Down, but Not Out: The FDLR in the JANUARY 2016 Democratic Republic of the Congo • he Forces Démocratiques de Libération army (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 192–93). du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Its primary stated objectives have long been to NUMBER 56 TLiberation of Rwanda, FDLR)—includ- reclaim power in Rwanda and to protect the ing its armed wing, the Forces Combattantes Rwandan refugee population in the DRC. Faced Abacunzi (Abacunzi Fighting Forces, FOCA)1— with the spectacular decline of its military is among the most enduring armed groups in strength—from an estimated 11,500 in 2002 to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 1,400 in 2014, according to UN sources—the (DRC). Several members of the group’s top group has called for the opening of political leadership are suspected of involvement in the space in Rwanda (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, 1994 Rwandan genocide, making the FDLR’s p. 187); in particular, it has sought ‘dialogue continued presence in the DRC a recurring point with the Rwanda government and reform of the of contention between Kinshasa and Kigali Rwandan security forces permitting FDLR rep- ARMED ARMED ACTORS and a source of tensions for the Great Lakes resentation at a leadership level’ (Schlindwein region as a whole (Omaar, 2008, pp. 65–66, and Johnson, 2014). Rwandan authorities have 236–312). Maj. Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura, yet to express readiness to engage in a political the group’s military commander, is wanted dialogue with FDLR leaders, however (UNSC, by the International Criminal Court for war 2015, para. 25). crimes committed in the DRC itself (ICC, 2012). The FDLR initially relied on a sophisticated, The group’s presence has also led to the emer- multi-layered support and financing scheme. gence of local armed groups that claim to pro- Kinshasa’s support to the FDLR officially ended tect communities, further complicating security following the end of the Second Congolese War dynamics in the eastern DRC (Debelle and (1998–2002), yet certain commanders of the Florquin, 2015, p. 206). FARDC continued to cooperate at least tacitly In 2015, the Forces Armées de la République with the FDLR in operations against other Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the armed groups, including the Congrès National DRC, FARDC) launched a new operation target- pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress ing mainly the FDLR, one in a long series that for People’s Defence, CNDP) in 2007 and 2008 has weakened the group since 2009. Alongside (UNSC, 2008, paras. 102–13). The group could continuing disarmament and reintegration also count on the external support of hundreds Notes programmes, as well as international judicial of Rwandans who had emigrated to Europe, proceedings, increased military pressure has North America, and other countries in Africa played a notable role in the FDLR’s loss of about after 1994.3 Most crucially, the FDLR essentially 85 per cent of its estimated strength since 2002 relied on sophisticated income-generating (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, p. 187). Yet, though activities within the DRC to fund its operations diminished, the group still stands, offering and subsistence. Although significant propor- policy-makers valuable insights into the impact tions of the FDLR’s human resources were of external interventions on armed groups. devoted to controlling and exploiting gold This Research Note examines the state of and tin ore mines, the group secured addi- the FDLR as of late 2015. It builds on the infor- tional revenue through trade in local goods, mation published in the Small Arms Survey agriculture and cattle raising, fishing and 2015 regarding the FDLR’s origins, structure, poaching, trafficking in cannabis, and looting and small arms holdings up to 2014 (Debelle (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 195–96). and Florquin, 2015). The Note also draws on Despite significant shifts in its configura- field research carried out by the Small Arms tion and influence, the FDLR remains a key Survey in the eastern DRC and Rwanda in armed actor in the Great Lakes region. Recent August and December 2015, as well as supple- changes are due to a convergence of inter- mentary commissioned research.2 linked factors, including improved collabora- tion between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, a succession of military operations An enduring force targeting the group, international judicial pro- Formed in 2000 from the remnants of the ceedings against the FDLR leadership members Hutu-dominated ex-Rwandan Armed Forces who were based in Europe, and ongoing efforts and Interahamwe militia that fled Rwanda in to encourage the demobilization and repatria- 1994, the FDLR distinguished itself on the tion of remaining combatants. The initiation basis of particularly strong internal cohesion of a series of military interventions in 2009 and hierarchical structures that closely resem- proved to be a turning point, beginning with Research ble those of the former Rwandan state and Umoja Wetu, an operation conducted jointly Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016 1 by the Rwanda Defence Forces and Sukola II the two FARDC generals selected to the FARDC. The FDLR retaliated with lead the operation, military collabora- As the voluntary disarmament process particularly gruesome attacks against tion between MONUSCO and the gradually stalled, the UN Security civilian communities it accused of aid- FARDC was suspended, however Council and regional African govern- ing the enemy (Debelle and Florquin, (UNSC, 2015, para. 26). The FARDC ments threatened to carry out joint 2015, p. 198). Additional FARDC-led and unilaterally launched its ‘Sukola II’ FARDC–MONUSCO military opera- UN-supported interventions followed operation on 27 January 2015 and tions against the FDLR unless it fully carried out offensives in the provinces and, by 2012, had led to the defection demobilized by early January 2015 of North and South Kivu. of almost 4,000 FDLR elements (SSRC, (ICG, 2014, pp. 11–14). Following a In the first seven months of the 2014, p. 3). The attacks also disrupted row over the human rights record of operations, there was little active the group’s ability to control territory and, by extension, their capacity to gen- erate revenue (Debelle and Florquin, Map 1 FDLR–FOCA areas of influence, October 2014 and October 2015 2015, p. 208). Progress in routing the FDLR lost momentum at the end of ITURI 2012 and into 2013, however, with the Oicha Kamango resurgence of other armed groups in Beni the Kivus, notably the M23. BENI Voluntary disarmament Butembo LUBERO In 2013, the UN Security Council estab- lished the Force Intervention Brigade Lubero TSHOPO Lake (FIB) as part of the UN Organization Edward Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO); the peacekeeping force Kanyabayonga was tasked with undertaking a targeted RUTSHRUTSHURUURU UGANDA NORTH offensive against armed groups in the Katobo eastern DRC, including the FDLR. The KIVU Rutshuru likelihood of an FARDC–FIB military WALIKALE RutsRutshuruhuru offensive was among the factors that MASISI Walikale Masisi prompted FDLR leaders to initiate a Walikale Masisi Forest ‘voluntary’ disarmament process in MANIEMA NYIRAGONNYIRAGONGOGO Goma 2014 . While some observers contend Lake that the initiative was a tactical ploy to Kivu Kigali buy time and delay what were thought KALEHE Kalehe Bugarula to be inevitable military operations, IDIDJWIJWI RWANDA sources close to the FDLR affirm that the decision to disarm was part of a Kabare strategic choice within the political KABAREBukavu Shabunda Walungu wing of the FDLR, which was more WALUNGU interested in political solutions.4 SOUTH Kigogo The first wave of voluntary disarma- SHABUNDA KIVU Mwenga-Hombo ment began in May 2014, when a group Mwenga UVIRA BURUNDI of FDLR elements surrendered in Bujumbura Kateku, North Kivu. In June 2014, MWENGA DEMOCRATIC Uvira more FDLR combatants came out to REPUBLIC FDLR-FOCA areas surrender at Kigogo, South Kivu, while OF of influence in a third wave was turned back follow- THE October 2014 ing the UN statement that their only LaLakeke FDLR-FOCA areas CONGO TanganyikaTanganyika of influence in option was a return to Rwanda. As October 2015 part of this process, a total of 339 com- FIZI International batants were demobilized and the FiziFizi boundary FDLR turned over 253 weapons (UNSC, Province T boundary 2015, para. 23). Although MONUSCO A Territory Kabambare N initially pushed for the repatriation of Zboundary A ex-combatants to Rwanda, the FDLR NationalN capital I leadership adamantly refused and, as ProvinceA capital of December 2015, the ex-combatants 0 50km TANGANYIKA Territory capital and their dependents were still in the camps of Kanyabayonga, Kisangani, Note: The methodology employed by sources to determine FDLR–FOCA areas of influence was slightly adjusted between 2014 and 2015. and Walungu, with no clear solution See the sources for more information. in sight (para. 24). Sources: Vogel (2015a); Stearns and Vogel (2015, p. 4) 2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016 combat, as the FDLR’s response was batants and perhaps as many reserves, military forces in the late 1990s and to retreat and abandon strongholds who could be remobilized.14 early years of the following decade without fighting (see Map 1).5 Reports Overall, the low intensity of the (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 200– indicate that combatants knew when fighting and the FDLR’s strategy to 205).17 In the past, the FDLR was also to abandon their camps thanks to abandon its positions