults have living ure 13) and aunts and uncles (Figure 14) between 2010 aunts and uncles because of the intergenerational and 2050. definition of this kin tie and mortality patterns. My

44 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 14. Changes in the Population Distribution of Numbers of Living Aunts and Uncles Between 2010 and 2050, by Sex and Age

Dark Blue/Red: 0 Living Aunts and Uncles Light Blue/Red: 1–9 Living Aunts and Uncles Lightest Blue/Red: 10 or More Living Aunts and Uncles

Source: Author’s calculations.

model highlights that the current experience, in spousal mortality. As such, I find that 24.2 percent of which most young adults have large numbers of aunts men age 50–54 in 2055 will not have a living spouse. I and uncles, is a temporary one. By 2050, only those find that the peak of the marriage squeeze, measured in the middle-age ranges will have so many aunts and as the proportion of 50–55-year-olds without living uncles. Their children will have far fewer because they spouses, is in 2065, when 31.4 percent of men were have few siblings of their own. Their parents, because without spouses. This indicates that China’s marriage of the role of mortality previously mentioned, also squeeze, coupled with its other demographic changes had few. Nonetheless, between 2010 and 2050, I see affecting the likelihood of being married, will con- dramatic shifts in the availability of aunts and uncles tinue for quite some time. After all, those who will be in Chinese society. 50–55-year-olds in 2065 are children today. The likelihood of being married in China is highly Spouses. The last type of living family members I sex differentiated, and my simulation results indicate consider are spouses. That China will experience a that discrepancies between the sexes in the likelihood marriage squeeze in the coming decades owing to its of being married will grow in the future. For instance, skewed sex ratios at birth is a well-established find- as can be calculated from the numbers detailed in ing.66 Christophe Guilmoto, for instance, projects Table A6, the percentage of 30–39-year-old men who that even if China’s elevated sex ratio at birth in favor did not have a living spouse rises from 16.8 percent of men declines rapidly and returns to a normal level in 1980 to 21.8 percent in 1990, 26.1 percent in 2000, by 2020, 15 percent of Chinese men age 50 in 2055 will 36.7 percent in 2010, 38.8 percent in 2030, 44.6 percent be unmarried. in 2040, and 45.4 percent in 2050. For women of the My model is more pessimistic, based on the UN same ages, the increase in the percentage without a liv- assumption that China’s sex ratio at birth does not ing spouse is much less dramatic: from 20.1 percent in return to a normal level until 2050 and accounting for 1980 to 28.1 percent in 2020 to 33.8 percent in 2060.

45 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 15. Changes in the Population Distribution of Having a Living Spouse Between 2010 and 2050, by Sex and Age 2010 2050 95+ 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 <5 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 10080604020020 40 60 80 100 Men Women Men Women Population (Millions) Population (Millions) Dark Blue/Red: Living Spouse Light Blue/Red: No Living Spouse

Source: Author’s calculations.

The gender gap at these ages is partially suppressed Kinless-ness. I next consider the phenomenon of mortality, because women marry men who are older kinless-ness in older adult years. I follow Margolis than themselves and, thus, are more likely to survive and Verdery in defining this in two ways: first, as those their spouse. At other ages, the trends in percent- individuals who have neither a living spouse nor living ages married are in the opposite directions for men children and, second, as those with no living spouse, and women. Among 50–55-year-olds, for instance, the children, or siblings.67 These two definitions examine percentage of men who are unmarried has been rising the kin ties that will most likely provide emotional, since 1985 and will continue to rise until 2065, owing financial, or instrumental support for individuals in to the aforementioned marriage squeeze, while the their elder years while providing both a more restric- percentage of women who are unmarried has been tive and expansive perspective on the issue. I simul- falling since the 1950s and will continue to do so until taneously consider the proportions of the population 2025, owing to declining older adult mortality. age 50 plus who meet each definition from 2000 to These trends can be seen most clearly in the popu- 2100 and the total number of people age 50 plus in lation pyramids displayed in Figure 15, which compares China who lack kin resources over these years. The the distribution of the population without spouses future availability of family resources for members of by sex and age in 2010 and 2050. Part of the trend in this age group is especially important to examine con- spouseless-ness is driven by rising ages of marriage, a sidering China’s rapidly aging population. pattern affecting both sexes. However, evidence points Figure 16 shows the proportion of China’s 50-plus- to an emerging marriage squeeze as the proportion year-olds who are kinless according to the two defi- of Chinese men without spouses increases rapidly by nitions. Reflecting the country’s impending marriage 2050. On the other hand, women, who tend to marry at squeeze, I find that nearly all the projected changes in younger ages, are much less likely to be without spouses kinless-ness in China are concentrated among men. until older adulthood, when mortality effects and the Indeed, I find that the projected proportion of kin- tendency of grooms to be older than brides produces less women will decline under the first definition and high levels of spouseless-ness at the oldest ages. remain approximately constant under the second,

46 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 16. Changes in Proportions of China’s 50-Plus-Year-Old Kinless Population Under Two Definitions, by Sex

0.1 Living Spouse or Children Living Spouse, Children, or Siblings

0.08

0.06 Men

0.04

Proportion Men

0.02 Women Women 0 2000 2020 204020602080 2100 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations.

Figure 17. Changes in Counts of China’s 50-Plus-Year-Old Kinless Population Under Two Definitions, by Sex

30 Living Spouse or Children Living Spouse, Children, or Siblings

20 Men

15 Men 10

Population (Millions) Women 5 Women 0 2000 2020 204020602080 2100 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

Note: The vertical line denotes the year 2015. Source: Author’s calculations. driven by continued improvements in old-age sur- This analysis helps contextualize the prior analyses of vival and declines in widowhood. Kinless men, on the proportions and account for the sheer scale of China’s other hand, will increase more than fourfold before population size. In a large population in which the beginning to decline in 2080 as the effects of China’s elderly age groups are projected to grow most quickly, marriage squeeze abate. such as China, even a small proportion of the elderly Lastly, I consider the raw number of people who being without kin may translate into a substantial will experience kinless-ness as older adults in China. number of individuals.

47 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 18. Comparing the Percentages Without Living Siblings Across Birth Cohorts Between the Simulation Data and Empirical Data from Six Comparator Countries

90 Women Men 80 India 70 Indonesia 60 Japan Korea 50 Malaysia 40 Simulation

Percentage Thailand 30 20 10 0 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 Birth Cohort Birth Cohort

Source: Author’s calculations; Indonesia Family Life Survey; Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement; Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging; Longitudinal Aging Study in India; Malaysian Family Life Surveys; and Survey of the Older Persons in Thailand.

In Figure 17, I look at the number of people who with the results from China. An overview of these are kinless. The trajectories I find are similar to data sources is available in Appendix B. what I found for proportions, except that the even- To determine whether the projected changes tually declining population size means that the peak in China are similar to or different from ongoing number of Chinese kinless will be reached around changes in other Asian countries, I examine the per- 2060–70. I expect that a substantial number of peo- centage of men and women without different types of ple will eventually be kinless in China, on the order kin in these surveys and how these percentages differ of 25 million when considering those without spouses across birth cohorts. I focus on the availability of liv- or children or about 10 million when considering a ing siblings, spouses, and children. Because the empir- more restricted set of people who also lack any living ical data sources are aging surveys, I am only able to siblings. How the country will cope with such a large examine a small number of birth cohorts in each. population of socially isolated older individuals is an In the empirical data, I examine the pre-1930, open question. 1930–39, 1940–49, 1950–59, and 1960–69 birth cohorts. (In Malaysia, data on cohorts beyond 1930–39 Comparison to Other Countries. To contextual- are not available, and data on the pre-1930 birth ize the simulation results, I now consider how kinship cohort in Japan are not available.) I compare the per- network change in China is similar to, and may dif- centages without each kin type in each birth cohort fer from, ongoing kinship network changes in other to the results for the same birth cohorts in the sim- countries in East, South, and Southeast Asia. To do ulation data in 2015. In addition, I also examine two this, I rely on recently published work,68 which exam- younger birth cohorts in the simulation data (1970–79 ines older adult kin availability in a number of coun- and 1980–89), which are not available in the empirical tries. For this analysis, I focus on data from India, data sets because their members are not old enough Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and to be eligible to participate in aging surveys. This com- Thailand, which offer a wide range of comparisons parison allows me to place the simulated results for

48 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Figure 19. Comparing the Percentages Without a Living Spouse Across Birth Cohorts Between the Simulation Data and Empirical Data from Six Comparator Countries

100 Women Men 90 India Indonesia 80 Japan 70 Korea 60 Malaysia Simulation

centage 50 r Thailand

Pe 40 30 20 10 0 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 Birth Cohort Birth Cohort

China against the backdrop of broader demographic China will begin to see an increase in the percentages changes in Asian countries and make some informed without living siblings. I speculate that this difference comments on how the projected changes in China owes to the increasing percentage of the population might be similar to and different from what would be born without siblings (Figures 11 and 12), which may expected elsewhere. be a unique feature of China. Figure 18 graphs the percentages without living For instance, in Japan and the Republic of Korea, siblings in each birth cohort in each of the countries there are only limited increases in the number of examined and the simulation. The simulated results women bearing only one child,69 with only about for China, shown with a thick red line, are clearly in 15–18 percent of women born in 1965 having com- line with what is seen in the comparator countries. The pleted fertility of parity one in either country (up older individuals, those born pre-1930 or in 1930–39, from approximately 12 percent in Japan and 5 percent are far less likely to have any living siblings. Younger in the Republic of Korea for women in the 1945 birth individuals, up to those born in 1960–69, are substan- cohort). By contrast, around 35 percent of women tially more likely to have living siblings. These patterns in the 1961–65 birth cohort had completed fertility are true for men and women. Indeed, these patterns of only one child in China, up from only 7 percent reflect the simple fact that older individuals, whose sib- among those born in 1946–50.70 As such, the projected lings are more likely to be older, are more likely to die; increase in the percentage of individuals without liv- they do not offer much insight into trends. ing siblings in China will likely be a different experi- Nonetheless, China does not stand out as a partic- ence than that which will be seen elsewhere in Asia. ularly different case from the other countries when Figure 19 examines the percentages without living looking at the birth cohorts for which empirical data spouses. It also shows that those born earlier, who are available. However, looking at the youngest birth are thus older, are more likely to be without a living cohorts—those born in the 1970s and beyond, which spouse than those born later in all countries, includ- are available only in the simulated data—suggests that ing China. This pattern is more dramatic for women

49 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 20. Comparing the Percentages Without Living Children Across Birth Cohorts Between the Simulation Data and Empirical Data from Six Comparator Countries

40 Women Men India 35 Indonesia 30 Japan Korea 25 Malaysia Simulation 20 Thailand Percentage 15

0 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 <1930 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 –39 –49 –59 –69 –79 –89 Birth Cohort Birth Cohort

than it is for men. Again, this pattern is likely the in the near future. China may not be alone in its mar- effect of mortality as older individuals tend to have riage squeeze, given the preference for men to marry older spouses, who are more likely to die. younger women and the successively smaller birth However, looking at the youngest birth cohorts, cohorts in recent decades that exist in several other which can only be examined with the simulation data, countries. However, the sex ratio at birth dynamics suggests that the experience of spouseless-ness in driving China’s marriage squeeze are more dramatic China may change in the coming decades (Figure 15). in China than anywhere else.73 The 1970s and especially the 1980s birth cohorts from Last, I consider the percentage without living chil- the simulation results have substantially higher frac- dren, as shown in Figure 20. Mortality has much less of tions without living spouses, with a notably larger and an effect here, given that children tend to be younger earlier turnaround for men than for women. Given than their parents. Looking across the birth cohorts the mean ages of marriage in China and the likelihood available in the empirical data, China does not stand that many who are unmarried by age 30 will remain as out as particularly notable. If China is distinctive, it is such, this result is consistent with research that docu- so because, among the older birth cohorts, Chinese ments ongoing retreats from marriage in China71 and women have among the lowest likelihood of having the marriage squeeze for men.72 no living children compared to women in the other Surprisingly, given that Christophe Guilmoto countries, while Chinese men have among the highest also projects that India will experience a marriage likelihoods. squeeze, I see little evidence of a turnaround in However, Japan stands out the most clearly among the proportions married in that country. However, the older birth cohorts, wherein rates of having no liv- among men, the lines for India, Korea, and Thai- ing children skyrocket from the 1940–49 birth cohort land appear to have a similar U-shape to the China to the 1960–69 birth cohort. Looking at the 1970–79 line, which may indicate that such countries will see and 1980–89 birth cohorts in China suggests that it increases in the percentage of men without spouses may be on a similar trajectory to Japan in terms of

50 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

childlessness, albeit with a delay of about 20 years. is a particularly consequential finding in a country However, the simulation results also suggest differ- where family and kinship networks play a large role in ences between the increased childlessness in Japan the provision of social support and the functioning of and what is projected to occur in China. the economy. Other work in this volume offers inter- Whereas in Japan the childlessness trends across pretations of how these changes might affect indi- birth cohorts are nearly identical for men and women, vidual Chinese families and China’s economic and in China the increase is much more dramatic for political health as a whole.75 men than it is for women. This latter result is, I sus- This analysis suffers from a number of limita- pect, attributable to the marriage squeeze. In China, tions. One is that I could only compare the simula- like many Asian countries, nonmarital childbearing tion results to empirical estimates for older adults. remains and is likely to persist at extremely low lev- A broader evaluation would imbue the results pre- els,74 which means that marriage is the key to having sented here with additional validity, but it is not an children. With more Chinese men unable to marry easy task. The household-based nature of most social due to the marriage squeeze, we can expect dramatic science data sources—be they census data or sam- increases in childlessness among men. Consider- ples—means that few data sets contain information ing the repercussions of these features through kin- on individuals’ counts of living family members. Out- ship networks—which would, for instance, imply that side of contemporary aging surveys, I am unaware of Chinese older adults will be substantially less likely such data being available for China. to have married sons—indicates that the marriage Of course, household-based estimates provide squeeze is one of the most important factors differen- interesting windows into China’s future as well.76 tiating China from other countries in East, South, and Without reliable data on family structure for all age Southeast Asia in terms of future kinship networks. groups, I have attempted to develop a simulation model that matches the country’s demographic experience under the logic that getting the demography Discussion and Conclusions right will enhance the validity of my estimates of family structure. In this respect, I successfully modeled In this chapter, I considered how China’s demogra- specific demographic processes—such as fertility phy is affecting its family structure with a particular rates that are specified according to a woman’s age, eye toward the long-run consequences of its low fer- parity, and marital status—that overall yielded rea- tility, its sex ratio imbalance, and its unique pattern sonable representations of macro-level vital rates. of low childlessness and consequently low rates of Such results should help ensure confidence in my higher-order births (but high numbers of parents with simulation results. I also found broad convergence only one child). I used a demographic micro-simulation between the simulation results and what can be esti- informed by the best available estimates of numer- mated for older adults in China. ous specific demographic processes including fertility A second limitation is that I ignore the role of patterns disaggregated by age, parity, and marital sta- migration in Chinese family structure. The Chinese tus; sex ratios at birth; mortality patterns; and mar- diaspora is one of the largest in the world,77 with riage, divorce, and remarriage rates that differ by sex. long-standing patterns of substantial out-migration I showed that the micro-simulation model can repli- to developed regions78 and an emerging migration cate key features of Chinese demography, produce regime to new destinations such as the developing results that are consistent with available estimates of nations of Africa,79 interrupted by a pause in emigra- older adult family structure in China, and offer novel tion during the first several decades of Communist insights into the changing nature of family in China. Party rule.80 By ignoring emigration from the coun- In total, my results point to a dramatic shift in the try, my estimates may miss an additional source of availability of living family members in China, which kinless-ness, wherein older adults are additionally

51 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

disadvantaged by the absence of their children who a son, men would be expected to have fewer siblings have gone abroad to seek opportunity. than women would. At the same time, this tendency At the same time, modeling migration in a may be overstated: The sex ratio imbalance in China is micro-simulation is challenging, and incorporating it large but perhaps not consequential enough to gener- into the model used in this chapter would add addi- ate meaningful differences in counts of siblings. Like- tional complexity that may bias my estimates. As wise, there is some evidence that under-registrations such, the results reported here should be taken to of female births may have inflated reported imbal- apply only to Chinese families who do not have emi- ances in China’s sex ratio at birth in recent decades.83 grant relatives. An interesting direction for future scholarship would A related issue is that I do not consider internal be to assess how China’s projected kinship networks diversity in China, where it is known that urban areas, might differ in the coming decades under different rural areas, and the so-called floating population of scenarios of under-registration. I leave these ques- internal migrants from rural to urban areas experi- tions for future work. ence different demographic realities.81 Recent work While there are limits to the analysis in this chap- notes important differences between older adults ter, there are also a number of strengths. It is a rare in urban and rural areas of China in terms of family technical achievement to use as many precisely spec- structure but few differences in the ways that family ified rates in a micro-simulation and explicitly con- can benefit older adult well-being.82 While this lim- sider their performance against benchmark input itation proscribes my ability to speak to differences parameters. Using such rates, I developed a realis- in the country, modeling the nation as a whole is not tic—if still simplified—model of China’s changing inaccurate and provides more tractable results. More family structure. While my results ultimately depend to the point, historical demographic data by regions in on the validity of the underlying input parameters, I China are either simply not available or too unreliable am confident that having used and replicated broad for this chapter. In future work, I intend to expand demographic features of China from the best avail- on these analyses and consider internal geographic able sources allowed me to conclude that the family diversity in China. network results I have presented reflect a best guess A third limitation of this chapter is that I did not about how China’s family structure will change over model fertility decisions as undertaken explicitly in the 21st century. the context of Chinese fertility control policy. Such The results presented in this chapter point to policies limit the number of children that couples can a collapse in Chinese family relations that may be have, often based on how many they have previously unprecedented in other large countries. Like many born, their province of residence, and the sex com- authors, I see a substantial marriage squeeze cre- position of their existing children. Such features may ated by sex ratio imbalances, declining sizes of birth affect decisions about whether to stop bearing chil- cohorts, and the tendency for men to marry younger dren and sex-selective abortions. Instead, I modeled women, reducing the likelihood that Chinese men age-, parity-, and status-specific fertility and a skewed have spouses in the coming decades. Going beyond sex ratio at birth—that is, the results, rather than the this, however, my model also shows that this mar- causes, of such policies. riage squeeze will, in turn, affect the likelihood that A more sophisticated model might incorporate men have children. explicit fertility stopping rules when couples, for The combination of these factors will produce a instance, successfully bear a son. Such a model may substantial proportion of Chinese adults without liv- reveal a larger sex disparity in the prevalence of having close family members, who together constitute a ing certain kin types—for instance, siblings—than the large number of individuals. But this tendency will minimal differences I found in this chapter. Under a almost entirely be concentrated among men. Sim- regime in which families bear children until they reach ilarly, my model points to a dramatic shift in the

52 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

likelihood that individuals in China have living siblings the creation and maintenance of family ties deserve in the coming years. The results show that those with greater attention. With the changing landscape of no living siblings will make up nearly half the Chinese family relations in China, more attention to the population and that over the next century the experi- demographic processes that determine the avail- ence of having living siblings will not depend on age ability of living kin will help uncover the future of as it has in the past. The breakdown of siblinghood its changing family structure. Many of the changes in China will in turn eventually affect other kin ties, I foresee in Chinese families are baked into the con- including aunts, uncles, and cousins. For instance, I temporary social structure and reflect the natural found that a substantial fraction of the young adult evolution of the Chinese age pyramid and its low population will be without cousins by 2050, which my fertility and skewed sex ratios over the past 25 years. model suggests is a new family form that has not pre- Even with a dramatic reversal in fertility, large num- viously existed in China. bers of current adults will age without family mem- All together, these results indicate that Chinese bers. What will become of such people is an open family structures are currently in flux and that con- topic of broad interest to academics, policymakers, siderations of the role of demographic processes in and the Chinese population.

53 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Appendix A

Table A1. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with Different Counts of Living Parents, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 33.2 2,769.2 97,608.3 54.9 2,709.2 89,473.1 10–19 1,299.7 21,178.7 141,320.8 1,182.5 19,063.2 131,271.7 20–29 6,025.7 29,161.4 58,104.9 5,846.7 27,582.6 55,326.2 30–39 14,565.9 30,376.1 25,151.6 13,608.2 29,834.1 24,591.5 40–49 20,687.7 15,961.6 4,803.6 18,997.4 15,292.3 4,477.5 50–59 19,428.6 5,135.9 598.1 19,271.9 5,063.3 556.5 60–69 11,342.6 461.5 14.8 12,872.4 446.7 3.7 70–79 3,522.4 3.7 0.0 5,129.2 7.3 0.0 80–89 502.1 0.0 0.0 1,054.4 0.0 0.0 90+ 7.4 0.0 0.0 95.2 0.0 0.0 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 30.3 3,147.6 158,000.9 37.0 3,080.8 143,295.0 10–19 417.4 7,779.7 82,664.8 441.1 7,525.2 76,258.6 20–29 4,342.6 31,081.8 112,053.3 4,067.3 28,895.4 104,972.1 30–39 11,398.6 32,307.1 39,642.5 11,309.7 30,787.6 38,090.6 40–49 21,097.1 26,846.9 13,256.8 20,781.0 26,447.6 13,272.6 50–59 23,090.0 8,880.5 1,424.0 22,454.3 8,818.1 1,336.7 60–69 16,151.9 1,427.3 70.7 17,525.1 1,592.6 57.2 70–79 5,531.0 43.8 0.0 7,875.3 37.0 0.0 80–89 845.0 0.0 0.0 1,784.5 0.0 0.0 90+ 57.2 0.0 0.0 114.5 0.0 0.0 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 13.8 1,344.2 74,386.2 10.4 1,275.6 64,732.5 10–19 382.6 10,140.1 153,566.6 359.5 9,759.1 139,448.9 20–29 2,078.3 15,485.9 74,672.2 2,084.6 14,875.5 68,829.1 30–39 12,632.1 47,340.1 88,858.8 12,068.4 43,983.6 83,732.3 40–49 22,934.2 35,245.7 24,219.8 22,622.7 33,923.7 23,455.8 50–59 31,440.6 20,380.2 5,266.5 31,915.1 20,590.0 5,337.6 60–69 22,961.8 3,174.4 258.5 24,690.0 3,381.0 221.2 70–79 10,247.0 162.0 0.0 13,250.7 197.0 0.0 80–89 1,737.1 3.4 0.0 3,197.7 3.5 0.0 90+ 68.9 0.0 0.0 252.4 0.0 0.0

54 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 6.7 924.4 92,427.2 10.2 769.8 79,664.7 10–19 118.1 4,287.9 69,439.3 122.1 4,062.8 60,239.4 20–29 1,676.7 19,715.5 138,463.7 1,587.1 18,645.3 125,816.7 30–39 5,988.2 23,851.5 59,750.3 5,866.9 22,918.3 54,596.3 40–49 28,227.1 56,187.7 58,107.3 26,129.9 53,032.9 55,138.9 50–59 35,922.4 29,084.0 10,228.8 35,805.2 28,849.7 9,865.2 60–69 35,436.6 9,118.9 1,039.1 38,738.7 9,868.6 1,129.3 70–79 15,532.2 445.3 6.7 19,798.3 518.9 0.0 80–89 3,700.9 6.7 0.0 6,134.8 10.2 0.0 90+ 188.9 0.0 0.0 552.8 0.0 0.0 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 6.8 878.7 80,973.3 6.8 643.7 70,771.5 10–19 108.6 4,000.1 89,530.0 74.9 3,412.6 77,021.1 20–29 654.8 9,744.2 63,496.8 728.8 8,970.8 54,737.3 30–39 5,676.2 35,146.3 118,925.5 5,490.1 32,504.5 107,584.3 40–49 14,226.1 33,382.1 40,910.8 13,456.1 31,367.0 37,541.6 50–59 52,663.5 56,636.5 26,409.8 49,608.2 54,066.3 25,652.1 60–69 46,556.4 15,674.9 1,682.8 49,100.7 16,282.9 1,794.8 70–79 28,482.8 1,771.1 37.3 35,964.7 2,142.2 57.9 80–89 6,022.3 10.2 0.0 10,244.5 17.0 0.0 90+ 481.8 0.0 0.0 1,215.9 0.0 0.0 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 0.0 628.3 61,958.1 0.0 518.1 56,315.6 10–19 69.0 3,310.9 79,717.6 62.2 2,604.6 69,535.3 20–29 552.4 9,666.9 84,730.6 435.2 8,300.7 72,582.0 30–39 2,889.7 19,340.8 52,626.0 2,690.9 17,506.4 44,788.6 40–49 17,165.7 56,365.1 87,012.6 15,119.5 51,945.9 78,568.3 50–59 29,687.8 36,223.3 20,442.1 28,176.8 34,259.9 18,456.4 60–69 78,360.8 35,664.0 6,010.8 77,811.8 36,128.6 5,758.3 70–79 41,895.7 3,090.0 41.4 50,059.9 3,772.1 44.9 80–89 13,464.6 24.2 0.0 21,423.6 76.0 0.0 90+ 973.6 0.0 0.0 2,328.2 0.0 0.0

55 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 6.9 581.5 69,972.8 0.0 563.5 63,039.6 10–19 44.7 2,291.5 59,881.3 55.3 2,057.1 54,610.8 20–29 402.6 8,195.7 73,964.0 321.5 6,658.7 65,048.3 30–39 2,411.9 19,439.8 72,491.4 1,870.4 16,791.9 62,341.3 40–49 9,224.4 30,061.1 34,668.1 8,601.7 26,012.4 29,639.1 50–59 39,846.3 68,527.7 45,998.2 36,183.7 62,521.0 42,939.1 60–69 47,945.7 23,902.3 5,298.6 47,039.4 23,350.3 4,898.9 70–79 79,737.4 8,605.1 498.9 87,043.4 9,683.8 546.2 80–89 22,023.7 65.4 0.0 30,977.0 114.1 0.0 90+ 2,790.4 0.0 0.0 5,687.2 0.0 0.0 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 10.5 409.5 54,648.9 3.5 380.7 51,493.8 10–19 49.0 2,107.1 69,461.9 31.7 1,991.8 62,668.9 20–29 357.0 6,058.9 56,696.6 363.1 5,446.6 51,909.7 30–39 1,858.6 17,417.1 64,456.5 1,565.2 14,668.7 56,908.6 40–49 8,372.5 32,534.5 54,372.4 7,304.4 28,276.3 46,258.7 50–59 24,543.5 33,178.6 15,446.5 22,029.5 28,300.9 13,491.2 60–69 77,463.4 53,010.8 13,584.4 72,670.1 49,466.7 12,930.7 70–79 54,277.9 6,968.9 602.0 56,883.9 7,145.7 493.5 80–89 48,478.0 182.0 0.0 60,053.1 208.0 0.0 90+ 5,467.3 0.0 0.0 9,497.1 0.0 0.0 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Zero One Two <10 0.0 367.3 55,803.6 3.6 325.6 51,511.0 10–19 28.3 1,585.8 53,900.0 32.2 1,377.7 51,135.3 20–29 339.1 5,718.1 66,120.3 246.9 5,399.8 59,909.5 30–39 1,486.9 12,050.8 50,007.8 1,452.8 10,985.7 45,957.3 40–49 7,060.2 29,558.3 47,341.3 6,108.3 25,560.5 41,971.0 50–59 23,119.7 41,549.0 29,572.4 20,618.7 35,615.8 25,181.2 60–69 46,680.8 19,453.6 3,012.7 41,777.8 17,015.3 2,680.2 70–79 102,410.3 16,486.8 858.2 99,962.5 16,049.1 858.8 80–89 37,208.3 222.5 0.0 41,688.3 243.3 0.0 90+ 13,315.2 0.0 0.0 19,781.4 0.0 0.0

Source: Author’s calculations.

56 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Table A2. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with Different Counts of Living Children, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 100,410.7 0.0 0.0 92,237.3 0.0 0.0 10–19 161,476.8 395.1 1,927.4 143,291.0 1,804.9 6,421.5 20–29 43,461.5 26,894.3 22,936.2 31,035.0 29,482.7 28,237.9 30–39 7,761.1 10,855.2 51,477.3 8,123.9 8,501.0 51,408.9 40–49 2,662.1 3,271.3 35,519.4 962.9 2,504.2 35,300.1 50–59 1,089.2 1,794.4 22,279.0 673.6 1,566.9 22,651.1 60–69 653.5 1,041.2 10,124.1 249.0 1,083.7 11,990.0 70–79 232.6 457.8 2,835.6 216.0 776.1 4,144.3 80–89 51.7 144.0 306.5 117.2 234.3 702.9 90+ 3.7 0.0 3.7 14.6 32.9 47.6 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 161,178.8 0.0 0.0 146,412.8 0.0 0.0 10–19 90,471.4 265.9 124.6 80,723.2 1,629.6 1,872.0 20–29 75,373.2 41,238.1 30,866.3 51,369.9 46,464.2 40,100.6 30–39 11,570.2 29,469.3 42,308.6 8,979.7 29,033.4 42,174.7 40–49 3,403.4 7,332.0 50,465.4 3,461.2 6,424.2 50,615.7 50–59 1,727.0 2,730.1 28,937.4 464.6 2,181.8 29,962.7 60–69 804.6 1,376.8 15,468.5 555.6 1,309.8 17,309.6 70–79 313.1 562.2 4,699.5 181.8 781.1 6,949.4 80–89 77.4 111.1 656.4 114.5 336.7 1,333.3 90+ 3.4 30.3 23.6 20.2 33.7 60.6 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 75,744.2 0.0 0.0 66,018.5 0.0 0.0 10–19 163,979.1 103.4 6.9 149,194.2 314.6 58.8 20–29 71,235.9 16,547.5 4,453.1 43,828.0 30,200.5 11,760.8 30–39 23,913.0 60,633.9 64,284.0 12,327.7 55,962.1 71,494.5 40–49 7,772.3 25,998.3 48,629.2 6,022.1 28,098.6 45,881.5 50–59 2,922.8 6,848.5 47,316.0 2,724.1 6,609.8 48,508.8 60–69 1,406.2 2,319.6 22,668.8 432.1 2,105.3 25,754.7 70–79 496.3 961.6 8,951.0 428.7 1,037.1 11,982.0 80–89 110.3 220.6 1,409.7 138.3 359.5 2,703.4 90+ 6.9 13.8 48.3 24.2 62.2 165.9

57 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 93,358.3 0.0 0.0 80,444.7 0.0 0.0 10–19 73,717.1 121.5 6.7 64,268.3 115.3 40.7 20–29 105,209.9 45,301.0 9,344.9 65,211.0 66,106.3 14,731.7 30–39 18,416.6 45,446.1 25,727.3 9,220.9 41,485.6 32,675.0 40–49 14,955.3 53,552.9 74,014.0 6,606.2 52,520.8 75,174.6 50–59 6,514.5 23,581.6 45,139.1 4,822.4 27,021.8 42,675.9 60–69 2,358.2 5,897.1 37,339.3 2,445.1 6,124.7 41,166.8 70–79 917.6 1,616.0 13,450.7 403.6 1,814.3 18,099.3 80–89 168.7 374.5 3,164.5 264.5 569.7 5,310.8 90+ 16.9 30.4 141.7 40.7 74.6 437.5 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 81,858.8 0.0 0.0 71,422.0 0.0 0.0 10–19 93,591.2 47.5 0.0 80,358.7 57.9 92.0 20–29 57,182.8 13,303.3 3,409.8 30,556.4 26,455.9 7,424.5 30–39 41,877.7 73,044.3 44,826.1 13,190.5 80,328.1 52,060.3 40–49 13,045.4 40,493.4 34,980.1 5,653.5 39,765.6 36,945.6 50–59 13,605.3 50,478.5 71,626.1 5,309.6 51,539.3 72,477.8 60–69 5,645.7 20,374.0 37,894.5 4,604.6 24,827.9 37,746.0 70–79 1,587.8 4,420.9 24,282.5 2,063.9 5,479.9 30,621.1 80–89 393.6 692.1 4,946.7 272.5 1,290.8 8,698.3 90+ 30.5 67.9 383.4 34.1 180.5 1,001.3 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 62,586.4 0.0 0.0 56,833.8 0.0 0.0 10–19 82,952.5 138.1 6.9 71,932.6 110.5 158.9 20–29 75,982.0 14,127.5 4,840.4 43,058.0 28,401.3 9,858.6 30–39 20,400.7 33,979.2 20,476.6 5,944.9 34,816.0 24,225.1 40–49 32,070.0 71,193.4 57,280.0 6,818.8 79,055.3 59,759.6 50–59 11,555.4 39,064.7 35,733.1 3,858.5 39,994.0 37,040.6 60–69 12,245.9 45,123.8 62,665.8 5,184.9 48,484.7 66,029.1 70–79 4,291.4 14,645.4 26,090.3 4,159.0 20,729.3 28,988.6 80–89 835.5 2,358.0 10,295.3 1,437.0 3,972.5 16,090.2 90+ 93.2 158.8 721.6 100.2 435.2 1,792.8

58 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 70,561.2 0.0 0.0 63,603.2 0.0 0.0 10–19 62,138.4 55.1 24.1 56,481.2 96.8 145.2 20–29 62,028.3 15,689.4 4,844.5 31,640.8 30,181.9 10,205.8 30–39 28,230.7 39,990.8 26,121.5 7,619.8 41,756.8 31,627.0 40–49 13,432.4 31,657.6 28,863.7 2,510.0 33,912.2 27,830.9 50–59 27,638.9 67,671.0 59,062.5 3,599.0 77,719.1 60,325.7 60–69 10,359.8 34,764.5 32,022.3 3,796.1 37,435.2 34,057.4 70–79 9,506.6 34,086.7 45,248.2 4,888.6 40,619.3 51,765.5 80–89 2,425.7 7,266.7 12,396.7 2,973.2 13,061.5 15,056.4 90+ 230.5 667.5 1,892.4 573.9 1,479.7 3,633.6 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 55,069.0 0.0 0.0 51,878.0 0.0 0.0 10–19 71,495.5 108.5 14.0 64,403.3 112.8 176.3 20–29 50,756.7 8,978.1 3,377.7 29,199.9 20,555.9 7,963.6 30–39 26,328.7 34,130.6 23,273.0 6,433.6 37,650.0 29,058.9 40–49 21,774.9 37,959.9 35,544.7 3,102.2 41,259.9 37,477.3 50–59 11,858.7 30,402.9 30,906.9 944.8 34,064.8 28,812.1 60–69 26,031.1 62,856.9 55,170.5 3,796.7 74,171.9 57,099.0 70–79 8,439.0 27,861.7 25,548.1 3,712.1 32,355.0 28,456.1 80–89 5,978.4 19,454.2 23,227.5 3,803.8 26,457.2 30,000.1 90+ 735.0 1,974.1 2,758.2 1,385.4 4,269.1 3,842.6 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 56,171.0 0.0 0.0 51,840.2 0.0 0.0 10–19 55,418.7 84.8 10.6 52,273.2 110.9 161.0 20–29 55,588.2 12,004.9 4,584.4 31,350.3 24,909.2 9,296.7 30–39 18,687.2 27,181.3 17,677.0 6,172.7 28,924.2 23,298.9 40–49 18,503.5 32,927.7 32,528.6 2,225.8 37,301.2 34,112.8 50–59 18,754.3 37,127.1 38,359.7 991.2 41,037.0 39,387.4 60–69 11,192.5 28,481.1 29,473.5 1,027.0 32,831.8 27,614.5 70–79 22,639.3 52,063.4 45,052.6 4,072.2 64,221.5 48,576.7 80–89 5,492.1 16,896.5 15,042.3 3,013.0 21,445.3 17,473.3 90+ 2,048.5 5,859.4 5,407.3 1,896.6 9,472.0 8,412.8

Source: Author’s calculations.

59 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table A3. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with Different Counts of Living Siblings, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 18,926.0 48,182.1 30,524.6 17,666.5 44,312.9 27,777.1 10–19 5,942.5 58,552.3 98,551.5 5,604.2 53,757.6 91,200.3 20–29 4,021.6 36,273.9 55,842.4 3,659.2 34,311.0 53,503.8 30–39 3,205.9 23,130.6 44,067.4 3,412.0 22,585.0 42,753.6 40–49 3,861.8 19,342.1 19,282.2 3,626.3 17,715.9 18,263.1 50–59 4,337.8 12,264.4 8,605.7 4,272.4 12,424.9 8,366.8 60–69 4,710.7 5,369.8 1,368.3 5,521.8 5,815.2 1,506.5 70–79 2,310.4 852.3 79.9 3,326.3 1,262.6 131.9 80–89 392.8 59.9 0.0 801.1 148.3 0.0 90+ 6.7 0.0 0.0 85.7 0.0 0.0 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 33,087.9 52,956.0 67,721.2 29,896.9 47,795.2 61,609.2 10–19 10,894.1 47,045.1 33,564.1 10,437.9 43,296.9 30,942.6 20–29 4,940.1 52,848.5 91,675.3 4,691.5 49,018.7 85,667.7 30–39 3,843.4 32,789.9 50,172.6 3,520.2 31,448.5 48,761.1 40–49 3,225.8 20,842.0 37,935.9 3,446.6 20,688.7 37,550.6 50–59 3,929.4 15,920.3 14,418.0 3,836.0 15,387.0 14,338.3 60–69 3,963.2 8,362.6 5,287.3 4,366.5 9,266.5 5,590.0 70–79 2,743.5 2,184.4 408.6 3,891.2 3,155.3 518.2 80–89 586.8 181.3 9.2 1,349.2 266.8 15.3 90+ 49.2 3.1 0.0 101.2 3.1 0.0 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 32,649.8 35,494.0 2,860.1 28,100.7 31,134.8 2,427.9 10–19 23,622.5 64,088.3 70,972.1 21,610.3 57,807.3 64,913.4 20–29 10,527.1 48,684.5 34,495.2 10,041.9 45,169.3 31,896.6 30–39 5,279.4 54,293.7 92,454.3 4,998.7 50,628.2 86,657.0 40–49 4,163.3 33,524.9 48,649.7 3,986.3 32,413.9 47,549.7 50–59 3,760.6 20,267.8 34,111.5 4,062.4 20,515.4 34,651.4 60–69 4,325.0 12,924.2 9,880.2 4,716.2 13,660.0 10,673.4 70–79 3,288.1 4,477.2 2,485.9 4,351.3 5,957.2 3,031.0 80–89 1,055.9 532.7 69.8 2,009.0 904.5 95.2 90+ 60.2 3.2 0.0 206.3 25.4 3.2

60 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 50,094.6 36,137.1 1,800.0 42,659.9 31,332.6 1,712.9 10–19 25,186.9 41,841.2 3,317.7 21,702.4 36,575.1 2,784.7 20–29 22,110.6 64,252.8 69,975.7 20,275.5 58,070.1 63,963.2 30–39 10,432.9 47,965.4 33,521.9 9,991.6 44,545.7 30,936.6 40–49 5,647.6 53,465.6 87,900.0 5,242.5 49,995.7 82,572.9 50–59 4,684.9 31,894.4 42,622.0 4,525.9 31,857.5 42,446.2 60–69 4,314.9 16,845.6 25,456.5 4,808.8 18,339.4 28,010.4 70–79 3,841.4 7,968.1 4,703.7 5,031.9 9,765.3 6,113.1 80–89 1,677.7 1,486.4 561.3 2,860.1 2,442.1 798.3 90+ 138.0 37.6 0.0 392.9 119.4 0.0 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 36,942.4 39,426.0 1,812.6 32,464.9 33,996.5 1,557.2 10–19 38,748.6 48,206.0 2,900.2 33,003.0 41,499.0 2,547.5 20–29 24,864.6 42,752.3 3,469.4 21,405.5 37,394.3 2,920.1 30–39 22,505.0 64,824.8 70,221.3 20,548.9 58,538.6 64,066.7 40–49 10,910.7 48,024.8 32,496.7 10,416.1 44,759.8 30,025.6 50–59 6,668.5 53,122.3 81,071.6 6,244.6 50,211.5 77,132.3 60–69 5,533.2 28,903.3 33,180.4 5,907.0 30,328.1 34,776.7 70–79 4,649.2 11,479.9 14,783.9 5,642.7 14,810.6 18,724.2 80–89 2,308.7 2,788.9 1,033.5 3,977.3 4,595.1 1,805.5 90+ 318.0 114.5 28.6 767.4 343.9 47.8 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 29,436.1 28,950.4 2,284.9 26,444.0 26,509.1 1,961.8 10–19 31,610.1 46,199.4 2,868.3 27,491.6 39,962.1 2,475.9 20–29 38,106.2 50,596.4 3,344.2 32,440.1 43,290.4 2,921.6 30–39 25,505.2 43,520.1 3,503.9 21,859.9 37,896.2 2,941.1 40–49 23,441.9 65,599.6 70,263.9 21,261.3 59,046.8 63,787.1 50–59 11,870.9 47,366.3 30,325.9 11,348.0 44,455.1 28,077.3 60–69 8,474.6 49,253.5 66,658.9 8,442.7 48,043.7 66,803.0 70–79 6,545.0 21,838.3 19,312.2 7,726.9 25,851.9 23,454.1 80–89 3,448.5 5,795.3 4,846.8 5,338.9 9,356.9 7,782.2 90+ 583.4 312.9 48.9 1,337.2 803.6 159.4

61 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 33,431.3 32,915.7 2,880.1 30,491.9 29,180.6 2,461.1 10–19 23,612.1 34,659.5 3,527.0 21,612.8 31,447.3 3,097.0 20–29 30,790.9 47,286.5 3,330.0 26,828.2 41,176.4 2,833.4 30–39 38,157.0 50,925.2 3,504.0 32,587.3 43,723.1 3,054.1 40–49 25,986.4 43,066.6 3,333.3 22,337.6 37,506.2 2,843.3 50–59 24,505.3 63,250.1 66,619.5 22,393.7 57,577.1 61,280.3 60–69 13,464.5 42,156.9 24,295.1 13,139.0 41,225.8 23,622.6 70–79 11,126.2 36,738.3 43,457.4 12,233.0 39,354.4 48,325.7 80–89 5,779.9 10,673.1 6,545.0 8,045.5 15,234.4 9,116.3 90+ 1,185.5 1,218.4 456.5 2,349.1 2,566.5 952.2 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 24,862.0 27,215.0 2,558.2 23,674.5 25,352.2 2,209.8 10–19 27,672.7 39,703.2 4,099.9 25,186.2 35,621.9 3,589.3 20–29 23,327.1 36,145.2 3,955.2 21,383.3 33,008.7 3,480.8 30–39 31,516.8 48,243.0 3,460.4 27,487.5 42,153.2 2,935.2 40–49 39,248.8 51,410.5 3,504.1 33,581.5 44,241.0 3,026.7 50–59 27,147.6 41,803.6 3,005.9 23,555.9 36,533.7 2,603.0 60–69 26,989.4 57,570.5 59,640.6 25,084.5 53,660.0 56,391.8 70–79 15,214.8 31,890.5 16,170.8 15,943.4 33,232.4 16,946.7 80–89 11,448.1 19,772.5 18,840.1 14,350.5 23,820.3 23,755.9 90+ 2,544.8 2,494.3 558.8 4,463.8 4,206.2 962.6 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: Zero One Two Plus Zero One Two Plus <10 26,423.3 26,849.8 2,743.3 24,483.2 24,552.3 2,661.2 10–19 20,455.5 31,927.0 3,664.6 19,665.3 29,892.0 3,176.2 20–29 26,883.9 41,265.9 4,657.5 24,535.0 37,288.1 4,154.3 30–39 23,492.3 36,639.1 4,125.2 21,586.9 33,676.4 3,625.5 40–49 32,148.8 48,206.1 3,439.4 28,146.6 42,289.1 2,923.9 50–59 39,877.2 50,229.5 3,330.2 34,402.2 43,412.3 2,903.1 60–69 28,221.5 37,427.3 2,398.7 25,036.1 33,306.6 2,132.4 70–79 29,511.3 43,988.8 45,974.6 28,575.2 42,762.6 45,461.8 80–89 14,378.6 16,183.6 7,168.8 16,409.7 17,926.9 8,032.0 90+ 6,039.4 5,636.8 1,968.8 8,975.5 8,495.1 2,961.9 Source: Author’s calculations.

62 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Table A4. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with Different Counts of Living Cousins, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 649.8 21,370.7 78,390.1 578.5 20,135.9 71,522.9 10–19 73.8 10,216.5 153,508.9 87.9 9,559.1 141,870.5 20–29 144.0 8,698.9 84,449.1 150.1 8,581.6 80,023.9 30–39 306.5 10,858.9 58,928.3 274.6 10,335.2 57,424.0 40–49 642.5 15,692.1 25,118.4 629.7 14,091.5 24,046.0 50–59 937.8 13,572.7 10,652.1 1,058.1 13,505.7 10,327.9 60–69 1,506.4 8,178.3 2,134.1 1,859.8 9,083.1 2,379.7 70–79 1,030.1 2,267.0 228.9 1,512.0 3,313.3 311.2 80–89 232.6 262.1 7.4 461.3 578.5 14.6 90+ 3.7 3.7 0.0 51.3 43.9 0.0 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 831.5 20,403.6 139,943.7 757.6 18,609.3 127,046.0 10–19 50.5 9,469.6 81,341.8 33.7 9,175.0 75,016.1 20–29 64.0 7,257.9 140,155.8 70.7 6,983.1 130,880.9 30–39 148.1 7,843.7 75,356.4 127.9 7,865.2 72,194.6 40–49 323.2 10,334.8 50,542.8 289.6 10,070.6 50,141.0 50–59 737.2 13,822.4 18,834.9 757.6 13,117.7 18,733.8 60–69 1,141.2 10,159.7 6,349.0 1,228.9 11,225.5 6,720.5 70–79 1,033.5 3,874.7 666.5 1,595.9 5,383.8 932.7 80–89 326.5 498.2 20.2 680.1 1,053.9 50.5 90+ 30.3 23.6 3.4 67.3 47.1 0.0 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 1,588.9 23,702.8 50,452.4 1,362.1 20,195.9 44,460.6 10–19 86.2 15,747.9 148,255.3 86.4 14,080.4 135,400.8 20–29 37.9 7,758.5 84,440.1 24.2 7,605.4 78,159.6 30–39 72.4 7,403.5 141,355.1 79.5 7,176.8 132,528.0 40–49 189.6 8,747.7 73,462.5 162.5 8,888.0 70,951.7 50–59 423.9 10,974.2 45,689.1 442.5 11,259.5 46,140.7 60–69 947.8 12,294.3 13,152.5 1,095.9 12,981.1 14,215.2 70–79 1,202.9 6,386.7 2,819.4 1,548.7 8,200.0 3,699.0 80–89 503.2 1,082.3 155.1 957.6 2,050.0 193.6 90+ 41.4 27.6 0.0 169.4 83.0 0.0

63 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 3,289.3 41,171.7 48,897.3 2,953.8 35,272.8 42,218.1 10–19 269.9 19,698.6 53,876.8 230.6 16,569.8 47,623.8 20–29 57.4 13,723.9 146,074.6 61.0 12,212.0 133,776.0 30–39 37.1 7,182.4 82,370.4 27.1 7,003.0 76,351.4 40–49 81.0 7,867.3 134,573.9 81.4 7,644.0 126,576.3 50–59 276.6 9,449.5 65,509.1 234.0 9,902.6 64,383.6 60–69 701.7 10,603.3 34,289.5 657.9 11,649.1 37,429.6 70–79 1,120.0 8,450.9 6,413.3 1,366.7 10,804.6 8,145.9 80–89 722.0 2,398.6 587.0 1,187.0 3,944.1 1,014.0 90+ 77.6 111.3 0.0 210.3 332.3 10.2 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 6,711.0 38,837.7 36,310.1 6,099.7 34,037.1 31,285.2 10–19 1,051.8 34,396.5 58,190.4 943.4 29,531.3 50,033.9 20–29 156.1 18,803.1 54,936.7 163.5 15,853.8 48,419.6 30–39 57.7 13,574.7 146,115.7 51.1 11,967.8 133,560.0 40–49 37.3 7,552.4 80,929.2 30.7 7,455.2 74,878.9 50–59 135.7 9,564.4 126,009.7 119.2 9,256.8 119,950.6 60–69 437.7 10,321.0 53,155.5 510.9 11,232.2 55,435.4 70–79 922.9 8,512.6 20,855.7 1,021.7 10,891.6 26,251.5 80–89 814.3 3,610.0 1,608.2 1,423.6 5,895.4 2,942.6 90+ 145.9 302.0 33.9 388.3 732.2 95.4 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 9,435.6 44,574.9 8,575.9 8,663.4 40,629.6 7,540.8 10–19 2,889.7 42,089.1 38,118.7 2,587.3 36,854.0 32,760.7 20–29 801.0 34,134.6 60,014.3 666.7 29,068.0 51,583.2 30–39 155.4 18,999.0 55,702.2 145.1 15,979.6 48,861.2 40–49 69.0 14,155.1 146,319.2 55.3 12,494.2 133,084.2 50–59 51.8 8,834.9 77,466.6 41.5 8,559.8 72,291.8 60–69 255.5 11,842.0 107,938.1 231.4 11,962.3 107,505.0 70–79 697.4 10,229.7 34,100.1 949.9 12,390.6 40,536.3 80–89 852.8 4,802.4 7,833.7 1,226.3 7,962.2 12,311.2 90+ 207.1 628.3 138.1 559.6 1,374.8 393.8

64 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 11,763.6 55,446.3 3,351.2 11,211.9 49,407.7 2,983.6 10–19 4,362.8 48,895.3 8,959.5 4,051.9 44,774.9 7,896.4 20–29 2,343.1 41,903.9 38,315.2 2,019.0 36,875.1 33,134.4 30–39 756.9 33,787.3 59,798.8 632.7 28,881.9 51,488.9 40–49 168.6 19,260.8 54,524.2 152.1 16,321.7 47,779.3 50–59 79.1 15,211.2 139,082.0 58.8 13,645.8 127,939.2 60–69 99.8 10,772.7 66,274.1 79.5 10,665.6 64,543.5 70–79 529.9 13,834.9 74,476.6 587.7 14,997.6 81,688.1 80–89 829.2 7,242.6 14,017.3 1,313.8 10,565.4 19,212.0 90+ 289.0 1,193.9 1,307.5 525.5 2,810.8 2,350.9 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 8,141.5 46,199.4 728.0 7,741.5 43,494.9 641.6 10–19 6,443.9 61,285.3 3,888.7 6,204.5 54,962.6 3,525.3 20–29 3,654.2 50,123.1 9,335.1 3,391.3 46,057.8 8,270.3 30–39 2,275.1 42,671.2 38,785.9 1,970.6 37,540.7 33,631.2 40–49 770.0 34,813.2 59,696.2 655.7 29,679.3 51,504.3 50–59 182.0 20,577.8 52,408.8 162.2 17,496.0 46,163.5 60–69 129.5 18,246.6 125,682.4 105.8 16,685.2 118,276.7 70–79 266.0 13,101.3 48,481.5 331.4 13,840.3 50,351.6 80–89 994.1 12,579.8 35,086.2 1,138.7 15,412.5 43,709.9 90+ 469.0 2,800.2 2,198.1 736.8 4,727.4 4,032.9 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 9,052.2 46,334.7 784.1 8,591.7 42,540.0 708.5 10–19 4,573.8 49,502.8 1,437.5 4,269.0 46,984.3 1,291.8 20–29 5,485.0 62,376.5 4,316.0 5,238.8 56,413.4 3,904.0 30–39 3,517.7 50,625.9 9,401.9 3,220.6 46,773.2 8,402.1 40–49 2,299.3 43,212.5 38,448.0 1,996.7 38,185.1 33,458.0 50–59 808.8 35,739.1 57,693.2 715.7 30,810.0 49,890.0 60–69 226.0 22,558.1 46,362.9 200.4 19,738.4 41,534.4 70–79 413.2 21,989.5 97,352.6 372.2 21,069.6 95,428.7 80–89 660.5 12,909.0 23,861.4 880.3 14,474.6 26,576.7 90+ 720.5 6,014.8 6,579.9 1,084.3 9,056.9 9,640.2 Source: Author’s calculations.

65 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table A5. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with Different Counts of Living Aunts and Uncles, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 254.8 27,086.3 73,069.6 212.3 25,148.0 66,877.0 10–19 1,163.1 46,297.1 116,339.0 1,094.7 42,428.3 107,994.5 20–29 2,994.4 39,529.2 50,768.4 2,976.5 37,068.4 48,710.7 30–39 6,151.3 39,617.8 24,324.5 5,887.0 38,635.4 23,511.5 40–49 11,770.9 27,145.4 2,536.6 10,811.2 25,678.8 2,277.2 50–59 12,708.7 12,332.1 121.8 12,513.6 12,264.6 113.5 60–69 8,824.5 2,994.4 0.0 9,994.7 3,324.3 3.7 70–79 3,156.9 369.2 0.0 4,671.5 465.0 0.0 80–89 494.8 7.4 0.0 1,014.1 40.3 0.0 90+ 7.4 0.0 0.0 95.2 0.0 0.0 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 252.5 34,774.7 126,151.6 195.3 31,131.0 115,086.5 10–19 265.9 21,716.5 68,879.5 222.2 20,511.6 63,491.0 20–29 1,471.1 41,864.3 104,142.3 1,380.5 38,733.7 97,820.6 30–39 3,979.1 36,767.6 42,601.5 3,919.2 34,966.0 41,302.6 40–49 7,648.4 35,040.6 18,511.7 7,643.0 34,727.0 18,131.1 50–59 13,085.1 19,215.3 1,094.1 12,511.7 19,164.8 932.7 60–69 11,678.0 5,955.1 16.8 12,626.1 6,535.3 13.5 70–79 4,871.1 703.6 0.0 6,898.9 1,013.5 0.0 80–89 818.0 26.9 0.0 1,720.5 64.0 0.0 90+ 57.2 0.0 0.0 114.5 0.0 0.0 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 227.5 23,037.6 52,479.1 200.5 19,525.2 46,292.8 10–19 296.4 32,781.3 131,011.6 221.2 29,554.0 119,792.4 20–29 406.7 22,468.9 69,360.9 397.6 21,253.7 64,137.9 30–39 2,667.7 46,013.1 100,150.1 2,630.8 42,611.1 94,542.3 40–49 6,607.3 39,457.6 36,334.9 6,374.7 38,566.4 35,061.0 50–59 11,322.3 32,857.2 12,907.8 11,377.0 33,470.8 12,994.9 60–69 14,507.1 11,673.9 213.7 15,134.8 12,939.6 217.8 70–79 8,492.6 1,916.4 0.0 10,889.6 2,554.7 3.5 80–89 1,630.3 110.3 0.0 3,059.5 141.7 0.0 90+ 68.9 0.0 0.0 252.4 0.0 0.0

66 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 1,211.1 34,468.3 57,678.9 1,041.1 29,667.0 49,736.6 10–19 226.0 21,844.2 51,775.0 189.9 18,546.9 45,687.4 20–29 374.5 32,494.8 126,986.6 257.7 29,460.1 116,331.3 30–39 833.3 24,887.2 63,869.5 752.9 23,783.1 58,845.6 40–49 5,256.1 51,269.0 85,997.1 4,924.1 48,186.8 81,190.8 50–59 10,002.8 40,712.9 24,519.5 10,262.0 39,722.1 24,536.0 60–69 14,071.4 26,611.2 4,912.0 15,562.6 29,049.8 5,124.2 70–79 11,338.8 4,628.6 16.9 14,480.8 5,795.7 40.7 80–89 3,360.1 347.5 0.0 5,649.9 495.1 0.0 90+ 185.5 3.4 0.0 546.0 6.8 0.0 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 3,854.3 40,093.1 37,911.5 3,330.8 35,508.4 32,582.8 10–19 1,238.4 33,894.4 58,506.0 1,062.6 28,853.5 50,592.5 20–29 244.3 22,436.8 51,214.8 221.4 19,218.7 44,996.8 30–39 661.6 36,561.2 122,525.3 521.1 32,524.9 112,532.9 40–49 2,100.2 29,232.6 57,186.2 1,920.8 27,682.0 52,761.9 50–59 10,354.9 58,227.8 67,127.2 9,655.3 55,626.2 64,045.2 60–69 14,755.4 37,948.8 11,209.9 15,785.7 39,690.6 11,702.2 70–79 14,460.3 15,318.6 512.3 18,523.9 19,160.8 480.2 80–89 5,146.9 885.5 0.0 8,718.7 1,542.8 0.0 90+ 458.0 23.7 0.0 1,178.4 37.5 0.0 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 7,502.2 46,249.3 8,834.9 6,856.8 42,263.5 7,713.5 10–19 3,953.1 40,532.0 38,612.4 3,399.0 35,676.1 33,126.8 20–29 1,308.5 34,845.8 58,795.6 1,112.3 29,617.3 50,588.4 30–39 362.5 25,220.3 49,273.7 297.1 21,523.8 43,165.1 40–49 1,557.1 44,895.9 114,090.4 1,195.2 40,253.1 104,185.4 50–59 4,850.7 36,458.1 45,044.4 4,452.6 34,484.4 41,956.1 60–69 18,153.1 62,938.6 38,943.9 18,242.2 62,498.8 38,957.7 70–79 18,494.9 25,002.8 1,529.4 22,166.3 29,872.9 1,837.7 80–89 9,404.5 4,063.6 20.7 15,275.0 6,221.2 3.5 90+ 921.8 51.8 0.0 2,179.7 148.5 0.0

67 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 11,271.6 55,817.9 3,471.6 9,849.7 50,648.8 3,104.6 10–19 7,452.5 45,963.8 8,801.2 6,866.1 42,178.5 7,678.6 20–29 4,035.9 40,637.7 37,888.6 3,453.8 35,827.6 32,747.1 30–39 1,469.2 36,526.1 56,347.8 1,203.1 31,291.6 48,508.8 40–49 763.8 29,489.9 43,699.9 660.3 25,576.8 38,016.0 50–59 3,943.0 56,069.1 94,360.2 3,599.0 50,458.7 87,586.1 60–69 9,162.5 44,367.4 23,616.7 9,127.2 42,849.2 23,312.3 70–79 25,464.4 56,609.3 6,767.8 28,121.3 61,947.1 7,204.9 80–89 13,931.3 8,099.3 58.5 19,658.0 11,350.2 83.0 90+ 2,374.1 416.3 0.0 4,943.9 743.3 0.0 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 8,327.0 46,129.4 612.5 7,589.9 43,709.9 578.1 10–19 11,529.7 56,493.5 3,594.7 10,075.3 51,402.1 3,215.1 20–29 7,641.0 46,808.4 8,663.0 7,110.5 43,047.2 7,561.7 30–39 4,396.3 42,149.6 37,186.3 3,824.9 37,152.9 32,164.7 40–49 2,271.6 40,049.5 52,958.3 1,889.6 34,396.2 45,553.7 50–59 2,628.7 35,796.7 34,743.2 2,252.7 31,371.5 30,197.5 60–69 11,106.2 66,623.2 66,329.2 10,114.0 61,565.5 63,388.1 70–79 17,028.6 40,242.0 4,578.3 18,021.2 41,912.1 4,589.9 80–89 26,220.1 22,369.9 70.0 32,520.7 27,641.7 98.7 90+ 4,417.3 1,050.1 0.0 7,568.8 1,928.3 0.0 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: Zero One to Nine 10 Plus Zero One to Nine 10 Plus <10 8,314.0 47,065.8 791.1 7,596.9 43,516.9 726.4 10–19 8,462.4 46,285.2 766.4 7,715.0 44,057.2 772.9 20–29 11,814.1 56,824.4 3,538.9 10,377.4 51,969.0 3,209.8 30–39 8,296.4 47,125.8 8,123.3 7,711.4 43,477.5 7,206.9 40–49 5,576.8 43,696.4 34,686.6 4,995.4 38,525.0 30,119.4 50–59 5,552.1 44,685.3 44,003.6 4,716.3 38,364.0 38,335.4 60–69 9,479.6 46,504.2 13,163.3 8,695.5 41,151.6 11,626.2 70–79 27,753.5 77,464.6 14,537.2 26,766.4 76,173.3 13,930.7 80–89 22,289.7 15,084.6 56.5 24,891.3 17,001.0 39.4 90+ 10,436.7 2,874.9 3.5 15,730.6 4,050.7 0.0 Source: Author’s calculations.

68 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Table A6. Simulated Numbers of People (in Thousands) with or Without a Living Spouse, by 10-Year Age Group, Sex, and Year (1980–2060)

Year: 1980 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 100,410.7 0.0 92,237.3 0.0 10–19 160,369.1 3,430.1 139,772.7 11,744.8 20–29 38,476.9 54,815.1 30,478.5 58,277.1 30–39 11,774.6 58,319.1 13,644.9 54,389.0 40–49 4,977.2 36,475.7 5,572.2 33,195.0 50–59 3,238.1 21,924.6 6,033.5 18,858.2 60–69 2,174.7 9,644.2 5,766.2 7,556.5 70–79 1,074.4 2,451.7 3,518.3 1,618.2 80–89 203.1 299.1 911.6 142.8 90+ 0.0 7.4 91.5 3.7 Year: 1990 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 161,178.8 0.0 146,412.8 0.0 10–19 88,101.5 2,760.4 69,615.5 14,609.3 20–29 67,371.3 80,106.3 56,087.0 81,847.7 30–39 18,151.5 65,196.6 16,656.4 63,531.4 40–49 7,486.8 53,713.9 11,111.0 49,390.1 50–59 3,817.5 29,577.0 6,296.2 26,312.9 60–69 2,720.0 14,929.9 7,037.0 12,137.9 70–79 1,454.3 4,120.4 5,053.8 2,858.6 80–89 360.2 484.8 1,528.6 255.9 90+ 43.8 13.5 111.1 3.4 Year: 2000 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 75,744.2 0.0 66,018.5 0.0 10–19 160,608.2 3,481.1 133,903.9 15,663.7 20–29 46,461.2 45,775.3 31,576.3 54,212.9 30–39 38,775.1 110,055.8 34,663.5 105,120.8 40–49 13,259.4 69,140.3 14,215.2 65,786.9 50–59 7,113.9 49,973.4 13,243.8 44,598.9 60–69 3,977.5 22,417.2 9,271.7 19,020.5 70–79 2,671.2 7,737.8 7,882.0 5,565.8 80–89 710.0 1,030.6 2,613.5 587.7 90+ 48.3 20.7 248.9 3.5

69 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Year: 2010 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 93,358.3 0.0 80,444.7 0.0 10–19 72,445.2 1,400.1 54,701.4 9,722.8 20–29 92,049.4 67,806.5 67,659.5 78,389.6 30–39 27,427.6 62,162.4 20,059.5 63,322.1 40–49 28,611.7 113,910.5 25,037.9 109,263.8 50–59 11,382.6 63,852.6 14,480.8 60,039.3 60–69 7,010.4 38,584.2 17,156.5 32,580.1 70–79 3,657.0 12,327.2 10,689.3 9,627.9 80–89 1,481.0 2,226.6 4,869.9 1,275.1 90+ 108.0 81.0 525.6 27.1 Year: 2020 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 81,858.8 0.0 71,422.0 0.0 10–19 92,234.1 1,404.6 71,398.2 9,110.4 20–29 45,338.4 28,557.5 29,517.7 34,919.2 30–39 58,604.4 101,143.7 40,906.5 104,672.4 40–49 20,024.5 68,494.5 14,828.7 67,536.1 50–59 23,091.6 112,618.2 21,330.2 107,996.4 60–69 10,076.7 53,837.4 17,008.3 50,170.1 70–79 6,816.2 23,475.0 20,155.2 18,009.6 80–89 2,466.6 3,565.9 7,945.6 2,315.9 90+ 274.8 207.0 1,144.3 71.5 Year: 2030 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 62,586.4 0.0 56,833.8 0.0 10–19 81,613.0 1,484.6 62,260.5 9,941.5 20–29 62,179.0 32,770.9 40,833.4 40,484.5 30–39 29,038.7 45,817.8 18,698.2 46,287.8 40–49 42,006.2 118,537.2 29,413.5 116,220.3 50–59 16,112.7 70,240.5 12,663.5 68,229.5 60–69 20,221.1 99,814.4 24,076.5 95,622.2 70–79 9,446.0 35,581.2 22,943.5 30,933.4 80–89 4,940.5 8,548.3 16,034.9 5,464.7 90+ 628.3 345.2 2,152.0 176.2

70 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Year: 2040 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 70,561.2 0.0 63,603.2 0.0 10–19 61,316.1 901.5 50,368.8 6,354.4 20–29 55,133.2 27,429.0 35,561.3 36,467.1 30–39 42,103.4 52,239.6 25,645.9 55,357.6 40–49 20,970.9 52,982.8 13,424.5 50,828.6 50–59 31,433.9 122,938.4 23,243.1 118,400.7 60–69 13,666.3 63,480.3 13,071.9 62,216.8 70–79 18,872.0 69,969.4 30,904.4 66,369.0 80–89 7,486.9 14,602.2 19,882.7 11,208.4 90+ 1,544.9 1,245.5 5,144.4 542.8 Year: 2050 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 55,069.0 0.0 51,878.0 0.0 10–19 70,627.4 990.6 57,596.0 7,096.4 20–29 43,241.7 19,870.7 30,807.4 26,912.0 30–39 37,977.4 45,754.9 23,210.4 49,932.1 40–49 31,866.0 63,413.5 18,729.8 63,109.6 50–59 15,929.5 57,239.1 10,752.1 53,069.6 60–69 26,892.2 117,166.3 22,174.0 112,893.5 70–79 13,199.3 48,649.5 16,230.4 48,292.8 80–89 15,796.5 32,863.6 31,882.6 28,378.5 90+ 2,863.2 2,604.2 7,847.3 1,649.8 Year: 2060 Men Women Age Group: No Living Spouse Living Spouse No Living Spouse Living Spouse <10 56,171.0 0.0 51,840.2 0.0 10–19 54,680.5 833.5 46,683.8 5,861.4 20–29 49,584.0 22,593.4 34,875.0 30,681.2 30–39 28,074.9 35,470.6 19,738.4 38,657.4 40–49 30,063.3 53,896.4 17,011.7 56,628.1 50–59 24,073.3 70,167.8 14,599.9 66,815.8 60–69 13,025.6 56,121.5 9,751.1 51,722.1 70–79 26,181.8 93,573.5 25,342.2 91,528.2 80–89 11,595.2 25,835.7 18,772.3 23,159.4 90+ 6,657.6 6,657.6 14,875.4 4,906.0 Source: Author’s calculations.

71 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Appendix B. Description of Data Sources

he data sets I use in this analysis are the Lon- KLoSA.87 I use data from the 2006 wave of KLoSA, Tgitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), Indo- which surveyed 10,254 adults residing in households in nesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), Japanese Study of mainland Korea. I weight the data with cross-sectional Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), Korean Longitudi- analysis weights accounting for the clustered survey nal Study of Aging (KLoSA), Malaysian Family Life design to make it nationally representative of the pop- Surveys (MFLS), and Survey of the Older Persons in ulation of mainland Korea. KLoSA is organized by the Thailand (SOPT). In this appendix, I review these Korea Employment Information Service. This analysis sources, acknowledge the data providers, and cite uses data or information from the Harmonized KLoSA requisite papers as requested in data access and use data set and Gateway to Global Aging Data’s Novem- agreements. ber 2015 “Codebook, Version B.” The development of the Harmonized KLoSA was funded by the NIA (grants IFLS.84 I use data from the fifth wave of the IFLS, R01 AG030153, RC2 AG036619, and R03 AG043052). which surveyed 50,148 individuals. Cross-sectional analysis weights are available to make estimates rep- LASI.88 I use data from the LASI pilot study, which resentative of the Indonesian population living in sampled 1,683 individuals and their spouses over the 13 IFLS provinces in 2014. Funding for the fifth- age 45. These data are not nationally representative, wave IFLS was provided by the National Institute on but I use individual weights that make the data rep- Aging (NIA), grant 2R01 AG026676-05; the National resentative of rural and urban population counts of Institute for Child Health and Human Development individuals above age 45 in each state. The LASI pilot (NICHD), grant 2R01 HD050764-05A1; the World data collection was supported by an R21 exploratory Bank in Indonesia; GRM International; and the grant from the NIA. LASI is a partnership among the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia. Harvard School of Public Health; the International Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai, India; JSTAR.85 I use JSTAR’s third-wave high-level con- and the RAND Corporation. Also involved in LASI fidentiality data, which constitute 90 percent of the are two other Indian institutions, the National AIDS total JSTAR sample—excluding personally identifi- Research Institute and the Indian Academy of Geriat- able information—and contain 4,515 individuals who rics. The University of California, Los Angeles, School were in focal age groups. With person-level analysis of Medicine also participates in LASI.89 I draw on data weights constructed as part of the National Institute and codebooks from the Harmonized LASI file, pro- of Aging’s funded Gateway to Global Aging project,86 vided by the Gateway to Global Aging Data.90 the data are representative of Japanese older adults. JSTAR was conducted by the Research Institute of MFLS.91 I use data from the senior panel subsample Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI); Hitotsubashi of adults age 50 and above in wave two of the MFLS, University; and the University of Tokyo. It was dis- which contained 1,357 respondents. MFLS was contributed by RIETI in Tokyo, Japan. This analysis also ducted in collaboration between the RAND Cor- uses data or information from the Harmonized JSTAR poration and the National Population and Family data set and Gateway to Global Aging Data’s August Development Board of Malaysia.92 The MFLS was 2014 “Codebook, Version B.” Further, the devel- funded by the NICHD (grant R01 HD23329) and the opment of the Harmonized JSTAR was funded by NIA (grant R01 AG08189). With person-level analysis the NIA (grants R01 AG030153, RC2 AG036619, and weights, these data are representative of individuals 1R03AG043052). in Peninsular Malaysia.

72 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

SOPT.93 I use data from the 2014 wave of SOPT, maintained by the National Statistics Office of Thai- which covers individuals age 50 and older living in land.94 I thank Jongjit Rittirong for providing access Thailand. SOPT is a nationally representative sur- to these data and for helping me understand how to vey, and I use provincial weights to generalize to analyze them. the national population. SOPT is collected and

73 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Notes

1. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017, http:// esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. 2. James Lee and Wang Feng, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities: The Chinese Demographic System 1700–2000,” Popula- tion and Development Review, 1999, 33–65. 3. John D. Durand, “The Population Statistics of China, AD 2–1953,” Population Studies 13, no. 3 (1960): 209–56; Dudley L. Poston and David Yaukey, The Population of Modern China (Berlin, Germany: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013); and UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. I note that many authors consider 1750–1950 to be distinct from the prior era, with higher growth rates on the order of five per thousand; for descriptive simplicity I group these periods together. See Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities”; and Poston and Yaukey, The Population of Modern China. 4. Wang Feng, “The Future of a Demographic Overachiever: Long-Term Implications of the Demographic Transition in China,” Population and Development Review 37, no. s1 (2011): 173–90. 5. S. Philip Morgan, Guo Zhigang, and Sarah R. Hayford, “China’s Below-Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Pros- pects,” Population and Development Review 35, no. 3 (2009): 605–29. 6. Isabelle Attané, “China’s Family Planning Policy: An Overview of Its Past and Future,” Studies in Family Planning 33, no. 1 (2002): 103–13; and Wang Feng, Gu Baochang, and Cai Yong, “The End of China’s One-Child Policy,” Studies in Family Planning 47, no. 1 (2016): 83–86. 7. Cai Yong, “China’s Below-Replacement Fertility: Government Policy or Socioeconomic Development?,” Population and Develop- ment Review 36, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 419–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00341.x; Daniel Goodkind, “The Astonishing Population Averted by China’s Birth Restrictions: Estimates, Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions,” Demography 54, no. 4 (2017): 1375–400; Wang Feng et al., “Is Demography Just a Numerical Exercise? Numbers, Politics, and Legacies of China’s One-Child Policy,” Demography 55, no. 2 (April 2018): 693–719, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0658-7; Susan Greenhalgh, “Making Demogra- phy Astonishing: Lessons in the Politics of Population Science,” Demography 55, no. 2 (April 2018): 721–31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ s13524-018-0660-0; Daniel Goodkind, “If Science Had Come First: A Billion Person Fable for the Ages (a Reply to Comments),” Demog- raphy 55, no. 2 (April 2018): 743–68, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0661-z; and Zhao Zhongwei and Zhang Guangyu, “Socioeco- nomic Factors Have Been the Major Driving Force of China’s Fertility Changes Since the Mid-1990s,” Demography 55, no. 2 (April 2018): 733–42, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0662-y. 8. John Bongaarts and Christophe Z. Guilmoto, “How Many More Missing Women? Excess Female Mortality and Prenatal Sex Selection, 1970–2050,” Population and Development Review 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 241–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457. 2015.00046.x. 9. Catherine Tucker and Jennifer Van Hook, “Surplus Chinese Men: Demographic Determinants of the Sex Ratio at Marriageable Ages in China,” Population and Development Review 39, no. 2 (2013): 209–29; and Christophe Z. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India, 2005–2100,” Demography 49, no. 1 (2012): 77–100. 10. Isabelle Attané, “The Demographic Impact of a Female Deficit in China, 2000–2050,”Population and Development Review 32, no. 4 (2006): 755–70. 11. Ashton M. Verdery, “Links Between Demographic and Kinship Transitions,” Population and Development Review 41, no. 3 (Sep- tember 1, 2015): 465–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00068.x. 12. UN Population Division, “Model Life Tables for E0=20 to 100 by 1 Year Increment for Ages up to 130—the Complete Life Tables,” in World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, 2015, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/4_Other%20Files/MLT_UN2011_130_ 1y_complete.xlsx. 13. Zhou Zhangjun, Ashton Verdery, and Rachel Margolis, “No Spouse, No Son, No Daughter, No Kin in Contemporary China: Differ- ences in Health, Wealth, and Economic Support,” Journal of Gerontology (April 24, 2018). 14. Wong Siu-lun, “The Chinese Family Firm: A Model,” British Journal of Sociology (1985): 58.

74 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

15. Isabelle Attané, “Second Child Decisions in China,” Population and Development Review 42, no. 3 (2016): 519–36. 16. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India.” 17. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin,” 2015, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/index.shtml. 18. Verdery, “Links Between Demographic and Kinship Transitions”; Jonathan Daw, Ashton Verdery, and Rachel Margolis, “Kin Count(s): Educational and Racial Differences in Extended Kinship in the United States,” Population and Development Review 42, no. 3 (2016): 491–517; Vladimir Batagelj and Andrej Mrvar, “Analysis of Kinship Relations with Pajek,” Social Science Computer Review, 2007; and Ashton M. Verdery et al., “Social and Spatial Networks: Kinship Distance and Dwelling Unit Proximity in Rural Thailand,” Social Networks 34, no. 1 (January 2012): 112–27, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2011.04.003. 19. Eugene A. Hammel, The SOCSIM Demographic-Sociological Microsimulation Program: Operating Manual, Institute of Interna- tional Studies, 1976; Eugene A. Hammel, Carl Mason, and Kenneth W. Wachter, “SOCSIM II a Sociodemographic Microsimulation Pro- gram Rev. 1.0 Operating Manual,” 1990; and Carl Mason, “Socsim Oversimplified” (working paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2016), http://lab.demog.berkeley.edu/socsim/CurrentDocs/socsimOversimplified.pdf. 20. University of California, Berkeley, “Microsimulation with Socsim,” 2016, http://lab.demog.berkeley.edu/socsim/. 21. Evert Van Imhoff and Wendy Post, “Microsimulation Methods for Population Projection,” inPopulation: An English Selection, 1998, 97–138. 22. Michael Murphy, “Tracing Very Long-Term Kinship Networks Using SOCSIM,” Demographic Research 10, no. 7 (2004): 171–96; Michael Murphy, “Long-Term Effects of the Demographic Transition on Family and Kinship Networks in Britain,” Population and Development Review 37 (January 1, 2011): 55–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00378.x; Kenneth W. Wachter, “Kinship Resources for the Elderly,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 352, no. 1363 (1997): 1811–17; Kenneth W. Wachter, Debra Blackwell, and Eugene A. Hammel, “Testing the Validity of Kinship Microsimulation,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 26, no. 6 (1997): 89–104; Verdery, “Links Between Demographic and Kinship Transitions”; and Kenneth W. Wach- ter, “2030’s Seniors: Kin and Step-Kin,” University of California, Berkeley, 1995, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.23.2011&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 23. Steven Ruggles, Prolonged Connections: The Rise of the Extended Family in Nineteenth-Century England and America (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Daw, Verdery, and Margolis, “Kin Count(s): Educational and Racial Differences in Extended Kinship in the United States”; Rachel Margolis and Ashton M. Verdery, “Older Adults Without Close Kin in the United States,” Journals of Gerontology: Series B (2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbx068; and Michael Murphy, “Variations in Kinship Networks Across Geographic and Social Space,” Population and Development Review (2008): 19–49. 24. Nathan Keyfitz and Hal Caswell,Applied Mathematical Demography (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2005). 25. Zhao Zhongwei, “Demographic Conditions and Multi-Generation Households in Chinese History: Results from Genealog- ical Research and Microsimulation,” Population Studies 48, no. 3 (November 1, 1994): 413–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0032472031000147946. 26. Wolfgang Lutz and Samir K. C., “Global Human Capital: Integrating Education and Population,” Science 333, no. 6042 (2011): 587–92; Wolfgang Lutz, “Demographic Metabolism: A Predictive Theory of Socioeconomic Change,” Population and Development Review 38, no. s1 (2013): 283–301; and Wolfgang Lutz and Samir K. C., “Dimensions of Global Population Projections: What Do We Know About Future Population Trends and Structures?,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1554 (September 27, 2010): 2779–91, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0133. 27. Cameron D. Campbell, Wang Feng, and James Z. Lee, “Pretransitional Fertility in China,” Population and Development Review 28, no. 4 (2002): 735–50; Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities”; James Lee, Wang Feng, and Cameron Campbell, “Infant and Child Mortality Among the Qing Nobility: Implications for Two Types of Positive Check,” Population Studies 48, no. 3 (1994): 395–411; and Zhao Zhongwei, “Fertility Control in China’s Past,” Population and Development Review 28, no. 4 (2002): 751–57. 28. UN Population Division, “Model Life Tables for E0=20 to 100 by 1 Year Increment for Ages up to 130.” 29. Samuel Preston, Patrick Heuveline, and Michel Guillot, Demography: Measuring and Modeling Population Processes (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2000), 199.

75 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

30. Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities,” 39. 31. Lee, Wang, and Campbell, “Infant and Child Mortality Among the Qing Nobility”; and Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities.” 32. UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, 2015, http:// esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. 33. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 34. Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot, Demography, 48. 35. Ferenc Ajus, “Documentation for Children per Woman (Total Fertility Rate) for Countries and Territories,” Gapminder, 2009, https://www.gapminder.org/documentation/documentation/gapdoc008_v2.pdf. 36. Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities.” 37. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 38. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 39. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and Vienna Institute of Demography, “Human Fertility Collection,” 2016, www. fertilitydata.org. 40. Gavin W. Jones, “Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia,”Population and Development Review 33, no. 3 (Septem- ber 1, 2007): 453–78, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00180.x; and Morgan, Guo, and Hayford, “China’s Below-Replacement Fertility.” 41. UN Statistics Division, “United Nations Demographic Yearbooks,” 2016, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/ DYBNat/. 42. For instance, compare fertility rates standardized on one dimension (age) to fertility rates standardized on two dimensions (age and marital status defined as married and unmarried). See Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot,Demography , 97. 43. Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities.” 44. Mattias Lindgren, “Documentation for Age at First Marriage of Women for Countries and Territories. Data Set 009. Version 1,” 2009, https://www.gapminder.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/gapdoc009.pdf; and UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Marriage Data,” 2015, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/marriage-unions/ WMD2015.shtml. 45. Lee and Wang, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities.” 46. Wang Qingbin and Zhou Qin, “China’s Divorce and Remarriage Rates: Trends and Regional Disparities,” Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 51, no. 4 (April 30, 2010): 257–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/10502551003597949. 47. Philip N. Cohen, “Multiple-Decrement Life Table Estimates of Divorce Rates,” 2016, https://osf.io/zber3/. 48. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Family Database, “Table SF3.2.A: Distribution of Divorce by Dura- tion of the Marriage, 2012,” 2016, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm. 49. Xu Qi, Qiu Zeqi, and Li Jianxin, “Is the ‘Seven-Year Itch’ Real?—A Study on the Changing Divorce Pattern in Chinese Marriages,” Journal of Chinese Sociology 3, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 17, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40711-016-0038-x. 50. UN Statistics Division, “United Nations Demographic Yearbooks”; and Wang and Zhou, “China’s Divorce and Remarriage Rates.” 51. Wang and Zhou, “China’s Divorce and Remarriage Rates.” 52. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India”; Bongaarts and Guilmoto, “How Many More Missing Women?”; and Daniel Goodkind, “The Claim That China’s Fertility Restrictions Contributed to the Use of Prenatal Sex Selection: A Sceptical Reappraisal,” Population Studies 69, no. 3 (2015): 263–79. 53. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India.” 54. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 55. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 56. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 57. Zhou, Verdery, and Margolis, “No Spouse, No Son, No Daughter, No Kin in Contemporary China.” 58. Zhao Yaohui et al., “Cohort Profile: The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS),” International Journal of

76 MODELING THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE TO 2100

Epidemiology 43, no. 1 (2012): 61–68. 59. Yu Jia and Xie Yu, “Cohabitation in China: Trends and Determinants,” Population and Development Review 41, no. 4 (2015): 607–28. 60. Margolis and Verdery, “Older Adults Without Close Kin in the United States”; Ashton M. Verdery and Rachel Margolis, “Projec- tions of White and Black Older Adults Without Living Kin in the United States, 2015 to 2060,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2017; and Zhou, Verdery, and Margolis, “No Spouse, No Son, No Daughter, No Kin in Contemporary China.” 61. Margolis and Verdery, “Older Adults Without Close Kin in the United States.” 62. Ashton M. Verdery et al., “Kinlessness Around the Word,” Journals of Gerontology: Series B (November 13, 2018), https:// academic.oup.com/psychsocgerontology/advance-article/doi/10.1093/geronb/gby138/5180075. 63. UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 64. David S. Reher, “Economic and Social Implications of the Demographic Transition,” Population and Development Review 37 (Jan- uary 1, 2011): 11–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00376.x. 65. Eduard B. Vermeer, “Demographic Dimensions of China’s Development,” Population and Development Review 32, no. S1 (2006): 116. 66. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India.” 67. Margolis and Verdery, “Older Adults Without Close Kin in the United States.” 68. Verdery et al., “Kinlessness Around the World.” 69. Tomas Frejka, Gavin W. Jones, and Jean-Paul Sardon, “East Asian Childbearing Patterns and Policy Developments,” Population and Development Review 36, no. 3 (2010): 579–606. 70. Morgan, Guo, and Hayford, “China’s Below-Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects.” 71. James M. Raymo et al., “Marriage and Family in East Asia: Continuity and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology 41, no. 1 (2015): 471–92, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112428. 72. Guilmoto, “Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India.” 73. Bongaarts and Guilmoto, “How Many More Missing Women?” 74. Raymo et al., “Marriage and Family in East Asia.” 75. David E. Scharff, “Changing Family and Marital Structure in China: Emotional Strain at Cultural and Individual Levels,” inChi - na’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019; and Jacque- line N. Deal and Michael Szonyi, “China’s Demographic Trends: How Will They Matter?,” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 76. Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong, “Household Change and Intergenerational Transfers in China: What Lies Ahead?,” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019; and Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian, “Dynamics and Policy Implications of Family Households and Elderly Living Arrangements in China,” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 77. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Age and Sex,” 2015, http://www. un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/index.shtml. 78. Liang Zai and Hideki Morooka, “Recent Trends of Emigration from China: 1982–2000,” International Migration 42, no. 3 (August 1, 2004): 145–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-7985.2004.00292.x. 79. M. Giovanna Merli et al., “Sampling Migrants from Their Social Networks: The Demography and Social Organization of Chinese Migrants in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania,” Migration Studies (2016). 80. Liang Zai et al., “Cumulative Causation, Market Transition, and Emigration from China,” American Journal of Sociology 114, no. 3 (November 2008): 706–37. 81. Liang Zai and Ma Zhongdong, “China’s Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census,” Population and Development Review 30, no. 3 (2004): 467–88. 82. Zhou, Verdery, and Margolis, “No Spouse, No Son, No Daughter, No Kin in Contemporary China.” 83. Cai Yong and William Lavely, “China’s Missing Girls: Numerical Estimates and Effects on Population Growth,” China Review (2003): 13–29.

77 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

84. RAND Corporation, “The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS),” https://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html; and John Strauss, Firman Witoelar, and Bondan Sikoki, The Fifth Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey: Overview and Field Report, RAND Corpora- tion, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1143z1.html. 85. Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, “JSTAR (Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement),” https://www.rieti.go.jp/ en/projects/jstar/. 86. Gateway to Global Aging Data, https://g2aging.org/. 87. Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, “About KLoSA,” https://survey.keis.or.kr/eng/klosa/klosa01.jsp; and Gateway to Global Aging Data. 88. Harvard School of Public Health, “Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI),” https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/pgda/major- projects/lasi-2/. 89. P. Arokiasamy et al., “Longitudinal Aging Study in India: Vision, Design, Implementation, and Preliminary Findings,” 2012. 90. Gateway to Global Aging Data. 91. RAND Corporation, “The First and Second Malaysian Family Life Surveys,” https://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/MFLS.html. 92. Julie DaVanzo and John Haaga, Second Malaysian Family Life Survey: 1988 Interviews (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1992). 93. Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, “National Statistical Office,”http://web.nso.go.th/en/survey/age/ older07.htm. 94. John Knodel, Vipan Prachuabmoh, and Napaporn Chayovan, “The Changing Well-Being of Thai Elderly: An Update from the 2011 Survey of Older Persons in Thailand,” Population Studies Center, 2013, https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr13-793.pdf; and John Knodel et al., “The Situation of Thailand’s Older Population: An Update Based on the 2014 Survey of Older Persons in Thailand,” Pop- ulation Studies Center, October 2015, https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr15-847.pdf.

78 Dynamics and Policy Implications of Family Households and Elderly Living Arrangements in China

Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian

nder the rapid socioeconomic transformations these three major types of households, the propor- Uthat have taken place in China over the past sev- tion of three-generation stem family households has eral decades, how have Chinese family households and remained stable in recent decades, whereas the pro- elderly living arrangements changed? How can we bet- portion of nuclear family households significantly ter understand these dynamic changes? Our previous declined from 2000 to 2010 due to the rapid increase studies based on the one-per-thousand micro sample of one-person households. data from the 1982, 1990, and 2000 censuses of China The young rural immigrants who moved to have shown that, during 1982–2000, the one-person urban areas could have contributed to the growth and one-couple-only households increased quickly, of one-person households in both rural and urban average household sizes decreased significantly, and areas. The inflow of young immigrants increased the the proportions of elderly couple–only households one-person household in cities, and the left-behind and elderly who did not live with children substan- elderly parents in rural areas contributed to the tially increased.1 Other studies also had similar find- increase of one-person elderly households in rural ings, concluding that the family transformation in regions.5 With elderly living arrangements, the China during 1982–2000 was caused by tremendous increase in the proportion of elderly age 65 or over who fertility decline, rapid industrialization, increasing live alone or with only a spouse and the decrease in the migration, a rise in women’s education, and significant proportion of elderly living in three-generation stem changes in social attitudes and economic mobility family households from 1982 to 2010 are substantial.6 related to co-residence between elderly parents and Based on our own and others’ previous studies, adult children.2 this chapter intends to significantly contribute to bet- The most recent census of China in 2010 reveals ter understanding the dynamics of households and that the trends outlined above have continued. For elderly living arrangements in China. We conduct example, although the total number of households comparative analyses across different periods and continues to increase in China, the average house- rural and urban areas by analyzing the micro data files hold size reduced from 3.44 in 2000 to 3.09 in 2010; of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses and the officially in particular, small households with only one or two published 100 percent cross tabulations. We integrate persons have increased rapidly.3 With the house- the analysis of elderly living arrangements with fam- hold structure, Wang Yuesheng found that nuclear ily household dynamics because the Chinese popu- households, three-generation stem family house- lation has been aging rapidly7 and family is the most holds, and one-person households made up the important institution for old-age support in Chinese majority of Chinese households in 2010.4 Among society.8 We investigate the trends based on not only

79 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

dynamics of proportion distributions of household that census enumerations had become more diffi- types and sizes and elderly living arrangements but cult during radical market economic reform, mainly also changes in absolute numbers, which are useful because many more people were moving around and for socioeconomic planning and business and market the administrative system was not yet adapted to the analyses. tremendous changes. The next section outlines the data sources and the For example, based on post-census sampling sur- approach of analyses. The third and fourth sections veys, the officially published net undercount rate present the general patterns and dynamic changes of of the 2000 census was 1.81 percent, compared to family household sizes and types and the elderly liv- 0.6 percent in the 1990 census. However, the officially ing arrangements since 1990. Then, we discuss the reported net undercount rate in the 2010 census was rural-urban differentials. Finally, we examine the pol- 0.12 percent. Perhaps the more mature administrative icy implications and conclude the chapter. Through- system adapting to the market economic system cre- out the chapter, we also discuss socioeconomic and ated the decline from the 2000 and 1990 rates.13 But cultural explanations on the patterns and dynamic generally, the undercount rates in the contemporary changes in Chinese family households and elderly liv- Chinese censuses are not as high as other countries’ ing arrangements. censuses.14 Nevertheless, we must keep the issue of undercount rate in mind, although it may not significantly affect our analysis on family household types Data Sources and the Approach of and living arrangements of elderly who usually do not Analyses move around. The governmental socioeconomic planning and The analyses presented in this chapter are mainly private business market analysis need not only based on the micro sample data of the 2010, 2000, detailed proportion distributions but also absolute and 1990 censuses with a sample size of 1.34, 12.6, and numbers of households by types and sizes and by 1.14 million persons, respectively. (The sample frac- elderly living arrangements. In some circumstances, tion was one per thousand of the total population the dynamic changes in absolute numbers may be for the 2010 and 1990 censuses and one per hundred more useful than that of proportions. For example, for the 2000 census.)9 Based on analyzing the 1953, as discussed later, the absolute numbers of the Chi- 1964, and 1982 censuses data and the 1982 one-per- nese oldest old age 80 and older living alone (who thousand fertility survey data, Ansley Coale10 con- may likely need care services) increased by 233.2 per- cluded that the data passed a series of stringent tests cent from 1990 to 2010. In contrast, the increase in of accuracy and consistency. Other scholars who the proportion of oldest old living alone among total have analyzed Chinese censuses and survey data population was 21.8 percent in the same period. have reached similar conclusions.11 Underreporting The statistical offices publish cross tabulations of births has, however, become a problem in recent of both proportions and absolute numbers based on decades, contributing to underestimation of fertility the 100 percent census data, but these cross tabu- and family household size. lations only contain certain limited broad catego- Based on sophisticated demographic analysis using ries, do not have detailed information of households the censuses and various other data, many scholars by types and sizes, and do not contain much infor- demonstrated that the overall fertility in China (espe- mation about elderly living arrangements. Thus, cially in urban areas) has been far below the replace- scholars rely on the data source of census micro ment level since the late 1990s. Thus, the effects of samples to estimate the proportion distributions underreporting of births on statistics of magnitude by detailed types of family households and elderly of family household size may not be large.12 Statisti- living arrangements, which are useful for academic cal officers and scholars in the field generally believe research and policy analysis.

80 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

However, almost all the previously published stud- phenomenon of the much faster increase in the num- ies on family households and elderly living arrange- ber of households than in population size. ments based on the census micro data include only proportion distributions but not detailed informa- Chinese Family Household Size Is Steadily tion about the cross-sectional and dynamic changes Decreasing. In 1990, four-person households con- in absolute numbers. Our present study intends to stituted the largest share of all household categories contribute to this research field by estimating and by size, but it became the second largest in 2000 and discussing both detailed proportions and absolute the third in 2010. Households of five or more people numbers of family households by types and sizes and account for 33 percent of the total family households elderly population by living arrangements, based on in 1990 but sharply declined to 22 percent in 2000 and the approach of integrated analyses on the census 17 percent in 2010. Three-person households consti- micro samples data and the official 100 percent cross tuted the largest percentage share in both 2000 (30 per- tabulations. cent) and 2010 (27 percent), whereas the two-person It is not valid to simply multiply the detailed pro- household became the second-largest group of house- portion distributions of family households and elderly holds in 2010 (23 percent). Large households were living arrangements derived from the census micro no longer popular; households of six or more people sample data by the absolute numbers of the officially constituted 15.4 percent in 1990, decreased to only published but limited summary measures based on 8.1 percent in 2000, and further decreased to 6.6 per- the 100 percent census data in order to estimate the cent in 2010 (Figure 1). corresponding detailed absolute numbers. This would The average family household size in China was produce results that are not internally and logically 5.6 in 1930–40 and 4.36 in 1982. It was reduced to 3.94 consistent. in 1990, 3.45 in 2000, and then 3.10 in 2010. According Thus, to avoid the inconsistency, we apply the to the Chinese census enumeration rules, the average BasePop module of the ProFamy extended cohort- family household sizes include the emigrants who component model and its software program for house- left home for less than half a year for job-related rea- holds and elderly living arrangements projections.15 sons. They were counted as hometown-household Based on the detailed census micro samples data and members, but these persons were not actually living the official 100 percent census data cross tabulations in their home residence. Therefore, the actual aver- of summary measures, the ProFamy BasePop module age household size in China today would be even prepares the detailed 100 percent population distribu- smaller than the published figures. Chinese family tions of households and living arrangements by house- household size is steadily and substantially decreas- hold types and sizes, age and sex, and co-residence and ing due to dramatically decreased fertility, rapid rural-urban residence in the census year as a baseline industrialization, rise in education, and changes in for the family households projections, as well as ensur- people’s attitudes, which tend to favor smaller fam- ing internal consistencies and accuracy. The ProFamy ily households. model and its technical modules (including BasePop) Although Chinese family households maintain and procedures are described, numerically evaluated, the typical Asian characteristics—namely, three- and discussed elsewhere, so they do not need to be generation extended family households remain a detailed here.16 relatively large proportion of the household types (to be detailed later)—Chinese family households in 2000–10 were substantially smaller than those of Changing Family Households, 1990–2010 many large Asian developing countries. For example, the average family household size in India and In this section, we discuss the dynamics of Chinese Indonesia in 2010 was 4.91 and 3.90, respectively family household size and types and the interesting (per the Indian and Indonesian censuses), which is

81 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 1. Family Household Size Distributions, Rural and Urban Combined, 1990–2010

1990 30 2000 2010 25

20 centage r 15 Pe

0 123 456789+ Family Household Size

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

58.9 percent and 26.2 percent larger than that in China delaying childbearing in 2010, compared to 2000 in the same year, respectively. and 1990. The increasing number of young couples in cities who choose to remain childless (i.e., the Dramatically Increased Proportion of One- so-called double-income-and-no-kids families) may Person and One-Couple-Only Households. One- also be a contributing factor. For example, based on person households in 2010, 2000, and 1990 accounted the famous zero-point index surveys, the proportion for 14.5, 8.3, and 6.3 percent of all households, respec- of double-income-and-no-kids family households tively, representing a 75.1 percent and 131.8 per- in the largest Chinese cities of Beijing, Guanzhou, cent increase in 2010 compared to 2000 and 1990, Shanghai, and Wuhan increased from 1.1 percent in respectively. 1997 to 10.5 percent in 2004, and the average propor- The one-couple-only family households accounted tion among 20 Chinese cities (including middle- and for 17.7 percent of all households in 2010, which was smaller-sized ones) was 6.5 percent in 2008. 2.7 times as large as that in 1990 and 1.4 times as However, the dramatically increased percentages of large as that in 2000 (Table 1). The average annual Chinese one-person and one-couple-only households rate of increase in the percentage of one-couple-only are still much lower than those in Western countries. households was 8.6 percent between 1990 and 2010. For example, the one-person and one-couple-only This dramatic increase is likely due mainly to con- households in the United States in 2010 constituted siderably more elderly couples living without their 26.7 and 27.2 percent of the total number of house- children (to be discussed later) and many couples holds, being 1.84 and 1.54 times as high as the Chinese

82 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Table 1. Percentage Distributions of Households by Types, 1990–2010

Rural and Urban Combined 1990 2000 2010 2010 vs. 1990

One-Generation Households One Person Only 6.27 8.30 14.53 +131.8% One Person and Others 0.76 1.15 1.96 +158.4% Married Couple 6.51 12.25 17.69 +171.8% Subtotal of One Generation 13.53 21.70 34.18 +152.5% Two-Generation Households Married Couple and Children 58.56 52.75 41.63 –28.9% Lone Mother and Children 3.45 2.65 3.34 –3.1% Lone Father and Children 6.05 3.91 2.85 –53.0% Subtotal of Two Generation 68.05 59.32 47.83 –29.7% Three-Generation Households Married Couple (Mid-Generation) 15.89 16.09 14.25 –10.3% Lone Mother (Mid-Generation) 0.71 0.90 1.69 +138.5% Lone Father (Mid-Generation) 1.82 2.00 2.06 +13.4% Subtotal of Three Generation 18.41 18.98 18.00 –2.3%

Average Household Size 3.46 3.46 3.07 –11.3%

Rural Urban 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 1990 One-Generation Households One Person Only 5.87 6.93 12.44 +112.1% 6.60 10.50 16.49 +149.7% One Person and Others 0.52 0.86 0.70 +34.3% 1.00 1.63 3.20 +219.6% Married Couple 5.86 10.43 16.63 +183.7% 7.00 15.14 18.63 +166.1% Subtotal of One Generation 12.25 18.21 29.77 +143.0% 14.61 27.26 38.32 +162.3% Two-Generation Households Married Couple and Children 59.49 52.86 41.67 –30.0% 57.78 52.58 41.61 –28.0% Lone Mother and Children 3.09 2.74 3.39 +9.6% 3.73 2.50 3.29 –11.8% Lone Father and Children 6.01 4.12 2.48 –58.8% 6.08 3.59 3.20 –47.4% Subtotal of Two Generation 68.60 59.72 47.54 –30.7% 67.59 58.67 48.10 –28.8% Three-Generation Households Married Couple (Mid-Generation) 16.94 18.84 18.07 +6.7% 15.04 11.70 10.71 –28.8% Lone Mother (Mid-Generation) 0.52 1.00 2.15 +316.9% 0.86 0.73 1.26 +46.5% Lone Father (Mid-Generation) 1.70 2.22 2.54 +49.8% 1.91 1.64 1.62 –15.2% Subtotal of Three Generation 19.15 22.07 22.77 +18.9% 17.80 14.07 13.58 –23.7% Average Household Size 4.13 3.67 3.31 –19.9% 3.80 3.11 2.83 –25.6%

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

83 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 2. Relative Increases of Number of Households and Population Size, 1990–2010

50 Number of Family Households +45.1% 45 Population Size 40

25 +23.0%

Percentage 20 +18.0% +17.9% 15 +12.5% 10 +4.8% 5

0 2000 vs. 1990 2010 vs. 2000 2010 vs. 1990

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

ones, respectively. The main reasons the percent- large as the population growth (17.9 percent) during ages of one-person and one-couple-only households the same period. Figure 2 also demonstrates that the in China are still much lower than those in Western relative difference between the increase of households countries are threefold. and population size in 2000–10 was much larger than First, fewer Chinese remain never married for life. that in 1990–2000. More specifically, the increase in Second, most Chinese couples, especially about half the number of households was 3.8 times (18.0 per- the population that lives in rural areas, had their first cent ÷ 4.8 percent) as large as population growth in birth earlier than their Western counterparts did, and 2000–10, in contrast to the corresponding relative fewer couples remain permanently childless. Third, difference of 1.8 times (23.0 percent ÷12.5 percent) as discussed in greater detail later, unlike the elderly in 1990–2000. The data shown in Figure 2 clearly in the Western countries who mostly do not live with indicate that while population growth in China has their adult children, most Chinese elderly, especially slowed substantially, the number of households is those who have no spouse, live with their children, increasing rapidly because many Chinese people are and such a tradition remains, although it is declining. forming one- or two-person and other kinds of small households. Much Faster Increase in Number of Households Than in Population Size. Figure 2 shows that the Substantially Decreasing Percentage of Two- number of Chinese family households increased by Generation Nuclear Family Households. The 45.1 percent from 1990 to 2010, which is 2.5 times as proportions of nuclear family households that are

84 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

one-couple-with-children households and single- living arrangements of oldest old (age 80 plus), who parent-with-children households decreased by 28.9 most likely need care in daily life and are increasing and 33.7 percent, respectively, from 1990 to 2010 much faster than that of any other age groups. We, (Table 1). This substantial decrease in nuclear family therefore, devote a substantial portion of this chap- households is due to the large increase in one-couple- ter to analyzing the dynamic changes in elderly liv- only and one-person households. The decreasing per- ing arrangements since 1990 and classify the elderly centage of single-parent family households while the population into two broad groups: younger elders divorce rate in China is increasing may also be due (age 65–79) and oldest old (age 80 plus). to most divorced couples having either no children or children who have already left home, increased remar- Co-Residence Between Elderly Parents and riage rates, and the decreasing widowhood rate.17 Adult Children Declined Substantially. As shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, the proportions of elderly living Changes in the Proportion of Three-Generation with children (including children and grandchildren Family Households. While nuclear family house- hereafter, unless otherwise specified) have declined holds are mainstream in Chinese society today, substantially in both 1990–2000 and 2000–2010. At extended family households with three genera- the same time, the majority of Chinese elderly still tions also have constituted a relatively large propor- live with their children because children are currently tion of households: 18.41, 18.98, and 18.00 percent the major source of old-age care in Chinese society. in 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively (Table 1). The decrease of co-residence with children among The three-generation family household was the young elders (Table 3) was faster than that among second-largest family household type in 2010, while oldest olds (Table 4). More specifically, the propor- the most popular was the two-generation nuclear tions of younger male and female elderly age 65–79 households and the third and fourth were one-couple- who co-resided with children in 2010 was lower by only and one-person-only households. 28.5 and 21.3 percent, respectively, compared to 1990 The proportion of three-generation family house- (Table 4), and the corresponding figures of decrease holds in rural areas increased by 18.9 percent from among male and female oldest olds (age 80 plus) were 1990 to 2010, but it decreased by 23.7 percent in 20.3 and 13.1 percent, respectively (Table 3). Among urban areas in the same period, while the proportion the male and female elderly populations age 65 plus, of three-generation family households in rural and the proportion of those living with children dropped urban areas combined slightly decreased by 2.3 per- by 27.6 and 19.2 percent, respectively, from 1990 to cent in 1990–2010. We discuss such interesting phe- 2010 (Table 2). nomenon and the dramatic rural-urban differentials These data indicate that (1) the prevalence of the later. traditional co-residence between elderly parents and adult children has declined substantially from 1990 to 2010, (2) the decrease was considerably more Dynamics of Elderly Living profound among young elders than oldest olds, and Arrangements, 1990–2010 (3) the decrease was substantially faster among men than women. Such trends may be due to increases in Analyzing the changes of elderly living arrange- younger and healthier elderly parents’ preference for ments would more directly and accurately reveal the independent living and increases in more adult chil- changes in intergenerational co-residence between dren migrating away from their elderly parents for elderly parents and adult children than would look- job-related reasons. Female elderly (either young ing at only the proportions of three-generation ver- elders or oldest olds) are much more likely to live sus nuclear family households as discussed above. with their adult children (see Tables 2, 3, and 4) than Furthermore, we must pay special attention to the male elderly are. This gender differential increased in

85 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table 2. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Elderly Age 65 Plus, 1990–2010

Rural and Urban Combined 1990 2000 2010 2010 vs. 1990

Age 65 Plus, Men Living Alone 8.0 7.8 9.8 +22.9% With Spouse Only 23.5 33.4 40.4 +72.3% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 31.5 41.2 50.3 +59.7% Married with Children 42.5 38.0 33.8 –20.3% Not Married with Children 23.5 18.8 13.9 –40.8% Subtotal of Living with Children 66.0 56.8 47.8 –27.6% Institutionalized 1.1 0.8 0.9 –23.2% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.4 1.2 1.1 –22.2%

Age 65 Plus, Women Living Alone 10.6 9.7 13.4 +26.6% With Spouse Only 14.2 20.4 25.9 +82.5% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 24.8 30.0 39.3 +58.6% Married with Children 22.8 28.5 26.4 +15.8% Not Married with Children 51.1 40.6 33.3 –34.8% Subtotal of Living with Children 73.9 69.1 59.7 –19.2% Institutionalized 0.4 0.3 0.5 +19.6% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.0 0.6 0.6 –40.5%

Age 65 Plus, Both Genders Living Alone 9.4 8.8 11.7 +24.3% With Spouse Only 18.4 26.5 32.9 +78.6% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 27.8 35.3 44.6 +60.3% Married with Children 31.8 33.0 30.0 –5.5% Not Married with Children 38.6 30.3 24.0 –37.9% Subtotal of Living with Children 70.3 63.3 53.9 –23.3% Institutionalized 0.7 0.5 0.7 –8.4% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.2 0.9 0.8 –29.5%

(continued on the next page)

2000–10, compared to 1990. This is because elderly 24.3 percent (Table 2). The relative increase of young women are more likely to be widowed and economi- elders who lived alone was substantially faster than cally dependent, and they are also more likely to pre- that for oldest olds, and the relative increase of female fer and be requested by their children to live together young elders and female oldest olds who lived alone to take care of grandchildren. was substantially faster than that of their male counterparts (Tables 3 and 4). Proportion of Living Alone and Living with a The relative increase in the proportion of elderly Spouse Only Among Chinese Elderly Substan- who lived with their spouse only for oldest olds tially Increased. The proportion of elderly age 65 (113.8 percent) in 1990–2010 was much faster than plus who live alone has declined by 6.4 percent from that for young elders (82.2 percent), especially so 1990 to 2000 but increased by 33.0 percent from 2000 for female oldest olds (167.1 percent increase) ver- to 2010. In the 20-year period from 1990 to 2010, sus female young elders (86.6 percent increase). the proportion of elderly living alone increased by The large increase in the proportion of elderly who

86 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Table 2. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Elderly Age 65 Plus, 1990–2010 (continued)

Rural Urban 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 1990 Age 65 Plus, Men Living Alone 8.5 7.9 10.9 +28.2% 6.4 7.5 8.4 +29.7% With Spouse Only 21.8 30.2 37.5 +72.0% 28.6 39.7 44.5 +55.6% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 30.3 38.1 48.4 +59.6% 35.0 47.2 52.8 +50.9% Married with Children 42.3 39.0 33.5 –20.7% 43.1 36.1 34.3 –20.3% Not Married with Children 25.1 20.8 16.2 –35.5% 18.6 14.8 10.7 –42.2% Subtotal of Living with Children 67.4 59.8 49.7 –26.2% 61.7 50.9 45.1 –26.9% Institutionalized 0.8 0.6 0.5 –28.2% 2.2 1.1 1.3 –41.6% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.6 1.5 1.3 –14.6% 1.1 0.8 0.8 –25.1%

Age 65 Plus, Women Living Alone 10.3 8.7 12.5 +21.2% 11.4 11.7 14.6 +28.2% With Spouse Only 14.1 18.6 24.0 +70.2% 14.6 24.0 28.6 +96.3% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 24.4 27.2 36.5 +49.5% 26.0 35.7 43.2 +66.4% Married with Children 22.8 28.8 26.9 +18.1% 22.9 28.0 25.7 +12.3% Not Married with Children 51.7 43.2 35.8 –30.7% 49.2 35.2 29.7 –39.6% Subtotal of Living with Children 74.5 72.0 62.8 –15.7% 72.1 63.2 55.4 –23.1% Institutionalized 0.3 0.2 0.2 –8.5% 0.8 0.5 0.8 –3.8% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 0.9 0.6 0.5 –39.3% 1.2 0.6 0.6 –48.2%

Age 65 Plus, Both Genders Living Alone 9.5 8.3 11.7 +23.4% 9.1 9.7 11.6 +27.3% With Spouse Only 17.6 24.1 30.5 +73.5% 21.0 31.5 36.2 +72.4% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 27.1 32.4 42.2 +56.0% 30.1 41.2 47.8 +58.7% Married with Children 31.6 33.6 30.1 –4.8% 32.2 31.9 29.8 –7.3% Not Married with Children 39.6 32.7 26.4 –33.5% 35.1 25.5 20.6 –41.3% Subtotal of Living with Children 71.3 66.3 56.5 –20.8% 67.3 57.3 50.4 –25.0% Institutionalized 0.5 0.4 0.4 –20.5% 1.5 0.8 1.0 –29.7% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.2 1.0 0.9 –22.6% 1.1 0.7 0.7 –37.4%

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

lived with their spouse only in 1990–2010 was likely in China. The reform aimed to protect elders’ rights, because of the substantial decline in the proportion including the right to remarry, which in traditional of elderly who lived with their adult children due Chinese society were often violated by intervening to increases in preference for independent living, children and other family members. While the pro- increased mobility of their children, declines in mor- portion of elderly who live with a spouse only in China tality of elders’ spouses, and rises in remarriage rates has increased substantially in the past two decades, among the elderly. it is still much lower than that in Western countries The increase in remarriage rates among the because the proportion of Chinese elderly who live elderly is a result of social reform and the progress with children is much higher than that in Western of mate-matching services in the past two decades countries.18

87 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table 3. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Young Elders Age 65–79, 1990–2010

Rural and Urban Combined 1990 2000 2010 2010 vs. 1990

Age 65–79, Men Living Alone 7.5 7.4 8.9 +18.7% With Spouse Only 24.1 35.0 42.4 +75.9% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 31.6 42.4 51.3 +62.3% Married with Children 44.5 39.4 35.7 –19.8% Not Married with Children 21.4 16.3 11.1 –48.2% Subtotal of Living with Children 65.9 55.6 46.7 –29.0% Institutionalized 1.1 0.7 0.8 –28.5% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.4 1.2 1.1 –19.1% Age 65–79, Women Living Alone 9.8 9.2 12.0 +21.9% With Spouse Only 15.9 23.0 29.7 +86.6% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 25.7 32.2 41.7 +61.9% Married with Children 25.8 31.7 30.2 +17.2% Not Married with Children 47.3 35.5 27.3 –42.3% Subtotal of Living with Children 73.1 67.1 57.5 –21.3% Institutionalized 0.3 0.2 0.3 +6.3% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 0.9 0.5 0.5 –43.6% Age 65–79, Both Genders Living Alone 8.7 8.3 10.4 +19.7% With Spouse Only 19.8 28.8 36.0 +82.2% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 28.5 37.2 46.5 +63.1% Married with Children 34.6 35.4 32.9 –4.7% Not Married with Children 35.1 26.1 19.2 –45.2% Subtotal of Living with Children 69.7 61.5 52.2 –25.1% Institutionalized 0.7 0.5 0.6 –18.1% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.1 0.9 0.8 –27.6%

(continued on the next page)

The Relative Increases in Absolute Num- have increased by 233.2 and 484.7 percent, respec- bers Versus Proportions of Elderly by Living tively, from 1990 to 2010 (Table A3). In contrast, the Arrangements. While the proportions of elderly increase in the proportions in the same period was age 65 plus who lived alone or with a spouse only 21.8 and 113.8 percent (Table 4). The much larger rel- increased by 24.3 and 78.6 percent, respectively, ative increases in the absolute numbers of elderly from 1990 to 2010 (Table 2), the absolute numbers of (especially oldest olds) who lived alone or with a elderly age 65 plus who lived alone or with a spouse spouse only, compared to the corresponding pro- only increased by 134.7 and 237.3 percent, respec- portions, are mainly due to rapid population aging, tively, in the same period (Table A1). The numbers while later and larger cohorts become elderly and of oldest olds who lived alone or with a spouse only oldest olds.

88 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Table 3. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Young Elders Age 65–79, 1990–2010 (continued)

Rural Urban 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 1990 Age 65–79, Men Living Alone 8.0 7.6 10.0 +25.5% 5.9 7.0 7.3 +22.8% With Spouse Only 22.4 31.8 39.8 +77.3% 29.4 41.2 46.2 +57.2% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 30.5 39.4 49.8 +63.7% 35.3 48.2 53.5 +51.4% Married with Children 44.3 40.4 35.3 –20.3% 45.1 37.3 36.2 –19.6% Not Married with Children 23.0 18.1 13.0 –43.3% 16.3 12.7 8.3 –49.2% Subtotal of Living with Children 67.3 58.5 48.3 –28.2% 61.4 50.0 44.5 –27.5% Institutionalized 0.7 0.6 0.5 –31.0% 2.2 1.1 1.2 –46.7% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.5 1.5 1.3 –11.4% 1.0 0.8 0.8 –20.8% Age 65–79, Women Living Alone 9.5 8.2 11.3 +19.5% 10.9 11.1 12.9 +17.8% With Spouse Only 15.7 21.1 27.6 +75.5% 16.5 27.0 32.5 +97.0% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 25.2 29.3 38.9 +54.4% 27.5 38.0 45.4 +65.4% Married with Children 25.7 32.1 31.0 +20.8% 26.1 30.7 29.1 +11.5% Not Married with Children 48.1 38.0 29.4 –38.8% 44.6 30.5 24.4 –45.3% Subtotal of Living with Children 73.8 70.1 60.4 –18.1% 70.8 61.1 53.5 –24.4% Institutionalized 0.2 0.1 0.2 –8.7% 0.7 0.4 0.5 –21.2% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 0.8 0.5 0.5 –42.0% 1.1 0.5 0.5 –51.6% Age 65–79, Both Genders Living Alone 8.8 7.9 10.7 +21.5% 8.5 9.1 10.1 +18.6% With Spouse Only 18.9 26.3 33.7 +78.7% 22.7 34.0 39.2 +73.0% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 27.6 34.2 44.4 +60.5% 31.2 43.0 49.4 +58.1% Married with Children 34.4 36.1 33.1 –3.5% 35.2 34.0 32.6 –7.4% Not Married with Children 36.4 28.4 21.2 –41.6% 31.1 21.7 16.5 –47.0% Subtotal of Living with Children 70.8 64.5 54.4 –23.1% 66.3 55.6 49.1 –25.9% Institutionalized 0.5 0.4 0.4 –23.7% 1.4 0.7 0.9 –39.7% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.1 1.0 0.9 –20.6% 1.1 0.6 0.7 –37.2%

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

The Rural-Urban Differentials areas dropped by 25.6 percent from 1990 to 2010 and decreased by 19.9 percent in rural areas in the same We present and discuss the rural-urban differentials period (Table 1). As shown in Figure 3, the major dif- in family household structure, elderly living arrange- ference of the percentage distributions of households ments, and its dynamic changes in the following two by size between rural and urban areas is that the per- subsections. centage of small households of one or two to three persons in urban areas is much higher than those in Rural-Urban Differentials in Family Household rural areas, while the opposite is true for larger house- Structure. The average sizes of family households in holds of four to five orsix-plus persons. Chinese rural and urban areas in 2010 were 3.3 and The rural-urban differences tend to be larger in 2.8, respectively. The average household size in urban 2010 and 2000, compared to 1990. The main factors

89 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table 4. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Oldest Olds Age 80 Plus, 1990–2010

Rural and Urban Combined 1990 2000 2010 2010 vs. 1990

Age 80 Plus, Men Living Alone 12.9 10.8 15.0 +16.8% With Spouse Only 17.1 20.7 29.3 +71.2% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 30.0 31.4 44.3 +47.9% Married with Children 23.0 27.0 23.8 +3.1% Not Married with Children 44.0 39.4 29.6 –32.6% Subtotal of Living with Children 67.0 66.4 53.4 –20.3% Institutionalized 1.2 0.9 1.2 +2.5% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.8 1.3 1.0 –42.5% Age 80 Plus, Women Living Alone 15.1 12.4 19.1 +26.8% With Spouse Only 4.0 6.4 10.6 +167.1% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 19.1 18.8 29.7 +56.0% Married with Children 5.2 12.2 11.1 +113.9% Not Married with Children 73.7 67.4 57.4 –22.1% Subtotal of Living with Children 78.9 79.5 68.5 –13.1% Institutionalized 0.7 0.7 0.9 +30.4% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.4 1.0 0.9 –39.2% Age 80 Plus, Both Genders Living Alone 14.3 11.8 17.4 +21.8% With Spouse Only 8.6 11.8 18.4 +113.8% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 22.9 23.6 35.8 +56.4% Married with Children 11.5 17.8 16.4 +42.6% Not Married with Children 63.2 56.7 45.8 –27.5% Subtotal of Living with Children 74.7 74.6 62.2 –16.7% Institutionalized 0.9 0.8 1.0 +20.2% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.6 1.1 0.9 –39.8%

(continued on the next page)

for such substantial differentials of family household higher and faster increase of one-person households sizes between Chinese urban and rural areas include in urban areas may be a result of a higher divorce rate, much lower fertility in urban than in rural areas and more not-married elderly preferring independent liv- large rural-urban family structural differentials to ing, and increased mobility of children. be discussed. The proportion of one-person and other households The one-person households and one-couple-only in urban areas more than tripled in 2010 (3.2 percent), households were substantially less prevalent in rural compared to 1990 (1.0 percent), while it has increased areas than in urban areas as revealed in all three cen- by only 34.3 percent in rural areas. Data (not shown) suses conducted in 1990, 2000, and 2010 (Table 1). indicate that almost all the tremendous increases in The proportion of one-person-only households the proportion of households with one person and increased by 149.7 percent in urban areas from 1990 others in 1990–2010 were from households with a ref- to 2010, compared to 112.1 percent in rural areas. The erence person younger than 65. Thus, we believe that

90 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Table 4. Percentage Distributions of Living Arrangements of Oldest Olds Age 80 Plus, 1990–2010 (continued)

Rural Urban 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 1990 Age 80 Plus, Men Living Alone 13.4 10.2 15.8 +18.0% 11.1 11.9 14.0 +25.6% With Spouse Only 15.9 17.8 24.7 +55.6% 21.0 26.7 35.4 +69.1% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 29.3 28.0 40.5 +38.4% 32.1 38.6 49.4 +54.0% Married with Children 22.8 27.8 23.5 +3.2% 23.9 25.4 24.1 +0.9% Not Married with Children 45.1 42.2 34.0 –24.7% 40.4 33.5 23.9 –41.0% Subtotal of Living with Children 67.9 69.9 57.5 –15.3% 64.3 58.9 48.0 –25.4% Institutionalized 0.9 0.6 0.7 –17.4% 2.1 1.6 1.9 –11.5% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.9 1.5 1.2 –35.3% 1.5 0.9 0.8 –47.7% Age 80 Plus, Women Living Alone 15.4 11.0 17.1 +10.9% 14.1 15.4 22.3 +58.4% With Spouse Only 4.0 5.9 10.0 +147.6% 3.8 7.6 11.5 +206.5% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 19.5 16.8 27.1 +39.1% 17.8 23.0 33.8 +89.6% Married with Children 5.3 11.7 11.3 +114.9% 5.1 13.3 10.9 +115.3% Not Married with Children 73.5 70.2 60.4 –17.7% 74.2 61.4 52.7 –29.0% Subtotal of Living with Children 78.7 81.8 71.7 –8.9% 79.3 74.6 63.6 –19.8% Institutionalized 0.5 0.4 0.4 –17.5% 1.4 1.3 1.7 +23.5% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.4 0.9 0.8 –39.3% 1.5 1.2 0.9 –41.2% Age 80 Plus, Both Genders Living Alone 14.7 10.7 16.6 +12.7% 13.1 14.1 18.6 +42.7% With Spouse Only 8.3 10.4 15.9 +93.1% 9.7 14.9 22.0 +126.7% Subtotal of Not Living with Children 23.0 21.1 32.5 +41.6% 22.7 28.9 40.6 +78.6% Married with Children 11.5 17.8 16.2 +41.2% 11.6 17.9 16.7 +44.2% Not Married with Children 63.4 59.6 49.8 –21.5% 62.5 50.7 40.1 –35.9% Subtotal of Living with Children 74.9 77.3 66.0 –11.9% 74.1 68.6 56.7 –23.4% Institutionalized 0.6 0.5 0.5 –14.5% 1.7 1.4 1.8 +9.1% With Others, Not with Spouse or Child 1.6 1.1 1.0 –36.4% 1.5 1.1 0.8 –43.9%

Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

this is mainly due to more young or middle-aged urban increased by 18.9 percent from 1990 to 2010, while residents not living with a spouse and children but it decreased by 23.7 percent in urban areas in the rather sharing an apartment with roommates. same period. The three-generation family households consti- Was the family household structure in rural areas tuted 22.8 percent in rural areas in 2010, compared in China in 2010 more traditional than in 1990? The to 13.6 percent in urban areas in the same year. These answer is no, and this interesting phenomenon was data indicate that the prevalence of three-generation mainly due to the demographic effects of a sharp family households in rural areas was 1.7 times as decline in fertility. More specifically, given that most high as in urban areas (Table 1). The proportion of rural elderly parents still live with one married child three-generation family households in rural areas (although declining), the adult children in 2010 who

91 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 3. Rural-Urban Comparisons of Household Size Distributions, 1990–2010

Rural Urban 60

30 Percentage

1 Person 1 Person 1 Person 2–3 Persons4–5 Persons6+ Persons 2–3 Persons4–5 Persons6+ Persons 2–3 Persons4–5 Persons6+ Persons Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China.

had much fewer siblings due to a large decline in children are also major factors contributing to sub- fertility had a smaller chance of moving out of the stantially decreased proportions of three-generation parental home to form an independent nuclear fam- households in urban China from 1990 to 2010. ily household. This resulted in the considerable struc- Clearly, while family households have been rad- tural increase in the proportion of three-generation ically changing in both rural and urban areas, rural households in rural China in 1990–2010.19 Chinese family households are more traditional However, while rural fertility is still slightly above than urban Chinese family households are, not only or around replacement level, fertility level in urban because the socioeconomic development level and areas declined to much below replacement level. changes in people’s attitudes about multigenerational As modeled and numerically simulated in Zeng Yi’s co-residence are substantially slower in rural than in research published in 1987, if fertility continues to urban areas but also because of the different demo- fall after reaching replacement level, a further reduc- graphic effects of fertility decline between rural and tion in the birth rate will reduce the proportion of urban areas. three-generation households due to the shortage of children.20 Rural-Urban Differentials in Elderly Living Of course, in addition to such impacts of far-below Arrangements and Its Dynamic Changes. The replacement fertility levels in urban areas, largely proportions of elderly men who lived with children changing attitudes concerning intergenerational in rural and urban areas in 2010 were 49.7 and 45.1, co-residence and increasing job mobility of adult respectively, and the corresponding figures for women

92 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

were 62.8 and 55.4, respectively (Table 2). Obviously, few policy recommendations concerning the remark- rural elderly are more likely to live with their children able dynamic changes in family households and than their urban counterparts are. Moreover, the pro- elderly living arrangements in the context of rapid portion of elderly living with children has declined at population aging. a slower speed in rural (20.8 percent) than in urban areas (25.0 percent) from 1990 to 2010. Imperative Needs to Analyze and Project Fam- The proportion of elderly women living alone is ily Household Dynamics Rather Than Focus- higher in urban areas than in rural areas by 2.1 per- ing on Population Growth. As presented in Figure centage points. But the proportion of elderly men 2, the trends of much faster increases in numbers of living alone is 2.5 percentage points lower in urban households as opposed to population growth have areas than in rural areas (Table 2). In urban areas, important policy implications in governmental socio- there was a 25.6 percent increase of male oldest economic planning, social services, and business olds who lived alone, in contrast to a 18.0 percent analyses on current and future market demands for increase of rural male oldest olds who lived alone products and services of which households (rather between 1990 and 2010 (Table 4). In 2010, about than individuals) are consumption units, such as one-fifth of female oldest olds lived alone in urban housing, home-based energy use, TVs, refrigerators, areas, a 58.4 percent increase from 1990, in contrast washing machines, furniture, and family-use vehicles. to 15.4 percent of female oldest olds who lived alone For example, a rising consensus is that household in rural areas, a 10.9 percent increase from 1990 increases (rather than population growth) should (Table 4). The rural-urban and gender differences in be considered one of the most important factors in the proportions of oldest olds living alone are enor- analyses for home-based energy consumption (such mous, and the largely increased female oldest olds as cooking, heating, cooling, and private vehicles). living alone in urban areas deserve attention from Because population growth is much slowed down the government and society. nowadays and will become negative in the near future, The proportions of urban elderly men and women quickly growing numbers of households with smaller who lived with only a spouse in 2010 were higher residential units drive energy consumption. than their rural counterparts by 7.0 and 4.6 percent- Consequently, continuing to focus on population age points, respectively, and the higher widowhood growth would mislead policymakers and the public. rates and lower remarriage rates in rural areas com- Thus, we call for seriously considering imperative pared to urban areas may have contributed to this needs of projections and analyses on households and phenomenon. home-based consumption and services to evaluate Tables A1, A2, and A3 demonstrated the rural-urban human impacts on the environment and strengthen differences in relative increases of absolute numbers sustainable development.21 We recommend that gov- of old adults by living arrangements, which are dra- ernmental agencies and scholars devote more efforts matically larger than the rural-urban differences in to collect and estimate household data. Data inade- changes in the proportions of the different elderly liv- quacy is a major barrier to household projections and ing arrangements presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. analyses and incorporating household characteristics into energy consumption and social services models.22 We strongly recommend integrating household Policy Implications and and energy consumption projections and household Recommendations and social services projections, which will lead to better understanding domestic and global trends of In this section, we discuss the policy implications of energy demands and social services and enhancing the empirical findings of present study and propose a the sustainable development agenda.

93 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Policymakers and Society Need to Seriously only are even dramatically larger than the increase Consider the Substantive Disadvantages of in the corresponding proportions due to the effects Women (Especially Female Oldest Olds) in of rapid population aging, while later and larger birth Family Welfare. As described later, both younger cohorts become old. Policymakers and business man- elderly women and oldest-old women are much more agers need to pay special attention to such trends of likely to be widowed and thus live alone or with chil- dramatic increase in the absolute numbers of elderly dren only (Tables 3, 4, and 5). Compared with elderly (especially oldest olds) who live alone or with a men, elderly women are more likely less educated, spouse only, rather than looking at the proportions economically more dependent, and much less likely only, to appropriately plan for social service programs to have pensions. Analyses on the eight wave (1998– and commercial market products. 2018) data sets of Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Lon- gevity Surveys (CLHLS) have demonstrated that Promoting Co-Residence or Nearby Living the female elderly (especially female oldest olds) in Arrangements Between the Elderly and Their China are also significantly disadvantaged in activities Children. There are two rapidly growing and partic- of daily living, physical performance, cognitive func- ularly vulnerable groups of elderly persons in China.25 tion, and self-reported health, compared to their male The first is theso-called older empty nesters who live counterparts. These gender differences are more alone or with a spouse only. This is mainly caused marked with advancing age. by quick and largely reduced fertility and the large Clearly, the large gender differentials among the out-migration of young people during rapid urban- Chinese elderly need serious attention from soci- ization and job mobility.26 The analysis reported in ety and government. For any old-age insurance and this chapter shows that the increases in numbers of social service programs to be developed or reformed, older empty nesters are dramatically larger than the they must benefit older women and men equally and increases in the corresponding proportions. Older provide greater resources to the most disadvantaged empty nesters, especially those living alone, are prone groups of both genders. to mental health problems.27 The second vulnerable group is disabled elderly. Paying More and Special Attention to Largely A recent study has predicted that the number of dis- Increasing Absolute Numbers of Elderly Liv- abled elderly age 65 and above will increase rapidly ing Alone or with a Spouse Only. The Chinese from 8.4 million in 2010 to 19 and 37 million in 2030 population is aging at exceptionally fast speeds and and 2050, respectively. The majority of these disabled large scales.24 The family households and popula- older adults are the oldest old at age 80 and over.28 tion projections under the universal two-child pol- Obviously, the health care, family, and social care icy scenario show that the proportions of elderly age needs of these two rapidly growing and particularly 65 plus and oldest old age 80 plus among total pop- vulnerable groups of elderly persons present a huge ulation in 2050 will be 2.9 and 4.7 times as large as challenge in China in the forthcoming decades.29 To those in 2010, respectively. Further, the proportions face the huge challenges of quick increases and large of elderly age 65 plus and oldest old age 80 plus liv- scales of the two particularly vulnerable groups of ing in empty-nest households among the total pop- elderly persons, we recommend the Chinese govern- ulation in 2050 will be 3.9 and 7.0 times as large as ment and society adopt a social policy to promote those in 2010, respectively.23 co-residence or nearby living arrangements between While the increases in the proportion of elderly the elderly and their children, mainly based on two and those elders living in empty-nest households in social facts with associated empirical analyses and China are enormous, as presented and discussed ear- theoretical considerations. lier, the increases in the numbers of elderly (espe- First, this policy would likely result in win-win out- cially oldest olds) who live alone or with a spouse comes, which are beneficial for both elderly parents

94 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

and their children.30 After controlling for various elderly parents help take care of their children’s chil- covariate, the statistical analyses using large sample dren and daily housework. data from CLHLS have demonstrated that, compared Although Confucianism was generally consid- to older empty nesters, the elderly who co-resided ered in mainland China as being feudal under Chair- with (or lived nearby) their children had 40 percent man Mao Zedong’s leadership in the 1950–70s, it higher cognitive function scores. Further, 32.4 percent was re-embraced as a virtue in the late 20th century, and 54.8 percent report a higher likelihood of good and the basic ideas of filial piety persist or may have health and life satisfaction, respectively.31 The causal even been promoted.37 For example, in 1996, the cen- explanations of these interesting findings are that tral government passed a law protecting the rights of elderly who co-reside with (or live nearby) their chil- elders, which dictated adult children’s obligations to dren have better chances to contact and interchange respect and take care of their aged parents physically, with their children and grandchildren, which effec- financially, and emotionally. Filial piety, however, may tively help them maintain good cognitive function have been weakened to some extent by the country’s and better health, prevent depression, and achieve fundamental economic and social transformation, life satisfaction.32 which resulted in a stronger focus on nuclear families Similar patterns of better health and life satisfac- and larger physical distances between elderly parents tion among elderly who co-reside (or live nearby) and adult children. their children, compared to older empty nesters, Given the long-term cultural tradition of the Con- were also found in Finland, Italy, and the Neth- fucian tradition of filial piety, we believe it is socially erlands.33 Furthermore, the CLHLS data analyses realistic and possible to adopt a policy to promote showed that home-based care costs among disabled, co-residence or nearby living arrangements between older empty nesters were 67.8 percent higher than the elderly and their children in China. This theoretical elderly who co-resided with (or lived nearby) their speculation is supported by many years of successful children.34 Based on the CLHLS data analyses, Shen implementations in promoting the three-generation Ke et al. also found that, compared to adult chil- family households in Singapore, where more than half dren who lived far away from their elderly parents, the elderly think co-residence with their children is women who co-resided with (or lived nearby) their preferred and should be considered a standard of suc- elderly parents had devoted 10 hours fewer per week cessful aging.38 to housework, had a 23.1 percent higher likelihood of labor force participation, and had, on average, a 9.4 hour increase per week in paid work.35 Clearly, Conclusions co-residence or nearby living arrangements between elderly and their children could have win-win out- This chapter presents analyses on dynamics and pol- comes, which are beneficial for both elderly parents icy implications of family households and elderly liv- and their children.36 ing arrangements in China, mainly based on the micro Second, the policy to promote co-residence or data of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses. We demon- nearby living arrangements between elderly and their strate and discuss the dynamic trends, the rural-urban children is consistent with the Confucian tradition of and gender differentials of largely declined house- filial piety, which has been a central pillar of cultural hold size, the quickly increasing one-person and and moral ideals for Chinese and other Eastern Asian one-couple-only households, and the substantially societies for thousands of years. Filial piety is a funda- increased proportions of elderly living alone or with mental component of Confucianism: Adult children a spouse only. Proportions of three-generation family are obligated to provide financial and emotional sup- households increased by 18.9 percent in rural areas but port to their older parents, with parents represent- decreased by 23.7 percent in urban areas from 1990 to ing an embodiment of filial piety. On the other hand, 2010 due to rural-urban differences in demographic

95 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

effects of large fertility decline and socioeconomic Based on solid empirical and theoretical analyses, and attitude changes. We also present and discuss we propose four policy recommendations. First, stud- two interesting demographic phenomenon, which are ies on social services, housing, home-based energy use, relatively overlooked. and other consumptions in sustainable development First, increases in the number of households are planning and analyses should be based on projections much larger than population growth, due to shrink- and analyses of family household dynamics rather ing households, decreasing family sizes, and slowing than population growth only. Second, policymakers population growth. Second, increases in the number and society need to seriously consider the substantive of elderly (especially oldest olds) who live alone or disadvantages of women (especially female oldest with a spouse only are dramatically larger than the olds) in family welfare. Third, policymakers, analysts, increases in the corresponding proportions, due to and society need to pay more and special attention the effects of rapid population aging, while later and to largely increasing absolute numbers of older empty larger birth cohorts become old. Such trends have nesters, rather than looking at the corresponding pro- important implications for policy analyses on social portions only. Fourth, the Chinese government and services and business analyses on current and future society need to consider adopting a policy of pro- market demands of products and services—of which moting co-residence or nearby living arrangements households are the consumption units—such as between the elderly and their children, which would home-based energy use, housing, TVs, refrigerators, be helpful in facing the serious challenges of popula- washing machines, furniture, family-use vehicles, and tion aging and would result in win-win outcomes for health care. both elderly parents and their children.

96 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Appendix 1990 +72.7% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +366.5% +459.8% +442.7% +186.5% +107.8% +162.8% +109.9% +169.4% +259.6% +327.6% +554.8% +455.1% +274.6% +101.6% +156.4% +221.0% +233.5% +340.0% +495.7% +448.6% +220.3% +102.9% +159.1% +142.9% +116.4% +245.6% 33 21 21 16 54 37 210 862 270 397 775 697 807 607 2010 1,117 1,327 1,132 2,512 1,173 1,504 2,714 1,893 2,500 1,559 1,076 2,635 5,225 Urban 16 11 24 20 7.7 9.2 106 559 665 508 208 717 180 369 549 431 541 972 286 928 939 750 1,409 1,537 1,214 1,689 2,947 2000 45 16 93 10 22 17 7.6 6.5 199 244 301 130 431 698 118 211 186 400 586 814 138 318 456 487 530 1990 1,017 1,512 –4.5% –8.5% –7.4% +9.2% +6.3% +7.8% 1990 –19.8% +89.8% +17.4% +26.4% +48.0% +60.0% +97.4% +56.0% +11.3% +20.8% +32.0% +71.9% +32.6% +10.4% +10.7% +39.3% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +154.6% +136.3% +124.8% +141.6% +117.2% 18 42 19 25 61 7.9 350 519 433 828 931 783 2010 1,204 1,554 1,075 1,595 3,209 1,261 1,239 2,171 3,458 2,033 2,816 2,007 1,758 3,764 6,667 Rural 16 41 17 22 58 5.6 219 835 575 270 579 849 898 488 2000 1,053 1,077 1,652 2,762 1,348 2,246 3,119 1,414 1,902 1,975 1,923 3,898 5,881 16 34 24 23 57 6.5 184 473 658 916 544 270 369 639 597 455 842 1990 1,460 2,168 1,354 1,951 2,620 1,296 1,513 1,898 3,411 4,788 1990 +7.0% +59.1% +18.2% +44.5% +53.4% +55.3% +99.6% +17.2% +45.2% +79.8% +78.3% +17.3% +44.9% +72.9% +33.1% +88.8% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +145.3% +243.9% +218.7% +127.7% +228.1% +185.2% +108.2% +115.0% +134.7% +237.3% +202.6% 50 63 29 35 79 98 560 789 830 2010 2,321 2,881 1,937 2,726 5,721 1,604 2,434 1,628 2,047 3,674 6,172 1,389 3,927 5,316 3,566 2,834 6,399 11,893 32 52 14 27 45 79 325 784 450 948 774 2000 1,394 1,718 1,585 2,369 4,171 1,398 1,329 1,889 3,218 4,657 2,342 3,117 2,914 2,673 5,587 8,827 Rural and Urban Combined Rural 32 41 13 33 45 74 230 672 902 674 363 487 850 783 592 1990 1,217 1,891 2,866 1,754 2,537 3,433 1,160 1,752 2,000 2,428 4,428 6,299

Table A1. Numbers of Elderly Age 65 Plus by Living Arrangements (Unit: 10,000), 1990–2010 (Unit: 10,000), 65 Plus by Living Arrangements of Elderly Age A1. Numbers Table Men Age 65 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Age 65 Total Men Plus, Women Age 65 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized With Others, Not with Spouse or Child Age 65 Women Plus, Total Both Genders Age 65 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized With Others, Not with Spouse or Child Age 65 Plus, Both and 1990 censuses in China. 2000, Genders tabulations of the 2010, percent cross based on the micro data files and officially published 100 by the authors Estimated Source: Total

97 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE 1990 +70.1% +78.4% +75.4% +55.4% +73.7% +97.7% +239.2% +426.5% +407.0% +169.1% +142.8% +165.2% +235.0% +278.1% +532.2% +430.9% +257.8% +142.7% +152.9% +221.0% +288.7% +466.8% +418.1% +203.5% +142.7% +105.7% +227.6% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 25 17 12 37 29 977 767 175 942 284 718 643 538 438 712 12.0 2,270 1,131 4,231 1,002 1,181 2,206 1,696 2,134 1,410 2,122 4,322 2010 Urban 14 10 18 16 4.7 6.5 520 609 471 160 631 144 351 495 400 396 796 232 871 871 556 1,352 2,527 1,302 1,104 1,427 2,565 2000 14 75 19 14 6.6 4.7 7.6 669 186 223 285 103 388 114 189 180 307 486 687 113 299 412 464 410 874 1,263 1,319 1990 –0.3% –4.1% –0.1% –0.2% –0.9% +3.2% –21.3% –25.3% –29.3% –24.2% 1990 +41.5% +10.7% +23.0% +38.9% +45.8% +88.4% +47.3% +11.4% +22.0% +57.8% +25.3% +29.9% +146.3% +127.3% +114.2% +132.1% +108.5% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 14 36 13 19 50 5.3 962 356 310 757 851 808 584 3,001 1,085 1,359 1,318 5,455 1,068 1,658 2,744 1,843 2,427 1,813 1,163 2,976 5,472 2010 Rural 14 36 13 18 49 3.7 779 967 991 445 214 550 764 839 991 401 2,640 1,435 4,905 1,830 2,610 1,329 1,730 1,830 1,436 3,266 5,063 2000 15 30 18 19 48 4.7 441 598 870 452 213 354 567 577 370 794 2,120 1,321 3,927 1,082 1,659 2,249 1,164 1,447 1,534 2,981 4,213 1990 –3.4% –2.7% –5.0% –3.0% 1990 +89.1% +49.7% +32.4% +33.4% +51.0% +86.6% +97.5% +32.7% +79.3% +68.6% +68.6% +32.5% +45.0% +28.1% +77.1% +228.2% +202.9% +105.5% +214.5% +173.0% +111.9% +222.6% +188.7% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. 39 54 17 25 56 79 531 594 5,271 2,062 2,490 1,729 2,260 9,686 1,475 2,070 1,493 1,346 2,839 4,951 1,022 3,539 4,561 3,223 1,875 5,097 9,794 2010 27 46 20 36 65 8.2 604 358 901 633 3,992 1,300 1,576 1,463 2,067 7,432 1,258 1,238 1,388 2,626 3,912 2,200 2,834 2,701 1,992 4,693 7,627 2000 Rural and Urban Combined Rural 29 36 26 38 62 9.4 626 821 555 288 467 755 757 483 2,790 1,155 1,709 5,190 1,388 2,146 2,937 1,093 1,576 1,912 1,943 3,855 5,531 1990 Table A2. Numbers of Young Elders Age 65–79 by Living Arrangements (Unit: 10,000), 1990–2010 1990–2010 (Unit: 10,000), by Living Arrangements 65–79 Age Elders of Young A2. Numbers Table Men Age 65–79, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Total Men Age 65–79, Women Age 65–79, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Total Women Age 65–79, Both Genders Age 65–79, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Age Both 65–79, Total Genders and 1990 censuses in China. 2000, tabulations of the 2010, percent cross based on the micro data files and officially published 100 by the authors Estimated Source:

98 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 1990 +646.5% +904.9% +815.1% +499.7% +250.7% +343.1% +425.8% +210.7% +494.4% +536.5% +661.8% +765.3% +185.5% +222.5% +396.4% +136.4% +301.9% +568.3% +961.9% +736.5% +575.4% +200.1% +258.7% +411.0% +162.7% +368.3% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +1,131.8% 55 95 94 58 55 16 7.1 3.1 9.1 5.1 7.7 140 196 190 396 113 171 268 323 508 168 199 367 151 362 513 904 2010 Urban 17 39 56 37 49 85 36 18 54 31 54 57 68 2.3 1.3 3.0 2.8 5.3 4.1 145 145 176 236 110 193 261 381 2000 14 21 16 27 43 67 18 22 94 25 19 44 22 7.4 1.4 1.0 4.7 6.4 1.8 1.9 3.2 2.9 100 126 121 143 193 1990 1990 +77.5% +99.5% +94.5% +52.3% +58.6% +75.7% +59.1% +17.1% +92.8% +63.3% +83.3% +77.8% +32.4% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +177.9% +266.6% +226.0% +143.1% +135.6% +113.7% +377.3% +168.2% +314.3% +134.5% +301.6% +194.5% +193.8% +108.0% 4 76 71 81 12 6.0 2.7 5.9 6.2 119 195 113 164 277 482 122 193 431 512 714 198 190 389 194 595 789 2010 1,195 Rural 32 55 87 86 56 30 86 59 87 85 1.7 4.6 2.0 4.7 3.8 9.3 130 216 310 357 416 508 172 145 487 632 818 2000 27 32 60 47 92 57 15 72 19 85 47 66 1.8 3.9 1.7 5.0 3.5 9.0 139 204 272 291 370 132 364 430 575 1990 1990 +86.1% +91.7% +49.6% +98.2% +64.6% 2010 vs. 2010 vs. +278.3% +454.2% +378.9% +233.8% +118.2% +157.9% +231.8% +223.7% +211.9% +557.0% +283.8% +426.1% +113.7% +220.8% +145.9% +233.2% +484.7% +327.7% +290.0% +127.7% +228.5% +173.4% 11 11 10 23 20 9.1 131 259 391 209 258 467 877 235 130 365 136 699 835 367 389 756 344 957 2010 1,221 1,301 2,099 49 94 92 48 91 13 4.0 6.0 5.1 7.5 9.1 143 123 179 302 455 140 502 592 745 141 142 283 213 680 894 2000 1,199 Rural and Urban Combined Rural 35 46 81 62 75 20 95 26 66 88 12 3.3 4.9 3.5 7.0 6.7 119 182 271 366 392 497 110 176 485 573 768 1990

Table A3. Numbers of Oldest Olds Age 80 Plus by Living Arrangements (Unit: 10,000), 1990–2010 1990–2010 (Unit: 10,000), 80 Plus by Living Arrangements of Oldest Olds Age A3. Numbers Table Men Age 80 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Total Men Age 80 Plus, Women Age 80 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Total Women Age 80 Plus, Both Genders Age 80 Plus, Living Alone With Spouse Only Subtotal of Not Living with Children Married with Children Not Married with Children Subtotal of Living with Children Institutionalized Not with Spouse or Child With Others, Total Both Genders Age 80 Plus, Source: Estimated by the authors based on the micro data files and the officially published 100 percent cross tabulations of the 2010, 2000, and 1990 censuses in China. 2000, tabulations of the 2010, percent cross based on the micro data files and officially published 100 by the authors Estimated Source:

99 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Notes

1. Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian, “Dynamics of Family and Elderly Living Arrangements in China: New Lessons Learned from the 2000 Census,” China Review 3, no. 2 (2003): 95–119. 2. Wang Yuesheng, “Analyses of the Chinese Household Structure,” China Social Science 1 (2006): 96–108; Guo Zhigang, “Analyses of the Chinese Household Changes,” China Population Science 3 (2008): 2–10; C. Cindy Fan, “Population Change and Regional Devel- opment in China: Insights Based on the 2000 Census,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 43, no. 6 (2002): 425–42; and Adam Ka-Lok Cheung and Wei-Jun Jean Yeung, “Temporal-Spatial Patterns of One-Person Households in China, 1982–2005” (paper presented at Population Association of America meeting, Boston, MA, August 2013). 3. Changhong Zhou, “Characteristics of Family Structure Change and Their Implications: Based on the Fifth and Sixth Census of China,” Journal of Nanjing Population Management College 4 (2013): 3–8. 4. Wang Yuesheng, “An Analysis of the Changes in China’s Urban and Rural Family Structures: Based on 2010 Census Data,” China Social Science 12 (2013): 60–77. 5. Hu Zhan and Peng Xizhe, “Household Changes in Contemporary China: An Analysis Based on Census Data,” Sociological Studies 3 (2014): 145–66; and Cheung and Yeung, “Temporal-Spatial Patterns of One-Person Households in China.” 6. Wang Yuesheng, “Household Type of the Elderly in the Rural and Urban China,” China Population Science 34, no. 1 (2014): 20–32; and Zhang Yi, “Household Living, Health and Care Arrangement of Chinese Elderly: Based on the Sixth Census Data,” Jiangsu Social Science 1 (2013): 57–65. 7. Judith Banister, David E. Bloom, and Larry Rosenberg, “Population Aging and Economic Growth in China” (working paper, Har- vard University Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Cambridge, MA, 2010). 8. Pei Xiaomei and Vijayan K. Pillai, “Old Age Support in China: The Role of the State and the Family,” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 49, no. 3 (1999): 197–212; Chen Xuan and Merril Silverstein, “Intergenerational Social Support and the Psy- chological Well-Being of Older Parents in China,” Research on Aging 22, no. 1 (2000): 43–65; and W. Jean Yeung and Xu Zhenhua, “Eco- nomic Stress, Quality of Life, and Mortality Rates Among the Oldest Old in China,” Social Indicators Research 108 (2012): 131–52. 9. Because of the huge sample size of the census micro data and because we use only the aggregate measures in this chapter, we believe it may not be necessary to perform statistical tests for evaluating differentials across periods, sex, broad age groups of younger elderly, and the oldest-old and rural-urban sectors. 10. Ansley J. Coale, Rapid Population Change in China, 1952–1982 (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1984). 11. Vaino Kannisto, “Features of the 1982 China Census from International Standpoint,” in A Census of One Billion People, Papers for International Seminar on China’s 1982 Population Census, ed. Li Chengrui (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 37–52; William Lavely, “First Impressions from the 2000 Census of China,” Population and Development Review 27, no. 4 (2001): 755–69; and Cai Yong, “China’s New Demographic Reality: Learning from the 2010 Census,” Population and Development Review 39, no. 3 (2013): 371–96. 12. Zhang Guangyu and Zhao Zhongwei, “Reexamining China’s Fertility Puzzle: Data Collection and Quality over the Last Two Decades,” Population and Development Review 32, no. 2 (2006): 293–321; and Zhao Zhongwei and Chen Wei, “China’s Far Below- Replacement Fertility and Its Long-Term Impact: Comments on the Preliminary Results of the 2010 Census,” Demographic Research 25, no. 26 (2011): 819–36. 13. Cui Hongyan, Xu Lan, and Li Rui, “Evaluation of the Accuracy of the 2010 Census,” Research on Population 1 (2013): 10–21. 14. Zhao Zhongwei, “Reflections on China’s Recent Population Statistics and Current Demographic Situation,”Chinese Cross Cur- rents 8, no. 3 (2011): 44–56. 15. Zeng Yi, James W. Vaupel, and Wang Zhenglian, “Household Projection Using Conventional Demographic Data,” Population and Development Review, no. 24 (1998): 59–87; Zeng Yi et al., “Household and Living Arrangements Projections at the Sub-National Level: An Extended Cohort-Component Approach,” Demography 50 (2013): 827–52; and Zeng Yi et al., Household and Living Arrangement Projections: The Extended Cohort-Component Method and Applications to the U.S. and China (New York: Springer Publisher, 2014). 16. Zeng, Vaupel, and Wang, “Household Projection Using Conventional Demographic Data”; and Zeng et al., “Household and Living

100 DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS AND ELDERLY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements Projections at the Sub-National Level.” 17. Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong, “Household Change and Intergenerational Transfers in China: What Lies Ahead?,” in China’s Impending Changes in Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 18 Zeng et al., “Household and Living Arrangements Projections at the Sub-National Level.” 19. Zeng Yi, “Changes in Family Structure in China: A Simulation Study,” Population and Development Review 12 (1986): 675–703; and Zeng Yi, Family Dynamics in China: A Life Table Analysis (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). 20. Zeng, “Changes in Family Structure in China”; and Zeng, Family Dynamics in China. 21. Mason Bradbury, M. Nils Peterson, and Liu Jianguo, “Long-Term Dynamics of Household Size and Their Environmental Implica- tions,” Population and Environment 36, no. 1 (2014): 73–84. 22. Reza Kowasari and Hisham Zerriffi, “Three Dimensional Energy Profile: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Household Energy Use,” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 7505–17. 23. Zeng Yi, Liu Yuzhi, and Linda George, “Gender Differentials of Oldest Old in China,”Research on Aging 25 (2003): 65–80. 24. Banister, Bloom, and Rosenberg, “Population Aging and Economic Growth in China”; and Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian, “A Policy Analysis on Challenges and Opportunities of Population/Household Aging in China,” Journal of Population Aging 7, no. 4 (December 2014): 255–81. 25. Zeng Yi and Therese Hesketh, “The Effects of China’s Universal Two-Child Policy,”Lancet 388, no. 10054 (2016): 1930–38. 26. Banister, Bloom, and Rosenberg, “Population Aging and Economic Growth in China.” 27. Lü Xiaoling et al., “Short Form 36-Item Health Survey Test Result on the Empty Nest Elderly in China: A Meta-Analysis,” Arch Gerontol Geriatr 56, no. 2 (2013): 291–97. 28. Zeng Yi et al., “Implications of Changes in Households and Living Arrangements for Future Home-Based Care Needs and Costs of Disabled Elders in China,” Journal of Aging and Health 27, no. 3 (2015): 519–50. 29. Zeng and Hesketh, “The Effects of China’s Universal Two-Child Policy.” 30. Shen Ke, “Comprehensive Analyses of the Living Arrangement Among Chinese Elderly—Its Influential Factors and the Effects on Well-Being” (PhD thesis, National School of Development, Peking University, 2011); Shen Ke, Zhang Yuan, and Yan Ping, “The Causal Effect of Family Structure on Female Labor Force Participation” [in Chinese], Population Research 36, no. 5 (2012): 15–27; Zeng Yi and Hu Angang, “Integrate Administrations of Health, Family Planning, and Population Aging, to Promote Well-Being of Bil- lions Families” [in Chinese], Population and Economics [Renkou yu Jingji] 223, no. 4 (2017): 36–42, 119; and Zeng Yi, “Encouraging the Second Birth Is Beneficial for Both the Nation and People and Also Helpful for Food Security,”Science and Technology for Development 14, no. 1 (2018): 7–16. 31. Shen, “Comprehensive Analyses of the Living Arrangement Among Chinese Elderly.” 32. Shen, “Comprehensive Analyses of the Living Arrangement Among Chinese Elderly.” 33. Boukje Maria van Gelder et al., “Marital Status and Living Situation During a 5-Year Period Are Associated with a Subsequent 10-Year Cognitive Decline in Older Men: The FINE Study,” Journals of Gerontology, Series B, Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 61 (2006): 213–19. 34. Zeng et al., “Implications of Changes in Households and Living Arrangements for Future Home-Based Care Needs and Costs of Disabled Elders in China.” 35. Shen, Zhang, and Yan, “The Causal Effect of Family Structure on Female Labor Force Participation.” 36. Shen, “Comprehensive Analyses of the Living Arrangement Among Chinese Elderly”; Shen, Zhang, and Yan, “The Causal Effect of Family Structure on Female Labor Force Participation”; and Zeng and Hu, “Integrate Administrations of Health, Family Planning, and Population Aging, to Promote Well-Being of Billions Families.” 37. Yeh Kuang-Hui et al., “Filial Piety in Contemporary Chinese Societies: A Comparative Study of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China,” International Sociology 28 (2013): 277–96. 38. Feng Qiushi and Paulin T. Straughan, “What Does Successful Aging Mean? Lay Perception of Successful Aging Among Singapore Elderly,” Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences 72, no. 2 (2017): 204–13.

101 Household Change and Intergenerational Transfers in China

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong

hose concerned with the profound demographic the recent changes mark a distinctive departure from Tchanges in China often focus on the macro or the past. Average household size stayed at roughly societal level: the abnormal sex ratio at birth, labor the same level of about 4.5 persons between 1953 and force shrinkage and aging, and the rising share of the early 1980s: 4.33 in 1953, 4.43 in 1964, and 4.31 in the elderly population.1 These changes are cer- 1982. In less than one decade, by 1990, the average tainly real and hugely consequential. Yet underneath size of the Chinese household shrank to 3.36, one per- these macro-level changes lie many micro-level son fewer than in 1982. In the two decades since, this transformations, those at the familial or individual trend of shrinking household size continued, to 3.44 level. These micro-level transformations define the in 2000, 3.1 in 2010, and 3.02 in 2015.6 macro-level trends and often bear greater economic What demographic, social, and economic forces and social significance than those observed at the have driven these changes in the Chinese household, societal or macro level. and what do such changes mean socially and eco- One such micro-level change in China in the past nomically in China and beyond? In this chapter, we three decades is in the Chinese household, which has attempt to answer these two broad questions, focus- long served as the basic unit of production, consump- ing on the implications of changing household size tion, procreation, and socialization.2 Less than three and structure on intergenerational transfers. and a half decades ago, when China carried out its We begin with an overview of the factors that lie first population census after the Cultural Revolution, behind the changes in the Chinese household. We the average Chinese household had 4.4 people. Today, then examine intergenerational transfers, differen- as the latest Chinese census in 2010 revealed, it has tiating between private transfers (e.g., from family) only 3.1.3 This places China well below the average and public ones (e.g., from the government). With in developing countries and approaching that in the the knowledge of the forces that are driving house- developed world.4 hold changes in recent decades in China, we con- To be sure, large and complex Chinese families clude with a discussion of future household changes with multiple generations living under one roof were and their implications for private and public transfers mostly an ideal rather than reality, and it was beyond across generations. the reach of most in society, even in the past.5 Yet

102 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

A New Era of Household Change doubled between 2000 and 2010, from 10 percent to close to 20 percent. For women, it rose fivefold, from The most basic and enduring social organization, 2 percent to over 10 percent. The share of unmarried the household, is affected by primarily the follow- women age 25 to 29 in urban China was even higher, ing factors: mortality and fertility levels; propensity, reaching nearly 30 percent by 2010.12 timing, and dissolution of marriage; and choice of The rising share of unmarried young people is part co-residence among relatives or with nonrelatives. of the reason for the rising marriage age, but it also Each factor in turn is affected by other cultural, eco- has its own significance. Continued postponement nomic, and political factors. of marriage after a certain age could mean a higher Despite the strong preference, even idealization, share of never-married individuals, a social phenom- of multigenerational co-residence in the Chinese cul- enon that is entirely new for females in China. Such a ture, and even with relatively high fertility levels in phenomenon, however, has become more and more the past, high infant and adult mortality rates effec- pervasive in other East Asian societies, such as Japan tively made such an ideal beyond the reach of most. It and South Korea.13 was only with the rapid decline in mortality and con- In addition to the rising marriage age and the share tinued high fertility that the ideal of large multigener- of unmarried young adults in the population, two ational households became a demographic possibility other key measures point to fundamental changes for the masses in China.7 in the marriage institution, changes that have direct Demographically, fertility and marriage have driven and significant implications for family change: rising the recent shrinkage of household size in China. Fer- divorce and premarital cohabitation. In the past four tility dropped sharply in the 1970s, from an average decades, while the annual number of marriages fluc- fertility level of over five children per couple to barely tuated from year to year, largely echoing the size of over two. Since the early 1990s, the fertility level has birth cohorts decades earlier, the number of divorces stayed significantly below the replacement level of rose steadily, from about 40,000 cases per year in the 2.1 children per couple, dropping to as low as around early 1980s to more than 400,000 in recent years. 1.5 in recent years.8 Sustained decline in fertility over Measured by the divorce ratio, which is the ratio the past decades is one of the main driving forces of between the number of divorces and the number of the secular decline in household size in China, as well marriages in a given year, divorce rose eightfold, from as in developed nations.9 Lower fertility means fewer five divorces per 100 marriages in the late 1970s to children when a family is young and less possibility of more than 25 divorces per 100 marriages in 2013 and co-residence when parents grow older. to 41 by 2017. The rise in divorce, both in absolute A more recent and profound change, which is still numbers and in the ratio, has clearly picked up in the not well recognized, is in the marriage institution. In past decade (Figure 1). the past several decades, especially since 2000, both Another sign of a new era of marriage and family marriage age and share of unmarried individuals have change in China is in the realm of sexual behavior, risen sharply. So has divorce.10 Since 1990, mean age especially before marriage. Premarital cohabitation, at marriage for men in China rose from younger than a total taboo in the socialist years, has risen sharply, 24 to 26, and for women from 22 to 24. In contrast to especially among urban and more educated young the rise in marriage age in the 1970s, resulting from people, driven in no small part by the increasing num- the government requirement of late marriage, the ber of young migrants.14 As reported by William Par- recent increase is a result of individual choice rather ish, Edward Laumann, and Sanyu Mojola, based on than “collective synchronization” and, hence, more their large-scale survey of sexual behavior in China likely to continue.11 conducted in 2000, the median age for first sex for The more dramatic change is in the share of young urban men who got married in the 1970s was about people never married by age 30. For men, it nearly 25 and for women about 22.5, almost identical to their

103 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 1. Rising Divorce in China, 1978–2017

14 42%

12 36%

10 30% Marriage

s 8 24% ir Pa lli on Percentage

Mi 6 18%

Divorce Ratio = Divorce/Marriage 4 12%

Divorce 2 6%

0 0% 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 20152020

Source: China Statistics Press, China Social Statistical Yearbook, 1978–2015; and China Statistics Press, China Statistical Yearbook, 2016–17. ages at first marriage.15 For those who got married in one child—means smaller households now and in the 1990s, however, age at first sex moved downward, the future, with a lower likelihood of parents living and premarital sex increased substantially, to 30 per- with their children.18 Delayed marriage and the ris- cent among women and 40 percent among men. Until ing number of young people living alone also mean the mid-1990s, sex with one’s fiancé was the domi- more single-person households and households with nant type of premarital sex (in contrast to commer- two cohabiting persons. With the enormous improve- cial sex and other types). ment in housing conditions and increasing preference Similarly, Yu Jia and Xie Yu report that the cohabi- for independent living, the number of smaller house- tation rate exceeded 20 percent for cohorts born after holds has further increased. 1977. For those who got married after 2000, 30 per- In the first decade of the 21st century, for exam- cent cohabitated before marriage, a level roughly simple, the increase in the number of family households ilar to other industrialized societies.16 In Shanghai, a (18.1 percent) far outpaced the rate of overall popula- 2013 survey of people born in the 1980s shows nearly tion growth (only 6.7 percent).19 In 1982, small fam- half of those who were married had premarital cohab- ily households, defined as households with one to itation experience.17 three persons, composed only 34 percent of all family Sustained low fertility levels and the emerg- households. By 2010, that share rose to 64.1 percent. ing new marriage norms and practices have direct The largest increase since 1990 is in single-person and significant impacts on the Chinese family and households.20 household organization. A small number of chil- A new trend in Chinese household change is the dren—especially with many young families with only increasing share of the population living alone. The

104 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

number of people living alone in China increased marital age and indirectly affects attitudes and behav- drastically between 2000 and 2010, from 28 million, iors toward marriage, employment, childbearing, and or 2.3 percent of the total population, to 58 million, living arrangements. Both urbanization and educa- or 4.4 percent of the total population. While these tional expansion are expected to continue in the com- do not seem to be large numbers, the trend signifi- ing decades and, in the process, further transform cantly affects China’s average household size. Taking household organization in China. out single-person households would increase China’s average household size from 3.46 to 3.68 in 2000 and from 3.09 to 3.44 in 2010. The Household and Intergenerational Driving these demographic changes in fertil- Transfers ity and marriage are two societal forces that have accompanied China’s recent economic boom: mas- Changes in the Chinese household, in both size and sive migration and urbanization and rapid expan- structure, bear tremendous implications for the sion of tertiary education. Between 1980 and 2015, Chinese economy and society. Among the many China’s urban population increased from about far-reaching implications, we focus on the relative 20 percent of the total population to 56 percent. In role of private transfers among family members and the process, nearly 500 million new urban residents the role of public transfers between individuals and were added, most via migration and reclassification, the government. not natural increase. Throughout human history and across societies, Migration often involves young people moving transfers, especially intergenerational transfers, form away from their parents and, in many cases, young the foundation for human survival and continuity. At parents moving away from their children and oth- an individual level, a “typical” person at the two ends ers in the family who stay behind in the country- of his or her life cycle is a dependent, whose survival side, as most Chinese migrants are the so-called depends partly on transfers from others and partly on floating population. In Shanghai, a top migrant des- asset-based reallocations, including asset income and tination, the 2010 census reported nearly 1.5 million savings.24 At these dependent ages, a life-cycle deficit single-person households, accounting for one in six (that is, when labor income falls short of consump- households (17.2 percent). More than 60 percent of tion) occurs. This deficit needs to be offset by trans- these single-person households are migrants from fers from those of working ages. elsewhere in China.21 In human history, such transfers mostly occurred Urban life has multiple effects on marriage, fertil- among kin, within the family organization. Only ity, and living arrangements, as urban residents marry in modern times have other organizations, such as later, have lower fertility rates, and have smaller and churches, communities, and increasingly govern- simpler households than rural residents do. This was ments, assumed a larger role in making transfers. the case in the 1980s, and it is still the case in the 2010s. Over time, the types of transfers have also expanded, In 2015, the average urban household size was merely from food and shelter to education, health care, and 2.84 people, as compared with 3.14 in rural areas.22 old-age pension. Higher education expanded at the same rapid pace Figure 2 shows China’s life-cycle deficit and sur- as migration and urbanization. In roughly one decade, plus on a per capita basis in 2009, as an illustration. between 1998 and 2009, annual college admission We calculated these results using both micro-level increased sixfold, from one million to 6.3 million. It household survey data, which provide income and further increased to over seven million by 2014. The consumption data by age, and the aggregate national gross tertiary education enrollment ratio more than accounting data, which the government collects.25 tripled, from 10.5 percent in 1998 to 37.5 percent in As shown here (and in Figure 3), in 2009, China still 2014.23 Expansion in higher education directly affects enjoyed a sizable life-cycle surplus (negative deficit).

105 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 2. Per Capita Life-Cycle Deficits and Transfers in China, 2009

B) 5 RM

000 0 Age (1, 0510 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 es –5 ta Valu

Capi –10 Per Public Net Transfer –15 Private Net Transfers Public Asset-Based Reallocation –20 Private Asset-Based Reallocation

–25

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Figure 2 also shows transfers by source: public public transfers do. For instance, in Sweden, while versus private. Private transfers are those occurring intra-household and public transfers are about equal mostly among family members, from parents to chil- for young dependents on a per capita basis, public dren and from adult children to their elderly parents. transfers finance almost the entirelife-cycle deficit Private transfers are an important source of transfers for older dependents.26 at both ends of the life cycle. At the aggregate or societal level, China still enjoys On a per capita basis, as shown in Figure 2, private a sizable surplus to fund transfers at dependent ages, transfers are much more common than public trans- as Figure 3 shows. Even with a rapidly aging popula- fers are for those age 0–22, at 46 versus 38 percent. tion, China in 2009 still had a relatively favorable age At prime working ages (30–49), more surplus went to profile, with a large share of its population at working private transfers (33 percent) and private asset-based ages and a relatively small share at both ends of the allocation (33 percent) than to public transfers life cycle. This is especially the case for the older pop- (22 percent). The larger share of public transfers at ulation, for which the aggregate deficits, or the needs older ages stems primarily from the disproportion- for transfers, are relatively small. ately higher pension income that a small share of Combined, our estimate results in a total amount urban residents receives, which we discuss more later. of pension support transfers (over age 50) of The real magnitude of private transfers in old age is 1,508.2 billion renminbi (RMB) yuan, or 220.89 billion likely to be much larger, as family members provide US dollars.27 This is equivalent to about 4.5 percent in-kind elderly care, which is not counted here. of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) in that Compared to more developed countries, China’s year, but nearly 20 percent of total government private transfers play a more important role than expenditure. (Not all public transfers are from the

106 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

Figure 3. Aggregate-Level Life-Cycle Surplus in China, 2009

0 Age 0510 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

–1

–2 Aggregate Values (Billion RMB) –3 Public Net Transfer Private Net Transfers Public Asset-Based Reallocation –4 Private Asset-Based Reallocation

–5

Source: Authors’ calculations. government, as urban employees also receive pen- Life-cycle transfers based on the National Trans- sions from nongovernment expenditure sources.) fer Accounts methodology show a similar pattern. To The role of public versus private transfers for illustrate the urban-rural differences in types of trans- old-age support varies enormously between urban fers, we compare two major types of public transfers and rural China. In urban China, according to Chi- between urban and rural populations on a per capita na’s 2010 census, 66.3 percent of those age 60 and basis: health care and pension. Throughout the life over report pension as their main source of income. cycle, urban residents receive a higher level of public In rural China, the corresponding number is only health care transfer on a per capita basis. The dispar- 4.6 percent. In contrast, 41.2 percent of the rural ity between the two increases drastically in the older elderly report labor income as their main source of ages, reaching a ratio of roughly two to one in the late income, and 47.7 percent rely on intrafamilial trans- 70s (Figure 5). The more pronounced disparity is in fers. The corresponding numbers for urban China old-age support, in the form of pensions, for which were only 6.6 and 22.4 percent, respectively. per capita public transfer varies by almost seven to The share of rural elderly relying on intrafamil- one in 2009 (Figure 6). ial transfers also increases sharply by age, when the Such a huge difference between urban and rural elderly persons lose the ability to work, as shown China is mostly a legacy of China’s socialist past.28 in Figure 4. By their late 70s, fewer than one in four The urban-rural dichotomy in economic structure, urban elderly report family transfer as their main from employment to welfare benefits, is the most source of income, whereas in the countryside, nearly glaring legacy of inequality of the Chinese planned 8 in 10 reported so. economy era.29 In the past, as is still the case to some extent today, private transfers, from family and kin

107 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 4. Proportion of Chinese Elderly Relying on Familial Transfers, 2010

90%

80%

Rural 70%

60%

Town 50%

40%

30% Urban

20%

10%

0% 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 Age

Source: 2010 Population Census.

Figure 5. Per Capita Public Transfer in Health Care, Urban and Rural China, 2009

3,000

2,500

2,000

Urban

1,500 RMB

Rural 1,000

500

0 0102030405060708090 Age

Source: Authors’ calculations.

108 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

Figure 6. Per Capital Public Transfer in Pension, Urban and Rural China, 2009

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

Urban RMB 8,000

6,000

4,000

Rural 2,000

0 0102030405060708090 Age

Source: Authors’ calculations.

members, made up for the lack of public support for multigenerational households, compared with only residents in rural China. 10 percent in urban China. Without more generous Whereas household size was larger and multigen- public transfers, residents in rural China can only erational households more common in rural than in turn to their families via private transfers. urban China in the past, this is increasingly no longer Urban and rural China differ in not only the share the case, as discussed earlier. In the past two decades, of their population living alone but also the age pat- the average household size has decreased in both terns of those who do so. These rural and urban dif- urban and rural China, with the reduction more dras- ferences provide important clues about why people tic in cities, dropping from 3.5 to 2.7 people. In rural live alone. China, the average size also dropped from more than In Figure 7, we plot these differences among three four people in 1990 to 3.3, similar to the average size resident groups based on China’s 2010 population in the cities two decades ago.30 census data. From these data, we can make the fol- The smaller urban household size is mainly a func- lowing observations. First, for age 14 or lower, the tion of the much larger share of single-person and proportion of the population living alone looks sim- couple-only households and the much smaller share ilarly low across the three residential types. What of three-generation households. In Chinese cities, the hides behind such a similarity is that rural children shares of single-person and couple households are are 40 percent more likely to live alone than children 17 and 21 percent, respectively, compared with in cities and towns, confirming the sad stories about only 10 and 16 percent in the countryside. In 2010, China’s left-behind children in rural areas. 20 percent of all households in rural China were

109 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 7. Proportion of the Chinese Population Living Alone by Age and Type of Residence, 2010

20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8% Urban

Town 4%

2% Rural

0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90–94 95–99 100+

Source: 2010 Population Census.

Second, the proportion of the population living Implications of Household Change for alone rose with age only gradually in rural China, but Intergenerational Transfers rather quickly in towns, and more so in cities. In cities and towns, the peak ages are 25–29. The contrast Many of the forces that have transformed the Chi- between rural and urban shows the effects of rural to nese household are likely to continue in the com- urban migration. ing decades. Changes in marriage and divorce as Third, between age 35 and 59, the three categories we have seen may well be the beginning of further begin to diverge, rising in rural areas, inching up slowly changes in the Chinese marriage and family insti- in towns, but leveling off in cities. The urban level- tution. All signs also point to a sustained period of ing off likely indicates a choice of lifestyle—divorce low fertility. or staying single. The rise in rural areas reflects that East Asia is already one of the world’s lowest fer- marriage increasingly becomes a privilege after a cer- tility regions. In addition, China’s One-Child Policy, tain age. which lasted three and a half decades, not only con- Fourth, there is little difference across urban and tributed to the estimated hundreds of millions of rural elderly age 60 and over, until age 80 and above, families with only one child but also changed social indicating that the strong Chinese tradition of tak- norms. Government propaganda made the abnormal ing care of the elderly is still prevalent. Finally, the norm of one child per family into an acceptable new divergence beyond age 80 simply reflects mortality norm. The lukewarm response following the abol- differences. ishment of the One-Child Policy illustrates how the new norm has taken root and reveals the constraints

110 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

Figure 8. Funding Sources for Persons Age 65 and Older, Measured as Shares of the Life-Cycle Deficit, in 17 Economies Around 2000

Source: Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “Theoretical Aspects of National Transfer Accounts,” in Population Aging and the Genera- tional Economy: A Global Perspective, ed. Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 32–54.

young Chinese face in having children.31 Together, In the three East Asian societies included in this these demographic fundamentals suggest that the global comparison, the elderly in Taiwan rely on a Chinese household is not going to get any larger, and combination of all three sources. The same is true maybe even smaller and simpler. for South Korea, though family transfers play a less China is by no means alone in facing an increas- important role than in Taiwan. (At less than one-third, ing need for public transfers. As standards of living the location of South Korea is farther away from the increase and household size and structure change, axis of family transfers.) In Japan, old-age support public transfers become more important than private depends almost entirely on asset income and public transfers. As shown in Figure 8, which draws from transfers (about half for each). the results of the National Transfer Accounts com- Our calculations based on China’s data for 2009 parative analysis, among the three sources of old-age show that, because Chinese elderly age 65 and over support—asset income, family transfers, and pub- still put more in savings than they take from asset lic transfers—high-income and industrialized West- income, China’s asset-based reallocations are nega- ern countries mainly rely on a combination of asset tive, accounting for 21 percent of the life-cycle defi- income and public transfers. Public transfers play an cit on a per capita basis. Family transfers account for especially prominent role in countries such as Austria, 39 percent, and public transfers account for 83 percent. Germany, and Sweden. On a per capita basis, public transfers account for

111 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

roughly twice the amount of family transfers. Such a part because of the political need to create an equita- high ratio between public and family transfers is in ble and uniform old-age support scheme and in part part because a large share of the Chinese rural elderly because of the demographic pressure of smaller rural continue to work until very old age and still rely on households and fewer private transfers. their own labor and other incomes. The potential magnitude of change can be esti- China’s continued urbanization and industrializa- mated by assuming the rural population follows the tion, compounded by declining household size, will same age-specific profile of public pension transfers as surely change the profile ofold-age support sources. the urban population in 2009. If China’s rural popula- China’s ongoing urbanization process will continue to tion received the same public pension transfer as the attract more young people from rural China to cities, urban population, the total amount of pension sup- and most likely to the largest ones, especially megaci- port would expand to 2,869 billion RMB, an increase ties. In the first decade of the 21st century, Beijing and of 90 percent. If the rural per capita pension benefit Shanghai each saw an expansion of population size of level increased to two-thirds the urban level, the total 40 percent or more, while national population growth amount of pension transfer would increase by about was only 6.5 percent. 56 percent. Such a level would be equivalent to nearly These large cities are where economic opportu- 7 percent of China’s GDP in 2009 and 30 percent of nities are, and they are culturally more diverse and all government expenditure. Even raising the rural interesting—hence, attractive to young migrants. At per capita pension benefit toone-third the urban level the same time, these cities are also the most expen- would cause the aggregate public pension transfers to sive locales to form a family and raise children, with be equivalent to 5.4 percent of China’s GDP in 2009 high costs of housing and childcare, long commutes, and 24 percent of all government expenditure. Social and congestion. Such a pattern of urbanization con- integration between the urban and rural parts of China tributes to the smaller and simpler household we will require drastically increased public spending on observe in urban China today, and this is where social benefits, to move the rural population’s benefit the whole country is heading. Further urbaniza- level closer to that of the urban population. tion, along with delayed and forgone marriages and In addition to the prospect of weakening house- increasing divorce, is likely to increase the share of hold and private transfers, China faces another single-person households. daunting challenge in intergenerational transfers: More people working and living in cities and smaller accelerating aging. One in five family households and more fragile households mean a greater demand already has an elderly person age 65 or over. The for public transfers, especially old-age support. The majority (57 percent) co-reside with children or greatest dividing line in Chinese society today contin- grandchildren.32 But 41 percent are living alone. In ues to be the half-century urban-rural separation, by 2010, more than 30 million households are composed which benefits are decided based on one’s household of only elderly persons age 65 and over. With rapid registration status. It is simply unthinkable, however, population aging, and especially with rising incomes that nearly half of China’s population, those who are and consumption, this enviable surplus will shrink still classified as rural or agricultural, will continue and could disappear before long.33 to live in a socially divided society and that they can Figure 9, which compares China’s life-cycle defi- continue to count on their weakened if not diminish- cit in 2009 and 2050, shows the effect of population ing kin network as their main source of old-age sup- aging on intergenerational transfers (private and pub- port. And this is what we see in the current pattern of lic combined). The 2009 age-specific profile of trans- transfers in China. fers is projected to 2050 using the population age How might public transfers change if the rural Chi- structure at that time (assuming moderate further nese population starts to resemble its urban coun- improvement in life expectancy and the current fer- terpart? Such a convergence should be expected, in tility level of 1.5 children per couple).

112 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

Figure 9. Aging and Life-Cycle Surplus in China, 2009 and 2050

4 2009 2050 3

0 Age 0102030405060708090

–1 Billion RMB –2

–3

–4

–5

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Population aging in China will cause three notice- government revenue in the past two decades, China able changes in life-cycle deficits and transfers. First, was able to launch a series of social welfare programs due to the shrinking share of the working-age popula- in education, health care, and pensions and extend tion, the absolute volume of the life-cycle surplus will coverage broadly and quickly. contract sharply (as shown in the middle ages in Fig- Yet great inequalities in benefit levels still exist. ure 9). Second, due to low fertility and a smaller share For the majority of the population, especially those of the population in young ages, the need for transfers in rural areas, coverage is still quite low, and public to the young will decline substantially. Third, and as transfers continue to be largely regressive. Slowdown expected with a rising share of the elderly population, in the Chinese economic growth, and an even more the magnitude of the life-cycle deficit or the need for drastic slowdown in government revenue growth, will transfers widens significantly. only make these challenges more daunting. In the real world, the two forces—population For China, demographic challenges go beyond aging at the aggregate level and rising need for pub- changing age structure and population size. The fam- lic support at the household or individual level—will ily institution in China, which has undergone tremen- generate an enormous demand for public transfers dous but less noticed changes in the past two decades, for old-age support and health care, exerting great will continue to drive China’s economic and social pressure for government expenditure. With rapid transformations for decades to come. economic growth and even more rapid increase in

113 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Notes

1. Wang Feng, “The Future of a Demographic Overachiever: Long-Term Implications of the Demographic Transition in China,” Population and Development Review 37 (Supplement) (January 2011): 173–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00383.x; Cai Yong, “China’s New Demographic Reality: Learning from the 2010 Census,” Population and Development Review 39, no. 3 (September 2013): 371–96, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00383.x; and Cai Yong and Wang Feng, “(Re)emergence of Late Marriage in Shanghai: From Collective Synchronization to Individual Choice,” in Wives, Husbands, and Lovers: Marriage and Sexuality in Hong Kong, Tai- wan, and Urban China, ed. Deborah Davis and Sara L. Friedman (Stanford, CA: Stanford Press, 2014), 97–117. 2. Martin King Whyte, “Continuity and Change in Urban Chinese Family Life,” China Journal 53 (January 2005): 9–33, https://www. jstor.org/stable/20065990. 3. Hu Zhan and Peng Xizhe, “Household Change in Contemporary China: An Analysis Based on Census Data,” Sociological Research 3 (2014): 145–67; and Xu Anqi and Xia Yan, “The Changes in Mainland Chinese Families During the Social Transition: A Critical Analy- sis,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 45, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 31–53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24339439?seq=1#page_scan_ tab_contents. 4. John Bongaarts, “Household Size and Composition in the Developing World in the 1990s,” Population Studies: A Journal of Demography 55, no. 3 (2001): 263–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/00324720127697. 5. Stevan Harrell, “The Rich Get Children: Segmentation, Stratification, and Population in Three Chekiang Lineages,” inFamily and Population in East Asian History, ed. Susan B. Hanley and Arthur P. Wolf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985); E. A. Hammel et al., “Changement démographique rapide et parenté: I’effect d’une évolution démographique instable sur les réseaux de parenté en Chine, 1750–2250” [The effect of rapid demographic change on aging, the case of China], in Conséquences de la croissance démo- graphique rapide dans les pays en dévelopment, ed. Georges Tapinos, Didier Blanchet, and David E. Horlacher (New York: United Nations, 1991), 233–60; Zhao Zhongwei, “Demographic Conditions and Multi-Generation Households in Chinese History: Results from Genealogical Research and Microsimulation,” Population Studies: A Journal of Demography 48, no. 3 (1994): 413–25, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/0032472031000147946; James Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700–2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); and Wang Feng, Noriko Tsuya, and James Lee, “Household Organiza- tion, Co-Resident Kin, and Reproduction,” in Prudence and Pressure: Reproduction and Human Agency in Europe and Asia, 1700–1900, ed. Noriko O. Tsuya et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 67–95. 6. Hu and Peng, “Household Change in Contemporary China”; and Xu and Xia, “The Changes in Mainland Chinese Families During the Social Transition.” 7. Hammel et al., “Changement démographique rapide et parenté”; Zeng Yi, Family Dynamics in China: A Life Table Analysis (Mad- ison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); and Zhao, “Demographic Conditions and Multi-Generation Households in Chinese History.” 8. Cai Yong, “An Assessment of China’s Fertility Level Using the Variable-r Method,” Demography 45, no. 2 (May 2008): 271–81, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2831367/; and Cai, “China’s New Demographic Reality.” 9. Bongaarts, “Household Size and Composition in the Developing World in the 1990s.” 10. Deborah S. Davis and Sara L. Friedman, “Deinstitutionalizing Marriage and Sexuality,” in Wives, Husbands, and Lovers: Marriage and Sexuality in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Urban China, ed. Deborah S. Davis and Sara L. Friedman (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 1–38; and Xu and Xia, “The Changes in Mainland Chinese Families During the Social Transition.” 11. Cai and Wang, “(Re)emergence of Late Marriage in Shanghai.” 12. Wang Feng, Cai Yong, and Shen Ke, “Getting Married in Shanghai: Arrival of a New Marriage Regime in China?” (paper presentation, Population Association of America 2016 Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, April 2, 2016). 13. Robert D. Retherford, Naohiro Ogawa, and Rikiya Matsukura, “Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan,” Population and Devel- opment Review 27, no. 1 (January 2004): 65–102, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00065.x; Gavin Jones, “The ‘Flight from Mar- riage’ in South-East and East Asia,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 36, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 93–119, https://www.jstor.org/

114 HOUSEHOLD CHANGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN CHINA

stable/41603982?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; and Gavin Jones, “Changing Marriage Patterns in Asia” (working paper, Asia Research Institute & Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 2010), http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/wps/wps10_131.pdf. 14. William L. Parish, Edward O. Laumann, and Sanyu A. Mojola, “Sexual Behavior in China: Trends and Comparisons,” Population and Development Review 33, no. 4 (December 2007): 729–56, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00195.x; Yu Jia and Xie Yu, “Cohabitation in China: Trends and Determinants,” Population and Development Review 41, no. 4 (December 2015): 607–28; and Wang, Cai, and Shen, “Getting Married in Shanghai.” 15. Parish, Laumann, and Mojola, “Sexual Behavior in China.” 16. Yu and Xie, “Cohabitation in China.” 17. Wang, Cai, and Shen, “Getting Married in Shanghai.” 18. Zeng Yi and Wang Zhenglian, “Dynamics of Family Households and Elderly Living Arrangements and Policy Implications in China” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 19. Zeng and Wang, “Dynamics of Family Households and Elderly Living Arrangements and Policy Implications in China.” 20. Hu and Peng, “Household Change in Contemporary China.” 21. Hu and Peng, “Household Change in Contemporary China.” 22. China Statistical Press, Tabulations of China’s 2015 Population Mini-Census. 23. Shen Ke, Wang Feng, and Cai Yong, “A Benevolent State Against an Unjust Society? Inequalities in Public Transfers in China,” Chinese Sociological Review 50, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/21620555.2017.1410432. 24. Ronald Lee, “Intergenerational Transfers, the Biological Life Cycle, and Human Society,” Population and Development Review 38, no. s1 (2012): 23–35, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23655284?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 25. Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “Theoretical Aspects of National Transfer Accounts,” in Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global Perspective, ed. Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011): 32–54; and Cai Yong et al., “China’s Age of Abundance: When Might It Run Out?,” Journal of the Economics of Ageing 4 (December 2014): 90–97, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2014.02.001. 26. Daniel Hallberg et al., “Intergenerational Redistribution in Sweden’s Public and Private Sectors,” in Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global Perspective, ed. Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 421–33. 27. The exchange rate we use is 1 USD = 6.8279 RMB. 28. Shen, Wang, and Cai, “A Benevolent State Against an Unjust Society?” 29. Martin King Whyte, ed., One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 30. Hu and Peng, “Household Change in Contemporary China.” 31. Wang Feng, “Policy Response to Low Fertility in China: Too Little, Too Late?,” AsiaPacific Issues, no. 130 (April 2017): 1–4, https:// www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api130.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36098. 32. Hu and Peng, “Household Change in Contemporary China.” 33. Cai et al., “China’s Age of Abundance.”

115 Changing Family and Marital Structure in China

EMOTIONAL STRAIN AT CULTURAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS David E. Scharff

have been studying Chinese family and marital were needed for working farms. Boys were preferred I structure over the past 10 years from the vantage both culturally, because sons mattered for the con- point of a Western psychoanalyst. I teach in China for tinuation of the family, to bring honor to ancestors, two to three weeks a year and recently coedited a vol- and economically, because boys would bring their ume on psychoanalysis in China.1 I am also the found- brides into the family while girls would leave to live ing editor of a new journal on psychoanalysis and with their husband’s family. In urban settings, a boy psychotherapy in China. I am particularly interested in brought honor to the family, while a girl “was often the comparative cultural issues in teaching an essen- regarded as little better than nothing.”3 Whether the tially Western invention—psychoanalytic psychother- purpose was the assurance of boys in the well-placed apy—to Chinese clinicians and in the way we and they merchant or landholding families or the need for can best understand the underlying mentality of Chi- labor in the country, the effect was the same. nese family and marital structure. I learn most from All this followed from the Confucian ethic that my Chinese colleagues as we discuss cases, and I see dominated Chinese structural thought for more things most in-depth when I interview a Chinese cou- than 2,500 years, in which allegiance was owed to ple or family for an hour a day over five days as part of the emperor, the father, and the oldest son. While teaching couple and family therapy in Beijing. Confucius did write that the emperor was obligated This direct clinical exposure allows me to quali- in a reciprocal way to be thoughtful to his subjects, tatively compare Chinese couples and families with this dictum was often honored in the breach, as my clinical experience with families and couples in was the idea that a father or oldest son should pay the United States and my research on comparative attention to the needs of the wife or daughters. The problems in family and couple therapy worldwide.2 axiom of this family organization was that the indi- Consequently, my remarks in this chapter carry the vidual was subservient to the group, the family to the advantages and limitations of close observation done father, and all of them to the emperor and therefore in this kind of clinical research. to the country. I will begin by examining the wider social con- Even the romantic myths of peasants struggling text in which my work takes place. Traditional Chi- against tyrannical emperors actually underscore the nese family structure before the Communist period emperor’s authority by showing the tragic conse- featured large families, both in urban, relatively quences of rebellion against him. Take, for instance, well-to-do families and in rural, agricultural families. the legend of the wife whose husband died in con- Of course, large families served different purposes in structing the Great Wall. She refused to bow to the rural and urban settings. In rural areas, large families emperor who had paid no honor to her dead husband,

116 CHANGING FAMILY AND MARITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA

killing herself instead of marrying the emperor. While emotionally on his own, and threatened by the close- such mythical stories show the dominant ethic’s ness of a family, all the while unconsciously long- potential for tyranny, they nevertheless paradoxically ing for a mother but fearing the intrusiveness of any confirm that it was the ruling ethic. And along the woman except his mother. way, this myth confirms a wife’s duty to her husband The Cultural Revolution was a time of national and to self-sacrifice, even unto death. individual trauma. It continues to haunt China and its This orientation of the individual to the family is families. But because people cannot talk about it, it still in the dialogue about the modern Chinese fam- has passed from the directly traumatized generation ily at individual and societal levels. Mao Zedong and to the current young generation without dialogue or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attacked the understanding, still taking its toll on young families in traditional view of the family. Parents had histori- ways they do not understand.5 In my experience con- cally chosen their children’s spouses, often with the ducting clinical interviews and interventions in China help of matchmakers, but this role was co-opted, to over the past 10 years, the Chinese people generally give the CCP and the work unit the right to deter- have little patience for discussing the traumas that mine marriage—and divorce. However, the family’s have beset them. purpose was still to serve the state, only now in the This is partly because the government has more embodiment of “Emperor” Mao. Of course, the ruling than discouraged talk about the Cultural Revolution elite did as they pleased in terms of family, marriage, or the traumas of the Great Leap Forward. The lat- and sexual license, but these rules were thoroughly ter introduced the largest famine in human history imposed on the population at large. and generalized industrial disaster. Even today, the In this early Communist period, two important government downplays the trauma from recent nat- things changed. The status of women was greatly ural disasters such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake enhanced, as in Mao’s aphorism, “Women hold up half because it could be blamed for such things as shoddy the sky.” And sex, while permitted for procreation, construction of schools and apartment blocks and was officially denigrated—except forhigh-ranking for its poor emergency response. While Germany CCP officials. For instance, Mao’s licentious life is has encouraged airing the trauma of the Holocaust well-documented.4 and World War II, with the effect of a great deal of In the Cultural Revolution, the family was even healing and rapprochement with the Jews of Israel, further sabotaged. Family members were forced to China has taken the opposite tack. The consequence turn against each other, and family loyalty was labeled is that trauma is deeply embedded in the Chinese as subversive if it challenged the state. The educated, experience, but it is not understood and so operates those with well-off parents, and anyone suspected of unconsciously.6 being a landholder were sent for reeducation. Ado- With Mao’s death in 1976 and the ensuing demise lescents from disfavored urban families were sent to of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping began the great the countryside, where children were raised in orphan opening up. Suddenly the family, too, was out from peer groups overseen by uneducated farmers. under the fire-breathing attack of Mao. But by now I evaluated one professor who was raised in such family ethics had been cast adrift after a generation a group and could not relate to his much younger of attacking the family as a central institution. The country-bred wife. He said, “I did not see my mother population simply did not know what to make of for six years, but I didn’t mind. I was raised with other newly emerging family structures. The traditional children in the sunshine of freedom.” In my clini- idea of large families briefly resumed, but almost cal evaluation, I came to see that this man was now immediately, the new One-Child Policy meant small, unable to conceive of how to form a family with his one-child families. beautiful, less-educated wife and his young daughter. The Confucian ethic had quickly come back He was unschooled in living in a family, used to being because there was nothing else dormant in the

117 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Chinese mind. But this time, it was not uncon- The Six-Pocket Child. In a culture where children tested emotionally. And because Deng urged people do not have siblings or cousins, two parents and up to develop economically, a new consumer individ- to four grandparents all dote on only one child. The ualism caused families and individuals to quickly child may be indulged without limits and is often become entrepreneurially out for themselves.7 therefore emotionally in charge of the family. This “Little Emperor” or “Little Empress” is often also called a “six-pocket child” because all the adults—two The One-Child Policy parents and four grandparents—compete to pamper the child. The opening up had barely begun when the One-Child This sets up a paradigm of how to raise a narcissis- Policy was imposed throughout China. In a bureau- tic child. Such children grow into young adults who cratic way, an aerospace engineer invented the policy feel that everything is owed to them. Boys are more to slow population growth, with, as some knew even likely to be entitled than girls, although of course any then, unintended social and economic consequences. generalization will not always hold. For the family, the effect was to block the return to I have heard anecdotal stories of young adults the old ethic of large, male-dominated families. who begin a job and immediately want the prefer- There were other immediate effects. Many girls ential treatment to which they feel entitled, growing were abandoned or put up for adoption to allow the quickly bored with routine work and insisting they are family to select for boys. This led to the long-term really too good for what they are doing. One result, as disastrous excess of men, a devastating consequence I heard recently from a consultant to Chinese busi- for men who now cannot find wives in a society nesses, has been difficulty finding dedicated, young, where having a (male) heir to extend the line is still educated employees and a dearth of competent Chi- paramount. nese middle managers. The effects were quite uneven, however. In rural areas, the One-Child Policy was less strictly enforced Empowerment of Women. One unintended con- because of an informal understanding that farm fam- sequence of the social development I have described ilies needed more hands for farming. In the urban is the empowerment of women. Mao’s dictum, areas where the policy was enforced, and because it “Women hold up half the sky,” and the move to became the norm, families tended not to resist. employ women in both rural and urban areas put Of course, in some cases families elected to have women on an equal footing with men, or almost so. a second child despite the economic penalties and (Of course, this was not true for the ruling elite, still social opprobrium. There have also been stories almost entirely men.) The One-Child Policy went emerging from China, especially lately, of forced further to put women on equal footing with men; if a abortions and other particularly brutal treatment family has only one child, then that child, regardless of women who dared to have more than one preg- of gender, will assume the mantle of the hopes for the nancy.8 In addition, there are now over 13 million family’s future. The result has been not only the eco- “second children” who have been denied education nomic and social empowerment of women but also a and other social services and who have been forced degree of psychological repair.11 to live outside all that is available to officially regis- Nevertheless, vestiges of the old denigration and tered children. This number represents a staggering self-denigration of women remain in the psychologi- 1 percent of China’s total population.9 cal substructure of the Chinese mind. When women It has turned out that families with an “only girl” seek psychological treatment, it is common to find often do better.10 Girls are more loyal to their parents that self-denigration and depression about their sta- and more likely to care for them in their old age. But tus as a woman underlie a great deal of difficulty.12 other problems ensued. The denigration of women and elevation of men

118 CHANGING FAMILY AND MARITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA

within the family creates a great deal of conflict, both through physical beatings and harsh criticism from between generations and within marriages. her mother. Even the games she played with her beloved grandfather were teasingly sadistic ones, an The Pressure of Being an Only Child. Only chil- inheritance of his trauma and deprivation during the dren are subject to enormous pressure. One child early days of the Chinese regime. Her parents then now has the entire burden of the family’s legacy and paid for her education abroad after college, support- future, both economically and emotionally. Success- ing her for several years while she gathered advanced ful children do well, as they do anywhere. But too degrees and began to work overseas. many crack under the pressure. When she sought psychological treatment, it In interviewing patients in psychiatric hospitals, I emerged that she had turned against her parents began to think that the children who could respond emotionally because of the effects their trauma had successfully to the pressure became doctors, and on their treatment of her as a child. This example of those who could not became patients. However, even an only child leaving her parents to emigrate, leaving the successful children often come to resent the pres- them emotionally, and being wary of having her own sure. One of my most successful young Chinese col- family lest she mistreat her own child demonstrates leagues told me recently that she and her husband the effects of the multiple forces I am describing. know they carry the responsibility for their four par- Clinically, I have seen that such problems occur fre- ents because there is no effective social security safety quently in those children who remain in China, too. net. She said, “It’s just too much. We can’t do it. And we probably won’t do it.” Left-Behind Children. There are other challenges And then there are the many successful young to the family in modern China, such as the many rural adults who want to emigrate, leaving their parents parents who leave their children with grandparents stranded in an aging culture—even when their par- to work in the city. This has reinforced and magni- ents often support the idea of emigration. Finally, fied the fracture of theparent-child bond in families many think an epidemic of youth suicide is par- and magnified an old pattern in which grandparents tially due to the pressure on these adolescents and are left to care for children. Such “left-behind chil- young people.13 dren” often turn against their parents, and we can expect them to have real difficulty forming families Emotional Isolation. Many demographic studies of their own. have documented how the rapid aging of the Chinese One such family is featured in the Chinese docu- population puts enormous strain on young families, mentary Last Train Home.14 In this movie, we see a showing that these families have diminished kin- Chinese couple laboring in a sweatshop in the city, ship networks even among their extended families. saving money to send back home, and going home Because the family has always been so important in only for the spring holiday. Their trip home is impos- China, this shrinking of the family to its nuclear core sible, marked by the difficulty obtaining scarce tickets, and the secondary effect of ever-smaller kinship net- crowded stations and rail carriages, and the exhaus- works result in emotional isolation of families and tion of a trip of several days. individuals. When they arrive back in their home village, they A few years ago, I evaluated a young Chinese meet their adolescent children, who have been liv- woman who left China for education in Europe and ing with grandparents and who now have no time for then the United States. Her parents and grandpar- their devoted but absent parents. The daughter seems ents, traumatized by the events under Mao and the to be going off the rails, and she turns on her parents. Cultural Revolution, passed the trauma onto her In the end, of course, the parents have to get back on without understanding it, through the absence of the train and go back to the city with no assurance her mother and father when she was young and later that their children are doing well.

119 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Second Children. Thirteen million children, almost mixed messages, first as children and subsequently 1 percent of the Chinese population, are undocu- as adults when these issues have been installed as mented and illegal “second children” whose parents unconscious contradictions and therefore sources of could not afford the fine involved in registering them guilt. Fong writes: or obtaining a household registration certification called a hukou. While the parents are often punished Because talk about the values of independence, excel- through lack of employment, the children are unedu- lence, obedience, and caring/sociableness is much cated and have difficulty finding a job. When as adults simpler than the complex, flexible, interconnected they have children of their own, that second generation cultural models held in mind by parents, many of the of undocumented children faces the same problems.15 nuances of the parents’ cultural models were lost in the process of transmission to their children, who, When the Only Child Dies. There are also the more in the course of maturing, developed practices and than a million couples whose only child has died, leav- rationales that differed significantly from those that ing them with emotional and financial despair. In a would ideally be generated by the cultural models of country with no social safety net and no child to take their parents. This resulted in parental dissatisfaction care of the parents in their advancing age, there is lit- with their children’s attitudes and behaviors. Exacer- tle hope they can survive above the poverty line.16 bating this dissatisfaction was the fact that parents not only wanted their children to replicate the cul- Falling Birth Rates. The One-Child Policy has offi- tural models they held in mind, they also wanted cially ended, but as we now know, it has ended too late. their children to improve on these cultural models in Children are expensive and drain resources. Through- ways that would make them better adjusted to con- out the world, developing countries are experiencing temporary socioeconomic conditions than their par- a fall in birth rates. ents were. The contradictions inherent in parents’ Chinese parents now may well be satisfied with dual desires for replication and improvement made one child and are unlikely to want more than two. But it even more difficult for children to understand and even two children per family are not enough to sus- fulfill their parents’ wishes.19 tain the Chinese population and support the aging generation. Too many young people do not want chil- To summarize these conflicting currents in mod- dren and certainly not more than one.17 ern Chinese families and marriages, brought about by the collision between such traditional beliefs and Psychologically Divided. Vanessa Fong, an anthro- modernity, all in the context of the one-child and pologist at Amherst College, has documented how opening-up policies of the past 30 years, I quote my modern Chinese parents are deeply divided emotion- colleague, Gao Jun of Fudan University in Shanghai. ally and psychologically. They value the traditional In 2017, she wrote to me: Confucian ethic of loyalty to the family, but they know their child has to be out for himself or herself, a Chinese families and couples are now facing unique young, rather ruthless entrepreneur.18 Almost within conditions of family structure and social-economic the same sentence, they move emotionally back and changes, which are not found in other counties and forth between these two ethics, saying, “Be loyal to probably in the history of mankind. The “4-2-1” fam- me and your family” and then “Go out there and make ily structure and the “left-behind children” are just it, regardless of the cost, and don’t mind us.” two prominent examples. These changes trigger This grammatically and psychologically mixed problems, but also unique coping strategies devel- message, a result of the parents’ conflicting wishes, oped by Chinese couples and families. For instance, implants psychological conflict in the minds of the concept of “the distance is one hot soup,” which these children. They have difficulty resolving the means that an ideal distance between a couple and

120 CHANGING FAMILY AND MARITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA

their parents is the distance over which one can bring This man’s childhood trauma was deeply instilled a hot soup from one family to the other without hav- in him. His professional-class parents had been sepa- ing the soup go cold. The phrase illustrates how Chi- rated and sent to the country for reeducation. He had nese couples negotiate boundaries with their parents grown up in, as he said, “the sunshine of youth” in a while enjoying the benefits of larger families.20 farm setting where nobody oversaw the many unpar- ented children, who more or less raised themselves. This traumatic childhood separation from his parents had given him the contradictory feelings of both Problems in Chinese Marriages wonderful independence and insatiable longing for a mother to take care for him. He then carried the long- As a mental health professional, I see two kinds of dif- ing for a woman who would dote on him and care for ficulties for modern Chinese family and marital struc- him, a sex partner who would be undemanding and tures. First I discuss struggles inside Chinese couples. would focus on him, and the family that he never had. My own sample of clinical engagements with Chi- When he met this young, beautiful, and accom- nese families is limited to middle-class urban families plished woman, he felt his prayers had been answered. that I interview or that are seen by Chinese clinicians However, he had no working knowledge of how to whom I supervise. relate or how to give of himself inside a marriage. He I also get some information about the struggles would come home at night and want to be by him- in rural families when hearing about those families self, expecting his wife to take care of herself and their that have moved to the city from rural settings. These young child. rural families, most commonly farming families, are The wife in this couple was also traumatized, but larger and poorer. They struggle with economic depri- in a different way. She had grown up in a large rural vation, especially for those children who grew up in family with a good deal of alcoholism. Her father took the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and this poverty her mother for granted and beat her. The woman her- itself imposes a kind of trauma on the families.21 self was the youngest, favored child with several older For instance, the 35-year-old wife in the marriage brothers, all of whom had to work the farm. She was that I described above came from a rural farm family. given less work and more education, graduating from She had moved to the city and opened her own busi- high school when the others had not. ness, becoming a successful small business woman Because they had lived in the rural setting, the Cul- before meeting her husband, who was 15 years older tural Revolution did not significantly touch them. and an academic. She had been looking for an older They had thus been spared the worst of the national man who would take care of her. Implicit in her search trauma, but they had nevertheless suffered the ravages was the idea that he would not be particularly demand- of alcoholism, poverty, the denigration of women, and ing, including that he would not impose on her sexually. the bias of male preference—even though she was Their marriage had broken down because it doted on as the youngest and only daughter. turned out that he was looking for someone to take As soon as she could, she escaped her family and care of him and that he had fantasies of an active came to the city, where she established a success- sexual life of a kind that he had never known as a ful small business. When she met her husband, she single man before their marriage. Early in my inter- expected he would value and take care of her, as she views with them, the couple recounted that this man was used to her family doting on her, only to find that had a housekeeper, whom he called his “nanny,” he had no idea how to relate to her and that he had whose job really was to take care of him. Even after sexual expectations, which she found oppressive. marriage, he continued to employ this nanny in the Increasingly chronically depressed, she took refuge house, giving his young wife the feeling that he much in her relationship with her daughter and wanted her preferred the nanny. husband to keep his distance.

121 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

This case illustrates much about current marriage The Changing Chinese Family and family situations in China. The two forms of common trauma were unlike each other but alike in the We have been discussing some dilemmas of forming effect they had on these partners, both of whom did and maintaining marriages currently in China, but not know how to relate inside marriage. Both had the modern Chinese family is also struggling. Once expectations that could not be voiced, resulting in these couples do manage to find each other and depression on both sides. It also resulted in overvalu- marry, most go on to have the one child they have ation of their daughter, not only because she was the been allowed to have. only child but also because each partner turned to the Although the Chinese government has recently child to compensate for feeling unloved and misun- scrapped the One-Child Policy, there are also indi- derstood by the other. cations, as I noted above, that most couples will To be sure, there are couples who manage to find not want to have more than two children. Many, if each other and construct more enduring relation- not most, will likely maintain the one-child pattern. ships. Somebody in my position as a psychoanalyst This has been true in other countries emerging from and couple psychotherapist tends to see mostly cou- poverty, as raising children becomes more expen- ples who are in difficulty. And in China, many of these sive and couples worldwide have moved to having difficulties carry the aura of the national trauma, pov- smaller families. erty, and rapid cultural change, which, among other In the modern, middle-class, young Chinese fam- things, means that the ways of finding partners in ily with one child, grandparents form a group of four, marriage have changed radically in the past 60 years.22 all focusing on that one child. (The pattern is differ- For instance, I saw another couple in which the ent in rural areas, where the One-Child Policy is more wife’s depression, her fear for the safety of her child, lenient and where exceptions allow for a second child, and her own low self-esteem made her exceedingly especially if the first child is a girl.) Grandparents vigilant about whether her well-meaning husband often take care of the child, since both parents usually understood the dangers their child would encounter work, and consequently the parents feel obligated to growing up. On this occasion, the husband was atten- their own parents because of the childcare they offer. tive to his wife’s depression, worked to bolster her When we now see these young adults clinically, they self-esteem, and during our sessions tried earnestly are burdened by the concern and often the financial to understand the source of her distress. Her distress care of their aging parents, a burden that often seems was rooted in traumatic conditions in her childhood, too great to bear. but she was lucky enough to have a husband who was One cannot say exactly how the Chinese family solicitous, caring, and devoted to her well-being and will evolve. What we can do is look at relatively young to their child. families as they now exist and struggle with the reali- Divorce is also problematic in modern China. ties of their evolving worlds. Under the first phase of the Communist control of Two stories illustrate some of the many challenges marriage, a couple could not divorce without authori- families face. Both families came to see me because of zation from their working unit or the CCP. Now there their highly symptomatic 14-year-old girls, but I also are divorce laws on the books, but enforcement is hear frequently of young adolescent boys struggling extremely uneven. So couples facing divorce do not with similar issues. These adolescents often have dif- know what they will be dealing with legally. I have ficulty staying in school, just when so much is riding heard anecdotally that the judicial administration of on them to carry the family’s future. the laws that do exist tends to be extremely variable and highly dependent on local whim and prejudice. Brittany. Fourteen-year-old Brittany23 was brought All of this leads to uncertainty and fear concerning the to see me because she was refusing to go to school, outcome of divorce and child custody proceedings. staying at home in her room, hearing voices, and

122 CHANGING FAMILY AND MARITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA

fearing that all the children at school were against child has an exaggerated and pampered sense of her her. It turned out that her successful but alcoholic power and importance. father was out every night drinking with business associates and perhaps seeing prostitutes. He then Clover. Another family with a similarly aged ado- came home to be rejected by his wife, who delegated lescent girl gives a contrasting picture of the effects Brittany to deal with him and his drunken apologies of Chinese culture on the family. Fourteen-year-old and pleas for understanding. Clover was obsessed with the idea of suicide and had The hallucinatory “voices” Brittany heard (and formed a “suicide club” at school. Her mother, who because of which she had been wrongly diagnosed as taught in the same highly competitive high school, psychotic) were actually the embodiment of her par- was devastated that the other teachers knew of Clo- ents’ fights, leaving her to feel that she had to stay ver’s difficulty, when the mother had not. Clover went home to protect her mother, a pressure she could to school, but her nights were spent on her cell phone, not bear. Her mother leaned on Brittany, crying, “If so she never got enough sleep and became a mystery he dies of drink, what will become of us?” Brittany to her parents. wanted to move out on her own, telling us that she, at Clover lived in quite a loving family. Her father was 14, could care for her mother and herself better than a professional and her mother a teacher. We learned her father could—a fantasy that was divorced from that her mother’s parents, both teachers also, tutored reality but not so unusual in adolescents because it and pressured Clover every day, just as they had pres- elevates their culturally supported idea of holding the sured her mother when she was a child. family’s future in their hands. Clover’s “suicide club” was not her only school Brittany’s alcoholic father had experienced quite a fantasy activity. She had also formed a fantasy “fam- lot of trauma growing up. Although he gave us a very ily” with boys and girls as family members, often dis- confused story, as best we could piece it together, regarding their actual gender, so that a boy might be a his family had been under pressure during the Cul- sister or a girl the father. In this way, they played with tural Revolution. His brothers were in the military the question of what their future family might be, and were able to find their way through the system. in the way children everywhere rehearse the future However, his family also lived in the area of a massive through fantasy play about alternative identities. Clo- earthquake, and this had hit his family hard. ver kept feeling guilty that she was letting her parents Additionally, as a “businessman” after leaving his down by not being studious enough and wanting to own military position, he took financial risks that just play. had put the family under pressure. In addition to his In this intervention, when the mother confronted alcoholism, this financial pressure was part of the her “loss of face” over Clover’s situation, the crisis family’s suffering. The nightly soirees with his busi- cracked things open, letting the family members find ness pals were common practice for people doing each other and begin to communicate emotionally. business in China, but they formed another cultural Once the parents recognized the enormous pressure element that created considerable backlash inside they were putting on Clover, her mother admitted his family. that she had not always obeyed her own parents when Brittany’s so-called psychotic illness expressed she was a child and that she had loved to play and several common cultural elements: the trauma atten- have fantasies herself. She had only become a more dant on the family through the generations, the pres- serious student in her university days. sures in which people doing business in China find As the family began to talk about the parents’ his- themselves frequently, the denigration of women as tories (which did not involve impingement from the part of her father relying on his wife without feeling Cultural Revolution), we could see the pressure in he had to pay attention to her, and the empowerment the family begin to dissipate. Clover announced that of the one child in the Chinese family, in which the she was no longer interested in suicide, discarding

123 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

it the way another child might discard an interest in the middle-class “embrace” of Western values of indi- a superhero, and the family began finding new ave- viduality and entrepreneurship without enough moral nues for emotional communication. This also cut underpinning. No one knows when social morality into the isolation that mother and daughter felt from might catch up with the newly emerging patterns. each other and the isolation the family felt from Whole other questions arise about rural families. their community. Less socially traumatized by the state, they nevertheless often carry the trauma of poverty or of having moved into the cities without a hukou, which Conclusions affords them and their children the right to education, health care, and social services. And now with From the perspective of Chinese mental health, we the government embarking on large-scale urbaniza- focus on not only the numbers and structures of tion of the rural population, large numbers are being future families but also their internal struggles. Chi- moved off farms and into cities without roots or use- na’s young people are often deeply divided emotion- ful employment. ally about the idea of family. This will determine both For all these reasons, employment, education, and the structure and inner struggles of future families mental health problems are a time bomb, comparable because the psychology they develop shapes the ide- to the one posed by the pollution that besets modern ologies they will live by. China, spoiling its air, water, and farmlands. The younger generations are certainly going to But here at the end of this chapter, I want to add have mixed feelings about whether to form mar- a caveat to almost everything I have said, which has riages and families at all; about whether to have chil- so far added up to a dire warning about the future of dren and, if so, how many; and about the burdens of China’s families. The emphasis on trauma and dif- having children. If and when they do have children, ficulty that I have stressed should be balanced by we can expect them to worry about where their chil- describing what we so frequently see as strengths dren’s loyalties should lie—whether their focus will and resources in Chinese families and marriages, be on caring for their parents or succeeding in their just as we do in the West. careers—and on how they wish those children to I have seen many married couples and families embody their legacy. We cannot tell how many more that come in with problems but that, in the space of young people will be raised with the narcissistic our interventions, exhibit warmth and psychological themes of self-indulgence, which represent an escape mindedness, the kind of flexibility that augurs well for from social and family pressures. growth and positive adaptation. I have left many fam- We can speculate about some of these issues, but ilies and couples with a sense that they will do well based on the sociological literature and articles, no given ordinary psychotherapeutic help. For every fam- one seems to feel sure about the future of the Chinese ily that seems hopelessly caught in the consequences family. There is already more separation and divorce of social change and inherited trauma, such as Britta- than anyone predicted a few years ago. Even more ny’s family, we encountered a family like Clover’s that surprising is the number of young people who do not has the will and the tools for growth and change. want to marry. The situation with the family is, therefore, one of We do not know what will happen to the many many crucial issues in modern China, but it is one rural men who cannot find wives and are socially des- that has received almost no attention in the press or titute as a result. And it has certainly caught the social academic circles. And while it is only one of the fac- engineers by surprise that the end of the One-Child tors that strain China in the years ahead, it is no exag- Policy is not yielding a sizable crop of larger families, geration to say that the future of Chinese families, not enough to offset the overall failure to maintain and therefore of China itself, rests with the struggles the workforce over the coming years. Then there is I have outlined.

124 CHANGING FAMILY AND MARITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA

Notes

1. See David E. Scharff and Sverre Varin,Psychoanalysis in China (London: Karnac Books, 2014). 2. My research over the past seven years has been with the Committee on Family and Couple Psychoanalysis of the International Psychoanalytic Association, a committee I currently chair. 3. Tong Jun, “Mother, Infant, and Women’s Identity,” Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy in China 2 (2016): 97–104, https://www. taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780429903557/chapters/10.4324%2F9780429478789-5. 4. Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994). 5. Tomas Plaenkers, ed., Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution (London: Karnac Books, 2014). 6. David E. Scharff, “Five Things Western Therapists Need to Know for Working with Chinese Therapists and Patients,” inPsycho - analysis in China, ed. David E. Scharff and Sverre Varvin (London: Karnac Books, 2014), 111–20. 7. Yan Yunxiang, “The Changing Moral Landscape,” in Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry Tell Us About China Today, ed. Arthur Kleinman et al. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 36–77, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnb7k. 8. Mei Fong, One Child: The Story of China’s Most Radical Social Experiment (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016). 9. Coco Liu and Chen Shanshan, “Lost Lives: The Battle of China’s Invisible Children to Recover Missed Years,” Reuters World News, December 14, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-children-policy/lost-lives-the-battle-of-chinas-invisible-children- to-recover-missed-years-idUSKBN1431CX. 10. Vanessa L. Fong, “China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters,” American Anthropologist, New Series 104, no. 4 (2002): 1098–109, https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.4.1098. 11. Fong, “China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters.” 12. Tong, “Mother, Infant, and Women’s Identity.” 13. See Susan Caskie, “The Rise of Youth Suicide in China,” Week, November 1, 2013, http://theweek.com/articles/457373/rise-youth- suicide-china; and Cesar Chelala, “Will China Be Able to Curb Adolescent Suicide?,” Globalist, July 20, 2014, https://www.theglobalist. com/will-china-be-able-to-curb-adolescent-suicide/. 14. Fan Lixin, dir., Last Train Home [Guītú Lièchēis] (Zeitgeist Films, 2009). 15. Liu and Chen, “Lost Lives.” 16. Kim Kyung-Hoon, “When an Only Child Dies,” Reuters Online, December 2, 2015, https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/china- when-an-only-child-dies. 17. Nicholas Eberstadt, “China’s Coming One-Child Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ nicholas-eberstadt-china8217s-coming-onechild-crisis-1385511532. 18. Vanessa L. Fong, “Parent-Child Communication Problems and the Perceived Inadequacies of Chinese Only Children,” ETHOS 35, no. 1 (2007): 85–127, https://doi.org/10.1525/eth.2007.35.1.85. 19. Fong, “Parent-Child Communication Problems and the Perceived Inadequacies of Chinese Only Children.” 20. Gao Jun (Fudan University), in discussion with the author, 2017. 21. Yang Yunping, “The Impact of Psychic Trauma on Individuation and Self-Identity: How the Psychic Trauma of Poverty Affects Individuation and Self-Identity in the Context of the Chinese Family,” in Psychoanalysis in China, ed. David E. Scharff and Sverre Varvin (London: Karnac Books, 2014), 137–49. 22. Scharff, “Five Things Western Therapists Need to Know for Working with Chinese Therapists and Patients.” 23. Chinese young people often give themselves Western names of their own choosing, as was true in this case and the next one. However, all names I have used are pseudonyms to protect the families.

125 China’s Demographic Trends

HOW WILL THEY MATTER?

Jacqueline Deal and Michael Szonyi

he aim of this chapter is to speculate in an of demographic developments using the CCP’s own Tinformed way about some of the possible conse- policies and policy objectives as a guide. quences—economic, security, social, and political—of Explicitly and implicitly, PRC policymakers have demographic change in the People’s Republic of China often approached the issue of national strength (PRC).1 We do this in two ways. First, we examine anal- and wealth in terms of the ratio between the coun- ogous cases from other countries and China’s own his- try’s resources and its population. In other words, torical experience and then make adjustments to these they have seen the issue in terms of a fraction, in cases in light of the distinctive features of the contem- which national resources are the numerator and porary PRC—including the role of the Chinese Com- population the denominator. A key goal of demo- munist Party (CCP). Second, we consider some recent graphic policy has been to lower the growth rate of high-level policy statements to gain a better sense of the denominator, in the hope that this would make how the leadership is thinking about the changes and it easier to attain higher gross domestic product how it may respond. (GDP) per capita. In practice, however, isolating Because we appreciate the seriousness with which the denominator has proved impossible. As we will the CCP leadership has approached demography over see, efforts to do so have: (1) made it more rather the past several decades, we take our bearings initially than less difficult to accomplish the CCP’s core eco- from the work of the Chinese demographers who have nomic and security goals and (2) produced other shaped elite thinking, starting with the rocket scien- undesirable side effects. tists and statisticians behind the PRC’s One-Child In response, Chinese planners have recently Policy. These pioneers of modern Chinese demo- begun to subdivide the denominator—that is, the graphic policy developed their theories and policy Chinese population—into different categories, gen- guidance in the 1970s, when the CCP was exploring erating a new set of paradigmatic ratios to guide pol- how best to increase the country’s economic and mil- icymaking. They now seek to not just regulate the itary capacity—or, as they often put it, how to make raw number of births but also develop more precise the country “wealthy and strong” (fuqiang). Demog- measures to influence these ratios. This includes raphy in the PRC has thus long been tied to the CCP’s incentivizing or mandating the physical movement modernization agenda. of different subgroups around the country and shap- We believe that thinking about the interaction of ing the quality (suzhi) of subgroups through educa- Chinese demographics with the CCP’s modernization tion, ideological training, and other measures. This agenda is a useful way of framing the possible effects approach suggests a tendency to focus on managing of future demographic change. Our goal is not to link developments such as the aging population, labor everything that may happen in the PRC to demogra- force dynamics, and the sex ratio imbalance by treat- phy. Rather, we want to analyze the potential impact ing them as discrete issues. There may, however, be

126 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

a deficit of attention to how the overall impact of for “400 million fewer births over thirty years.” Had these multiple changes is fundamentally transform- these policies not been implemented, “per capita ing Chinese society. land resources, water resources, forests and energy The research and deliberations that supported resources would be 20% lower [than they are].”3 the Planned Reproduction (jihua shengyu) policy, Our main argument here is that the issue is not colloquially known as the One-Child Policy, were so straightforward. In this chapter, we identify some undertaken as Deng Xiaoping was launching the important connections or interactive effects between Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, national numerator and denominator that may yet interfere defense, and science and technology), designed to with the CCP’s continued pursuit of wealth and secure CCP rule and propel the PRC into the ranks strength. The engineers of the One-Child Policy did of the leading nations of the world. Chinese political not anticipate that achieving the goal of higher GDP elites decided that reducing the rate of population per capita would itself affect consumption patterns growth was essential to improve the country’s pros- or that a slowdown and eventual reversal of popula- pects for economic development, attain prosperity tion growth might eventually act as a brake on eco- and security, and rebuild the CCP’s legitimacy, objec- nomic growth. tives that the Maoist-period political campaigns had The One-Child Policy was intended to reduce the badly undermined. denominator in the fraction (or at least reduce its As the anthropologist Susan Greenhalgh has rate of growth). For better or worse, this was accom- shown, Deng and his colleagues embraced the schol- plished. Economic reform policies today focus on arly rationale that China, like every country, has a growing the numerator. We see much evidence “sustaining capacity” based on its natural endow- that the engineering and rocket-science mindset of ments, which can support only a certain level of 40 years ago continues to shape leadership thinking. consumption. They feared that even if their poli- But just as a single-minded emphasis on the cies aimed at economic growth and national security denominator failed to consider some of the complex were successful, the PRC’s rapid population growth consequences of demographic policy, the single- in preceding decades would dissipate the impact of minded emphasis on the numerator may also neglect those gains. They concluded that the population the iterative relationship between the two. In this needed to be reduced to below the PRC’s sustaining chapter, we use contemporary Chinese sources to capacity to avoid undermining strategic planning. identify some other ratios that demographic change Their ideas can thus be summarized as a formula to in the PRC has affected: increase per capita GDP by lowering the growth of the denominator, the number of people.2 Only by • Non-working-age population/working-age pop- doing so could they reduce the country’s demand ulation (dependency ratio), for or consumption of resources (reflected in the denominator), bringing it more in line with the • Young and entrepreneurial ratio/total popula- PRC’s capacity (the numerator)—defined broadly as tion (entrepreneurialism ratio), its supply of resources, economic output, and capital stock. • Households with complex structure/total house- Almost 40 years later, the PRC has become holds (complex kinship ratio), the second-largest economy in the world and has secured international recognition as a major power. • Elderly without adult children/total elderly Chinese leaders often cite these accomplishments as (social welfare provisioning ratio), evidence that population-control policies have been successful. One commonly expressed formulation • Urban population/unit area (urban vulnerability is that population-control policies were responsible ratio),

127 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

• Local ethnic minority/local Han population fertility decisions. As Figure 1 illustrates, in all Asian (ethnic vulnerability ratio), societies a rapid decline in mortality plus expanding educational and professional opportunities for women • Youth suitable for military service/total youth has led to significantly lower fertility rates. (military recruitment ratio), There is simply no reason to think the PRC will be different. Although fertility rates for Chinese women • College graduates with jobs/total college gradu- were artificially suppressed during the One-Child Pol- ates (college graduate employment ratio), and icy, the key factors shaping fertility choices are now converging with those in the rest of economically • 18- to 35-year-olds with spouses/total 18- to developed East Asia, and for that matter North Amer- 35-year-olds (youth marriage ratio). ica and Europe. Historical factors that conditioned Chinese people to favor large families—specifically These ratios hint at some of the complexities the need to have sons to provide support for one’s in China’s demographic future. While the CCP has old age and high levels of child mortality—have all developed plans for managing each ratio on the list, but disappeared. Micro-level incentives to maintain the composite effects could yet be surprising. To be low fertility—specifically the high costs of raising and clear, we do not presume that all these new paradig- educating a child—are strong. matic ratios are explicitly and consciously part of We conclude, therefore, that the possibility of rapid leadership thinking on demographic issues; rather, we demographic reversal and return to historical fertility think they are useful tools to explore how the leader- levels is effectively nil. We expect the PRC will con- ship is thinking. tinue to debate and increasingly implement measures to increase fertility, including restricting access to abortion, encouraging marriage and childbirth, and Analogies discouraging divorce. These measures may have some significant political and social effects, but we do not Below we explore analogous cases from other coun- expect them to have significant demographic effects. tries and from China’s own historical experience. In There will be no fertility rebound in China. many respects—not least of which is its sheer size— This approach also allows us to rule out some of the PRC experience is unprecedented. But evidence the more sensationalist claims about the direct con- from other societies that have gone through rapid sequences of the PRC’s demographic situation. For modernization, in particular societies that share example, over the past several decades, China has had certain cultural inheritances with today’s PRC, and a highly distorted sex ratio at birth, with far more boys evidence from Chinese history allow us to make born than girls. These boys are known in Chinese as informed predictions about trends in household and “bare branches” (guanggun) because they will not family decision-making. bear fruit—that is, they will not be able to find wives One of the advantages of this approach is that it and have children of their own. allows us to rule out certain possible futures. For Some media and academic sources argue that example, now that the One-Child Policy has been hordes of unmarried adult men will lead to serious eased and limits on fertility may soon be lifted com- social and political disturbances, or even that finding pletely, it is possible at least in theory that fertility ways to deal with these men may lead the government rates could return to the levels of the Maoist period. to pursue a more adventurist foreign policy.4 We Were that to happen, the PRC population would think this is unlikely. While evidence from other soci- resume its upward growth trend. eties does suggest that distorted sex ratios and large But the PRC’s demographic future for the next gen- numbers of unmarried men may contribute to higher erational cohort will be shaped by the current cohort’s levels of prostitution, trafficking, sexually transmitted

128 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Figure 1. Declining Fertility in East Asia, 1960–2015

7 China East Asia and the Paciﬁc Japan Republic of Korea 6

4 oman

3 Births per W

0 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2010 2012 2014 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman), http://data.worldbank.org. disease, criminality, depression, and even suicide, percentage of men who married, technically known as there is no reason to expect a massive increase in the male nuptiality rate, rose. During the Maoist and unrest at the hands of such men. early reform periods, universal male marriage, which The weakness of the “bare branches” argument had never been a reality before, became the norm. is that it is based on a poor understanding of Chi- Viewed in this light, the recent distortion in the nese history. The historical evidence suggests that sex ratio and the prospect of large numbers of bare distorted sex ratios (due to female infanticide) have branches is actually nothing more than a return been a perennial, even regular, feature of Chinese to historical norms. If, as some historians argue, society. Concubinage and polygamy by the rich fur- 10–15 percent of adult men in traditional China were ther reduced the availability of marriage partners for never married, then the number of unmarried men in poor men. Historically, many Chinese men never mar- the PRC today does not diverge from the historical ried. The perception that this is potentially dangerous norm for much of China’s history.5 is not a new phenomenon, either. Although they used This is not to deny that distorted sex ratios of different terminology, people in China have long been recent birth cohorts may impose enormous individual worried, at times alarmist, about the consequences of and collective long-term costs. One factor that could distorted sex ratios. distinguish the contemporary from the past situation In the 20th century, female infanticide fell, is changing expectations for individual self-fulfillment and concubinage was eliminated. As a result, the that may make unmarried men less willing to accept

129 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

their lot than in the past. (On the other hand, more areas—created the low-cost workforce that fueled diverse ideas of what constitutes a fulfilled life may growth. Chinese government-sponsored research mean that the ability to marry becomes a less univer- estimates that between one-quarter and one-third of sally accepted criterion of a good life.) But the evi- the total growth in the PRC’s GDP per capita can be dence simply does not support the notion that the attributed to this dividend.6 distorted sex ratios have created a historically unprec- There is a serious debate in the PRC about when edented situation that is likely to lead to dramatic and this demographic dividend has been or will be large-scale social unrest. exhausted—and what can be done about it. Some The main lesson of these two (not so) possible argue that the country retains a significant surplus futures—a return to high fertility and instability due rural labor force today. Others argue that the day of to large numbers of unmarried men—is that when reckoning can be delayed by increasing the labor par- making predictions about the PRC’s future based on ticipation rate—for example, by raising retirement cultural assumptions, we must be cautious not to con- ages. Still others hold that the PRC should imitate fuse normative expectations of China’s past with the what smaller Asian countries have been doing and realities. Of course, expectations may have changed look to immigration. But whatever the stopgap solu- over the past century, so what was acceptable a cen- tions, the inexorable logic of demography means that tury ago is not necessarily still acceptable today. It is the demographic dividend will eventually disappear. crucial to both distinguish empirical findings from The core consensus is thus that no matter what normative assumptions and question whether norms policies are adopted, the PRC’s workforce will sooner have remained unchanged. or later begin to shrink, both relative to the rest of Demographic factors might well affect social sta- the population and in absolute terms. Figure 2 shows bility, but as we will discuss below, some of the the impact of various estimates of the PRC’s future worst-case scenarios are potential second-order fertility rates on the working-age population and the effects; that is, a crisis is unlikely to be a direct prod- dependency ratio—that is, the ratio of people not of uct of demographic developments but rather could working age against those of working age—using UN arise from the interaction among demographic projection scenarios for low, medium, and high fertil- trends, other policy goals, and dynamics within the ity rates in the PRC to 2100.7 The compilers note that CCP itself. To return to the example above, we do not “under all the fertility scenarios, China’s working-age think people will riot because they cannot find wives. population declines at a similar rate over the next few We think they may riot if, for example, demographic decades, and is lower over the next 100 years than it is factors produce a prolonged economic slowdown that now.” Under all scenarios, the dependency ratio rises undermines the regime’s legitimacy. before flattening out around 2080. Whether the chief cause for this shrinkage is CCP policies or personal choice (our analysis suggests that Economics it was the former in the early years of the One-Child Policy but is now the latter), the denominator will While a single factor cannot explain the PRC’s eventually begin to shrink, if it has not already. extraordinary rates of economic growth over the past Low-cost labor will no longer be a prime driver of the four decades, analysts inside and outside of China PRC’s continued economic prosperity. One analysis generally agree that one of the most important drivers concludes that the contraction of the working-age was the demographic dividend—the growth poten- population will cause an annual reduction of 0.7 per- tial generated by a shift in population structure such cent in the PRC’s GDP by the 2030s.8 that the working-age population constituted a high With the PRC’s working population growing older proportion of the total population. This dividend— and eventually smaller, and with wage rates ris- and the movement of labor from rural to urban ing, the PRC will need to find a new basis for global

130 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Figure 2. China: Demographic Outlook

Million Working-Age Population Million

High 800 800 Baseline 400 400

Low % DependencyRatio %

160 160

100 100

40 40 1950 1980 2010 2040 2070 2100

Source: Lim Jiamin and Arianna Cowling, China’s Demographic Outlook, Reserve Bank of Australia, June 2016, https://www.rba.gov. au/publications/bulletin/2016/jun/5.html.

competitiveness besides low-cost labor. The obvi- So an older population is typically a less entre- ous and indeed only option is to move toward a preneurial population. Of course, the PRC has many knowledge-based economy rather than one based on innovators and entrepreneurs, and one can find manufacturing. In an earlier phase in its economic examples of innovators and entrepreneurs among development, there were economic gains to be made the young and the elderly. But at the macro level, the by imitating leading technology or adapting it to the size of the cohort that is most likely to yield innova- PRC. This becomes increasingly challenging as the tion and entrepreneurship is shrinking in China—not PRC approaches the world technology frontier. gradually, but dramatically. The size of this cohort is Surprisingly, demographics play a role in techno- also shrinking relative to the total population; we call logical development because research shows that this relationship the entrepreneurialism ratio. entrepreneurship and innovation are mainly activities This is an entirely separate issue from the ques- of the young adult. Entrepreneurship and innovation tion of whether the education system and the social- vary directly with age up to a certain point; infants ization process of the contemporary PRC—in some do not become entrepreneurs. At that point the rela- measure a legacy of population-control policies— tionship reverses, and beginning in early adulthood, promotes or inhibits innovation and entrepreneur- entrepreneurship and innovation vary inversely with ship. (We discuss this subject later.) It is simply a age. This is even more true when the older popula- logical conclusion based on demographic reality. One tion is less educated than younger segments. The of the long-term consequences of the effort to shrink peak age of entrepreneurship seems to be around the denominator is that the PRC is becoming older. If 40 years of age and perhaps lower for more innovative innovation in a society correlates to average age, then entrepreneurship.9 as the PRC becomes older, it will be less innovative.

131 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table 1. Changing Trends in Size of Chinese Households in Rural and Urban Areas

Two- Three- Four- One-Person Person Person Person Five-Person Average Household Household Household Household Household Household Area Year (%) (%) (%) (%) and Larger (%) Size (Persons)

2010 13.66 24.37 26.86 17.56 16.66 3.09 National 2000 8.30 17.04 29.95 22.97 21.73 3.46 1990 6.27 11.05 23.73 25.82 33.13 3.96 2010 17.95 27.82 33.16 12.13 8.95 2.71 City 2000 10.68 21.60 40.22 15.75 11.74 3.03 1990 7.06 13.94 34.81 22.90 21.29 3.53 2010 14.10 24.41 27.78 17.87 15.85 3.08 Town 2000 10.16 18.62 33.89 20.39 16.93 3.26 1990 7.88 14.60 32.03 23.47 22.02 3.55 2010 12.44 22.07 22.34 21.03 22.11 3.34 Village 2000 6.93 14.85 24.90 26.47 26.85 3.68 1990 5.87 9.87 19.75 26.89 37.62 4.13

Source: Adapted from Hu Zhan and Peng Xizhe, “Household Changes in Contemporary China: An Analysis Based on the Four Recent Censuses,” Journal of Chinese Sociology 2, no. 9 (December 2015).

Moreover, the declining working-age population will even at similar overall fertility rates, people in the PRC also lead to higher wages, which could have negative will have fewer kinship ties than people elsewhere. consequences for the early phases of business expan- Why should fewer kinship ties matter to the sion, by making it harder for entrepreneurs to expand PRC’s economic prospects? Small family-owned and their hiring. family-operated businesses have been an important A second aspect of demographic change that may element in the PRC’s economic dynamism. Francis affect the economy is family structure. As Ashton Fukuyama once argued that the strong emphasis on Verdery shows in his chapter, demographic changes family and personalist connections makes the PRC are profoundly influencing family structure.10 House- a low-trust society with relatively weak universalis- holds in the PRC are increasingly small and simple; tic norms, and this has fundamental consequences people have few siblings and a smaller network of for economic behavior.11 Much of the evidence used extended kin. Further, the PRC is distinguished by to support this argument in the 1990s—for example, its relatively low variance in household size. In other the dearth of large-scale firms in the PRC and Chi- countries, many households have no children, and nese firms’ low level of brand recognition—has been many others have two or more children. But in the called into question in the subsequent two decades. PRC, a large and growing number of households have But Fukuyama was fundamentally correct that trust one child only, and a large and growing number of based on kinship relations mattered and continues to households have no children, as shown in Table 1. So matter a great deal to economic success in China.

132 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Sociological research suggests that kinship net- Its interface enables buyers and sellers to mimic tra- works serve as an informal institution that plays the ditional, interactive, face-to-face communications, role more formal institutions do in Western econo- allowing online interpersonal relationships to form mies. Private entrepreneurs embedded in kinship quickly. networks are better able to secure informal financing The corporate leadership of JD.com, Alibaba’s without a well-developed banking system. They have main, though less well-known, competitor, also clearly better access to information about markets. For exam- recognizes the issue of building trust. A possibly apoc- ple, informal lending by kin (including both agnates ryphal story of the company’s founding has it that and affines) has been crucial to the development of early efforts to sell online failed until an old customer rural private enterprises; a 2001 survey of Wenzhou began to post on online boards vouching for the com- entrepreneurs found that 68 percent received funding pany. To maintain trust, JD.com seeks to manage the for their first nonagricultural enterprises from kin.12 entire business-to-consumer supply chain to ensure Again, this is not to say that no one in the PRC that any issues that might weaken trust are immedi- can successfully build a business without relying on ately addressed.13 All of these can be seen as ways in kinship networks. But if in the aggregate kinship ties which e-commerce businesses address trust issues. contribute to business growth in the PRC, then the They are the modern-day equivalent of native-place shrinking and even disappearance of kinship ties— and surname associations among Chinese communi- what we might call a decline in the complex kinship ties abroad. ratio—will necessarily have negative consequences The empirical question is whether there are lim- for the economy. To determine the overall impact its to the substitution of fictive trust for family trust. of these negative consequences, one would have to Are the alternatives to kinship-based trust adequate quantify the significance of these ties—which is all to compensate for the decline in real kinship? Are but impossible—and explore the alternatives to kin- there areas of economic life where the substitutes and ship as the basis for trust. alternatives are less successful, and are these there- One possible method to deal with trust deficits in fore areas in which the PRC will develop more slowly? Chinese society would be reform of the legal system. Fukuyama’s argument about the challenge of If Chinese business elites were confident that rule building large-scale Chinese firms was surprisingly of law would secure their interests, they would have prescient on one score. He argued that one way the less need to rely on personal networks. This sort of PRC could get around the limits of familism was systemic legal reform is unlikely in the medium term for the state to get involved. Recent policies aimed because Chinese political elites have explicitly ruled at strengthening and expanding a small number of it out. state-owned enterprises may suggest that, knowingly Another possibility would be to substitute other or not, the CCP leadership agrees with this argument. organizational resources for family and kinship as The Chinese population is aging rapidly, which the a basis for economic organization and trust. Such chapter by Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong explores resources certainly exist in Chinese tradition. One has further.14 Massive intergenerational transfers will only to visit any Chinatown around the world to see become necessary to ensure adequate health care and fictive kinship associations and common native-place maintain the elderly’s standard of living. Changes in associations that serve similar purposes to the fam- family structure exacerbate this need. Traditionally ily back in China—to reduce transaction costs, reduce in China the elderly were supported by their depen- uncertainty, and facilitate investment. dents. Family structure shifts will make this difficult. The PRC’s e-commerce industry has been inno- In the future, a single child might have to support two vative in dealing with trust problems. For example, parents and four grandparents. (The Chinese call this some of Alibaba’s innovations can be interpreted as the 8-4-2-1 problem, since great-grandparents poten- technological approaches to the question of trust. tially also need to be considered.)

133 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

The overall balance of transfers from working-age Inequality in the distribution of transfers will fac- people to dependents will increasingly shift away tor into the popular reaction to them. At present, from transfers to youth dependents, which can be there is considerable inequality in the provision of seen as investments in the future, to transfers to benefits to rural and urban residents. If transfers are elderly dependents. This will happen simultaneously inadequate, dissatisfaction with this situation may with a decline in the share of the working-age popula- be mitigated by the fact that many elderly people tion, which ultimately provides these transfers. inhabit relatively rural areas where health care costs As Wang and his colleagues point out, it is difficult are much lower. Furthermore, elderly residents in to predict the consequences of this dramatic shift in rural areas are more atomized and less likely to orga- the size and structure of needed intergenerational nize in protest or opposition. In China today, elderly transfers. Given high and rising inequality in Chinese people are disproportionately located in rural areas society, many of these transfers will have to be pub- for many reasons; we suspect one factor may be lic rather than private. The reality that many Chinese the PRC state’s deliberate intention to limit con- elderly will be childless exacerbates the problem by tingent liabilities such as health care and stability increasing the ratio of the working-age population to maintenance. the elderly, which we might call the social welfare provisioning ratio. One likely consequence is greater state involve- Security ment. To support these transfers, the state will need to impose higher levels of taxation and other extraction The PRC’s defense modernization over the past few and play a larger redistributive role. If the CCP does decades has impressed many international security not come up with an adequate solution to the prob- experts, but they typically focus on the new hard- lem of intergenerational transfer, this could have seri- ware for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), such as ous implications for its legitimacy that go well beyond its growing inventory of cruise and ballistic missiles, the maintenance of the elderly itself. fighter jets, and aircraft carriers. Less attention has These developments might seem to pose terrible been paid to the impact of demographic trends on the challenges to a social system emphasizing filial piety PLA’s “software,” or the way that these trends have and the expectation that children should make sac- created new vulnerabilities for the PRC as a whole. rifices for their parents. But the situation in the PRC CCP planners in the 1980s correctly anticipated today is more complicated. Although in traditional that economic development and the acquisition of China there were strong cultural pressures to sup- foreign technology would enable a defense buildup. port the aged, the reality was rather different. When However, their successors do not believe that the PLA there were scarce resources, the elderly did not can now rest on its laurels. A major reorganization always receive their fair share. The traditional par- of the force announced in late 2015 was designed to agons of filial piety were paragons precisely because enable joint, integrated operations, including power their behavior was at odds with what ordinary peo- projection to the periphery of the mainland and even- ple did. tually beyond the PRC’s borders. Here, too, it is analytically crucial to distinguish While the PLA has certainly upgraded its weapons normative ideals from empirical realities. The chal- systems to achieve these ends, the restructuring has a lenge of providing support for an aging population significant demographic component, in terms of both will likely not create impossible tensions for Chinese its drivers and its ambitions. The PLA’s new missions values. However, if new civic norms emerge that find include efforts to shore up the country’s security in the notion of rural elderly suffering appalling, this light of population developments that have made it could have implications for regime legitimacy and more vulnerable. And to achieve heightened security, ultimately even for social stability. the national military planners on the Central Military

134 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Commission also believe they must upgrade the PLA’s an added irritant, as US and coalition forces operat- human capital using demographic policy tools. ing on and over the Korean Peninsula menaced north- Chinese defense strategists today conceive of the eastern PRC industrial centers. As Beijing’s relations country’s demography as connected to its security with Moscow deteriorated, the PLA again had to worry in two key ways—with the population structure at about the security of Manchuria and southeastern cit- large and with defense personnel in particular. The ies facing Taiwan. In the mid-1960s, Mao decided to contemporary PRC discipline of “national defense devote roughly half the state’s investment budget to demography” (guofang renkou xue, or NDD) thus the construction of the Third Front, an interior, alter- includes two elements: demography for national native industrial base, military rear area, and transpor- security and national defense demography. Demogra- tation infrastructure that would remain intact even if phy for national security focuses on security-relevant the United States or the Soviet Union attacked.16 structural aspects of the population—for example, Today, urbanization has rendered the PRC even its geographic distribution and ethnic composition. more vulnerable to strategic bombing. While cities in National defense demography focuses on issues con- the PRC are less dense than cities elsewhere due to cerning the supply of and demand for defense per- Chinese real estate investment trends that encourage sonnel, including the size and character of the current sprawl, they are still not evenly distributed around and potential future recruiting pool, along with gov- the country.17 As noted in authoritative PLA publi- ernment policies affecting these matters. cations such as the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, These two areas of focus parallel the dual secu- “38.5 percent of the national population, 34.3 per- rity goals of the Four Modernizations program at the cent of the large and midsized cities, and 66.1 per- time when the One-Child Policy was launched. The cent of the GDP” are now concentrated in the PRC’s first goal was to redress structural vulnerabilities 12 coastal provinces.18 (See Figure 3.) According to arising from the mismatch between the population’s the textbook, the growing concentration of the PRC’s size and available resources, and the second goal was population and economy in eastern cities within the to improve the PLA’s ability to stand up to outside strike range of potentially hostile forces—the urban powers that might try to exploit such vulnerabilities. vulnerability ratio—requires the PLA to increase its Significant progress has been made in both areas, air defense capabilities around key points. Even in an but as the two tracks of the NDD field suggest, the age of precision munitions capable of hitting specific PRC is now confronting challenges involving both military, rather than civilian, targets, Chinese defense the structure of the population and the PLA’s future planners are responding to historical experiences and capability. the risk of attacks on logistics lines that could isolate Structurally, Chinese military planners have long urbanites from food supplies. worried about protecting coastal eastern cities and The country’s worsening east-west structural economic centers from seaborne invasions or air imbalance was a driver of the “Develop the West” strikes. This concern has intensified as the PRC’s eco- (xibu da kaifa) campaign, launched under Jiang Zemin nomic development has entailed mass migration from in 2000. Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initia- rural to urban areas. China lost a huge proportion of tive (BRI) builds on this foundation. BRI partly entails its productive capacity when Japanese bombers and investment in infrastructure to and through the PRC’s invading forces decimated its eastern cities in the late western province of Xinjiang to encourage new trad- 1930s.15 Even after the end of the Chinese Civil War in ing hubs on the PRC’s continental rather than mari- 1949, the PLA was preoccupied with defending Shang- time flank. Population density considerations are not hai and other coastal cities from Nationalist attacks the sole or even primary drivers of PRC policies on from Taiwan. urbanization or the shift in emphasis to the west, but The presence of the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan they should be included among the variety of factors Strait following the outbreak of the Korean War was connected to these policies.

135 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Figure 3. PRC Population Density, 1953–2010 1953

Population Density per km2 0–50 51–100 101–250 251–500 501–1,000 1,001–5,000 5,001+

2010

Source: Generated using Harvard University, Center for Geographic Analysis, “ChinaMap,” https://worldmap.harvard.edu/chinamap/.

136 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

For instance, in both western and northeastern the country, which in turn depends on the success of border areas, the focus on demography for national the PLA’s ongoing modernization efforts. security has also engendered a concern about higher Of course demography will not be the only fac- birth rates among non-Han relative to Han popula- tor affecting the PLA’s progress as it prepares to tions—the ethnic vulnerability ratio.19 The fear at fight and win the “informatized local wars” xinxi( - the local level is that concentrations of minorities in hua jubu zhanzheng) that it anticipates in the 21st cen- border areas with ethnic ties to populations in neigh- tury.21 Nonetheless, demographic trends will affect boring states could invite or facilitate interventions the PLA’s human capital and even its prospects for by those countries. The policy responses appear to obtaining the most advanced technology, insofar as vary by area, including an emphasis on restricting the latter depends on an innovative economy (dis- Uyghur births in Xinjiang and incentives for multi- cussed earlier). ple children among Han residents of Liaoning in the The human capital outlook can be divided into northeast. quantitative and qualitative factors. In pure quantita- Despite substantially lower population growth tive terms, there is no reasonable scenario in which across the country, the PLA now confronts another the PLA will face an absolute shortage of manpower, new structural concern about food security (liangshi even as the military-age population declines at an anquan). The One-Child Policy was originally aimed accelerating rate from 51 million in 2010 to 40 million at reducing the population to better match the PRC’s in 2021. “China is the most populous country in the resource endowment—that is, to increase available world; there is no possibility of an absolute popula- resources per capita—but Chinese planners did not tion shortfall that could affect national defense con- anticipate that people’s tastes would change as their struction,” writes leading PLA defense demographer standard of living increased. All over the world, an Ding Xuezhou.22 expanded appetite for meat has followed from rising But since at least 2003, when the PRC’s Central prosperity. The PRC is no exception. Military Commission launched the Strategic Project Even though more of the population now lives in for Talented People, PLA leaders have recognized cities, where in theory people consume fewer calories a need to improve the education and skills level, or overall than their rural counterparts, urbanites con- suzhi, of its personnel.23 Whereas the equivalent of sume more meat, which is grain-intensive to produce. a ninth-grade education sufficed for most officers While Chinese agricultural productivity has risen, entering the PLA in the past, the demands of joint, output has not kept up with the increased demand. As informatized operations in the 21st century require of 2006, the PRC could still produce enough grain to officers with postsecondary degrees, an experienced satisfy its people’s appetite for grain, but not enough and technically capable noncommissioned officer to feed the livestock that provide the meat the popu- corps, and even a proportion of college-educated lation now demands.20 enlisted personnel. The goal of self-sufficiency therefore remains The PLA’s concern with suzhi raises the question elusive, even more so if one takes into account the of the selectivity of its conscription and recruitment impact of environmental pollution—a byproduct processes. Even if there is no risk of an absolute short- of the PRC’s rapid industrialization—on the nutri- fall in recruits, thinking about the proportion of total tional value of the grain produced domestically. Here, youth who are suitable for military service—the PLA too, the PRC’s answer has been to look abroad, with recruitment ratio—makes clear that the situation investments in overseas food production made first is more complex. On this issue, Ding Xuezhou has in the “Go Out” (zou chu qu) policy of the 1990s, and recently sounded the alarm: then more recently as part of BRI. From a security perspective, these efforts ultimately make sense only The physical capacity of our youth has not risen in if the PLA can ensure the flow of goods from outside keeping with increases in the national economy and

137 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

in people’s standard of living, with a serious impact boom in 1999, the PLA had to reduce its conscription on the physical quality of the national defense popu- term from three years for the ground force and four lation [i.e., the pool of possible recruits].24 years for the navy and air force down to two years for all three services.30 This was apparently partly The effects of urbanization, rising living stan- attributable to the One-Child Policy as well, as par- dards (including an influx of cheap junk food), and ents dependent on a single child for their old-age pollution have combined to make the pool of poten- support did not want to see their offspring diverted tial conscripts and recruits less healthy, another for too long from the civilian workforce. While con- unintended consequence of the PRC’s moderniza- scripts now make up a shrinking proportion of the tion efforts over the past few decades. The rising PLA overall, this change had the effect of reducing the incidence of diabetes, obesity, and, especially, visual time available for training and therefore lowering the impairment has forced the PLA to lower its physical PLA’s overall capacity and readiness level. standards three times—in 2008, 2011, and 2014—to More recently, as the PRC’s economic growth ensure sufficient recruits.25 has slowed and civilian employment prospects have Ding and other PLA academics such as Liu Mingfu, contracted, the PLA has enjoyed greater success in a retired senior colonel from the National Defense attracting college graduates.31 But if this economic University in Beijing, have also opined on the spiritual slowdown means the PRC is not succeeding in tran- deficiencies of military-age youth in the PRC today.26 sitioning to an alternative growth paradigm based They specifically blame the One-Child Policy for pro- on innovation (again, as discussed above), then the ducing a generation of only children who have grown PLA’s human capital gain may be offset by a technol- up as spoiled narcissists. They also cite the impact of ogy deficit. the PRC’s recent economic growth, which has made Access to foreign technology is a potential solu- today’s youth relatively soft and ill-prepared for any tion, but slower PRC economic growth could also kind of deprivation or hardship. Whether or not this eventually constrain the PLA’s ability to purchase for- is a fair judgment, it raises the potential for interne- eign technology. Acquiring intellectual property over- cine conflict, as the PLA’s senior generation, tested seas through investment would also become more by the Cultural Revolution, trains and leads a cohort difficult over time. Theft and espionage could provide of millennials. short-term solutions. Worries about the character of singleton soldiers— Ultimately, military force might become part of the and the casualty tolerance of their parents—may also PRC’s strategy to secure access to foreign resources, discourage the leadership from initiating war.27 At a including intellectual property. (For example, this minimum, these considerations could encourage the might become an element in the calculus over the use PLA’s interest in “war control” (zhanzheng kongzhi), of force against Taiwan.) But no PRC leader would be “effective control” youxiao( kongzhi), or the contain- willing to deploy the PLA for this purpose until it was ment of a conflict to avoid a collapse in morale in the judged strong enough to prevail with almost absolute ranks or in support for the regime among the broader certainty. So for the time being, the PLA’s modern- public.28 The Science of Military Strategy 2013 text- ization could be impaired without progress on the book warns that the PRC’s “warfare endurance capac- human and technological capital fronts. ity” has dropped in recent years, as the country has Overall, then, demographic and social trends have moved past the phase of “having bare feet and thus reinforced older security concerns such as population fearing having no shoes.”29 concentration and generated new issues—for exam- Finally, the PLA’s ability to attract educated ple, dependence on overseas raw materials such as recruits, as either enlisted forces or officers, depends food—that in turn create new missions for the PLA on the state of the economy and their other employ- and other Chinese security forces. As the CCP contin- ment prospects. At the height of the PRC’s economic ues to try to encourage Han population members to

138 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

move west, tensions with local Tibetans and Uyghurs Plan (2016–25) can be read as a window into the increase the need for stability operations within the party-state’s fears and hopes for the rising generation, PRC’s borders. At the same time, the country’s new defined as 14- to35-year -olds.34 While such a multi- appetites also drive it to rely increasingly on overseas faceted plan indicates awareness of an array of poten- resources that need to be guarded both at the site and tial challenges, here again, the approach is to try to en route back to the PRC. manage each one separately, as a specific ratio to be Fulfilling the PLA’s traditional missions and addressed. The broader transformation of Chinese these new missions will require a higher-level or society that these youth-related issues collectively better-trained class of recruits, but trends in the edu- reveal may be a blind spot for the CCP. cation and attitude of young people in the PRC today According to the plan’s preamble, “Promoting create a mixed outlook at best. In pure numerical youth to grow better and develop faster is a basic stra- terms, the PLA will have no trouble obtaining enough tegic project of the country.” While the party-state personnel, but its ability to recruit and retain highly cannot invent children who were not born, it can try to skilled personnel will also be shaped by the PRC’s shape the youths on whom the PRC’s future depends. future growth prospects. If growth slows, this will The plan starts from the assumption that “the new be correlated with, and generate, its own set of chal- characteristics of . . . [China’s] demographic structure lenges, particularly regarding access to technology. will increase the pressure on the younger generation’s work and life, and require [that they receive] more care and help in marriage and social security.” Social A broad range of tools will be used for this purpose, including curricular initiatives, matchmaking services, From the demand for innovation and entrepreneur- scholarships, innovation awards, and subsidies for ship in the economic realm to the demand for more overseas volunteer service or service in Western China. skilled soldiers in the defense sphere, many of the While most of the discussion focuses on positive incen- CCP’s aspirations now depend on the rising youth tives, the report also mentions psychological counsel- cohort. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, schol- ing, behavioral correction, and even penal camps. ars inside and outside the PRC have expressed con- Technology figures prominently, as the CCP cern about the downstream effects of a society of only intends to extend its new social credit system to children: the attenuation of extended kinship, the pro- include a “youth credit system” that will “guide young liferation of bare branches, and legions of left-behind people in practicing the concept of integrity.” Other children in the countryside and migrant kids in cities. policies include incentivizing, providing, and moni- The party-state has long assumed what in the toring online education and training; expanding the West would be considered an outsized role in the ranks of youth “cyber-civilization volunteers”; and affairs of individual Chinese people and their fam- monitoring and curbing the spread of illegal and ily lives. As a People’s Daily editorial recently pro- unhealthy information on the internet. Internet ser- claimed, “Having children is not just a family affair; vice providers, meanwhile, will be forced to comply it is also a state affair.”32 Even if past Chinese demo- with laws to discourage online “violence, pornogra- graphic policies have caused or exacerbated some of phy, gambling, drugs, superstitions, and cults,” along today’s challenges, the CCP stands ready to use new with “the vilification of the party, national image, and population-centered tools to address emerging prob- revolutionary martyrs.” lems in ways that serve the party’s goals. Overall, the document mixes aspirational language For the first time, in April 2017, the CCP Central about encouraging civic-mindedness with hints of Committee and the State Council issued a national more concrete, technologically backed measures for plan focused on the PRC’s youth population.33 ensuring compliance. Other themes include improv- The Middle and Long-Term Youth Development ing education to promote innovation, employment,

139 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

health, and marriage. Particular subpopulations sin- increase average years of schooling and enrollment gled out for special treatment include migrants, in higher education. The quality of instruction will minorities, unemployed college graduates, and the be improved through new teacher training methods disabled. to “reverse the tendency of one-sided exam-oriented The plan’s educational section emphasizes ideol- education,” and the state will support young college ogy, morality, and the acquisition of practical skills graduate entrepreneurs with government funds. by a range of students with varying levels of poten- The plan’s discussion of health covers both phys- tial. The authors are clearly aware that generating ical and mental conditioning. Concerns include the new technologies is important to the PRC’s future high rate of “occupational ailments among working economic growth. However, they are also cognizant youth,” the scourges of “HIV/AIDS and sexually trans- that barriers to education, such as school fees, the mitted diseases,” and “drug addiction, drug traffick- hukou system, and other structural factors, result in ing, and prostitution.” While no numbers are given, lost human capital. As many as one in five children in the last group of problems is likely increasingly due the PRC today is the left-behind offspring of migrant in part to the bare branches phenomenon; the docu- worker parents, and public health researchers have ment discusses these issues immediately before the found that more than half of students in poor rural section on marriage (addressed later). areas have IQs of less than 90.35 “Obesity, myopia, and dental cavities” are more The plan addresses this situation by setting out broadly distributed problems, to which the pro- goals tailored to every child’s capacity. Sorting or posed solution is “deepening school sports reform screening of students will be improved through “tar- [and] intensifying physical education classes and geted admissions in poverty-stricken [rural] areas” extra-curricular training.” These actions—together and the use of “entrance examinations for the chil- with improved health sampling and monitoring of dren of migrant workers” in urban areas—so that they the population—are included among the 10 key proj- can be identified for different kinds or levels of educa- ects or immediate action items toward the end of the tion. The document also advocates increasing invest- document, suggesting there is some urgency about ment in rural schools and schools in ethnic minority the situation, as does the aforementioned relaxing of regions, as well as eliminating tuition and fee require- health requirements for military service. ments in such areas. But nine years of free education A section of the document on “youth social secu- has been stipulated by PRC law since 1986, and the rity” is devoted almost entirely to assisting children mandate has been funded since 2006, although rural with disabilities. It emphasizes the need to cultivate education continues to be beset by problems. There is “social habits of understanding, respecting, caring no guarantee that this time will be different.36 for, and helping disabled youth” in the PRC today, a More precise sorting will allow for some students theme that recurs in the plan’s discussion of training to be channeled into a “modern vocational education social workers (discussed later). Again, migrant chil- system” (targeted at young migrant workers, rural dren in cities and left-behind children in the country- junior high school graduates, children from poor fam- side are singled out for attention. ilies, retired young soldiers, and disabled youth) and The plan stresses the importance of “civilized, others to new “national youth talent cultivation bases healthy, and rational” marriage, part of an effort to in high-level research universities and research insti- promote the youth marriage ratio in response to con- tutes.” These tracks will in turn be used to “strengthen cerns about both bare branches and increasing child- youth employment services,” with a particular focus lessness. An estimated 12–15 percent of Chinese young on unemployed college graduates—that is, to boost men will not be able to find spouses in the next seven the college graduate employment ratio. years,37 and after a single-year bump in 2016 follow- At the high end of the spectrum, the focus is on ing the relaxation of the One-Child Policy, the fertility innovation and entrepreneurship. The plan aims to rate fell in 2017 by 3.5 percent.38

140 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The state will rely on “sexual health education for work by Chinese youth in countries such as Ethio- young people and eugenics [yousheng youyu] propa- pia, Liberia, and the Seychelles. Chinese leaders from ganda education” to encourage “the balanced devel- Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping have touted this initiative as opment of the population.” Balanced development a way of enhancing the PRC’s international image appears to refer to both numbers and quality. The text and reinforcing the idea that Beijing’s largesse comes explains, “Areas where conditions are ripe are encour- with “no political strings attached.” Moreover, some aged to explore ways to give young people more sup- youths stay abroad after their service, “a solid force port in terms of materials and holidays,” presumably for enriching . . . [the PRC’s] overseas institutions.”39 a reference to cities where both parents are likely Outside the PRC, attention has focused on the to work and worry about the costs of childcare and economic rewards associated with hosting increas- school. Thus, prenatal efforts will be directed at ing numbers of Chinese tourists. Their ranks have well-educated (or in Chinese parlance, high-quality) expanded more than tenfold in the past decade, couples. The state will also play a greater role in the and the number of PRC citizens with passports marriage market, especially for “older unmarried is expected to grow significantly from less than youths,” through “standardizing” existing online 10 percent today.40 But according to the Middle and dating social networks and creating new ones with Long-Term Youth Development Plan, at least some greater “integrity.” of the increase will be young state-backed volunteers Finally, the discussion of marriage in the plan deployed to burnish the PRC’s image. includes a description of the “correct family con- Whether or not the necessary funds will be allot- cept,” which entails general “respect for the elderly” ted or policy measures implemented, the plan shows and “neighborhood solidarity.” In the absence of a that CCP leaders are aware of emerging challenges state-sponsored social security system, the document associated with changing family structure in the PRC. gestures toward greater collective responsibility for As in other areas discussed above, their strategy for the aging population, who may or may not be sup- addressing these challenges involves an engineer- ported by their own family members. ing approach, tailored to each separate issue. The By promoting social work and advocating existing CCP will use tests and technology to sort different official “volunteer service” programs, the plan bridges population elements and even to match people and anticipated demand for a reliable and effective social physically move them around—or, at least, create safety net with anticipated demand for additional incentives for such developments. youth employment opportunities and a trend toward In the face of this ambitious agenda, the leadership increasing foreign travel. These programs target objec- recognizes that its national-level vision and planning tives both inside and outside the PRC, meaning they may conflict with reality on the ground in particular serve multiple purposes: providing care for the needy, areas. The document states, “All localities should use creating employment options for Chinese youths, this plan as a guide and formulate their youth devel- and advancing the CCP’s goal of expanding the PRC’s opment plans according to their actual conditions.” global footprint and influence. By 2020, hundreds of The plan also clearly establishes that if and where thousands of young people will have become trained they conflict, the priority of maintaining order—“con- social workers, groomed at special universities and sciously safeguarding social harmony and stability”— matched to different locations through an online ser- trumps youth advocacy. vice platform linked to a government procurement But there is less evidence that the CCP appreciates system. Every year, 20,000 new volunteers will be sent the possibility that its various initiatives to address to both western and central China. particular youth challenges or ratios may fail because Internationally, the document refers to the China they neglect the broader social transformation under- Youth Volunteers Overseas Service Program, a pro- way in the country. The CCP is not infallible, and the gram initiated in 2002 that has already sponsored aid party itself will be affected by demographic trends

141 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Table 2. Offspring of Recent Politburo Standing Committee Members

14th 16th 18th 19th (1992–96) (2000–04) (2012–16) (2016–20)

1 son, Jiang Zemin 2 sons Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 1 daughter Xi Jinping 1 daughter 1 daughter

2 sons, 1 son, Li Peng Wu Bangguo Li Keqiang 1 daughter Li Keqiang 1 daughter 1 daughter 1 daughter

2 sons, 1 son, Qiao Shi Wen Jiabao Zhang Dejiang 1 daughter Li Zhanshu 1 daughter 2 daughters 1 daughter

2 sons, Li Ruihuan 2 sons Jia Qinglin Yu Zhengsheng 1 son Wang Yang 1 daughter 1 daughter

1 son, Zhu Rongji Zeng Qinghong 1 son Liu Yunshan 2 sons Wang Huning 0 1 daughter

2 sons, Liu Huaqing Huang Ju Wang Qishan 0* Zhao Leji 2 daughters

1 son, Hu Jintao Wu Guanzheng 3 sons Zhang Gaoli 1 son* Han Zheng 1 daughter 1 daughter

1 son, Li Changchun 2 daughters

Luo Gan

Total 19 (12 sons) 16 (10 sons) 7 (4 sons) 5 daughters Note: We left blank cells for those for whom we consider it impossible to provide a reliable figure on number of children. *Wang Qishan is rumored to have adopted a woman who is either his niece or an illegitimate daughter, and Zhang Gaoli adopted the daughter of a biological cousin. Source: Authors’ estimates using publicly available Chinese-language internet sources, including online message boards and other popular, nonofficial venues. underway, which may in turn affect its ability to stew- the policy was virtually a prerequisite for promotion. ard the country through major changes in the social (See Table 2 on the offspring of PBSC members across fabric and other structural shifts. several recent tenures.) No member of the current PBSC is known to have more than one child. In other words, demographic change has affected not just the Political context in which decisions are made but also the decision makers themselves. The senior leadership today, almost by definition, con- One could argue that these data suggest the sists of people whose personal fertility choices were impending end of the families of senior leaders—the shaped by the One-Child Policy. Why “by definition”? so-called princelings—as a political force in China. Because mid-level officials who ignored the policy in This conclusion would be premature. Senior leaders their personal lives in the past 30 years mostly did not may find ways to empower their daughters, use mar- rise to the top. The two most recent Politburo Stand- riage to their daughters as a way to find substitute ing Committees (PBSCs) confirm that adherence to male heirs, or pursue other strategies.

142 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

However, the One-Child Policy did powerfully meetings of senior cadres responsible for developing undermine Chinese families’ traditional diversifica- policy options to address emerging challenges. tion strategies. Historically, Chinese families have It is not a given that a national government needs sought to diversify their children’s occupations and to address demographic issues. Not every govern- their family social networks. The attenuation of the ment has or needs to have a demographic policy. But leadership’s social networks will likely generate a the Chinese government clearly continues to see need for alternative bases for alliances. demographic policy as a key national policy. When Within the leadership, shared ideological positions the end of the One-Child Policy was announced in are one possible basis for alliances. This could gener- late 2015, the head of the then–National Health and ate more polarized and even more extreme policies. Family Planning Commission reported that new Such a dynamic may already be operating within the policies would “optimize the demographic struc- CCP’s domestic policymaking apparatus. ture, increase labor supply, ease pressure from the Consider the jockeying that led to the selection of aging population, and help improve the health of Xi Jinping as CCP general secretary in 2012. Ahead the economy.”42 of time, many analysts expected Hu Jintao’s succes- We have discussed some of the ways in which the sor to show similar policy preferences and leader- CCP is dealing with specific challenges arising from ship style to Hu: commitment to consensus and a demographic change. In this section, we consider bland leadership style. The reality was very different. the CCP’s capacity to address demographic changes The two leading contenders were Xi and Bo Xilai. Bo themselves. was widely seen as adopting policy approaches that The PRC’s demographic policy has become more invoked memories of Mao Zedong. Since his acces- elaborate and less repressive, but it remains a national sion, Xi has advocated both the restoration of tra- priority. From a simple focus on fertility, aimed—as ditional Chinese values and appeals to the Maoist discussed earlier—at solving the “denominator prob- inheritance, a far cry from Hu Jintao’s style. One lem,” the focus of population policy has now shifted possible interpretation of this development is that to concerns about both sheer numbers and popu- these two contenders for leadership sought a wider lation quality. But the notion that population is a range of allies by proposing distinctive policy agen- measurable and manageable entity that government das. If this view of a trend toward ideological polar- policy can shape and manipulate remains strong. ization is correct, then demographic change could Our interviews with leading population policy offi- also portend more dramatic and desperate measures cials suggest confidence that the government has in times of crisis. more accurate knowledge of the PRC’s true demographic situation than is typically assumed. But these interviews, as well as public statements, give the Alternative Futures impression that the CCP leadership is also highly confident about its capacity to influence demographic By all accounts, the CCP leadership is well aware of factors.43 We think there is potential overconfidence, the various demographic challenges facing China. and this may have serious consequences. While the The party has good data, based on the work of census CCP leadership is making efforts to understand and takers and professional demographers with econom- respond to fundamental family structure change, this ics and defense subspecialties in the National Health issue has implications that are so complex and itera- Commission.41 The Development and Research Cen- tive that strategic surprises are certainly possible. ter of the State Council and state-backed institutes We have framed the basic Chinese demographic such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also policy under the One-Child Policy in terms of efforts pursue demographic research. Leading personnel to “reduce the denominator.” Today, the Chinese in the field are invited to present their findings at government continues to try to structure society to

143 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

control the denominator by regulating fertility. While defense. A population in which many felt materially the One-Child Policy was formally abolished in Janu- deprived would likely require the CCP to spend more ary 2016, it was replaced with a two-child-per-family on internal security, reducing the resources available law. The CCP apparently still assumes that there is an for power projection forces. optimal fertility rate and that it can use policy tools to While slower economic growth (and attendant achieve this rate by influencing the procreative behav- higher unemployment rates) could induce more col- ior of individual PRC citizens. lege graduates to opt for military careers, increasing At the same time, the party’s efforts to improve the PLA’s human capital, its access to high technology the quality of the population, remake the economy, would suffer in an environment in which the PRC was and limit contingent liabilities can also be understood not producing innovations and had a limited budget as efforts to focus on the numerator of new ratios for foreign technology acquisition. Again, however, involving subgroups of the population. If these efforts this would be a gradual process of decline in the rate succeed, then economic growth will be sustained of modernization, not a dramatic meltdown. and political and social stability maintained. But they This scenario assumes that the CCP itself contin- might fail in different ways. ues to operate as a relatively united leadership body, Under a slow failure path, the population will con- capable of executing incremental policies in a prag- tract, and economic growth will eventually give way matic fashion. We can also speculate about the pos- to stagnation. This need not have immediate conse- sibility of a more dramatic scenario arising from the quences for social and political stability. As discussed combination of a confidence-sapping economic per- earlier, the CCP is under increasing pressure to pro- formance and a lack of internal cohesion in the CCP vide public transfers to meet the needs of the elderly itself. As discussed earlier, current demographic population. It may choose to not honor its commit- trends have led to smaller families and therefore lim- ments to provide those transfers or carefully calibrate ited the availability of extended family networks to the level and structure of transfers in the hope of serve as the basis for intraparty alliances. When per- minimizing opposition. Many of the people who will sonal history or family connections have not been rely on those transfers are isolated and located in rel- available as a source of legitimacy within and for the atively low-cost areas, however, so they may choose CCP, economic performance and nationalism have not to or be unable to organize in opposition. been the two alternative sources. Under the condi- More broadly, as Ashton Verdery’s chapter shows, tions of a slowdown, nationalism would be the only the dramatic reduction in fertility in the PRC over the option, creating the specter of jockeying within the past few decades has decimated the traditional Chi- party to show who is most nationalistic. nese extended family structure. In times of political Factional competition animated by nationalism turmoil, Chinese family networks have typically pro- could have extreme policy results, especially when vided the alternative to state networks, which has China is also facing economic pressure. If the result- allowed for organized protest. Today’s CCP faces a ing policies are mostly domestically focused, we could much more atomized population. Theoretically, this see blunt moves that create heightened tension or reduces the potential for social groups to organize even civil conflict within the PRC. Outward-facing together to oppose the government. policies would be more likely to reflect a sense of enti- Social unrest arising from a gradual slowdown tlement or concern about a closing window of oppor- might be addressed through control measures tunity, leading to more aggressive or risky behavior. intended not to mitigate suffering but to confine it While we began by ruling out the direst predictions to the least threatening members of society. If the of demographically based demise, this scenario shows PRC’s innovation drive failed and the economy stag- how a combination of Chinese demographic, eco- nated, this would constrain the resources available to nomic, and elite political factors could potentially the central government for spending on welfare and lead to internal turmoil or foreign adventurism.

144 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

A quick failure or crisis path would involve a dra- to recent statements by high-level leadership and to matic slowdown in economic growth and perhaps the goals of economic growth, defense moderniza- market collapse and capital flight. Social unrest tion, and stability maintenance underlying the PRC’s would follow. Demographic factors themselves would demographic policies adopted over the past several not have directly caused such a crisis, but they could decades. nonetheless affect its trajectory. The major Chinese Our assessment suggests that the CCP will face national-level movements of the past century often significant challenges in the years to come. The mag- had students at their forefront. We speculate that, nitude of these challenges will depend on not just based on their reading of this history, the leadership demographic developments but also intervening vari- probably takes some confidence from the rapidly ables such as the economic situation and the cohe- aging population, believing that older people are less siveness of the CCP itself, both of which will in turn likely to demand regime change. also be affected by demographic trends. The decline of kinship-based social networks, the China’s economic future will depend on the CCP’s resulting atomization of the population, and the rela- ability to maintain growth despite the demographic tive susceptibility to government intervention of the hurdles. Economists and planners have prescribed available substitutes to those networks will mean that shifting from a growth model based on better har- social unrest is less likely to expand rapidly. Our con- nessing the supply of labor to a model based on gen- clusion is that the leadership holds that demographic erating productivity-enhancing innovations. But the factors will mitigate the political consequences of an same demographic forces that rule out continued reli- economic slowdown. Whether these perceptions are ance on labor as the driver of growth will also compli- accurate is another question. cate the effort to spur innovation. The CCP’s solutions are not all ones that Western economists would advocate. Many involve greater cen- Conclusion tralization rather than reliance on market forces to regulate the behavior of firms, along with state intervention Our analysis shows that some of the most dire predic- in the personal decision-making of Chinese people. tions about the impact of the ongoing demographic This intervention is aimed at not only regulating the transition in the PRC are not well-grounded in his- supply of talent or human capital available for innova- torical, cultural, or contemporary precedent. Many tion but also limiting the party-state’s contingent liabil- claims that the shrinking, aging, or sex ratio imbal- ities and the potential for unrest. Many analysts outside ance of the Chinese population will lead to crisis fail of China question whether these measures can suc- to explain the connection between cause and effect. ceed and wonder if, by focusing on discrete challenges To improve our ability to forecast the impact of or managing particular ratios, the CCP is neglecting current Chinese demographic trends on economic, the broader social transformation underway in China security, social, and political developments, we at its peril. CCP planners may have a more optimistic investigated the impact of analogous developments view, perhaps based in part on the emergence of big in other societies and in China historically. We then data tools that they think will improve the efficiency adjusted for the particular characteristics of today’s of their ongoing centrally directed resource-allocation PRC. We also framed our assessment with reference and population-control measures.

145 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Notes

1. Some of the research in this chapter was supported by the US Department of Defense. 2. Susan Greenhalgh, Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng’s China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 116; and Susan Greenhalgh, Cultivating Global Citizens: Population in the Rise of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 20. 3. Such claims have been appearing for a decade. “Zhuanfang jisheng wei zhuren: Zhongguo chuangzao shijie renkou fazhan qiji” [Interview with Director of Family Planning Committee: China Creates World Population Development Miracle], September 17, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-11/06/content_1457932.htm. The claim appears most recently in People’s Daily in August 2018. Zhang Yiqi, “Sheng wa shi jiashì yeshì guoshi” [Having Children Is Not Only a Family Affair; It Is Also a State Affair],People’s Daily, August 2018, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2018-08/06/content_1872810.htm. “Since the implementation of population control policies, China has had 400 million fewer births [than it would have without these policies], significantly reducing the pressure of population on resources and the environment has been effectively slowed, and forcefully promoting economic development and social progress.” 4. For example, Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 5. J. Lee and W. Feng, “Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities: The Chinese Demographic System 1700–2000,” Population and Development Review 25, no. 1 (March 1999): 42, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.1999.00033.x. 6. Fang Cai, “Demographic Transition, Demographic Dividend, and Lewis Turning Point in China,” China Economic Journal 3, no. 2 (2010): 107–19. Earlier research by Wang Feng and Andrew Mason suggested a more conservative figure of 15 percent and estimated that the dividend would be exhausted in 2013. Wang Feng and Andrew Mason, “The Demographic Factor in China’s Transitions,” in China’s Great Economic Transformations, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 136–66. 7. Lim Jiamin and Arianna Cowling, “China’s Demographic Outlook,” Reserve Bank of Australia, June 2016, https://www.rba.gov.au/ publications/bulletin/2016/jun/5.html. 8. Richard Jackson et al., China’s Long March to Retirement Reform: The Graying of the Middle Kingdom Revisited, Center for Strate- gic & International Studies, April 2009, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090422_gai_ chinareport_en.pdf. 9. Benjamin Jones, “Age and Great Invention,” Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–14, https://www. mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/rest.2009.11724. More recent research argues that the decline in entrepreneurial business startups in the United States can largely be explained by an aging population structure. Joseph Kopecky, “An Aging Dynamo: Demographic Change and the Decline of Entrepreneurial Activity in the United States,” December 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2907198. 10. Ashton M. Verdery, “Modeling the Future of China’s Changing Family Structure to 2100,” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 11. Frances Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1996). 12. Wang Xiaoyi, Cai Xinyi, and Li Renqing, Nongcun gongyehu yu minjian jinrong—Wenzhou de jingyan [Rural industrialization and informal finance: The experience of Wenzhou], 2004. 13. Carol Xiaojuan Ou, Paul A. Pavlou, and Robert M. Davison, “Swift Guanxi in Online Marketplaces: The Role of Computer- Mediated Communication Technologies,” MIS Quarterly (2014); and Fan Jiayang, “How E-Commerce Is Transforming Rural China,” New Yorker, July 23, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/23/how-e-commerce-is-transforming-rural-china. 14. Wang Feng, Shen Ke, and Cai Yong, “Household Change and Intergenerational Transfers in China: What Lies Ahead?,” in China’s Changing Family Structure: Dimensions and Implications, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 15. S. C. M. Paine, The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 135.

146 CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

16. Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialisation in the Chinese Interior,” China Quarterly no. 115 (September 1988): 351–86; and Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008), 308–9. 17. The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization, 2014, https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/ WEB-Urban-China.pdf. 18. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department, eds., Zhanlue Xue [The Science of Military Strategy] (Mili- tary Science Press, 2013), 209. 19. Mark Wang and Cecilia Joy-Perez, “China Finally Wants More Kids. But There Are Problems,” AEIdeas, September 24, 2018, https://www.aei.org/publication/china-finally-wants-more-kids-but-there-are-problems/. 20. Bishwajit Ghose, “Food Security and Food Self-Sufficiency in China: From Past to 2050,”Food and Energy Security 3, no. 2 (December 2014): 86–95, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267157761_Food_security_and_food_self-sufficiency_in_China_ From_past_to_2050. 21. People’s Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 27, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/ white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm. 22. Ding Xuezhou, “Guofang Renkou Changqi Pingjun Fazhan Yanjiu” [Research on the Development of Long Term Balance for the National Defense Population], Renkou Yanjiu, September 5, 2014. 23. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2004,” December 27, 2004; and Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 226. 24. Ding, “Research on the Development of Long Term Balance for the National Defense Population.” 25. Ding Xuezhou, Guofang Renkou Xue [National Defense Demography] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2014). 26. Ding, National Defense Demography; and Liu Mingfu, “Duzijun: neng zhan fou?” [A single-child army: Can it fight?],Bingqi Zhishi, July 15, 2011. 27. The authors thank Nicholas Eberstadt for raising this issue. 28. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department, eds., Science of Military Strategy, 110–11. 29. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department, eds., Science of Military Strategy, 111. 30. Kenneth Allen, “Reforms in the PLA Air Force,” China Brief 5, no. 15 (July 5, 2005); and Roger Cliff, China’s Military Power: Assess- ing Current and Future Capabilities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 107. 31. See Zhang Tao, “More Than 1 Mln Chinese College Students Sign Up for Army,” Xinhuanet, August 31, 2017, http://english. chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-08/31/content_7738181.htm; and Hu Hao, “These 1.078 Million College Students, Their Youth Has Been Set Off,” China Military Online, August 31, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-08/31/content_7737820.htm. 32. Zhang, “Having Children Is Not Only a Family Affair.” 33. Zhong chang qi qingnian fazhan guihua (2016-2025 nian) [Middle and Long-Term Youth Development Plan (2016–25)], http:// www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-04/13/content_5185555.htm. This is the source of the quoted material in this section. 34. The plan is of course not the only high-level document addressing demographic change. The CCP leadership has issued plans dealing with social welfare reform, the changing labor force, and many other topics. We focus on the Youth Development Plan here because it provides the best insight into how the leadership is thinking about the social consequences of demographic change, specifically the changes in family structure. 35. Yuan Peng and Wang Long, “Migrant Workers: China Boom Leaves Children Behind,” Nature 529, no. 25 (January 7, 2016); and Dennis Normile, “China’s Childhood Experiment,” Science 357, no. 6357 (September 22, 2017): 1226–30. 36. Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Rural Education Action Program, “Educational Chal- lenges: Education for Migrant Workers,” https://reap.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/educational_challenges__education_for_migrant_children. 37. Jessica Levine, “China’s New Bachelor Class,” Atlantic, February 11, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2013/02/chinas-new-bachelor-class/273040/. 38. Dexter Roberts, “What Happened to China’s Baby Bump?,” Bloomberg, February 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/

147 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

articles/2018-02-13/what-happened-to-china-s-baby-bump. 39. Baidu Baike, “Zhongguo qingnian zhiyuan zhe haiwai fuwu jihua” [China Youth Volunteers Overseas Service Program], August 7, 2018, https://baike.baidu.com/item/中国青年志愿者海外服务计划. 40. Oliver Smith, “The Unstoppable Rise of the Chinese Traveller—Where Are They Going and What Does It Mean for Overtour- ism?,” Telegraph, April 11, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/comment/rise-of-the-chinese-tourist/. 41. In 2013, the Ministry of Health and the National Population and Family Planning Commission were combined to create the National Health and Family Planning Commission. In March 2018, it was renamed the National Health Commission. 42. See Huaxia, “China to Allow Two Children for All Couples,” Xinhua, May 5, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015- 10/29/c_134764064.htm. 43. See, for instance, “Wei ji wei: Zhongguo renkou wenti bu qe shuliang 2030 nian jiang da 14.5 yi” [Health and Planning Commis- sion: No population shortage in China—will reach 1.45 billion in 2030], China News, March 11, 2017, http://news.163.com/17/0311/15/ CF8Q4VM300018AOQ.html; and Chinese Government Network, “Libin zhuren chuxi lian da renkou fazhan tebie huiyi bing fayan” [Director Li Bin Attends the UN General Assembly on Population Development and Delivers a Speech], September 24, 2014, http:// www.nhfpc.gov.cn/gjhzs/s3578/201409/1de7808a569741cfbf12d46f29371021.shtml.

148 About the Authors

Cai Yong is an associate professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published widely in demographic journals, including Population and Development Review and Demography. He earned a PhD in sociology from the University of Washington.

Jacqueline Deal is the president and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group, a senior fellow of the Foreign Pol- icy Research Institute, and an advisory board member of the Alexander Hamilton Society. She has published in Journal of Strategic Studies, Orbis, Parameters, Foreign Policy, and the New York Times, among other outlets. She received a DPhil from Oxford University.

Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and is a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research. His many publications include China’s Demo- graphic Outlook to 2040 and Its Implications: An Overview (AEI, 2019) and Poverty in China (International Devel- opment Institute, 1979). His PhD in political economy and government is from Harvard University.

David E. Scharff is cofounder and former director of the board of the International Psychotherapy Institute and director of the Continuous Training Program in Couple and Family Therapy in Beijing. He is also coeditor of Psychoanalysis in China (Routledge, 2014) and editor-in-chief of the journal Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy in China. He received his MD from Harvard Medical School.

Shen Ke is an associate professor at the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Fudan University. She has published in academic journals including Chinese Sociological Review and the Journal of the Economics of Ageing, and she earned a PhD in economics from Peking University.

Michael Szonyi is Frank Wen-Hsiung Wu Memorial Professor of Chinese History and director of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. He is a social historian of late imperial and modern China; his works include The China Questions: Critical Insights into a Rising Power (Harvard University Press, 2018, coedited with Jennifer Rudolph) and The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China (Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2017). He earned a DPhil from the Faculty of Oriental Studies of Oxford University.

Ashton M. Verdery is an assistant professor of sociology, demography, and social data analytics at Pennsylvania State University. He has published articles on kinship networks, social support, and demography in the Proceed- ings of the National Academy of Sciences and Social Forces, among other venues. He received a PhD in sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Wang Feng is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine, and Fudan University. He is a coauthor of Convergence to Very Low Fertility in East Asia: Processes, Causes, and Implications (Springer, 2019), and his writing has been featured widely in academic journals, including Population and Development Review and Populations Studies. He earned a PhD in sociology from the University of Michigan.

149 CHINA’S CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Wang Zhenglian is a senior research scientist at Center for Population Health and Aging at Duke University and a senior research fellow at the China Population and Development Research Center. Her many academic publications include Household and Living Arrangement Projections: The Extended Cohort-Component Method and Applications to the U.S. and China (Springer, 2013). She and Professor Zeng Yi et al. developed the ProFamy software program for projections of household structure and living arrangements. She earned a PhD in health science (medical demography) from the University of Southern Denmark.

Zeng Yi is a professor at Peking University’s National School of Development and Duke University’s Center for the Study of Aging and Human Development and Geriatric Division of Medical School. His numerous scholarly books and articles include Household and Living Arrangement Projections: The Extended Cohort-Component Method and Applications to the U.S. and China (Springer, 2013) and Healthy Longevity in China: Demographic, Socioeco- nomic, and Psychological Dimensions (Springer, 2008). He earned a PhD in demography from the Brussels Free University and conducted postdoc research at Princeton University.

150