A Case Study in International Price-Fixing
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University of Arkansas System Division of Agriculture [email protected] | (479) 575-7646 An Agricultural Law Research Article Lysine: A Case Study in International Price-Fixing by John M. Connor Originally published in CHOICES 13:03 CHOICES 13 (1998) www.NationalAgLawCenter.org CH( ll( 1.\ Third QUemer 1998 13 LVSINE A Case Study in Intemational Price-Fixing n 14 October 19% in L.S. Disrrict Court in able cartel rhat could easily have gone underecred. by John M. OChicago, Archet Daniels ~ lidland (AD~ I) com Company managers will no doubt norice thar rhe Connor pany pleaded guilty to price'-tlxi ng in the' world penalties for and chances of being caught fixing prices market for the amino acid lysine'. In rhe' pica agrcc have escalared as a direcr result of rhe lysine episode. ment, ADM and rhree Asian lvsinc manufacrurers Here I chronicle the operarion of rhe 1992-95 lysine admirred to rhree felonies: colluding on lvsinc prices, conspiracy and idemity a number of key legal, eco allocating the volume of lysine to be sold b;· cach nomic' and managemem issues raised by rhe episode. manufacturer, and participating in meetings to monitor compliance of cartel members (Dept. of The market for lysine Justice). A corporate officer of ADM testified rhat Lysine, an essential amino acid, srimulares growrh his company did not dispute rhe facts contained in and lean muscle development in hogs, poultry, and the plea agreement. In addition to precedent-set fish. Lysine has no subsrirures, bur soybean meal ting fines paid by the companies, four officers of also contains lysine in small amounts. Somerime in these companies pleaded guilry and paid hefty fines, rhe 1%Os, Asian biorechnology companies discov while four more managers have been indicted and ered a fermentarion process rhar converts dextrose face probable fines and jail sentences for their lead into lysine ar a much lower cosr than conventional ing roles in the conspiracy. exrraction merhods. (Documentarion of rhese and The lysine price-fixing episode was one of the other tacts can be tound in Connor 1998a and in largest, best documented, and most important pros orher publications lisred in "For More Informa ecutions in modern times under the Sherman Act of rion"). By rhe 1980s, rhey were importing large 1890. The lysine cartel was striking in its comprehen quantiries of dextrose from U.S. wer corn millers sive multinational dimensions. Both the structural char and exporting high-priced lysine back [() the Unired acteristics of the world lysine market as well as the Srares. ADM became rhe largest U.S. manufacturer corporare management culrures of the principal con of lysine in February 1991 and quickly gained about spirarors helped tacilirare collusive selling behavior for half of rhe U.S. market. U.S. lysine consumprion abour rhree years. Amirrusr officials have learned how grew 10 percent per year in rhe 1990s. The U.S. easy ir was for four derermined companies wirh sales marker reached sales of $330 million in ] 995: world spanning tlve cominems [0 organize a highly profir sales totaled $600 million. 14 CHOICES Third Quarter 1998 Archer Daniels Midland of farm-state Congressmen and Senators, especially ADM is a large and diversified company. In flscal Hubert Humphrey and Robert Dole. Since 1979, year 1995, ADM had consolidated net sales of$12.7 Andreas and ADM have contributed more than $4 billion (ADM). During 1986-95, ADM's net sales million to candidates for national offlce or rheir had increased by 10.1 percent per year. ADM's parties. ADM has benefitted greatly from the U.S. major divisions are oilseed and corn starch prod sugar program and from federal ethanol subsidies ucts. The corn products division produces corn and usage requirements (Bovard). sweeteners, corn starch, alcohols, and a host of bio technology products. Within the corn products di Economic conditions facilitating vision, fructose and ethanol are mature or matur price-fixing ing industries with slow growth and narrowing mar Standard industrial organization textbooks and sur gins: however, the other bioproducts from corn gen veys provide checklists of market conditions that are erate much higher margins. During 1989-95, ADM known from economic theory or industrial experi invested $1.5 billion in its bioproducts division. ence to encourage overt cartel behavior. With one or two exceptions, the lysine market exhibits all the necessary conditions that facilitate price-flxing. First, market sales concentration was very high. The lysine cartel consisted of four manufacturers that produced 95 percent of the world's feed-grade lysine. During 1994, ADM supplied 48 to 54 percent of the U.S. market. Second, lysine is a perfectly homogeneous product. Third, technical barriers to entry are high. Plants are highly specialized in production (imply ing large sunk costs of invesrment), and rheir sizes are large relative to marker demand. Parents and technological secrecy impede entry. Fourth, marker power is difficult to exercise when accurate price reporting mechanisms exist, such as auctions in public exchanges. Domestic lysine prices are almost completely hidden from public view. Fifth, lysine purchases were large and infrequent. Animal feed manufacturers purchased lysine by the ton. Large and lumpy orders are easier for a cartel to monitor for compliance than are frequent, small transactions. Finally, the conditions necessary to develop tacit collusion in the lysine market were absent. Tacit pricing cooperation (which is rarely prosecuted) de For a company of its size and diversity, ADM is velops from companies with years of experience in managed by a remarkably small number of manag observing strategic moves and countermoves in an ers (Kilman and Ingersoll). Dwayne Andreas and a few top offlcers reportedly made all major strategic decisions from 1970 to 1997. Until late 19%, rhe ADM board contained a large majority of current Antitrust officials have learned how and former company offlcers, relatives and long easy it wasforfour determined standing close friends ofAndreas, or offlcers of com panies that supply goods and services to ADM. companies with sales spanningfive Andreas cultivated the image of an international continents to organize a highly statesman primarily concerned with world hunger and national food security. His official biography profitable cartel that could easily credits him as one of the major forces behind the PL 480 Program (Kahn). He is identified as Armand have gone undetected. Hammer's successor, by becoming rhe U.S. capi talist with the closest relationship with Kremlin and other Eastern Bloc leaders in the 1980s. Andreas industry. ADM's large-scale entry abruptly has builr a legendary network of powerful business reconfigured the nascent lysine industry. The ab and government contacts since the 1960s. He was sence of a long period of business interaction means close friends with and contributor to a wide array that tacit cooperation could not be learned. whereas (H( )ICES Third Quarter 1998 15 the advantages of forming a cartel can be appreci shares across several regions of the world. ated quickly. When ADM's new plant came on The conspirators apparently were successful in stream in 1991, ADM cut U.S. lysine prices from raising rhe U.S. price of lysine to $0.98 for three $1.30 per pound to the $0.60 to $0.70 range and months (November 1992 to January 1993). From kept those money-losing low prices for about a year. October 1993 to August 1994, prices held at a The Asian exporters of lysine were losing more steady $1.08 to $1.13 and then rose again to about money than ADM because their facilities were $1.20 for another six months. Industry output smaller and older, their dextrose supplies were more growth was constrained to half its historical rate. A costly, and trans-Pacific transportation COStS were year after the conspiracy ended in late 1995, U.S. significant. ADM's willingness to accept and inflier lysine exports doubled. losses in pursuit of a large market share may have persuaded the Asian exporters of the superior prof itability of a cartel arrangement. ADM's willingness to accept In sum, nearly all of the market preconditions for price-fixing were met for lysine. The major ex and inflict losses in pursuit of ception is the surprisingly pluralistic composition a large market share may have of the conspirators and their globe-girdling loca tions. Cultural diversity and geographic distance persuaded the Asian exporters can no longer prevent effective collusion among multinational corporations, if in fact they ever did. ofthe superior profitability ofa cartel arrangement. Price-fixing: chronology and mechanics By the late 1980s, Ajinomoto, Kyowa, and one Whiracre was recruited by the FBI as a secrer in South Korean compan:' (Sewon) were exporting formanr (a "mole") in November 1992. Up until June about 530 million of l\'Sine per year to the United 1995, he provided hundreds of audio tapes of many States and charging 51.00-52.00 per pound, much price-fixing meetings concerning lysine, ciuic acid, less rhan U.S. organiL' L'hemicll companies were and fructose. The FBI secrerlv made additional video charging for extraered l\'Sine. Then, ADM discov tapes of the "lysine associarion" meerings. A federal ered why Asian biotechnolog\' companies were buy grand jury was formed in Chicago in early June of ing so much dexrrose from rhe Lnitcd States-ir is 1995 and obtained subpoenas for all information on t~rmenrarion. the raw material tor Ivsine. madt' lw. price-fixing by ADM and its co-conspirators. In 1989, ADM commirrt'd an initial 51 'iO million More than 70 FBI agents raided ADM's corpo to build the world's largesr Iysint' EKton' in Decatur, rate offices in Decarur, Illinois, on the nighr of 28 Illinois, and hired thirty-two-ycar-old biochemisr June 1995: many ADM officers were interviewed Mark Whiracre to direer rhe nnv [nine division.