Down, but Not Out: The FDLR in the

JANUARY 2016 Democratic Republic of the Congo

he Forces Démocratiques de Libération army (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 192–93). du (Democratic Forces for the Its primary stated objectives have long been to NUMBER 56 • TLiberation of Rwanda, FDLR)—includ- reclaim power in Rwanda and to protect the ing its armed wing, the Forces Combattantes Rwandan refugee population in the DRC. Faced Abacunzi (Abacunzi Fighting Forces, FOCA)1— with the spectacular decline of its military is among the most enduring armed groups in strength—from an estimated 11,500 in 2002 to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 1,400 in 2014, according to UN sources—the

(DRC). Several members of the group’s top group has called for the opening of political leadership are suspected of involvement in the space in Rwanda (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, 1994 , making the FDLR’s p. 187); in particular, it has sought ‘dialogue continued presence in the DRC a recurring point with the Rwanda government and reform of the of contention between Kinshasa and Rwandan security forces permitting FDLR rep-

ARMED ARMED ACTORS and a source of tensions for the Great Lakes resentation at a leadership level’ (Schlindwein region as a whole (Omaar, 2008, pp. 65–66, and Johnson, 2014). Rwandan authorities have 236–312). Maj. Gen. , yet to express readiness to engage in a political the group’s military commander, is wanted dialogue with FDLR leaders, however (UNSC, by the International Criminal Court for war 2015, para. 25). crimes committed in the DRC itself (ICC, 2012). The FDLR initially relied on a sophisticated, The group’s presence has also led to the emer- multi-layered support and financing scheme. gence of local armed groups that claim to pro- Kinshasa’s support to the FDLR officially ended tect communities, further complicating security following the end of the Second Congolese War dynamics in the eastern DRC (Debelle and (1998–2002), yet certain commanders of the Florquin, 2015, p. 206). FARDC continued to cooperate at least tacitly In 2015, the Forces Armées de la République with the FDLR in operations against other Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the armed groups, including the Congrès National DRC, FARDC) launched a new operation target- pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress ing mainly the FDLR, one in a long series that for People’s Defence, CNDP) in 2007 and 2008 has weakened the group since 2009. Alongside (UNSC, 2008, paras. 102–13). The group could continuing disarmament and reintegration also count on the external support of hundreds programmes, as well as international judicial of Rwandans who had emigrated to Europe, proceedings, increased military pressure has North America, and other countries in Africa played a notable role in the FDLR’s loss of about after 1994.3 Most crucially, the FDLR essentially 85 per cent of its estimated strength since 2002 relied on sophisticated income-generating (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, p. 187). Yet, though activities within the DRC to fund its operations diminished, the group still stands, offering and subsistence. Although significant propor- policy-makers valuable insights into the impact tions of the FDLR’s human resources were of external interventions on armed groups. devoted to controlling and exploiting gold This Research Note examines the state of and tin ore mines, the group secured addi- the FDLR as of late 2015. It builds on the infor- tional revenue through trade in local goods, mation published in the Small Arms Survey agriculture and cattle raising, fishing and 2015 regarding the FDLR’s origins, structure, poaching, trafficking in cannabis, and looting and small arms holdings up to 2014 (Debelle (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 195–96). and Florquin, 2015). The Note also draws on Despite significant shifts in its configura- field research carried out by the Small Arms tion and influence, the FDLR remains a key Survey in the eastern DRC and Rwanda in armed actor in the Great Lakes region. Recent August and December 2015, as well as supple- changes are due to a convergence of inter- mentary commissioned research.2 linked factors, including improved collabora- tion between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, a succession of military operations An enduring force targeting the group, international judicial pro- Formed in 2000 from the remnants of the ceedings against the FDLR leadership members Hutu-dominated ex-Rwandan Armed Forces who were based in Europe, and ongoing efforts and militia that fled Rwanda in to encourage the demobilization and repatria- 1994, the FDLR distinguished itself on the tion of remaining combatants. The initiation basis of particularly strong internal cohesion of a series of military interventions in 2009 and hierarchical structures that closely resem- proved to be a turning point, beginning with

Research Notes ble those of the former Rwandan state and Umoja Wetu, an operation conducted jointly

Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016 1 by the Rwanda Defence Forces and Sukola II the two FARDC generals selected to the FARDC. The FDLR retaliated with lead the operation, military collabora- As the voluntary disarmament process particularly gruesome attacks against tion between MONUSCO and the gradually stalled, the UN Security civilian communities it accused of aid- FARDC was suspended, however Council and regional African govern- ing the enemy (Debelle and Florquin, (UNSC, 2015, para. 26). The FARDC ments threatened to carry out joint 2015, p. 198). Additional FARDC-led and unilaterally launched its ‘Sukola II’ FARDC–MONUSCO military opera- UN-supported interventions followed operation on 27 January 2015 and tions against the FDLR unless it fully carried out offensives in the provinces and, by 2012, had led to the defection demobilized by early January 2015 of North and South Kivu. of almost 4,000 FDLR elements (SSRC, (ICG, 2014, pp. 11–14). Following a In the first seven months of the 2014, p. 3). The attacks also disrupted row over the human rights record of operations, there was little active the group’s ability to control territory and, by extension, their capacity to gen- erate revenue (Debelle and Florquin, Map 1 FDLR–FOCA areas of influence, October 2014 and October 2015 2015, p. 208). Progress in routing the FDLR lost momentum at the end of ITURI 2012 and into 2013, however, with the Oicha Kamango resurgence of other armed groups in Beni the Kivus, notably the M23.

BENI Voluntary disarmament Butembo LUBERO In 2013, the UN Security Council estab- lished the Force Intervention Brigade Lubero TSHOPO Lake (FIB) as part of the UN Organization Edward Stabilization Mission in the DRC

(MONUSCO); the peacekeeping force Kanyabayonga was tasked with undertaking a targeted RUTSHRUTSHURUURU UGANDA NORTH offensive against armed groups in the Katobo eastern DRC, including the FDLR. The KIVU Rutshuru likelihood of an FARDC–FIB military WALIKALE RutsRutshuruhuru offensive was among the factors that MASISI Walikale Masisi prompted FDLR leaders to initiate a Walikale Masisi Forest ‘voluntary’ disarmament process in MANIEMA NYIRAGONNYIRAGONGOGO Goma 2014 . While some observers contend Lake that the initiative was a tactical ploy to Kivu Kigali buy time and delay what were thought KALEHE Kalehe Bugarula to be inevitable military operations, IDIDJWIJWI RWANDA sources close to the FDLR affirm that the decision to disarm was part of a Kabare strategic choice within the political KABAREBukavu Shabunda Walungu wing of the FDLR, which was more WALUNGU interested in political solutions.4 SOUTH Kigogo The first wave of voluntary disarma- SHABUNDA KIVU Mwenga-Hombo ment began in May 2014, when a group Mwenga UVIRA BURUNDI of FDLR elements surrendered in Bujumbura Kateku, North Kivu. In June 2014, MWENGA DEMOCRATIC Uvira more FDLR combatants came out to REPUBLIC FDLR-FOCA areas surrender at Kigogo, South Kivu, while OF of influence in a third wave was turned back follow- THE October 2014 ing the UN statement that their only LaLakeke FDLR-FOCA areas CONGO TanganyikaTanganyika of influence in option was a return to Rwanda. As October 2015 part of this process, a total of 339 com- FIZI International batants were demobilized and the FiziFizi boundary FDLR turned over 253 weapons (UNSC, Province T boundary 2015, para. 23). Although MONUSCO A Territory Kabambare N initially pushed for the repatriation of Zboundary A ex-combatants to Rwanda, the FDLR NationalN capital I leadership adamantly refused and, as ProvinceA capital of December 2015, the ex-combatants 0 50km TANGANYIKA Territory capital and their dependents were still in the camps of Kanyabayonga, Kisangani, Note: The methodology employed by sources to determine FDLR–FOCA areas of influence was slightly adjusted between 2014 and 2015. and Walungu, with no clear solution See the sources for more information. in sight (para. 24). Sources: Vogel (2015a); Stearns and Vogel (2015, p. 4)

2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016 combat, as the FDLR’s response was batants and perhaps as many reserves, military forces in the late 1990s and to retreat and abandon strongholds who could be remobilized.14 early years of the following decade without fighting (see Map 1).5 Reports Overall, the low intensity of the (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 200– indicate that combatants knew when fighting and the FDLR’s strategy to 205).17 In the past, the FDLR was also to abandon their camps thanks to abandon its positions rather than to known to procure arms from the advance warnings from the FARDC fight back appears to have limited FARDC and other armed groups, (UNSC, 2015, para. 27). Very few actual the number of combatants who were either by seizing them during incur- engagements took place between the killed, captured, or demobilized. In sions, or by purchasing or trading for FDLR and the FARDC during this late August 2015, the FARDC reported them.18 It appears unlikely that the period, such that human rights viola- having killed 35 FDLR combatants and FDLR has substantially resupplied tions reportedly remained limited.6 captured or accepted the surrender of its weapons stores in the last two to In November 2015, the FARDC 313 others; in October 2015, however, three years.19 Observers suggest that began a new wave of attacks in North the UN Group of Experts confirmed the FDLR currently procures small Kivu, which forced the FDLR to retreat the capture of only 190 fighters, noting amounts of weapons, largely by cap- to areas where it faced opposition from that many of them may in fact have been turing equipment on the battlefield.20 other local armed groups.7 Some observ- refugees or civilians (UNSC, 2015, paras. As the FDLR sourced its weapons ers viewed the last round of attacks 30–32). According to FARDC sources, mainly from diverted regional stock- as significant, possibly the largest in operations in North Kivu between piles, its diverse holdings contain a the region since those targeting M23 in 1 November and 10 December 2015 significant proportion of ageing and 2013.8 The FDLR retreated together with resulted in the killing of an additional unreliable weapons. These weapons dependents and Congolese civilians, 24 FDLR fighters, while 29 were cap- suffered from years of exposure to un- abandoning the FDLR headquarters tured or surrendered during this favourable climatic and inappropriate in Katobo to head towards north-east period.15 Far fewer FDLR combatants storage conditions. Unsurprisingly, and north-west Walikale, south-west pursued repatriation in response to most weapons surrendered in 2014 Lubero, and north Masisi.9 the Sukola II operations than in the were small arms in poor condition, context of the Umoja Wetu attacks of including ageing AK-pattern rifles and 2009. Indeed, the Rwanda Demobili- several M-16 A1 rifles. The scarcity of Current state of the FDLR zation and Reintegration Commission NATO ammunition in the region helps repatriated and discharged only 155 to explain why FDLR combatants While the full impact of the late 2015 ex-FDLR combatants in 2015, compared abandoned a variety of NATO-calibre attacks remained unclear at the time of with 1,149 in 2009.16 In short, while the weapons in 2014, including the M-16, writing, general developments pointed FDLR may have lost a few hundred SAR-80, R4, and UZI (Debelle and to a militarily weakened FDLR, albeit fighters in 2015, its core leadership and Florquin, 2015, Table 7.2). one that was not yet defeated. The UN structure remained relatively unaffected. Although most of the FDLR Group of Experts on the DRC reported stockpile is ageing, it is clear that the that while Sukola II had forced FDLR weapons surrendered in 2014 were elements to abandon long-held posi- Revenue particularly old, and that the most tions and had further disrupted the Although military operations have functional weapons remain in the group’s revenue strategy, its leadership, largely interrupted the FDLR’s former control of the group. Only one rocket- strength, and overall military capacity mainstays of mineral extraction and propelled grenade launcher and two remained largely intact (UNSC, 2015, trade since 2009, the group maintains mortars were turned in during the paras. 22, 28). No senior officers were control over mines in certain areas, 2014 disarmament campaign, sug- captured in 2015,10 although four— notably in north Walikale. Other mem- gesting that the ceremonies did little two colonels, one lieutenant colonel, bers of the FDLR continue trade for to diminish the FDLR’s light weapons and a major—deserted and repatri- themselves but no longer channel holdings. Since the FDLR probably ated to Rwanda.11 Significantly, the their profits to the FDLR leadership. holds few larger weapons, its ability operations seem to have forced FDLR In general, the FDLR currently gener- to carry out large-scale operations, leaders to put aside the internal rifts ates revenue primarily through the or to defend territory against a well- created by the volunteer disarmament trade in wood and charcoal, the taxa- equipped opponent, may be limited. 2014 12 process of . tion of local farmers and traders in Ammunition stockpiles appear to be the villages under their control, and in particularly short supply (Debelle Strength possibly kidnappings. Some FDLR and Florquin, 2015, p. 200). fighters have reportedly made their Estimates of the number of remaining way to some of the areas abandoned FDLR combatants vary. As of December in 2015, notably in South Kivu, as the Conclusion 2015, some informants reported that FARDC’s attention shifted to other about 800 combatants remained in locations (UNSC, 2015, paras. 22, 28). Long considered one of the principal North Kivu and 200–300 in South Kivu, obstacles to peace in the region, the for a total of about 1,000–1,100; mean- FDLR appears severely weakened while, informed Rwandan sources Weapons and no longer able to threaten the estimated that as many as 2,500 fighters Numerous sources stress that the Rwandan government in Kigali. The remained active in early 2016.13 Other FDLR still maintains weapons that aggressive international pressure on sources distinguished between an esti- they took from Rwandan army stock- the FDLR leadership, targeted mili- mated 1,000–1,500 ‘effective’ FDLR com- piles in 1994 or obtained from foreign tary operations, and the implementa-

Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016 3 tion of credible demobilization and 7 Author interviews, Goma, 9–11 December repatriation programmes discernibly 2015. 8 Author interview, Goma, 9 December 2015. accelerated the group’s decline. The 9 On 7 December 2015, in the context of these About the progress made in neutralizing the attacks, Congolese authorities arrested FDLR is noteworthy and shows how Ladislas Ntaganzwa, one of nine genocide Small Arms Survey suspects, on an international arrest war- an array of political, military, eco- The Small Arms Survey is a global centre rant, in Nyanzale (Vogel, 2015b; author nomic, and diplomatic initiatives can of excellence whose mandate is to generate interviews, Goma, 9–10 December 2015). be effective over time. impartial, evidence-based, and policy- 10 Author interview, Goma, 9 December 2015. Even if the FDLR no longer poses 11 Author interview, Kigali, 11 December 2015. relevant knowledge on all aspects of a military threat to Kigali, however, 12 Author interviews, Goma, 19 August 2015; small arms and armed violence. It is the its mere survival represents an ideo- author correspondence with confidential principal international source of exper- tise, information, and analysis on small logical threat, one that appears to be sources, January 2016. 13 Author interview, Goma, 9 December 2015. arms and armed violence issues, and acts preventing at least some Hutu refugees 14 Multiple author interviews, Bukavu, Goma, as a resource for governments, policy- from returning home. Moreover, given and Kigali, August and December 2015. makers, researchers, and civil society. It the resilience of the FDLR’s military 15 Author interview, Goma, 11 December 2015. is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the leadership, the volatile context of the 16 Author correspondence with the Rwanda Graduate Institute of International and Great Lakes region, and the history Demobilization and Reintegration Com- Development Studies. mission, January 2016. of political manipulation of armed The Survey has an international staff 17 Author interviews, Bukavu, 22 August 2015. with expertise in security studies, politi- groups in the eastern DRC, the cur- 18 Author interview, Goma, 19 August 2015. cal science, law, economics, development rent dynamics are liable to change. 19 Author interview, Goma, 18 August 2015. studies, sociology, and criminology, and Competing regional priorities, particu- 20 Author interviews, Goma, Bukavu, Kigali, collaborates with a network of researchers, larly in the lead-up to national elec- August and December 2015. partner institutions, non-governmental tions in the DRC and Rwanda in 2016 organizations, and governments in more and 2017, combined with heightening than 50 countries. political tensions in Burundi, may References For more information, please visit: weaken the current focus on the FDLR. Debelle, Raymond and Nicolas Florquin. 2015. www.smallarmssurvey.org. Downgrading or postponing efforts ‘Waning Cohesion: The Rise and Fall of to subdue the FDLR could seriously the FDLR.’ In Small Arms Survey. Small Publication date: January 2016 Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World. jeopardize the progress achieved to Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, date, as the group still appears able to pp. 186–215. Acknowledgements revive its previous income-generating ICC (International Criminal Court). 2012. activities and rebuild its strength, The Prosecutor vs. Sylvestre Mudacumura. This Research Note is published with financial support from the Kingdom of should it be left to its own devices. ICC-01/04-01/12. ICG (International Crisis Group). 2014. Congo: the Netherlands. Ending the Status Quo. Africa Briefing No. 107. 17 December. Notes Omaar, Rakiya. 2008. The Leadership of Rwandan Credits Armed Groups abroad with a Focus on the Authors: Nicolas Florquin and 1 In this Note, FDLR refers to both the FDLR and RUD/Urunana. Report commis- Claudia Seymour FDLR and FOCA, as they are closely inter- sioned by the Rwanda Demobilization and twined and part of a single organization. Reintegration Commission. December. Contributors: Josaphat Musamba Bussy, Although several factions splintered from Schlindwein, Simone and Dominic Johnson. Willy Mikenye, and Simone Schlindwein the core FDLR structure as of 2005, the 2014. ‘Endgame or Bluff? The UN’s Copy-editing: Tania Inowlocki FDLR remains by far the primary force Dilemma with the FDLR Militia in DRC.’ Proofreading: Donald Strachan among them (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, Briefing paper. 15 August. pp. 192, 210). SSRC (Social Science Research Council). 2014. Cartography by Jillian Luff 2 Confidential author interviews for this FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies. Report (www.mapgrafix.com) Research Note were carried out in Bukavu prepared on behalf of the DRC Affinity Design and layout: Rick Jones and Goma, DRC, and in Kigali, Rwanda, Group. March. ([email protected]) with local and international analysts, rep- Stearns, Jason and Christoph Vogel. 2015. resentatives of humanitarian and human The Landscape of Armed Groups in the East- rights non-governmental organizations, ern Congo. New York: Congo Research Contact details UN mission staff, World Bank represent- Group, Center on International Coopera- Small Arms Survey atives, Congolese and Rwandan officials, tion, New York University. December. intelligence officers, diplomats, and former UNSC (United Nations Security Council). Maison de la Paix FDLR fighters. 2008. Final Report of the Group of Experts Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E 3 FDLR president on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. CP 136 – 1211 Geneva, Switzerland was himself based in Germany until his S/2008/773 of 12 December. t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 arrest in 2009; other key political leaders 2015 Midterm Report of the Group of Experts —. . e [email protected] also lived in Europe (Debelle and Florquin, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2015, p. 192). S/2015/797 of 16 October. 4 Moderate forces within the FDLR served Vogel, Christoph. 2015a. ‘Mapping Armed as the driving force behind the group’s Groups in Eastern Congo.’ Map. Accessed push for disarmament, leading to inter- 16 January 2016. nal tensions with the FOCA commander, —. 2015b. ‘Does Ntaganzwa’s Capture Herald Sylvestre Mudacumura (author interviews, the Implosion of FDLR?’ Blog. 11 December. Goma and Bukavu, August 2015). 5 Author interview, Goma, 18 August 2015. For more information on armed groups, 6 Author interviews, Goma, 10 December please visit

4 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 56 • January 2016