‘FIGHTING FOR THE UNITY OF THE EMPIRE’1 AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE SECOND ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 1899-1902
GUY MURFEY
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy, The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 2017
1 From the inscription of the South African War memorial on St. Kilda Rd, Melbourne. http://monumentaustralia.org.au/themes/conflict/boer/display/33452-south-african-soldiers-memorial TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS page ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS page iii
ABBREVIATIONS page v
INTRODUCTION page 1
1. THE POLITICAL ELITE’S SUPPORT FOR THE WAR page 21
2. THE ROLE OF NEWSPAPERS page 49
3. POPULAR SUPPORT page 76
4. DISSENT page 110
5. HISTORIOGRAPHY page 142
CONCLUSION page 169
APPENDIX A: Statistical analysis of voting outcomes during the Second Anglo South African war page 172
APPENDIX B: Details of party affiliation, religion, country of origin and profession of colonial politicians voting on the motion as to whether troops should be sent to South Africa (October 1899) page 176
APPENDIX C: Parliamentary dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the South African War page 189
APPENDIX D: Labor voting in regards the sending of a contingent to the South African War (10 October 1899) page 197
APPENDIX E: Persons cited as critics of the war by Henry Reynolds in Unnecessary Wars and their statements of loyalty during the South African War page 200
APPENDIX F: Extract of transcript of Reynold’s interview 28 April 2016 page 206
BIBLIOGRAPHY page 207
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to my supervisors Associate Professor
Eleanor Hancock and Professor Craig Stockings for their patience, guidance and professionalism.
In particular I have very much appreciated the skills they have given me over the past three years to understand and execute a project of this nature.
I would also like to thank the Administrators of the Andrew Denis Research Travel
Award 2015 for their generous grant that greatly assisted accessing Libraries and Archives around the country. I have very much appreciated all the support I have been given by the administrative staff of the School of History and Social Sciences at Australian Defence Force Academy,
Bernadette McDermott.
I have also been fortunate to be assisted by the librarians and archivists across the country including the ADFA Library, the State Library of Victorian, Monash University Library,
Melbourne University Library (Special collections), Latrobe University Library, NSW State
Library, the Australian War Memorial, the National Library, the National Archives, Public
Records Office of Victoria, NSW Government State Records and the Library of the Tasmanian
Parliament. Nancy Wallace deserves special mention for her excellent proofreading.
I cannot thank my wife Josephine enough for her unstinting emotional and practical support (there is no doubt having a librarian for a wife gives a significant advantage to research.)
My sister Judith Murfey and my friends Tim Dunlevie and Peter Antonenko deserve special mention for the extended hours of conversations about issues and regular checks on my progress.
My children Nathan and Julia as well as my other friends and family (Jack and Gail
Chatziyakoumis, Imogen Dunlevie, Chris Sommer, Jessica Chatziyakoumis, Kyle Hamer,
Brendan Myers, Heli Simpson, Annabel Crawford, Julia Antonenko, Ian and Joan James, Peter and Helen Norman) deserve a mention for their good humoured willingness to listen to a rather esoteric topic.
ii
ILLUSTRATIONS
Fig. 1 Combined voting outcomes for Australian politicians deciding for or against the dispatch of contingents to the Second Anglo-South African War graphed as percentages. page 26
Fig. 2 ‘The War’ headlines. (Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900 p. 5) page 54
Fig. 3 ‘The Colenso Battle’ headlines. (Argus, 20 December 1899, p. 7.) page 63
Fig. 4 ‘Departure of the New South Wales Lancer detachment.’ (Departure of the New South Wales Lancer detachment and other troops for the South African War, with crowds lining the streets to bid farewell,’ AWM A05228). Page 80
Fig. 5 ‘The Victorian Contingent Procession’ [‘The Victorian Contingent Procession’ – farewelling the first Victorian contingent’ (Stereoscopic image) - AWM P01700.001]. page 80
Fig. 6 ‘Boer War troop parades, 1899-1901.’ Second Contingent departing Sydney [17 January 1900] ‘Boer War troop parades, 1899-1901.’ State Library of NSW, [online photograph] page 84
Fig. 7 ‘Second Victorian Contingent Procession (ca 1900)’ [14 January 1900] [(online photograph) - AWM P01700.006.] page 85
Fig. 8 ‘Relative sizes of things in Australia just now,’ (The Bulletin, 27 January 1900, p. 17) Page 87
iii
Fig. 9 ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1900, p. 8) Page 92
Fig. 10 ‘‘The ‘Abit’. (Bulletin 14 October 1899) Page 127
Fig. 11 ‘Turing over a new leaf,’ (The Bulletin, 30 December 1899 p. 5) Page 130
iv
ABBREVIATIONS
Parliamentary debates
CPD(HR) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates – House of Representatives
CPD(S) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates – Senate
NSWPD(LA) New South Wales Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Assembly
NSWPD(LC) New South Wales Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Council
QPD(LA) Queensland Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Assembly
QPD(LC) Queensland Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Council
VPD(LA) Victorian Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Assembly
VPD(LC) Victorian Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Council
WAPD(LA) West Australian Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Assembly
WAPD(LC) West Australian Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Council.
**South Australia is not included because its records are not electronic and require a more detailed citation.
OTHER
AWM Australian War Memorial
CoE Church of England
NAA National Archives of Australia
NLA National Library of Australia
MHR Member of the House of representatives
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly
MLC Member of the Legislative Council
PROV Public Records of Victoria
SLNSW State Library of NSW
SLV State Library of Victoria
v
1
INTRODUCTION
The Second Anglo-South African War (1899–1902), commonly referred to as the Boer
War or the South African War, was a conflict between the British Empire and two small
Afrikaner republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The overt reason for the war was the denial of voting rights in the republics to foreigners, who were mainly British or of British descent. The Boer War was significant for Australia for a number of reasons. It was the first time large numbers of troops from Australia had been committed to a conflict. It was also important that these forces were imperial in nature. While there had been other instances of colonial troops being sent to support British troops in other parts of the empire, the Boer War, with the deployment of New Zealanders, Canadians and Australians alongside British soldiers, can be said to be the first time that a truly imperial force was deployed.
The war occurred in the lead up to Federation, a crucial point in Australia’s history when the six separate colonies, after a long and difficult journey, were finally unified. Further, the war raised important questions as to what Australia’s involvement in imperial defence should be. In what circumstances should it go to war in the interests of the empire? Should there be formal arrangements or were the current ad hoc measures sufficient?1 In turn, particularly given colonial sensitivity towards its political prerogatives, questions of defence raised broader issues about imperial relations generally.
The tension that eventually resulted in the conflict commenced with the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Boer Republics in 1885, which brought in large numbers of immigrants looking to make their fortune. A significant proportion of these immigrants were from English-speaking democracies and increasingly resented paying what they viewed as high
1 C. Wilcox, Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2002, pp. xii-xiv.
2 taxes to the republics without having any political representation.2 The Boers of the Transvaal, on the other hand, were Calvinists of Dutch and German origin who had left Europe centuries before. The harsh climate and competition with warlike tribes encouraged resilience, resourcefulness, and a society fiercely concerned for its independence. The Transvaal Boers, particularly the leadership, viewed the granting of franchise to the huge numbers of foreigners, referred to as Uitlanders, as a serious threat to their sovereignty.3
There were, however, a number of other factors pushing Britain to war with the Boer republics. Prior to the discovery of the precious gems and metal in the region, South Africa had attracted little interest. A military expedition in 1881 had sought to restore the Transvaal to
British control but early failure and the disagreeable prospect of a protracted and unwanted war discouraged the then British government from continuing. They resolved the conflict by allowing the Boers self-government in the Transvaal under nominal British rule.4 The defeat, however, was a lingering source of discomfit to imperial and military pride.5 The discovery of gold in 1885, however, changed the dynamic substantially. There were potentially significant benefits both for the empire and for wealthy individuals, such as Cecil Rhodes, if the republics could be absorbed into a greater British union in South Africa.6 Rhodes, using the ‘franchise issue’ as a pretext, continually agitated for annexation. He went so far as to sponsor a small force that was supposed to act as a catalyst for an uprising of disaffected Uitlanders in the republics. Embarrassingly, the incident in 1895–1896, referred to as the Jameson raid, did not
2 ibid, pp. 12-13. 3 I.R. Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902, Longman, London, 1996, pp. 14-69; B. Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902, Arnold, London, 1999, pp. 1-6, 21-29; D. Judd and K.T. Surridge, The Boer War: A History, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2013, pp. 32-51; T. Jackson, The Boer War, Channel 4 Books, London, 1999, pp. 9-11,17; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 12-13. 4 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 12; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 30-31. 5 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 50. 6 Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902, pp. 28-69; Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902, pp. 22-26; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 12-14; Jackson, The Boer War, p. 17; D. Phillips, ‘Australia’s Imperial War; the Anglo Boer War,’ Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2000, pp. 76-78; Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War, Sidgwick & Jackson in association with the National Army Museum, London, 1999, pp. 1-9.
3 incite the rebellion as planned and this force was ignobly rounded up by Boer militia. The raid escalated levels of tension between the empire and the Boers.7
The importance of the republics after the gold and diamond discoveries also had implications in the broader international context. This was the period of new imperialism. The
European powers were in tight competition with each other worldwide, and particularly in
Africa.8 Greater British control in South Africa had the potential to increase its power and prestige while at the same time stifling further expansion by other European nations, particularly Germany, which as a latecomer to the imperial race was seeking to catch up.9
The path to war was driven by prominent imperialists, notably Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain, and the High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Cape
Colony, Sir Alfred Milner.10 Contrary to the wider government’s desire to avoid war, both wanted the quick take-over of the Boer republics (by use of force as a last resort) and engineered circumstances to provoke a confrontation.11
There was a vocal minority both in Britain and in Australia who were opposed to the war. They argued that the war was illegal, that Britain’s argument for intervention was inconsistent with the earlier treaties, and that it was immoral; the war was simply an act of
7 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 14-15; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 36-42; Jackson, The Boer War, pp. 19-21; Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War, pp. 7-8; Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902, pp. 70-104; Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902, pp. 30-31; Phillips, ‘Australia’s Imperial War; the Anglo Boer War,’ pp. 79-81; J.R. Jewell, ‘Using barbaric methods in South Africa: The British concentration camp policy during the Anglo-Boer War,’ Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2012, p. 2. 8 D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future World Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp. 35-40; J. Mordike, An Army for a Nation, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1992, p.55; S.J. Clarke, Marching to their own drum: British military officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand, PhD Thesis, UNSW ADFA, 1999, p. 58. 9 Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902, pp. 37-39, 75, 106-111. 10 J. Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire, Pickering and Chatto, London, 2007, pp. 37-54; P.T. Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, Entrepreneur in Politics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, pp. 456-458, 462-475. 11 Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 37-54; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 42-51; Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902, pp. 32-34; Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, pp. 455, 465; B. Porter, ‘The Pro-Boers in Britain,’ in P. Warwick (ed.), The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, Longman, Essex, 1980, p. 242.
4 bullying a much smaller nation.12 In particular, opponents of the war pointed to what they considered to be the obvious influence of wealthy British capitalists, like Rhodes, who stood to significantly benefit from a British victory.13 This argument also included an element of anti-
Semitism for some, who linked their arguments against capitalism to their perception that this elite group of capitalists were in the main Jewish.14
The dissenters, both in England and Australia, were, however, very much in the minority.15 With growing pressure throughout the empire to address the ‘injustices’ perpetrated against Uitlanders by the Boers, an unproductive meeting between Paul Kruger, the President of the Transvaal, and Milner in May 1899 resulted in the dispatch of an expeditionary force to secure British interests.16 Kruger, aware that the Boer position would be significantly compromised by this escalation of force, issued an ultimatum that this expedition and other
British military on its borders be recalled. The British rejected the ultimatum, and on 11
October 1899, Boer troops entered British territory, laying siege to three major centres:
Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley.17 The Second Anglo-South African War had begun.
General Sir Redvers Buller, in command of the British expeditionary force to South
Africa, launched a three-pronged attack to relieve the sieges. Each of these advances was defeated in a series of battles within the space of a week: Colenso, Stormberg and
Magersfontein (10–17 December 1899). The defeats were collectively labelled ‘Black Week’ and shocked the empire. It was incomprehensible that the great might of Britain could be humiliatingly stopped by such tiny nations with part-time amateur armies, even if they were
12 See Chapter Four – Dissenters, pp. 110-111. 13 B.R. Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War: a study in colonial imperialism,’ Journal of British Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1967, pp. 109-111. 14 See Chapter Four – Dissenters, pp. 118-119, 127-128. 15 For Australia see Chapter Four – Dissenters, pp. 109-108. For England see E. Halévy (translated by E.I. Watkin), Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (2nd ed.), Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1951, pp. 93-94; Porter, ‘The Pro-Boers in Britain,’ pp. 239-240. 16 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 47, 49-50; Jackson, The Boer War, pp. 21-22; Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War, pp. 8-12; Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 46-54. 17 Jackson, The Boer War, p. 23.
5 well armed and well organised. Worse, Black Week was perceived across the empire as a disaster that might encourage the European powers to challenge British hegemony elsewhere; as disturbing a spectre for the self-governing colonies as it was for Britain itself.18 So profound was the psychological impact that opposition to the war almost entirely evaporated in
Australia.19 Serious opposition did not appear again until the later stages of the war when the
British terror tactics against civilians became known.20
Overall, 16,655 men and 21 female nurses were deployed over the duration of the war under the official auspices of either an Australian colony or the Commonwealth.21 Limited places in official contingents resulted in an additional estimated 4–5,000 other Australians enlisting in other imperial units, so that the total of Australians involved was approximately
20,000.22 In the month commencing 9 October 1899 every Australian colony sent a contingent to South Africa, a total of 1,529 volunteers: 629 from New South Wales, 250 from Victoria,
262 from Queensland, 127 from South Australia, 130 from Western Australia and 84 from
Tasmania. A further 11,325 soldiers and 21 nurses in 23 contingents were sent from the
Australian colonies over the next eighteen months. From 16 February 1902 the Commonwealth government, still largely reliant upon the administration of the former colonies, now States, dispatched a further 3,801 men in three contingents.23
18 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp 25-26; Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War, p. 50; Phillips, ‘Australia’s Imperial War: The Anglo Boer War,’ p. 84; C. Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ in P. Dennis and J. Grey ( eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2000, p. 2; F. Pretorious, ‘The Anglo-Boer War: an overview,’ in F. Pretorious (ed.) Scorched Earth, Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 2001, pp. 11-17; S.M. Miller, ‘In support of the “Imperial Mission”? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902,’ The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 3, 2005, p. 692 19 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 98. 20 See Chapter Four – Dissenters pp. 112, 122-124, 130-132. 21 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 389-413. 22 Volunteers enlisted either through recruiting agents operating in the major centres in Australia or by obtaining passage to South Africa and enlisting on arrival. This indirect form of recruiting does not allow for an exact count of Australians involved, hence the estimate. Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. xiii. 23 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 389-413.
6
Majority Australian support for the war may seem counter-intuitive. The Australians had a lot in common with their enemy. The Boer farmers scratched a living from a dangerous frontier, were deeply anxious about being in close proximity to vast numbers of ‘non-white’ people and were concerned about maintaining their community and cultural homogeneity.24 In retrospect, the arguments against the war that it was illegal, immoral and appeared to be driven by a self-interested elite seem persuasive. This appears particularly to be the case after the republics offered to reduce the qualification-to-vote period from fourteen down to seven years.25 Why would Australians, particularly working-class Australians, want to assist in the suppression of these people when the main ultimate benefit appeared to go to wealthy individuals? Why would they continue to do so when it became known that in the later stages of the war the empire was using such harsh tactics as burning farms and herding women and children into concentration camps?
Therefore, a key question is – why does the evidence suggest that Australians were so consistently supportive of the war? Despite the war’s difficult conduct, despite the methods used (particularly the concentration camps, the blockhouses and scorched earth policies of the later stages), despite the lack of an existential threat posed by the Boers, how was it, for example, that Australia’s final contingent in May 1902 was as oversubscribed as its first? This thesis will examine the issue of Australia’s support for the war. It will investigate the extent to which Australians both supported and opposed the war, and the reasons why.
Despite its importance to Australia and military history, and despite a reasonable volume of historical research (to be specified below), there remain significant gaps in the scholarly and public understanding of the conflict and Australia’s involvement in the Second
Anglo-South African War. These problems are largely the result of two underlying factors.
24 ibid, p. 12; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 18-21. 25 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, p. 47. 7
First, the Australian involvement in this war has often been eclipsed by later larger wars.
Second, much of the historiography of this period appears to over-emphasise opposition to the war, as will be shown.26
For the purposes of this thesis, the literature has been divided into four genres: those that go to the details of how the war was fought (such as narratives or descriptions of individual experiences), those that provide overviews of the war, those that provide overviews of
Australia’s involvement, and those directly related to the reasons Australians went to war.
There are necessarily overlaps between these genres. For example, generalist works will occasionally refer to reasons for involvement; where this occurs it has been included in the analysis.
There is a plethora of books and articles that focus on individual or unit experiences.27
Reithman’s article ‘Bravery beyond the call of duty: Walter Karri Davies in the South African
War 1899–1902’ and Staunton’s ‘Sgt James Rogers VC’ are typical of material in relation to individuals.28 Reithman follows the experiences of Walter Karri Davies, an Australian who was one of the principal agitators in Johannesburg against the Boer regime. There is a brief reference to his sense of injustice at the treatment of Uitlanders but no wider consideration.
Staunton’s article on James Rogers, one of the winners of the VC during the war, is typical of this class of writing, which is virtually all narrative.
Material relating to specific units follows a similar pattern. Chamberlain’s The
Victorians in the South African War 1899–1902 was a small exception; he provided a small
26 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. xiv, 362; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ p. 2. 27 M. Chamberlain, ‘The Victorians in the South African War 1899-1902,’ Victorian Historical Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, 2004, pp. 209-224; J. Cope, Boer War Men of Queanbeyan-Braidwood Region: Adventurers or Patriots? Ginninderra Press, ACT, 2005; R.W.F. Droogleever, “That Ragged Mob”: Being the service record of the 3rd and 4th Victorian Bushmen Contingents in the Boer War with a brief biographical sketch of each man who served, Droogleever, Melbourne, 2009; H. Reithman, ‘Bravery beyond the call of duty: Walter Karri Davies in the South African War 1899-1902,’ Sabretache, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2012, pp. 14-21; A. Staunton, ‘Sgt James Rogers VC [Paper presented at the Military Historical Society of Australia Biennial Conference (2000: Canberra)]’ Sabretache, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2000, pp. 32-37. 28 Reithman, ‘Bravery beyond the call of duty,’ pp. 14-21; Staunton, ‘Sgt James Rogers VC,’ pp. 32-37.
8 amount of analysis as to reasons for popular support. In the main, however, the article was a narrative tracing the actions of Victorian participants.29 Droogleever’s book That Ragged Mob is more representative of this genre, tracing the exploits of the 3rd and 4th Victorian Bushmen
Contingents, including brief biographical sketches with only a cursory examination of motivations and almost nothing on community support as a whole.30 Laffin has chapters on the
Boer War in his two studies of Australian soldiers – Digger: The story of the Australian soldier in 1959 and Digger: The legend of the Australian soldier in 1986.31 These books are focused on the warfighting capabilities of Australian soldiers rather than reasons for participation.
Coates’ An Atlas of Australian Wars also has a chapter on the Boer War; however, his focus is understanding the physical geography rather than a detailed analysis of Australian involvement.32
The war-fighting literature is useful in understanding the conditions of the war, the individual responses and individual impressions of the society at the time. There are occasional and important insights into personal motivations but generally the material about the extent of, and reasons for, the war’s popularity is meagre, further supporting the rationale for a more thorough examination.
The next genre is literature focused on the war as a whole rather than from an Australian perspective. Australian involvement was occasionally part of the text but is incidental. Two large tomes were produced immediately after the war – The Times History of the War in South
Africa in seven volumes published across 1900–1909 and the Official History of the War in
South Africa 1899–1902 in four volumes published across 1906–1910.33 Both are largely
29 Chamberlain, ‘The Victorians in the South African War 1899-1902,’ pp. 209-224. 30 Droogleever, That Ragged Mob. 31 J. Laffin, Digger: The Story of the Australian Soldier, Cassell, London, 1959; J. Laffin, Digger: The Legend of the Australian Soldier, MacMillan, South Melbourne, 1986. 32 Coates, An Atlas of Australian Wars, pp. 16, 18. 33 L.S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa, Sampson, Lowe, Marsden & Company, London, 1900-1909; J.F. Maurice and M.H. Grant, Official History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902. Vols.
9 narratives. Political commentary was completely removed for the Official History by the
Colonial Secretary at the time of publication because of its sensitivity.34 Leo Amery, the editor of The Times History and author of its first three volumes presented the rationale for the war but this was biased in favour of Britain. He had a close association with Milner and others who were involved with the decision-making in the conflict.35
There is only a single reference to Australia’s motivations in each of the first volumes of The Times History and the Official History. These briefly state that support was due to
Australian colonists having a stake in the ‘empire’ as much as their English counterparts.36
There are a number of other general books produced immediately after the conflict, many by the prominent writers of the period, while there was still popular interest. 37 These works, if they refer to colonial involvement at all, are brief statements about colonial patriotism. This literature in the immediate aftermath presumes colonial support for empire. There is little of note in this genre until 1979, when Pakenham produced a detailed and extensive text: The Boer
War. His brief analysis of the support given to Britain by the white dominions, however, is superficial. It is similar to the works produced immediately after the war; specifically, that the dominions were motivated by race and ‘felt a natural solidarity with the mother country.’38
There have been a number of general books on the war produced in more recent times, particularly around the time of the war’s centenary. Iain Smith’s The Origins of the South
African War 1899–1902 published in 1996 is focused as the title suggests on the factors that
I-IV, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1906-1910. 34 T. Pakenham, The Boer War, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979, p. xvi; F. Maurice & M.H. Grant, Official History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Vol. I, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1906-1910, p. 1. 35 Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 249. 36 Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa, p. 13; Maurice and Grant, Official History of the War, pp. 33-34. 37 W. Churchill, The Boer War, Leo Cooper, London, 1989 (first published in 1900); A.S. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, Elder & Co, London, 1901; R.W.F. Droogleever, From the Front; A.B. (Banjo) Patterson's Dispatches From the Boer War, Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 2000; R. Kipling, Traffics and Discoveries, Macmillan, London, 1904. 38 Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 249.
10 led to the conflict.39 Since 1999 there have been a number of works that examine the war in its totality. These include Fremont-Barnes’ The Boer War 1899–1902, Judd and Surridge’s The
Boer War: a History, Smurthwaite’s Hamlyn History of the Boer War, 1899–1902, Nasson’s
The South African War 1899–1902, Jackson’s The Boer War and Carver’s book The National
Army Museum Book of the Boer War.40 Carver’s book has some analysis but is largely a narrative of events that relies heavily on diary entries of the soldiers engaged at the relevant point in the chronology. The other books provide analyses of the causes of the war but again do not look at the detailed reasons why there was such support for empire and the war in the
‘self-governing’ colonies. The general literature focuses on understanding the events and the detail of the war, as well as providing analysis of British motivation and how the empire was pulled into the war.
The third genre is the literature that takes an overview of Australia’s involvement in the war. There are relatively few books in the modern era that attempt a comprehensive study of this. Chamberlain built up a body of well-regarded research including two books To Shoot and
Ride: The Australians in the South African War 1899–1902 in 1967 and The Australians in the
South African War, 1899–1902 in 1999.41 Wallace produced the uncontroversial and pedestrian
Australians at the Boer War in 1976.42 There is the valuable The Boer War, Army, Nation and
Empire – a collection of papers arising from the 1999 Chief of Army / Australian War
Memorial Military History Conference edited by Dennis and Grey which covers a broad range of issues relating to the conflict.43 By far Wilcox has produced the largest amount of material on Australian involvement in the South African War, notably his extensive book Australia’s
39 Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902. 40 Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War; Judd and Surridge, The Boer War; Jackson, The Boer War; Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902. 41 M. Chamberlain, To Shoot and Ride: The Australians in the South African War 1899-1902, Military Historical Society of Australia, Melbourne, 1967. 42 R.L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War. The Australian War Memorial and the AGPS, Canberra, 1976. 43 P. Dennis and J. Grey (eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Canberra, Army History Unit, 2000.
11
Boer War in 2002.44 Wilcox’s body of work, in conjunction with the 1999 conference papers, is to date the best analysis of Australia and the war.
These general works focus on Australia’s involvement provide a better understanding of the country’s role in the war as well as significant detail about Australian experiences and impressions. Again, these provide the most comprehensive account of Australian perspectives on events in the war, which is useful in understanding the context. The impression from these authors, particularly Wilcox, is that there was little general support for the war until Black
Week, and that after Black Week there was popular support but this waned, turning to disenchantment by war’s end.45 These general works, however, do not examine in depth the rationale for support in any detail. There is therefore a gap as to the extent of, and reasons for,
Australian support for the Second Anglo-South African war.
The final genre is the literature that goes directly to the question of ‘why did Australia involve itself in the South African War?’ Up to and through the 1960s the general and scholarly opinion was that the overall population at the time was enthusiastic about the war.46 During the
44 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War; For other examples of Wilcox’s work see C. Wilcox, ‘Irish Volunteer and Militia Corps in Australia,’ R. Pelan (ed.), Irish Australian Studies, papers delivered at the Seventh Irish-Australian Conference, July 1993, Crossing Press, Sydney, 1994, pp. 311-318 ; C. Wilcox (ed.), Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899-1914, Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 1999; C. Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War,’ in P. Dennis and J. Grey (eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Army History Unit Canberra, 2000; C. Wilcox, ‘The NSW Lancers in England and South Africa in 1899: an episode in Imperial Federation,’ London Papers in Australian Studies, No 1., Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 2000; C. Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War: Imperial pressure or Colonial Realpolitik?’ in J. Moses and C. Pugsley (eds.), The German Empire and Britain’s Pacific Dominions 1870-1919, Regina books, Claremont, 2000, pp. 197-220; C. Wilcox, The Boer War: Australians and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902: Research Guide, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2000 (Specifically Chapter 2 ‘Committing the Contingents’) http://guides.naa.gov.au/boer-war/index.aspx (accessed 30 May 2016); C. Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second,’ in P. Dennis et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2009, pp. 93-97; C. Wilcox, ‘Breaker Morant: The murderer as martyr,’ in C. Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, NewSouth, Sydney 2010, pp. 29-49; C. Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Military History does not begin on Gallipoli,’ in C. Stockings (ed.), ANZAC's Dirty Dozen: Twelve Myths and Misconceptions of Australian Military History, NewSouth, Sydney, 2012 pp. 11-34; C. Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ in C. Stockings and J. Connor (eds.), Before the Anzac Dawn: A Military History of Australia to 1915, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney, 2013, pp. 204-229; C. Wilcox, A Kind of Victory; Captain Charles Cox and his Australian Cavalrymen, NLA Publishing, Canberra, 2014. 45 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 310-316. 46 Doyle, The Great Boer War, p. 62; Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa, p. 13; Churchill, The Boer War, pp. 237-238; B.K de Graris, ‘1890-1900,’ in F.K. Crowley (ed.), A New History of Australia, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1974, p.254; N.K. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914, Sydney
12
1970s, however, this view was challenged. New voices arose arguing that the war was not greeted with enthusiasm by the mass of ordinary people. If there was any colonial support, argued this viewpoint, then it was confined to a small number of upper- and middle-class members of the community.47
This position appeared to have been influenced by a widely shared assumption at the time that citizens of British colonies even at that early stage were seeking to assert a separate identity.48 The label ‘nationalist’ historian in this thesis is applied to individual scholars on the basis of Meaney’s definition, specifically, those having ‘a tendency to assume that European
Australians have been engaged from early in their history in an inexorable struggle for independence.’49 That ‘nationalist’ historical viewpoint that the colonists were seeking an identity unique from Great Britain, was challenged and it is now generally considered to be repudiated.50
The most significant historian to put forward the ‘nationalist’ interpretation of the South
African War is Connolly.51 He initially proposes that popular support of the war in the colonies was the product of an extensive and manipulative public relations campaign by British imperialists such as Chamberlain and Milner.52 This campaign in its early stages, he argues,
University Press, Sydney, 1976, pp. 15-16, 36; D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965 pp. 138, 140; Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 97-98, 108-109. 47 C.N. Connolly ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,” the Australian offers of troops for the Boer War,’ Historical Studies, Vol. 18, No. 70, 1978, pp. 106-117; L. Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 150-151; E.M. Andrews, The Anzac Illusion: Anglo- Australian Relations During World War 1, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993, pp. 36-38; J. Mordike, An Army For a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments 1880-1914, Allen & Unwin, 1992; B.J. Bridges, ‘NSW and the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902,’ PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, 1981, pp. 49-53. 48 D. Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism” in British settlement colonies,’ Journal of British Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1971, pp. 160-163; N. Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: some reflections,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2003, pp.122-123. 49 N. Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity: the problem of nationalism in history and historiography,’ Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 32, No. 116, 2001, pp. 76-79. 50 D.M. Schreuder, ‘Australia and Great Britain, 1788-1901,’ in A. Bashford and S. MacIntyre, The Cambridge History of Australia (Vol. 1 - Indigenous and Colonial Australia), Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2013, p. 532. 51 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 106-117. 52 ibid.
13 had significant trouble gaining support because the idea of empire was at best tolerated and often viewed with suspicion by the colonies.53 Similar views are expressed by Mordike in An
Army For a Nation, Field in The Forgotten War, Trainor in British Imperialism and Australian
Nationalism and Andrews in The Anzac illusion.54 Hirst asserts in Sentimental Nation that not only did Chamberlain engineer colonial support but he did so to sway British opinion to the cause. 55
This line of reasoning, as Wilcox states, soon became the dominant paradigm, recorded in texts such as the Oxford History of Australia.56 In his ‘Boer War’ entry in the Oxford
Companion to Australian History, Burness supports the manipulation hypothesis and the idea that there was strong opposition in the period before Black Week.57 He modifies the paradigm
Connolly established by asserting that there was support for the war after ‘Black Week’, although this had faded during the later phases of the war.58 Burness’s modified position was followed by Keneally in Australians: From Eureka to the Diggers.59 Grey, in the first edition of A Military History of Australia, states that the war was popular from the outset, and particularly after Black Week, but waned after that.60 This nationalist perspective is also reflected in secondary school teaching material, which implies that Australians were beginning to reject the mother country and assert their independence.61
53 ibid. 54 Mordike, An Army For a Nation, pp. 60-62; Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, p. 150; Andrews, The Anzac Illusion p. 36; L.M. Field, The Forgotten War, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 11-12. 55 J. Hirst, The Sentimental Nation: The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, Oxford, South Melbourne, 2000, p. 232. 56 G.C. Bolton et al., The Oxford History of Australia., Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1986, pp. 130- 132; Wilcox, ‘Looking Back on the South African War,’ p. 2; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 364. 57 P. Burness, ‘Boer War,’ in G. Davison, J. Hirst and S. Macintyre (eds.), Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 98. 58 ibid. 59 T. Keneally, Australians: From Eureka to the Diggers, Allen & Unwin, Melbourne, 2011, pp. 220, 224. 60 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 55-56. 61 H. Simmelhaig, For Australia's Sake: A History of Australia's Involvement in Nine Wars, Nelson, Melbourne, 1984, pp. 20, 31.
14
Some historians, such as Wilcox, reassert that Australians at all levels were enthusiastic participants in the empire generally.62 Chamberlain observes that the diverse backgrounds of volunteers, including Irish and manual workers, were evidence that the popularity of the war was not restricted to a limited number of groups in the community.63 Clarke flatly rebuts the
‘imperial conspiracy’ argument based on his analysis of the communications between relevant authorities in England, the British commandants in the colonies and the colonial governments.64 This analysis shows colonial offers of support coming before the Colonial
Office’s requests.65
Wilcox’s early writing also rejects Connolly and Mordike’s paradigm that Australians were manipulated into fighting the war, arguing that Australian involvement was more a partnership.66 Wilcox, though, sees that the colonial governments needed prompting to act, and did so reluctantly.67 In his 2000 paper he attributes support throughout the war but for six months after Black Week to ‘loyalists, concentrated in the middle classes’ and ‘opportunists.’68
His comprehensive 2002 book appears to acknowledge a level of popularity just before the departure of the first contingents but generally still holds to the view that, other than a short period after Black Week, the war was not popular with the majority and interest was driven by loyalists.69
62 Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ p. 2. 63 Chamberlain, ‘The Victorians in the South African War 1899-1902,’ p. 210. 64 S. Clarke, ‘Manufacturing spontaneity? The role of the commandants in the colonial offers of troops to the South African war,’ in P. Dennis and J. Grey (eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2000, pp. 129-150; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ pp. 280-312; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ p. 2. 65 Clarke, ‘Manufacturing spontaneity?’ pp. 129-150; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ pp. 280-312. 66 Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ pp. 2-3. 67 ibid. 68 ibid, p. 4. 69 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 24-26, 310-320.
15
Two recent books, Karageorgos’ Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam, and
Reynolds’ Unnecessary Wars, address specifically the question of popular support.70 Reynolds acknowledges that the war was popular, citing the large crowds, the importance of the military and the celebrity status of the returned servicemen during the Federation celebrations.71 He also notes that the parliaments did not suffer any ‘political pain’ sending the troops.72 Reynolds is explicitly critical of what he perceives to be a militaristic predisposition on the part of
Australians since Federation. He argues that Australians have involved themselves in what he refers to as ‘unnecessary wars’ and that this predisposition has its origins in the South African
War.73 He directs readers to the critics of the war as exemplars of how the Australian nation ought to have behaved at the time and should now aspire to.74 Karageorgos’ book explores
Australian attitudes towards the war but her focus is mainly on the soldiers’ experiences.75 Her views on the popularity of the war are mainly based on secondary material.76 Both works still to a degree rely upon the themes developed by the historians of the 1970s and therefore require closer examination.
Importantly, it should be recognised that throughout the literature, support for the South
African War is directly related to Australian attitudes toward empire. Overwhelming support for the war was generally equated to overwhelming support for empire and vice versa.
Similarly, throughout the literature support for empire is often juxtaposed with notions of
Australian identity. Historians who consider that Australians of the time had an imperial identity, generally contend that Australians supported empire, and therefore, the war. Those
70 E. Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam, Bloomsbury, London, 2016; H. Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, NewSouth, Sydney, 2016. 71 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 25-30. 72 ibid, p. 29. 73 ibid. pp. ix-xiv; ‘War and Australia’s national identity,’ on ABC’s Big Ideas Thursday, 28 April 2016, 8:05PM, http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/rn/podcast/2016/04/bia_20160428_2005.mp3. (accessed February 2018). 74 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. xiii, 11, 141, 153-154, 162-163; Reynolds reiterates this point in the radio interview ‘War and Australia’s national identity.’ 75 Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, p. 6 (the claim that there is insufficient documentation to assert working class support), p. 29 (popularity). 76 ibid, p. 25-26 (footnote 16), p. 30 (footnote 57). 16 historians who consider that Australians of the time had a unique national identity take the view that Australians did not support the empire or the war. These assumptions and their interrelationships will necessarily also be investigated in this thesis.
The current state of the historiography relating to the reasons for participating in the
South African War is incomplete. Overall scholarly and public understanding still appears to be unduly influenced by the anti-imperial, proto-Australian nationalist view of the 1970s. There has been, though, a partial shift back toward the position that Australian identity in the late nineteenth century was more imperial and less distinctively Australian; however, there is still insufficient detail and analysis about the reasons why Australia became involved in the South
African War. Nor is there sufficient understanding of the extent of popular support. There is a strong case to undertake a fresh and more thorough examination of why Australia and
Australians became involved.
The result of this historiography is uncertainty and confusion. This can be traced in the current teaching of Australian history and how the idea of Australian identity at the time of
Federation is treated. Victorian School Certificate materials for the Australian history subject for the 2016–2020 period acknowledge the Australian attachment to empire, yet the crucial issue of why this was the case is not fully explained. The term ‘dual identity’ is frequently used to describe the culture; that Australians are both British and Australia. This is not fully clarified and is often accompanied with 1970s themes that over-emphasise the Australian component of the dual identity issue.77 These textbooks appear to have created a hybrid and confused view, rather than giving a position or presenting the debate.
77 S. Mirams, M. Davidson and S. Gordon, Imagining Australia, VCE Units 3 & 4, Cengage, South Melbourne, 2006, p. 98; D. McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ in Readings: Images of the Nation, HTAV, Collingwood, 1997, pp. 10-11. Imagining Australia was the textbook in 2014. There is currently no textbook (as at June 2017); history teachers are, however, using these references as instruction material.
17
Recent VCE textbooks and articles demonstrate this anachronistic thinking.78 Mirams,
Davidson and Gordon state that ‘for the majority of Australians this dual identity, both British and Australian, was accepted and embraced with pride.’79 This ‘difficult paradigm’, to use
Stevenson’s term, is not properly explained, which suggests it is not properly understood.80
This is shown by the authors leading into the notion of ‘dual identity’ with arguments from the
‘nationalist’ paradigm. These stress the Australian component at the expense of the imperial, for example the idea of the artists and poets being heralds for ‘a unique identity’, or suggest that a separate Australian identity had to come about for Federation.81 Tellingly, and typically,
McDonald poses the question, ‘Could one be an Australian if one was still ruled by England?’82
She acknowledges that ‘for some dual loyalty was also possible,’ then cautions students on generalising about identity, and concludes with a paragraph on the ‘Several forces [which had] developed in Australia to push for independence.’83 Significant weight is given to the Bulletin’s
‘push for independence’ and ‘anti-imperialism’ in both texts without giving sufficient acknowledgment of its abandonment of republicanism.84 Mirams et al. do not acknowledge the
Bulletin’s abandonment of its republican stance.85 McDonald states that the Bulletin in 1903 was fostering an Australian identity within empire, much later than the Bulletin’s change of stance in 1895.86 While there is nothing incorrect about those statements, it is the emphasis that is important. Shining a light onto one part of the stage can give a different impression from illuminating the whole. These materials are the key to guiding students and teachers through
78 Mirams et al., Imagining Australia; McDonald, ‘Australian Nationalism until 1918.’ 79 Mirams et al., Imagining Australia, p. 98. 80 R. Stevenson, The War with Germany, Oxford, South Melbourne, 2015, p. 13. 81 McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ pp. 10-11; Mirams et al., Imagining Australia, pp. 59-60. 82 McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ pp. 10-11. 83 ibid. 84 Mirams et al., Imagining Australia, pp. 59-60; McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ pp. 10-11. 85 Mirams et al., Imagining Australia, pp. 59-60. 86 McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ pp. 10-11.
18 the issue and are particularly important, given many of the sources on the reading list take the approach of Australia having a separate rather than dual identity.87
As a consequence of the clear historiographical ‘gap’ and the confusion it has created, the primary purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate and account for Australian support for the war in South Africa. From this a range of other sub-issues arise. Why did the colonial governments send troops in the first place? Did the various ethnic groups and social classes support the war to the same extent? If not, what were their differences in motivation and the levels of support? What was the real influence and impact of the pro- and anti-war movements?
What was the role of sentiment for the mother country? Does the fact that Australia bore only a small financial cost influence how Australia’s support should be interpreted? What role did
Social Darwinism and the concepts of empire play? What weight should be given to other factors as to why men and women volunteer for war, such as reliable income, to seek adventure and to be a part of an event that your peers are all participating in? Taken in total, the answer to these and other associated questions will make a substantial contribution to the scholastic and public understanding of this war.
Some historians, such as Karageorgos and Connolly, have also selectively applied a strict empiricism to the evidence on popular support for the war.88 This analytical approach of history was demanded by Porter, who argued that an opinion or a belief cannot be ascribed to an historical figure unless they have expressed it.89 This allows for arguments that, as there is
87 See VCE Australian history Units 3 and 4 2016–2020 – Resources [website] http://www.vcaa.vic.edu.au/Documents/vce/history/AustralianHistory-Resources-2016.docx (accessed 17 July 2017). 88 Connolly, ‘Class, Birthplace, Loyalty,’ p. 210. Connolly commences his argument that the flaw in the previous imperialist historiography was the reliance on middle- and upper-class sources for public opinion, specifically stating the working-class majority ‘left no record of their views,’ suggesting a strict approach is required. Karageorgos asserts that there is insufficient evidence to determine working-class attitudes during the South African war because the material relied upon was sourced from the middle and upper classes; Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, pp. 6, 26. 89 B. Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. xiii; C. Hall, ‘Culture and identity in Imperial Britain,’ in S. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008, p. 200.
19 no direct evidence of general support, it could not, therefore, be said that Australians generally supported the war.90 Equally, such an approach does not allow historians to argue that the population generally opposed the war.
This thesis takes the approach as argued by Hall, in rebuttal to Porter. Hall states that the strict approach to historical analysis ‘makes no attempt to understand the world of assumptions in which decisions are made, or how, when those assumptions change, things which are taken for granted in one period have to be expressly stated in another.’91 Importantly, she makes the point that the underpinning assumptions are unconscious, taken as common sense at the time and frequently never expressed.92 For example, particularly in the newspaper articles of the period, loyalty to empire is rarely mentioned, although strongly implied.93
To achieve its aim, the thesis is organised into five chapters. The first chapter looks at the Australian political decision making in favour of the war, specifically the extent of support and the reasons why. This chapter also examines the extent to which the political decisions and drivers reflected the attitudes of the various classes of Australians. The second chapter looks at the role of the newspapers that supported the war, again considering the degree of support and the reasons why. This chapter also examines the role of newspapers in influencing public opinion and the extent to which they are evidence of public opinion, including whether there were class differences. The third chapter examines the evidence directly relating to popular opinion, specifically, whether there was widespread support for the war. This includes issues such as participation in the farewells to the troops and patriotic funds, as well as the oversubscription of volunteers throughout the war. The fourth chapter examines opponents of the war, who they were, their rationale and what proportion of the community they represented.
The final chapter closely reviews the historiography that arose in the 1970s against the
90 Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, pp. 30-32. 91 Hall, ‘Culture and identity in Imperial Britain,’ p. 200. 92 ibid. 93 See Chapter 2 – Newspapers pp. 50-51, 58-71. 20 available evidence to determine its veracity. Within each chapter changes of attitude from 1899 to 1902 have also been considered.
The sources that are relied upon are the parliamentary debates, the newspapers of the period, records held by the State and Federal archives, records held by the State Libraries and the personal papers of key figures. Detailed examination focuses on the papers and politics of the larger colonies, Victoria and New South Wales. Where appropriate, the other colonies have been sampled to ensure that there are no obvious anomalies.
The rationale to undertake an investigation into the motivations of Australia and
Australians to support the South African War is compelling. The war occurred at a critical time in this nation’s history and was a significant event in the formation of Australia and in the lead up to the First World War. The forces that underpinned the attitudes of the community toward the war and toward empire are important to understanding not only the nation’s attitude to war but to itself and its place in the empire.
21
CHAPTER 1 –THE POLITICAL ELITE’S SUPPORT FOR THE WAR
The available evidence suggests that the vast majority of pre- and post-Federation
Australian politicians supported involvement in the South African War. The dissenting politicians, who were a small minority (never more than fifteen and a half percent nationally), will be discussed in Chapter Four. The central aim of this chapter is not only to demonstrate that the great majority of politicians were in favour, but also to uncover the primary reasons why. Primary points of investigation include concepts such as ‘British’, pan-British or imperial identity, conceptions of loyalty to the concept of an Anglo-Saxon race, more pragmatic issues of strategic security and the importance of solidarity within the empire, and the perceived
‘justice’ of the imperial cause congruent with pervading social attitudes. While this chapter is focused on the politicians, there is an argument to suggest that their opinions and rationale are representative of the elite and middle classes generally (while there were some exceptions, most politicians were members of the elite and middle classes). Their opinions and underlying motives, to an extent, also reflected those in the broader population.
The evidence for this chapter and its conclusions are derived primarily from colonial parliamentary debates. The evidence is generally derived from the two largest colonies of NSW and Victoria as well as the Commonwealth Parliament after political Federation in 1901. Where appropriate, reference is made to other Australian colonial jurisdictions to indicate that the various Houses of Parliament held consistent views. It is important to note that during this period, with the exception of the Labor Party, there were no political parties as understood today; the other politicians were effectively independents with loose affiliation such as ‘Free
Trade’ or ‘Protectionism.’ For the purposes of this thesis, political party details of individual members will be given when known. 22
An analysis of Parliamentary voting from 1899 to 1902 on whether or not to send contingents demonstrated extensive support by the majority of politicians. By way of overview, there were four decision points relating to the dispatch of the nine contingents sent to the South
African War from Australia – October 1899 before Black Week, immediately after Black Week
(December 1899–January 1900), in response to Kitchener’s request for replacement troops
(January 1901) and in response to foreign allegations that the dominions no longer supported the war (January 1902).1
The first decision point related to the situation before Black Week, when only a small number of troops were to be dispatched as a show of support for the empire. Despite the fact the conflict was not considered an existential threat, there was still an overwhelming majority of colonial politicians in the Legislative Assemblies who voted in favour of the motions to send troops. Out of a total of 212 politicians in colonies where the parliament actually divided on the question of whether to send troops, only 34 (or 15.5 percent) voted against the motion (see
Table 1 and Figure 1 below). It was recorded that the members in the Legislative Assemblies of NSW, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia also either stood and sang ‘God Save the
Queen’ or cheered after the vote (see Table 1 below). The newspaper articles of these debates also report frequent calling out of ‘hear hear’ throughout the speeches recommending troops be sent.2 The upper houses of all six States but South Australia overwhelmingly supported the motion to the extent there was not a division.3 South Australia’s upper house was unique in that half its members objected to sending troops, not because they disagreed with the British cause but because they considered that their colony was too small to make any material
1 C. Wilcox, The Boer War: Australians and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902: Research Guide, National Archives of Australia [website], Canberra, 2000 (Specifically Chapter 2 ‘Committing the Contingents’), retrieved from http://guides.naa.gov.au/boer-war/index.aspx (accessed 22 June 2017); See also Table 2 below. 2 Argus, 11 October 1899, p. 4. 3 VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801; NSWPD(LC), 19 October 1899, p. 1478; QPD(LC), 25 October 1899, p.601; WAPD(LC), 17 October 1899, p. 1591; ‘The Transvaal Contingent,’ The Mercury, 12 October 1899, p. 4.
23 difference. The Bill, however, was approved when the President of the Chamber broke a vote which was tied 6 for and 6 against.4
TABLE 1: Parliamentary voting for the sending of contingents (before Black Week – October 1899) in Houses of Assembly.
DATE God Save the Queen / other COLONY FOR AGAINST (1899) expressions of enthusiasm VICTORIA 10 Oct 645 14 Yes6
NEW SOUTH WALES 19 Oct 787 10 Yes8 NO QUEENSLAND 18 Oct Indeterminate10 Three cheers for the Queen11 DIVISION9 NO WESTERN AUSTRALIA 5 Oct Indeterminate13 Cheering14 DIVISION12 SOUTH AUSTRALIA 12 Oct 1815 1016
TASMANIA 11 Oct Passed17 Indeterminate18
TOTAL 178 34
4 Vote was tied 6 noes, 6 ayes, decided by the President, see Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 156 (10 October 1899). 5 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1790. 6 ibid. 7 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1585; Evening News, 18 October 1899, p. 4; Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 13. 8 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1585. 9 QPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 505. 10 It is important to note that the Queensland House did not divide on the question of sending troops. There was a division, which some historians have treated as a vote on the sending of troops; however, on careful reading the division was a vote of confidence in the Premier. There was considerable anger that the Premier had, without asking the Parliament, offered troops to the Colonial Office. Several members of the House stated that they supported the sending of troops but not the action of the Premier. The actual vote on whether or not to send troops was made without a division. Therefore, no number has been included; QPD(LA), 11, 12, 17&18 Oct 1899, pp. 339-505. 11 QPD(LA), 18 Oct 1899, p. 505. 12 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. 1561. 13 The WA debate was brief; there was effectively no dissent. Mr. Vosper queried whether the WA parliament was sufficiently informed to decide but stated he would vote in favour. The other politicians who spoke later asserted that it was not necessary for the WA parliament to be familiar with the issues. It was a matter for the British government. There was no dissent expressed, the motion was put and passed; the vote appears to be unanimous, but this is not certain, so the WA data is not included. WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, pp. 1556-1561. 14 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. 1561. 15 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899, p. 661, (12 October 1899). There was (and still is) a practice of ‘pairing’, which was an informal agreement between the parties that if a person through necessity had to be absent from the House then a member of the opposing party would abstain from voting. These pairs would cancel each other out and the outcome would not be impacted. For the purposes of this analysis the pairing is not included. 16 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899, p. 661, (12 October 1899). 17 Tasmanian ‘Votes and Proceedings’, session of 1899, No. 69, p. 326 (12 October 1899). The initial vote was 18 Noes and 10 Ayes, the bell was rung summoning members to the House, the Bill was then passed with no recorded division, therefore this is not included. 18 ibid.
24
The decisions to send the second contingents were made after Black Week in mid-to- late December 1899. Given the perceived seriousness of events there was even greater support.
The Parliaments, Upper and Lower Houses of NSW, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia approved the sending of troops without a division (see also Figure 1 below).19 In Western
Australia and Tasmania, the Premiers felt sufficiently confident of support to make an executive decision themselves to send troops without parliamentary approval as neither parliament was sitting at the time.20 The shock of Black Week reduced what little opposition existed to a small number of isolated individuals, such as William Holman (Labor), NSW
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), and John Murray, Victorian MLA (Labor), who were still prepared to speak out. 21
In late 1900, the men of the first contingent were due for rotation back to Australia, and
Lord Kitchener, Commander of the Imperial forces in South Africa, requested replacements.
Australia at the time was transitioning from six colonies into the Commonwealth. Kitchener’s request was considered at a Council of Premiers in early January 1901. They agreed unanimously to the request without reference to their respective parliaments.22
19 VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2883; VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2863; NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3528; NSWPD(LC), 19 December 1899, p. 3486; QPD(LA), 20 December 1899, p. 1475; QPD(LC), 21 December 1899, p. 1511; Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) pp. 359 & 1079 (19 December 1899). 20 Sir John Forrest, WA Premier, appears to have made an Executive decision to send troops without reference to Parliament. The Parliamentary session closed on 16 December 1899. The telegrams requesting additional troops were not made until 19 December 1899. The newspaper reports state that Forrest had agreed to the NSW Premier’s request for troops. WAPD(LA), 16 December 1899, pp. 3069 & 3072; ‘News and Notes,’ Southern Times (Bunbury), 21 December 1899, p. 3; ‘Colonial Contingents,’ Kalgoorlie Western Argus, 21 December 1899, p. 9; ‘Australian preparations,’ Norseman Times, 20 December 1899, p. 2; ‘Troops for the Transvaal – Westralian Contingent,’ The Daily News, 20 December 1899, p. 4; ‘Another Australian Contingent – Tasmania to send more men,’ Mercury, 19 December 1899, p. 3. 21 Holman, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3520-3521; Murray, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2865; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 59. 22‘The new Australian contingent,’ The Age, 8 January 1901, p. 5, ‘Troops for South Africa,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 January 1901, p. 5; ‘More Troops for South Africa,’ The West Australian, 8 January 1901, p. 5; ‘The next contingent,’ Adelaide Observer, 12 January 1901, p. 30; ‘The new Australian Contingent,’ The Leader (Melbourne, Vic) 12 January 1901, p. 24; ‘Conference of Premiers’ Chronicle (Adelaide); 12 January 1901, p. 12.
25
The final contingents of the war were still supported by a large majority in the new
Commonwealth Parliament; in January 1902, 45 members of the House of Representatives voted for and 5 against the sending of troops.23 There was a unanimous decision from the 36 senators in favour of the Bill that had been approved in the House of Representatives.24 Out of a total of 95 Commonwealth politicians, only five percent voted against the move. The House of Representatives also concluded its vote by singing ‘God Save the Queen’ and cheering.25 As is starkly reflected by the table and graph below, (Table 2 and Figure 1), there was very strong support for the war from the commencement to the end.
TABLE 2: Combined voting for politicians deciding to send contingents to the Second Anglo-South African War.26
TOTAL VOTING VOTING VOTING VOTING DECISION DECISION POINT POLITICIANS FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST MAKERS & DATE27 VOTING28 (Nos) (Nos) (%) (%)
1st – before Black Colonies Week 212 178 34 84.5 15.5 Oct 1899 2nd – after Black Colonies Week 41029 410 0 100 0 Dec 1899 3rd – Kitchener’s Council of request 6 6 0 100 0 Premiers Jan 1901
Federal 4th – Foreign criticism 75 71 4 95 5 Government Jan 1902
23 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp.8799-8800. 24 CPD(S), 22 January 1902, p.9030. 25 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p.8800. 26 See ‘APPENDIX A: Statistical analysis of voting outcomes during the Second Anglo South African War’ for source details. 27 Wilcox, The Boer War: Research Guide [website]. 28 There were a number of issues to address in determining an appropriate and balanced approach to what percentage of politicians were against the war. Those parliaments where there was no division (or none recorded) on the question of whether troops should be sent were excluded. The underlying presumption being that the three parliaments where a vote was taken (Victoria, NSW and SA) would be representative of the percentage of politicians. For details see ‘APPENDIX A: Statistical analysis of voting outcomes during the Second Anglo South African war.’ 29 This figure takes account of the Western Australian and Tasmanian premiers making executive decisions rather than referring to their respective parliaments. The politicians from those states, but for the Premier, have been removed from the headcount. 26
FIGURE 1: Combined voting outcomes for Australian politicians deciding for or against the dispatch of contingents to the Second Anglo-South African War graphed as percentages.
120
100
80 PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR 60 PERCENTAGE VOTING 40 AGAINST
20
0 (1st)Oct 1899 (2nd)Dec 1899(3rd) Jan 1901 (4th&5th) Jan 1902
Having established that there was strong evidence to suggest that the political class supported the war, the thesis turns to the question of ‘why was there this support?’ There are several factors that account for this. Importantly, Australian and imperial loyalties (or rather aspects of identity) were not seen as mutually exclusive. Alfred Deakin and William ‘Billy’
Hughes as Prime Ministers of Australia both described themselves as simultaneously patriots of Britain and Australia and importantly saw no contradiction in this.30 Another example of this fused Australian and imperial loyalty a few years before the South African War was the
Sudan incident of 1885. New South Wales military volunteers deployed to an imperial conflict to become the first official and identifiable ‘colonial contingent’ of the empire to mount an expedition in support of British regulars.31 Australians were loyal to the empire and to
30 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo: The Initiation of Australia, Book Club Associates, Sydney, 1976, p. 22; S. Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, (3rd ed.), Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2009, p. 147. 31 B.R. Penny, ‘The age of empire: an Australian episode,’ Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 11, No. 41, 1963, pp. 32-42. 27
Australia; they thought of themselves as Australian Britons. These were two inseparable sides of the same coin. Contribution to Britain was to share in the benefits of empire, and therefore a contribution to Australia as it was understood at this time. The Sudan incident epitomised the
‘deepest emotions which animated Australians in the age of empire.’32 Meaney describes the evidence for Australians having a British Empire identity as overwhelming.33 The paradox of the independent Australian Briton is puzzling only for contemporary observers looking backwards and trying to impose a sense of modern Australian identity which was simply lacking in this era.34
Within the broader context, the reality of Australia’s strong imperial identity underpinning the support for the war was reflected starkly in the political debates. Colonial politicians across the political spectrum, prior to the staggering British Army reverses of Black
Week (10–17 December 1899), made impassioned speeches about sending troops to South
Africa for love and duty to the empire. The image of mother (England) and child (Australia or the relevant Australian colony) was frequently adopted. On 10 October 1899, Premier Sir
George Turner of Victoria’s rationale for sending troops was that it was an expression of loyalty to the Queen and sympathy for the aims of the imperial government.35 He further went on to say that the House had stated their loyalty and commitment to ‘assist the mother country’ on many occasions and that this was an opportunity to give substance to that.36 NSW Premier Sir
William Lyne on 17 October 1899 stated that the main reason for the deployment was ‘to show the spirit and the feeling of the colonies toward the mother colony.’37 Godfrey Carter, Victorian
MLA on 10 October 1899 stated: ‘I am proud to have the honour of being an Englishman. I
32 ibid, pp. 41-42. 33 Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity,’ p. 79. 34 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 129-130; B.R. Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ Historical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 56, 1967, p. 526. 35 Turner, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp.1727-1729. 36 ibid, p.1727. 37 Lyne, NSWPD(LA), 17 October 1899, p. 1379.
28 have lived an Englishman and I mean to die as one.’38 Donald Melville, Victorian Member of the Legislative Council (MLC), on 11 October 1899 opened his speech with the statement:
‘Yes, I will be a Britisher’ and concluded by ‘…declaring that we [his constituency], as
Britishers, are prepared to fight and sympathise with our country to the end.’39 Nathaniel Levi,
Victorian MLC, on the same day supported the motion reaffirming Jewish loyalty to the empire under ‘whose flag they live.’40 Donald McLeod, Victorian MLA, on 10 October 1899 further claimed that: ‘if we were not equal to the occasion now I consider that we would not be worthy of the name of Britons.’ He continued on to quote the following poem.
Britannia Britannia your loyal sons are free, And Britain’s sons from every land will fight for liberty. We link our hands from shore to shore with hands across the sea, One God, one flag, one brotherhood, one glorious destiny. 41 A significant proportion of the other politicians in each of the colonies continued in this emotive vein.42 This rhetoric continued after the defeats in Black Week.43 Significantly, as will be investigated later in this thesis (Chapter Four), political opponents of sending the contingent were no less strident in their declarations of loyalty. Their objections were not to the empire, but to this particular war.
It is important to note that there was little change to the levels of support from politicians in Australia when the war entered its final stages and the empire had clear military
38 Carter, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1765. 39 Melville, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1800. 40 Levi, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1800. 41 McLeod, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1783; Note: the original source of this poem could not be identified after checking several reference works. 42 Murray-Smith, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1748; Zox, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1734; Kirton, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1773; Bowser, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1773; McBride, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1780; Salmon, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1781; McCulloch, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1790-1792; Wrixon, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1793-1794; Fraser, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1795-1796; Reid, VPD(LC,) 11 October 1899 pp. 1796- 1797; Cooke, VPD(LC) 11 October 1899, pp. 1797; Grimwade, VPD(LC) 11 October 1899 p. 1799; Ham, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801; Copeland, NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, pp. 1439; Cook, NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, pp. 1456-1457; Storey, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1532-1536; McGowen, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1552-1554; Dickson, QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, pp. 339-343. 43 Sheils, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, pp. 2876-2877; Melville, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2857; Storey, NSW(LA) 19 December 1899, pp. 3511-3512; Moore, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3526-3527.
29 dominance in South Africa. This support persisted, even though there was a general awareness that the war was taking a severe toll on civilians, mainly women and children. Kitchener’s
‘scorched earth policy’ left much of the Boer population homeless and there were very high mortality rates in the concentration camps in which they were placed.44 Australian Prime
Minister Edmund Barton, when introducing the bill to send the final Australian contingents on
14 January 1902, noted the telegraph from the imperial government requesting further contingents and then asked his parliament: ‘how was it possible for anyone to suppose that, on receipt of that telegram, any part of the Empire which knew its duty could refuse to accede to the request?’45 George Reid, then leader of the opposition, gave a strident speech in support of the motion. Both Barton and Reid remained convinced that a refusal to send troops would breach their duties to the empire (an empire of which the new nation was most assuredly a part) and would ignore all the sentimental reasons and practical benefits that attached to that bond with the greater imperial whole.46 Subsequent discussions in the federal parliament consistently denied the effects of the British tactics on the civilian population.47 The burning of farms was, it was commonly argued, an unfortunate but necessary step to conclude the guerrilla activities
(any reference to this behaviour in parliament and the press was euphemistically referred to in terms such as the vigorous pursuit of the war for a quick and humane end).48 Most speeches centred on the continuing nobility of British conduct, outrage at foreign criticism and the
44 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp.187-196; Smith, The Origins of the South African War, pp. 5, 9; Pretorious, ‘The Anglo-Boer War,’ pp. 21, 28, 36-59; Nasson, The South African War, pp. 220-224; Phillips, ‘Australia’s Imperial War,’ pp. 86-88; Jewell, ‘Using barbaric methods,’ pp. 1-18; Jenny de Reuck, ‘Social suffering and the politics of pain: observations on the concentration camps in the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902,’ English in Africa, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999, pp. 69-78; N. Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and Lessons for Global power, Basic Books, New York, 2003, pp. 277-282; E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, pp. 310-311. 45 Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8743. 46 ibid, pp. 8739-8744; Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8744; also Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ pp. 321-323; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 144-147. 47 Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8744-8747; Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8747-8749. 48 McLean, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8751-8752; Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8743; Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8748. For examples in the press see Chapter 2 Newspapers pp. 69-71.
30 importance of more decisive support from the colonies to bring the war to a close, and therefore stop the suffering and simultaneously strengthen the empire.49
The politicians, like the majority of Australians of the era, were also connected to
Britain by the idea of ‘race loyalty’, an issue that played heavily into the factors underpinning support for the war. Such a loyalty and a belief in the superiority of the ‘white’ and ‘white
British’ race, and the corollary of the inferiority of ‘non-white’ races, strengthened in the popular consciousness the validity of being ‘British’ and the validity of any imperial military cause.50 Australians considered that they shared the same Anglo-Saxon ‘blood’ as the rest of the ‘white’ empire. This belief was further reinforced by the tremendous success of the imperial project since the middle of the nineteenth century. For an empire founded by a small island nation, particularly one that had much larger competitors as neighbours, there were many achievements that its proud citizens could point to: the virtual control of the world’s sea lanes, the vast and profitable trading network, the domination of populous nations like India and
China. The empire was to its members a living demonstration of Social Darwinism, the most efficient (Anglo-Saxon) race surviving and thriving while the less efficient withered.51 In an
Australian context this paradigm fed paranoia about the large and populous nations to the north which were seen as racially inferior.
49 Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8744-8747; Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8747-8749; McLean CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8751-8752; Wilks, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8781; Kennedy, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8785- 8787. 50 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp. 47-49; Penny, ‘The age of empire,’ pp. 33-34; G. Kennedy (ed.), Imperial Defence, the Old World Order 1856-1956, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 6; C. Stockings, Britannia’s Shield: Lieutenant General Sir Edward Hutton and Late Victorian Imperial Defense, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2015, p. 6; B.P. Farrell, ‘The coalition of the usually willing: the dominions and imperial defence, 1856-1919,’ in G. Kennedy (ed.), Imperial Defence, the Old World Order 1856-1956, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 258. 51 C.N. Connolly ‘Miner’s rights,’ Labor History, No. 35, 1978, p. 42; R. White, Inventing Australia, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1981, pp. 66-76.
31
A core value underlying Australian Federation was the maintenance of a white
Australia.52 Equally, Australians were conscious of the need to continue the success of the
‘British race.’ to maintain its virility and superiority so as to not be usurped by another competitor.53 Loyalty to their race, fear of other races (the need for security) and concern for maintaining superiority and virility of the Anglo-Saxons were powerful factors underpinning
Australia’s British identity and its support for imperial military projects.
This idea of British racial identity being one of the key factors for supporting the war was reflected in the political speeches at the time. Sir John Bowser, Victorian MLA, on 10
October 1899 talked about ‘the measure of support they give to the motion will be the measure of loyalty to their race, and their love for Australia.’54 He hoped ‘that when ‘men of the blood’ are attacked in any part of the world the same spirit will be displayed.55 David Copeland, NSW
MLA, on 18 October 1899 argued that removing the Boers by force was the natural order of things, just as had occurred with the Maoris and the Australian Aboriginals. Specifically, he stated, ‘I believe it is one of the laws of nature that the better type of humanity should displace the lower.’ That the Boer was the lowest form of ‘white humanity.’56 He later went on to suggest that, ‘In the great majority of cases, however, the greatest blessing that ever fell upon such a people came to them when they were invaded by a superior race because they brought with them civilization and knowledge of freedom.’57 Alfred Downward, Victorian MLA, on 10
October 1899 declared that having some ‘warlike’ tendency was an important thing for it made
52 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 142-147, 149. 53 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 101-102; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ p. 526; Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp. 47-49; Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism,”’ p. 173. 54 Bowser, VPD(LA),10 October 1899, p. 1773. 55 ibid, p. 1774. 56 Copeland, NSWPD(LA) 18 October 1899, p. 1439; this view was repeated in the Argus which described the Boer as ‘an aboriginal to be put up with because he was disappearing,’ Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 19. 57 Copeland, NSWPD(LA,) 18 October 1899, p. 1441.
32 nations and destroyed others.58 There were other parliamentarians that continued this rhetoric prior to Black Week and after.59
Another crucial motivation for political support for the war was the more pragmatic reason that the physical security of Australia was seen as being dependent on the empire. The
Australian colonies’, and later the Australian Federation’s, defence was reliant upon the Royal
Navy.60 This included not only the defence of the mainland but the protection of the trade routes vital to Australia’s existence and prosperity.61 Australians were aware they existed at the very fringe of the known world at the time, and their sense of remoteness was acute.62 The colonies were vulnerable tiny enclaves next to a vastly populous Asia where the English, German,
Russian and Japanese empires rubbed up against one another.63 Australians were increasingly anxious about a threat originating from Asia, particularly after Japan, adapting Western organisation and technology, defeated China and occupied Korea in 1895. There was a rash of invasion novels in the Australian colonies that described Australia being overrun by vast
Eastern armies, usually under the direction of European officers.64 In the same year as Japan’s victory over China, a leading politician of the period James MacKay, NSW MLA (National
Federal Party) wrote a lurid novel of a Chinese army led by Russians invading Australia, called
58 Downward, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p.1744. 59 For example, Chief Secretary O’Loghlin, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899), pp. 146- 147 (10 October 1899); Dowling, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2860; Terry, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3511; Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8748. 60 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp. 21, 48; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 10; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 140-141; A. Cooper, ‘The Australian historiography of the First World War: who is deluded?’ Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1994, p. 27. 61 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 150. 62 Cooper, ‘The Australian historiography of the First World War,’ p. 27; Penny, ‘The age of empire,’ pp. 33-34; Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 97; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 532- 533; C. Wilcox, ‘Australia's South African war 1899-1902,’ Scientia Militaria, Vol. 30, No 1, 2000, p. 2. 63 Penny, ‘The age of empire,’ pp. 32-33. 64 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 141; L. Trainor, ‘British Imperial defence policy and the Australian colonies, 1892-96,’ Historical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 54, 1970, p. 214; A. Meaher, ‘Radical nationalists and Australian Invasion novels,’ in Stockings and Connor, Before the Anzac Dawn, pp. 230-254.
33
The Yellow Wave.65 Being part of the empire allowed Australia to be part of something bigger in a hostile world dominated by giant and threatening entities. The wider imperial project was a comfort and a convenience because of Australia’s geographical and racial isolation and loneliness.66
This attitude overlapped with, and was reinforced by, the notion of ‘Greater Britain.’
Greater Britain was an idea formulated by historian and essayist J.R. Seeley, who argues in his bestseller that Britain was more than just the island off the coast of Europe.67 He notes that over the previous three centuries Britain had expanded out into the Americas, Asia and the
Pacific, and that the white self-governing colonies – Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa – had become extensions of Britain herself.68 All were bonded together by their Anglo-
Saxon heritage, history, values and to some degree by their destiny, what he terms ‘Greater
Britain.’69 Given Britain’s relatively small population compared to its European neighbours, particularly Russia and Germany, Seeley’s idea was seen as a solution to Britain’s extant security dilemma (and that of its white colonies). That is, the notion of Greater Britain laid the intellectual and philosophical scaffold for arguments in support of a system of imperial defence whereby the centre (Britain) and the periphery (the white self-governing colonies) would provide real and material mutual support in a crisis. What had previously been perceived as instinctive assumptions might now be formalised. The notion of Greater Britain went to the
65 M. Mackay, The Yellow Wave, Wesleyan University Press, Connecticut, 2003 (First published in 1895); Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 9; P. Burness, 'Mackay, James Alexander Kenneth (1859–1935)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mackay-james-alexander-kenneth-7379/text12825 published first in hardcopy 1986 (accessed 16 February 2017). 66 Cooper, ‘The Australian historiography of the First World War,’ p. 27; Penny, ‘The age of empire,’ pp. 33-34; Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 97; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 532- 533; Wilcox, ‘Australia's South African war,’ p. 2. 67 J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, Macmillan & Co, London, 1883, pp. 8-16; P. Burroughs, ‘John Robert Seeley and British imperial history,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1973, pp. 208, 191-211. 68 Seeley, The Expansion of England, pp. 8-16. 69 ibid.
34 very future of the empire – a newly conceived alliance of Anglo-Saxon countries. Greater
Britain was both persuasive and popular in England and in the wider empire. It felt like the answer to a number of troubling questions, with one commentator of the period claiming that it was a ‘household’ name.70
In practical terms, of course, Australia’s vulnerability was probably not as great a risk as perceived at the time. Mounting a direct attack on the Australian mainland would have been a very difficult military exercise. Defence of the Australian mainland, however, was, and is, not the same as the defence of Australia. In the event of a major confrontation between Britain and one of the other empires in which Britain were to lose, it would have been very unlikely that Australia would have retained its freedom.71 Significant territory and overseas imperial possessions would have been forfeit to the victors.72 Australian support was not purely emotional or sentimental, nor driven by misconceived perceptions of vulnerability in the region; the empire was important for Australia’s security.
Nonetheless, the empire’s defences were seen by Australians as inadequate, expensive and a constant source of controversy.73 There was a perception that the empire was ramshackle, over-extended and vulnerable. There was a sense that something needed to be done.74 In looking to solve this dilemma, various proposals were conceived and put forward with an object of utilising the financial and manpower resources of the colonies more effectively.75 This idea can be seen in the parliamentary debates prior to Black Week. Ephraim Zox, Victorian MLA,
70 Burroughs, ‘John Robert Seeley,’ p. 208, 191-211. 71 Clarke, Marching to their own drum, p. xviii; Cooper, ‘The Australian historiography of the First World War,’ pp. 30-31; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 150; C. Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past: John Mordike’s An Army for a Nation,’ Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1994, pp. 52-65; J. Grey, ‘In every war but one? Myth, history and Vietnam,’ in C. Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, NewSouth, Sydney, 2010, p. 193; J.A. Moses and G. Munro, Australia and the “Kaiser’s War” 1914- 1918, on understanding the ANZAC tradition argument and theses, Broughton Press, Brisbane, 1993. 72 Cooper, ‘The Australian historiography of the First World War,’ pp.30-31. 73 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 10. 74 ibid. 75 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp.41-42, 53-65; Trainor, British Imperialism, pp. 151-153.
35 on 10 October 1899, argued for the importance of reciprocity giving the hypothetical example of seeking the assistance of the empire if Australia was attacked by China or Japan.76 Alfred
Downward, Victorian MLA, on the same day stated that it was important that Victoria share in its responsibilities of empire.77 This rhetoric in the parliament continued through Black Week until the end of the war.78
Another important factor underpinning Australian political support for the war was a deeply held view that the physical security of Australia was dependent upon showing the Great
Powers that the empire was united. Viewed from the continent where conscript armies were measured in the millions, Britain’s all-volunteer army, although very professional, was tiny, approximately 225,000.79 A large proportion of these volunteers were in very poor health as recruits frequently came from British urban slums.80 This army was supplemented with a further 150,000 Indian troops.81
The growth of German power was seen as a particular threat. If Britain were to show weakness then, the argument ran, Germany might intervene in the Transvaal (and possibly also
‘press their interests’ in the Pacific to gain territory as they had in New Guinea and Samoa).82
Potential enemies needed to be aware that, should any part of the empire be attacked, the empire as a whole would bring its resources to the conflict. It was therefore considered important that the Australian colonies, along with Canada and New Zealand, demonstrate solidarity.83
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain was a key champion of this, seeking to encourage the
76 Zox, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1735. 77 Downward, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1742-1744. 78 Storey, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3511-3512; Dawson, QPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 348; McDonald-Patterson, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8778. 79 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, p. 60; Smith, The Origins of the South African War, p. 60. 80 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, p. 60; Smith, The Origins of the South African War, p. 60. 81 D. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, Macmillan, London, 1994, Table 1.4 Class composition of the Indian Army, 1 January 1904, p. 20. Mollo records the Indian Army strength at 152,000 after Kitchener’s reforms had been put in place in 1908, B. Mollo, The Indian Army, Blandford Press, Dorset, 1981, p. 139. 82 Penny, ’The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ p. 532. 83 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp. 45-46.
36 colonial governments into making official offers of assistance rather than ad hoc or even formal support for private initiatives – not that any colonies, with the exception, perhaps, of Canada, required much of a prod in that direction.84 Solidarity was one of the dominant motivations in
Australia prior to Black Week because it was almost universally acknowledged in both
Australia and London that Australian troops would make no material difference.85
After Black Week the significance of Australia showing solidarity with the empire by supporting the war increased exponentially. Images of Redcoats being defeated by Dutch farmers were as humiliating for the imperial subjects of Sydney and Melbourne as for those in
London.86 Black Week was perceived as a massive disaster; it shook the empire from one end to the next on many levels.87 It was feared that the empire’s international and military reputation had been damaged to the extent that other European powers, particularly Germany, might involve themselves in the conflict.88 This attitude persisted up until the end of the war; the
Commonwealth government’s main rationale to send troops was the perceived need to re- affirm or continue to affirm solidarity with the empire.89
The political debates of the period reflected the importance that ought to be given to supporting the war because of this need to show solidarity with the empire. Prior to Black
Week, Victorian Premier Sir George Turner on 10 October 1899 stated that supporting the war was a means to show the world a ‘United British Empire.’90 He accepted that Victoria’s contribution was a ‘token’ but saw it was an important gesture; a demonstration to any
84 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 18-21; Chamberlain’s telegrams were to form the basis of the argument that the colonial governments were unwilling participants in the war, having been manipulated by devious imperialists in London and their stooges in the colonies. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 85 Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ p. 32. 86 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 26. 87 ibid. 88 ibid. 89 ibid, pp. 320-324. 90 Turner, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1727; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 27-28.
37
European power that if England were to be menaced, the colonies would support her to ‘our last man and our last sovereign.’91 NSW Premier William John Lyne on 17 October 1899 stated that the main reason for the deployment was ‘to let the world know that if at any time the
Imperial Government is menaced we would not send 250–500 men but perhaps we would raise an army of 10,000 to assist the mother country in foreign lands.’92 David Copeland, NSW
MLA, on 18 October 1899 asked, ‘Can it be doubted for a moment that if Great Britain had ever lost her supremacy that France or Germany would not have immediately taken possession of this country?’93 A large number of other politicians made statements affirming the importance of sending troops as a demonstration of unity.94 This included politicians who identified with the labour movement, Richard Sleath, NSW MLA (Labor), and James Sinclair
Taylor McGowen, NSW MLA (Labor).95 Support for the war cut across party lines.
After the defeats of Black Week, the sense of vulnerability and the need to support the war was more acute. Victorian Premier McLean on 9 January 1900 commented that ‘it will prove to the world that in all emergencies, that in the hour of danger, the great British Empire, scattered as it is over every quarter of the globe, is as solid and fixed as the immutable laws of nature.’96 A number of other politicians made similar statements about the greatness of the empire and the European threat.97 Almost all dissent promptly evaporated after Black Week.
91 Turner, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1728; Keneally, Australians, p.220. 92 Lyne, NSWPD(LA), 17 October 1899, p. 1379. 93 Copeland, NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, pp. 1440. 94 Downward, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1742-1743; Trenwith, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1775- 1776; Reid, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1796- 1797; Embling, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1797-1798; McCulloch, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1791; Levi, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801; Barton, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1503-1504; Meagher, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1528; McGowen, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1552-1554; Sleath, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1557-1565; Wrixon, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1793-1795; Dickson, QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p.341; Downer (SA) in Field, The Forgotten War, p. 26. 95 Sleath, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1557-1565; McGowen, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1552- 1554. 96 McLean, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2868. 97 Carruthers, NSWPD(LA) 19 December 1899, pp. 3509-3510; Terry, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3511; Whiddon, NSWPD(LA) 19 December 1899, pp. 3514-3515; Chapman, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp.
38
Nearly all politicians who objected to the first contingent being dispatched publicly recanted their initial decision.98
As noted, there was precious little change to this attitude right up to the final stages of the war; ongoing concerns for security and solidarity were present throughout. The trigger for the final offer of troops was a result of an article in a German newspaper, Vossiche Zeitung.
The article read:
So long as it is thought in the colonies that military laurels could be cheaply won by a promenade to Johannesburg and Pretoria, there are young people forthcoming in Canada and Australia, bent upon adventures and military glory, who were glad to fight for the idea of empire. But military ardour soon vanished when it became evident that the war against the Boers was no nursery game. Since then the Imperial idea has given but few proofs of its vitality.99 The article was not even an official statement from the German government; on the contrary, the official German position was formally pro-British.100 It is important to note, though, that the article was typical of a strong Anglophobia, both in the German press and German popular opinion, which was created by the Boer War. Australian Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, on
14 January 1902, explicitly used this article as the foremost rationale for the dispatch of troops in the final stages of the war.101 Several other parliamentarians relied upon Barton’s argument for the need to show loyalty to the empire.102
Throughout the parliamentary debates during the duration of the war, a significant number of members argued that the best demonstrations of solidarity were unanimous votes in
3522-3523; Davis, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3523-3524; Ferguson, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3503-3505; Tucker, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2873; Sheils, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, pp. 2877-2880. 98 Murphy, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2866; Tucker, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2873-2874; Donaldson, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3522; Watkins, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3528; Norton, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3505-3507; Carruthers, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3509-3510; Norton and Carruthers also reported in ‘The matter before Parliament,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1899, p. 8. 99 Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8740-8741; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 321-323; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 144-147. 100 P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, Allen & Unwin, London, 1980, pp. 239 -247. 101 Barton, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8740-8741. 102 For example see Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8748; Salmon, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8769- 8771; MacDonald-Patterson, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8777-8778; Wilks, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8778-8779; Quick, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8782-8783; Bruce-Smith, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8787; Glynn, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8792-8793. 39 favour of supporting the war and that any opposition was detrimental. Large majorities were viewed as insufficient; total support was required. This was usually expressed as a plea that the
House not ‘divide’; a division was a call for the votes to be counted rather than by a show of hands. If the House did not divide, it was implied that the members were overwhelmingly in favour and that there was no-one in the parliament strongly opposed. For example, John
Anderson, Victorian MLA, on 10 October 1899 pleaded that a division should not be taken in order to show ‘that we, as British subjects, are in sympathy with Great Britain in her efforts to secure liberty for her subjects in whatever country they may reside.’103 This theme of unanimity was repeated by a number of members throughout the period of the war.104 Again, for the duration of the war throughout the parliamentary debates in NSW, Victoria and the
Commonwealth, a number of members complained that not enough was being done to support the empire. For example, Sir David Storey, NSW MLA, on 19 December 1899 complained that the offer of troops was inadequate in the circumstances; specifically he stated that if there was a referendum then 90 percent of NSW would support sending 5,000 men.105 Several other members expressed this line of argument.106
Political support for the war was certainly also a product of the politicians’ belief in the
‘righteousness’ of the empire. They were of the opinion the empire was innately just; the empire’s support for the Uitlander cause was therefore morally correct, and it was an obligation to protect and even spread ‘civilization’ in South Africa. Moreover, there was a strong belief that the empire was correct to intervene in the Uitlander cause and ultimately imperial rule in
103 Anderson, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1783. 104 Reid, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1797; Fraser, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1795; Melville, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1800; Salmon, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1781; Wrixon, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1793; Fitzpatrick, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3519; Salmon, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp.8769- 8771; Bruce-Smith, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8787-8791; Glynn, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp.8792- 8793. 105 Storey, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3512. 106 McCulloch, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, pp. 2858-2859; Cook, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3511; Whiddon, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, pp. 3514-3515; McLean, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902 pp. 8751-8752.
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South Africa would be better for all those involved, including the Afrikaners and the black
African population.107 The British flag was perceived as standing for ‘freedom, justice and the highest arts of civilization.’108 The banner’s long history was an evocative symbol. The commander of the Ladysmith garrison during the siege captured the sentiment and patriotic fervour by his comment, ‘thank God we kept the flag flying.’109 His comment was latched onto throughout the empire. Union Jacks were produced in the thousands on significant days, such as to wave off or welcome back contingents.110 Australians had confidence in the imperial government to make the correct decisions.111 Even the Catholic and Anglican churches in
Australia outwardly supported the war as a ‘just cause’, noting, however, that key Catholic leaders such as Cardinal Moran were privately against the war.112 The ultimatum from Kruger in 1899 was viewed as temerity and an affront.113
Once more parliamentary speeches reflected the righteousness of the imperial cause in
South Africa. For example, Donald Melville, Victorian MLC, on 11 October 1899 commenced his speech with a flattering record of Britain’s role in championing justice using the treatment of refugees and the ending of slavery as examples.114 He noted Britain’s total commitment to these values.115 Nathaniel Levi, Victorian MLC, noted on the same day that he was pleased to support the motion to ensure the British received the same rights as the Dutch in British South
Africa.116 Richard Meagher, NSW MLA, on 19 October 1899 made an impassioned defence of the British as a noble people and described the effort and expense to England of stamping out
107 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 103-104; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ p. 527. 108 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 113. 109 ibid. 110 ibid. 111 ibid, p. 109. 112 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 117; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 26; for a discussion of Catholic dissent and Cardinal Moran’s reservations see Chapter Four, pp. 135-137. 113 Penny, ‘Australia's reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 105. 114 Melville, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, pp. 1799-1800. 115 ibid. 116 Levi, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801.
41 the slave trade. Specifically, he stated, ‘If to be proud of one’s flag is to be a jingo, I am a jingo.
If to be proud of a country that has done so much for humanity, I am a jingo.’117 John Anderson,
NSW MLA, on the same day stated, ‘I feel perfectly satisfied that Great Britain is fighting your cause, my cause, and the cause of Australia. I feel that the liberty of the great Australian nation would be lost but for the fact that the British flag is flying over them.’118 Ephraim Zox,
Victorian MLA, stated on 10 October 1899 that ‘you cannot meet with greater liberty in the world than you meet with in Great Britain.’119
Confidence in and connection with the British government was so significant in the
Australian colonies immediately prior to Federation that many of the politicians completely abrogated any responsibility for the moral and legal correctness of the war. They declared that it was an issue for the British government and that they would support the empire whether the war was right or wrong. Victorian Premier Turner on 10 October 1899 stated that they, the
House, were not in full possession of the facts of the situation but that he was confident the
British government was.120 Godfrey Carter, Victorian MLA, on the same day argued that when our mother is attacked we do not ask whether the cause is right. He quoted an Americanism,
‘the question for us is not whether the motherland is right or wrong.’121 James Cook, Victorian
MLA, on the following day made a brief statement that it is important that they trust in the judgement of the imperial government in the matter.122
So, too, parliamentary debates of the period reflected near total support for the argument that the Uitlanders were mistreated, which in turn justified Britain’s involvement. Sir Edmund
Barton, NSW MLA, on 19 October 1899 referred to Milner’s Blue Book on the South African
117 Meagher, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1528. 118 Anderson, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899 p. 1570. 119 Zox, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1735. 120 Turner, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1728. 121 Carter, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1765. 122 Cooke, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1797.
42 situation, asserting that it and Milner were unquestionably honest and reliable.123 The Blue
Book dismissed the argument that the franchise movement was driven by capitalists. Milner presented the petition by the Uitlanders for British intervention to help secure voting rights in the Transvaal, as driven by hard-working ordinary folk who simply wanted a fair share of the say in government.124 They wanted this say because they believed it would remedy the facts that ‘they bear the chief burden of taxation, that they consistently feel in their business and daily lives the effects of chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic administration.’125 The Blue Book was a misleading document based on Milner’s dispatches, which were expressly intended to influence public opinion to support the imperial cause.126 He was accused at the time of ‘yellow journalism’ and of ‘concocting’ stories to pass off as public opinion in South Africa.127 Chamberlain then heavily edited Milner’s dispatches for the Blue
Book, misrepresenting Colonial Office policy at the time.128 This further demonstrated the uncritical approach the majority of Australia’s politicians had towards British policy and decision makers. There were a large number of members who used similar rhetoric as
Barton.129
For his part, Victorian Premier Turner noted that it should be remembered that a number of Australians were in the Transvaal.130 The Chief Secretary of South Australia’s Legislative
123 Barton, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1496. 124 Barton, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1496-1497. 125 ibid, p. 1497. 126 Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 40-46; Badsey, ‘A print and media war,’ pp. 13-14 in C. Wilcox (ed.), Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899-1914, Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 1999; S. Badsey, ‘Propaganda and the defence of Empire, 1856-1956,’ in G. Kennedy (ed.), Imperial Defence, the Old World Order 1856-1956, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 226. 127 Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 50-52. 128 J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century, the Athlone Press, London, 1964, pp. 248-249; Connolly, ‘Manufacturing spontaneity,’ p. 108. 129 Murray-Smith, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1748-1750; Salmon, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1781; Anderson, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1782-1783; Sargood, VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1793; Copeland, NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1442; MacDonald, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1515; Anderson, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1569-1570; Meagher, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1526-1527; O’Loghlin, Legislative Council Debates SA , First Session 1899 (1899) pp. 146-147 (10 October 1899). 130 Turner, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1728.
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Council J.V. O’Loghlin, who moved the motion to send troops to the Transvaal, cited the presence of large numbers of Australians as the first reason.131 Queensland Premier Dickson, on introducing the bill to send the contingents, argued that Australians in the Transvaal were being brutally treated.132
Overwhelming political rhetoric concerning the nobility of the British cause in South
Africa continued until the end of the war. Even after the ‘scorched earth’ tactics and the concentration camp deaths had come to light during the course of 1901, George Reid,
Opposition Leader in the Commonwealth House of Representatives (Free Trade), on 14
January 1902 still stated, ‘the British soldier and the British sailor was always conspicuous not only for his valour in the hour of strife, but for his tenderness and humanity when the battles were over.’ He concluded with a testimonial to the empire.
What is it that enables us to so heartily and so thoroughly to stand by the old flag? It is because conspicuous amongst those of the older nations of the earth that flag is more often found shielding freedom and justice, and protecting the oppressed, than any other that has ever waved in the breeze of heaven.133 There were similar comments made throughout the debates.134
When teasing apart the specific reasons why these Australian politicians gave their support, it is crucial to recognise the interrelationships of various other complex issues. They are not discrete elements: each ‘reason’ noted relates to, and reinforces, a number of others.
Either side of the turn of the twentieth century, Australians (much like peripheral imperial communities elsewhere) had a profoundly imperial identity, combined with strong feelings of
(Anglo-Saxon) race loyalty. Being British and being ‘of the British race’ were used interchangeably yet they are separate concepts. Australians were dependent upon the empire
131 O’Loghlin, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session, 1899, pp. 146-147 (10 October 1899); Field, The Forgotten War, p. 27. 132 Dickson, QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p.339; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 29. 133 Reid, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8749. 134 For examples see Dowling, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2860; Sachse, VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2861; Salmon, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8769; Wilks, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p.8781; Kennedy, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8785; Bruce-Smith, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902 p. 8787. 44 for defence and, importantly, they viewed security as dependent upon the solidarity of the empire, which was in turn connected to the solidarity of the ‘British race’ and having an imperial identity. Further, Australians, by and large believed in the justice, morality, spirituality and to some extent inevitability of the imperial cause. With heavy Social Darwinist tones, the
‘righteousness’ of the white Anglo-Saxon imperial project was a reflection of the superiority of the ‘British race,’ relating to British identity and the need for steadfast intra-empire links.
Any discussion of any one reason for supporting the war was therefore very often and simultaneously linked with discussions of other reasons. All at once, for example, an MP might encompass almost all these themes within a couple of sentences. Edward Terry, NSW MLA, stated on 19 December 1899, ‘The war in the Transvaal will be an object lesson to Europe. It will show that the English race has not degenerated …and that we are still willing to rally under the British standard in whatever part of the world it may be raised.’135
Defence was not the only practical concern, Australia’s economic progress was dependent upon Britain.136 Three-fifths of imports were British, and half of Australia’s exports went to Britain.137 Eight out of ten grocery lines were British, as was the currency itself. 138
British investment was the major engine of development and growth.139 Downard, Victorian
MLA, cited the forms of ongoing economic support from England, particularly in terms of access to markets.140 Other politicians also referred to this close economic tie to Britain.141
Australia prior to the First World War looked to Britain for its economic wellbeing.
135 Terry, NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3511. 136 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, p. 21; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 150; Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ p. 54. 137 Macintyre, A, Concise History of Australia, p. 150. 138 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, p. 21. 139 ibid. 140 Downward, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1742. 141 Glynn, CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8794; Reid, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1796; McLeod, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1783.
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There were a number of other ‘secondary’ reasons that the politicians supported the war, which fall beyond the scope of this thesis to address in detail. Briefly, the colonial governments in October 1899 also influenced and competed with each other; it would have been difficult for one of the governments to refuse if all the others were agreeing to send contingents.142 There was also an argument justifying the war as a ‘good thing’ in that it was considered a remedy for racial decay and a mechanism to refresh national virility; this arose out of the Social Darwinist opinions of the day.143 Each of these ‘secondary’ reasons, much like the central motivations discussed at length within this chapter, interacted with and was interrelated to all the other reasons.
The question arises as to the extent to which voting and statements of the politicians reflected the views of the community. Studies specifically focused on the elite class in British colonies have noted the British identity and the importation of British culture, albeit modified for colonial conditions.144 The wealthier colonists who identified as the ruling class did not have the hereditary aristocratic system of Britain, but were instead successful merchants, landholders, businessmen and professionals or the sons of such individuals.145 A perusal of the occupations of Victorian and NSW politicians shows a predominance of those forms of employment.146 Wilcox noted contemporary observers stated that the colonial politicians resembled the average middle-class man back in Britain.147
142 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 21; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 25, 27, 29; Zox, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1734-1735; Anderson, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1782; Lyne, NSWPD(LA), 17 October 1899, pp. 1378-1379; Cook, NSWP(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1459; Tomkinson, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899, (1899), p. 147, (10 October 1899); Wilcox, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899, (1899), p. 153, (10 October 1899). 143 Penny, ‘Australia's reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 101-102; Meagher, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899 p. 1529. 144 D. Denholm, The Colonial Australians, Allen Lane, Ringwood, 1979, p. 173; For a discussion of the equivalent elite in Victoria, British Columbia see V. Green, Chapter 12 ‘And in conclusion,’ Above Stairs, Social life of Upper-Class Victoria, Touchwood editions, Victoria BC, 2011. 145 In Green’s detailed study of the elite in Victoria British Columbia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, every successful businessman or professional of note that she identified as being members of the colony’s elite entered politics or was given important political appointments. See Green, Above Stairs, passim. 146 See APPENDIX B - Details of party affiliation, religion, country of origin and profession of colonial politicians voting on the motion as to whether troops should be sent to South Africa (October 1899). 147 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 6-7.
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It was not unusual that a person who acquired wealth, and the education that accompanied financial success, would sit in the parliament.148 It was often seen as a natural progression to take up a political role after achieving commercial success.149 This was not due to formal restrictions but rather a practical consideration; a representative needed independent resources to participate until as recently as 1889, when pay for politicians was introduced in
NSW.150 The presence of Labor representatives, who were both a relatively new phenomenon in the parliaments and a small minority, was an exception. It is highly probable then that the majority of politicians were indicative of middle-class and elite opinion and attitudes generally.
When combined with other evidence of elite opinion, such as the opinions in the major daily newspapers (to be discussed in detail in Chapter Two) and the financial contributions that the wealthy made to the patriotic funds (to be discussed in detail in Chapter Three), the case for a pro-imperial elite is difficult to question.151
Penny and Meaney’s observations that Australians had an imperial identity were not confined just to the politicians but applied across the broad class spectrum.152 The policies and electoral outcomes of the politicians also provide, albeit qualified, an indicator that there was broader support across the Australian class spectrum. The degree to which an elected official in a representative democracy might necessarily reflect the opinions of his constituents was, and is, variable. For example, where representatives did hold views that were different from
148 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, pp. 164-165, 178-183 149 Green, Above Stairs, Douglas (Chapter 1 pp. 25, 26), Skinner (Chapter 2 p. 36), Pemberton (Chapter 3 p. 48), Crease (Chapter 4 pp. 59, 62-63, 67), O’Reilly (Chapter 5 p. 72), Trutch (Chapter 6 pp. 88- 91), Rithet (Chapter 7 pp. 102-103), Barnards (Chapter 8 pp. 113-116, 119). 150 NSW Parliamentary website, ‘1890 to 1900 - Towards Federation’ https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/Pages/1890-to-1900-Towards-Federation.aspx (accessed 7 June 2017]). Federal politicians were paid from the opening of the Parliament in 1901, see Commonwealth Government Remuneration Tribunal website, ‘A brief history of Parliamentary remuneration,’ http://www.remtribunal.gov.au/offices/parliamentary-offices/parliamentary-offices-background/a-brief-history- of-parliamentary-remuneration/A-BRIEF-HISTORY-OF-PARLIAMENTARY-REMUNERATION.pdf (accessed 7 June 2017) 151 Chapter Two, passim; Chapter Three pp. 85, 89-93. 152 Penny, ‘The age of empire: an Australian episode,’ pp. 41-42; Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity,’ p. 79. 47 their electorate, those views might not have mattered enough to impact upon polling. In another circumstance, a politician may have offended voters, but that offence occurred early enough in the election cycle that by the time of the poll, its memory had been dimmed or overtaken by other events. Elected representatives, however, could not have been significantly out of alignment on issues of importance to their voters or they would not have retained their seats. It is a question of weight and timing, how important the sending of troops was to the community and how close it was to an election. First, as has been comprehensively discussed in this chapter, the vast majority of politicians supported the war. The electoral consequences for those who argued against the war were mixed. The first NSW election after the dispatch of troops was 3 July 1901. Of the ten members that voted against sending troops, seven sought re- election, and all were returned including Holman, who was very outspoken.153 In the Victorian election, eight months earlier on 1 November 1900, and therefore closer in time to the initial decisions to send troops, of the thirteen candidates that voted against sending troops, twelve sought re-election.154 Of those twelve, five retained their seats and seven were defeated.155
Henry Bournes Higgins, MLA Victoria (Radical), directly attributed his defeat to his opposition to the war.156 Serle also commented that James Whiteside McCay, MLA Victoria, suffered a heavy defeat, and that it was likely due to his dissent.157 This suggests that the public,
153 Names of members voting against sending troops, NSWPD (LA) 19 October 1899, p. 1585; Evening News, 18 October 1899, p. 4; Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 13; Names of members recontesting seats, 'The General Election,' Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July 1901, pp. 7-8; Election results from NSW Parliament website ‘Former members’ page https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/Pages/all-members.aspx (accessed 27 March 2017). 154 Names of members voting against sending troops, VPD(LA) 10 October 1899, pp. 1790; Names of members recontesting seats, ‘The General Election,’ Argus, 26 October 1900 p. 5; Election results, Victorian Parliament website ‘Re-member’ page http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member (accessed 27 March 2017). 155 ibid. 156 Autobiography draft, p. 113, MS1057 Papers of Henry Higgins, Box 7, National Library of Australia, Special Collections; J. Rickard, 'Higgins, Henry Bournes (1851–1929),' Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/higgins-henry-bournes- 6662/text11483, published first in hardcopy 1983 (accessed 27 March 2017). 157 G. Serle, ‘McCay, Sir James Whiteside (1864–1930),' Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mccay-sir-james-whiteside- 7312/text12683, published first in hardcopy 1986 (accessed 27 March 2017); Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 26. 48 provided it was fresh in their memories, were prepared to punish those politicians that objected to the dispatch of troops.
Support for the South African War by the majority of Australian politicians was because they self-identified as British, they saw themselves as part of an Anglo master race, they believed that their security was tied to a united empire and that the British cause was righteous
(generally and in South Africa specifically). The parliamentary debates of that period provide powerful indications that the elite and the middle classes, given their influence and control over the government, supported the war. These debates are also reflective of the support and the deeply held beliefs within the culture as a whole. This will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE ROLE OF NEWSPAPERS
The newspapers of the period are a valuable source of information in understanding
Australian attitudes towards the South African War. They can be seen as indicative of the opinions of the middle and upper classes, as well as, to a limited extent, those of the broader population. Specifically, this chapter seeks to answer the question, to what extent did the major daily newspapers support the war and what was their rationale for that support? This chapter will then examine the extent to which newspapers both reflected and influenced public opinion across the class spectrum. In regard to the newspaper sources, the emphasis is on the major daily newspapers in Victoria and NSW, with contextual reference to a range of other contemporary newspaper and periodical publications including in rural areas and the other colonies (later States) to ensure there are no obvious inconsistencies.1 Dissenting publications, including Labor papers, however, will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Ownership and control of the major daily papers at the time was in the hands of members of the wealthy elite who were by and large imperialists. For example, Sir James
Reading Fairfax (1834–1919) and his son Sir James Oswald Fairfax (1863–1928) were owners of the Sydney Morning Herald. 2 James R. Fairfax had been involved in the colonial militia and was a committee member of the National Rifle Association.3 One of the two men was a founding committee member of the NSW Patriotic Fund, with the father and son donating £200
1 Citations for newspapers outside the major publications in NSW and Victorian include a bracketed notation as to colony or state where the newspaper was located. 2 C. Simpson, 'Fairfax, Sir James Reading (1834–1919),' Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/fairfax-sir-james-reading- 6133/text10525, published first in hardcopy 1981 (accessed 28 February 2017); Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211. 3 Simpson, 'Fairfax, Sir James Reading (1834–1919),' ‘National Rifle Association,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1900, p. 5.
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($A31,488 in 2015 values).4 Major John Randal Carey (1834–1923) was part of the syndicate that set up the Daily Telegraph.5 His paper campaigned to send volunteer soldiers to South
Africa.6 Carey himself chaired the Citizen’s Bushman committee as well as involving himself in the recruitment of men and the buying of horses.7 As a reserve major, he led the contingent when it marched through Sydney.8 Frank Bennett was the owner of the Evening News and the
Town and Country paper.9 He set up a specific patriotic fund, called ‘the Evening News Shilling
Fund’, and promoted it in both publications.10 David Syme (1827–1908) was the owner of the
Age and the Leader.11 He donated large sums to the rifle clubs from the early months of the war.12 According to Sayers, Syme had a powerful influence on the Victorian government, effectively being able to choose ministries.13 It was unlikely, therefore, that any decision to send troops would not have had his endorsement. It is also important to note that these publications depended upon advertising revenue from other businesses, businesses also owned and operated in the main by members of the elite class in the colonies.14 It is therefore unsurprising that the Australian press were predisposed to an imperial bias.
4 For membership of Patriotic Fund committee see ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Australian Star, 31 October 1899, p. 3; For donation see ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ The Age, 4 November 1899; For conversion to 2015 Australian dollars see ‘Thom Blake Historian – How much is it worth?’ http://www.thomblake.com.au/secondary/hisdata/query.php (accessed 20 May 2017). *It is uncertain whether father or son was on the committee member of the Patriotic Fund as he is described in the article only as Sir James Fairfax. 6 H. Radi, ‘Carey, John Randal (1834–1923),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/carey-john-randal-5502/text9361, published first in hardcopy 1979 (accessed 28 February 2017); Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211. 6 Radi, ‘Carey, John Randal (1834–1923)’. 7 ibid. 8 ibid. 9 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211; ‘The late Mr Frank Bennett,’ Evening News, 29 October 1901, p. 5. 10 ‘The Evening News Shilling Fund,’ Evening News, 7 November 1899, p. 5. 11 C.E. Sayers, 'Syme, David (1827–1908),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/syme-david-4679/text7741, published first in hardcopy 1976, (accessed 28 February 2017); Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211. 12 ‘Patriotic offer,’ Mount Alexander Mail, 24 February 1900, p. 2. 13 C.E. Sayers, David Syme, a Life, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, p. vii-viii; Sayers, 'Syme, David (1827– 1908),'; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211. 14 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 211.
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Unlike the politicians who were making express statements of loyalty, loyalty was presumed in the daily papers and implied throughout the narratives. This was demonstrated in the way articles were most often directed to ‘how’ the war was, or should, be fought rather than
‘why.’ As an example of typical reporting in the period, the Argus on 11 October 1899 under the heading ‘The Transvaal’ had a number of articles concerning events around the crisis in
South Africa. These included the British government’s plans, the movement of troops from
India, Boer tactics, Buller’s departure, the stopping of Boer supplies, a narrative on likely Boer strength as well as a map of South Africa.15 The better part of three columns on the following page were dedicated to topics like transport arrangements and British units ready for dispatch to the Transvaal.16 This was in addition to extensive coverage of the Victorian Parliament’s decision to send troops.17 The major dailies and the regional papers produced a massive amount of material that was uncritical and often flattering about the war effort, produced for public consumption on a daily basis.18
15 Argus, 11 October 1899, pp. 7-8, 11. 16 ibid. 17 ibid. 18 A search on ‘Trove – digitised newspapers and more,’ (the National Library of Australia’s website which holds historic newspapers electronically available to the public) returned a large number of results. Using the ‘advanced search’ function on the term ‘Transvaal War’ just for NSW between 13 October 1899 to 13 December 1899 (prior to Black Week) returned 2,492 articles. Using the same parameters on the term ‘Boer war’ produced an additional 1,365 articles. For examples of these articles see ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 17 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 13 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer Invasion,’ The Age, 14 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 16 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 17 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 18 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 19 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 20 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 21 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The Natal battle,’ The Age, 23 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 24 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 25 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 26 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Boer War,’ The Age, 27 October 1899, p. 5; Evening News, 11 November 1899, p. 3S (Supplement).
52
Similarly, the newspaper reports took a particular interest and positive tone about the activities of the Australian troops in all aspects – volunteering, recruitment, equipment, training, transport and action. The focus of these articles was overwhelmingly on the sense of pride rather than any criticism of the colony’s involvement. For example, before the start of the war a contingent of NSW Lancers had at their own expense travelled to England for the purposes of training and had enjoyed considerable public attention in England and at home.19
The trip was in many ways dysfunctional; the troopers were ill led, received little training and were disliked and ignored by their English counterparts. To the populations of Britain and
Australia, however, they embodied the imperial ideal of British and colonial troops training and possibly fighting together.20 Their celebrity status increased exponentially after their boorish and incompetent commander Captain Cox volunteered them all for service in South
Africa.21 This offer set up a series of events that would make the Lancers the first colonial troops to arrive in the theatre of war, a matter of intense colonial pride and the subject of equally intense public interest.22
19 For a complete history of the NSW Lancers and their involvement in England and South Africa see: C. Wilcox, A Kind of Victory: Captain Charles Cox and his Australian Cavalrymen, NLA Publishing, Canberra, 2014. 20 Wilcox, A Kind of Victory, pp. 67-79 (‘Celebrities,’) & pp. 142-155 (‘Heroes’). 21 To the embarrassment of the War Office, the Colonial Office and the NSW government, Cox had not consulted or obtained proper consent from his men. Wilcox, A Kind of Victory, pp. 118-119, 127-128, 132-135, 139-141, 154-155; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p.20. 22 Wilcox, A Kind of Victory, pp. 142-155 (‘Heroes’); For other newspaper examples see ‘NSW Lancers, aboard the Nineveh,’ Evening News, 2 May 1899, p. 5; ‘The NSW Lancer contingent,’ The Maitland Weekly Mercury (NSW), 6 May 1899, p. 3; ‘The Lancers at the Cape,’ The Cumberland Argus and Fruit growers Advocate (NSW), 6 May 1899, p. 2; ‘Queens Birthday Review,’ Evening News, 19 May 1899, p. 6; ‘Military Tournament,’ Evening News, 27 May 1899, p. 6; ‘The NSW Lancers in England,’ Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NSW), 8 June 1899, p. 5; ‘Cablegrams,’ Northern Star (Lismore, NSW), 10 June 1899, p. 5; ‘N.S.W. Lancers in England - The welcome to the boys,’ The Shoalhaven News and South Coast Districts Advertiser (NSW), 10 June 1899, p 4; ‘National Ode of Welcome to the N.S.W. Lancers,’ The Hillston Spectator and Lachlan River Advertiser (NSW), 24 June 1899, p. 9; ‘Review at Aldershot ,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1899, p. 7; ‘The NSW Lancers at Aldershot,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1899, p. 7; ‘The Boer ultimatum,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 1899, p. 7; ‘NSW Lancers,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The NSW Lancers, a Cromwellian uniform,’ Evening News, 13 July 1899, p. 7; ‘The NSW Lancers, demonstration at their departure,’ Evening News, 11 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The NSW Lancers, letter from Captain Cox,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1899, p. 9.
53
There was similar interest in the military preparations in the colonies themselves. A large number of articles covering a wide range of topics were produced. For example, the
Sydney Morning Herald on 12 January 1900 described activities in the training camps, how shooting was improving with training, the first mounted march, and a story about an individual with Royal Hussars’ experience that the men of the unit were proud of.23 There was growing public concern about the quality of the saddles that had been provided and the arrangements for veterinarians to travel with the horses.24 There was also a half a page of detail about preparation, training and recruitment around the country towns of the colony as well as in other parts of the empire.25 Most newspapers throughout the period produced substantial detail about local military preparations.26
The Australian soldiers’ first engagement at Sunnyside Farm, 40 kilometres north of
Belmont on 1 January 1900, was reported on extensively and in complimentary terms. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald on 5 January 1900, described the Queenslanders running into a Boer force and rescuing their Lieutenant after his horse was shot from under him.
Specifically, it stated, ‘The Queenslanders behaved magnificently and chatted and laughed
23 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1900, pp. 5-6. 24 ibid. 25 ibid. 26 For further examples see Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1900, p. 8 (This has biographies of NSW officers leaving for South Africa); Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 8 (Biographies article repeated); Evening News, 18 January 1900, p. 6; ‘The Australian Contingent further delay in preparation,’ The Age, 3 October 1899, p 5; ‘The Troops,’ Hawkesbury Advocate (NSW), 17 November 1899, p. 1; ‘The NSW contingent,’ Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NSW), 10 October 1899, p. 5; ‘Preparations in New South Wales,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 October 1899, p. 5; ‘NSW preparations - an object lesson to the world,’ The Gundagai Independent and Pastoral, Agricultural and Mining Advocate (NSW), 25 October 1899, p. 2; ‘The N.S.W contingent,’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 1899, p. 5; ‘Australasian help – Melbourne,’ South Australian Register (SA), 16 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Military. An infantry field day,’ Evening Journal (SA), 16 October 1899, p. 2; The Transvaal contingent,’ The Advertiser (SA), 16 October 1899, p. 4; ‘A Geelong Sargent Major’s distinction. Selected for a responsible post. His military career,’ Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 16 October 1899, p. 3; ‘The Victorian contingent final arrangements for transport. Men go to camp tomorrow - donations of horses and smokes,’ Sunday Times (NSW), 15 October 1899, p. 7; ‘General news. The Transvaal contingent,’ The Express and Telegraph (SA), 16 October 1899, p. 2; ‘The colonial contingents Sydney,’ Maryborough Chronicle, Wide Bay and Burnett Advertiser (Qld), 16 October 1899, p. 2; ‘Permanent Artillery Volunteers Queenscliff,’ The Age, 16 October 1899, p. 6.
54 while under fire.’27 (See also Figure 2 below). Later the paper stated, ‘British military authorities are delighted that the colonial troops were the first to strike a blow against the enemy since the Battle of Magersfontein.’28 A further report told that the Queensland Lieutenant
FIGURE 2 ‘The War’ headlines. 29
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, pp. 4-5; Also reported in the Evening News, 5 January 1899, p. 5 & the Argus, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 28 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 4; Also reported in Argus, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 29 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 55
Governor Lord Lamington ‘had received a cablegram from Mr. Chamberlain congratulating
Queensland on the gallant behaviour of her troops at Sunnyside.’30
The voices of the dissenting politicians confirmed that the Australian press was ‘one- sided’ in their pro-British stance. William Holman, NSW MLA (Labor), on 18 October 1899 spoke strongly against the stories coming through the Cape press via London, which he asserted were under the control of the Rand Lords, specifically Rhodes.31 He noted that their allegations against the Boers were often proven to be wrong but were never corrected later in the newspapers.32 John Norton, NSW MLA (Protectionist), on the same day criticised Premier
Lyne for reading a telegram that was based on questionable unsubstantiated press reports.33 He also stated, ‘we have had columns of the public press stuffed with lies that have had to be contradicted almost the next day.’34 John Murray, Victorian MLA (Labor), on 10 October 1899 accused the press, for want of cricket news, of doing ‘all it can, to arouse a military craze in this country.’35 He stated that the reporting was unreliable, coloured and ‘destitute of a grain of truth.’36 On the same day, Thomas Smith, Victorian MLA (Labor), stated that the reports in the press were one-sided.37 Henry Bournes Higgins, Victorian MLA, on 10 October 1899 complained about the ‘jingo’ one-sidedness of the papers, given that all the information came from the Times, which had a policy of pro-imperialism, and that the Boer cause was given no space in the news.38 Specifically, he stated:
First it comes from the Times correspondent in Africa, and the Times is a jingo; then having got into the Times, there is an Australian combination, to which all out
30 ibid. 31 NSWPD(LA) 18 October 1899, pp. 1462-1464. 32 ibid. 33 NSWPD(LA) 18 October 1899 pp. 1471-1472. 34 ibid, p. 1472. 35 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1731. 36 ibid. 37 ibid, p. 1740. 38 ibid, p. 1777.
56
Melbourne and Adelaide and some of the Sydney newspapers belong. They pay £5,000 a year and the same words come to all the papers. 39 Tighe Ryan, Irish pro-Boer and editor of the Catholic Press, also made similar comments about the Times and its influence in the Australian press.40
The print evidence and the statements of those opposed to the war indicate that editorial opinion was enthusiastically supportive of the war and Australia’s involvement. There were occasional voices that made specific (but muted) objections during the period, such as the
Bulletin, the Worker and the Catholic Press.41 These publications that opposed the war, despite the frequency of their use and the quotations they have provided past historians, were exceptions to the usually enthusiastic support given by the mainstream publications.
An important feature of understanding the role of the Australian newspapers was the influence of the British press. The supply of information from the South African War has been a matter of historical controversy.42 Hobson, one of the major critics of the war in England at the time and a journalist for the liberal newspaper the Manchester Guardian, was alarmed at how the news was biased towards British imperialism.43 Most of the news coming out in the lead up to and during the war originated from reporters in South Africa, as was the convention
39 ibid; Higgins’ comment was reflected in the major Australian dailies of the period. The Times was frequently relied upon. For example, see ‘The Boers hesitancy,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The Cape Dutch and the Boers,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1899, p. 9; ‘The Boers “Clever plans,”’ Evening News, 25 October 1899, p. 5. 40 ‘The “Times,” the Transvaal and the Australian Press,’ Catholic Press, 7 October 1899, p. 22. 41 For examples of express statements of loyalty see ‘Two Editors opinions – American and Australian views’, Evening News, 7 October 1899, p. 6; Argus, 22 July 1899, p. 8; Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 1899, p. 4; ‘The war and Britain’s destiny as an empire,’ Evening News, 7 November 1899, p. 7. For newspapers that opposed see Chapter Four – pp. 106, 124-126, 133-134. 42 For a detailed discussion on the issue, see S.J. Porter ‘“The dark stream of shameless falsehood?” The British Press and news gathering strategies during the Boer War,’ in C. Wilcox (ed.), Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899-1914, Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 1999, pp.18-19; Hobson dedicated a chapter to the issue in his book on the causes of the war, see ‘A Chartered Press’ in J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, James Nisbett & Co, London, 1900, pp. 206- 228. 43 ibid.
57 at the time.44 This was for mostly reasons of cost.45 Hobson believed, with some justification, that the South African journalists were under the influence of the Rand Lords. Porter considered, though, that Hobson, and historians who have followed his line of reasoning, have overstated their case.46
The Australian papers, apart from a handful of Australian-commissioned reporters like
Banjo Patterson, were dependent upon British sources.47 Importantly, the British press overwhelmingly supported the war. Only the Manchester Guardian and the Westminster
Gazette maintained their opposition throughout.48 The Daily News and the Daily Chronicle had been pro-Boer in the early stages of the dispute, but the Daily News changed hands and the
Daily Chronicle removed its pro-Boer reporters.49 The Manchester Guardian did not arrive in
London until later in the day and was by then stale news, which diminished its influence. Until
January 1901, there was no pro-Boer newspaper in London itself. 50 The term ‘pro-Boer’ as a descriptor of all those who opposed the war arose at the time and was intended to be derogatory; if you were not for the British cause then you were pro-Britain’s enemy in time of war, akin to calling someone a traitor. The term ‘pro-Boer’ is still used in the research as a term for
44 ibid. 45 Porter, ‘The dark stream of shameless falsehood,’ pp.18-19. 46 ibid. 47 R. Kirkpatrick, Dailies in the Colonial Capitals: A Short History, Rod Kirkpatrick, Newmarket, 2016, pp. 96- 97. Higgins stated that the cable news came almost exclusively from the Times; Higgins, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1777; Wood made similar statements. see Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, 2016, p. 26. 48 E. Halévy (translated by E.I. Watkin), Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (2nd ed.), Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1951, pp. 94-95; S. Badsey, ‘The Boer War as media war,’ in P. Dennis, and J. Grey (eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Army History Unit Canberra, 2000, p. 74; S. Koss (ed.), The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement - The Pro-Boers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1973, p. xxx. For Reuters specifically see D. Read, The Power of the News: The History of Reuters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 399. For instances of citing the Manchester Guardian as pro-Boer in Australian papers, see ‘Literary notes. From our special correspondent,’ The Age, 4 November 1899, p. 14; ‘Literary notes,’ Evening News, 30 December 1899, p. 4 49 S. Koss (ed.), The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement - The Pro Boers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973, p. xxx. 50 ibid.
58
‘dissenters’ but without the emotive connotation, and is perhaps imprecise in that a dissenter might be ‘anti-war’ rather than being in favour of the Boers.51
Critics of the war in Britain, like their counterparts in Australia, were frustrated by the one-sidedness of information being provided to the public.52 The British pro-Boers turned to an extensive pamphlet campaign to try to communicate their message to the public.53 The Daily
News was purchased in January 1901 by a consortium (backed by the pacifist Lord Cadbury) with the express purpose of giving the pro-Boer Liberals a voice in the London popular press again.54 Koss questioned the influence of the pamphlet campaign because of the much greater influence of the new journalism in the cheap papers.55 Specifically he stated in reference to the pamphlet campaign, ‘the penny press weakened it, then the half penny press killed it.’56
Crucially though, the London papers which supported the war were greatly admired by the Australian papers and treated as authoritative. For example, after Black Week, the Sydney
Morning Herald on 16 December 1899 stated, ‘The British newspapers in their comments on the reverse are calm and virile.’57 The inference was that it was important and admirable that the British press were steadfast in the face of this adversity. Similarly, the British press’s endorsements of the government’s action, specifically the replacement of Buller with Roberts, were treated as having special weight.58 These articles appeared in identical, or near identical,
51 C.F. Behrman, ‘Introduction,’ J.A. Hobson and G.P. Gooch, The War in South Africa, its Causes and Effects, Garland Publishing, New York, 1972, p. 11; J.S. Galbraith, ‘The pamphlet campaign on the Boer War,’ The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1952), p. 114. 52 Halévy, Imperialism, pp. 107-108; Porter, ‘The dark stream of shameless falsehood,’ pp. 17-27; Hobson, The War in South Africa, pp. 206-228. 53 J.S. Galbraith, ‘The pamphlet campaign on the Boer War,’ The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1952), pp.111-126. 54 Halévy, Imperialism, pp. 107-108. 55 Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, p. xxxii. 56 ibid. 57 ‘Newspapers are calm and virile,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1899, p. 7. 58 For examples see ‘Lord Roberts to be Commander in chief in South Africa,’ Argus, 19 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Cabinet defence committee,’ Brisbane Courier (Qld), 19 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Cabinet decisions – Roberts replaces Buller – 50,000 reinforcements – British Press satisfied,’ Daily News (WA), 19 December 1899, p. 3; ‘Roberts to be commander in chief – Kitchener to be chief of staff,’ Evening News, 19 December 1899, p. 5; ‘The
59 form in newspapers across Australia, demonstrating both the way the British pro-war press opinion circulated and the respect it was accorded.59 The Australian media did on occasion cite the Manchester Guardian but rarely for its anti-war views.60 Where its anti-war views were acknowledged, there was no detail of its arguments against the fighting.61 As this thesis argues, there was sound evidence that, even without British press reporting, the owners and editors of the Australian papers would have supported the war. Given the dependence on, and respect for, the British press, however, there is little doubt that its pro-war stance would have acted as an important influence on local opinion.
Having established that the owners and editors of the major (and the majority of smaller) newspapers were supportive of the war, the question arises as to how they justified these beliefs. The material suggests that they followed the same rationale as their political
Transvaal campaign,’ Evening Journal (SA), 19 December 1899, p. 3; ‘The British plan of operations,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 December 1899, p. 5; For further examples: http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/result?q=Lord+Roberts&exactPhrase=&anyWords=¬Words=Boer+Press &requestHandler=&dateFrom=1899-12-19&dateTo=1899-12-20&sortby 59 Using key word searches and date ranges in the advanced search engine in Trove, items that are identical or almost identical can be found across the Australian newspapers. For example, using the term ‘calm’ and ‘press’ in the week after Black Week produced the following examples of the British press being ‘calm and virile,’ sourced from an item transmitted from London on 16 December 1899. See ‘Newspapers calm and virile,’ Goulburn Evening Penny Post (NSW), 19 December 1899, p. 4; ‘Colonial ardour commended – British press calm,’ Hamilton Spectator (Vic), 19 December 1899, p. 3; ‘English press view – calm and unfaltering,’ The Age (Vic), 18 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Feeling in Great Britain – Newspapers virile and calm,’ Murchison Times and Day Dawn Gazette (WA), 19 December 1899, p. 3; ‘English Press view – Calm and unfaltering,’ Weekly Times (Vic), 23 December 1899, p. 20; ‘Tone of the press – calm and virile – no sign of panic,’ Riverine Herald (Vic / NSW), 19 December 1899, p. 3; ‘The feeling of the press – calm and convinced as to the future – Boers unlikely to initiate attack,’ North Western Advocate and the Emu Bay Times (Tas), 18 December 1899 p. 2; ‘The papers calm – British guns in Natal,’ Coolgardie Miner (WA), 18 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Heavy British losses – upwards of 1,000 killed, wounded and missing – English Press calm – Military enthusiasm – Thousands volunteering,’ Express and Telegraph (SA), 18 December 1899, p. 3; ‘Press Comments,’ Telegraph (Qld), 18 December 1899, p. 4. 60 ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 17 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 October 1899, p. 7; ‘The future of the Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 24 November 1899, p. 8; ‘Boer tribute to British bravery,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March 1900, p. 8; ‘Value of the balloon in warfare,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1900, p. 8; ‘How long will it last,’ Evening News, 24 November 1899, p. 5; ‘Where the Boers’ arms come from,’ Evening News, 20 October 1899, p. 6; ‘The future of the Transvaal,’ The Age, 6 December 1899, p. 11; For more examples; http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/result?q=Manchester+Guardian&exactPhrase&anyWords=Transvaal+Boer&n otWords&requestHandler&l-advcategory=Article&sortby&openFacets=true. 61 For example, see ‘Literary notes. From our special correspondent,’ The Age, 4 November 1899, p. 14; ‘Literary notes,’ Evening News, 30 December 1899, p. 4.
60 counterparts; specifically, that they had a British imperial identity, which incorporated a belief in an Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. They were also concerned about their security and supported the case for the empire demonstrating solidarity, as well as believing in the righteousness of the British cause in South Africa. Again, as Hall argues, their values were taken as common sense and rarely if ever discussed directly; nevertheless, it is not difficult to divine the value system underpinning the language of the publications.62
The evidence supports the thesis that the newspapers had an imperial identity; this was clearly implied from their admiration of most things British, but particularly the military. For example, at the start of the war, prior to Black Week, the Sydney Morning Herald gave extensive coverage to British success in a minor skirmish at Glencoe. The language was strongly pro-imperial. The sub-headlines read: ‘A crushing defeat’; ‘Boers completely routed’;
‘Splendid work by British Artillery’; ‘Gallantry of British officers (refusing to take cover).’63
The Argus on 21 October 1899 included a report that Colonel Baden-Powell had inflicted a heavy defeat on the Boers at Mafeking, with 1,500 thought to have been killed. In other skirmishes around Natal the cavalry was described as having behaved ‘splendidly.’64 There were other examples of this language through the period up until Black Week.65 There were also a number of biographies of senior officers published within leading newspapers of the time, written in universally flattering terms. The Argus on 16 November 1899 described Baden-
Powell’s military efficiency and experience, his familiarity with South Africa, his intellectual ability (as the author of several books) as well as his artistic (painting, acting, etching) and sporting (yachting, pigsticking, polo, big game hunting) prowess.66 The Argus on 12 September
62 Hall, ‘Culture and identity in Imperial Briton,’ p. 200. 63 ‘The War,’ ‘Special cables’ and ‘the Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1899, pp. 6-8. 64 ‘The War,’ Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 1. 65 ‘The War,’ ‘Special cables’ and ‘the Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1899, pp. 6-8; ‘Another Brilliant engagement’ and ‘The Battle of Glencoe,’ Argus, 24 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The War,’ Argus, 13 November 1899, p. 5; ‘The War,’ Argus, 15 November 1899, p. 7. 66 ‘Colonel Baden-Powell,’ Argus, 16 November 1899, p. 5.
61
1899 noted of Major General Archibald Hunter, Chief of Staff to General Redvers Buller, that
‘you would say his one fault is his reckless daring.’67 The article could easily fit within an edition of the Boy’s Own Paper.
Significantly, after Black Week, the newspapers’ confidence in the British Army did not change with the changes of imperial military fortune. The papers presented excuses for the defeats and played up the British gallantry; there could be no undermining of these assumptions of British strength. The reversals were considered an aberration. In the Argus on 19 December
1899, for example, there were frequent references to the bravery of the troops. It stated:
The gallantry of the British troops both officers and men, in this desperate fight was such that a volume would be required to do justice to every individual case. Hundreds of instances are recorded of bravery and heroism that deserve the awarding of the Victoria Cross.68 The paper also included several items of how, despite the fact the British were defeated, the consequences for the Boers were also severe. About Magersfontein, they stated that ‘the enemy lost more heavily than the British, their casualties being stated at 1000 men.’69 Later editions mentioned treason, Boer trickery and bad luck rather than incompetence and blundering. ‘Had it not been for the misfortune of the artillery being put out of action,’ the Argus continued,
‘victory would have very probably been with the British.’70 (See also Figure 3 headlines below.) The Sydney Morning Herald alluded to Lieutenant General William Gatarce, commanding imperial forces during the defeat at the battle of Stormberg (10 December 1899), as having been betrayed by his guides.71 Significant emphasis was also given to the replacement of Buller with Lord Roberts as overall commander and the appointment of Lord Kitchener as
67 ‘The Transvaal,’ Argus, 12 September 1899, p. 5. 68 ‘Lord Roberts to be commander in chief in South Africa,’ Argus, 19 December 1899, p. 5; There are almost identical reports in ‘The Transvaal war,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 December 1899, pp. 5-6 and in ‘The Boer war,’ Evening News, 19 December 1899, p. 5. 69 Argus, 19 December 1899, p. 5. 70 ‘The Colenso battle,’ Argus, 20 December 1899, p. 7; For another example see ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 71 ‘The Transvaal war,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1899, p. 7.
62 the new Chief of Staff, along with the usual flattering biographies.72 Such themes continued throughout the period.73
72 ‘Lord Roberts to be commander in chief in South Africa,’ Argus, 19 December 1899, p. 5. 73 For examples see ‘The Transvaal War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 December 1899, p. 7, ‘The Boer War,’ Evening News, 22 December 1899, p. 5, ‘News by cable’ and ‘The Boer Forces,’ Argus, 21 December 1899, p. 6; Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1899, p. 6; ‘A chat with Col. Young RA,’ Evening News, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 63
FIGURE 3: ‘The Colenso Battle’ headlines.74
74 Argus, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 64
Toward the middle of January 1900, there was criticism levelled at the British military for their failings in Black Week, but these were reports from the British press. The Australian press was, in this instance, little more than a conduit.75 For example, in the Sydney Morning
Herald, on 12 January 1900 there were articles from British editors criticising British tactics and the unpreparedness of the Army.76 Letters from soldiers were cited as being critical of the generals.77 There was said to be an ‘outcry’ about the lack of readiness.78 There were later articles about a failure of intelligence (the secret service) to provide the necessary information and of the Navy to provide artillery in a timely manner.79 The Evening News, also on 12 January
1900, was more direct in its criticism, although not until the English press set the precedent.
After talking about the immobility of the British armies, it stated:
No wonder that there is indignation in England about the immobile armies of besieged and unrelieved garrisons, and that “The Times” declares that the public insists upon knowing why 7000 casualties have occurred in South Africa among British forces before the enemy’s territory was invaded.80 It should be noted, however, that the main themes of British valour and competence remained unchanged. The bravery of the British troops was consistently reported. The failings were implicitly attributed to Buller’s leadership which was then, in editorial opinion, rectified by his replacement. The new leaders, Roberts and Kitchener, were lauded as superior. The underlying
75 ‘Comments of the London Press,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘London Press comments – Hostile Strictures – What the public demands,’ Evening News, 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Press comments,’ Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘South Africa – the Boer War,’ Brisbane Courier (Qld), 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘The Press on the situation – The government attacked,’ South Australian Register (SA), 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘The War,’ West Australian (WA), 12 January 1900, p. 5; ‘The present deadlock an outcry in Great Britain,’ Daily Telegraph (Launceston, Tas), 12 January 1900, p. 2; War in South Africa – ‘The Times’ and the War Office – Scathing rebuke,’ Northern Miner (Qld), 12 January 1900, p. 3; ‘The Times and the War Office – Britain wrathful,’ North Queensland Register (Qld), 15 January 1900, p.17; ‘London Press criticism,’ Australasian (Vic), 13 January 1900, p. 37. 76 ‘The Transvaal war,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1900, pp. 4-5, 7; see also the Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 5 for near identical material. 77 ibid. 78 ibid. 79 ibid. 80 In the general news section, Evening News, 12 January1899, p. 4.
65 competence of the British military authorities therefore remained intact.81 Similarly, such criticism was never about continuing support for, or the appropriateness of, the war, rather comments on its operational conduct.
The admiration of British institutions and their representatives was not confined to the military. As noted above, the London press were considered as authoritative. Both Milner and
Chamberlain, key political figures in the lead up to the war, were lauded. The Blue Book on the Uitlander situation, although manifestly provocative (as was releasing the report), was described as ‘masterful’ in the Sydney Morning Herald of 21 July 1899.82 This tone was maintained throughout the article.83 It is important to recognise that Milner, who had been a journalist, through the Colonial Office and his networks was consciously structuring the imperialist message.84 Milner was aware his report would be received favourably by the media and therefore bolster public opinion. Chamberlain was also flattered for his brilliance in the matter.85
Newspaper articles of this period also indicate that British ‘racial’ identity was a major reason Australian newspapers supported the war. This was implied by the adulation of the
British as referred to above and was also reflected in the descriptions of the Boers who, although white, were considered inferior. The Sydney Morning Herald on 23 October 1899 stated that ‘the village elders [of the Boers]’ are ‘stuffed with flagrant prejudices, ignorant, utterly unresponsive to ideas.’86 The Evening News on 7 November 1899 described the Boers
81 For examples see W. Churchill. ‘Reconnaissance in an armoured train,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1900, p. 7; A. (Banjo) Patterson, ‘Letters,’ Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 5; Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1900, p. 7. 82 ‘The Transvaal trouble,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 July 1899, p. 6. 83 ibid. 84 Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 11-17 (Milner’s history as a journalist), pp. 37-54 (Milner and his press efforts to bring about the war); Badsey, ‘A print and media war,’ pp. 13-14; Badsey, ‘Propaganda and the defence of Empire,’ p. 226. 85 ‘The scene in the Commons,’ Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 13. 86 ‘The temper of the people,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1899, pp. 6-8.
66 as a ‘few ignorant, half civilised, slave-holding farmers’ who were interfering with Britain’s great mission.87 The Argus on 22 July 1899 noted: ‘The Boer is a vanishing quality. In one sense he is an aboriginal, to be put up with because he is disappearing.’88 The Evening News on 22 July 1899 reproduced an article from the Cape Illustrated magazine.89 The article was a
Social Darwinian examination of the Boers, and stated that it was inevitable that the ‘lesser race’ will be bred out within six generations.90 The article then went through a rather tortured logic that concluded that Boer lineage was descended from a cruel (yet chaste) European Goth, without any acknowledgement that chaste people would not have descendants.91 Finally, it argued that this would lead to the inevitable extinction of the Boers.92 There were many more press examples of this belief of superior and inferior races in relation to the Boers. 93
The case for empire ‘solidarity’ was a theme that was further expressed in press comments before and throughout the war. In the pre-Black Week period for example, the
Sydney Morning Herald on 31 August 1899 quoted the Times as stating that war would be deplorable. It would be worse, however, ‘if Great Britain were to lose her influence, not only in South Africa, but all over the world, by the abrogation of Imperial responsibility.’94 Other stories echoed this anxiety that if Britain were to lose paramountcy, the rest of the empire would
87 ‘The war and Britain’s destiny as an empire,’ Evening News, 7 November 1899, p. 7. 88 ‘General News Summary,’ Argus, 22 July 1899, p. 8. 89 ‘The Boer,’ Evening News, 22 July 1899, p. 3. 90 ibid. 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 For example Lord Balfour’s statements in ‘Britain and the Transvaal,’ Evening News, 29 July 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal trouble,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 July 1899, p. 6; Sydney Morning Herald, 31 July 1899, p. 6; ‘General news’ section Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 1899, p. 4; ‘A chat with Col. Young RA,’ Evening News, 20 December 1899, p. 7; Connolly also noted the Sydney Morning Herald dismissing the Boer because they are interfering with expansion; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 210-211. 94 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1899, p. 8.
67 be jeopardised.95 There was also notable interest in world reactions, particularly those of
Germany, France and Russia.96
Newspaper reports further indicated a wholesale belief in the superiority of British values and the correctness of the war in South Africa. The British justification for the war was accepted by most editorial opinion as conclusive, imperial action supported as righteous and the descriptions of the mistreatment of Uitlanders were prominent. For example, on 21 July
1899 the Sydney Morning Herald reported on the British government Blue Book, ‘Papers relating to the complaints of British subjects in the South African Republic.’97 The central tenets of the article were that the Uitlanders were noble, that they were grossly mistreated, that the Boers were pig-headedly stupid and that the British were taking an entirely wise and reasonable position. The Uitlanders were described as ‘having large possessions, and represented the intellect, wealth and energy of the State’ yet were treated as ‘helots.’ The Boers were described as ‘ignorant.’98 These messages were repeated with increasing intensity up until
Black Week.99 As noted above, the Blue Book was likely an exaggeration produced by Milner, who had a stated objective ‘to work up a crisis …by steadily and inflexibly pressing for the redress of substantial wrongs and injustices.’100
There were many newspaper articles specifically on the nobility of the British cause.
For example, the Evening News on 7 November 1899 gave an account of a speech given by
95 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 July 1899, p. 5; Evening News, 23 August 1899, p. 5; The General News Summary and ‘The Transvaal crisis,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 1899, pp. 6-7; Evening News, 25 September 1899, p. 4; ‘General news’ section and ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 1899, p. 4; Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1899, p. 6; ‘Unjoined chat,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 1899, p. 7. 96 See examples ‘The War,’ Argus, 13 October 1899, p. 13; ‘The Powers and the Transvaal crisis,’ Argus, 11 November 1899, p. 6; ‘General news’ section and ‘The Transvaal crisis,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 1899, pp. 6-7; ‘Britain and the Transvaal,’ Evening News, 3 August 1899, p. 5; Argus, 11 November 1899, p. 13; ‘The Papal organ and the Transvaal,’ Argus, 15 November 1899, p. 9. 97 ‘The Transvaal trouble,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 July 1899, p. 6. 98 ibid. 99 For further examples see both the ‘General news’ section and the article headed ‘The Transvaal crisis,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 1899, pp. 6-7. 100 Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 455; See also Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 37-54 (Milner and his press efforts to bring about the war); Badsey, ‘A print and media war,’ pp. 13-14; Badsey, ‘Propaganda and the defence of Empire, 1856-1956,’ p. 226.
68
Reverend George Walters of the Australian Church.101 The Reverend stated that ‘the British empire was a blessing’, that it bore ‘the burden of solicitude and care for subject races; by repressing tyranny.’102 He stated that Britain’s ‘destiny might work for the general cause of civilization and for the education, the uplifting and final regeneration of humanity.’103
Examples of this type of theme continued after Black Week. The Sydney Morning Herald on
5 January 1900 reported a speech given by Chamberlain, in which he stated:
We ask no ransom: we exact no tribute: we have nothing directly to gain by a war which will transfer to us territory not presently ours. If to-morrow the Union Jack waved over the Transvaal and the Orange Free State the only result would be that thenceforth good government and justice – (cheers) would prevail. (A voice: and it will) And if prosperity followed that we should do as our custom – we would share it with the rest of the civilised world. 104 In a letter on the same day in the Sydney Morning Herald an anonymous South African native was quoted, suggesting, ‘if the English win, then we black men can breathe and live; if the
Boers win, then we may as well die, for we shall be no more looked upon as men, but as cattle; so we shall go home and pray to God for the English to be strong.’105
A particular feature of many newspaper articles was the description of brutality toward the Uitlanders, which reinforced the British cause. The Sydney Morning Herald on 3 August
1899 described the exodus of women and children from the Republics and specific incidents of abuse or negligence by Boer police, such as police mistakenly shooting an Uitlander cycling and Boer artillery men attacking a shopkeeper and his wife while police looked on.106 Later again in the Sydney Morning Herald on 22 August 1899, further acts of violence against
101 ‘The war and Britain’s destiny as an empire,’ Evening News, 7 November 1899, p. 7; The Rev. Walters appeared to have lectured frequently in Sydney usually at the IOOF Hall. He spoke often in favour of the war and was in support of other human rights issues such as women’s suffrage. For example, see; ’Australia Church,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 August 1899, p. 5; ’Women’s Suffrage League,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 9 November 1899, p. 6; ‘Nurses at War,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The Australian Church,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1900, p. 7; ‘The Jewish Girls Guild,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1900, p. 3. 102 ‘The war and Britain’s destiny as an empire,’ Evening News, 7 November 1899, p. 7. 103 Ibid and ‘Britain’s Destiny,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 1899. 104 ‘Mr Chamberlain on the government critics,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 105 ‘Letter from a religious minister the Rev. J.S. Moffat,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 106 For a further example see ‘The crisis in South Africa,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 1899, p. 4.
69
Englishmen were reported and recalled a previous incident in April where the wife of a missionary was ‘brutally assaulted’ and died within days.107 The article attributed this to the complete absence of police and continued that the Johannesburg residents (mainly Uitlanders) were living in a ‘state of terror.’108 This theme continued frequently throughout the pre-war period, leading up to and after Black Week.109
A second common feature of these newspaper articles supporting the righteousness of the British cause was that the British were legally correct, and the Boers were wrong as far as the franchise was concerned. The Argus on 21 July 1899 reported that the Transvaal Republic had passed legislation granting franchise after seven years’ residency and the swearing of an oath but then disputed the efficacy of this legislation, claiming that it imposed a high property ownership requirement and that the naturalisation conditions were vexatious. The Uitlanders would therefore be unlikely to be able to influence government policy.110 Other newspapers repeated this theme.111
The Boer ultimatum for many media commentators changed the nature of the dispute, shifting the blame squarely on to the Boers. For example, a journalist in the Sydney Morning
Herald under the pseudonym ‘Mercutio’ asserted that he was ‘in the minority’ of people because he disagreed with Britain’s conduct in South Africa, particularly concerning the use of force. He, however, asserted on 21 October 1899 that his opinion had changed in the light of the Boer ultimatum. The article argued that the war had been brought on by the Boers and that
107 ‘The Transvaal crisis,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 1899, p. 7. 108 ibid. 109 For further examples see Sydney Morning Herald, 12 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal crisis,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 1899, pp. 6-7; ‘The Transvaal,’ Argus, 13 September 1899, p. 11; ‘The Transvaal,’ Evening News, 7 October 1899, p. 4; ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 7 October 1899, pp. 8-9; ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 October 1899, p. 5; ‘The War,’ Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 1; ‘From Johannesburg in a coal truck,’ Evening News, 12 January1899, p. 7. 110 ‘The Transvaal,’ Argus, 21 July 1899, p. 5. 111 For examples see ‘The Bloemfontein Conference,’ Argus, 21 July 1899, p. 5; ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1899, p. 7; ‘The Transvaal,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1899, p. 7.
70 faced with the prospect of disloyalty by other Afrikaners in other parts of Africa, Britain must assert its authority.112
The newspapers’ support of the righteousness of the imperial cause – come what may
– was often reflected in how critics, like Emily Hobhouse, were reported. Hobhouse returned to England in June 1901 after witnessing the suffering in the concentration camps and commenced a public awareness campaign.113 That campaign eventually resulted in Sir Henry
Bannerman-Campbell, Liberal (and at the time opposition) Party leader in the British House of
Commons, delivering a stinging criticism of the British Army’s conduct in South Africa.114
The reaction of the Australian press either suppressed or ignored Hobhouse’s full report and persistently undermined her credibility.115 The Sydney Morning Herald and the Argus on 28
June 1901 attributed the political backlash to ‘sensational statements made by Emily
Hobhouse.’116 In a letter to the Times, Reverend Adrian Hofmeyr, a well-known Afrikaner pastor, rebutted Hobhouse’s allegations. The Reverend claimed to have visited the camps and called Hobhouse’s reports ‘ignorant and highly coloured’ and that ‘officials were doing everything possible for them [the Boer inmates].’117 The use of Hofmeyr’s denials by newspapers across the country was indicative of how unthinkable it was to the Australian community that the British Army could be guilty of atrocities.118
112 ‘Mercutio’, ‘Unjoined chat,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 1899, p. 7. 113 E. Hobhouse, The Brunt of War and Where it Fell, Methuen & Co, London, 1902, p. 126. 114 Nasson, The South African War, p. 222; Jewell, ‘Using Barbaric Methods,’ pp. 15-17; J. Wilson, CB - A life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1st ed.), Constable and Company Limited, London, 1973, p. 349; H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists. The Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Élite, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, pp.62-63; A.J. McLeod, ‘Emily Hobhouse: her feet firmly on the ground,’ in F. Pretorious (ed.), Scorched Earth, Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 2001, pp. 212-219. 115 A Trove search of newspapers of the relevant period, June 1901, on the keyword ‘Hobhouse’ produced a significant number of articles identifying Miss Hobhouse as a critic but failed to produce her report or the details from it. Her pamphlet was eventually located in Holman’s personal papers. 116 ‘The refugee camps. Agitation fomented by Radicals,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1901, p. 7; ‘The Boer war. The refugee camps. Radical agitation. Based on incorrect reports,’ Argus, 28 June 1901, p. 5. 117 ‘The refugee camps,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1901, p. 7; ‘The war in South Africa,’ Argus, 28 June 1901, p. 5. 118 For examples see ‘The refugee camps. Sensational reports,’ Advertiser (SA), 28 June 1901, p. 5; ‘The refugee camps,’ Australasian (Vic), 29 June 1901, p. 47; ‘The refugee camps,’ Brisbane Courier (Qld), 28 June 1901, p. 5; ‘The Boer refugee camps. Source of the ‘inhumanity’ charges,’ Daily Telegraph (Tas), 28 June 1901, p. 2; ‘The
71
Other criticisms of the war were treated in a similar fashion. The newspapers gave emphasis to the rebuttals. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald and Argus on 19 June 1901 described the British Secretary of State for War, St John Brodrick’s reply to the allegations. He denied any ‘inhumanity’ in the treatment of Boer civilians and that it was British ‘leniency’ that had ‘protracted the war.’119 Pro-Boer speeches filtering back to South Africa were said to be ‘encouraging the Boers to continue their resistance.’120 The high death rate in the
Johannesburg camp was ‘owing to an outbreak of measles’ and the refusal of the Boer women
‘to follow the dietary directions.’121 This reply was noted as a ‘victory for the government’ in the newspapers.122 The Argus on 27 July 1901 described the British conduct as saving all those civilians from the natives and the open veldt. Specifically, the article stated, ‘a stupendous act of humanity almost without parallel in the history of war.’123
These themes of British disunity prolonging the war by giving the Boer cause to hope, the Boer women bringing the fatalities on themselves, and Hobhouse being an unreliable source persisted throughout the relevant period.124 The report of the ‘Fawcett (or Ladies) commission’ sent to investigate Hobhouse’s allegations stated that the deaths were largely attributable to the unsanitary conditions in the country and to causes within the control of the Boer women.125
This in turn was repeated across a number of Australian papers as a ‘striking vindication of the
refugee camps. Treatment of the Boers. Allegations answered,’ Kalgoorlie Miner (WA), 28 June 1901, p. 5; ‘The War,’ Manilla Express (NSW), 29 June 1901, p. 2. 119 ‘The war in South Africa,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1901, p. 7 and ‘The Boer war’ Argus, 19 June 1901, p. 5. 120 ibid. 121 ibid. 122 ‘The war in South Africa,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1901, p. 7; ‘The Boer war,’ Argus 19 June 1901, p. 5. 123 In the ‘General news’ section, Argus, 27 July 1901, pp. 12-13. 124 For other examples see ‘The refugee camps – official inspection,’ Argus, 13 July 1901, p. 13; ‘The refugee camps,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 1901, p. 7; ‘News by mail – Happy England,’ Argus, 3rd August 1901, p. 6; ‘News by mail – Boer refugees’ Argus, 21 August 1901, p. 10; ‘Distress in South Africa,’ Evening News, 28 October 1901, p. 3; ‘The War in South Africa – the concentration camps – a Boer woman’s testimony,’ Evening News, 22 November 1901, p. 5; ‘Justifying the camps. The report of the Ladies commission. Pro-Boer exaggerations,’ Examiner (Tas), 28 February 1902, p. 7. 125 M. Fawcett et al., Report on the Concentration Camps in South Africa by the Committee of Ladies, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1902, pp. 14-17.
72 management of the camps and a high tribute to Lord Milner.’126 A significant amount of this material went beyond mere support and was propaganda, particularly during the later stages of the war. As the allegations that Kitchener was deploying terror tactics against the civilians spread, the response of the newspapers was generally outrage, fervent denials and wildly inaccurate testimony that British conduct was an unparalleled example of kindness and humanity.127
Whatever their opinion on the war, Australian newspaper readers generally had restricted access to information compared with their English counterparts. Arguments against the war, while available in Australia, were not as readily available as in Britain. There were for a start two major daily British newspapers, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News, agitating on behalf of the pro-Boers.128 There were also the massive pamphlet campaigns of the ‘Stop the War’ and ‘South African Conciliation’ committees.129 Hobhouse herself toured
Britain giving speeches and agitating to stop the atrocities.130 Given the one-sidedness of the information, Australians were generally more susceptible to the pro-imperial arguments that the newspapers were making.
Did the newspapers themselves reflect public opinion? A number of factors need to be considered. First, major newspapers had virtual control of the agenda. Any consumer of news,
126 For examples, see ‘Camps. What the Ladies commission says,’ Adelaide Observer (SA), 1 March 1902, p. 14; ‘The concentration camps,’ Daily Telegraph (Tas), 22 February 1902, p. 4; ‘The concentration camps. Report of the Ladies commission,’ Evening News (NSW), 22 February 1902, p. 4; ‘Justifying the camps. The report of the Ladies commission. Pro-Boer exaggerations,’ Examiner (Tas), 28 February 1902, p. 7; ‘Conduct of the concentration camps. Ladies commission report,’ Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 22 February 1902, p. 5; ‘The concentration camps – a report,’ Weekly Times, (Vic), 1 March 1902, p. 20; ‘South African war,’ Western Mail (WA), 1 March 1902, p. 20. 127 For example, see ‘General news’ section, Argus, 27 July 1901, pp. 12-13; ‘The concentration camps,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1902, p. 6; ‘Boer concentration camps,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 1901, p. 10; ‘The concentration camps,’ Evening News, 26 March 1902, p. 3; ‘In the concentration camps,’ The Age, 4 January 1902, p. 9; ‘The refugee camps – causes of mortality,’ Argus, 18 November 1901, p. 5; ‘Continental Pro-Boers – A women’s appeal,’ Argus, 31 December 1901, p. 5; ‘The concentration camps,’ Evening News, 18 January 1902, p. 3. 128 Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, p. xxx. 129 Galbraith, ‘The pamphlet campaign on the Boer War,’ pp.111-126. 130 Hobhouse, The Brunt of War, p. 126.
73 with a few exceptions – the Bulletin, the Worker and the Catholic Times – would have been saturated both with news of the war and views favourable to the imperial cause. This would have had influence over the debate at the time.
Secondly, this control of the agenda, albeit powerful, should not infer or imply the owners and editors dictated public opinion. A newspaper could have held views that its customers disagreed with. A reader might purchase a paper for a specific purpose like the sporting page and have little interest in the political commentary. The readers have their own views and beliefs; it is an interactive process.131 As Aldous Huxley observed about propaganda, it has to fall on fertile ground.132 There must be some acceptance of the view already in the community for it to succeed.133 When the Bulletin, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily
News opposed the war, their circulation fell.134 The acceptance of the views of the major dailies and the rejection of the pro-Boer papers suggests there was widespread popular support for the
South African War and colonial pride in the dispatch of troops. The evidence indicates newspapers were publishing information and opinion that the public wanted to read; this has particular resonance when taken with the other evidence discussed throughout the thesis.
It is important to recognise that late-nineteenth-century technology had created not only an industrial but an information revolution.135 Steam printing presses produced news and
131 There are a range of theories that seek to explain media influence over popular opinion; broadly they can be categorised as ‘hypodermic needle’ theories or ‘limited effect’ theories. Hypodermic needle theories argue that the receiver of the information is passive, that the individual merely adopts the argument of the media outlet. Limited effect theories recognise that the process is more interactive between the provider and the receiver of information. For an overview of media theories see C.J. Fergusson, Media Psychology 101, Springer Publishing Company, New York, 2015, pp. 25-47. 132 B. Franklin et al. (eds), Key Concepts in Journalism Studies, Sage Publications, London, 2005, p.205. 133 Badsey, ‘Propaganda and the defence of Empire,’ p. 226. 134 Penny, ‘Australia's reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 115, (footnote 79); Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, pp. xxx-xxxi; R. Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, Edward Arnold, London 1905, p. 199. 135 Ferguson, Empire, pp. 164-171; P. Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997, Jonathan Cape, London, 2007, pp. 141-142, 145; J. Darwin, The Empire Project, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 48, 100, 110; J.M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960, Manchester University Press, New York, 1984, pp. 17-19.
74 knowledge on an industrial scale to mass audiences.136 Even the remote Australian Bush was connected.137 As demonstrated above, news reports written in London were reproduced within twenty-four to forty-eight hours across Australia. The combined effect of these innovations was the maintenance of the empire as a cultural phenomenon.138 It should be recognised that newspapers were the mass media of that time and had the capacity to influence as least as much as the mass media of today, if not more.139 As this chapter has demonstrated, using the South
African War as an example, newspapers were an important part of the technological bridge that allowed a person to live in Australia, never even see Britain, and yet have so much imperial influence surrounding them that they could still consider themselves British.
The material produced by Australian newspapers in relation to the war was voluminous and, with very few exceptions, supported Britain. This support was demonstrated throughout the material; even in the face of the massive failures during Black Week, the reporting was still flattering. The reasons for this support reflect the underpinning social drivers of imperial and racial identity as well as the practical concerns in relation to Australian security. This cultural mindset was facilitated by the dependence of Australian news services on British sources, the respect Australians had for the British pro-war press, and the technology of the day which allowed for the rapid transmission of information and ideas. England and the white self- governing colonies were bonded tightly together. There were also strong reasons to suggest that the support for the war was not limited just to the newspaper proprietors. Newspaper owners were members of the elite class and their imperial beliefs were indicative of their peers in that upper strata. Newspapers were the main conduit of information and entertainment for the average citizen of the time. They would have found the war, Britain’s righteous cause and
136 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp. 3-5, 99-102, 103, 145-146. 137 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 5. 138 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp. 48, 100, 110; Ferguson, Empire, pp. 164-171; Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, pp. 141-142, 145; MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp. 17-19. 139 MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 16. 75
Australia’s imperial responsibilities inescapable topics. The mass of the public willingly digested the message and rejected those that opposed it. The weight of this conclusion increases when taken in combination with the other material of popular support such as the turnouts to the troop departures, the subscriptions to the patriotic funds, the almost total lack of public protest and the levels of volunteering throughout the war; these will be discussed in detail in
Chapter Three. 76
CHAPTER 3 – POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE WAR
Evidence that ordinary Australian people supported the war is found in the overwhelming turnouts for the early troop departures, their fundraising activities, the almost total absence of protest and the over-subscription of volunteers for military service. There were periods of intense public interest, such as immediately after Black Week (10–17 December
1899) and on the relief of Mafeking (17 May 1900); however, it is important to note that the evidence suggests popular support was maintained throughout the war. Opposition to the war, which was both small and ineffectual, will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
This chapter is heavily reliant on the newspaper articles that were written at the time.
This presents a challenge as there is a need to take account of the bias of the owners, editors and writers. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, editorial bias in the major daily papers was overwhelmingly in favour of the war and Australia’s participation. There are, however, a number of factors that mitigate the risk that this bias presents. First, the journalists were not just providing opinion. They were eyewitnesses to the events occurring, such as the departures of the troop ships. There was, of course, scope for reporters to exaggerate what they were seeing. These descriptions, however, were often mirrored by other witnesses and occurred across the country, frequently captured in illustrations, photographs and in one instance on film.1 This corroboration and consistency speaks to the reliability of the observers and should be given proper weight as evidence.
One of the striking pieces of evidence for Australians’ support of sending troops to the
South African War was the turnouts for the departures of the earliest contingents. These
1 F.C. Wills, ‘Boer War Transvaal Contingent,’ (SILENT FILM), Australian Sound and Film Archive, 1899, http://aso.gov.au/titles/historical/boer-war-transvaal/clip1/ (viewed on 17 November 2015). 77 turnouts were massive and the crowds were as demonstrative as teenage fans at a modern rock concert. Newspapers of the period estimated between 200,000 and 250,000 attended the first troop departure from Sydney on 28 October 1899.2 This was approximately half of Sydney and one-seventh of NSW.3 Wilcox noted that perhaps ‘two in every three Sydneysiders’ went to the farewell.4
As well as the estimates of numbers, there were also numerous descriptions of the large crowds. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald of 30 October 1899 described the farewell of the first NSW contingent on 28 October 1899.5 The editorial stated, ‘The passage of the troops through the streets was marked by an extraordinary demonstration of enthusiasm, notwithstanding the fact that rain fell in torrents.’6 In a later article in the same paper, a writer stated, ‘All along the thoroughfares there were dense masses of spectators …they overspread the footpaths until they encroached to a considerable extent upon either side of the roadway.’7
Not only were the streets filled with people but so too was every other vantage point. ‘Balconies were freighted to the utmost of their capacity, while every window had its complement of people. Even parapets were resorted to as providing good points.’8 Union Jacks of various sizes were prominently displayed by both small and large business houses.9 Even the horses and vehicles were decorated; one report stated, ‘Omnibuses and cabs were not without
2 The Transit authorities reported carrying 230,000 passengers on the day, ‘The traffic arrangements,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 8; ‘Departure of the NSW contingent,’ Sunday Times (NSW), 29 October 1899, p. 7; ‘Departure of the contingent – witnessed by 200,000 people,’ Clarence River Advocate (NSW), 31 October 1899, p. 2; ‘The Lancer’s farewell,’ Cumberland Argus and Fruit Growers Advocate (NSW), 1 November 1899. 3 The population of Sydney in 1901 was 487,900 and NSW as a whole 1,454,846; T.A. Coghlan, A Statistical Account of Australia and New Zealand 1903-1904 (11th edition), Government Printer, Sydney 1904, pp. 155 (Sydney) & 149 (NSW). 4 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 25. 5 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, pp. 7 & 8. 6 ibid, p. 6. 7 ‘The scene on Pitt street,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 7. 8 ibid. 9 ‘The city decorations,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 7.
78 embellishment. Some bore distinctive mottos and a few pictorial representations.’10 Some aspects of this description can be seen in the photograph at Figure 4 below; dense crowds on either side of the road, people atop walls and roofs and umbrellas to protect against the inclement weather.
The people in the crowd cheered and, supported by bands playing patriotic music, sang enthusiastically for hours. Prior to the arrival of the troops the crowds cheered the mottos written on the buses.11 Later, as the troops started to arrive, the reporter described the response as ‘…the cheering was such as to resound throughout the city. From that point onward there was hardly any cessation in the cheering.’12 As the troop ship the Kent moved from the wharf it was described as ‘the signal for vociferous cheers from the assemblage, with much waving of hats.’13 Sydney Harbour itself was filled with sometimes dangerously overloaded craft shouting approval to the soldiers as they left. The Kent steamed out ‘attended by a perfect flotilla of ferry and pleasure boats, all of which were blowing “cock-a-doodle” salutes on their steam whistles in a token of hearty bon voyage.’14 Finally, the Sydney Harbour shoreline was crowded with well-wishers. The paper recorded, ‘The sight presented was, indeed, a striking one. The shore as far as the eye could reach appeared lined with human forms – and umbrellas.
Every point which commanded a view of the water was taken advantage of. All seemed enthusiastic, and beyond doubt each one was dripping wet.’15 The sound this crowd made was described as ‘not unlike the roar of a cannonading in the distance.’16 The majority of these observations on the day were repeated in other newspapers.17 This was an impressive
10 ibid. 11 ‘The scene on Pitt street,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 7. 12 ibid. 13 ‘The scene at casting off,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 8. 14 ibid. 15 ‘Demonstration on the Harbour,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 8. 16 ibid. 17 For other example see Evening News, 30 October 1899, p. 6; Sunday Times, 29 October 1899, p. 7; ‘Off to the War,’ Australian Town and Country Journal (NSW), 4 November 1899, p. 13; ‘Departure of the contingent,’ The
79 demonstration of support, not only because of the poor weather conditions, but more so because it was in the middle of a bubonic plague pandemic.18
The farewell of the Kent was to be repeated with other ships and in other cities across
Australia as troops left.19 In Victoria, an estimated 250,000 attended out of a population of
494,129 in Melbourne (approximately half) and out of 1,208,854 in the State of Victoria
(approximately one-sixth).20 Buildings and vehicles were decorated, business effectively stopped for the afternoon as huge numbers attended and people often dangerously filled every vantage point.21 The enthusiastic crowds cheered troops and sang to bands playing patriotic songs.22 There were goodbyes at the docks and the troopships were escorted out by flotillas of boats big and small.23 Figure 5 below shows the very large crowd that turned out to farewell the first Victorian contingent. Note the large banner that the troops were marching under with the motto ‘For Queen.’ Like Sydney, the turnout in Perth was also in bad weather yet large numbers attended.24 It is important to note the level of support at this juncture was especially significant because the dispatch of Australian troops at this time was a token. It
Clarence River Advocate (NSW), 31 October 1899, p. 2; ‘Departure of the NSW troops; extraordinary enthusiasm,’ The Scone Advocate (NSW), 31 October 1899, p. 2; ‘The departure of the NSW Contingent,’ The Clarence and Richmond Examiner (NSW),31 October 1899, p. 5. 18 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 30. 19 For Victoria see Argus, 30 October 1899, pp. 4-6; see also The Age, 30 October 1899, pp. 5-6; ‘The South African Contingent,’ Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 30 October 1899, pp. 1 & 3; ‘Gone to the War,’ Mt Alexander Mail (Vic), 30 October 1899, p. 2; ‘Departure of the troops; brilliant demonstration,’ Horsham Times (Vic), 31 October 1899, p. 3; For Brisbane see ‘Our contingent,’ The Courier Mail (Qld), 30 October 1899, pp. 5-6; Wills, ‘Boer War Transvaal Contingent,’ (SILENT FILM); For South Australia see ‘Troops for South Africa,’ The Advertiser (SA), 1 November 1899, pp. 5-6; For West Australia see ‘Western Australian contingent,’ The West Australian (WA), 6 November 1899, pp. 5-7. 20 ‘For Queen and Empire,’ Argus, 30 October 1899, p. 4; Coghlan, A Statistical Account, pp. 155 (Melbourne) & 149 (Victoria). 21 For Victoria see Argus, 30 October 1899, pp. 4-6; see also The Age, 30 October 1899, pp. 5-6; ‘The South African Contingent,’ Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 30 October 1899, pp. 1 & 3; ‘Gone to the War,’ Mt Alexander Mail (Vic), 30 October 1899 , p. 2; ‘Departure of the troops; brilliant demonstration,’ Horsham Times (Vic), 31 October 1899, p. 3; For Brisbane see ‘Our contingent,’ The Courier Mail (Qld), 30 October 1899, pp. 5-6; Wills, ‘Boer War Transvaal Contingent,’ (SILENT FILM); For South Australia see ‘Troops for South Africa,’ The Advertiser (SA), 1 November 1899, pp. 5-6; For West Australia see ‘Western Australian contingent,’ The West Australian (WA), 6 November 1899, pp. 5-7. 22 ibid. 23 ibid. 24 ‘Western Australian contingent,’ The West Australian, 6 November 1899, pp. 5-7.
80
FIGURE 4: ‘Departure of the New South Wales Lancer detachment.’25
FIGURE 5: ‘The Victorian Contingent Procession’26
25 ‘Departure of the New South Wales Lancer detachment and other troops for the South African War, with crowds lining the streets to bid farewell,’ AWM A05228; also in Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ (following p. 312). 26 ‘The Victorian Contingent Procession’ – farewelling the first Victorian contingent (Stereoscopic image) – AWM P01700.001; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 25. 81 was recognised that the small number of men was unlikely to make any material difference to the very large British Army being sent. It was a tiny symbolic gesture of Australia’s support for the empire, yet it was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm.
The military disaster of Black Week changed the character of the conflict and colonial contribution. There was immediately greater concern in the Australian community; it was perceived that the empire and therefore Australia was facing greater risks. In terms of the response as measured by the scenes at the departures, however, there was little difference. In both Melbourne and Sydney, the scenes were of wide popular support, suggesting numbers similar to or greater than the departure of the first contingents.27 There were elaborate farewells for individuals and small groups who had been chosen as part of the contingents.28 These volunteers were often given expensive gifts such as pocket knives, wallets of sovereigns, photographs, fine pipes, inscribed cigarette cases, inscribed pocket diaries, field knives and tobacco.29 There were special trains and trams put on for the troop departures, as well as mementos minted.30 People connived to get into the bases the night before posing as family and pre-departure public events were swamped.31 In both capitals, the streets were packed, people stood on roofs, boys filled every tree on the routes, there was deafening cheering,
27 For Sydney the newspapers estimated between 200,000-260,000 people in the crowd. ‘The crowd,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 8 (260,000); ‘In the domain and on the wharves – a sea of humanity,’ Evening News, 18 January 1900, p. 3 (at least 200,000); For Victoria no source in the material ventured an estimate of the size of the crowds, although there were comments that the display was record breaking and the descriptions of people lining the streets are similar to those reporting the departure of the first contingent. For Melbourne examples see ‘The march of the contingent’ and ‘The march to the port,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, pp. 5-6; M. Gaunt, ‘A farewell,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, p. 6; ‘March through the city,’ The Age, 15 January 1900, p. 6. 28 ‘Farewell to contingent members,’ Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 6; ‘Farewell to the volunteers,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1900, p. 9; ‘Farewell to the volunteers,’ Evening News, 17 January 1900, p. 7. 29 ‘Farewell to contingent members,’ Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 6; ‘Farewell to the volunteers,’ Evening News, 17 January 1900, p. 7. 30 Evening News, 12 January 1899, p. 6. 31 ‘Again for Queen and Empire,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, p. 5; ‘The Bushman’s contingent’ and ‘Her majesty’s matinee,’ Evening News, 12 January1899, p. 6; Argus, 12 January 1900, p. 6.
82 banners were hung from most of the buildings on the routes, and hand-held flags were waved in the tens of thousands.32
The Argus on 15 January 1900, reporting on the departure from Melbourne stated, ‘The scene at the gates of government house was a remarkable one. Far as the eye could reach the crowd extended along the St. Kilda road, a multi-coloured mass of people.’33 As the parade moved into the city the police struggled to control the crowds. The article stated that the police had erected barriers. ‘For a long time the police made endeavours to keep the road way clear
…this failed and they tried to keep the tram track clear, but it was like attempting to push back the incoming tide with brooms.’34 The soldiers were unable to hold their formations because of these crowds. One writer described the march in Sydney as ‘all order was annihilated, and individuals were crowded by friends who obtruded themselves into the ranks.’35 The scenes at the wharves for the departure of the second contingents were similar to the scenes when the first contingents departed; large crowds on the docks and vantage points, cheering and singing, masses of boats of all sizes sounding their whistles.36 These impressions of general enthusiasm were confirmed by the photographs at Figure 6 (Sydney) and Figure 7 (Melbourne) below.
Massive crowds can be seen particularly looking down the roads toward the horizon. The people are well dressed, which prima facie suggests middle- and upper-class individuals;
32 For Melbourne examples see ‘The march of the contingent’ and ‘The march to the port,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, pp. 5-6; M. Gaunt, ‘A farewell,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, p. 6; March through the city,’ The Age, 15 January 1900, p. 6; For Sydney examples see Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1900, pp. 7-8; ‘Bourke Street,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7; ‘Bridge and Macquarie Streets,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7; ‘In Park and Pitt Street,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The traffic,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 8; ‘The crowd,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 8; ‘The scene along the route,’ Evening News, 17 January 1900, p. 5; 18 January 1900, p. 3. 33 ‘The march of the contingent’ and ‘The march to the port,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, pp. 5-6 34 ‘Bourke Street,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7; see also ‘Seeing the contingent off,’ The Bulletin, 27 January 1900, pp. 7-8. 35 ibid. 36 ‘The scene at Woolloomooloo,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The final farewell’ and ‘Greetings down the bay,’ Argus, 15 January 1900, p. 6.
83 however, dress was not even a good indicator of class at the time.37 Many in the population were aspirational and bought clothing to reflect a higher status.38 The size of the crowds themselves is a better indication that there was widespread public attendance.
The buildings were decorated with flags and bunting. In the Melbourne photograph the people can be seen sitting on the roofs below the ‘Electra-cycle’ sign. In the Sydney photo people are spilling well onto the road, on the awnings of shops, and on window ledges and up lamp posts. The troops, in unmilitary fashion, had to make their way through a narrow gap in the crowd. Civilians can be seen walking in the ranks. The good humour of the event is in particular captured by a small child close to the front of the picture wearing the helmet of one of the troopers marching with the contingent. Other photographs and illustrations of the troop departures from across Australia, including the departures of the third and fourth contingents, are consistent with these images of massive, enthusiastic crowds.39 When examining the data, caution needs to be exercised when concluding there is popular support. In particular, photographs do not show who is not there. Taken together as part of a mosaic of evidence, however, these reports and images tend to support the hypothesis that the war was popular.
37 M. Maynard, Fashioned from Penury; Dress as a Cultural Practice in Colonial Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994, p. 96; R. Twopenny, Town life in Australia, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1973 (first published in 1883), pp. 73-81. 38 Maynard, Fashioned from Penury, p. 98. 39 ‘Victorian Contingent “SS Medic” off to South Africa’ – farewelling the first Victorian contingent (Stereoscopic image) AWM P01700.002. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P01700.002 (accessed 7 March 2017); ‘Passing through Newmarket on Friday,’ (Drawing) Argus, 15 January 1900; ‘Troop ship departing’ and ‘The steamer Newcastle crowded with spectators,’ (Photographs) Australian Town and Country Journal (NSW), 27 January 1900, pp. 21, 25; ‘Departure of the troops yesterday – scene at the east side of Woolloomooloo Bay,’(Drawing), Evening News, 18 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Sydney NSW Australian troops en route for the South African War 1899- 1902,’ AWM website [online photograph] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/129016/ (accessed 7 March 2015); ‘Departure of the Bushmen’s contingent. Police band en route,’ 28 February 1900, State Records NSW, REF: 1254_a011_a011000017R.jpg [online photograph] http://investigator.records.nsw.gov.au/asp/photosearch/photo.asp?1254_a011_a011000017R (accessed 5 November 2015). 84
FIGURE 6: ‘Boer War troop parades, 1899-1901.’ Second Contingent departing Sydney [17 January 1900].40
40 ‘Boer War troop parades, 1899-1901,’ State Library of NSW [online photograph] http://acms.sl.nsw.gov.au/album/ItemViewer.aspx?itemid=845927&suppress=N&imgindex=2 (accessed 8 March 2015) and also Australian Town and Country Journal (NSW), 27 January 1900, p. 24; The State Library does not identify a specific date; however, the Australian Town and Country relates the photograph to the departure of the second contingent. The weather is also consistent with that, since the first contingent left in the rain and the second on a bright sunny day. 85
FIGURE 7: ‘Second Victorian Contingent Procession (ca 1900)’ [14 January 1900]41
41 George Rose, ‘Second Victorian Contingent Procession (ca 1900)’ [online photograph] http://trove.nla.gov.au/goto?i=picture&w=167562687&d=http%3A%2F%2Fhandle.slv.vic.gov.au%2F10381%2 F298511 The library record does not give a date; however, a poorer copy of this image is also at the AWM, showing 13 January 1900 as the relevant date; also at AWM P01700.006. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P01700.006 86
Tellingly the Bulletin, which until well after Black Week had been a vocal opponent of the war and therefore may have been predisposed to perceive the war as unpopular, observed disapprovingly that the overwhelming majority of Australians supported the war.42 This was also illustrated by the cartoon ‘Relative sizes of things in Australia just now’ (Figure 8 below), published on 27 January 1900. The cartoon implied levels of support, noting the title, the size of the soldier to the cricketer and crowds gathered around the map.43
Across the board, the observers recording the departures were stunned by what they were witnessing. One writer for the Sydney Morning Herald wrote:
Regarded merely as a spectacle, so much of yesterday’s demonstration as could be comprehended by a single pair of eyes presented a sight not easily forgotten. Some enthusiasm was to be expected, with an infusion of the emotional element among those having a personal interest in the departure of the troops. Yet I for one was scarcely prepared for the spontaneous outburst of patriotic sympathy which spread throughout the vast concourse that assembled to wish “God-speed” to our second contingent.44
At the start of the war there were by all contemporary accounts significant and emotional demonstrations at the troop departures which signified support of the empire and the imperial cause in South Africa. The turnouts for the departures reduced towards the end of the war, but these reduced crowds were more likely the product of the population having become acclimatised to the war. It was, by then, accepted as ‘business as usual.’45
42 ‘Seeing the contingent off,’ Bulletin, 27 January 1900, pp. 7-8. In the weeks after Black Week the Bulletin maintained its strident anti-war rhetoric; it was not until 10 February 1900, two months later, that it editorialised that the situation was then ‘Empire, right or wrong’ and the war had to be supported. 43 The Bulletin, 27 January 1900, p. 17. 44 ‘The scene at Woolloomooloo,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1900, p. 7. 45 When taken with the additional evidence, particularly the lack of support that the anti-war movements were able to generate at the end of the war, it is suggestive that popular support for the war had not significantly diminished. This anti-war evidence is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, pp. 130-133. 87
FIGURE 8: ‘Relative sizes of things in Australia just now.’46
46 The Bulletin, 27 January 1900, p. 17. 88
Mafeking, the last British-controlled city to be under siege by Boer forces, was relieved on 13 May 1900 which marked a key turning point in the war.47 The popular response in
Australia was another demonstration of the community’s commitment to the South African
War. The siege had been drawn out, running for 216 days. Along with its able and press- conscious commander Colonel Baden-Powell, Mafeking had become symbolic of Britain’s struggle in South Africa. Its rescue by the relief column released an unprecedented public outburst across the empire.48 The streets of English cities filled with people, cheering and singing patriotic songs.49 Fires were lit at night so that the celebrations could continue.50 The reaction was such that a phrase was coined, ‘to Maffick’, meaning ‘over the top’ celebrations.51
This reflected the popular support for the war.52 So much so that some of the rowdier, drunken revelling raised concerns for some of the imperially minded elite.53 Many community leaders had been trying to instil a public commitment to the empire, but this extreme behaviour was further than they wanted it to be taken. The reaction had, to an extent, gone too far.54
The experience in Australia was little different; the relief of the besieged garrison was greeted by a spontaneous emotional outburst.55 The Age on 24 May 1900 described the crowds as follows: ‘Collins street, Swanston street, Elizabeth street were lively enough all day with impromptu processions, and tooting, and the unearthly din of bells and buzzers. But it was in
Bourke street where the crowd abandoned itself to downright solid horse play.’56 The writer went on to describe the ongoing detonation of fireworks, saying that they were so continuous
47 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 181-182; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 42-43. 48 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 181-182; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 42-43. 49 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 181-182. 50 ibid. 51 ibid, p. 182. 52 A.M. MacDonald (ed.), Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, Thomas C. Lothian, Melbourne, 1977. 53 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, pp. 181-182. 54 ibid. 55 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 43; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 124. 56 ‘Mafeking day,’ The Age, 24 May 1900, p. 7.
89 as to be like a ‘Maxim gun’ in action.57 The Evening News on 22 May 1900 described the scene in Sydney as:
The crowd was mainly congregated in the streets of the block between Park, George, Hunter, and Castlereagh streets. The arcades, the Queen Victoria Markets, and the recognised area of “the Block” were each a continuously seething and densely packed mass of merry humanity. Everybody shouted, old age in unison with youth and when their voices failed from laryngeal exhaustion, took a turn at the less tiring but ever more effective, tin trumpet.58
There was the usual enthusiastic patriotic singing and wearing of colourful buttons and suits.
One man wore a jacket made of the Union Jack.59 These celebrations were repeated in other papers and across the country.60
Wilcox stressed that the working class were not simply taking the lead from the middle and upper classes. At a football match between Balmain and North Sydney, a crowd of 3,000 cheered the Queen, Baden-Powell and the garrison.61 After Mafeking, the President of the
Letter Carriers’, Mail Boys’ and Mail Drivers’ Association led a rendition of ‘God Save the
Queen’ and three cheers for Baden-Powell at the GPO in Sydney.62 The extent of popular involvement extended to the reports of prisoners at Darlinghurst goal singing the national
57 ibid. 58 ibid. 59 ‘Mafeking night,’ Evening News, 22 May 1900 p. 3; ‘Mafeking day,’ The Age, 24 May 1900, p. 7. 60 For examples see ‘Mafeking relief day,’ The Age, 22 May 1900, pp. 5-6; ‘Great popular demonstration,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1900, pp. 7-8; ‘At the theatres,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1900, p. 6; ‘Demonstration in Newcastle,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1900, p. 8; ‘Demonstration of the fire brigades,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1900, p. 9; ‘Demonstrations in the country,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1900, p. 9; ’Reported relief of Mafeking,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1900, p. 9; ‘Celebrations in the country,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1900, p. 8; ‘Enthusiasm on the ‘change,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1900, p. 8; ‘Military demonstrations,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1900, p. 8; ‘G.P.O Letter carriers,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1900, p. 5; ‘Mafeking rejoicing,’ South Australian Register, 23 May 1900, p. 8; ‘Relief of Mafeking rejoicings,’ The Mercury (Tas.), 22 May1900 p.3; ‘Free Mafeking,’ Darling Downs Gazette (NSW), 21 May 1900, p. 2; ‘Relief of Mafeking,’ Examiner (Launceston, Tas), 22 May 1900, p. 6; ‘Mafeking day in Fitzroy,’ Fitzroy City Press (Vic), 25 May 1900, p. 3; ‘Mafeking relief celebrations,’ Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 25 May 1900, p. 4; ‘Mafeking celebrations,’ and ‘Waratah,’ Newcastle Morning Herald (NSW), 21 May 1900 p. 6; ‘A lively week,’ Scone Advocate (NSW), 25 May 1900 p. 2. 61 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 43. 62 ibid; ‘G.P.O Letter carriers,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1900, p. 5.
90 anthem. 63 As was the case with the troop departures, the responses to the relief of Mafeking strongly suggested that the war had widespread popular support.
One of the strongest indicators of this was the activity surrounding the patriotic funds.64
These funds were essentially of two types: the first raised money to send troops and the other was a welfare fund for troops. The welfare funds were directed to paying for the upkeep of maimed soldiers, of families left at home without a breadwinner, as well as providing for widows and orphans of men killed on active service. The welfare funds were particularly important as at that time governments made little or no provision of that type. Both types of funds directly appealed to the general population for donations. These funds had sprung into existence even before the war began.65 The fundraising was supported throughout the country by concerts, dances, parades and appeals in the newspapers.66 Names of contributors and their donations are printed in the paper (see example in Figure 9 below).67 There was widespread support; even children were donating money. Local councils became involved. Funds spontaneously appeared along local, colony and occupational lines.68
On 16 October 1899 the famous British author Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem, ‘The
Absent-Minded Beggar,’ and shortly after Sir William Sullivan, of the Gilbert and Sullivan
63 ibid. 64 M. Oppenheimer, ‘Home front largesse: colonial patriotic funds and the Boer War,’ in P. Dennis and J. Grey, (eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2000, pp. 200-214. 65 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 34-35. 66 ibid, p. 31. 67 For other examples see ‘Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 November 1899, p. 5; ‘New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 1899, p. 7; ‘New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 1899, p. 7; ‘New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 1899, p. 9; ‘Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November 1899, p. 5; New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 1899, p. 7; ‘New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 November 1899, p. 9; ‘New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November 1899, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 November 1899, p. 7; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 24 November 1899, p. 5; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 1899, p. 5. 68 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 35.
91 operetta team, put it to music; all the proceeds were then to be directed to welfare funds.69 The poem and the song were in essence an emotive plea to the population of the empire as a whole; specifically it implied everyone could participate because everyone could afford a shilling.70
The poem opens:
When you've shouted "Rule Britannia": when you've sung "God Save the Queen" When you've finished killing Kruger with your mouth: Will you kindly drop a shilling in my little tambourine For a gentleman in khaki ordered South?71
This song was widely used in fundraising entertainments, whether they were military tattoos, local bands, professional music hall shows or country amateur performances. It was sung at concerts throughout the empire and was a massive success.72 In Victoria alone, Kipling’s
‘Tommy Atkins Fund’ raised 59,391 shillings ($A466,133) by 23 February 1900.73 (Note that on Figure 9 there are three instances of collections at Her Majesty’s Theatre relating to the performance of the Absent-Minded Beggar. The song became so ubiquitous it was eventually reduced to the abbreviation AMB.)
69 ‘Rudyard Kipling's New Poem - The Absent-Minded Beggar,’ Daily Mail, 31 October 1899, p. 4 extracted from Daily Mail Historical Archive, 1896-2004 [website], (accessed 16 June 2017); Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 35. 70 ibid 71 ‘Rudyard Kipling's New Poem,’ Daily Mail, 31 October 1899, p. 4. 72 ibid. As examples of monies raised by the singing of the ‘Absent-Minded Beggar’ (also referred to as ‘A.M.B’ from March 1900) in NSW see donations to ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1900, p. 8 (Figure 9); ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 9 January 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1900, p. 5; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 31 March 1900, p. 10; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 1900, p. 5; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1900, p. 10; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 1900, p. 8;‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1900, p. 5. 73 ‘Victorian Patriotic Funds,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 1900, p. 7; Currency converter on website ‘Thom Blake Historian - How much is it worth?’ http://www.thomblake.com.au/secondary/hisdata/query.php (accessed 21 March 2017). All conversions to Australian dollars hereafter are given in 2015 values and calculated using this website. 92
FIGURE 9: The New South Wales Patriotic Fund’ including amounts in 2015 Australian dollars.74
THE NEW SOUTH WALES PATRIOTIC FUND The ho. Treasurers, Messers. J. Russel French and T.A. Dibbs advise £ s p 2015 $AUS Amount previously advised 14743 15 0 $2,314,768.75 Collected by M.Morrision, Hillcrest, Nowra 13 $102.05 Mort's dock and Engineering Co. Ltd 25 $3,925.00 Employees Sanderman 2 $314.00 Park streerCab stand 2 5 $353.25 Amount throw on stage at Her Majesty's Theatre durung singing of 'Absent Minded Beggar' by Miss Dorothy Vane on 25th instant 7 10 $1,177.50 Amount throw on stage at Her Majesty's Theatre durung singing of 'Absent Minded Beggar' by Miss Dorothy Vane on 26th instant 6 6 4 $991.72 Amount throw on stage at Her Majesty's Theatre durung singing of 'Absent Minded Beggar' by Miss Dorothy Vane on 24th instant 8 0 0 $1,256.00 E. S. and A. Bank 2 16 0 $439.60 E. S. and A. Bank St Leonards 0 5 0 $39.25 Employees Finlay E. Munro 3 0 0 $471.00 C.A.W. Fowler 2 10 0 $392.50 Bradwin E.J. Bradwyn 2 2 $329.70 Newtown Bicycle club smoke concert "Absent Minded Beggar" 14 $109.90 Newtown Bicycle club smoke concert "Absent Minded Beggar" 10 $78.50 Miss J.M. Morrision 10 $78.50 R.O.Pring 2 $314.00 Collcted at the Sydney Rowing club's Boathouse 17th instant 2 1 $321.85 Mssers Watson, Montrose 1 1 $164.85 14819 0 5 $2,326,586.27
74 ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1900, p. 8.
93
The nature of fundraising in both Victoria and NSW took different paths. The NSW
Patriotic Fund was established on 30 October 1899 for the purposes of welfare to injured NSW soldiers, widows and orphans of the conflict.75 In Victoria, the Victorian Patriotic Fund did not commence until 21 December 1899.76 This did not mean that Victorians were not contributing to patriotic funds, rather they were contributing directly to English funds (like Kipling’s
‘Tommy Atkins’ Fund). After Black Week, the decision was taken to establish a Victoria- specific fund.77 The Victorian identity of this fund, however, was relatively short-lived. On 8
January 1900, in response to a request from the Mayor of London, Victoria’s fund was absorbed into a wider ‘Empire Fund.’78 The underlying idea was that any soldier of the conflict or dependent, regardless of their residence in the empire, could be a beneficiary of the fund.79
This further reinforces the idea that Australians had an empire-oriented identity.
In the first five months of the war, covering the six weeks before and the six weeks after
Black Week, the newspapers reported a total of £56,034 ($A8,797,338) collected in NSW or the equivalent of $A6.49 in 2015 values per head of population, and £39,453 ($A6,194,121) in
Victoria or $A5.16 per head of population (see tables 3 and 4 listed below). The NSW Patriotic
Fund, in its first six weeks, the period up until Black Week, raised £5,918 ($A929,126) or an average of £986 ($A154,802) per week.80 In the following six weeks, the period immediately after Black Week, the fund raised an additional £8,901 ($A1,397,457) or an average of £1,483
($A232,909) per week; a significant increase.81
75 ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1899, p. 7. 76 ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund – A subscription opened,’ Argus, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 77 ibid. 78 ‘The Empire’s Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 8 January 1900, p. 5. 79 ibid. 80 ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1899, p. 12. 81 ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1900, p. 8.
94
Newspaper tables reporting donations continued until late November 1900 when it was recorded that the fund had raised a total of £50,000 ($A7,850,000).82 Therefore, in the first four months of the fund they raised approximately £25,000 and over the next five months they raised the same amount again. Considering the other collections occurring at the time, the Patriotic
Fund for the first year of the war continued to maintain a relatively consistent level of collections.
TABLE 3: Donations to patriotic funds in New South Wales up to 3 March 1900 as reported by the Sydney Morning Herald.83
Donations EQUIVALENT FUND NAME POUNDS POPULATION per head of $A (2015) population NSW Patriotic £25,864 $A4,060,648 Bushman’s £30,170 $A4,736,690 Fund TOTALS £56,034 $A8,797,338 1,354,846 $A6.49
TABLE 4: Donations to patriotic funds in Victoria up to 23 February 1900 as reported by the Sydney Morning Herald.84
Donations FUND NAME POUNDS $A (2015) POPULATION per head of population Victorian Patriotic Fund (later the £16,444 $A2,581,708 Empire fund) Argus Fund £5,040 $A791,280 Tommy Atkins £2,969 $A466,133 Fund Bushman’s Fund £15,000 $A2,355,000 TOTALS £39,453 $A6,194,121 1,201,070 $A5.16
82 ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 1900, p. 6. 83 ‘The Bushman’s contingent’ and ‘Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 3 March 1900, p. 10; Population statistics see Coghlan, A Statistical Account, p. 149. Note: donations to the Patriotic Funds were not reported in detail in the newspapers after November 1900. References after that date are regular (fortnightly) reports from the Fund committee on the distribution to beneficiaries. *For comparison the Royal Children’s Hospital Good Friday Appeal in Melbourne raised $16.8M from 5.79M people in 2016 (Donations per head $2.90). 84 Amounts for Victoria were summarised in ‘Victorian Patriotic Funds,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 1900, p. 7; Population statistics see Coghlan, A Statistical Account, p. 149.
95
It is impossible to assign a specific percentage of these sums to classes within the society, particularly the working class. The patriotic funds were usually established by local notables, along with speeches about loyalty to England and substantial donations.85 This again reflects the pro-imperial commitment of the wealthier classes. The anecdotal evidence of collection activities and the sheer volume of attention suggests, however, that donating money was widespread. Any perusal of the relevant articles in relation to the patriotic funds shows extensive involvement in fundraising across the NSW and Victorian colonies. This included public meetings, door knocking, tin rattling, collections at church services, sporting and other events as well as donations from employee groups (railways, public servants, banks, lighthouse keepers).86 Groups such as sporting clubs (cycling, bowling, cricket, rowing), tradesmen’s associations and country towns set up committees specifically for fundraising. 87 There were also innovations such as music stores selling sheet music of the ‘Absent-Minded Beggar’ with all proceeds going to the fund.88
85 For example see ‘The patriotic fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 1899, p. 5. 86 For examples see ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 21 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 22 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 23 December 1899, p. 7; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 26 December 1899, p. 5 ; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 28 December 1899, p. 4; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 29 December 1899, p. 4; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 3 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 4 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 5 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 6 January 1900, p. 13; ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 19 January 1900, p. 5; ‘The Empire’s Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 9 January 1900, p. 5;‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus 19 January 1900, p. 5;‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus 20 January 1900, p. 13; ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus 22 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 23 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 25 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 26 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 27 January 1900, p. 13; ‘The New South Wales Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 9 January 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1900, p. 6; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1900, p. 5 ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 31 March 1900, p. 10; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 1900, p. 5; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1900, p. 8; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1900, p. 10; ‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 1900, p. 8;‘The Patriotic Fund,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1900, p. 5. 87 ibid. 88 ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 22 December 1899, p. 5.
96
There were also examples reflective of a diversity of support in the tables of donations, such as ‘Railway Loco. Branch employees (sixth instalment) £4 2s 6d’ and then the following entry:
The ladies of the Jewish Girls’ Sewing Bee gave a gypsy tea at Fern Bay on Sunday, the proceeds to be devoted to the patriotic fund. A couple of steamers left the bottom of King-street at 2 and 3 o’ clock, and were well filled. On arrival at the destination, amusements of various descriptions were indulged in. Mrs. Alfred Cohen was the hon secretary, and owing to her energetic endeavours the fund should be substantially increased.89 Although Victoria initially did not set up its own fund, once the fund was established, similar commitment could be seen. For example, the Argus on 20 December 1899 made a plea for public support for the ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund’ and then reported their £100 ($A15,744) donation and a £50 ($A7,772) pledge by Lord Brassey, Governor of Victoria.90 This was followed by a letter by Lady Janet Clarke, a leading philanthropist, who called a public meeting at ‘Cliveden,’ her mansion in East Melbourne, to establish and manage the fund.91 After that there was a letter with the nom de plume ‘Auntie,’ pleading with the children of the colony to donate a shilling of their Christmas gift money for the children of England who had lost fathers; the shilling donation was aligned to the pleas in Kipling’s poem ‘The Absent-Minded
Beggar.’92 Below that was an extensive list of contributors (similar to Figure 9 above).93
There were also events held to raise money for the patriotic funds which were very popular, such as the Jewish Girls’ sewing bee gypsy tea cited above.94 The Sydney Morning
Herald on 22 December 1899 reported on a Military Tattoo in Balmain.95 The event was a huge affair. The article stated, ‘From the early hours of the evening, trams, steamers, buses, and all
89 ibid. 90 ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund’ Argus, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 ibid. 94 Evening News, 19 December 1899, p. 6. 95 ‘Military Tattoo at Balmain,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 1899, p. 6.
97 modes of conveyance were thronged with great numbers of the public to witness the event.’96
The Tattoo was presided over by a number of dignitaries: the mayor of Balmain, the
Archbishop of Sydney and MPs. 97 The article continued:
In the centre of the oval stood a brilliant constellation formed by acetylene burners supervised by the Acetylene Gas Company’s representatives, and surrounded by numerous coloured lights, and altogether the scene presented a highly picturesque appearance.98 As part of the spectacle the military units involved were accompanied by comrades carrying torches or acetylene lamps worn on the shoulder. Ten bands in all were involved, performing a patriotic programme. The article later stated, ‘As each band marched into the square the applause was deafening.’99 Later blue and red lights were placed around the whole space as well as a powerful lantern that flashed the names of the band as they marched in. During the interval the ‘illuminated bicycle parade’ looped around the oval multiple times. At the conclusion the bands were massed for a grand finale.100 There were numerous other examples of concerts, smoke nights and sporting events.101
Shortly after Black Week a proposal was floated to raise £30,000 ($AUS4.7 million) from the public to equip a contingent of 500 Bushmen from across the Australian colonies for service in South Africa. Half the sum was pledged within a week, mainly by rich donors, further reinforcing that among the elite there was support for the imperial cause.102 John Randall
96 ibid. 97 ibid. 98 ibid. 99 ibid. 100 ibid. 101 For example see ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 21 December 1899, p. 5 (Concert in Geelong); ‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 23 December 1899, p. 7 (Cycle race);‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 3 January 1900, p. 5 (Benefit at the Alexandra Theatre);‘Victorian Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 6 January 1900, p. 13 (Coburg smoke night-MCC concert); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 20 January 1900, p. 13 (Band Performance – Hawthorn); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 22 January 1900, p. 5 (Exhibition concert); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 23 January 1900, p. 5 (Collections at ANA fete); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 25 January 1900, p. 5 (Parliamentary concert – Wandong concert); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 26 January 1900, p. 5 (League of Victorian Wheelmen’s race meeting – Concerts in Ballarat, Poowong and Benalla); ‘Empire Patriotic Fund,’ Argus, 27 January 1900, p. 13 (Concert in the Town Hall – Horsham & Kerang concert – Cricket match). 102 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 31.
98
Carey, owner of the Daily Telegraph and one of the people responsible for the concept, wrote to Australian mayors and requested that they raise funds and select recruits.103 There was a significant positive response. Committees were formed and the Press got behind the effort; names of contributors to the funds were again published in the papers.104 Some of the money was raised by holding concerts and military displays.105 There was a campaign to contribute a shilling at newspaper offices.106 Children collected money on street corners.107 Hundreds of horses and a steam tractor were offered.108 Community enthusiasm was such that the original concept of 500 Bushmen was raised to 1,400.109 There were multiple examples of the breadth and depth of the fundraising activities.110 Wilcox noted, however, that there were still insufficient funds to cover the full cost of the soldiers in the field.111 Recognising that the wealthy contributed large amounts and making allowance for a pro-imperial bias in the newspaper reporting, the evidence still suggests that donations came from all classes in the
Australian community.
The relationship between Australians and the British during the war was, however, not without abrasive incidents. On 12 June 1901 at a place called Wilmansrust, Victorian volunteers were overrun by a Boer commando and surrendered. Their conduct prompted a
British general to describe the volunteers as, among other things, ‘a lot of white-livered curs.’112
103 ibid. pp. 31-32. 104 ibid p. 32; ‘Proposed Bushman’s Contingent,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 5. 105 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 32. 106 ibid. 107 ibid. 108 ibid. 109 ibid; 110 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1900, p. 5; ‘Military Matters,’ Evening News, 5 December 1899, p. 3; ‘Another Patriotic Australian,’ Evening News, 22 December 1899, p. 5; ‘Letters to the editor’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 1899, p. 6; Evening News, 5 January 1899, p. 6; Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1900, p. 7; ‘The Bushman’s contingent’ Evening News, 12 January 1899, p. 6; A committee representing Queensland women raised money for and donated ambulances, and in South Australia, a horse called ‘Bugler’ was auctioned multiple times but never taken by the successful bidder, see Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 32. 111 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 33-34. 112 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, p. 60.
99
This comment prompted some men to respond that they should not go out again under the general’s command. This response led to a court martial and controversy in Australia.113 A second incident occurred when Lieutenants Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and Peter Handcock, serving in the Bushveldt Carbineers, an irregular unit under British control, ordered the killing of Boer prisoners. Handcock was Australian and Morant, although born in Ireland, had lived for years in Australia and had written for the Bulletin. They were tried, convicted and executed for committing war crimes on 27 February 1902. A controversy arose in Australia that they had been executed unfairly, the argument being that their actions had been unofficially sanctioned by the British command, given the guerrilla nature of the conflict.114 After all the flattery from the English authorities about colonial prowess, these incidents were unsettling and doubtless strained popular opinion; there is little evidence, though, that they seriously undermined support for the war generally.
In the British tradition the colonial governments of NSW and Victoria, and later in the war the Commonwealth, all maintained comprehensive and detailed records of government business, such as letters received and action taken.115 These records contain virtually no protest about sending Australian troops to the South African War which, while not conclusive, indicates a supportive rather than an unsupportive community. A detailed examination of official correspondence bears this point out. There was simply no record of significant complaint about the war, as compared to support for it. The Public Records Office of Victoria
(PROV) holds registers of inward correspondence to what was the government of the colony
113 ibid, pp. 57-62. 114 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 276-296. 115 VICTORIA - Registers of inward correspondence 1899 & 1900, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18 and VPRS 1164/P0000/19 Public Records Office of Victoria; NSW – Colonial Secretary – indexes to registers of letters received 1899 & 1900 – NSW State Records – Reel 2972 item 5/2591 1899 and Reel 2973 item 5/2594. COMMONWEALTH – A11823/1 Register of Miscellaneous Correspondence – National Archives of Australia (NAA).
100 of Victoria for 1899 and 1900.116 The registers were all inclusive in terms of the types of letters recorded; whether it was a cable from Chamberlain or a begging letter from a member of the public, everything was noted.117 Reviewing all of the inward correspondence for the relevant headings, specifically ‘Imperial affairs,’ ‘Defence,’ ‘Premiers,’ ‘Deputation’ and
‘Miscellaneous,’ there was one item of protest about the war itself; a cable from an Arthur
Lynch of London dated 11 October 1899.118 There was a further letter on 12 January 1900 from a Mr Watt suggesting a ‘two week truce to resolve the dispute to be a wiser and more humane basis.’119 There was also the deputation by the Peace and Humanity Society (PHS) complaining about the treatment of workers who were alleged to have been disloyal for failing to sing the national anthem.120 In comparison, there were 36 letters offering to serve and a number of others offering horses, fruit and saddles between 25 September 1899 and the end of March
1900.121 Other than the PHS protest, there were no other deputations protesting against the war.122 NSW and the Commonwealth maintained similar registers. With the exception of the
PHS anti-war petition presented to the Commonwealth government by Higgins late in the war,
116 Registers of inward correspondence 1899-1900, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18 and VPRS 1164/P0000/19 Public Records Office of Victoria. The inward register is in tabular form, recording a ‘registry number,’ date of the correspondence (both date of writing and date of receipt), the name of the sender, the government department the letter was referred to and a brief summary of the letter. The register itself is divided up into headings such as ‘Imperial affairs,’ ‘Defence,’ ‘Premiers’. 117 Registers of inward correspondence 1899-1900, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18 and VPRS 1164/P0000/19, Public Records Office of Victoria. 118 Arthur Lynch, entry recording cable from London protesting the South African war, 11 October 1899 Register of inward correspondence 1899, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18, pp. 190 & 318, Public Records Office of Victoria. 119 Entry recording letter sent by W.A. Watt 12 January 1900, Register of inward correspondence 1899, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/19, p. 22, Public Records Office of Victoria. 120 Minutes of the meeting between the Peace and Humanity Society and the Victorian Premier, 6 June 1900, VPRS 1177/P0000/8 Deputations 1897-1901, ff. 631-632, Public Records Office of Victoria; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 184; ‘Victorian Peace Society,’ Thames Star (Britain), 6 June 1900, p. 2. 121 Registers of inward correspondence 1899-1900, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18 and VPRS 1164/P0000/19 Public Records Office of Victoria. 122 Registers of inward correspondence 1899-1900, Victorian Colony, Refs: VPRS 1164/P0000/18 and VPRS 1164/P0000/19 Public Records Office of Victoria. Note that the Peace and Humanity Society (PHS) were officially protesting the threatened sacking of staff for disloyalty for failing to sing in June 1900, not the War, but the minutes show they complained about the War itself as well; Minutes of the meeting between the Peace and Humanity Society.
101 there was no correspondence or deputation protesting against the war recorded.123 (The petition, and its minimal number of signatories will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.)
A further key indicator of public support was the level of volunteering; throughout the conflict there were always more applicants than positions, including for the final
Commonwealth contingents up to 1902. It is also important to note that several thousand who were unable to enlist in colonial units because of limited spaces, signed up to join imperial units.124 This was further evidence that from a citizen’s perspective there was little difference between being a soldier for Australia or a soldier for the empire. For Wilcox the recruits were imperial volunteers rather than Australian soldiers.125
Historians have been consistent in reminding readers that patriotism was not the only motivator for volunteering. Wilcox argues that after years of depression, steady pay would have been attractive to rural men.126 Penny notes some volunteers were looking for the individual power and pleasure that war can deliver, the permission to destroy and loot.127 The economic argument, though, is not consistent with the evidence of Chief Statistician T.A. Coghlan, who contrasts the 1890–1895 with the 1895–1900 period and observes that economic indicators such as the marriage rate reflected noticeable fiscal improvement.128 Importantly, the war and in particular Black Week were crises perceived as going to the very existence of the society, which would have been a significant motivator.
123 For Correspondence Registers see NSW – Colonial Secretary – indexes to registers of letters received – NSW State Records – Reel 2972 item 5/2591 1899 and Reel 2973 item 5/2594; and for the COMMONWEALTH see A11823/1 Register of Miscellaneous Correspondence, National Archives of Australia (NAA). 124 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. xiii. 125 Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war,’ pp. 1-2. 126 ibid, p. 4. 127 Penny, ‘Australia's reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 122. 128 Coghlan, A Statistical Account of Australia and New Zealand, pp. 207-208.
102
To understand the drive behind volunteering it is also crucial to recognise the cultural environment from which it arose. This includes the imperial identity, the race loyalty and the righteousness of the empire as discussed in Chapter One, and also the way in which these values were taken up by the youth.129 The majority of commentary on this issue comes from the British experience. What occurred in Britain tended to be mirrored in Australia.130 The young people of the 1890s had been immersed through their formative years in a blend of militarism, chivalric values, duty to empire, ancestor worship and adventure.131 War was generally perceived by the culture as ennobling.132 While death in battle was seen as a glorious way to die, the chances of glory without dying were much higher, given the low percentages of deaths; they did not yet have the comparison of the cataclysmic war in 1914–1918.133 Subjects like geography and history were taught with an imperialistic bent. History was about the moral integrity of heroic
British figures who performed mighty deeds in the name of empire.134 Geography was the study of maps of the world showing the great empire in red.135 Bratton argues that the heavy-handed education system was insufficient to explain the deep engagement with empire that the British community had in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.136 She, and Crotty in the
Australian context, contend that late-Victorian children’s fiction was a powerful transmitter of the ideology.137 The adventure books enabled their readers to identify with the chivalrous
129 Chapter One pp.26-29 (imperial identity), pp. 29-30 (race loyalty), pp. 37-42 (righteousness of empire). 130 M. Crotty, Making the Australian Male: Middle Class Masculinity, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 2001, p. 12. 131 M.D. Blanch, ‘British Society and the War,’ in P. Warwick and S.B. Spies (eds.), The South African War, Longman, Harlow, 1980, p. 211. 132 Penny, ‘Australia's reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 116-117. 133 ibid. 134 Blanch, ‘British Society and the War,’ pp. 212-213. 135 W.J. Reader, At Duty’s Call: a Study in Obsolete Patriotism, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988, p. 38. 136 J.S. Bratton, ‘Of England, home and duty: the image of England in Victorian and Edwardian juvenile literature,’ in J.M. MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986, pp. 73-93. 137 ibid. Crotty makes similar although more tempered observations about the Australian audience, noting also that the majority of juvenile literature available in Australia originated in Britain. Crotty, Making the Australian Male, pp. 12, 97.
103 protagonists and participate in the excitement.138 The adventure books were more persuasive as they invited the youth to participate vicariously in empire as compared with the undisguised indoctrination of their formal education.139 The Boy’s Own Paper (BOP) has been considered one of the most influential magazines ever published for its inculcation of the imperial message into its young readership.140 The juvenile periodicals of the period were both collected and swapped. The image of Britain and the British people became an idealised myth, deeply absorbed into the individual’s values and psyche.141 The psyche of Australian youth in 1899 had been long groomed for military service in support of the empire. Recognising that patriotism was not the only factor, it was very likely to have been a significant factor for those seeking enlistment.142 Corporal George Wooten stated that he ‘could not rest’ until he had supported the Queen and the Nation.143 Trooper Brackenreg described the selection as ‘the proudest moment of his life.’144 Herbert Hosling, another volunteer in the Bushmen contingent, considered himself ‘loyal to the backbone.’145
As the Black Week disaster had driven political action, it also drove volunteering; the need to demonstrate the solidarity of the empire shifted from symbolic to essential. In Britain and in the dominions, it was considered that the core of British strength had been threatened and thousands of volunteers came forward.146 The impression in Britain at the time was that
138 Bratton, ‘Of England, Home and Duty,’ pp. 73-93. 139 ibid; MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp. 7, 18-19; Reader, At Duty’s Call, p. 20. 140 Miller, ‘In Support of the “Imperial Mission,”’ p. 702; Ferguson, Empire, pp. 256-257. 141 Bratton, ‘Of England, Home and Duty,’ pp. 73-93; MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp. 7, 18-19; Reader, At Duty’s Call, p. 20. 142 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 39-40; Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War: Imperial pressure or Colonial Realpolitik?’ pp. 207-209. 143 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 39. 144 ibid, p. 40. 145 ibid, p. 32. 146 D. Lowry, ‘When the world loved the Boers,’ History Today, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1999, p. 44.
104 the large number of volunteers could be attributed to a strong sense of patriotism and the war was viewed at the time as well supported.147
To demonstrate public enthusiasm in Australia for volunteering further, after the second contingent was raised, another, the ‘Bushmen’ contingent, was formed which was at its outset funded by public subscription.148 There was ‘a rush to enlist.’149 There were twelve men for every place in South Australia.150 The Bushman contingents signed up 1,400 in eleven weeks including medical teams and nurses.151 Despite the demand for willing men imposed by the first, second and third contingents, a fourth call was made shortly after, on 27 February 1900.152
Chamberlain, who was looking to find additional troops to assist in the relief of Mafeking via
Rhodesia instead of through South Africa, asked the colonial governments whether an additional 2,000 men fully funded by the War Office could be sent.153 They agreed without hesitation, given there was no cost, the troops would be well paid and there had been significantly more men volunteering than there had been places in the earlier contingents.154
The colonial politicians had read their population correctly and for the third time since Black
Week more applicants came forward than there were positions available – approximately 400 for Queensland’s 242 spots and 800 for Tasmania’s 100. NSW was able to fill its initial levy of 500 plus another 600, should they be required.155
This ‘over-subscription’ of volunteers continued through to the end of the war, even though the severity of the threat had subsided, and concerns had been raised about the humanity
147 Miller, ‘In Support of the “Imperial Mission,”’ p. 694. 148 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 27-29 (Second Contingent) 30-32 (Bushmen contingents). 149 ibid, p. 32. 150 ibid. 151 ibid, p. 33. 152 ibid, p. 38. 153 ibid. 154 ibid. 155 ibid, p. 39.
105 of the tactics employed by the British. When the Federal government called for men to fill the
Australian Commonwealth Horse contingents in January 1902, enough men came forward to fill the requirement multiple times over.156 After the quota for the first Australian
Commonwealth Horse contingent was filled, confidential telegrams were sent to each of the military commandants of the States on 22 January 1902. The Ministry of Defence asked ‘if there will be any difficulty in raising a second contingent and whether you had any difficulty getting the numbers for the first?’157
The responses given by the various commandants consistently demonstrated the high levels of interest. Despite the similarity of responses, their individual answers merit quoting; their language paints a picture of the enthusiasm for the call to serve. Colonel Legge (Tasmania) replied on 23 January 1902, ‘Apprehend no difficulty in raising second contingent …have had
500 applicants.’158 Lieutenant Colonel Campbell (WA) on 24 January 1902 stated, ‘I anticipate no difficulty in raising complete unit for second Commonwealth contingent. I had not the slightest difficulty getting number for first. Could have enrolled two units easily on the first night.’159 The South Australian Military Commandant, on 23 January answered, ‘…I do not anticipate any difficulty whatever. There were double the number of applications for the present unit and men in the country districts had little opportunity to apply as the numbers were
156 Cable from Colonel Legge (Tas) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902; Cable from Lieutenant Colonel Campbell (WA) to Ministry of Defence, 24 January 1902; Cable from name handwritten and illegible (SA) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902; Cable from Lieutenant Colonel Lyster (QLD) to Ministry of Defence, 22 January 1902; Cable from Brigadier General Finn (NSW) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902; Cable from Major General Downes (Vic) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 157 Cable from Ministry of Defence to military commandants 22 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 158 Cable from Colonel Legge (Tas) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 159 Cable from Lieutenant Colonel Campbell (WA) to Ministry of Defence, 24 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688.
106 easily procurable in and about Adelaide.’160 Lieutenant Colonel John Sanderson Lyster,
Commandant of Queensland on 22 January 1902 cabled, ‘no difficulty whatever in raising one or even two additional units in this State …no difficulty experienced in raising the 1st Battalion
…300 were received immediately advertisement appeared in newspapers. Before advertisement reached the North and West I was obliged to wire and stop further action as numbers required easily obtained.’161 Brigadier General Henry Finn, Commandant of NSW, on 23 January 1902 likewise stated, ‘no difficulty raising similar numbers allotted to this State for first contingent nor is expected in raising similar numbers for the second (About twelve hundred applicants who have not served in South Africa but otherwise eligible).’162 Finally,
Major General Francis Downes, Commandant of Victoria, confirmed that ‘There will be no difficulty in raising three units from this State.… no record kept 100’s applied.’163 Throughout the war the authorities experienced no difficulty in filling their ranks.
Despite all these indications of high levels of volunteering, a prima facie examination of the actual numbers seems unimpressive, since 21,000 enlisted compared to the over 300,000 who enrolled for the First World War. The number enlisted, however, did not equal the number volunteering; there were relatively few places and not everyone was accepted. The contemporary reports, like those of the commandants, suggest more than double the number accepted volunteered which suggests 42,000 to 63,000 applicants. Secondly, not everyone in
160 Cable from name handwritten and illegible (SA) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 161 Cable from Lieutenant Colonel Lyster (QLD) to Ministry of Defence, 22 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 162 Cable from Brigadier General Finn (NSW) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688. 163 Cable from Major General Downes (Vic) to Ministry of Defence, 23 January 1902 in ‘Second Commonwealth Contingent – formation of – confidential wires sent to Military commanders and their replies,’ National Archives of Australia Series A6443 item 688.
107 the population could apply. The basic requirements were that a man had to be single, between
20 and 40 years old, over 5 feet 6 inches (168 cm) and fit.164 The average age for men to marry at that time was 29.165 Overall, the population of males in 1901 aged between 20 and 30 was
336,594.166 This would suggest those actually recruited made up 6 percent of men of the right age, with approximately 12–18 percent applying.
Given the levels of interest and the small number of positions, the military could, however, set the bar very high. They could pick the fittest men as well as preferring those who could shoot and ride (militia experience was also preferred in the early stages).167 Wilcox stated that ‘rigorous medical, shooting and riding tests turned away many applicants.’168 This ability to ‘shoot and ride’ did not appear to limit the recruitment to rural areas and occupations. Based on Victorian information, only 42 percent of the recruits were in this category.169 Nevertheless, competition would have dramatically reduced the available pool of possible candidates.
Chamberlain noted that the medical standards were particularly strict, and a candidate could be excluded for poor teeth.170 High fitness standards would have reduced the pool even further.
As a conservative estimate, presuming that height, fitness and ability removed one-third of potential candidates, as was the case in the First World War, this could have left a pool as low
164 E. Scott, Australia During the War: Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol 11 (7th edn.), Angus and Robinson, Sydney, 1936, p. 439. The NSW infantry required a minimum height of 5 feet 7 inches and mounted troops 5 feet 6 inches; the average height of Australians in 1900 was 5 feet 6.4 inches (172 cm): M. Roser, ‘Human Height,’ from ‘Our world in data’ website, https://ourworldindata.org/human-height/ (accessed 5 April 2017). 165 Coghlan, A Statistical Account, p. 208. 166 The total number of breadwinners (people employed) was 1,642,677 and the total number of agricultural workers was 414,847. Coghlan, A Statistical Account, p. 1005 (Total number of breadwinners), p. 1007 (Total number working in agriculture). Chamberlain notes, based on the details of the Victorian recruits, 95 per cent were under 30: W.M. Chamberlain, ‘The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers,’ Historical Studies, Vol. 20, No. 78, 1982, p. 49; Australian War Memorial website [website], ‘Encyclopaedia – Enlistment standards’ https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/enlistment/ (viewed 23 March 2017). 167 Chamberlain, ‘The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers,’ p. 48; 168 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 22. 169 Chamberlain, ‘The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers,’ p. 49. 170 ibid, p. 48.
108 as 224,000.171 This would suggest 19 to 28 percent of the available men could have applied to serve.172 On balance, the percentage probably leans toward the higher numbers, firstly because of the other evidence of support for the war throughout this thesis, and secondly because it is consistent with recruitment figures from the First World War. During the First World War, the age range was greater; candidates could be between 21 and 45 years old.173 There was also no requirement to be single or to shoot and ride.174 The statistics for the period show there were
849,120 men aged between 21 and 45 and of those 416,812 enlisted; therefore, without considering those applying, which would have been a much greater number, 49 percent of the available pool signed up.175
While it is difficult to know what working-class opinion of the South African War was, indications suggest that it was the same as the middle and upper classes. Working-class behaviour was consistent with the imperial identity, the race loyalty and the perceived righteousness of the empire (as discussed in Chapter One).176 This is further reinforced by the attitudes and behaviour of the representatives of the working class, Labor and the trade union movement (to be discussed in Chapter Four, which examines the dissenters).177 The population did not protest, volunteered if they could and, as discussed in Chapter One, in some cases punished dissenting politicians electorally when the dissent was fresh in their memory. They also punished publications like the Bulletin for their anti-war stance in the initial stage of the war. Journalists, editors, illustrators and photographers captured the enthusiasm of the
171 For First World War enlistments rejected on medical grounds see Scott, Australia During the War, pp. 211- 212. 172 This figure is based on the more than double the number of positions quoted above, 42,000 to 63,000 divided by 224,000. 173 Scott, Australia During the War, p. 439. 174 ibid, pp. 211-212, Medical officers in the First World War initially also applied a rigorous fitness standard, given they had more applicants than positions. 175 J. Bou and P. Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2016, Table 3.2, Total enlistments on p. 60; Population statistics from G.H. Knibbs, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1913, McCarron Bird & Co, Melbourne, 1914, p. 119. 176 Chapter One, pp.26-29 (imperial identity), pp. 29-30 (race loyalty), p. 33 (Seeley and the popularity of Greater Britain), pp. 37-42 (righteousness of empire). 177 Chapter Four, pp. 114-120. 109 population as they raised money to support the war effort and cheered the troops as they left.
The crowds waited for uncomfortable hours for glimpses of the volunteers. The public cheered and sang until they were hoarse. They did so virtually until the departing ships were no longer in sight. They did so packed tightly together, hanging from every vantage point, in heat, bucketing rain, and in the instance of the first NSW contingent, with the threat of bubonic plague.
110
CHAPTER 4 - DISSENT
This chapter will examine the contemporary dissenters of the South African War, specifically discussing who they were, their attitudes and politics, and their reasons for objecting to the dispatch of Australian contingents. This will assess the evidence about the numbers of dissenters, both in politics and the general community. It will also examine their reasons, whether legal, moral or practical, for objecting to the war. Particular attention will be paid to the extent to which dissent against the war could be linked to a desire to disengage from the empire itself, specifically how much of the evidence supports the idea that Australians were seeking a separate identity from that of the empire. Other factors to be considered will be whether anti-Semitic feeling was a significant influence over the dissent and whether dissent changed over time.
The first crucial point is that there was only ever a very small number of dissenters, reflecting the strong support in the population for both the empire and the war. The most vocal were made up of a small number of politicians (this included a portion of the Labor representatives), Professor Wood (Challis Chair of History at the University of Sydney), the
Bulletin (until February 1900), the Catholic Times (edited by Tighe Ryan) and trade union papers such as The Worker. Other dissenters included some, but certainly not all, Labor and trade union delegates, some members of the Catholic community and the membership of two anti-war parties [the Anti-War League (AWL) and the Peace and Humanity Society (PHS)].
Both the AWL and the PHS at their respective peaks in late 1901 never mustered much more than 1,000 signatures each for their petitions (discussed below). 1
1 See pp. 127-128. 111
Until Black Week, the main voices of dissent were a small number of politicians mainly in the larger colonies of Victoria and NSW; 14 out of 64 (or 21 percent) in Victoria voted against sending troops and 10 out of 68 (or 15 percent) in NSW.2 There was a higher percentage in South Australia ten out of 18 (or 36 percent); however, close reading of the South Australian debate shows that the dissenters viewed sending 126 South Australians to assist the legendary
British Army as pointless, rather than looking deeply into the actual merits of the dispute.3 For example, Frederick William Coneybeer, South Australian MLA, quoted the Bulletin:
This proposed patriotic uprising is to help Great Britain in a war with 80,000 Boers of the little state of Vaal. The population of Ireland and Great Britain is over 40,000,000 – say, 300 to 1 odds against the Boers. Reckoning Britain and British India together, and no taking count of the rest of the Empire, the odds against the farmer of the little republic are about 3,000 to 1, without Australian interference.4 In Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, there was no division taken so there is no means of determining the extent of dissent, although dissenters must have been in the minority because the vote was lost on a show of hands.5
The main arguments of the dissenters included that the colonial parliaments did not have sufficient information to make a proper decision, that the Boers had not acted unreasonably in their treatment of the Uitlanders, that the Transvaal government had the right to legislate to manage its internal affairs and that the franchise issue was merely a front for wealthy British speculators (notably Rhodes).6 For these reasons, the use of the immense power
2 See Table 1 in Chapter One. 3 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) pp. 608-611 (5 October 1899), pp. 621-644 (10 October), pp. 651-661 (12 October 1899). 4 ibid, (12 October 1899) p. 656. 5 See Table 1 in Chapter One. 6 For moral and legal reasons see Holman in, NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1460-1470; Murray in Field, The Forgotten War, p. 28; VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1729-1731, 1733-1734; Higgins in Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 21; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 28; VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1776-1779; Griffith in NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1538-1552; Hughes in Field, The Forgotten War p. 31; NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, pp. 1432-1436; Norton at Town Hall in Connolly, ‘“Manufacturing spontaneity,,”’ p. 107; NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1518-1524; NSWPD(LA) 18 October 1899, pp. 1471-1472; Smith, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1739-1742; MacCay, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1744-1748; Dr. Maloney, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1751-1755; Ashton, NSWPD(LA),18 October 1899, pp. 1445-1453; Hayes, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1505-1513; Edden, NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1565-1567.
112 of the British Empire in comparison to the tiny South African republics was immoral.7 There was also concern about the ‘unlimited’ financial liability of colonial involvement at a time when critics perceived the need for the money to be spent in the colony to be greater.8 After
Black Week (10–17 December 1899), what little parliamentary opposition there was initially, evaporated almost entirely. Most dissenters expressly recanted their initial position.9 For example, John Norton, an NSW MLA (Labor), who had spoken against the pro-Uitlander position at the Sydney Town Hall in May 1899, supported the motion to send troops, arguing that the ‘time for talking and protest has gone by.’10 The votes in the NSW and Victorian colonies passed without a division (see also Figure 1 in Chapter One).11
Only a handful of individuals stuck to their original opposition and continued to make public their protests.12 For example William Holman, NSW MLA (Labor), continued to argue against sending troops. He stated on 19 December 1899 the only reasons to send troops were
‘It may be necessary for the success of the English in their battles at the Cape. It may be necessary as a demonstration of loyalty. It may be necessary to save or restore the perhaps endangered prestige of the old country.’13 He stated, however, that sending troops from NSW would not alter any of these factors.14 Josiah Thomas, NSW MLA (Labor), followed Holman’s
7 ibid. 8 For monetary reasons see Hamilton, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1735-1736; Dr. Maloney, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1755-1759; Cook, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1763-1764; Watt, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1766-1769. 9 Wilcox, ’Australia’s involvement in the Boer War: Imperial pressure or Colonial Realpolitik? p. 203. 10 NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3505; For Norton at Town Hall meeting Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 107; ‘Transvaal Grievances-Meeting at Town Hall, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1899, p. 5; For other examples of politicians who changed their original position see Rawson, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, pp. 2865-2866; Murphy, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2866; Tucker, VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, pp. 2873-2874; Donaldson, NSWPD (LA) 19 December 1899 p. 3522. 11 VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2883; VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2863; NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3528; NSWPD(LC), 19 December 1899, p. 3486; QPD(LA), 20 Dec 1899, p. 1475; QPD(LC), 21 Dec 1899, p. 1511; Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) pp 359, 1079 (19 December 1899). 12 Higgins and Griffith did not change their views but ceased making public statements on the issue; Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 204. 13 NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3520. 14 ibid, pp. 3520-3521.
113 stance.15 John Murray, Victorian MLA (Labor), announced that he would not oppose the motion as ‘he knew it would be perfectly useless’ but he asked for explanations.16 He complained that with the sending of the first contingent there were only meagre reasons given.17
According to Penny, imperial sentiment was so overwhelming in Australia that anti-war advocates could do nothing until the wave of support subsided.18
Opposition to the war in parliament did not resurface again until early in the life of the new Commonwealth in January 1902. Henry Bournes Higgins, Member of the Commonwealth
House of Representatives (MHR), made the main case.19 His objections extended his earlier argument in October 1899 when he had been Victorian MLA.20 Specifically, he stated that he felt initially that the war was ‘unnecessary and unjust’ but that the situation had become even starker.21 He further stated:
I intend to do so [vote against the contingent], now that there is a proposal for a contingent, not for the purpose of giving Uitlanders their rights – not for the purpose of driving back the Boers who have invaded Natal – but for the purpose of absolutely and unconditionally subjugating the two Boer republics.22 Five members out of a total of fifty voted against the 14 January 1902 motion to send
Commonwealth contingents.23 Overall, while vocal, the numbers of dissenters in the parliaments throughout the war was small.24 This is particularly true when comparing the
Australian experience with Britain. During October 1899 a motion was moved in the House of
Commons expressing disapproval of the war; this received 27 percent of votes.25 In the same
15 NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3525. 16 VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, pp. 2865; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 59. 17 ibid. 18 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 98, 108-109. 19 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8754-8762. 20 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1776-1779. 21 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8753. 22 ibid; Charles McDonald, MHR (Labor) added that the men were needed here to work the land and that war brutalised them. See CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8774. 23 For Commonwealth voting data see CPD(HR) 14 January 1902, p. 8800 (and Table 2 in Chapter 1). 24 For overall voting data see Table 2 in Chapter One. 25 The 19 October 1899 motion was defeated 362 to 135 (27%) see Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, pp. 38-47.
114 month the Australian colonial assemblies were voting on the question of whether to send troops; only 15.5 percent of votes were against this action.26 A second motion on 26 February
1901 in the House of Commons condemned the conduct of the conflict, this received 20 percent of the votes.27 Almost a year later, on 14 January 1902, the Australian Federal Parliament, voting on the question of whether to send further troops had only 5 percent of members opposed.28
Importantly, even before Black Week, no Australian politician argued against being part of the empire, only against what the empire was doing in the South African conflict.
Underlining this fact, with only isolated exceptions, each of these men declared their loyalty to the empire.29 In particular, they made a distinction between the South African War, which they did not perceive as a threat to the empire, and some future event which could be considered a real danger. In that situation, they passionately declared they would give wholehearted support.
For example, Norton stated on 18 October 1899, ‘when Parliament is seriously considering a matter …I shall deliberate with a loyalty which I trust will do me credit.’30 On the following day he stated, in reference to the empire, ‘I believe we will be ready to send her 10,000 troops who will be able to effectively defend her if she should stand in need.’31
There were multiple other examples of these patriotic declarations.32 Virtually all of the other dissenting parliamentarians who spoke made similar statements of loyalty.33 In the
Victorian House of Assembly, thirteen voted against sending troops, ten spoke and nine of
26 For the Australian Colonial Parliaments results see Table 2 in Chapter One. 27 The 26 February 1901 motion was defeated 243 to 91 (20%) see UKPD(HC) 26 February 1901, cc. 1239-91; Porter, ‘The Pro-Boers in Britain,’ p. 250. 28 For the Australian Federal Parliament results see Table 2 in Chapter One. 29 There was only one instance in those colonies where a division is taken (NSW, Victoria and South Australia) that a politician who spoke who did not declare his loyalty; William Maloney MHR (Victoria). Maloney, did not address loyalty but neither did he repudiate it. See below and APPENDIX C – Dissenters and statements of loyalty. 30 NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1471. 31 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1524. 32 Other examples are at APPENDIX C- Dissenters and statements of loyalty. 33 See APPENDIX C – Dissenters and statements of loyalty.
115 those made statements of loyalty.34 William Maloney, Victorian MLA, was the exception. He did not make a clear statement of loyalty; however, it is difficult to conclude from his speech that he was anti-imperial.35 Primarily, he argued that the money needed to be spent on old-age pensions to assist the destitute and was continuously called to order by the speaker for this repeated irrelevance.36 In NSW, ten voted against the motions, four spoke and all four made statements of loyalty.37 In the South Australian Legislative Assembly, ten voted against the motion, nine spoke and all made statements of loyalty.38 In Queensland, where the vote was a confidence motion in protest of the Premier’s action (rather than on the question of whether to send troops) the great majority still made loyalty statements.39 Only two Queensland politicians who voted in favour of the no-confidence motion, James Charles Stewart MLA (Qld) and
George Ryland MLA (Qld), did not make statements of loyalty.40 Ryland went further and complained about the conduct of the British in Ireland. 41 These declarations of loyalty continued through to the final Australian parliamentary debate of the war. In the
Commonwealth Parliament, five voted against the motion, two spoke and both made statements of loyalty.42
This declaration of loyalty to empire was particularly true of the prominent political dissenters who feature in the historiography, such as Holman, Murray, Higgins, Griffith, and
William ‘Billy’ Hughes, NSW MLA (Labor). For example, the most controversial episode of
34 See APPENDIX C – TABLE C1 – Victorian dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on the sending of troops to South Africa (10 October 1899). 35 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1751-1759. 36 ibid, pp. 1752,1756, 1757, 1758 ,1759. 37 See APPENDIX C – TABLE C2 NSW dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on the sending of troops to South Africa (18-19 October 1899). 38 See APPENDIX C – TABLE C4 South Australian dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on sending of troops to South Africa (12 October 1899). 39 See APPENDIX C – TABLE C3 – Queensland members expressing concern over the war and statements of loyalty during the first debate on the no-confidence motion in the Premier, as distinct from whether or not to send troops (18-19 October 1899). 40 ibid. 41 QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, pp. 487-489. 42 See APPENDIX C – TABLE C5 Commonwealth dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the final debate in regards to sending of troops to South Africa (14 January 1902).
116 the pre-Black Week dissent was the comment on 18 October 1899 by Holman, who, after putting the case against the war, stated, ‘I hope that England may be defeated.’43 For this remark and its consequences – Holman was physically attacked at an event and burnt in effigy – he is cited throughout the historiography as one of the notable dissenters.44 The detail of Holman’s outburst is important. First, the atmosphere in the debate was intense; there were frequent interjections and frequent allegations that pro-Boers were traitors.45 Second, in that environment Barton baited Holman, asking him whom he thought should win and Holman answered reactively.46 Holman immediately recognised the serious error of his statement and modified it to wanting to see the Rand lords defeated.47 The Bulletin on 4 November 1899 was scathing about his retraction, specifically stating ‘his ‘mistake’ was magnificent but his ‘crawl out’ hideous.’48 Holman’s comments were seriously outside what was acceptable, rashly spoken and earnestly retracted. Whether these were his own views, which is likely, or that he felt compelled because of public opinion, Holman was adamant in his loyalty to empire.49
The other prominent dissenters stated and restated their loyalty throughout the period.
Higgins, a politician of Irish origin and radical in the Australian political context, stated on 10
October 1899:
43 NSWPD(LA,) 18 October 1899, p. 1466. 44 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 21, 26; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 31-32; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 212, 215 (including footnote 30); M. Clark, History of Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1993, p. 406; H. McQueen, A new Britannia (4th ed.), Penguin books, Ringwood, 2004, pp. 21-22. 45 The Speaker Joseph Palmer Abbott NSW MLA noted he was in difficulty controlling the House. Abbott stated that he had not had such difficulty in the nine years he had been in the role. NSWPD(LA), 17 October 1899, p. 1388; B. Nairn, 'Abbott, Sir Joseph Palmer (1842–1901)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/abbott-sir-joseph-palmer-2858/text4069, published first in hardcopy 1969, (accessed 12 April 2017) 46 NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1466. Crawford also noted that Holman was very young at the time, 28 years old and answered ‘impetuously.’ See R. M. Crawford, A bit of a rebel, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1975, p. 152. 47 NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 1469. 48 The Bulletin, 4 November 1899, p. 7. 49 Holman restated his loyalty again at the Labor Conference on 5 February 1902. Specifically, he stated that ‘he had proved his loyalty to the British Empire by helping to pull down the statesmen ‘who were trying to ruin the British Empire.’ It is significant that Holman publicly expressed this view at the late stages of the war and at gathering of Labor representatives. See ‘The South African War,’ The Worker 8 February 1902, p. 3.
117
I think it will serve to convey our feeling that it is not our duty, at this stage and in this war, to interfere in the affairs of the mother country, much as we love her and wish to stand by her, and that it is our business to wait until she is in need, and then we will help her.50 Later, while serving in the Commonwealth parliament, he was again an outspoken opponent of the war, but on 14 January 1902 stated ‘…I said then as I have said always, that if England were in extreme need – if her existence were in danger and it were a matter of life and death – we should spend every man and every shilling in defending the empire.’51 Later on the same day he stated:
I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am one who regards as clear that no empire in the history of the world has done so much for civilization and for liberty as the British Empire. I may also add, if the honourable members will allow me to do so, that personally I belong to a stock which is the most loyal and the most attached to the England of all stocks within the wide ring of the world. 52 He went on for the rest of the column describing the greatness of England.53 Griffith also affirmed his loyalty at a number of points, specifically on 19 October 1899 when he stated:
I think it is well that I should say, though it may not be necessary to say, that if at the present time the empire was engaged in a struggle for life and death against some powerful European combination then I should be willing, without considering the rights and wrongs of the case that every penny of our money and every man that could shoulder a rifle should be used in the contest, upon the ground of overwhelming necessity of struggling for national existence would stifle any abstract considerations of right or wrong. 54 Later in the same speech he stated, ‘I should be willing to shed my last drop of blood for the independence of my country. I hope if this country is ever threatened the hon. Member will be as willing to fight as the Boers are willing to fight for their country.’55
Hughes on 18 October 1899 asserted his loyalty specifically: ‘For my part, while I yield to no man in loyalty to the nation I belong to.’56 Then again, ‘so long as we are prepared to
50 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1779. 51 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8753. 52 ibid, p. 8755. 53 ibid. 54 NSWPD(LA) 19 October 1899 p. 1539. 55 ibid. 56 NSWPD(LA) 18 October 1899 p. 1429.
118 accept the protection of Great Britain we must be ready to lend a hand in her hour of need.’57
Hughes, however, did not consider this situation an instance where Britain should have
Australia’s support.58 On 10 October 1899 as part of his opening speech, Murray too stated,
‘of course we are all essentially loyal.’59
Importantly, where the record exists, the prominent dissenters were good to their word that they would support Britain in what they considered to be a true crisis. Holman supported
Australia’s involvement in the First World War as Premier of NSW in 1914 and campaigned for conscription in the face of Labor party opposition.60 Higgins saw no alternative to fighting
Germany.61 Griffith considered the First World War was a struggle for civilization, requiring total support. Like Holman, he supported conscription despite Labor’s opposition.62 Wood, after reading the published diplomatic exchanges, concluded Germany had caused the war and he supported the war effort.63 Billy Hughes as Prime Minister vigorously supported the war, including a referendum on conscription.64
57 ibid, p. 1434. 58 ibid. 59 VPD(LA) 10 October 1899 p. 1729. 60 B. Nairn, 'Holman, William Arthur (1871–1934)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/holman-william-arthur- 6713/text11589, published first in hardcopy 1983, (accessed 14 March 2016) and also NSWPD(LA), 5 August 1914, pp. 584-585; NSWPD(LA), 16 June 1915, pp. 51-52. 61 John Rickard, 'Higgins, Henry Bournes (1851–1929)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/higgins-henry-bournes- 6662/text11483, published first in hardcopy 1983, (accessed 14 March 2016). 62 B. Nairn, 'Griffith, Arthur Hill (1861–1946)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/griffith-arthur-hill-6486/text11117, published first in hardcopy 1983, (accessed 14 March 2016). 63 R. M. Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold (1865–1928)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wood-george-arnold- 9170/text16193, published first in hardcopy 1990, (accessed 14 March 2016). 64 L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'Hughes, William Morris (Billy) (1862–1952)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hughes-william-morris- billy-6761/text11689, published first in hardcopy 1983, (accessed 14 March 2016).
119
Charles McDonald, Queensland MLA (Labor) and later MHR (Labor), a politician noted for his republican sentiments, was the one exception in the parliamentary arena.65 He stated:
I hold that Australia is destined to be a great and independent nation. While I pay to Great Britain all the respect which is due from us as descendants of the British race, I hold that the time will come when Australia will not be dependent upon Great Britain, but will be a free and independent nation. …I believe this is the ultimate destiny of the Australian people. I do not think that the great British Empire to which we belong at present can possibly exist for all time.66 McDonald, however, was a lone voice and his republican sentiment was heavily qualified as it was posed hypothetically about a distant time in the future. This was likely the only way a republican sentiment could have been expressed at the time.
Anti-Semitism was a common feature of the dissent both in England and Australia, sometimes ardently so.67 Most of the opposition attributed Britain and Australia’s involvement in the war to the influence of capitalists like Rhodes. Often the argument went further, specifically alleging Jewish capitalist influence.68 It is important to note that anti-Semitism in this period, like racism generally, was common and culturally acceptable.69 The English journalist J.A. Hobson, who was working for the Manchester Guardian, wrote a number of articles and papers protesting the war.70 His writings, with their anti-Semitic themes, found
65 T. Moroney, 'McDonald, Charles (1860–1925)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mcdonald-charles-7334/text12729, published first in hardcopy 1986, (accessed 29 March 2016). 66 See CPD(HR) 14 January 1902 p.8774. McDonald made similar statement in the Queensland parliament during the debates on whether or not to send a contingent to South Africa. Specifically, he stated ‘…I hope to live to see the day when Australia will become and independent nation.’ QPD, 11 October 1899 p. 503. 67 Porter, ‘The Pro-Boers in Britain,’ pp. 245-246; Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, pp. xxix, 26, 43, 55,57, 58, 94, 95, 149; Antisemitism in Australia, Safe Haven: Records of the Jewish Experience in Australia, National Archives of Australia website, http://guides.naa.gov.au/safe-haven/chapter6/antisemitism.aspx (accessed 19 June 2017). 68 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 109-110; Hobson, The War in South Africa, pp. 189-197. 69 C. Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society, Edward Arnold, London, 1979, p. 68. 70 Holmes, Antisemitism, pp 66-68. Hunt, T, ‘JA Hobson, Lenin and Anti-Imperialism,’ Sunday Feature, Great British Ideas, BBC Radio 3, broadcast 22:00 Fri 20 Jul 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006tnwp. (accessed 4 July 2017); Hobson, The War in South Africa; Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 110.
120 resonance and were influential with fellow opponents in the Australian colonies.71 When the
AWL sought to inform the public of the case against the war, Griffith produced a document called ‘Facts about the Transvaal’ which was a distillation of Hobson’s lengthier protest that the war was driven by moneyed Jewish interests.72 Specifically, the booklet stated, ‘Today her government is controlled and her policy shaped by a few millionaire brewers, and moneylenders, mostly Jews whose instrument of government is capitalist owned press.’73
There were other examples of dissenters making anti-Semitic comments. Vincent Bernard
Lesina, MLA Queensland (Labor) stated:
Will any hon. Member in this Chamber venture to tell me that Cecil Rhodes, or Dickson, or the big moneyed Jews in Johannesburg or the Jews in London who own the London Press, and are forcing on this jingo agitation, care a tinker’s curse about the extension of the franchise to the Uitlanders? They do not care a red cent.74 Lesina proceeded to name the Jewish men who allegedly owned each of the London papers and then stated, ‘There we have a number of ‘hawk-beaked, vulturous Jews egging on a bloodthirsty war in the Transvaal.’75 Dawson, MLA Queensland, described the war as a ‘Jewish invasion.’76 There were other instances where Murray, Smith and Holman all made anti-
Semitic comments in relation to the war.77 Anti-Jewish prejudice was an influence on the dissent against the South African War.
71 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 110. 72 A. Griffith, The facts about the Transvaal, Being a Series of Excerpts from Mr. J. A. Hobson’s Book With an Introduction and Notes by Arthur Griffith, M.P., The Worker Trades Union Printery, Sydney, 1902; Special Collections, University of Melbourne Library, REF: MIL:BOER:GRIF. 73 ibid. 74 Lesina, QPD(LA), 12 October 1899, p. 397; R. Barber, 'Lesina, Vincent Bernard (Joe) (1869–1955)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lesina-vincent-bernard-joe-7174/text12397, published first in hardcopy 1986, accessed 3 June 2016. 75 Lesina, QPD(LA), 12 October 1899, p. 402. 76 Dawson, QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p. 344. 77 Murray described the Uitlanders as ‘Russian Jews,’ that were ‘riff-raff’ of the old world. Murray, VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1730; Murray later quoted a British newspaper that states ‘The cost of the war will be borne, not by the sordid gang of Jews and adventures in whose interest this war is fought…’ VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2870; Smith attributed the trouble, to among others, the Russian Jews; VPD(LA),10 October 1899, p. 1741; Holman blamed the war on German Jews; Wilcox Australia’s Boer War p. 324; Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 109-110.
121
Two key groups labelled as dissenters by earlier historians were the Labor Party and the trade unions, although not all Labor members and trade unionists agreed with the pro-
Boers.78 Opposition to the war did not follow party lines.79 There was strong evidence to suggest that a large majority of the Labor Party and the trade union movement supported the empire and a large minority supported the war for reasons they believed to be sound. This was reflected in the initial votes for and against sending troops. Of the ten parliamentarians in
Victoria that could be identified as Labor or closely affiliated with the trade union movement, five voted for and five against.80 Of the fourteen members in the NSW parliament, eight voted against the 19 October motion and six in favour.81 In addition, there were a number of Labor politicians who not only supported the empire but the war. Prior to Black Week, Richard Sleath,
NSW MLA (Labor), on 19 October 1899 spoke in favour of the motion to send troops and was very critical of those who opposed the war.82 He repeated Holman’s comments even after
Holman’s apology, which in turn produced a fracas in the parliament.83 Further, Sleath used an industrial analogy to justify the war, that is, once a strike started unionists were really not in a position to question it. He concluded, ‘I believe it is absolutely necessary, in the interests of the British Empire, that England should have supremacy in South Africa.’84 William Arthur
Trenwith, Victorian MLA, the Labor leader, speaking in favour of the motion to send troops on 10 October 1899, observed that Australia and the other dominions showing solidarity would
78 Clark, History of Australia, p. 414; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 217; Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 116; Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, p. 151; J. Hirst, The sentimental nation: the making of the Australian Commonwealth, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne p. 233. 79 Penny, ‘Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 128. 80 See APPENDIX D; TABLE D1: Labor voting in the Victorian House of Assembly on the sending of the first contingent to the Second Anglo-South African War (10 October 1899). 81 See APPENDIX D -TABLE D2: Labor voting in the NSW House of Assembly on sending of the first contingent to the Second Anglo-South African War (19 October 1899); Note: Connolly provided extensive analysis of voting patterns aligned to class, however, these are problematic. The Queensland parliament was included in the tables but did not divide on the question of sending troops but on the question of confidence in the Premier for offering troops without consulting parliament. Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ Tables I-IV, pp. 226-229. 82 NSWPD(LA) 19 October 1899 pp. 1557-1560. 83 ibid. 84 ibid. The Bulletin described Sleath and McGowen, the Labor Leader, voting in favour, also as Jingos ‘Plain English,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899 p. 7.
122 be a valuable demonstration to the rest of the world.85 He raised the spectre that a European power may have already secretly agreed to come to Kruger’s aid because his behaviour otherwise was inexplicable.86 He argued Kruger was known to be shrewd and there were many nations jealous of Britain’s power. Although the dispute was small, he saw it was a question of not compromising British prestige.87
After Black Week, Trenwith gave a patriotic speech at the town hall on 8 January 1900 supporting the war.88 Murray, in parliament the following day, expressed his astonishment that the leader of the Labor party had supported the imperial cause in contrast to John Burns, Labour
Party leader in Britain.89 Specifically he described Trenwith as ‘an Imperialist of Imperialists.
He did not merely wish to see the flag of England floating over the Transvaal, but floating over every other flag in the world.’90 Tom Price, South Australian MLA and the Labor leader who had opposed the sending of the first contingent, supported the new motion because England and the empire were by then in difficulty.91 Anderson Dawson, Queensland MLA, the Labor leader who rallied support against Dickson’s offer of troops without reference to parliament, questioned whether Britain could prevail in South Africa and expressed the fear that England’s
85 VPD(LA) 10 October 1899, pp. 1775-1776. 86 ibid, p. 1775. 87 ibid. 88 Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 59-60 89 VPD(LA) 9 January 1900 p. 2870; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 59-60. The description of John Burns as a British Labour leader requires clarification. He was a prominent trade unionist and socialist but a member of the Liberal party, then the party of social reform. The advance of the Labour Party as a separate entity in the House of Commons was significantly behind that of the various Labor parties in Australia. This can largely be attributed to the fact the franchise in Britain was still restricted in such a way that a significant portion of working class men still did not have the vote, a situation that was not reversed until 1918 (when the property qualification was removed and women were first given the vote). In the election of October 1900 (‘the Khaki election’), the Labour Representation Party fielded fifteen candidates, only two of which were elected, Keir Hardie and Richard Bell. John Burns remained, and was returned, as a Liberal member during that election. Hardie and Bell, although a fraction of the Pro-Boers, were opposed to the war. Porter stated, while Hardie and Bell spoke out against the war, they were never at the forefront. This was arguably because the war was secondary to the social issues they were facing. Koss, The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, pp. 94-96 (John Burns) p. 166 (Labour and the 1900 Election) Porter, ‘Pro-Boers in Britain,’ p. 244; For UK suffrage see N. Johnston, ‘The History of the Parliamentary Franchise,’ Research Paper 13/14, 1 March 2013, pp. 40-45 UK parliament website: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP13-14#fullreport (accessed 21 June 2017) 90 VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2870; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 59-60. 91 Field, The Forgotten War, p. 60.
123 competitors would make ‘a dash for her possessions.’92 The Labor Party conference in 1900, shortly after Black Week, did not debate the war; this was probably because of the strong pro- war sentiment in the aftermath of Black Week.93 Trade unionists like the President of the
Victorian Amalgamated Miners stated that they were behind ‘humanity and upholding the
British flag.’94
When the war entered its final phases, spurred by Kitchener’s scorched earth tactics and the brutality of the concentration camps, dissent by some Labor representatives and some trade unionists surfaced again. Opinion, however, was still split. Of those Labor members of the House of Representatives who voted on the bill to send further contingents to South Africa on 14 January 1902, noting that they were not bound by party discipline on this issue, five were for the motion and four were against.95 The four members against the motion mostly left
Higgins to deliver the argument.96 James Fowler MHR (Labor) spoke in favour of sending the contingents.97 He argued that the Boers, through their backward behaviour such as mistreating
92 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 26. 93 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 217. 94 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War,’ p. 26; Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 203. 95 Voting against the motion were Charles McDonald, Josiah Thomas, James Ronald and Fredrick Bamford. Voting for the motion were John Watson, David Watkins, James Fowler, William Spence and James Page. Seven others did not appear in the record and were presumably absent. Billy Hughes was paired with Hugh MacMahon, another member of the Labor party (so arguably it was six for and five against sending troops). It should be noted that while there were expectations of consistency of voting on certain issues, the Parliamentary Federal Labor party at the time was not subject to party discipline as understood today. There was a long standing debate as to the desirability of binding members to vote in a particular way. The first Federal Caucus agreed to a limited form of binding of parliamentary members on a small number of key issues. Participation in the South African War was not one of these issues. Later in March 1902 when a third Australian contingent was promised, Labor Senator Higgs protested that there should have been a debate at the same time acknowledging that the party was divided on the issue: S. MacIntyre, ‘The first caucus,’ ’in J. Faulkner and S. MacIntyre (eds.), True Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001 p. 19. For voting in the Commonwealth House of Representative see CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8800; For Higgs see Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 324. 96 Charles McDonald, MHR (Labor) also spoke against the motion and in the main supported Higgins’ arguments. He specifically argued the Prime Minister acted outside constitutional powers by committing troops. His view was only the Parliament could decide and that the Parliament had been put in a difficult situation given the Prime Minister had already effectively committed troops. Furthermore, he saw that it was inappropriate to react to the continental press as it made not the slightest impact on British honour. He stated, ‘The motion has without doubt been introduced with a view to proving to the world the loyalty of Australia, but there is no real necessity for an affirmation on that point. We are still loyal to Great Britain, and as far as I can understand, that has never been doubted.’ See CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8772. 97 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8762-8769.
124 the black population, had created the current circumstances that had caused the war.98 He considered that the arguments against capitalism were effectively invalid because the war was about the franchise and that the right to vote was the antidote to abuses by capitalists.99
The 1902 Labor conference was a rare example where a majority of Labor representatives expressed opposition to the war. The AWL attended the conference and was given the opportunity to put its case. The League presented a petition and Griffith moved that the President sign it on behalf of the conference. Although the motion was narrowly defeated
(36 votes to 35), the reasons for the rejection, and the results of two further motions, demonstrated most were against the conduct of the war.100 The records of the debate in The
Worker of 8 February 1902 show that the likely sticking point for many of the delegates in the initial vote was not whether they approved of the war. It appeared that they considered that they could not agree to the President signing because they believed that they could not speak for the people they represented on this issue.101 The conference passed a further motion (39–
25) that Chamberlain make peace and pay reparations for damages caused.102 Similarly, the delegates also refused (38–23) to pass another motion approving of the conduct of the war.103
Together these reflect that, while divided, opinion had shifted. A majority of Labor delegates were, certainly by 1902, against the war. Crawford noted that the Labor movement was ‘closely and bitterly divided’ over Griffith’s motion.104 Both the voting and the reports on the debate in
The Worker support Crawford’s claim.105
98 ibid, pp. 8764-8767. 99 ibid, pp. 8768-8769. 100 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 218-219; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324. 101 See Labor conference delegates Smith and Clara, ‘The War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3. 102 ‘The South African War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3. 103 ibid; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 218. 104 Crawford, A Bit of a Rebel, p. 185. 105 ‘The War,’ and ‘The South African War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3.
125
Throughout the war Labor representatives and trade unionists, like their political representatives, were not arguing against the empire but against the war itself. It was significant that Holman, during his argument to the 1902 conference, made a point of declaring his loyalty to the empire, suggesting again that the issue of the war was separate from loyalty to empire, and that loyalty to empire would be received well by the Labor delegates.106 In the same debate,
Griffith also agreed with a delegate when they declared ‘there was no better flag to be under than the British flag.’107 Like the politicians, there were a number of delegates who declared their loyalty to the empire. For example, Mr Johnson wanted placed on the record the conference’s ‘implicit confidence in His Majesty’s Government to conduct the war in South
Africa.’108 It is also telling that there was a significant minority which was still willing to endorse a motion that they approved of the conduct of the war, given its brutality.
This attitude is not surprising because working-class people shared many of the values and fears of the middle and upper classes. They were concerned about the security threats posed by the other great powers and Asia.109 Most workers (the overwhelming majority of whom were white) believed in the idea of Social Darwinism prevailing at the time, particularly in their opinions of Anglo-Saxon superiority and their views of the Asians being corrupt debauchers who posed a threat to the virtue of white women.110 This is illustrated in the Bulletin drawing below (Figure 11), where a white woman is compromisingly shown in a Chinese opium den.
106 See ‘The South African War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3. 107 ibid. 108 ‘The War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3; See also delegates Savage, Kelly, Sedgwick and Walker in ‘The South African War,’ The Worker, 8 February 1902, p. 3. 109 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp. 161, 163-164; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 140-142. Also see Chapter One, pp. 32-33. 110 F. Bongiorno, ‘The origins of caucus, 1856-1901,’ in J. Faulkner and S. MacIntyre (eds.) True Believers; The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001, pp. 15-16; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 142-147, 149.
126
Workers also had an important additional reason to be anxious about the populous countries to the North. Asia was seen as a source of cheap labour that could swamp the country and undermine working conditions.111 These anxieties meshed in 1895 when Japan defeated
China. This combined the two greatest fears: an Asian nation and a powerful military force interested in the Pacific.112 Together these anxieties and beliefs mostly aligned with those of the middle and upper classes; there was almost near total agreement about the solution, which was participation in, and support of, the empire.
The Bulletin, under its controversial editor Jules François Archibald, and its key contributors were scathing in their criticism of the colonial parliaments’ decisions to send troops to South Africa in support of the British.113 The publication, however, like Wood and the dissenting politicians, criticised the war only within the context of empire.114 Examination of the paper’s commentary up until late February 1900 confirms this; the magazine repeatedly and comprehensively condemned the war but also asserted its loyalty to empire.115
111 Bongiorno, ‘The origins of caucus,’ pp. 15-16; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 142-147, 149. 112 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp. 161, 163-164; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 140-142. 113 McQueen argued that the anti-war sentiment at the Bulletin was limited to Archibald, and particularly reflected his anti-Semitism: H. McQueen, A New Britannia (4th ed.), Penguin Books, Ringwood, 2004, p. 20. Connolly disagreed with this position and argued that McQueen had misread Norman Lindsay’s Bohemians of the Bulletin: N. Lindsay, Bohemians of the Bulletin Sydney, 1965, p. 18. Connolly noted that fifteen of the signatories on the AWL petition were from the Bulletin; see Connolly ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 220 (footnote 46). 114 For the Bulletin see Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp. 21-22; Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ p. 54. For Archibald see S. Lawson, ‘Archibald, Jules François (1856–1919),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/archibald-jules-francois- 2896/text4155, published first in hardcopy 1969 (accessed 24 March 2016). 115 For examples of the Bulletin condemning the war see ‘Naboth’s vineyard,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899, p. 6; ‘Jingo,’ Bulletin, 30 September 1899, pp. 6-7; ‘Plain English,’ Bulletin, 21 October 1899, pp. 8-9; ‘Political Points,’ Bulletin, 21 October 1899, p. 22; ‘The Jingo Parson’s creed,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899, p. 7; ‘War literature and other matters,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899, p. 6; ‘The disgrace of the Transvaal War,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899, pp. 6-7; ‘At Poverty Point,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899, p. 8; ‘Society,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899 p. 10. Cartoons were also used extensively to express the journal’s negative opinion of the war, see for example Figure 12 below. See also ‘He returns the lion,’ Bulletin, 30 September 1899, cover page; ‘Splendid offer of Australian troops for the Transvaal,’ Bulletin, October 1899 p. 17; ‘Australia and Oom Paul,’ Bulletin, 14 October 1899, p 16; ‘The warriors farewell,’ Bulletin, 14 October 1899, p 17; ‘War,’ Bulletin, 21 October 1899, cover page; ‘Useful practice – blooding the pups,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899, cover page; ‘The same old process,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899, p. 16; ‘Drunk,’ Bulletin, 28 October 1899, p. 17; ‘The English speaking people again,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899, cover; ‘War Fever items,’ Bulletin, 4 November 1899, p. 17. 127
FIGURE 10: ‘The ’Abit.’ 116
116 ‘The ’Abit,’ The Bulletin, 14 October 1899. 128
Throughout its anti-war rhetoric, the Bulletin’s writers defended themselves by pointing out the immorality of a patriotism that supports the actions of a government whether they are
‘right or wrong.’117 For example, on 30 December 1899, the Bulletin’s editor was accused by another publication of breaching his oath not to print seditious material.118 After printing the accusation, the editor responded:
for nearly 20 years this paper has striven hard to keep down sedition…by helping, so far as it is within its lay, to remove the causes that lead to tumult, and to make the Government one that no one would be discontented with, and to make lawful authority so walk an honourable chalk line that the public would not dream of wanting to resist it. Also, it has never knowingly or intentionally said a word against the good government of Her Majesty the QUEEN, though it may have been justly severe at times of the bad government – not of the QUEEN. 119
The Bulletin’s attitudes toward the Boer War, like many of the Labor politicians, was influenced by anti-Semitism.120 For example, on 30 September 1899, the paper stated, ‘the prospective war isn’t to free the natives, but to give the British-American-German-Jew gang of exploiters in Johannesburg a better hold on the country.’121 In another edition, a trooper is referred to as a ‘cohentingenter.’122
In the weeks after Black Week the Bulletin maintained its strident anti-war rhetoric, but on 10 February 1900, two months after Black Week, even it capitulated and editorialised
‘Empire, right or wrong.’123 After describing the British ‘blunders’ of Black Week, it specifically stated, ‘No Empire can afford to inquire what is right or what is wrong after that impression [of blundering] has got abroad. The only thing is to do whichever pays best with all
117 Bulletin, 16 December 1899 p. 8. 118 Bulletin, 30 December 1899, p. 6. 119 ibid. 120 McQueen, A New Britannia, p. 20; Penny, ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 110. 121 ‘Jingo,’ Bulletin, 30 September 1899, p. 6. 122 Bulletin, 12 October 1901, p. 9. 123 ‘The Empire, right or wrong,’ Bulletin, 10 February 1900, p. 6.
129 possible vigour.’124 The article then went on to discuss the vulnerability of the British Empire as it related to the huge conscript armies of the other European Powers.125
Commercial reasons, due to a fall of sales, may have also had an influence on the decision to come out in favour of the war.126 This is evidence of the earlier point that newspapers ran a business risk in taking an opposing position to a strongly held opinion in the community. The key point, though, is that the Bulletin’s fundamental values were no different from those Australians who unconditionally supported the war from the outset. They believed that the future of Australia was dependent on the future of the empire.127 This was particularly so after Black Week, when the authors of the paper perceived a serious threat to the empire.
Lawson argued that Archibald was away from Australia at the time the change of policy occurred and was angry that his editor and associate manager had changed the policy in his absence.128 She also noted that he gave an extensive interview to an American newspaper while he was away, denouncing the war and expressing the view that Australia would eventually be an independent nation.129 It should be noted that these were not comments that Archibald made within Australia, nor did he reverse the policy of the newspaper on his return, suggesting that to do so would have run seriously counter to the opinion of his readership.
124 ibid. 125 ibid; Connolly ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 221. 126 See Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 115, Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, p. 199. 127 White, Inventing Australia, pp. 103-109. 128 S. Lawson, The Archibald Paradox: A Strange Case of Authorship, Miegunyah Press, Carlton, 1983, p. 265. 129 ibid, pp. 266-267. 130
FIGURE 11 ‘Turning over a new leaf,’ The Bulletin, 30 December 1899.130
130 The Bulletin, 30 December 1899, p. 5. 131
In examining dissent against the war, it is important to consider the degree of support given to organizations formed to protest against the war. Two such organisations were formed: the Melbourne Peace and Humanity Society (PHS), established in May 1900, and the Anti-
War League (AWL), established in February 1902.131 Support for these groups was tiny. The reported membership of the AWL at its foundation meeting was 200 members out of a national population of almost four million.132
Theologians Dr Charles Strong and Professor Laurence Rentoul, as well as Higgins, set up the PHS.133 It was led by Rentoul and made up of middle-class progressive Protestants, who saw the war being driven by capitalist interests.134 The PHS was against the war and the resulting militaristic empire its members believed it would create.135 A PHS deputation visited
Victorian Premier Allan McLean shortly after the fall of Mafeking, to protest the proposed sacking of Board of Works employees who, it was alleged, did not sing ‘national songs’ as a sign of their loyalty.136 Rentoul, however, used the opportunity to express his objections to the war.137 McLean noted that Rentoul’s protests against the war were irrelevant to the purpose of the deputation and then stated that the allegations of disloyalty were a matter for the Board of
Works.138 The action of the Board of Works employees was not denied by the delegation and
131 For PHS see Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 324. A letter dated 20 January 1902 was distributed calling people to a meeting to form the AWL. Crawford, A Bit of a Rebel, p. 181. 132 ‘The Anti-War League,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1902, p. 5; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African war’, p. 324; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 218; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 150. The Australian census of 1901 recorded the population of the Commonwealth as 3,773,248. Coghlan, A Statistical Account, p. 148. 133 ‘Anti-war and peace movements,’ eMelbourne, the city past and present: http://www.emelbourne.net.au/biogs/EM00071b.htm (accessed 24 February 2016). 134 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 184; S. Macintyre, ‘Rentoul, John Laurence (1846–1926),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/rentoul-john-laurence-8184/text14311, published first in hardcopy 1988, (accessed 24 February 2016). 135 Minutes of the meeting between the Peace and Humanity Society and the Victorian Premier 6 June 1900, VPRS 1177/P0000/8 Deputations Nov 1897 – Mar 1901, ff. 631-632; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 184; ‘Victorian Peace Society,’ Thames Star (Britain), 6 June 1900, p. 2. 136 Minutes of the meeting between the Peace and Humanity Society. 137 ibid. 138 ibid.
132 is also reflective that while there was wide popular support, as this thesis has argued, it is acknowledged that not all members of the community approved of the war or the war spirit prevailing at the time.
The herding of women and children into concentration camps late in the war reignited protest.139 Yet the PHS mustered only several hundred signatures on a petition to end the war which was presented to the new Federal Parliament by Higgins on 21 January 1902.140 The petition was formally received, but Parliament almost immediately affirmed the sending of the next contingent. Penny noted the PHS as having ‘feeble support.’141 By one description, the petition was received in silence and the affirmation of troops with cheering.142
Concerns about the conduct of the war in the later stages also prompted the creation of the Anti-War League (AWL) in Sydney. Professor George Arnold Wood, Holman, Griffith and key Bulletin staff called a meeting of protest in February 1902.143 Wood, who had held the
Challis Chair of History at the University of Sydney since 1891, had been one of the most prominent critics at the outset of the war.144 From October to December 1899, in a series of letters in the Daily Telegraph, he argued that the pro-Boer movement in England was
139 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 217-218; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 149-150. 140 CPD(R), 21 January 1902, pp. 8954; Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 124-125; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 150. Karageorgos described the PHS petition as a petition sent to the Federal parliament by Miss Alice Henry, Henry was a member of the PHS but the document would be better characterised as the PHS petition, see Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, p. 29. 141 Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 105, footnote 36. 142 ibid, p. 125; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 150. 143 ‘Anti-War League formed,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1902, p. 12; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 217-218; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 150. See also Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 324-325; Crawford, A bit of a rebel, p. 183 (with regard to Wood being elected President specifically). 144 R. M. Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold (1865–1928)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wood-george-arnold- 9170/text16193, published first in hardcopy 1990, (accessed 22 February 2016); Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 212; Penny, ‘Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 109; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 526-527, 529; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 33; Clark, History of Australia, p. 406; N. McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution, a history of Australian Nationalism, Penguin, Ringwood 1989, p. 180.
133 widespread, and that this movement arose from the injustice of England’s actions.145 He further argued that the war offended against England’s principles as a righteous nation.146 After Black
Week, Wood did not change his opinion but was no longer outspoken on the subject until the news about the deaths of Boer women and children became known.
Two hundred people attended this inaugural meeting of the AWL.147 The attendees were described as ‘curiously motley’ and made up of labour men, nationalists, liberals,
Irishmen and Europeans motivated by a wider range of grievances.148 It was resolved at the meeting to establish the League with Wood as president.149 In April and May 1902 the League circulated a petition to councils throughout New South Wales to be sent to the House of
Commons in England.150 There is an inference to be made here about Australian identity; the protestors directed their petition to the House of Commons in England rather than the
Commonwealth Parliament. This implies that they considered, like the majority of the
Australian politicians, that the decisions about the war were made in London and that as citizens of the empire they could appeal directly to the authorities there. This petition was sharply rebuffed by the local governments of NSW.151 Some councils returned the petition with curt rejections while others accused the AWL of treason, and yet others burned the petition while singing the national anthem.152 The petition collected only 1,026 signatures for all of NSW.153
The high point of the PHS and the AWL was two anti-war petitions later in the war; each
145 Crawford, ‘Wood, George Arnold,’[website]; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 212; Penny, ‘Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 109; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 526-527. 529; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 33. 146 Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold’; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 212; Penny, ‘Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 109; Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 526-527. 529; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 33. 147 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 218; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324. 148 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 218 (Connolly used the term ‘curiously motley’); Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324. 149 Crawford, A bit of a rebel, p. 183. 150 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 125. 151 ibid. 152 ibid. 153 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 150.
134 gathered approximately 1,000 signatures, less than one-thousandth of the population of their respective States.154
Wood’s protest almost cost him his university chair when he incautiously told the
Manchester Guardian that a large minority of Australians were concerned about the war.155 He was censured by the University Senate for making statements that were ‘highly reprehensible.’156 As a consequence of this threat to his standing, he resigned as president of the AWL.157 Despite his opposition to the war, Wood was another example of an individual being pro-empire and anti-the South African War.
Crawford, Wood’s biographer, notes, ‘The irony was that Wood was as fervently loyal to the British Empire as any of his accusers, but his loyalty was to the Gladstonian view of an empire committed to liberty and justice.’158 Wood, in a letter published in the Daily Telegraph on 24 November 1899, wrote, ‘I believe there are few persons who feel toward England a love stronger than I feel; few who value the great work that England has done and is doing in the world, few who more ardently hope that the future of the Empire will be more glorious than the past.’159 In early 1902, before his censure was brought to the University Senate, Wood specifically stated, ‘I thought it a patriotic duty incumbent upon me as a British citizen to give public expression to my opinion.’160 Throughout his criticism and writings he consistently asserted this position.161
154 In NSW, where the AWL petition was circulated, the population is recorded as 1,354,846 and the Victorian population where the PHS petition was circulated as 1,201,070. See Coghlan, A statistical account, pp. 148. 155 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 125. 156 Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold,’[website]; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War p. 331-332. For a full account of the University Senate’s action against Wood see Crawford, A bit of a rebel, pp. 187- 231. 157 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 334. 158 Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold,’[website]; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 315. 159 G.A. Wood, ‘Two ideals of Empire,’ Daily Telegraph, 24 November 1899, also in Commonplace books 1&2,’ Box 1, P13.Archives of the family of George Arnold Wood, Sydney University Archives. 160 G.A. Wood, draft letter to Professor W.M. MacCallum, Sydney University (undated) Folder entitled ‘Correspondence re South African War 1902,’ Box 5, P13. Archives of the family of George Arnold Wood, Sydney University Archives. 161 Crawford, 'Wood, George Arnold,’[website]. 135
The minimal support for the PHS and the AWL was significant. There were, as has been discussed, able and forthright spokesmen for the anti-war movement such as Wood,
Holman, Higgins, Griffith, Hughes and the writers of the Bulletin. The case against the war was argued at public meetings, in parliaments and in the press. Had there been even a reasonable minority who were against the war and Australia’s involvement, there were rallying points. Yet there was no substantial organised protest of any kind until toward the end of the war, culminating with the two petitions, both of which were dismal failures at a time when there was increasing awareness that atrocities were being committed by imperial troops.162
Historians include Irish Catholics in their lists of opponents of the war.163 The longstanding friction between Anglo-Scottish Protestantism and Irish Catholicism in the
United Kingdom was considered to be the main source of tension in Australia during the period.164 It has been thought that the large numbers of Catholics of Irish origin, twenty five percent of the NSW population, had a traditional ‘unease’ toward Britain and the empire because of the treatment of the Irish in Ireland and the controversy over ‘home rule.’165
Denholm argues, though, that the hostility has been ‘exaggerated.’166 The universal right to vote and the associated reverence for Parliamentary democracy, like other British institutions, served to mitigate the Catholic-Protestant division.167 The Irish in Australia, as with the Scots,
162 Information, even if some of it was not detailed, about the farm burning and the high death rates in the concentration camps was well known particularly after Hobhouse’s agitation in the later part of 1901; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 314-316. The Leader of the Liberal opposition in the English House of Commons Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in response to Hobhouse’s reports on the concentration camps gave his famous speech denouncing the conduct of the war on 14 June 1901. (‘When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.’) Wilson, CB, p. 349; H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists. The Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Élite, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, pp. 62-63. 163 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 116; Trainor, British Imperialism, p. 151; Bridges, ‘NSW and the Anglo-Boer War,’ p. 43. 164 F. Bongiorno, ‘British to their bootheels too: Britishness and Australian Radicalism’, The Trevor Reese Memorial Lecture 2006, Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 2006, p. 12-13, 14; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 3-4; L. Trainor and L. Taylor, ’Monarchism and Antimonarchism: Anglo-Australian comparisons c. 1870-1901‘, Social History, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, p. 161. 165 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 10; Trainor, British Imperialism, p. 151; Bridges, ‘NSW and the Anglo-Boer War’, pp. 43-44. 166 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p. 22. 167 Darwin, The Empire Project, p. 179.
136 identified with Britishness; however, the disputes back home were a long way away and it was difficult for them to be an enclave in colonies that were open and mobile.168 The argument of home rule was distant for most Irish Australians and their focus was social and economic improvement in Australia.169 O’Farrell has stated that the issue of home rule was perceived as damaging to Irish-Australian interests and they sought to distance themselves from the controversy.170 Pursuit of home rule was confined to a small minority who criticised mainstream Irish Australian leaders for their ‘jingoism’ and ‘imperialism.’171 Leaders, like
Cardinal Moran, sought to better integrate Catholics into the Australian society, even marginalising the small home rule elements in the local community.172 Catholic volunteer
Militia Corps were set up as a further demonstration of Catholic commitment to Australia. Even
Ward, a nationalist historian, discussing the period between Federation and the First World
War wrote that even the Irish Australians felt ‘Britishness’ and that ‘Britishness’ was a guarantee of Australian independence rather than an impediment.173
Four senior Catholic clergy, Cardinal Moran, Archbishop Gallagher, and Bishops
Doyle and Kelly, while taking care to frame any criticism within a context of loyalty, did publicly express reservations about the war.174 These leaders would have had considerable influence over their parishioners. Moran consistently stated throughout the war that he thought that it was better for the security of Australia if the men remained at home and he emphasised
168 ibid. 169 P. O’Farrell, The Irish in Australia: 1788 to the present, (3rd edition), UNSW Press, Sydney, 2000, pp. 179- 180; C. McConville, Croppies, Celts and Catholics: the Irish in Australia, Edward Arnold Australia, Caulfield East, 1987, pp. 104-105; C. Wilcox, ‘Irish volunteer and militia corps in Australia,’ in R. Pelan (ed.) Irish Australian Studies, papers delivered at the Seventh Irish-Australian Conference, July 1993, Crossing Press, Sydney, 1994, pp. 311-318. 170 O’Farrell, The Irish in Australia, pp. 179-180. 171 ibid. 172 ibid, pp. 183, 241. 173 ibid. 174 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 223.
137 better preparation for war.175 He was no stranger to political sensitivity and the necessity of being cautious; while he was still in Ireland, many of the clergy there believed that he was in favour of British rule even though this was not the case.176 In Australia, he used humour to gently mock the war and militaristic fervor in the colonies, as well as emphasizing, like some dissenters, the priority of protecting continental Australia.177 Even when raising the spectre of an existential threat to the empire itself, his comments could be read as an argument for
Australia defending itself. Specifically, he stated, ‘If a war really broke out in Europe which would materially affect this country he (the Cardinal) was afraid that Australia would be totally unprepared to meet the aggression.’178
Moran was, however, very careful to support the volunteers and did not directly criticise the war effort. For example, at the opening of the Ultimo Church bazaar, reported in the
Freeman’s Journal on 11 November 1899, after stating that if asked his advice, it would be to stay home and defend Australia, he then said that ‘when these Australians resolved to go, he would say that the colonists were right to wish them God-speed, and to hope that they would all come back, as he had no doubt they would be triumphant.’179
At the farewell mass to the Catholic volunteers on 14 January 1900, Moran pointed out that soldiers too had been saints.180 He also noted the benefits that would come from a British
175 ‘St. Ita’s School Church Glebe,’ Freeman’s Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 16; ‘The Cardinal and the NSW Contingent,’ Freeman's Journal, 11 November 1899, p. 17; ‘The Cardinal and the War,’ Freeman's Journal, 30 December 1899, p. 17; ‘The Cardinal at Leichardt,’ Freeman's Journal, 17 February 1900, p. 18; ‘The Cardinal and the War,’ Freeman's Journal, 24 February 1900, p. 26; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 223; O’Farrell, The Irish in Australia, pp. 240-241; E. Cahill, 'Moran, Patrick Francis (1830–1911)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/moran-patrick-francis-7648/text13375, published first in hardcopy 1986, (accessed 3 April 2017). 176 Cahill, 'Moran, Patrick Francis’ [website]. 177 ‘St. Ita’s School Church Glebe,’ Freeman’s Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 16; ‘The Cardinal and the NSW Contingent,’ Freeman's Journal, 11 November 1899, p. 17; ‘The Cardinal and the War,’ Freeman's Journal, 30 December 1899, p. 17; ‘The Cardinal at Leichardt,’ Freeman's Journal, 17 February 1900, p. 18; ‘The Cardinal and the War,’ Freeman's Journal, 24 February 1900, p. 26; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 223. 178 ‘The Cardinal at Leichardt,’ Freeman's Journal, 17 February 1900, p. 18. 179 ‘The Cardinal and the NSW Contingent,’ Freeman's Journal, 11 November 1899, p. 17. 180 Penny, ’Australia's Reactions to the Boer War,’ p. 117; ‘Address of the Cardinal Archbishop of Sydney to the Catholic Soldiers of the South African Contingent, at St Mary’s Cathedral,’ Sydney, 14 January 1900, in F16515
138 victory, specifically an end to the Boers’ restrictions on Catholics and the Catholic mission work in the Republics.181 In summary, he (like the rest of the Catholic Church hierarchy in
Australia) delivered a mixed message. Moran’s beliefs about home rule in Ireland (albeit held privately), his mocking of the war and the colonies’ military fervour, as well as his recommendation to volunteers to stay home, strongly suggests that he disapproved of the war.
His public comments, however, were ambiguous enough to be read as being consistent with the general sentiment in favour of the imperial cause. This is further evidence of public feeling at the time; Moran, who was very likely against the war, felt he had to be guarded. It is unlikely a man in his position would have been so cautious unless he thought it was necessary.
Conscious about the Catholic-Protestant tensions at the time, he possibly recognised that adverse comments could have had serious repercussions in the community.
Tighe Ryan, editor of the newspaper the Catholic Press, was a notable exception; he was an outspoken critic throughout the war.182 He was very anti-British and anti-war. He criticised the Premier for sending troops, ridiculed the troops in verse and attacked the
Freeman’s Journal, the other Catholic paper; for declaring its loyalty after Black Week.183
Bound collection of Catholic publications with the spine title The definition of the infallibility of the Pope, etc. National Library of Australia. 181 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 13, 26; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 223; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 68; ‘Address of the Cardinal Archbishop of Sydney to the Catholic Soldiers of the South African Contingent, at St Mary’s Cathedral,’ Sydney, 14 January 1900. There were other senior clergy who made similar statements. Archbishop Carr of Melbourne also reminded everyone that the Catholics were as vitally involved as anyone else. There was a high mass at St Patrick’s Cathedral for all the Catholic volunteers. 182 M. McKernan, 'Ryan, John Tighe (1870–1922)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ryan-john-tighe-8315/text14583, published first in hardcopy 1988, (accessed 29 May 2017). 183 ‘The plundering Outlanders,’ The Catholic Press, 1 July 1899, p. 15; ‘To the Transvaal,’ The Catholic Press, 8 July 1899, pp. 13-14; ‘To kill Boers,’ The Catholic Press, 15 July 1899, p. 8; ‘Notes and news of the week,’ The Catholic Press, 29 July 1899, p. 16; ‘Mr. Chamberlain and Jingoism,’ The Catholic Press, 12 August 1899, p. 3; ‘The truth about the Transvaal’ and ‘The plundering Outlanders,’ The Catholic Press, 26 August 1899, p. 13; ‘Why we sympathise with the Boers,’ The Catholic Press, 2 September 1899, p. 9; ‘Michael Davit and the Boers,’ The Catholic Press, 23 September 1899, p. 6; ‘The coming War, the cry from South Africa,’ The Catholic Press, 7 October 1899, p. 8; ‘Our volunteers on the field of battle, how they will be slaughtered,’ The Catholic Press, 21 October 1899, p. 21; ‘In whose hands is the wealth of South Africa,’ The Catholic Press, 28 October 1899, p. 10; ‘Our Irishmen in Parliament,’ The Catholic Press, 28 October 1899, p. 16; ‘The Jingos; enemies of the Empire,’ The Catholic Press, 11 November 1899, p. 15-16; ‘No glory,’ The Catholic Press, 2 December 1899,
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It has been argued that the attitude in the Catholic community generally may have been divided between older Irish-born and younger locally born Catholics.184 The older Irish-born
Catholics, like the clergy, were more acutely conscious of the Irish situation and generally more likely to be anti-British.185 The younger Catholics saw themselves as a part of the Anglo-Celtic world power that had evolved.186 The older group had seen the oppression in Ireland but the younger group had only experienced the freedom of the constitutional democracy; thus there was some foundation to a division of Irish Catholic opinion.187 This was demonstrated at a meeting of the Hibernian Society in early 1902; Father Bunbury in his address lamented the imperialism of the younger members and was opposed by the NSW Minister of Works E.W.
O’Sullivan, who saw Bunbury’s comments as ‘parochial.’188 This produced a divided audience with cheering and interjection on both sides.189 On balance, it was likely there were differing
p. 15; ‘The war; day by day,’ 9 December 1899, p. 16; ‘The war; day by day,’ The Catholic Press, 16 December 1899, p. 16; ‘The thousand men,’ The Catholic Press, 23 December 1899, p. 16; ‘To the slaughter,’ The Catholic Press, 30 December 1899, p. 15; ‘The Transvaal Troubles,’ Freemans Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 6; ‘Acta Populi,’ Freemans Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 10; ‘Notes current,’ Freemans Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 15; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 67; Connolly ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 224. 184 Connolly ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 224-225. 185 ibid; Connolly relied on two extracts from the Freeman’s Journal which reported Catholic applause to disloyal statements (footnote 73). In the first extract, Moran, after extolling the virtues of education at the dedication of a new school, was reported by the Freeman’s Journal as stating:
‘More than brute strength was wanted nowadays. He observed that many Australians were now filled with military ardour, and wanted to shoot Boers in the Transvaal. (Laughter) He would advise most of them to stop at home, because a great many were only going there to get themselves shot, and to fill graves in a distant land. There was no use nowadays for the unskilled soldier. (Hear, hear). He must be completely educated in the profession of arms.’ ‘St. Ita’s School Church Glebe,’ Freeman’s Journal 14 October 1899, p. 16.
The second entry was recorded as Freeman’s Journal, 17 October 1902, however, there is no edition for this date. A search of the nearest edition (15 October 1902) did not reveal anything nor did the edition of the 18 October 1902. Similarly, a further search on the terms ‘South Africa,’ “Transvaal,’ and ‘applause’ from 1 September to 30 November 1899 did not reveal anything of relevance. 186 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 224-225. Connolly relied upon the applause given at the Catholic Young Men’s Association ‘smoking concert’ to a speaker who gave a pro-British lecture; see ‘Our Catholic Young Men,’ Freeman’s Journal, 14 October 1899, p. 17. 187 ‘Irishman’s place in the Empire,’ Freeman’s Journal, 1 March 1902, p. 21; ‘The H.A.C.B. Society in conference,’ Catholic Press, 1 March 1902, p. 13; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 224-225. 188 ‘The H.A.C.B. Society in conference,’ Catholic Press, 1 March 1902, p. 13; ‘Irishman’s place in the Empire,’ Freeman’s Journal 1 March 1902, p. 21. 189 ‘The H.A.C.B. Society in conference,’ Catholic Press, 1 March 1902, p. 13; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 224-225.
140 views and individuals who were emotionally invested in each side of the argument, even allowing for Tighe Ryan’s anti-British disposition. It is, however, difficult to gauge the relative proportions, although it should be noted that 63 percent of the adult Catholic population were native-born and a high percentage of the remainder would have come to Australia as young children.190 O’Sullivan’s speech in rebuttal, and the support he received, however, does indicate that a significant portion of the Catholic community in Australia was invested in the imperial values and mission.
There is no question that there were some like Tighe Ryan who brought a hatred for the
British with them from Ireland and that the Church hierarchy, who would have been influential with their parishioners, expressed guarded reservations. The ambiguous stance of the Church hierarchy, the lack of protest and the fact that almost one in five recruits were Catholics, however, all suggests that the amount of dissent was small.191 The general absence of dissent by the Catholics of Irish origin is consistent with the notion that they identified as members of the empire.
To understand if and why a majority of Australians desired to participate in the South
African War it is crucial to understand the extent and nature of the dissent. First, the anti-war movement while vocal was relatively very small. Their objections were moral (the war was
190 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 225. 191 Detailed records are available for Victoria (roughly 40 per cent of the 16,500 enlisted). Those records show seventeen per cent of recruits were Catholic: Chamberlain, ‘The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers,’ p. 41 (Table 1). The Catholic population was recorded as 21.6 percent in 1900: Coghlan, A statistical account of Australia and New Zealand, 1904, p. 886. It is recognised that the percentage of recruits relative to the total percentage of Catholics in the Australian community was lower, although not significantly so. This may have been due to Catholic men marrying younger, having bigger families and being poorer (losing employment may have been a greater risk). There is no evidence though to specifically support these hypotheses. There is evidence, however, to suggest that religious differences may have influenced recruiting decisions. Depending upon the dominant religion in a particular unit, there may have been favoritism toward one or the other that may have accounted for some of the variation. For example, the NSW Mounted Rifles had a majority of Catholic officers, and there was at least one complaint that this unit favoured Catholics. This suggests the same may have been true for the units where the officers were predominantly Protestant. Regardless, Catholics were well represented in the contingents. For the NSW Mounted Rifles see Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p 28. Note also that there was proportionally a slightly higher number of Catholics in the AIF in the First World War than of other denominations, Ward, Australia, p. 131. 141 wrong), Australian involvement was unnecessary (the British Army did not require assistance) and practical (the money was best spent on other civic requirements). There was also a reasonable belief that the war had been brought about by wealthy capitalists, determined to bring South Africa’s riches under their control. For some dissenters there was also an element of anti-Semitic feeling, specifically the belief that the war was not the result of capitalists generally but of Jewish capitalists in particular.
Over the course of the conflict, there was an ebb and flow to the anti-war movement.
They were very vocal at the beginning but rendered almost silent by Black Week, not to rise again until 1901 when news of the British atrocities became known. Importantly, their objections, with a very small number of exceptions, were never about the empire or Australia’s participation in the empire, just the war itself. This chapter has examined in detail the nature of dissent in Australia against the South African War also because it has been relied upon as important evidence of an emerging unique Australian identity, separate from that of Britain, which was opposed to Australia’s involvement. This historiography will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 5 - HISTORIOGRAPHY
This chapter examines the Australian historiography of the South African War. Central to this historiography has been a pervasive idea that Australia had an identity separate from its
British origins. Specifically, some historians have argued that Australians during this period were seeking to assert themselves as a separate culture, a nation independent of the British
Empire. This school of thought has been referred to as the ‘nationalist’ approach. A study of
Australian attitudes to the South African War has shown that it is difficult to find evidence to support this concept. The data strongly suggests Australians saw themselves as citizens of the empire. Despite this, the idea that Australia had this proto-nationalist identity persists today both in popular opinion as well as among some professional historians. This chapter will examine critically the key historical writing for the period and seek to explore some of the reasons why this interpretation may have arisen.
The idea that Australians had a separate national character has had a lengthy and pervasive influence on the historiography in describing events since white settlement until arguably the aftermath of the Second World War.1 This interpretation, while often not directly commenting on the South African War, created a background that influenced how the history of that war was written. C.E.W. Bean was a principal originator of this idea before, but particularly after, the First World War experience.2 Bean, with a patriotic emphasis, promoted a vision of Australians that marked them as exceptional.3 In his mind, the qualities of the
1 Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity,’ pp. 76-77. 2 R. Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 13-14; For Bean see K. Inglis, 'Bean, Charles Edwin (1879–1968),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bean-charles-edwin-5166/text8677, published first in hardcopy 1979, (accessed 13 May 2016). 3 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 13-14.
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Australian soldiers were forged in the rugged and unforgiving outback. 4 The Australian soldier was ‘invincible’ because of his ‘easy going bravery, his inventive self-reliance, his indomitable pluck in the face of heavy odds.’5 This Australian military ‘exceptionalism’ theme endured throughout the twentieth century.6 Bean was not, however, making a statement that Australia itself was seeking a path separate from the empire.
It was with the rise of the ‘radical nationalist’ school in the pre- and post-Second World
War period that the notion of Australia seeking to break the shackles of empire arose.7 A key statement of this is made by Russel Ward in his book The Australian Legend.8 He, and those historians who were later to be referred to as ‘the old left,’ claimed that this identity arose out of the harsh conditions of bush living, in particular the lifestyles of the various outback workers such as the drovers, shepherds, shearers, farmers and farm labourers.9 This lifestyle created values such as mateship, resilience, a sense of community and egalitarianism.10 Australian culture for those historians played a significant role.11 The city populations through the fictional
4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 C. Stockings, Bardia, myth, reality and the heirs of ANZAC, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009, pp. 288-289; J. F. Williams, ANZACS, the media and the Great War, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999, pp. 27-28; A. Thompson, ANZAC memories, living with the legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 25-26; Grey, ‘Every war but one?’, pp. 194-197. 7 Turner included in the ‘radical nationalist’ (or the ‘old left’) tradition Brian Fitzpatrick, Russel Ward, Robin Gollan, Geoffrey Serle and himself. This group he considered the ‘older generation’ of the left born between the 1880s and 1920. This group considered themselves as Socialists and Marxist; all but Serle joined the Communist Party. See I. Turner, ‘Australian nationalism and Australian history,’ Journal of Australian Studies, Vol 3, No. 4, 1979, pp. 1-11. See also McQueen A new Britannia, p.1; Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 4, 42, 48. Bongiorno, ‘British to their bootheels too,’ pp. 13-14; F. Bongiorno, ‘Two radical legends: Russel Ward, Humphrey McQueen and the new left challenge in Australian Historiography’, Journal of Australian Colonial History, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 208. 8 R. Ward, The Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1958; D.A. Roberts, The Legend turns fifty, Essays and reportage, Inside Story [website], 27 November 2008, http://insidestory.org.au/the-legend-turns- fifty (accessed 30 May 2017); B. Alder, ‘The Australian legend fifty years on,’ Quadrant online [website], 1 September 2008, https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2008/09/the-australian-legend-fifty-years-on/ (accessed 30 May 2017). 9 Ward, The Australian Legend, pp. 1-2; Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p. 52; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20; Roberts, The Legend turns fifty [website]. 10 Ward, The Australian Legend, pp. 1-2; Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p. 52; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20; Roberts, The Legend turns fifty [website]. 11 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p. 52; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20. Bongiorno, ‘Two radical legends,’ p. 218; Roberts, The Legend turns fifty [website].
144 literature of the period then adopted these values, hence significant weight was given to the role of the Bulletin as the conveyor of this Bush ethos.12 This culture, they asserted, was captured by the writings of people like A.B. Patterson and Henry Lawson and in the paintings of artists like the members of the Heidelberg School.13 These historians of the ‘old left’ claimed that the Australian working man was a natural socialist.14 This was reflected in the rise of organised labour and the development of Labor as a political movement in the 1880s and
1890s.15
From this ‘leftist’ conceptual basis then there was a predisposition to emphasise the role of class conflict in history. For example, Fitzpatrick began from a premise that ‘the history of the Australian people is among other things the struggle between the organised rich and the organised poor.’16 He was examining Australian history through the lens of class conflict.
There may also have been other agendas at play, in that some historians may have looked to the past to validate their own ‘socialist’ goals for the Australian community. According to
Pascoe, the older generation of these leftist historians was ‘profoundly distressed by the nature of Australian society in the 1930s and 1940s.’17 Turner expressly admitted this subjectivity:
We [historians] all read back into the past our expectations about, and our hopes for, the present. Historians are not natural scientists; they do not approach their data disinterestedly. They seek for the past not only an understanding of the regularities of social behavior and change but a validation of present policies.18
12 Souter, Lion and the Kangaroo, p. 21; Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p. 52. 13 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 49-51; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20. 14 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 49-51; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20. 15 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 49-51; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-20. 16 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p. 43. 17 ibid, p. 48. 18 I. Turner, ‘Australian nationalism and Australian history,’ Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1979, p. 11.
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New voices in Australian history arose in the 1960s and 1970s. This phenomenon was facilitated by a major increase in the number of Australian universities, which doubled between
1955 and 1966.19 This increased the volume and diversity of opinion; there was more room for non-conformists.20 Although these new voices were still predominantly leftist, they challenged the view of the ‘old left’ that Australia was predominantly made up of proto-socialists.
McQueen, a leading historian of ‘the new left,’ directly attacked Ward’s thesis.21 He and others were critical of the lack of nuance in the analysis of class, and the over use of culture (writing, poems, paintings, etc.) as evidence of Australian attitudes, Australians as well as the neglect of
Australian racism and the role of women.22 This shifted perceptions of the Boer War, as discussed in detail below.
This new approach, importantly, was influenced by reactions to the war in Vietnam, which itself represented and formed part of the broader anti-colonial, anti-imperialist sentiment that arose at the time.23 (By the 1980s a significant number of scholars studying South Asia were challenging not only colonial historiography but even Marxist historiography because of
19 P. Pierce, (ed.) Vietnam days and the impact of Vietnam, Penguin, Ringwood, 1991 p. 3; J. Grey, ‘Protest and dissent: Anti-Vietnam activism in Australia,’ in J. Doyle, et al, Australia’s Vietnam War, Texas A&M University Press, College Station USA, 2002, p. 55. Riemer at several points noted the increase in university resources in the early 1960s, prior to and during a political and intellectual conflict that ultimately led to a public fracturing of Sydney University’s English department: A. Riemer, Sandstone Gothic, confessions of an accidental academic, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1998, pp. 107-178; The increase in university education at the time was a worldwide phenomenon: C. Barker, ‘Some reflections on student movements of the 1960s and early 1970s,’ Revista Critica de Ciências Sociais, Vol. 81, 2008, paragraphs 20-34. 20 For example, the establishment of Macquarie University (and other new tertiary institutions) allowed the ‘non- conformist’ academics at Sydney (and presumably other) universities the opportunity to relocate within academia; Riemer, Sandstone Gothic, pp. 138-139. 21 McQueen, A new Britannia, pp.1-3; Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp. 139-141. 22 McQueen, A new Britannia, pp.1-3 (critique of ‘old left’ historians) pp. 30-31(failure of old left to address racism); Turner, ‘Australian nationalism,’ p. 9 (feminism); M. Dixson, The real Matilda; Women and identity in Australia -1788-present, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1976, pp. 81-82 (feminism); Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, pp.48-49, 140-141. 23 Turner, in defence of the school of ‘radical nationalists,’ discussed the forces that influenced this younger generation of Australian historians which he saw as significant. He listed among other historical events ‘…the colonial liberation movements (including the trauma of Vietnam)’: Turner, ‘Australian nationalism,’ p. 1. See also Bongiorno, and Mansfield, ’Whose war was it anyway?’ p. 64; C. Hamilton, What do we want? The story of protest in Australia, NLA publishing, Canberra, 2016, pp. 1-31; Barker, ‘Some Reflections,’ pp. 43-91.
146 its perceived Western-centricity.24) While there had been protest against the Vietnam War previously, the introduction of national service added significant fuel to the anti-war movement within these institutions.25 The universities were key centres for anti-war activism; humanities departments in particular became increasingly radicalised.26 McQueen, for example, was the foundation chairman of the Revolutionary Socialist group and was actively involved in the anti-war movement.27 Historians made explicit comparisons that Australia, by joining with the
Americans in South East Asia, was making the same mistake it had in the pre-World War II period with Britain. McQueen expressly attributes the impetus for A New Britannia as being opposition to the Vietnam War.28
It is also important to remember that the historiography of Australia’s participation in the South African War is a subset of a much larger nationalist historiography of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, which hinged upon Australia’s perceived relationship to Britain. Nationalist historians either saw, like McQueen (the ‘new left’), that
Australia’s policy of supporting Britain was a blunder or, like Turner (the ‘old left’), that
Australians who were fundamentally noble and egalitarian had been naïve and had been tricked into supporting Britain.29 Both lines of reasoning have in common the idea that Australia had a separate identity from that of the empire. A key proof of their assertions that the relationship was detrimental to Australia was the nation’s costly involvement in the tragedy that was the
24 The ‘Subaltern Studies Collective’(SSC) adopted Gramsci’s approach which focused on ‘non-elite’ groups as having agency in making social change: R. Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Duke University Press, Durham, 1999, p. 4. 25 Grey, ‘Protest and dissent,’ p. 55. 26 ibid, p. 55, 61-63. 27 Pascoe, The manufacture of Australian history, p.140; Bongiorno, ‘Two radical legends,’ pp. 202, 204, 218; McQueen described himself as a Marxist, see McQueen, A New Britannia, p.1. 28 McQueen, A new Britannia, p.252. 29 I. Turner, ‘1914-1919,’ in Crowley, F., (ed.) A new history of Australia, Heinemann, Richmond, 1974, p. 314. McQueen used Australia’s involvement in the Boer War as context for Australian participation in the First World War, specifically he described Australia’s motivation as dependence on a ‘great and powerful ally.’ This was something that he plainly disapproved of. The First World War is then described as ‘dwarfing’ the wars before it; McQueen, A New Britannia, p. 19 (‘the insurance of a great and powerful ally), pp. 25-29 (First World War), p. 252 (Vietnam).
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First World War.30 Importantly, Australia was not alone in this change of paradigm; other dominions like Canada also reinterpreted their past to create a more independent, less imperial nation.31
This approach was criticised at the time. In 1971, the Canadian historian Cole asserted that there was a desire by historians to see the British settlement colonies as evolving from colonies to nations rather than becoming components of a wider Britannic world.32 He was critical of the looseness of definitions by these historians, particularly the use of ‘nation’
(‘nationalism’) and ‘state’ (‘patriotism’). He defines nation as a group of people who share certain qualities that set them apart from other groups of people; nationalism is thus an expression of a shared self-identification with a group – not necessarily one corresponding with map boundaries. The qualities they most commonly share are ‘language, traditions, mores and culture, a degree of common descent (frequently given the term ‘race’), and religion.33 The
‘state’ is the body that asserts political control of a geographic area, through the ‘legitimised monopoly of the use of physical force.’34 Although nation and state frequently overlap, they are separate and distinct entities.35
30 For a discussion of the historical argument see Cole, ‘The problem of "nationalism" and "imperialism,"’ p. 167; Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity,’ p. 77; Stevenson, The war with Germany, pp. 11-12; Bongiorno and Mansfield, ’Whose war was it anyway?’ p. 64; Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War,’ pp.19-22; Alomes, A nation at last, pp. 56-57; Grant, The Australian dilemma, pp. 4-5, 29 and 80; J. Grey, ‘In every war but one? Myth, history and Vietnam,’ in C. Stockings (ed.), Zombie myths of Australian Military History, NewSouth, Sydney, 2010, p. 193. It is important to note that there is a significant controversy over the nationalist interpretation of the First World War. 31 Cole, ‘The Problem of "nationalism" and "imperialism,"’ p. 162; R. Cook., The Maple Leaf Forever; Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada, McMillian, Toronto, 1977, pp. 123-147; C. Berger, The sense of power: studies in the ideas of Canadian imperialism, 1867-1914 (2nd edition), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013, pp. 8-11; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War,’ pp. 1-2 (referring to the South African experience). 32 Cole asserts that Canadian confederation and Australian federation were frequently described as ‘nation- creating’ events but he argued this was not true. These were not popular movements about creating a new ethnic group but a new political arrangement. Cole, ‘The Problem of "nationalism" and "imperialism,"’ pp. 160-163. 33 Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism,”’ p. 164; Stockings, Britannia’s shield, p. 6. 34 Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism,”’ p. 164. 35 ibid, pp. 164-165.
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Cole describes nationalism as ‘a consciousness of being an ethnically differentiated people and expresses itself as loyalty to an ethnic nation,’ while patriotism is ‘a loyalty, not to an aggregate of people, but to a political state and the geographic territory circumscribed by that state.’36 Once this distinction is made clear, it is obvious that Australia (or Canada or New
Zealand) was not seeking to become a separate ethnic group. Cole holds that there was not a separate Australian ethnic identity because it was incompatible with the ideology of a common
‘Anglo-Saxon’ race.37 Cole concludes that Canadian and Australian local interests were still pursued but within the idea of a union of the British race.38 Imperial nationalism was distinct from, but not incompatible with the local patriotism Australians had for their respective colonies. It is the explanation for Deakin’s statement that he was ‘an independent Australian
Briton.’39 Souter in 1978 reasserts that Australians at all levels were enthusiastic participants in the empire generally.40
Later historians are also critical. Meaney argued in 2003 that ‘nationalist historians’ were in error in their fundamental assumption that ‘all history has been directed toward fulfilling the destinies of unique peoples, of achieving their self-realisation, most commonly in sovereign states.’41 He argues that recent Western political theory rejected this idea and saw nationalism as not an inevitable course but as something that is contingent upon a set of circumstances prevailing at a particular time.42 He observes that the idea of ‘Britishness’ was
36 ibid. 37 ibid, p. 177. See also Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, pp. 6-7. 38 Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism,”’ pp. 171-178. 39 Stocking, Britannia’s Shield, p. 170. 40 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, p.21 41 N. Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: some reflections’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2003, pp.122-123. 42 ibid.
149 greater in Australia and New Zealand than in Britain.43 Schreuder’s, view is that the ‘Meaney thesis’ on Australian nationalism has been ‘broadly vindicated.’44
The dominant interpretation prior to the 1970s, and even in some histories written at that time, had been that Australians eagerly supported the war.45 During the 1970s the two lines of nationalist argument, that Australia was acting as a toady to a belligerent superpower at the nation’s expense or that a naïve Australia had been manipulated by imperialists, were applied to the South African War.46 McQueen explicitly links Australian policy in that war to the
Vietnam War. He states, ‘Here again is the policy of taking out insurance with a great and powerful ally.’47 Alomes also explicitly makes the connection and describes Australia’s involvement in the South African War as an ‘expeditionary war for another imperial power.’48
This approach contrasts with the more detailed analysis by Mordike and Connolly that
Australia had been manipulated into the war. Mordike’s central premise in An Army for a
Nation is the triumph of the imperial ideology (and manoeuvering) over Australian national interests leading into the South African War, and then into the First World War.49 Connolly’s
1978 articles on the subject ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity”: The Australian offers of troops for the Boer War’ and ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty: Australian attitudes to the Boer War,’ also align
43 ibid, pp.121-122, 125-132; Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian identity,’ p.82. 44 D.M. Schreuder, ‘Australia and Great Britain, 1788-1901,’ in A. Bashford and S. MacIntyre, The Cambridge History of Australia (Vol. 1 - Indigenous and Colonial Australia), Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2013, p. 532. Stevenson, writing of the First World War, also noted this ‘indivisible pairing’ of loyalty to the Britain Empire and Australian nationalism: Stevenson, The War with Germany, p. 13. 45 Doyle, The Great Boer War, p. 62; Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa, p. 13; Churchill, The Boer War, pp. 237-238; B.K. de Graris, ‘1890-1900,’ p. 254; Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, pp. 15-16, 36; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership, pp. 138, 140; Penny, ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 98, 108. 46 Alomes, A Nation at Last? p. 35; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216 (footnotes 32 and 33). For other examples see Grant, The Australian Dilemma, p. 80. This view is still reflected in recent historical writing, see Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 4; Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, p. 22. 47 McQueen, A New Britannia, p.19. 48 Alomes, A Nation at Last? p. 35. 49 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p. xviii. Field also described Australia’s involvement as ‘unwitting’: Field, The Forgotten War, p. 2.
150 the historiography with the ‘nationalist’ viewpoint that Australia had been manipulated into committing troops.50 He dismisses the evidence of ‘popular imperial hysteria’ on the basis that earlier historians had mistaken imperialist manoeuvres and middle-class opinion for wider popular support.51 Connolly asserts that the war was largely driven by the manipulative actions of British imperialists, specifically the Colonial Office and the Colonial Commandants. He argues that the working class (in the main), who made up the majority of the population, was at best indifferent to the war.52 Connolly also stresses that colonial politicians were very reluctant to engage in imperial wars.53 Field, although not as influential as Connolly, presented an almost identical argument in 1979.54
Connolly’s assertion was to become the paradigm for understanding Australia’s involvement in the historiography for decades. Mordike in 1992, Andrews in 1993, Trainor in
1994, and others expressly follow Connolly’s line of reasoning.55 Mordike uses ‘manufactured conspiracy’ as an example of his book’s main argument that an imperial conspiracy spanning the decades before the First World War thwarted Australian nationalism.56 Andrews, whose focus is Australia’s involvement in the First World War, uses Connolly’s articles as part of the foundation for understanding the manipulative British/Australian relationship in the pre-War years.57 Trainor, a sometime co-author with Connolly, presents a thesis that imperialism was driven by the interests of the moneyed class, occasionally by subterfuge, at the expense of
50 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 106-117; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ pp. 210-232. 51 Connolly, ‘“Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 106-107; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 210 (middle class opinion). 52 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 106; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’: pp. 216, 232. 53 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 109 (Reid), p. 112 (Lyne). 54 Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 11-12. Field may have come to these conclusions independently as Connolly’s work is not cited. 55 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p. 62; Trainor, British Imperialism, p. 150; Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 36; Hirst, The Sentimental Nation, pp. 231-235; N. McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution; A History of Australian Nationalism, Penguin, Ringwood, 1989, p. 180; S. Alomes and C. Jones, A Documentary History in Australian Nationalism, Angus and Robertson, North Ryde, 1991, p. 126. 56 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p. 62. Wilcox wrote a comprehensive rebuttal of Mordike’s argument: Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ pp. 52-65. 57 Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, 1993, p. 36.
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Australian national interests.58 Needless to say, ‘manufactured spontaneity’ fitted neatly into this paradigm.59 Connolly’s position became the accepted position in The Oxford History of
Australia and The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History.60
Despite in 1971 Cole having raised the failure of some historical analysis to recognise the difference between ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ in the self-governing colonies of the
British empire, Connolly, Mordike, Trainor and Andrews (and some others that followed) have not engaged with the issue.61 Connolly’s characterization of nationalism is that Australians were either imperialists (the elite and middle class) or Australian nationalists (Irish, Europeans,
Labor and the working class).62 Similarly Mordike characterises the debate on Australian defence as being a contest between imperialists and Australian nationalists.63 Trainor acknowledges that one option could be a British identity but he too described ‘imperialism’ and ‘Australian nationalism’ as a dichotomy rather than as things that could exist together.64
The title of his book, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, also implies this mutual exclusivity; an historic actor was either an imperialist or an Australian nationalist, but never both. Andrews too identifies the tension as between ‘British and Australian conservatives’
(imperialists) and Australian nationalists.65 Trainor and Andrews both cite Cole’s article in their bibliographies for British Imperialism and The ANZAC Illusion respectively, yet the issue is not dealt with there. Connolly cites Penny’s ‘Australia’s reactions to the Boer War’ article,
58 Trainor, British Imperialism, p. 2 (imperialism as a class struggle), p. 26 (the Sudan as a manipulation of public opinion), p. 31 (naval expenditure using ‘secrecy and concealment’), p. 32 (deception to serve class interests), pp. 50-63 (the Empire of commerce). 59 ibid, p. 150. 60 S. MacIntyre, The Oxford History of Australia (Vol. 4): 1901-1942 The Succeeding Age, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1986, pp. 131-132; ‘Boer War, Second’ in P. Dennis et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (1st ed.), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 106 (no author for the entry is given). 61 Penny, ’Australia’s reactions to the Boer War’, p. 129; Penny also discusses the idea of imperialism being part of Australian nationalism in other articles on the subject: Penny, ‘The Australian debate on the Boer War,’ pp. 526, 539-540; Penny, ‘The age of empire,’ pp.41-42. 62 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216 (pro-imperial), p. 216 (Australian nationalist). 63 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp. xvii-xviii; Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ p. 52. 64 Trainor, British Imperialism, pp. 3-5, 66-67, 184-185. 65 Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 15. 152 which also addresses the idea Australians had an imperial identity and, like Trainor and
Andrews, Connolly does not seek to reconcile his hypothesis with this concept. The fundamental error of these historians is to take Australian patriotism, affection, competitiveness and enthusiasm for their colony, as the desire to be an independent nation. With almost no exception, including the dissenters of Australia’s participation in the Boer war, this was not the case. Australians’ patriotic feeling for their colony was always within the idea of empire.
Australians were imperial nationalists and local patriots, and there was nothing contradictory about these ideas.66 To cite Deakin’s statement again, he described himself ‘an independent
Australian Briton.’67
The logic of Connolly’s analysis still echoes in popular and professional writing today.
Reynolds, in What’s Wrong with ANZAC? in 2010 relies on Connolly’s central argument of imperial manipulation.68 Karageorgos in 2016 cites ‘Class, birthplace and loyalty’ as a
‘valuable Australian work’ for public attitudes as well as ‘broadening public knowledge on general attitudes.’69 Contrary to Connolly’s view, she concludes that Connolly could not form a view that the war was unpopular with the working class as there was no direct evidence to support that.70
That Australia had been nudged or tricked into the war was not a new idea. In 1902,
Australian Labor and radical politicians had been using the same argument. Connolly, however, discovered what he believed to be clear evidence.71 His main argument in support of the
66 Stocking, Britannia’s Shield, p. 170. 67 ibid. 68 H. Reynolds ‘Colonial Cassandras; why weren’t the warnings heeded,’ in M. Lake et al., What’s Wrong with ANZAC? NewSouth, Sydney, 2010, p. 53. 69 Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, p. 6. (broadening public knowledge), p.188 footnote 16 (valuable Australian work). 70 ibid, p. 6 (working class attitudes). 71 For a discussion of the early use of this argument by Labor and radical elements see Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War’ pp. 2-3; Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 197.
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‘manipulation’ hypothesis, is that on 3 July 1899 Chamberlain sent secret telegrams to the
Premiers of NSW and Victoria as well as the Prime Minister of Canada asking for a
‘spontaneous offer’ of soldiers.72 Clearly, any offer could not actually have been spontaneous as Chamberlain had prompted it, but actual spontaneity was not necessary, just the outward appearance of it. The offers of troops were part of Chamberlain’s plan to influence the South
African republics to accept Britain’s demands by showing the solidarity of the empire. This dovetailed with the media campaign by Milner to influence public opinion to support the
British cause.73 To the disappointment of the Colonial Office, each of the Premiers refused.74
The deceptive nature of the telegrams and colonial reluctance was, according to Connolly, clear evidence that the imperial authorities (including the commandants of the colonies) actively manipulated the Australian and Canadian politicians and therefore their people into participating in a war they did not want.75 He labelled this ‘manufactured spontaneity.’76
Connolly’s implicit assumption seems to be a Marxist one, that the working class has no nationality.77 The opinions of the working class could therefore be severed from those of the middle and elite classes. This implies the moneyed section of society, but not the working class people, were imperialistic.78 This reasoning also allows both the parliamentary debates and newspapers as sources of evidence to be dismissed, as parliamentary members and newspaper owners generally belonged to the elite class and therefore were not a reflection of
72 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 106; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 18; Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp.59-60; Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, p. 174; Clarke, Marching to their own drum, pp. 281-282. 73 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 107-108; T. Crosby, Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist, I. B. Taurus, New York, 2011, pp. 143-144; Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp. 37-54. 793 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 109-110. 75 ibid, p. 106. 76 ibid. 77 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216. 78 ibid, pp. 211-212.
154 the community as a whole.79 He concludes that the attitude of the working class toward the war was largely lack of interest. For example, he states:
When the first contingents departed, many who had little commitment to aggressive imperialism must have lined the streets, wooed by a special public holiday, bands, bunting and a procession. Moreover, fascination with war and pride in the colonial troops probably rivalled imperial enthusiasm as motives for attendance; and the sheer novelty of the spectacle was important, for few people farewelled the contingents which left in the later stages of the conflict.80 While the issue of separating the classes was far from straightforward in Australian colonial and early federal society, the evidence at hand as discussed in detail in Chapter Three simply does not support this position.81 Connolly’s assertions are difficult to accept given the reported enthusiasm of the crowds at the departure ceremonies, including long uncomfortable waiting for the arrival of the troop processions, and turning out in large numbers despite the threat of bubonic plague! Even taking into account a level of bias in the newspapers and parliamentary debates, support for the war and imperialism, while not totally universal, was abundant.
One particularly misleading underpinning of the imperial conspiracy theory was the idea that British and Australian defence interests were mutually exclusive.82 Connolly, but particularly Field and Mordike, argue that the commandants were ‘Trojan Horse[s]’ who primarily acted to serve British defence interests at the expense of Australian security.83 The military commandants and local politicians of the period, however, were of the opinion that there was an alignment between British and Australian defence interests and their actions were
79 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 116-117; Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, pp. 36-38. 80 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 215. Connolly makes similar statements on pp. 213 and 216, attributing attendance to ‘entertainment’ as much as patriotism. 81 For the difficulties in understanding and analysing class in Colonial Australian society see Denholm, The Colonial Australians, pp. 22-25. 82 Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, pp. 106-107; ‘Boer War, Second,’ in P. Dennis et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (1st ed.), Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 106. 83 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 116-117; Field, The Forgotten War, pp. 10-16; Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp. xvii-xviii, 30-34, 38-40; Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, pp. 106-107.
155 toward that end; they were of one mind to build an imperial force to defend the empire, including Australia.84
In 1999 Clarke made a telling case that the timing of offers, the actions of the War
Office and those of the colonial commandants demonstrated there was no collusion with
London to trick Australia into sending troops.85 Clarke’s argument in brief is that first, Premiers
Dickson in Queensland and Kingston in South Australia made offers of troops and there is no evidence to suggest these offers were not spontaneous.86 Connolly concedes that South
Australia’s offer was likely spontaneous.87 In Queensland, Major General Gunter, the
Queensland commandant, did suggest to Dickson that it would be desirable to offer troops; however, the timing of the telegrams was such that it was highly unlikely that Gunter could have known about Chamberlain’s telegrams.88 He was acting on his own initiative, for private reasons that will be discussed later. Secondly, the War Office request for infantry rather than mounted troops demonstrated that they did not consult with the colonial commandants; the commandants would have recommended and pressed for mounted troops.89 Colonel Gordon, commandant of South Australia, was not consulted even though he was in London at the time; he went to the War Office personally after finding out about the request later and argued vigorously against it.90 Finally, the commandants were working to their own personal agendas rather than part of a high-level conspiracy. Specifically, they wanted to see active service
84 For a comprehensive discussion of the weaknesses of this ‘conflict of imperial and Australian nationalist ideologies’ in defence argument see Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ pp. 52-65. This was also noted in Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, pp. 106-107. 85 For the detailed rebuttal of the ‘imperial conspiracy’ argument see Clarke, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 280-312. 86 Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ pp. 285-286 (Dickson), p. 295 (Kingston), pp. 299-300 (Seddon). 87 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ p. 111. 88 ibid, pp. 285-286; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 18. Clarke examined the other white dominions and found further evidence that there was no global imperial conspiracy. Premier Seddon in New Zealand offered troops before being asked. Major General Hutton in Canada, the ambitious imperialist in the largest of the colonies, did not even make a start on rallying support until after it was raised with him directly by Lord Minto: Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ pp. 288-289. 89 Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum’, pp. 303-304. 90 ibid.
156 desirably at the head of a colonial contingent that they had helped build.91 To this end, they competed with one another and undermined the desirable possibility of a single Australian force being sent.92 The commandants did not even co-operate with one another, let alone operate as a co-ordinated body fully synchronised with London.
Like the general premises of the nationalist narrative, Connolly’s ‘manufactured spontaneity’ argument is also flawed at a fundamental level. The British Empire was engaged in a continuous struggle with the other Great Powers.93 It was an aggressive political environment; Britain was constantly on the brink of conflict in the late nineteenth Century.94
There were deep anxieties about the rising military and economic power of Germany, Russia and the United States (and to a lesser extent France and Italy).95 For example, there was anxiety about the alliance between France and Russia as well as deep concerns about Germany’s rising power.96 There was a real fear that Germany might decide to involve itself in the dispute over
South Africa in 1899, particularly after the Kaiser’s telegram of support to Kruger after the failure of the Jameson raid in 1895.97 This raises the question as to whether Chamberlain and
Milner’s actions (trying to enlist the support of the premiers secretly and their publicity campaign) were as inappropriate in the circumstances as Connolly wants his readers to believe.98
91 ibid, pp. 284 (Maj. Gen. French - NSW), pp. 285-6 (Gunter - Qld), p. 289 (Hutton), pp. 292-293 (Maj. Gen. Holled Smith). Penny made similar statements, see Penny, ’Australia’s reactions to the Boer War,’ pp. 98-99. 92 Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum’, pp. 294-297. 93 Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, pp. 35-40. 94 ibid. 95 ibid. 96 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p.55; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ p. 58; Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second,’ pp. 93-97. 97 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, pp. 15-16; Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p.55; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ p. 58. 98 This is similar to the criticism Cooper made of the ‘nationalist’ historians concerning the First World War, see Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography,’ pp. 32-33.
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Connolly’s use of the premiers’ refusal of Chamberlain’s request as evidence of imperial manipulation also seems incorrect. In reality, it was a demonstration that colonial authorities were not readily susceptible to imperial influence and acted in accordance with what they considered best for their colony.99
Connolly sees the premiers’ unwillingness to commit troops until the British government bore the cost as a demonstration of colonial reluctance.100 Cost was an important consideration though; throughout the historical records the question of ‘who pays’ was central.
The Governor General of Canada and the Governors of NSW and Victoria wrote back in response to Chamberlain’s telegram and stated that the respective governments were happy to give support as long as Britain met the cost.101 Major General French advised the Colonial
Office that if they wanted to use colonial troops, then they were more likely to get support if the British government offered to pay.102 Reid offered extensive assistance in recruiting volunteers but telegraphed ‘equipment of troops must involve deficit of revenue, unwilling to incur new taxation or loan.’103 Turner replied to London, ‘before the government takes further action, they desire assurance that the Imperial Exchequer bear all the expenditure.’104 This insistence that Britain pay, however, did not suggest an intention on the part of the premiers to reject the empire, as implied by Connolly. As demonstrated by their patriotic speeches, these refusals were less about allegiance and more about protecting their local political privileges, particularly in regard to colonial revenue.105
99 Reid in NSW, Turner in Victoria as well as Prime Minister Laurier in Canada; Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 108-109; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ p. 285. 100 Connolly ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 109-110. 101 Clarke, ‘Manufactured Spontaneity?’ p. 133; Field, The Forgotten War, p. 11; Clarke, ‘Marching to their own drum,’ p. 285. 102 Clarke, ‘Manufactured Spontaneity?’ p. 132. 103 Field, The Forgotten War, p. 11. 104 ibid. 105 Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, p. 34; For Turner and Lyne’s patriotic speeches see also Chapter One, pp. 26, 35; For Reid see below pp. 155-156.
158
In parallel to imperial manipulation, Connolly argues that the greater mass of
Australians were either against the war or were lacking in interest. His evidence consists of low attendance at public meetings about the war in May 1899, declining attendance at troop departures and, comparatively, public attitudes to the Vietnam War.106 Specifically, in his
Vietnam War comparison, he cites Almond, a 1950s’ authority, that the American working class was disinterested in foreign policy, a study by Hahn that opposition to the war in Vietnam by Americans was greater in the working class, and responses to a survey of Australian people who objected to the Vietnam War.107
There are issues with each of these pieces of evidence. The public meetings were called in May 1899 to show support for the Uitlander cause, and it was correct that only small crowds responded.108 There is, however, a difference in context between May and September 1899. In
May, there was an expectation that the matter would be resolved through diplomacy; there was almost no expectation that it would result in war.109 This was not something that would likely have attracted significant public interest.
The issue of diminishing attendance at troop departures is, however, a more substantial point.110 Public turnouts did significantly reduce toward the end of the war and one interpretation could be reduced popular support; but equally it could be attributed to the desensitizing of the public to the business of war. By the end of the conflict, nine contingents had departed and the nature of the war had changed significantly. It was no longer the case of
106 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 108-109 (public meetings); Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216 (footnotes 32 & 33), p. 220 (Vietnam references), p. 216 (reduced attendance at troop departures). 107 G.A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, Harcourt, Brace and Coy, New York, 1950, pp.122- 130; H. Hahn, ‘Correlates of public sentiments about war: local referenda on the Vietnam issue,’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970, pp. 1186-1198; Survey of Australians objecting to the Vietnam War; Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216, (footnote 33). 108 Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “spontaneity,”’ pp. 108-109 (public meetings). 109 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 19. 110 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 216 (Reduced attendance at troop departures).
159
Australia seeking to demonstrate its loyalty and value to empire as it had been at the start, nor was it the serious existential threat that it had been after Black Week. Even in the early months of 1902, in the aftermath of the Vossiche Zeitung article, there were patriotic rallies across the country attracting large numbers denouncing allegations of colonial disloyalty and misconduct by imperial troops.111 When taken together with the other evidence late in the war, such as the consistent over-subscription of volunteers and low numbers on the anti-war petitions, on balance the weight of the argument would fall to the population perceiving the war as ‘business as usual’ rather than a collective lack of interest. Finally, the use of public attitudes to the
Vietnam War as a comparison to demonstrate popular opinion to the South African War is very questionable. There is too vast a gulf between the cultures and contexts of these wars for that conclusion to be drawn; it is anachronistic. Together, the edifice of ‘uninterested’ Australian public opinion in the historiography rests upon these three pieces of tenuous evidence.
Connolly also downplays anti-Semitic motivations among the dissenters. He describes these biases in the arguments as an afterthought. Specifically, he states:
But although racism was almost universal in ‘pro-Boer’ circles and anti-Semitism common, neither prejudice explains the opposition to the war. The capitalists behind the conflict were rarely described as Jews until several months after the fighting had begun, and allegations that coloured labour was to be introduced were seldom, if ever, made before 1900. Most ‘pro-Boers’ had declared their position on other grounds months previously, and racism and anti-Semitism merely added variety to the ‘capitalist conspiracy’ theme and confirmed anti-war views already well established.112 This approach significantly underestimated the deeply ingrained nature of the prejudice among some of the dissenters, which was embedded into the key anti-war documents and many of the
111 For examples see ‘The patriotic demonstration,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 1902, p. 6; ‘Loyal meeting at Melbourne,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1902, p. 4; ‘Loyal meeting at Town Hall – a citizens’ demonstration – spirited addresses,’ Argus, 18 February 1902, p. 5; ‘Recent patriotic demonstration – messages for Chamberlain and Milner,’ Brisbane Courier, 25 February 1902, p. 5; ‘Demonstration in Adelaide,’ Western Mail (WA), 8 February 1902, p. 19; ‘Loyal demonstrations [Balmain],’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1902, p. 12; ‘The patriotic demonstration,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1902, p. 11; The Newcastle demonstration is also mentioned in Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 213. 112 Connolly, ‘Class, birthplace, loyalty,’ p. 217.
160 public pronouncements of the dissenters as described in Chapter Four.113 It is important to recognise that anti-Semitism was not merely a phenomenon in the anti-war movement; it was widespread in the community. Diminishing the importance of the anti-Semitism presents the opposition in a more favourable light to modern sensibilities.
Alongside and consistent with the challenge to the ‘nationalist’ historical perspective in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Connolly’s hypothesis that Australians through their politicians were manipulated into participating in the war by imperialists is rejected not only by Clarke but by other historians. By far, the most important historian for Australia’s involvement in the South African War over the past two decades has been Wilcox. He has produced a number of detailed scholarly works on the period, not the least being the comprehensive and important book Australia’s Boer War, published in 2002, commissioned by the Australian War Memorial for the centenary of the conflict.114 Wilcox, from the early days of his writing, firmly opposes the ‘nationalist’ historical argument that Australia’s military development was the result of manipulation by imperialists.115 With regard to popular support for the South African War, from 1999 he has consistently argued that prior to Black Week support was lukewarm, that the premiers had to be prodded and that only after that military crisis was there real public support.116 He notes that there was general concern that the war was an unnecessary invasion and that there was a ‘taint’ of race betrayal in attacking white farmers.117 His hypothesis hinges on the perceived existential threat that Black Week presented.
Furthermore, he states that from the middle of 1901 that there was:
113 See Chapter Four pp. 118-119, 127-128. 114 See above p. 11, (footnote 44). 115 Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ pp. 52-65; Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 198; Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ p. 222. 116 Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 198; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War,’ pp. 4-5; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 310; Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second,’ pp. 93-97; Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ pp. 221-225. 117 Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second,’ p. 94.
161
rising colonial nationalism, disappointment in the war effort, and dissent against the war, along with unease at the army’s handling of the Wilmansrust and Bushveldt carbineers affairs, and cries against continuing engagement against a multiracial empire that might force white Australia to share their continent with black, brown and yellow immigrants from other imperial estates.118
Wilcox attributes support throughout the war but for six months after Black Week to ‘loyalists, concentrated in the middle classes’ and ‘opportunists.’119 He has made occasional observations that would suggest perhaps greater popular support than his position would imply, such as the excitement when war is declared as well as the ‘bustle of charities’ and the ‘flood of volunteers’ in 1901 and 1902, indicating a sizable enthusiastic minority.120 He has, however, generally maintained that the war was unpopular but for a short while after Black Week.121 As recently as 2013, he has stated that the common strand of opposition during the guerrilla phase was
‘passive disengagement’ and that Australians lived as if there was ‘no army, no war, no empire.’122 Wilcox is the pre-eminent Australian historian of the war. His thoroughness and reasoning are persuasive and more difficult to challenge. He has taken proper note of factors such as the imperialist identity of the community, the Bulletin’s reversal after Black Week and the influence of anti-Semitic sentiment of the dissenters.123 This thesis has provided evidence, however, that the war’s popularity was not as low before Black Week or in the long guerrilla period as Wilcox has suggested.
First, did the colonial politicians need prodding because of want of loyalty to the empire or because they wanted to maintain their local political privileges, particularly control over revenue?124 During the debates on whether to send troops to the South African War most of the
118 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 310. 119 Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War,’ p. 4. 120 Wilcox, ‘Australia’s involvement in the Boer War,’ p. 198. 121 ibid; Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the South African War,’ pp. 4-5; Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 310; Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second,’ p. 93-97; Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ pp. 221-225. 122 Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ p. 225. 123 Wilcox, ‘Boer War, Second’ pp. 93-97; Wilcox, ‘Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa,’ p. 222. 124 Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, p. 34.
162 politicians, including most of the dissenters, stated that in a real crisis colonial resources would be immediately forthcoming. As the First World War showed, Australia was prepared to sacrifice its blood and treasure in just such an emergency.125
Second, the size and enthusiasm of the crowds prior to Black Week (described in
Chapter Three) were very similar to those immediately after Black Week. Third, there was the powerful influence of the imperial identity of the population, which Wilcox acknowledges.126
Did the constellation of issues like Wilmansrust diminish this so greatly, noting that even the dissenters were adamant in their loyalty to the empire throughout? Finally, were the shrinking crowds at the departures a sign of reduced popularity or that the war had become ‘business as usual,’ noting the rallies in response to the Vossiche Zeitung article in 1902 and absence of protest in the later part of the war? Wilcox appears to have placed too great an emphasis on the vocal and articulate voices of dissent (particularly in the wake of the nationalist argument that the war was unpopular).
The Canadian experience is again a useful comparison to make. Canada, like Australia at the time, had a strong imperial identity. There were, of course, exceptions to this such as the large French-Canadian minority. Importantly, the Canadian Prime Minister at the time, Laurier, was stridently against sending Canadian troops to the South African War. He was conscious of his French-Canadian powerbase and did not see the South African situation as a threat.127
Public opinion, the press and the opposition brought significant and mounting pressure to bear
125 Total Australian military expenditure during the First World War was £188,480,000 and during each year of the war military expenditure ranged from 70 to 110 percent of GDP. Enlistments numbered 416,809 from a population of less than 5 million, of whom more than 60,000 were killed and 159,000 wounded, gassed, or taken prisoner. For enlistment and casualties see Bou and Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Table 3.2 Total enlistments, p. 60 and Table 5.4 Breakdown of AIF’s war casualties, p.116; for costs see D. Watt and A. Payne, Australian Parliament House website, ‘Trends in Defence expenditure since 1901,’Graph 1: Defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP and total expenditure, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetR eview201314/DefenceExpenditure (accessed 10 May 2017). 126 Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 9. 127 Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, p. 177.
163 on him and he still refused to commit troops.128 After war was declared, the pressure was such that he considered he had little choice but to capitulate and sent a contingent.129 Here was an example that runs totally contra to the nationalist hypothesis. It is not the public bowing to the will of colonial politicians but the other way around.
Recently there have been two historical studies that address the reasons Australia sent troops to the South African War in which this ‘nationalist’ theme has still been given some traction: Karageorgos’ Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam and Reynolds’
Unnecessary Wars. Karageorgos acknowledges that the war was popular. Since her main focus is the soldiers’ experience, she does not make an extensive survey or analysis of opposition to the war.130 She does follow Connolly’s view that the opinions of the working class could not be known.131 Karageorgos, relying on Wilcox quoting Wood, states that a ‘very large minority’ held dissenting views.132 She does touch upon the main pockets of resistance: Labor politicians, trade unionists, trade union publications, AWL and the PHS.133 Her review, though, is missing a comprehensive analysis of the parliamentary debates, the evidence surrounding the troop departures, the conflicts within the Labor movement and the low numbers supporting the petitions. Together this context would have brought into question Wood’s statement that a
‘very large minority’ were opposed to the war.134
Reynolds’ work specifically focuses on the importance of dissent with an emphasis on the politicians. His main hypothesis is that Australians have, since Federation, been culturally predisposed to be militaristic.135 This militarism, according to Reynolds, has led to Australia
128 ibid, p. 179. 129 ibid, pp. 180-183. 130 Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, pp. 29-32. 131 ibid, pp. 6 & 26 (working class support cannot be determined), p. 29 (the war had widespread support). 132 ibid, p. 30; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War p. 334. 133 Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, pp. 30-32. 134 ibid. 135 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. xiv; ‘War and Australia’s national identity’ on ABC’s Big Ideas Thursday, interview with Henry Reynolds, 28 April 2016, 8:05PM,
164 being involved in conflicts that were not important to the interests of the nation, and as a result,
Australia fights ‘other people’s wars.’136 He does accept the argument that the South African
War was popular.137 There are, however, significant issues with his methodology and evidence relating to the South African War. A central pillar of Reynolds’ argument is that there were a number of critics of the war who were seeking an Australia that would go its own way, be separate from the Empire, seek neutrality in times of conflict and were ‘republican’ in spirit.138
Reynolds refers to a ratio of roughly ten percent of colonial politicians in this category, a demonstration of ‘nationalist’ history living on.139
Reynolds cites sixteen parliamentarians as critics of the war. Only eleven of these men were in parliaments that cast votes on the sending of troops (NSW, Victoria, South Australia and the Commonwealth).140 Of those eleven, one did not vote (Haynes), two voted ‘for’ sending troops (Reid and Sawers) and eight voted against.141 Of the sixteen parliamentarians cited, fourteen made statements of loyalty to the empire.142 Only one, James Charles Stewart,
Queensland MLA (Labor), expressed opinions consistent with Reynolds’ hypothesis of dissenters who were seeking an independent Australia.143 Outside the parliament Cardinal
Moran, whom Reynolds cites briefly, was another but he is not explored in any detail.144
The use of Reid as an exemplar of Reynolds’ hypothesis is particularly difficult to understand. Reynolds quotes Reid from the debate on whether to send troops to China in 1900
http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/rn/podcast/2016/04/bia_20160428_2005.mp3. 136 Grey has argued that the idea Australia fights other people’s wars is a mistaken but deeply entrenched part of Australia’s military mythology, see Grey, ‘In every war but one?’ pp. 192-194. 137 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 29, 132-136. 138 ibid, pp.1, 153-154; ‘War and Australia’s national identity’[interview]. 139 ‘War and Australia’s national identity’[interview] 140 See APPENDIX E - Persons cited as critics of the war by Henry Reynolds in Unnecessary Wars and their statements of loyalty during the South African War. 141 See APPENDIX E - Henry Reynolds’ dissenters. 142 ibid. 143 ibid. 144 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 24-25.
165 as stating that, ‘Australians did not want to be looked upon as a military people’ who were
‘ready to send their contingents forth to do battle in any part of the globe.’145 Reid committed the colonies, however, to ‘do anything, go anywhere’ to defend the empire at the colonial conference in London in 1897.146 He voted in favour of sending contingents to the South
African War both in the NSW parliament in October 1899 and as leader of the opposition in the Federal Parliament in January 1902.147 Reynolds does mention Reid as making a pro- imperial speech during the January 1902 debate in defence of the allegations that the British
Army was committing atrocities, although Reynolds does not explain how this could be consistent with an independent-looking outlook or his voting in both instances to send troops.148
Furthermore, at a luncheon reported in the Sydney Morning Herald on 30 October 1899,
Reid gave a patriotic speech. After deriding the critics of the war, he stated, ‘but we know there is a feeling of loyalty that rises above all cold logic and scepticism, and which thrills this vast
Empire to the core. (Cheers)’149 Later in the same speech, he stated:
The Empire means peace, but no empire can exist unless it has the latent force which will enable it to defend itself against any possible danger. (Hear, hear) And the Empire of Great Britain will only last so long as other nations are convinced that it is powerful enough to defend its own territory. (Cheers) 150 Reid was still giving speeches in defence of the war in 1902.151 During the First World War, he held a seat in Britain’s House of Commons as an ‘independent imperialist’ and supported the ‘win the war’ coalition.152 He also referred, in more than one instance, to the significance
145 ibid, p. 156. 146 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, p. 49. 147 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1585; CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, p. 8800. 148 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 169. 149 ‘The Luncheon,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p. 8. 150 ibid. 151 ‘The patriotic demonstration,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 1902, p. 6. 152 W.G. McMinn, ‘Reid, Sir George Houstoun (1845–1918),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/reid-sir-george-houstoun- 8173/text14289, published first in hardcopy 1988, (accessed 28 April 2017).
166 of race loyalty. For example, at the speeches in celebration of Federation, Reid spoke of ‘the crimson thread of kinship’ and during the luncheon speech of 30 October 1899 (noted above) he stated ‘a feeling of pride to know that New South Welshmen of the same British blood are leaving here to take part in a movement [the South African War] that makes for the freedom of humanity and the welfare of mankind. (Continued cheering).’153
Reid’s affection for the empire is manifest in his autobiography, as for example in his reminiscences of Queen Victoria’s jubilee in 1897.154 His apparent reluctance to send troops was not about his seeking some kind of independence for Australia but because, like other colonial politicians, he wanted to maintain his local political privileges, particularly control over the colony’s finances as discussed above.155 He did not want to write the War Office a blank cheque but that did not make him a critic seeking a separate path from the empire.
Reynolds holds up the critics of the war as tragically overlooked, that Australians then as now should have listened to these virtuous pacifists seeking an independent way for
Australia.156 Specifically, he describes them cautiously: ‘Not all the critics of the war could be called radical nationalists, but they were certainly men whose focus was centred on Australia and who questioned the need for overseas involvement.’157
Nothing in this statement is necessarily inaccurate; however, overall it is misleading because without the awareness of the strong pro-imperial statements made by these ‘critics’ a reader of his work would accept his argument that they were independently minded republicans.158 Specifically, on a Radio National interview in 2016 referring to the dissenters,
153 Souter, Lion and the Kangaroo, p. 47; ‘The Luncheon,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1899, p.8. 154 See Chapter XIV ‘In England for the Diamond Jubilee,’ G.H. Reid, My Reminiscences, University of Sydney Library, Sydney, 1917. 155 Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, p. 34. 156 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 11-12, 142, 153-154, 176, 229-230, 232, 238-239; ‘War and Australia’s national identity’[interview]. 157 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 154. 158 For pro-imperial statements see APPENDIX E Henry Reynold’s dissenters.
167 he stated, ‘I suspect there was about ten percent of those who spoke – there would be about ten percent who took this republican independent stand.’159
Fully apprised of the evidence, Reynolds’ passionate and sincere concern about militaristic attitudes in the contemporary Australian community appears to have unconsciously influenced his analysis of the material. Like the earlier generation of nationalist historians,
Reynolds does not engage with Cole or Meaney’s analysis throughout the text. He confuses nationalism and patriotism, particularly when referring to the critics of the war who were clearly imperial nationalists and local patriots, as were the great majority of Australians at the time.
Reynolds is not alone in this. There are multiple examples where historians appear to have let their preferred world view influence the way facts are presented. Other examples include McQueen’s complaints about the ‘old left’ not including the racism of the period, as well as Dixson’s complaint about the absence of women in Australian history writing.160
Macintyre criticises Turner for his over-emphasis on the Labor movement at the expense of understanding the society as a whole.161 Ward waxes lyrical about the Bulletin’s republicanism in the early 1890s but omits its reversal after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.162 VCE Textbook authors McDonald, Mirams, Davidson and Gordon refer to the Bulletin’s ‘push for independence and ‘republicanism’ but again do not mention the publication’s abandonment of this position.163 Ward and Karageorgos fail to mention the Bulletin’s reversal on the South
African War after Black Week.164
159 See APPENDIX F- Extract of transcript of Reynolds interview 28 April 2016 (Radio National). Reynolds also refers to the critics as nationalists and republicans; Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 11. 160 McQueen, A New Britannia, pp.1-3, 30-31; Dixson, The Real Matilda, pp. 81-82; Ward, The Australian Legend, pp. 208-210. 161 Pascoe, The Manufacture of Australian history, p. 49. 162 Ward, The Australian Legend, pp. 208-210. 163 McDonald, ‘Australian nationalism until 1918,’ pp. 10-11; Mirams et al., Imagining Australia, pp. 59-60. 164 Ward, The Australian Legend, pp. 208-210; Karageorgos, Australian Soldiers, 2016, pp. 26, 28. 168
Some of the historians may have been emotionally invested in a particular hypothesis so that they simply have not researched widely enough or do not recognise the importance of the broader historical context. This context is necessary, however, to form a fair picture of why the historical actors made the decisions they did. A failure to provide that background is to invite the reader, particularly high school students or the general public, to believe that the culture and social mindset of Australia in 1899 were the same culture and social mindset that existed at the time of the Vietnam War or that exist today.
The historiography of whether Australians supported the South African War has been dominated in the professional and public mind by an idea that the population at the time of
Federation had begun to see themselves as a separate nation and people. This idea originated with left-leaning historians prior to and after the Second World War because it aligned to their own socialist ambitions for Australia. The idea gained impetus during the Vietnam War period when the alliance with America, the twentieth-century superpower, invited uncomfortable comparisons with Australia’s relationship to Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. Seen through the nationalist historians’ eyes the South African War was either one of policy blundering or imperial manipulation and popular indifference. These misconceptions have been incrementally and mostly dismantled but their echoes still reverberate and distort.
169
CONCLUSION
Throughout the South African War, the great majority of Australian politicians voted to send troops to support the imperial cause. The bulk of newspaper opinion endorsed that decision. From the available evidence there was also widespread public support. This was shown in the massive public demonstrations and fundraisers, as well as the absence of protest and the high levels of volunteering. At first blush, this behaviour seems counter-intuitive.
Australians had a lot in common with their Boer foe; both communities forged lives on the fringes of the civilised world, faced similar challenges and shared many values. Once we step into the shoes of Federation-era Australians though, it is not difficult to understand their conduct.
There were practical reasons to support the empire, like the protection provided by the
Royal Navy, and there were sentimental reasons, like the close cultural bonds arising out of most Australians either having been born in the United Kingdom or having parents who had been born there. It was, however, Australia’s sense of identity that probably carried the most weight. To understand this identity, it is crucial to put aside how Australians view themselves today. They were not us. Their identity did not stop at our convenient coastline. Across the class spectrum Australians saw themselves as part of a pan-Britannic culture, linked by race and reinforced by a belief that this culture was a force for good. Without question the Australian population considered the empire an engine to civilise the world. Its institutions, democracy, the rule of law and Christianity strengthened their faith in the mission enough to overlook the defects such as the excesses of the imperial army in South Africa.
There is an important point to make here: several historians have portrayed Australia’s relationship with Britain as obsequious, like a servant to a master, making the association all 170 the more distasteful and harder for today’s Australians to accept, but this again is anachronistic.
Those Australians that lived at the time of Federation did not consider themselves subservient but partners in the enterprise. The pride that can be heard in their language about the nobility of the race and its achievements was pride in themselves as much as the British. Distasteful as this is to modern sensibilities, they were shareholders in the great project of empire.
It is telling that even the opponents of the war pledged their loyalty. They argued that their objections were those of patriots who did not want to see their beloved empire harmed.
The historiography has, however, been influenced by a misguided but pervasive narrative that insisted that Australians were somehow separate from their tainted imperial origins. This narrative has argued that true Australians, specifically the working class and their spokesmen, were opposed to the war or at best disengaged from British machinations. This thesis, through the vehicle of the South African War, has argued that the evidence does not support this. As
Cole states, the idea of Australia having a separate national identity was incompatible with the
Anglo-Saxon racial bond that underpinned the society at the time.1 The working class, like the rest of the community, were enthusiastic supporters, cheering the empire and its cause while denying or excusing its excesses. The historiography should clearly articulate this.
A crucial failure in the historiography is the confusion about the difference between nationalism and local patriotism as described by Cole. Several historians, such as Mordike, have worked from a presumption that they were the same thing, most likely because in modern
Australia, and much of the Western world, these separate concepts fully overlap, but this was not the case during the Federation period.2 At that time, the citizens of Australia were empire nationalists (which was why they supported the war) and local patriots proud of their colony’s achievements within the pan-Britannic polis.
1 Cole, ‘The problem of “nationalism” and “imperialism,”’ p. 177; Stockings, Britannia’s Shield, pp. 6-7. 2 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pp. xvii-xviii; Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the past,’ p. 52. 171
Some members of the Australian historical community have even expressly argued that there was some kind of license, or even duty, to present history in a biased way. For example,
Turner’s comments mentioned in Chapter Five, Gould’s comment about all history being ideological, left or right, and Hirst’s observation that historians work from evidence, their understanding of the world and how they would like it to work.3 It is, as Stevenson observes though, the responsibility of the researcher to apply their historical imagination so that a reader might better understand why a person in the relevant time might behave in a way very alien to how we might react today.4 This requires a recognition of the roles of racism, anti-Semitism, security concerns and the powerful influence of British values on Australia in the early twentieth century.5 Modern historians also have the benefit of 120 years of hindsight; we know how the imperial story ends. The historic actors did not, and this should also be given more weight in the historiography.
3 Turner, ‘Australian nationalism and Australian history,’ p. 11; J. Hirst, Sense and Nonsense in Australian History, Black Inc. Agenda, 2009, p. 1; B. Gould, ‘Dumbing down Australian history and its teaching,’ Self- published pamphlet, distributed at the June 2000 Labor History Conference, June 26, 2000, https://www.marxists.org/archive/gould/2000/dumbingdownhistory.htm (accessed 26 April 2017). 4 Stevenson, The War with Germany, pp. 12-13. 5 ibid, p. 11. 172
Appendix A: Statistical analysis of voting outcomes during the Second Anglo-South African war
FOR AGAINST MARGIN God Save the Queen VICTORIA
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)1
ASSEMBLY – 10 Oct 1899 642 14 54 Yes3 NO DIVISION4 COUNCIL – 10 Oct 1899 Yes6 48 members5
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
ASSEMBLY – 9 Jan 1900 NO DIVISON7 No8
COUNCIL – 9 Jan 1900 NO DIVISON9 Not reported10
NEW SOUTH WALES
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)
ASSEMBLY – 19 Oct 1899 7811 10 68 Yes12 NO DIVISON13 COUNCIL – 19 Oct 1899 Not reported15 48 members14
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
1 There are four decision points relating to the dispatch of the nine contingents sent from Australia to the Second Anglo-South African War. The colonial governments made the first three and the Federal government made the final decision. The first decision point related to the situation prior to Black Week when only a small number of troops were to be dispatched in a demonstration of support for the empire. The second decision point related to the period after Black Week, when the series of defeats was perceived to be a serious threat to the existence of the Empire. The third decision point was made by the Council of Premiers in response to Kitchener’s request for replacement troops, given the original contingents’ term of service was about to expire. The final decision was made in response to allegations made in the European press that the dominions were losing interest in supporting the Empire. C. Wilcox, The Boer War: Australians and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902: Research Guide, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2000 (Specifically Chapter 2 ‘Committing the Contingents’) Retrieved from http://guides.naa.gov.au/boer-war/index.aspx. 2 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1790. 3 ibid. 4 VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801. 5 VPD(LA), 1899-1902, Vol. 91 (June-Sept) ‘List of Members of Parliament.’ 6 VPD(LC), 11 October 1899, p. 1801. 7 VPD(LA), 9 January 1900, p. 2883. 8 ibid. 9 VPD(LC), 9 January 1900, p. 2862. 10 ibid. 11 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1585. 12 ibid. 13 NSWPD(LC), 19 October 1899, p. 1478. 14 NSWPD(LC), 17 August 1899, p. p. 831. 15 NSWPD(LC), 19 October 1899, p. 1478. 173
ASSEMBLY – 19 Dec 1899 NO DIVISION16 COUNCIL – 19 Dec 1899 NO DIVISION17
QUEENSLAND
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)
NO DIVISION18 ASSEMBLY – 18 Oct 1899 20 3 Cheers for the Queen21 72 members19 NO DIVISION22 Yes, & 3 Cheers for the COUNCIL – 25 Oct 1899 24 42 members23 Queen
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
ASSEMBLY – 20 Dec 1899 NO DIVISION25 3 Cheers for the Queen26
COUNCIL – 21 Dec 1899 NO DIVISION27 3 Cheers for the Queen28
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)
NO DIVISION29 Cheering31 ASSEMBLY – 5 Oct 1899 44 members30 NO DIVISION32 COUNCIL – 17 Oct 1899 24 members33
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
16 NSWPD(LA), 19 December 1899, p. 3528; Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1899, pp. 6; 7-8; Evening News, 20 December 1899, p. 7. 17 NSWPD(LC), 19 December 1899, p. 3486; **There is effectively no dispute (the motion is introduced and passed). 18 QPD(LA), 18 Oct 1899, p. 505. 19 QPD(LA), 18 Oct 1899, pp. v-vi. 20 There was a division taken during the debate on whether to send troops to South Africa, which has been used by some historians as the measure of dissent against the war. However, this is not correct; the division did occur but it was not a question of dissent against the war but a question of confidence in the government. There was considerably anger that the Premier had without asking the Parliament offered troops to the Colonial Office. Several members of the House stated that they supported the sending of troops but not the action of the Premier. The actual vote on whether to send troops was made without a division. Therefore, no number has been included. QPD(LA), 11, 12, 17 and 18 Oct 1899, pp. 339-505. 21 QPD(LA), 18 Oct 1899, p. 505. 22 QPD(LC), 25 Oct 1899, p.601. 23 QPD(LA), 18 Oct 1899, p. v. 24 QPD(LC), 25 Oct 1899, p. 601. 25 QPD(LA), 20 Dec 1899, p. 1475. 26 ibid; C. Wilcox, Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1902, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, (2002) p. 28. 27 QPD(LC), 21 Dec 1899, p. 1511. 28 ibid. 29 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. 1561. 30 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. v. 31 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. 1561. 32 WAPD(LC), 17 October 1899, p. 1591. 33 WAPD(LA), 5 October 1899, p. vi. 174
Premier – 20 December Executive decision34
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)
1835 ASSEMBLY – 12 Oct 1899 1037 8 54 members36
738 COUNCIL – 10 Oct 1899 640 1 24 members39
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
ASSEMBLY – 19 Dec 1899 UNANIMOUSLY41 Carried without COUNCIL – 19 Dec 1899 dissent42
TASMANIA
1st Decision point (Pre ‘Black Week’)
Passed43 ASSEMBLY – 11 Oct 1899 45 Members 3544
COUNCIL – 10 Oct 1899 Agreed46
2nd Decision point (Post ‘Black Week’)
34 Sir John Forrest, WA Premier, appears to have made an Executive decision to send troops without reference to Parliament. The Parliamentary session closed on 16 December 1899. The telegrams requesting additional troops are not made until 19 December 1899. The newspaper reports state that Forrest has agreed to the NSW Premier’s request for troops. WAPD(LA), 16 December 1899, pp. 3069 & 3072; ‘News and Notes,’ Southern Times (Bunbury), 21 December 1899, p. 3; ‘Colonial Contingents,’ Kalgoorlie Western Argus (WA), 21 December 1899, p. 9; ‘Australian preparations,’ Norseman Times, 20 December 1899, p. 2; ‘Troops for the Transvaal – Westralian Contingent,’ The Daily News (WA), 20 December 1899, p. 4. 35 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 661 (12 October 1899). 36 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 1 (22 June 1899); Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) Preface under ‘The Parliament.’ 37 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 661 (17 October 1899). 38 Vote was tied 6 noes, 6 ayes, decided by the President, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 156 (10 October 1899). 39 Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899), Preface under ‘The Parliament.’ 40 Vote was tied 6 noes, 6 ayes, decided by the President, Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 156 (10 October 1899). 41 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p.1079 (19 December 1899). 42 Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899) p. 359 (19 December 1899). 43 Tasmanian ‘Votes and Proceedings,’ session of 1899, No. 69, p. 326 (12 October 1899); The initial vote was 18 noes and 10 ayes, the bell was rung summoning members to the House, the Bill was then passed. It is not known how many were in favour of the Bill. 44 ibid. 45 ibid. 46 ‘The Transvaal Contingent,’ The Mercury (Tas), 12 October 1899, p. 4. 175
ASSEMBLY – 18 Dec 1899 Executive decision47 COUNCIL – 18 Dec 1899
COUNCIL OF PREMIERS
3rd Decision point (Kitchener’s request for UNANIMOUS48 replacements)
COMMONWEALTH
4th Decision point (Allegations in the foreign press that the dominions would not support the Empire) REPRESENTATIVES 4549 5 40 Yes50 51 SENATE Question affirmed (36 Senators)
47 ‘Another Australian contingent,’ The Mercury (Tas), 19 December 1899, p. 3. 48 ‘The new Australian contingent,’ The Age, 8 January 1901, p. 5, ‘Troops for South Africa,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 January 1901, p. 5; ‘More troops for South Africa,’ The West Australian (WA), 8 January 1901, p. 5; ‘The next contingent,’ Adelaide Observer (SA), 12 January 1901, p. 30; ‘The new Australian Contingent,’ The Leader (Vic) 12 January 1901, p. 24; ‘Conference of Premiers,’ Chronicle (SA), 12 January 1901, p. 12. 49 CPD(HR), 14 January 1902, pp. 8799-8800. 50 ibid, p. 8800. 51 CPD(S), 22 January 1902, p.9030. 176
APPENDIX B - Details of party affiliation, religion, country of origin and profession of colonial politicians voting on the motion as to whether troops should be sent to South Africa (October 1899).
TABLE B_1. Details of party affiliation, religion, country of origin and profession of NSW colonial politicians voting on the motion as to whether troops should be sent to South Africa (October 1899).1
*indicates the member voted against sending troops
SURNAME FIRST PARTY RELIGION COUNTRY PROFESSION NAMES OF ORIGIN *Ashton2 James NA Anglican Geelong, Newspaper man/ Victoria Businessman *Donaldson3 R NA CoE Westmeath, Construction Ofally, Ireland supervisor *Edden4 Alfred Labor NA Staffordshire, Coalminer England *Fergusson5 William Labor Anglican/ Redruth, South Engine driver/ John Methodist Australia Journalist *Holman6 William Labor Anglican London Solicitor *Nielsen7 Niels Labor Catholic Copenhagen, Cabinet maker Rasmus Denmark Wilson *Miller8 Gustave NA NA Prospect, New Journalist/Proprietor Thomas South Wales Carlisle *Thomas9 Josiah Labor Methodist Cornwall Miner, union leader *Thompson10 James NA CoE Fintona, County Surveyor and
1 All extracts of information are either from the NSW Parliamentary website, specifically the ‘Former Members’ page or the Australian Dictionary of Biography webpage. 2 Former Members page, NSW Parliamentary website, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1140 (accessed 4 July 2017). 3 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=939 (accessed 4 July 2017). 4 W.G. McMinn, ‘Edden, Alfred (1850–1930),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/edden- alfred-6083/text10419, published first in hardcopy 1981 (accessed 4 July 2017). 5 Former Members page, NSW Parliamentary website, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1053 (accessed 4 July 2017). 6 ibid, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/holman-william-arthur-6713 (accessed 4 July 2017). 7 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1202 (accessed 4 July 2017). 8 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=957 (accessed 4 July 2017). 9 B. Penny, ‘Thomas, Josiah (1863–1933),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/thomas-josiah-8779/text15391, published first in hardcopy 1990 (accessed 4 July 2017). 10 Former Members page, NSW Parliamentary website, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=646 (accessed 4 July 2017).
177
Banford Tyrone, Ireland selector Thompson *Watkins11 David Labor NA Wallsend, New Coal miner South Wales Anderson12 George NA NA Lancaster, Policeman/ England Businessman Barnes13 John NA NA London, Hotelier Frederick England Barton14 Edmond Glebe, New Barrister South Wales, Australia Brunker15 James Free trade NA Newcastle, New Stock and station Nixon South Wales agent Campbell16 Archibald NA NA Inverness, Newspaper Scotland proprietor Carroll17 James NA Catholic Tipperary, Publican/Land and George Ireland mining agent Chapman18 Major NA Presbyterian County Cork, Grocer and tea Henry Ireland merchant Clark19 Edward NA CoE Hobart, Timber merchant Mann Tasmania Clarke20 Henry NA Presbyterian Maghera, Produce and Ireland shipping agent Clarke21 Thomas NA Methodist Hazelbrook, Commercial agent New South and produce Wales merchant Cohen22 John Jacob NA Jewish Grafton, New Barrister/Architect South Wales Cook23 Sir Joseph Labor (?) Methodist Staffordshire, Miner
11 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1151 (accessed 4 July 2017). 12 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=842 (accessed 4 July 2017). 13 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=722 (accessed 4 July 2017). 14 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=920 (accessed 4 July 2017). 15 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=651 (accessed 4 July 2017). 16 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=669 (accessed 4 July 2017). 17 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=984 (accessed 4 July 2017). 18 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=869 (accessed 4 July 2017). 19 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=981 (accessed 4 July 2017). 20 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=523 (accessed 4 July 2017). 21 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=141 (accessed 4 July 2017). 22 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1055 (accessed 4 July 2017). 23 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1070 (accessed 4 July 2017).
178
England Copeland24 Henry NA CoE Hull, England Miner and farmer Crick25 William Radical and Catholic Kapunda, South Solicitor Patrick protectionist Australia Cruickshank26 George NA CoE Dubbo, New Banker and Alexander South Wales landowner Dacey27 John Labor (?) Catholic Cork, Ireland Blacksmith and Rowland coachbuilder Davis28 David NA CoE Norfolk Island, Builder and Australia contractor Davis29 William NA NA Bathurst, New Butcher and Walter South Wales pastoralist Dick30 William NA Presbyterian Sydney, New School teacher Thomas South Wales Dight31 Charles NA CoE Singleton, New Pastoralist Hilton South Wales Ewing32 Thomas NA CoE Pitt Town, New Surveyor Thompson South Wales Fegan33 John Lionel Labor (?) Methodist Chelmsford, Miner Essex, England Ferris34 Lieutenant- NA Catholic Parramatta, New Auctioneer and Colonel South Wales estate agent William John Fitzpatrick35 Thomas NA Catholic Montrath, Pastoralist Queens County, Ireland Gillies36 John NA Presbyterian Airdrie, Newspaper man Lanarkshire,
24 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=751 (accessed 4 July 2017). 25 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/formermembers/Pages/former-member- details.aspx?pk=1098 (accessed 4 July 2017). 26 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=966 (accessed 4 July 2017). 27 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=982 (accessed 4 July 2017). 28 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=977 (accessed 4 July 2017). 29 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=768 (accessed 4 July 2017). 30 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1147 (accessed 4 July 2017). 31 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=800 (accessed 4 July 2017). 32 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1015 (accessed 4 July 2017). 33 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1083 (accessed 4 July 2017). 34 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=985 (accessed 4 July 2017). 35 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/formermembers/Pages/former-member- details.aspx?pk=694 (accessed 4 July 2017). 36 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=831 (accessed 4 July 2017).
179
Scotland Gormly37 James NA Catholic County Carrier and Roscommon, pastoralist Ireland Graham38 Dr James NA CoE Edinburgh, Medical practitioner Scotland Griffith39 Thomas NA CoE Santa Cruz, Commission agent Hunter West Indies and pastoralist Hassall40 Thomas NA NA England Pastoralist Henry Hawthorne41 John Stuart NA Coe Sydney, New Draper and South Wales auctioneer Jessep42 Thomas NA Methodist Gooderstone, Fruit merchant Norfolk, England Kidd43 John NA Presbyterian Brechin, Storekeeper/ and Forfarshire, dairy farmer Scotland Law44 Sydney NA CoE Redfern, New Auctioneer James South Wales, Lees45 Samuel NA Methodist Sydney, New Printer Edward South Wales Levien46 Robert NA CoE Singleton, New Solicitor Henry South Wales Lyne47 William Free trade Anglican Apslawn, Van Pastoralist John Diemen’s Land MacDonald48 Henry NA CoE Newcastle, New Carpenter, builder, James South Wales estate agent and auctioneer
37 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=703 (accessed 4 July 2017). 38 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1011 (accessed 4 July 2017). 39 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=793 (accessed 4 July 2017). 40 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/formermembers/Pages/former-member- details.aspx?pk=759 (accessed 4 July 2017). 41 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=903 (accessed 4 July 2017). 42 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=909 (accessed 4 July 2017). 43 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=736 (accessed 4 July 2017). 44 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1016 (accessed 4 July 2017). 45 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=802 (accessed 4 July 2017). 46 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=914 (accessed 4 July 2017). 47 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=833 (accessed 4 July 2017). 48 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1268 (accessed 4 July 2017).
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Mahoney49 William NA Methodist Adelaide, South Lawyer Henry Australia McLean50 Francis NA (ANA) Methodist Sydney, New Accounts clerk and Edward South Wales timber merchant McCourt51 William NA CoE County Newspaper Monaghan, proprietor and land Ireland speculator McFarlane52 John NA Presbyterian Hunter River Farmers co-op District, New manager South Wales McGowen53 James Labor CoE ‘Western Bride’, Boiler maker Sinclair at sea Taylor Meagher54 Richard Labor Catholic Bathurst, New Lawyer Denis South Wales Millard55 William NA CoE Wollongong, Tanner and dairy New South farmer Wales Molesworth56 Edmund NA CoE Oxford, England Customs and William shipping agent Moore57 Samuel Free trade Methodist Bau, Fiji Mine manager Wilkinson Morgan58 William NA CoE Bathurst, New Lawyer South Wales, Neild59 John Cash NA CoE Bristol, England Insurance agent Nelson60 Arthur NA CoE Camden, New Engineer David South Wales Nicholson61 John Trade CoE Cumberland, Coalminer
49 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1005 (accessed 4 July 2017). 50 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1115 (accessed 4 July 2017). 51 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=943 (accessed 4 July 2017). 52 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/formermembers/Pages/former-member- details.aspx?pk=976 (accessed 4 July 2017). 53 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=993 (accessed 4 July 2017). 54 B. Nairn, ‘Meagher, Richard Denis (Dick) (1866–1931),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/meagher-richard- denis-dick-7546/text13165, published first in hardcopy 1986 (accessed 4 July 2017). 55 Former Members page, NSW Parliamentary website, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=830 (accessed 4 July 2017). 56 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=891 (accessed 4 July 2017). 57 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=978 (accessed 4 July 2017). 58 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=791 (accessed 4 July 2017). 59 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=871 (accessed 4 July 2017). 60 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=852 (accessed 4 July 2017). 61 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=763 (accessed 4 July 2017).
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Barnes Union England Nobbs62 John NA CoE Surry Hills, New Conveyancer, South Wales property owner, newspaper proprietor. O’Sullivan63 Edward Protectionist Catholic Launceston, Journalist, printer William Tasmania and author Perry64 John NA Presbyterian Sydney, New Storekeeper and South Wales cane farmer. Phillips65 Samuel NA Jewish Parramatta, New Jeweller South Wales Quinn66 Patrick NA Catholic Darlinghurst, Journalist Edward New South Wales Reid 67 George Free trade Presbyterian Renfrewshire, Lawyer Houston Scotland Richards68 Edwin NA Methodist Mudgee, New Journalist South Wales Rigg69 William NA Presbyterian Liverpool, Businessmen England Rose70 Thomas NA CoE Parramatta, New Lawyer (solicitor), South Wales draper, newspaperman Ross71 Dr Andrew Protectionist Presbyterian Ayrshire, Medical practitioner Hendry Scotland and surgeon Sawers72 William NA CoE Stirlingshire, Pastoralist Bowie Scotland Stewart Campbell See73 John NA Anglican Huntingdon, Merchant
62 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=862 (accessed 4 July 2017). 63 B.E. Mansfield, ‘O’Sullivan, Edward William (1846–1910),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/osullivan-edward- william-7931/text13803, published first in hardcopy 1988 (accessed 4 July 2017). 64 Former Members page, NSW Parliamentary website, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=860 (accessed 4 July 2017). 65 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=893 (accessed 4 July 2017). 66 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1088 (accessed 4 July 2017). 67 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=855 (accessed 4 July 2017). 68 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1006 (accessed 4 July 2017). 69 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=895 (accessed 4 July 2017). 70 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=998 (accessed 4 July 2017). 71 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=599 (accessed 4 July 2017). 72 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=827 (accessed 4 July 2017). 73 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=864 (accessed 4 July 2017).
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England shipowner Sleath74 Richard Labor NA Fifeshire, Miner Scotland Smith75 Samuel Labor Presbyterian Ayrshire, Fireman/Union Scotland official Spence76 William Labor Presbyterian Orkney Islands, Union official Guthrie Scotland Spruson77 Wilfred NA Catholic Sydney, New Patent attorney and Joseph South Wales engineer Storey78 David NA Presbyterian County Merchant Monaghan, Ireland Terry79 Edward NA CoE Rouse Hill, New Landed proprietor South Wales Thomson80 Dugald NA Presbyterian London, Retired England businessman Waddell81 Thomas NA Presbyterian Monaghan, Pastoralist Ireland Whiddon82 Samuel NA Congregationalist London, Boot and shoe Thomas England manufacturer Wilks83 William NA NA Sydney, New Fuel merchant Henry South Wales Wilson84 Charles NA NA Paignton, Journeyman Graham Devon, England Wise85 Bernhard NA NA Petersham, New Lawyer Ringrose South Wales Wood86 William NA CoE Wallhollow, Storekeeper Herbert Victoria
74 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/formermembers/Pages/former-member- details.aspx?pk=1127 (accessed 4 July 2017). 75 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1023 (accessed 4 July 2017). 76 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=882 (accessed 4 July 2017). 77 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1215 (accessed 4 July 2017). 78 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1012 (accessed 4 July 2017). 79 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=766 (accessed 4 July 2017). 80 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=912 (accessed 4 July 2017). 81 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=975 (accessed 4 July 2017). 82 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=905 (accessed 4 July 2017). 83 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1117 (accessed 4 July 2017). 84 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=787 (accessed 4 July 2017). 85 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1039 (accessed 4 July 2017). 86 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1211 (accessed 4 July 2017).
183
Wright87 Francis NA CoE London, Commercial agent Augustus England
87 ibid, https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=697 (accessed 4 July 2017).
184
TABLE B_2. Details of party affiliation, religion, country of origin and profession of Victorian colonial politicians voting on the motion as to whether troops should be sent to South Africa (October 1899)88
*indicates the member voted against sending troops
SURNAME FIRST PARTY RELIGION COUNTRY PROFESSION NAMES OF ORIGIN Mason89 Francis NA Catholic Inniskillen Various Conway (SPEAKER ) Maloney90 William Labor Wesley (?) West Melbourne Physician Robert Nuttall * Murray91 John* (Lib and Presbyterian Kangaroo Flat, Grazier Labour) Victoria Bromley92 Fredrick Labor CoE Wolverhampton Decorative artist Hadkinson * Hamilton93 Walter Labor NA Glenelg, South Coach builder and Alfred* Australia co-op bakery manager Sangster94 George* Labor Catholic (?) Aberdeen Seaman Styles95 James* Labor CoE Croydon, Surrey Engineer Watt96 William Liberal Presbyterian Kyneton, Victoria Hay and grain Alexander* merchant McCay97 James NA Presbyterian Ballynure, County Barrister Whiteside* Antrim Murphy98 Edward* NA Catholic Clontarf, Ireland Mining interests
88 All extracts of information are either from the Victorian Parliamentary website, specifically the ‘Re-Member (Former Members)’ page. 89 Re-member page, Victorian Parliamentary website, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/576- mason-francis-conway (accessed 4 July 2017). 90 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/573-maloney-william-robert-nuttall (accessed 4 July 2017). 91 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/609-murray-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 92 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/244-bromley-frederick-hadkinson (accessed 4 July 2017). 93 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/422-hamilton-walter-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017). 94 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/707-sangster-george (accessed 4 July 2017). 95 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/760-styles-james (accessed 4 July 2017). 96 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/808-watt-william-alexander (accessed 4 July 2017). 97 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/535-mccay-james-whiteside (accessed 4 July 2017). 98 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/604-murphy-edward (accessed 4 July 2017).
185
Maloney99 William Labor Wesley (?) West Melbourne Physician Robert Nuttall * Cook100 James NA (ANA) Auckland, New Estate agent Newton Zealand Haxton Hume* Higgins101 Henry NA (Pro CoE (?) Newtownards, Solicitor Bournes* Home County Down Rule) Gillies102 Duncan Conservati Pres(?) Overton, near Mining interests ve liberal Glasgow coalition Toutcher103 Richard Deakinite CoE Maryborough, Civil servant Frederick Liberal Victoria Zox104 Ephraim Free Trader Jewish Liverpool Businessman Lamen Beazley105 William Labor ? Pres or Meth London, England Estate agent David Gray106 Fredrick Labor Methodist Redruth, Draper and grocer Charles Cornwall Trenwith107 William Labor Free thinker Launceston, Boot maker and Arthur Tasmania union secretary Wilkins108 Edgar Labor CoE Newport, Butcher Monmouthshire Outtrim109 Alfred Labor CoE London, England Auctioneer Richard (1904) Burton110 John Labour NA Edinburgh Miner Balfour Peacock111 Alexander Liberal CoE Creswick, Legal manager James Victoria (mining) Shiels112 William Liberal OS OS Barrister McLean113 Allan Liberal Catholic OS Stock and station agent Deakin114 Alfred Liberal NA Fitzroy, Victoria Lawyer and wing of journalist
99 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/573-maloney-william-robert-nuttall (accessed 4 July 2017). 100 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/298-cook-james-newton-haxton-hume (accessed 4 July 2017). 101 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/446-higgins-henry-bournes (accessed 4 July 2017). 102 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/392-gillies-duncan (accessed 4 July 2017). 103 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/779-toutcher-richard-frederick (accessed 4 July 2017). 104 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/852-zox-ephraim-lamen (accessed 4 July 2017). 105 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/209-beazley-william-david (accessed 4 July 2017). 106 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/406-gray-frederick-charles (accessed 4 July 2017). 107 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/780-trenwith-william-arthur (accessed 4 July 2017). 108 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/821-wilkins-edgar (accessed 4 July 2017). 109 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/631-outtrim-alfred-richard (accessed 4 July 2017). 110 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/255-burton-john-balfour (accessed 4 July 2017). 111 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/640-peacock-alexander-james (accessed 4 July 2017). 112 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/717-shiels-william (accessed 4 July 2017). 113 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/561-mclean-allan (accessed 4 July 2017). 114 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/329-deakin-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017).
186
coalition Anderson115 John NA Catholic England Publican Austin116 Edwin NA CoE Australia Pastoralist Henry Bennett117 George NA Catholic Buckie, Cordial manufacturer Henry Banffshire Best118 Robert NA CoE Australia Lawyer Wallace Brake119 James NA Presbyterian Cavendish, Storekeeper Hugh Victoria Cameron120 Ewen Hugh NA Presbyterian Inverness Farmer Carter121 Godfrey NA CoE St Annes Businessman Downes Chirnside122 John Percy NA Presbyterian (?) Skipton, Victoria Pastoralist Craven123 Albert NA CoE England (At age Engineer William 1yo) Downward124 Alfred NA CoE Melbourne Grazier Duffy125 John Gavan NA Catholic Dublin Lawyer Duggan126 Daniel NA Catholic Louisa Creek, Auctioneer Josep NSW Dyer127 John Henry NA Methodist Cornwall Farmer Fink128 Theodore NA Jewish Geurnsey (at age Solicitor/Newspaper 5yo) prop Forrest129 Charles NA Pres(?) Dundee Farmer and grazier Lamond
Foster130 Henry NA CoE Coventry, Mining Agent Warwickshire Gair131 Mackay NA CoE Stornaway (at age Solicitor John 5yo) Scobie Graham132 George NA Methodist Linlithgow Farmer Gurr133 William NA Congregationali Launceston, Auctioneer st Tasmania
115 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/181-anderson-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 116 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/191-austin-edwin-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 117 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/216-bennett-george-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 118 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/222-best-robert-wallace (accessed 4 July 2017). 119 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/238-brake-james-hugh (accessed 4 July 2017). 120 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/264-cameron-ewen-hugh (accessed 4 July 2017). 121 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/273-carter-godfrey-downes (accessed 4 July 2017). 122 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/284-chirnside-john-percy (accessed 4 July 2017). 123 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/309-craven-albert-william (accessed 4 July 2017). 124 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/340-downward-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017). 125 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/343-duffy-john-gavan (accessed 4 July 2017). 126 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/344-duggan-daniel-josep (accessed 4 July 2017). 127 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/349-dyer-john-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 128 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/369-fink-theodore (accessed 4 July 2017). 129 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/377-forrest-charles-lamond (accessed 4 July 2017). 130 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/378-foster-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 131 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/386-gair-mackay-john-scobie (accessed 4 July 2017). 132 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/401-graham-george (accessed 4 July 2017). 133 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/413-gurr-william (accessed 4 July 2017).
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Harris134 Albert NA CoE London, England Storekeeper Harris135 Joseph NA Pres(?) Bristol, England Nurseryman Isaacs136 Isaac NA Jewish Melbourne Barrister Alfred Isaacs 137 John Alfred NA Jewish Melbourne Barrister Kennedy138 Thomas NA Catholic Gisborne, Farmer Victoria Keys139 John NA Methodist County Tyrone Local government officer Kirton140 Joseph NA Methodist (?) Ballarat Victoria Auctioneer and agent William Levien141 Jonas Felix NA Jewish Williamstown, Businessman Australia Victoria McBride142 Peter NA Presbyterian Dunolly, Victoria Storekeeper McColl143 James NA Presbyterian South Shields, Legal manager Hiers Durham McGregor144 Robert NA Methodist London, England Business agent McKenzie145 Malcolm NA Presbyterian Broadford, Pastoralist Kenneth Victoria McLeod146 Donald NA Congregationali Moorabool, Pastoralist Norman st Victoria Madden147 Frank NA Catholic Cork, Ireland Lawyer Mason148 John NA CoE Worcester Butcher Walker Methven149 David NA Presbyterian Fifeshire Contractor Morrissey150 John NA Catholic Thurles, Storekeeper and Tipperary pastoralist Murray- Robert CoE Liverpool Businessman Smith151 Moule152 W.H. NA CoE Brighton, Victoria Barrister and judge Staughton153 Samuel NA CoE Hertford Pastoralist Thomas
134 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/431-harris-albert (accessed 4 July 2017). 135 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/432-harris-joseph (accessed 4 July 2017). 136 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/468-isaacs-isaac-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017). 137 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/469-isaacs-john-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017). 138 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/483-kennedy-thomas (accessed 4 July 2017). 139 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/488-keys-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 140 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/493-kirton-joseph-william (accessed 4 July 2017). 141 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/514-levien-jonas-felix-australia (accessed 4 July 2017). 142 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/531-mcbride-peter (accessed 4 July 2017). 143 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/537-mccoll-james-hiers (accessed 4 July 2017). 144 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/548-mcgregor-robert (accessed 4 July 2017). 145 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/558-mckenzie-malcolm-kenneth (accessed 4 July 2017). 146 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/563-mcleod-donald-norman (accessed 4 July 2017). 147 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/569-madden-frank (accessed 4 July 2017). 148 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/578-mason-john-walker (accessed 4 July 2017). 149 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/584-methven-david (accessed 4 July 2017). 150 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/599-morrissey-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 151 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/732-smith-robert-murray (accessed 4 July 2017). 152 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/601-moule-william-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 153 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/745-staughton-samuel-thomas (accessed 4 July 2017).
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Taverner154 John NA CoE Williamstown, Stock and station William Victoria agent Thomson155 John NA Presbyterian Shelford, Victoria Pastoralist Tucker 156 Albert NA Fitzroy, Victoria Accountant Edwin Elworthy Lee Turner 157 George NA NA Surrey Grazier James Wheeler158 James NA CoE Alfreton, Saw miller Henry Derbyshire White159 John NA CoE (?) Cambourne, Contractor Samuel Cornwall Williams160 Edward NA Congregationali Montgomeryshire Businessman David st (OS) Williams161 Henry NA Methodist Cornwall Mining director Roberts Bowser162 John National Presbyterian London, England Journalist Salmon163 Charles Protectionis CoE Amherst, Victoria Physician Carty t /ANA Irvine164 William Reform Presbyterian Newry, County Barrister Hill Down Ireland
154 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/766-taverner-john-william (accessed 4 July 2017). 155 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/773-thomson-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 156 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/781-tucker-albert-edwin-elworthy-lee (accessed 4 July 2017). 157 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/786-turner-george-james (accessed 4 July 2017). 158 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/815-wheeler-james-henry (accessed 4 July 2017). 159 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/817-white-john-samuel (accessed 4 July 2017). 160 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/825-williams-edward-david (accessed 4 July 2017). 161 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/827-williams-henry-roberts (accessed 4 July 2017). 162 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/236-bowser-john (accessed 4 July 2017). 163 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/703-salmon-charles-carty (accessed 4 July 2017). 164 ibid, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/467-irvine-william-hill (accessed 4 July 2017).
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APPENDIX C - Parliamentary dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the South African War.
TABLE C_1. Victorian dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on the sending of troops to South Africa (10 October 1899). SURNAME First name Did Did they Statement of loyalty they make a speak? statement of loyalty? Bromley Fredrick Y Y ‘I do not think anyone could accuse me of Hadkinson that [disloyalty], being connected with the old country myself. On a former occasion when the empire was threatened, I was one of the first to enrol myself among the volunteer corps, and if danger threatened the empire tomorrow I should be one of the first to volunteer again.’ 1 Cook James Y Y Cook asks why Victoria should send a Newton contingent. There is an interjection to this Haxton rhetorical question, ‘is Australia not British?’ Hume Cook replies, ‘Yes thank God and I hope we always remain British.’ Cook protested the interjection because it inferred he was not loyal.2 Hamilton Walter Y Y ‘Because I think it will be unanimously Alfred recognised that this House is unanimously of the opinion that Her Majesty the Queen and the Imperial Government have our very heartiest sympathy in their difficulties [in South Africa]. If not unanimous, we shall nearly be so on that point…’3 Higgins Henry Y Y ‘…I think it will serve to convey our feeling Bournes that it is not our duty, at this stage and in this war, to interfere in the affairs of the mother country, much as we love her and wish to stand by her, and that it is our business to wait until she is in need, and then we will help her.’4 Murphy Edward Y Y Spoke against the motion after affirming every member of the Assembly’s loyalty.5 Murray John Y Y As part of his opening speech Murray stated, ‘of course we are all loyal.’6 Rawson Hugh Y Y Spoke against the motion, arguing that there was no value in sending troops to South Africa as distinct from a situation where a
1 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1780. 2 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1760. 3 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1735. 4 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1779. Higgins makes similar remarks in the Federal Parliament in 1902 see Table C5 below. 5 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1783-1784. 6 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1731.
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major European power like Germany or France were to threaten England.7 Sangster George N N Styles James N N Watt William N N ‘I yield to no man in this House in loyalty to Alexander the British Empire, and to the throne and the person. I believe that these colonies should remain long if not permanently attached to the British Crown.’8 Maloney William Y N Maloney was the exception; he did not make Robert a clear statement of loyalty. However, it Nuttall would be difficult to conclude from his speech that he was anti-imperial. Primarily, he argued that the money needed to be spent on old age pensions to assist the destitute (and was eventually ruled out of order by the speaker for this repeated irrelevancy).9 McCay James Y N McCay, while protesting the motion Whiteside recognised that the situation appealed to ‘our feelings as Englishmen and citizens of the British Empire.’ Later he described Australians taking affront to the mistreatment of women and children as a laudable attribute of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race.’10 TOTAL 13 9 8
7 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1774-1775. 8 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1766. 9 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1751-1759. 10 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1744.
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TABLE C_2. NSW dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on the sending of troops to South Africa (18-19 October 1899).
SURNAME First name Did Did they Statement of loyalty they make a speak? statement of loyalty? Ashton James Y Y Ashton opened with an affirmation that regardless of a member’s position on the question of troops to South Africa, there was no question as to his loyalty. Specifically, he stated that ‘the question that must meet us when we consider the matter is, is the empire in danger?’11 Donaldson R Y Y ‘For that matter I am loyal as anyone. I am a born Britisher.’12 Edden Alfred Y Y ‘I am an Englishman, and no one would regret to hear a cablegram of a British repulse more than I.’ 13 Fergusson William N N John Holman William Y Y ‘I hope that this intrigue [the British in South Africa] may fail, I express that hope in no way allowing it to interfere with or qualify my genuine loyalty to the empire to which we belong.’14 Nielsen Niels N N Rasmus Wilson Miller Gustave N N Thomas Carlisle Thomas Josiah N N Thompson James N N Banford Thompson Watkins David N N TOTAL 10 4 4
11 NSWPD(LA), 18 October 1899, pp. 1445-1446, 1451. 12 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1567-1569. 13 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1565-1568. 14 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, pp. 1484-1485; Holman, one of the most noted dissenters, is discussed extensively in Chapter Three.
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TABLE C_3. Queensland members expressing concern over the war and statements of loyalty during the first debate on the no-confidence motion in the Premier, as distinct from whether or not to send troops (18-19 October 1899).15
SURNAME First name Did Did they Statement of loyalty they make a speak? statement of loyalty? Dawson Anderson Y Y ‘If Great Britain was in danger; if she was at war with a first-class power – a power that was a match for her, and that might challenge her supremacy – nay, even challenge her very existence – then it would be the bounden duty of everybody within the British dominions to strain every nerve in order to defeat that power.’16 Browne William Henry Y Y ‘…but in a few months, for all we may know, it may be a large war all over the world, and Queensland and all the other colonies may want all the men they can possibly get or raise to defend Great Britain.’ 17 Jackson George Y Y ‘As private individuals let us do what we can to assist the mother country if she is engaged in a righteous dispute and requires our assistance. In that case it would be our duty, as members of the same race, or, if you like, as members of the same grand Empire – I believe it is one of the greatest Empires that has ever existed.’ 18 Turley Joseph Henry Y Y ‘Well, I am a Briton, and just as proud of Lewis it as the honourable member.’ 19 Lesina Vincent Y Y When the Premier raised the question of Bernard Joseph patriotism as a reason to support Britain, Lesina responded, ‘I am just as patriotic as the hon. Gentleman, but my idea of patriotism is quite different from his.’ 20 He later reinforced his argument by stating, ‘I am more a British subject than
15 The problem with the Queensland debate was that it is dominated by anger at the Dickson government having committed troops without the consent of parliament rather than on the issue of sending troops. There were politicians like Kidston who specifically stated that they were in favour of sending troops but against the action of the government. [QPD(LA), 12 October 1899, p. 415]. The vote which was 39 to 28 cannot be used as a defacto list of those who were dissenting about the war [QPD(LA), 18 October 1899, p. 479]. Even so, many who spoke against the war still made statements of loyalty per the table above, reflecting that they were against the war specifically rather than the empire. 16 QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p. 347. 17 QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p. 349. 18 QPD(LA), 11 October 1899, p. 377. 19 QPD(LA), 12 October 1899 p. 384. 20 QPD (LA), 12 October 1899 p. 400.
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you [The Treasurer] are. I am an Australian native, and you were born a Scotsman.’21 This implied the Australians were more British than the Scots. Givens Thomas Y Y ‘We have heard a great deal about loyalty – the fact of sending troops is evidence of loyalty, but many and many a time in the history of England men who were stigmatized as rebels, proved the most loyal subjects and heroes England ever had.’ 22 (Givens also made a strong argument about the mistreatment of the Irish by the British.)23 Maxwell William Y Y ‘I hold that I am as good a Britisher as any man on either side of the House…’24 Stewart James Charles Y N Stewart made no statement of loyalty.25 He did however make statements that the defacto foreign policy of Australia was ‘non-intervention’ in foreign squabbles.26 Boles Jason Y Y ‘I do not say that from any feeling of disloyalty, because I believe I am a very much more loyal subject than some of the persons who bellow and prate about their loyalty, for in my opinion their valor is very low down in their boots.’27 Ryland George Y N Made no statement of loyalty and argued about other injustices perpetrated under the Union Jack, specifically the treatment of Ireland. 28 McDonald Charles Y Y ‘I am just as much a Britisher probably as any man in this House although born in Australia.’29 McDonald did make an argument for Australia developing into an independent nation Hamilton John Y Y ‘I could quite understand the position if England was engaged in a war with a strong and powerful European nation, and it was in want of men or money. I do not think there is any man in this House or in the country who would grudge to send them assistance.’30
21 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899, p. 446. 22 QPD (LA) 17 October 1899, p. 439. 23 QPD (LA) 19 October 1899, p. 492. 24 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899, p. 446. 25 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899, pp. 452-455. 26 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899, pp. 452. 27 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899, p. 484. 28 QPD (LA) 11 October 1899, pp. 487-489. 29 QPD (LA), 11 October 1899, p. 503. 30 QPD (LA), 11 October 1899, p. 498.
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TABLE C_4. South Australian dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the first debate on sending of troops to South Africa (12 October 1899).31
SURNAME First name Did Did they Statement of loyalty they make a speak? statement of loyalty? Archibald William Y Y If England really required assistance he believed that every South Australian who could bear arms should be sent, and the last shilling expended in helping the motherland. 32 Bachelor Lee Y Y There was no question of the loyalty and patriotism of the Australian nation… Just now they were permeated with imperial sentiment. Throughout the empire there was still a strong desire to preserve its unity. That sentiment had developed enormously during the previous two to three years, and naturally so owing to the Jubilee celebrations marking the sixtieth year of Her Majesty’s reign – a period unexampled in the history of the world and civilisation for progress in the arts and industries to which their own race had come to the fore. They all contemplated that period with a great deal of pride.33 Carpenter William Henry Y Y He was not lacking in loyalty…34 Coneybeer Frederick Y Y He had sufficient confidence in his fellow William Australians to know that when an emergency arose they would be prepared for duty and service.35 Hourigan Francis Y Y They were part of the Empire no doubt…36 Hutchison James Y Y He claimed to be as loyal and patriotic as any member of the House, or any individual outside it. 37 McGillivray Y Y He did not think any man calling himself a Britisher would fail to uphold the Empire to which he belonged. Although he was getting up in years he would be prepared to do his share for the defence of the Empire.38 Roberts Ernest Y Y The time had not arrived when the British Empire was in danger which necessitated the assistance of the colonies and
31 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (12 October 1899) p. 661. *The SA reports were written in the third person e.g. he said… rather than a verbatim transcript. 32 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 635. 33 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 621. 34 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 643. 35 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (12 October 1899) p. 656. 36 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 640. 37 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 631. 38 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 641.
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dependencies. When the time did arrive it would be a lasting disgrace to South Australia if she could not muster 20,000 able-bodied men ready and anxious to give their lives, if necessary to sustain the British Empire. They would be justified in going further and submitting to a war tax, no matter what the amount, in order to maintain it. 39 Wood Richard Y Y He was as loyal to the Queen and her throne as any person inside or outside the House, and if there was any necessity he would ask the Premier to adjourn the House so that all of them could take part in the fighting. 40
Hooper Richard N N TOTAL 10 9 9
39 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (12 October 1899) p. 651. 40 SAPD(LA) Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (10 October 1899) p. 637.
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TABLE C_5. Commonwealth dissenters’ statements of loyalty during the final debate in regard to sending of troops to South Africa (14 January 1902).
SURNAME First Did they Did they Statement of loyalty name speak? make a statement of loyalty? Bamford Fredrick N N Ronald James N N Black Thomas Josiah N N Higgins Henry Y Y ‘…I said then as I have said always, that if Bournes England were in extreme need – if her existence were in danger and it were a matter of life and death – we should spend every man and every shilling in defending the empire.’41
Later on the same day he stated:
‘I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am one who regards as clear that no empire in the history of the world has done so much for civilization and for liberty as the British Empire. I may also add, if the honourable members will allow me to do so, that personally I belong to a stock which is the most loyal and the most attached to the England of all stocks within the wide ring of the world.’ 42 McDonald Charles Y Y ‘We are all still loyal to Great Britain, and as far as I can understand, that has never been doubted.’43 McDonald, though, is an exception in that he was prepared to state that ‘I hold a time will come when Australia will not be dependent upon Great Britain, but a free and independent nation.’44 5 2 2
41 CPD (R) 14 January 1902, p. 8753. 42 CPD(R) 14 January 1902, p. 8755. 43 CPD(R) 14 January 1902, p. 8772. 44 CPD(R) 14 January 1902, p. 8774.
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APPENDIX D: Labor voting on the sending of a contingent to the South African War (10 October 1899)
TABLE D_1. Labor voting in the Victoria House of Assembly on the sending of a contingent to the second South African War (10 October 1899).
SURNAME FIRST NAME Voted Place of Birth Occupation against sending troop1 Beazley2 William David N London, England Estate agent Gray3 Fredrick Charles N Redruth, Cornwall Draper and grocer Maloney4 William Robert Y West Melbourne Physician Nuttall Trenwith5 William Arthur N Launceston, Boot maker and Tasmania union secretary Wilkins6 Edgar N Newport, Butcher Monmouthshire Bromley7 Fredrick Y Wolverhampton Decorative artist Hadkinson Burton8 John Balfour N Edinburgh Miner Hamilton9 Walter Alfred Y Glenelg, South Coach builder and Australia co-op bakery manager Sangster10 George Y Aberdeen Seaman Styles11 James Y Croydon, Surrey Engineer
1 VPD(LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1787-1789. 2 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/209-beazley-william-david (accessed 4 July 2017). 3 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/406-gray-frederick-charles (accessed 4 July 2017). 4 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/573-maloney-william-robert-nuttall (accessed 4 July 2017). 5 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/780-trenwith-william-arthur (accessed 4 July 2017). 6 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/821-wilkins-edgar (accessed 4 July 2017). 7 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/244-bromley-frederick-hadkinson (accessed 4 July 2017). 8 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/255-burton-john-balfour (accessed 4 July 2017). 9 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/422-hamilton-walter-alfred (accessed 4 July 2017). 10 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/707-sangster-george (accessed 4 July 2017). 11 http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/re-member/details/760-styles-james (accessed 4 July 2017). 198
TABLE D_2. Table of Labor voting in the NSW House of the second South African War (19 October 1899). Assembly in regards the sending of a contingent to the second South African War (19 October 1899).
SURNAME FIRST NAME Against Place of Birth Occupation sending troops12
Edden13 Alfred Y Staffordshire, Coalminer England Fergusson14 William John Y Redruth, South Engine driver/ Australia Journalist
Holman15 William Y London Solicitor
Nielsen16 Niels Rasmus Y Copenhagen, Cabinet maker Wilson Denmark
Thomas17 Josiah Y Cornwall Miner, union leader Watkins18 David Y Wallsend, New Coal miner South Wales
Meagher19 Richard Denis N Bathurst, New Lawyer South Wales Sleath20 Richard N Fifeshire, Scotland Miner
12 NSWPD(LA), 19 October 1899, p. 1585; Evening News, 18 October 1899, p. 4; Argus, 21 October 1899, p. 13 13 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/edden-alfred-6083 (accessed 4 July 2017). 14 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1053 (accessed 4 July 2017). 15 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/holman-william-arthur-6713 (accessed 4 July 2017). 16 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1202 (accessed 4 July 2017). 17 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/thomas-josiah-8779 (accessed 4 July 2017). 18 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1151 (accessed 4 July 2017). 19 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/meagher-richard-denis-dick-7546 (accessed 4 July 2017). 20 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1127 (accessed 4 July 2017). 199
Smith21 Samuel N Ayrshire, Scotland Fireman/Union official
Spence22 William Guthrie N Orkney Islands, Union official Scotland
McGowen23 James Sinclair N ‘Western Bride’, at Boiler maker Taylor sea
Cook24 Sir Joseph N Staffordshire, Miner England
Dacey25 John Rowland N Cork, Ireland Blacksmith and coachbuilder
Fegan26 John Lionel N Chelmsford, Essex, Miner England
21 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1023 (accessed 4 July 2017). 22 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=882 (accessed 4 July 2017). 23 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=993 (accessed 4 July 2017). 24 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1070 (accessed 4 July 2017). 25 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=982 (accessed 4 July 2017). 26 https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/pages/member-details.aspx?pk=1083 (accessed 4 July 2017). 200
APPENDIX E - Persons cited as critics of the war by Henry Reynolds in Unnecessary Wars and their statements of loyalty during the South African War
TABLE E_1. Politicians cited as critics of the war by Henry Reynolds, how they voted and their statements of loyalty with regard to sending of troops to South Africa (October 1899).
SURNAME First Colony/ Did they Did they STATEMENT OF name Federal vote make a LOYALTY against statement sending of troops loyalty?
Darling, 1 John (Jnr) SA Yes Yes ‘He claimed to be as (paired) loyal as any member of the House.’ 2
‘He was sure that if the occasion did arise South Australia, and Australia’s people would rise to a man if the flag was in danger.’ 3
‘if the necessity did arise he had no doubt that they would draw even the last drop of blood for the fight.’ 4 Robinson, 5 William SA Yes Yes ‘he claimed to be as Alfred. patriotic even as Mr. Tomkinson. He was as ready to fight for his country in time of need as Mr. Tomkinson or the Chief Secretary…’6
1 H. Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, NewSouth, Sydney, 2016, p. 155. 2 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899), 10 October 1899, p. 639. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 156 6 Legislative Council Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899), 10 October 1899, p. 148.
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Price7 Thomas SA Yes Yes ‘He said with a (paired) previous speaker that when the occasion arose to help the Empire he hoped that every man who had got the blood of a Britisher in him would be ready to lay down his life for the cause.’ (He continued in this vein).8 Sawyers9 William NSW Voted in Yes ‘I have no desire to Bowie favour of discuss the merits of the Stewart sending war. The war exists, Campbell troops and I as a Britisher, am loyal to the flag… Surely, we, in the Southern world, far removed from the scene of negotiations should have the confidence of the men who form the government of Great Britain.’ 10 Reid11 George NSW/CTH Voted in Yes Multiple (see pp. 164- favour of 166). sending troops
Murray12 John VIC Yes Yes ‘of course we are all loyal.’ 13
Watt14 William VIC Yes Yes ‘I yield to no man in Alexander this House in loyalty to the British Empire, and to the throne and the person. I believe that these colonies should remain long if not
7 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 157. 8 Legislative Assembly Debates SA, First Session 1899 (1899), (16th Parliament 1899 – 22 June – 21 December 1899) 10 October 1899, p. 626. 9 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 156. 10 NSWPD (LA) 19 October 1899, pp. 1554-1557. 11 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 154-155. 12 ibid, 157. 13 VPD (LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1731. 14 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 157. 202
permanently attached to the British Crown.’ 15
McCay16 James VIC Yes Yes ‘however we may Whiteside differ as to the wisdom or advisability of interfering in the dispute, that does not affect our patriotic interests if war actually arises, and I for one would strongly resent any imputation on the sincerity of my loyalty and the reality of my patriotism because I feel it to be my duty to oppose this resolution.’ 17 Higgins18 Henry VIC/CTH Yes Yes Multiple (see 116-117). Bournes
Maloney19 William VIC Yes No Maloney was the Robert exception in the Nuttall Victorian parliament. He did not make a clear statement of loyalty; however, it would be difficult to conclude from his speech that he was anti-imperial. Primarily, he argued that the money needed to be spent on old age pensions to assist the destitute (and was eventually ruled out of order by the speaker for this repeated irrelevancy).20
15 VPD (LA), 10 October 1899, pp. 1766. 16 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 157. 17 VPD (LA), 10 October 1899, p. 1745. 18 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 160-162. 19 ibid, p. 157. 20 VPD (LA), 10 October 1899), pp. 1751-1759. 203
Haynes21 John NSW Did not Yes ‘As far as I am vote concerned, I hope the day will never come when we shall be anything else but part and parcel of the British Empire,’ and spoke of ‘believing in the power of the British Empire and the omnipotent benefits of British rule.’ Browne22 William QLD Queensland Yes ‘but in a few months, Henry did not for all we may know, it have a may be a large war all division23 over the world, and Queensland and all the other colonies may want all the men they can possibly get or raise to defend Great Britain.’ 24 Kidston25 William QLD Expresses Yes ‘I am in a peculiar favour in position, because I sending agree with the policy of troops the British Government in South Africa, and I disagree with the policy of our own government here.’26
‘I venture to say that there are members on this side of the House, of whom I claim to be one, who are just as loyal to the country they live in and the country they were born in as any member on the other side can possibly be.’ 27
21 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 164-165. 22 ibid, pp. 155-157. 23 Determining those for and those against sending troops during the Queensland debate is complicated by the fact that the debate mainly expressed anger at the Premier for committing the troops before speaking to Parliament. The division that was called during the debate was a no-confidence motion in the government. The motion to send troops was carried without a division. 24 QPD (LA), 11 October 1899, p. 349. 25 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 156. 26 QPD (LA), 17 October 1899, p. 405. 27 ibid, p. 418. 204
Stewart,28 James QLD Queensland N Stewart is the one clear Charles did not example of Reynolds’ have a thesis because he division actually did consider Australia was or should be a separate nation. For example, he made statements that the defacto foreign policy of Australia was ‘non- intervention’ in foreign squabbles.29 Turley30 Joseph QLD Queensland Y ‘Well, I am a Briton, Henry did not and just as proud of it Lewis have a as the honourable division member.’31
Vosper32 Frederick WA States he Y ‘I think we may, in Charles would not these colonies, reserve Burleigh oppose the our strength and motion33 expressions of loyalty until we find the Empire really menaced.’34
28 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 158-159; Former members page, Queensland Parliament website, James Charles Stewart, https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/members/former/bio?id=960440369 (accessed 28 April 2017). 29 QPD (LA) 18 October 1899 pp. 452. 30 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, p. 155. 31 QPD, 12 October 1899 p. 384. 32 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 155-156. 33 WAPD, 5 October 1899, p. 1559. 34 ibid. 205
TABLE E_2. Prominent individuals and organizations cited as critics by Henry Reynolds, how they voted and statements of loyalty in regard to sending of troops to South Africa (October 1899).
NAME Did they STATEMENT OF LOYALTY make a statement of loyalty?
Prof. George Arnold Wood35 Y Multiple (see 117, 133-134).
The Bulletin 36 Y Reynolds uses the Bulletin as an example of a publication critical of the war but fails to note its pro-empire stance from 1895 and its express support of the war after Black Week,37 reflective of the Bulletin’s underlying recognition that Australia’s future was linked to the empire (see 127-128).
35 Reynolds, Unnecessary Wars, pp. 164-165. 36 ibid, pp. 169-173. 37 ibid, pp. 169-173. 206
APPENDIX F – Extract of transcript of Reynolds interview 28 April 2016.
Paul Barclay - Interview
‘War and Australia’s national identity’ on ABC’s Big Ideas, Thursday 28 April 2016 8:05PM http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/rn/podcast/2016/04/bia_20160428_2005.mp3
18:41 (into recording)
PB: Were there many dissenters that followed in Lang’s footsteps?
HR: The one place that you can find this ongoing debate is in the colonial parliaments and if you really want to torture yourself read the parliamentary debates of the nineteenth century.
(Laughing)
HR: But at least they discussed these things more than we do now. I suspect there was about ten percent of those who spoke – there would be about ten percent who took this republican independent stand.
The interesting thing is that they appear in every colony. Now I doubt if they knew one another. There wasn’t much communication across the colony.
They certainly didn’t read – the newspapers didn’t report debates in Brisbane about the debates in South Australia.
So it was a home-grown tradition which comes up all over Australia and that’s why I say it is a strong tradition and it’s ten percent. I suspect it may well have been more because it wasn’t popular and it was so easy for someone to call you disloyal.
(19:52)
207
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Boy’s Own Annual 1899-1900 (UK), 22nd Annual.
Brisbane Courier (Qld), 1899-1902.
Chronicle (Adelaide, SA), 1901.
The Clarence and Richmond Examiner (NSW), 1899. 210
Clarence River Advocate (NSW), 1899.
Coolgardie Miner (WA), 1899.
Cumberland Argus and Fruit Growers Advocate (NSW), 1899.
Daily Telegraph (NSW), 1899-1900.
The Daily News (WA), 1899.
Darling Downs Gazette (Qld), 1900.
Evening Journal (SA), 1899.
Evening News (NSW), 1899-1900.
Examiner (Launceston, Tas.), 1900.
The Express and Telegraph (SA), 1899.
Fitzroy City Press (Vic), 1900.
Geelong Advertiser (Vic), 1899-1900.
Goulburn Evening Penny Post, (NSW), 1899.
The Gundagai Independent and Pastoral, Agricultural and Mining Advocate (NSW), 1899.
Hamilton Spectator (Vic), 1899.
Hawkesbury Advocate (NSW), 1899.
The Hillston Spectator and Lachlan River Advertiser (NSW), 1899.
Horsham Times (Vic), 1899.
Kalgoorlie Miner (WA), 1901.
The Leader (Melbourne, Vic), 1901.
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Maryborough Chronicle, Wide Bay and Burnett Advertiser (Qld), 1899.
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Mt Alexander Mail (Vic), 1899.
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CONTEMPORARY BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
Amery, L.S., The Times History of the War in South Africa, 7 Vols, Sampson Low Marston, London, 1901-1909.
Churchill, W., The Boer War, St Edmundsbury Press Ltd, Suffolk, 1989 (first published in 1900).
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Griffith, A., The facts about the Transvaal: being a series of excerpts from Mr. J.A. Hobson’s book, with an introduction and notes by Arthur Griffith, M.P., (Pamphlet) The Worker Trades Union Printery, Sydney 1902. 212
Headlam, C., (ed.) The Milner Papers; South Africa 1899-1905, Cassell & Company, London, 1933.
Hobhouse, E., The Brunt of War and Where it Fell, Methuen & Co, London, 1902.
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Wills, F.C., ‘Boer War Transvaal Contingent,’ (SILENT FILM), Australian Sound and Film Archive, 1899, http://aso.gov.au/titles/historical/boer-war-transvaal/clip1/ (viewed on 17 November 2015)
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Chamberlain, M, To Shoot and Ride: The Australians in the South African War 1899-1902, Military Historical Society of Australia, Melbourne, 1967.
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