Acknowledgements ...... 3 List of Abbreviations ...... 3 Executive Summary ...... 4 1. Introduction ...... 5 2. Visual Mapping ...... 7 3. Capacity Building...... 9 4. Dialogue Facilitation ...... 11 5. Conclusions ...... 17 6. Recommendations ...... 19 7. Bibliography ...... 25

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 2

The project was funded by the United Kingdom, Conflict, Security and Stability Fund and implemented by Danish Demining Group. This lessons learned study was conducted and written up by Simon Harris, an independent conflict specialist consultant. The report would not have been possible without the valuable inputs and insights of the following DDG team members: Raphael Ekai Locham (Project Coordinator, Turkana); Jimmy Kokedieny (AVR Coordinator Karamoja); Alex Lokimoi (Project Coordinator, Pokot); Adan Abdirahman Mohamed (Project Coordinator, ); Poul Thisted (Project Manager, Karamoja); Abdul Haro (AVR Manager); and Mads Frilander (Country Director, ); and the logistical/administrative support of Grace Kironcho.

CME Conflict Management Education CMCS Advanced Conflict Management and Conflict Sensitivity CSSF Conflict Security and Stability Fund DDG Danish Demining Group DFID Department for International Development GIS Geographic Information System KPR Kenya Police Reserve NPR National Police Reserve

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 3

DDG’s six months Borderlands project on conflict prevention and conflict management in the Karamoja Cluster and Mandera Triangle was overall successful in testing new ways of bringing together multiple levels of community stakeholders, security providers and county/national administrators in starting to build the relationships and trust necessary to help strengthen the security environment in these areas. The grass roots bottom-up approach feeding into national and county level policy and decision makers at different levels has provided the opportunity for the communities to work in partnership with, and inform the actions of, security providers. DDG’s community-security provider dialogues have been shown to be a powerful tool in building trust and changing attitudes. Cross-border dialogues have revealed a wide range of common issues across neighbouring countries and counties whilst also highlighting to key actors the challenges they face and the benefits that can be accrued by working together to address them. Opportunities for sharing lessons learned and best practices exist through these cross-border relationships. The project revealed the need for all parties across borders to work together to develop compatible policies and practices on border security particularly with respect to sustainable disarmament. A key aspect of this is improvement in the coordination between security providers within individual countries and across borders. Of particular concern for Kenya was the need to ensure that security management is professionalised through better incorporation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) into the National Police Service (NPS) command and control structure in order to avoid their potential politicisation at the county level. A key lesson from the project was the need to focus on the youth in terms of supporting livelihoods and measures to avoid increased alienation and the risk of radicalisation. The Borderlands project has shown high potential for replication but requires multi- year funding. It has also demonstrated that its services help stimulate interest, action and demand for further conflict prevention and security management services within and beyond the current target areas. A number of innovative recommendations have emerged from the lessons learned study including the need to develop cultural orientation training for security and administrative personnel deployed to the northern borderlands; opportunities for institutionalising Conflict Management and Conflict Sensitivity (CMCS) training within the police and defence services; and the need to incorporate traditional authorities and justice into the secular approaches in order strengthen security arrangements.

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 4

This report was commissioned by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to examine the lessons learned from their Borderlands Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster project. The Borderlands project was funded as a six months pilot by the United Kingdom (UK) Government’s newly established Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF). The report examines the conflict prevention and management activities that DDG have implemented over the pilot period of September 2015 to March 2016 and draws upon their previous experiences of conflict prevention related work in northern Kenyan and Horn of . It focuses on what has worked well and less well in terms of initiatives to improve the management of conflict and insecurity in the borderland areas of Uganda (Karamoja ), Kenya (North Pokot, Turkana and Mandera) and (Gedo Region). The report assesses the relevance and effectiveness of DDG’s approach and the different project activities. It concludes with a set of recommendations for the next phase of the project.

CONTEXT The Karamoja Cluster and the Mandera Triangle are two of the most complex, fragile and conflict affected areas in the region. Strengthening conflict reduction and management capacities in these areas is important for addressing local, national and regional security needs. The purpose of this report is not to provide an extensive analysis of the context in each target area. There is an extensive literature available on that subject for further reading.1 It is however important to highlight two broad contextual observations that have relevance to the lessons learned for the Borderlands project. The first is that the Karamoja Cluster and the Mandera Triangle are two very different contexts each with their own unique set of conflict dynamics. DDG recognises that ‘one size doesn’t fit all’ when it comes to programming for conflict prevention and management. As one senior DDG manager noted “If you apply the same blanket approach you will fail because every conflict and context is different”. DDG therefore place significant emphasis on contextualising its approach. The tools used in the Borderlands project are adaptable to different contexts encountered in the Karamoja Cluster and Mandera Triangle. Entry points for engagement on the ground are predicated on careful stakeholder mapping and analysis that is informed by the affected communities from the bottom up and but also has the buy in of local authorities at every level. However, a cautionary note from a senior County Government security advisor pointed out the need to go even deeper in order to develop an accurate analysis to inform programming. Noting that there was a tendency amongst many international peace-building actors to base their analysis on the views of a small pool of respondents or usual suspects – frequently easy to access urban based intellectuals and political or administrative elites – he commended DDGs teams for getting out into the communities but urged them to develop closer grass roots ties by spending even more time engaging at the kraal level – the pastoralist’s fortified extended family homesteads and protective circles for livestock - where attitudes towards others and conflict are often nurtured. The second observation is that the drivers of conflict in both the Karamoja Cluster and Mandera Triangle are changing as a result of Kenya’s devolution of power to county governments, the growth of the extractive industries sector in northern Kenya and foreign policy / security dynamics in addressing the threat of al Shabaab terrorism

1 See bibliography

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 5 domestically and in neighbouring Somalia. No longer are conflicts in the Karamoja Cluster and Mandera Triangle, based solely on pastoralist disputes, access to water, grassing pastures and cattle routes or raiding and retaliation. These are still important but the primacy of other resources such as oil and minerals, particularly in Karamoja Cluster are beginning to reshape pastoralist and tribal dynamics as political elites and county administrations vie for control of high value land across contested boundaries. In the Mandera Triangle inter-clan rivalry over who controls local government and its resources is intersecting with resident-migrant dynamics, the rise of radicalisation and national security fears in Kenya over the Somali border being a vulnerable entry point for terrorists. One of the lessons learned from the Borderlands project is that more research is needed into the changing conflict dynamics which can provide security providers and other key local stakeholders with greater awareness of these emerging dynamics and their impacts. The project shows that security providers will need to find new ways of managing these conflicts and that a closer compact with local communities will be one of the most effective ways of strengthening security and preventing or managing conflict.

PROJECT SUMMARY The project is designed to contribute to the CSSF object of reducing ‘levels of conflict over natural resources and the marginalization of border and pastoralist communities”.2 It identifies the Mandera Triangle and the Karamoja Cluster as two highly fragile and increasingly important areas in need of urgent attention for regional stability. The project included four activity areas3: 1) Facilitation of inclusive community consultations on what has and has not worked in terms of promoting peace; 2) Visual mapping and dissemination of information on such conflict management, capacities and strategies along with information on local conflict dynamics; 3) Capacity building of local stakeholders in conflict management, small arms sensitivity and border security management; 4) Facilitation of multi-level cross-border dialogue meetings between local stakeholders as well as in-country dialogue meetings between the population and local authorities and security providers. The project was purposefully designed with a six months’ timeframe to accommodate the CSSF’s first cycle as a new funding mechanism and its interest in a pilot project that tested some of the findings from the DDG’s 2015 conflict mapping and analysis of the Somalia borderlands with Kenya and .4 Field teams in both the Karamoja Cluster and the Mandera Triangle reported that in order to accommodate the timeframe, implementation was both fast-tracked and intensive. In the Karamoja Cluster where DDG benefited from extensive prior experience all project targets were met. In the Mandera Triangle the project required more time to start-up and more extensive relationship building amidst an adverse security situation (e.g. the legacy of the al Shabaab attacks on Garissa University College in April 2015 and their more recent and domestically (in Kenya) politically controversial attack on Kenya’s African Union peacekeeping forces in January 2016 at a military base in el-Ade, Somalia.) However, this work in the Mandera Triangle benefitted greatly from DDG’s many years’ experience in Gedo region of Somalia. In both of the project locations therefore, the six month time frame was adequate to start up and carry out activities – such as cross- border dialogues – and to establish awareness, interest and participation across different levels. However it was too short to adequately observe the full impact of these initiatives. An extension of any future pilot phase from six months to twelve months

2 DDG (2015) Borderlands Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster, Project proposal submission to Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) 3 ibid 4 DDG, 2015: Somalia Borderlands Conflict Mapping / Analysis, Written for Danish Demining Group by Dr. Ken Menkhaus.

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 6 was viewed as being more suitable to fully testing the methods as well as achieving preliminary results.

METHODOLOGY The methodology for producing the lessons learned report comprised of stakeholder workshops, a desk review and key informant interviews. The stakeholder workshops were facilitated by DDG team members in (Kenya), Turkana County (Kenya) and Moroto District (Uganda) where national, county/district and community participants from different levels met to discuss small arms management and community driven cross-border conflict prevention and management.5 These meetings, which were an integral component of the pilot activities, generated a range of valuable perspectives, opinion and recommendations from community stakeholders, government administrators and security provider representatives on the conflict context, the existing conflict prevention architecture and needs, emerging issues and recommendations. The reports of these workshops were analysed as part of the desk review of available literature. This also included other research reports, field progress reports and the project proposal documentation. The methodology included in depth interviews with the project coordinators and project managers in Kenya and Uganda including the Karamoja Sub-Region (Uganda) and Pokot, Turkana and Mandera Counties (Kenya). Further inputs were included from key informant interviews from senior security provider stakeholders.

The project conducted a conflict mapping exercise in both the Karamoja Cluster and the Mandera Triangle. The exercise mapped both current and historic conflicts going as a far back as 1978 in some locations. Historic analysis of conflict in both is important because past grievances inform today’s relationships between different communities at political, tribal, clan and family levels. The mapping process involved going into the communities and eliciting the information through group exercises and individual key informant interviews. Historic data is based on the triangulated recollection of multiple informants as well as other sources such as police records. The information provided included the details of different conflicts that the communities had experienced. These included inter and intra communal conflicts, state and community conflicts as well as cross-border, crime related and extractive industry related conflicts. The mapping exercises elicited detailed information on specific incidents including precise timing, what happened, the parties involved, resolution attempts and outcomes and whether or not the conflict was still on going. The information was uploaded to interactive GIS maps.6 The maps provide a valuable conflict analysis resource that can help inform security provider, community and humanitarian actor strategy, planning and actions. The maps provide a detailed picture of conflict dynamics and specific events. The historic data enables a timeline that can reveal changes in the location and intensity of conflicts that assist in the analysis of conflict trends. As the data includes information on resolution efforts it is of significant value to researchers and evaluators examining the

5 High Level Meeting on the Small Arms Management, Mandera Town, Mandera County, Kenya 24-25 November 2015; High Level Meeting on the Small Arms Management Lodwar Town, Turkana County, Kenya 19-20 November 2015; People Sensitive Border Security management in Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia Borderlands, Red Sea Hotel, Mandera, KENYA 16-17 December 2015; People Sensitive Border Security management in the Pokot-Turkana-Karamoja Borderlands, Leslona Hotel, Moroto, Uganda 6 Karamoja Cluster map can be accessed here and Mandera Triangle map can be accessed here

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 7 effectiveness of past conflict prevention and management actions. The maps is a first step in promoting more data driven and evidence-based policy discussions which DDG sees as critical to address both reoccurring conflicts as well as addressing new causes and drivers of conflict in the borderland areas. There are concerns remaining around the extent to which all of the data should be freely available as there are risks that some of the information could be used by different interest groups to fuel rather than prevent conflicts. Access may need to include some sort of filtration according to user. The key actors who would benefit the most from full access are security providers, peace building actors, government planners at a national and sub-national (especially county/district) level and donors. The key limitation of the map is the lack of a real time data capacity. DDG are aware of this and are exploring ways in which a real time mapping could be developed. A real time capacity would have enormous tangible value to security providers and peace actors and communities themselves as it could integrate both conflict early warning and rapid response functions. Given the high penetration of mobile phone technology in Kenya especially there are opportunities for real time capacities to be linked to volunteer peace monitors a grass roots community level who could upload data via SMS or the internet from their handsets. Similar approaches were implemented with significant success in Kenya’s recent past to address and prevent election and referendum related violence.7 Information on the current maps were collected between November and December 2015, so do not capture the details of any conflict since. They are mainly event driven and there is a need to add in the drivers of these conflict events in order to develop a richer and more nuanced picture that will better inform conflict prevention and management actions. DDG are exploring how do this. The current user interface comprises different coloured dots representing different types of conflict. The visualisation needs to be made clearer and for improved user friendliness. Much of the collected data is based on recollection. This means that there is a risk of informant bias. Certain events may be over emphasised or even missed out depending upon the interests and affiliations of the reporting party. User education the use of disclaimers regarding the reliability of the information will be important conflict sensitive safeguards in making the maps available to a wider audience.

LESSONS LEARNED The GIS maps provide a valuable conflict analysis resource that can help inform security provider, community and humanitarian actor strategy, planning and actions. Conflict dynamics mapped on a multi-layer GIS map provide a powerful tool for conflict prevention dialogue in the region. It could be more effective if given real time capabilities and linked to volunteer community monitors as part of a community based conflict early warning and response system using mobile phone and internet technology to upload incidents to the map.

7 Examples in Kenya include the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) http://www.cewarn.net/ and the UWIANO Platform for Peace http://www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/programmes/uwiano-platform-for-peace

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Capacity building activities comprised of Conflict Management Education (CME) for community members, Advanced Conflict Management and Conflict Sensitivity (CMCS) for security providers, administrators and chiefs, and Third Party Neutral (TPN) mediation dialogue facilitation training for a range of government and civil society peace actors and security providers.

Value of Trainings Conflict management education training for security providers and community-security provider dialogues has captured the attention of security providers in adjoining counties and stimulated demand for an expansion of DDGs programme to these areas. This demonstrates that the need exists for the delivery of such services in other areas – and indeed the conflict context in these areas is very similar to that in the current target areas. It also shows that the training and project content in the existing target counties is highly valued by security providers and communities which is evidenced by the fact they are spreading news of the project to others.

Scope for Expansion There is significant scope for expansion of capacity building activities to other counties. In the north-west of Kenya a particular need was noted for the South Sudan border areas but across both regions there are needs for such services in all of the adjoining counties. An expansion of services would require a scaling up of the entire operation and an increase in the number of personnel if managed by DDG. Alternative options for going to scale could be usefully explored such as franchising training provision to other local NGOs or government entities with DDG providing an overarching coordination, monitoring and quality assurance role.

Security for Participants In Mandera the risks of conducting trainings for security providers and community members is a major challenge. Any convergence point such an NGO workshop is currently a potential target for terrorist attacks. Participants were vocal in expressing their willingness to attend to prove their determination to live a normal life. DDG mitigated the risk by organising their meetings around safer areas and properly secured facilities. Additional security personnel were deployed around the meeting venue from the NPS and the NPR for cross-border meetings that involved cross-border administrators and elders from Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite the risk the fact that participants are willing to attend demonstrates the level of interest and support for these trainings.

Community Application of Tools The practical tools used to demonstrate how different people have different perspectives using props have proven extremely effective in engaging community interest and understanding. For example the use of spectacles with different coloured lenses have been taken on board and used by communities in dispute resolution activities outside of DDGs direct involvement.

NPR Capacity Gaps The project revealed significant capacity gaps within the NPR, formerly the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR). This is the security provider that most rural community

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 9 members are likely to encounter on a daily basis in the target areas. The NPR is a voluntary service made up of local community members who are auxiliary to the Kenya Police Service and ostensibly under the overall command of the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) and Officer Command Police Station (OCPS) at a local level. In reality there is often an extremely weak chain of command and control resulting in significant issues of discipline, professionalism and accountability within the NPR. This was underlined in a recent conversation between a DDG manager and a county commissioner. On being asked how many NPR officers there were in the county the commissioner replied: “That’s one of the first questions I asked when I took up this position over year ago, and I still don’t know the answer”. As a relatively untrained and uncontrolled entity of armed and locally appointed security providers the NPR are potential liabilities in the effective administration of community safety and security. However, as a community integrated force with extensive network of local contacts and a first-hand knowledge of the dynamics and terrain, they are also a potential key actor in facilitating the flow of intelligence from the grass roots and for providing an effective first response in dealing with and preventing conflict and crime. The key needs for the NPR are the development of a functioning command and control system, capacity strengthening training, and a strategy for their effective deployment as front line actors in conflict / crime reduction and security management.

Need for Improved Cultural Awareness Most police, military and central government administrators are appointed from other areas on a rotational basis. Many are reported to lack sufficient understanding and respect for the local culture and norms, particularly with regards to traditional authorities, dispute resolution and justice systems. The institutionalisation of pre- deployment cultural orientation could help to increase awareness and respect for the local systems. This role could be performed by police training institutions or outsourced to organisations such as the Kenya School of Government or partners such as DDG.

CME / CMCS/ TPN as Part of the Standard Police/Military Curriculum DDGs experience from Uganda shows that given sufficient investment in time, relationship building and the buy-in of senior commanders and government ministers, conflict reduction and management training programmes can be accepted and integrated into the standard curriculum of security providers. This is an area that needs to be extended to Kenya and broadened in its scope and application across the region. The changing demands on the security sector show the need for their engagement in better community relationships and development of skills in conflict analysis, facilitation and dispute resolution.

LESSONS LEARNED CME/CMCS/TPN trainings are highly appreciated by community and security provider participants. An awareness and demand has been created for the expansion of capacity building services to other counties. Security concerns for trainees in Mandera may necessitate a revision of training modalities. Many of the DDG tools are being used independently by communities to assist conflict reduction/resolution.

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NPR can be a vital player in community security but has significant capacity gaps (professional training; command and control structures; deployment strategy) that need to be addressed comprehensively and as soon as possible. There is a need for cultural awareness training for military/police/administrative personnel being deployed to the borderlands. Integrating CME/CMSC training within the police/military curriculum is an effective strategy in building capacity across the security sector and needs to be expanded.

Dialogue facilitation included both community-security provider meetings and high- level cross-border stakeholder consultations.

High Level Meetings In the contexts of the Karamoja Cluster and the Mandera Triangle, high level meetings refer to meetings between administrators, politicians, security providers and leading civil society. The meetings focused on two key issues impacting on conflict and security in the regions; 1) approaches to managing small arms / light weapons (SALW), and 2) approaches for community-sensitive border security and management (CSBSM). The meetings were successful in bringing together a wide range of key stakeholder from across county borders as well as across the regional international borders. Despite the different composition of the groups there was a surprisingly high degree of consensus in their recommendations for the way forward on these issues. The participating groups gave their recommendations under five broad areas: 1) strengthening border management and cooperation; 2) supporting disarmament; 3) strengthening the security sector; 4) promoting cross-border trade, alternative livelihoods and infrastructure development; and 5) youth. Many participants also expressed the concern that policy dialogue in itself is insufficient to for change to happen. Implementation of policies is where leaders need to place more emphasis.

Strengthening border management and cooperation Proposals for strengthening border management focused on boundary issues, border points, policing and cross-border cooperation. It was recognised that the Kenya-Somali border was particularly demanding due to its length and the absence of official crossing points. For the Uganda-Kenya border is was recommended that the two national governments appoint a joint survey team to ensure that borders are mapped and clearly demarcated to avoid future conflicts. The establishment of formal functioning and policed border points were recommended at a number of specific locations including Nakilor, Lokiriama, Alakas, Kanyems on the north west border with Belet Hawa and Suftu in the north east. The need to increase the number of police points along the border areas was noted. However, it was also emphasised that border points are unlikely to be able to fully prevent illegal cross-border activity as the border is porous and people that know the terrain can cross the border in many places without being detected. The development of infrastructure at all border-crossing points was recommended including immigration checks and custom with joint staffing by border management authorities on both sides of the border. The need for an improved and regular channel of communication between national border authorities was identified as a concern and the establishment of Ugandan (UPDF) and Kenyan (KDF) liaison officers seconded to work with their counterpart border authorities was proposed for Kabong, Turkana and Kotido but is a model that could be usefully applied throughout

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 11 the northern borders. Concerns were expressed over Ethiopia’s tendency to regularly change border administrations with little continuity or sustainability of agreements between them.

Strengthening the security sector The lack of police presence in the rural areas was identified as a major factor contributing towards community insecurity in these areas forcing civilians to arm themselves in the absence of state protection. When there is a police presence along the border it was criticised for being more interested in obtaining bribes than ensuring security. A disconnect between the security providers and the chiefs was noted. Historically the institution of the chief has been an important connector and conduit between the community and security providers for channelling security related information and community concerns. This has however been eroded through the devolution in which chiefs feel that their traditional roles and responsibilities have been side-lined. The emergence of devolved federal governments in the Gedo region such Jubaland were seen as offering both opportunities and risks for regional security and trade. Whilst Jubaland has the potential to become one of the richest territories in Somalia it has little experience of effective administration and could become a source of inter- clan rivalry as well as magnate for attempts at destabilisation by terrorists / militants. Any emerging entity needs to be included in the regional security framework and engaged as early as possible on developing appropriate policies and infrastructure to support cross-border security needs. The need for increased and sustained community - security provider - civil administration and cross-border authority dialogues was viewed by the participants as essential in ensuring security in the region as it would enhance trust building and enable grass roots voices to inform policy and practice.

Supporting disarmament Disarmament was a key issue for the Karamoja Cluster participants from Kenya. They were interested in Uganda’s and other regional experience of disarmament for lessons learned in order to help inform prospective disarmament actions in Kenya. It was however recognised that appropriate incentives were required to ensure the surrender of weapons at both an individual and community level. It was recommended that local leaders at Kraal level should be sensitised on small arms control and encouraged not to cross borders with weapons. A general sensitisation of the populations in the region on the risks and negative impacts of holding small areas was viewed as important. An integrated, conflict sensitive disarmament policy harmonised between Kenya and neighbouring countries was recommended as a long-term solution, with a general disarmament in Kenya, in recognition of the porous borders, prevalence of dual nationals and ease with which weapons could be transported between countries. It was noted that any Kenyan disarmament plan would require enabling legislation to be enacted and would need to incorporate clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the key stakeholders, especially the army and police services. Laws enabling the military to deploy quickly to support disarmament actions or respond to other potential border management crises were viewed as important. The high level meeting of Mandera Triangle participants echoed many of the recommendations from the Karamoja Cluster but also recognised that a conducive environment supportive of disarmament was a long way off, although the process for this should be developed by both national and county governments working together to establish a context specific disarmament strategy. Participants called for interim measures including a stronger policy framework and legislation for regularising and

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 12 controlling ownership, together with increased awareness and education on the safe handling of firearms amongst the general public and pastoralist communities whilst taking action on those found with illegal weapons. Along the north-east border the reciprocal arming of communities for self-defence was noted. Because of the free flow of weapons in Somalia and the spike in terrorist and anti-terrorist activity, border communities in Kenya were more likely to arm themselves in preparedness for attack.

Promote of cross-border trade, alternative livelihoods and infrastructure development Participants recognised the important role that the borderland areas could play in supporting trade between countries in the region and the benefits that this would accrue for their local communities. This has been underlined by closures of the Kenya- Somali border which has had a negative impact on people’s livelihoods on both sides. There was a call to reframe the labelling of the region as ‘marginalised’ in order to create a more conducive environment for growth and development. It was recognised that security and stability was a necessary prerequisite for attracting investment. Measures to increase community awareness of these possibilities was recommended, and linked to the broader framework of economic and livelihoods incentives seen as essential components in securing disarmament. There was strong recognition that those giving up arms needed to experience a tangible peace dividend. Whilst legitimate cross-border trade would support this there also need to be investment in improving the entire infrastructure in order to reduce the risk of resource conflicts. In Kenya there was a call for the national government’s Equalisation Fund (which is a constitutional provision established to allocate funding for the uplifting of marginalised counties) to support development initiatives linking Pokot and Turkana. The role of the extractive industry as a source of alternative livelihoods was seen as an important development and opportunity for the region but one that needed to be supported by investment in training local human resources for employment in the is sector. The three border towns of Mandera (Kenya), Baled Hawo (Somalia) and Suftu (Ethiopia) are focal points for trade, services and civilian exchanges. They are also flash points for insecurity. Respondents noted that Baled Hawo has a better relationship with Suftu than it does with Mandera. It was also noted that Mandera had better relations with Kismayo than it did with Baled Hawo. The reasons for this need to be further explored. Long-term security in the region will be enhanced by better collaboration and cooperation between the civil and military/police authorities of these towns.

Youth The need to support youth in post-disarmament alternative or enhanced livelihoods was noted in the Karamoja Cluster. In the Mandera Triangle there were concerns over alternatives to radicalisation and militancy. It was felt that there wasn’t enough understanding on the drivers of radicalisation as a prerequisite to developing strategies to combat this trend amongst the youth. There was a particular concern that youth returning to Kenya from Somali arrive with skills in weaponry that, in the absence of viable alternatives, they might employ in criminal activity even if they don’t continue with terrorist actions. Linked to this was the risk of alienating returnee youth. Both the labels “radicalisation” and “returnee” were seen as prerogatives and laden with negative images and assumptions for both the public and security providers that impact upon their perceptions and treatment of such youth. A re-labelling of returnees as ‘War Affected Youth’. It was noted that such youth were frightened of both the government security provider and the terrorists. The potential for extending the community-security provider dialogue model to break down the barriers between youth and the authorities was highlighted.

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Community-Security Provider Meetings The community-security provider meetings held on a regular basis are highly successful in building trust and enabling the sharing of information between communities and security providers. These meetings are helping to change the perceptions of both community members and security providers about one another. Relationships between community members and security providers in the target areas have historically been very weak and a source of conflict. The relationship has frequently been characterised by fear and mistrust of the security providers by the community, whilst security providers have resorted to oppressive measures in their dealings with the community. The flow of information on crime and security issues from the community to the security providers was extremely low. The community-security provider meeting are now challenging and changing these perceptions. They are extremely cost effective and value for money activities, costing very little to organise with highly tangible benefits for improving the security environment through information sharing. The symbolic and practical importance of community members discussing together with security providers as peers cannot be understated. For most ordinary people in the target areas the notion of engaging a police officer as an equal was previously unimaginable. This was poignantly demonstrated during one of the first meetings when a community participant reached over to touch the sleeve of a police to convince himself that it was really happening and he wasn’t dreaming. The rationale for these meetings recognises that security provider-community mistrust can be both a driver of conflict and undermines the ability to effectively respond to other conflict dynamics by limiting the exchange of information between security providers and communities. At the heart of this project component is the theory of change that the better the relationship between communities and security providers, the more likely information on crime and security will be forthcoming from the grass roots thus enabling a more effective response from the security providers resulting in a safer and more secure environment. Community dialogues are making significant inroads into enabling this. However their relationship is not always an easy one. There remain issues of how open communities are in providing full and timely information to the security providers; how responsive the security providers are in handling the information they receive, and how effectively information and decision making is coordinated between the different levels of security providers within counties, between them and between countries. This will be strengthened by county and national governments institutionalising opportunities for safe, positive and collaborative community-security provider interactions as a core aspect of their strategy for improving the security environment.

Independent community replication of dialogues Evidence from the Karamoja Cluster shows that warriors from different communities in the region have established their own cross-border dialogue process. This occurred after they observed the activities of the Borderlands project. This is independent of DDGs involvement but demonstrates the timeliness, need and local appeal of the both community and high-level dialogue. It also shows that dialogue on conflict management issues can evolve organically which is a significant unforeseen value added impact of the Borderlands initiative. Mapping and research of the process that that warriors have undertaken is now necessary in order to understand the extent and content of their actions and the impact that is having on cross-border conflicts.

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High Level Cross-Border Meetings DDG’s model is based upon a bottom-up approach that aims to channel local level conflict analysis, needs and security related information through to successively higher layers of administration in order to inform security and conflict management related policies and practices. However, engagement at the highest levels is also necessary to raise awareness and secure the senior level buy-in that is necessary to ensure that the various levels of administration are receptive and responsive to the issues and ideas generated from the communities. The Borderland’s project shows that high level cross-border meetings can be a logistically complicated and time-consuming process. The lessons learned meeting to be held in Nairobi in March is costly and visas processing especially difficult for Somali delegates. However the pay-off should be considerable in terms of the awareness raising of issues, the relationship building between parties, the sharing of information and exploration of challenges and policy options for overcoming them, the opportunity to build consensus over what needs to be changed and buy-in for lower level activities (especially with regards to security provider capacity building and trainings). Although progress towards these results can be slow and incremental it does enable community concerns to percolate through to the highest levels. This is clearly demonstrated in Kenya where the Borderland’s project has captured the attention of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and where the Director of the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) has been working with DDG and the Mandera County Government in exploring ways of improving roles and responsibilities for conflict and security data collection and information sharing.

Empower traditional authorities to manage conflicts The high level meetings revealed that clan elders / local chiefs are being increasingly alienated from involvement in conflict reduction and management. This is particularly prevalent where Kenya’s strong secular justice system is the dominant mechanism. Failure to include traditional justice and conflict reduction mechanisms can risk undermining the effectiveness of the secular system as demonstrated by the following reported example: The porous border in Mandera means Kenyans can and do sometimes run into problems from local justice systems when on the Somali or Ethiopian side and vice versa. In a recent incident the release of Kenyan youth arrested on Somali territory was resolved through the intervention of clan elders negotiating with their counterparts across the border. This incident was held in contrast to a subsequent event involving Somali youth arrested on the Kenya side. Clan elders who attempted to intervene were dismayed by the resistance they encountered from Kenyan security / justice providers. Whether or not the specifics of the two cases differ the key issue is that Somali clan elders were able to exercise their traditional role as mediators in resolving a dispute on one side of the border but not on the other. Special arrangements are needed for the borderlands that recognise the particular issues that might arise from porous borders and the peace building impact of resolving them through traditional and even sharia law where appropriate and relevant.

Concepts of ‘border’ In both the Mandera Triangle and the Karamoja Cluster the concept of a physical border as delineated by a line on a map has little meaning to the people who live there. In the Karamoja Cluster many of the people living on the Kenyan and Ugandan sides are historically the same people, the same tribes and frequently hold dual citizenships and national identity cards for both territories. In Mandera the same clans can be found across borders with Somali and Ethiopia. In both territories porous open borders have seen the free flow of people and their cattle in cyclical movements for water sources

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 15 and pastures. Whilst this has been a source of conflict it is also a source of unity that transcends notional concepts of border. The proposed construction by Kenya of a 440 km wall along the Somali border threatens to undermine this connection. Designed to improve security by preventing the easy movement of al Shabaab it risks causing more security problems. The wall impacts on both the core identity as well as livelihoods of people on both side of the border whilst alienating traditional authorities who seem to have been excluded from consultation on the construction and management of the wall and crossing points.

Linking Livelihoods A key observation from every level was the need to integrate livelihoods into conflict reduction activities. The expressed rationale for this was that as warriors give up the gun and participation in cattle raiding they will need to see a tangible dividend linked to their livelihoods and security. The security component can be achieved by professionalising the NPR and by developing a stronger compact between communities and security providers. The livelihoods component can be strengthened by introducing pastoralist warriors to other forms of income such as exploring value chains linked to cattle. This would require an attitudinal shift from valuing cattle in terms of numeric accumulation linked to power, marriage and prestige, towards envisioning cattle as opportunities for wealth accumulation through dairy, meat production, hides, bones and other value chain options. It would also require introducing pastoralists to other forms of production and labour including greater diversification in agriculture, livestock, poultry, and training opportunities in the emerging extractives sector.

Different approaches to gun control There are different policies and practices toward gun ownership and control depending upon the national territory. This is most evidenced between Uganda and Kenya. Uganda has had a relatively successful disarmament drive that is complicated by the more liberal approach to arms across the border, the ability of communities on each sides to possess national identities for both countries, and their consequent capacity to easily transfer arms from one territory to another. The Borderlands project also revealed significant interest from Kenyan security providers in learning more about what worked well and less well in Uganda’s disarmament process. There is a need for greater cross-border engagement on synthesising approaches and policies.

Upstream / downstream feedback of participants It is suspected that senior officials do not routinely feedback the information from workshops to their teams or even superiors. Further work is needed to ensure that attendance results in discussions on the issues are raised within the participants’ respective departments and are communicated upstream and downstream.

Coordination of peace actors There are multiple national and international peace actors operating in the target territories with weak coordination of their activities. Observers were concerned that potential synergies are being missed and that efforts are being duplicated.

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LESSONS LEARNED Community-security provider dialogues are extremely effective in building trust and enhancing security but they need to be regular and institutionalised with local authorities/security providers. Dialogues are being independently replicated by warrior groups. This demonstrates the potential for community dialogues to evolve organically and independently of NGO involvement. High level cross-border meetings are more expensive and logistically complicated to organise but are essential in building awareness, consensus, relationships and buy-in at the highest levels. They are also valuable forums to through which to introduce community level concerns so that grass roots issues can help inform top level policies. Traditional leaders and justice providers are being excluded from contributing to security management and conflict prevention by the more dominant secular actors. This risks fuelling further tensions. Strategies for incorporating traditional roles into the regional security strategies needs to be identified. The understanding of the concept of border is differs greatly among national political and security actors and local communities in the borderlands. Strategies such as constructing a wall may prove counter-productive as it may negatively impact upon the identity and livelihoods of the border communities. More effective strategies for security should be based on community engagement and agreeing joint security compacts based on mutual support and understanding. Livelihoods needs to be integrated into conflict reduction and security management strategies. Different national policies on small arms reduction and control can undermine national successes and greater efforts are needed to harmonise approaches across borders. Efforts are needed to ensure reporting from high-level meetings filters upstream and downstream in the departments of participants. Peace actor coordination is weak and needs to be improved.

Relevance All of the Borderlands component activities are relevant and necessary to the objective of preventing conflict and increasing security in the borderlands. They are mutually reinforcing in addressing different aspects of the problem. Security provider capacities for conflict sensitive understanding and analysis closely interlink with their willingness and ability to engage closely and collaboratively with communities. Cross-border high- level meetings help build understanding and cooperation between administrations and also provide an opportunity for grass roots perspectives to inform national and county policies. Many of the practical tools used by DDG in the programme have been taken on board for wider application by the target communities. The demand from neighbouring counties and districts for an expansion of DDG services points to how relevant and valued the content of the Borderlands project is to communities and key stakeholders.

Effectiveness The six-month time frame was too short to assess the long-term effectiveness of the Borderland project. However, in even this short period there are substantive indicators

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 17 that a longer-term (ideally four years) investment would yield increasing greater results for an improved security environment. The demand creation noted above, the interest and involvement from community, administrative and security providers all point to the potential to sustain and build upon the initial momentum created by the Borderlands project in the first six months. Increased and sustained community and high-level dialogues, expansion to other key areas, and an enhanced focus on youth will help increase the effectiveness of the project.

What worked well and less well? The Borderlands project benefits from a dedicated team who are from the local communities where they work and are passionate about their work. DDG have a unique approach that differs from most other peace actors in that it is community driven from the bottom-up. It is an approach grounded in building strong grass roots relationships with the target communities and between those communities and the security providers who serve them. This is a model that appears to be extremely effective in gaining community level support for safety and security activities. For an initial six months the project worked most effectively in the Karamoja Cluster where there was a longer standing history of DDG involvement. In the Mandera Triangle activities took longer to establish due to both the more recent programme presence and need for investment in relationship building as well the impact of the prevailing security situation between Kenya and Somalia. In Mandera for example levels of trust that the project expected to build between the agency and key stakeholders, as well as between the community and security providers, was not as advanced as anticipated at the outset although a sound platform was established for future engagement and progress. Limited communication between different security actors across borders and within national territories themselves (e.g. NPS, NPR, KDF and county/national administrations) do frustrated activities to develop collaborative security mechanisms based on a shared understanding of the issues and needs translating into an agreed and coordinated approach to resolving them. However progress on this will be linked to high level endorsement and the DDG project has already attracted the attention of senior central level policy and government officials whose support will be important in enabling action at a county and cross-border levels. More high level meetings are need to continue this momentum.

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TO DDG Pursue multi-year funding Multi-year donor support for this initiative will be key to realising results and has strong potential for generating long-term value for money returns and impact amongst the affected programmes. The nature of the problem and solution requires a longer term approach as the capacity building and relationship related outcomes require a longer time investment to realise its potential.

Support county governments in coordinating peace / security actors DDG should support county governments in coordinating the efforts of local and international conflict management actors more effectively. This needs to be conducted in concert with better coordination between local and national security actors. The replication of Turkana peace plans in other counties would be a logical vehicle for pursuing this with community and community based security provider needs, concerns and aspirations feeding into the plans through DDGs community-security provider dialogue mechanisms.

Continue and expand cross-border dialogue at different levels Cross-border dialogue needs to be increased, expanded and sustained. DDG should continue facilitating these efforts and expand to multiple levels including traditional authorities, civil administrations, military and police at all levels.

Research warrior led dialogue initiatives Local initiatives that appear to have been influenced by DDG actions but are not facilitated by them need to be fully researched by DDG to understand the dynamics and potential opportunities for replication and parallel support to their project initiatives. It would also be useful to revisit historic inter-tribal peace agreements and encourage more of these to be adopted together with a closer assessment of what works and what doesn’t work in the peace agreement process.

Expand advanced CMCS training DDG should increase trainings in CMCS to a wider range of security providers at different levels as well as for traditional authorities. It could usefully be packaged with training on different dispute resolution and mediation techniques.

Pursue integration of training in police curriculum There is great potential to go to scale on CMCS training and the ideal platform for this would be through regularisation within police / military training programmes for all officers. DDG should continue and further networking to build the relationships with police/military training providers to enable this.

Expand services to areas of high demand DDG have been approached by communities and security providers in other counties/districts requesting services and should look at ways of meeting this demand.

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TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF KENYA, UGANDA, SOMALIA, ETHOPIA & SOUTH SUDAN Increase and regularise high level dialogues on cross-border security management High-level dialogues between the national governments of Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan should be institutionalised on a regular basis both collectively and bi-laterally where appropriate (at least twice annually) in order to build relations and strategies for action on cross-border security concerns. Dialogues should be multi-level and include both national and county/district government administrative and security sector representatives to ensure a joined up approach to the issues and problems Identify opportunities for harmonising national policies that impact on cross-border security management and conflict prevention There are policies differences in each country that currently impact on limiting the effectiveness of issues related to small arms control, conflict reduction and security management. These policies need to be identified, discussed at the highest levels and measures taken to harmonise them in order to improve cross-border security management coordination and information sharing.

Ensure that existing and new cross-border structures are inclusive Border issues impact on three different countries in each of the northern border regions but a number of existing cross-border dialogue structures are bi-lateral excluding the third national party. For example Kenya and Ethiopia hold joint annual meetings between administrators and county commissioners. These meetings discuss issue that directly affect Somalia who are not represented. For example issues of cross-border socio-economic, political, security and border management issues including ethnic conflict and cattle raiding. All governments are urged to ensure that all neighbouring countries are included in cross-border dialogues on issues that affect them.

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA Invest in winning hearts and minds The Kenyan government must invest in winning the hearts and minds of the people living in the borderlands. Security actors need to become context, conflict and people sensitive in their approaches to avoid the risk of alienating the community and traditional authorities through culturally inappropriate behaviour or heavy-handedness. Overcoming tribal or clan identification and instilling an inclusive culture of being Kenyan is essential in establishing and maintaining community security. Sustained community – security provider dialogue is a key component in building mutual understanding and dismantling stereo-types and negative perspectives. Adopt special recognition status for traditional forms of dispute resolution and justice to improve community-security provider relations, reduce tensions and conflict, and strengthen the security environment The porous border in the Mandera Triangle means that Kenyans can and do sometimes run into problems from local justice systems when on the Somali or Ethiopian side of the border and vice versa. There are reported examples of instances when Kenyan youths in Somalia have got into trouble and arrested by the local authorities. Subsequent intervention of clan elders negotiating with their counterparts across the border resulted in the release of these youths. However there are also

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 20 reported incidents that demonstrate the lack of reciprocity in cases of Somali youth being arrested in Kenya. In Kenya they are more likely to encounter secular justice with whom traditional arbitration methods and cross-border negotiations likely to be excluded. This can fuel tensions between the communities and security providers. Special administrative, security and judicial arrangements could be developed specifically for borderland areas that recognise the particular issues that might arise from porous borders and the security enhancing, peace building impact of resolving them through traditional, Xeer and even sharia law where appropriate and relevant. By bringing traditional and secular justice and security providers together under a shared security framework that recognises the unique contributes, roles and responsibilities of each party could help strengthen the overarching security environment. Strengthen the relationship between community members and security providers to enhance safety, intelligence information flow and security In both the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster the concept of a physical border as delineated by a line on a map has little meaning to the people who live there. In the Karamoja Cluster many of the people living on the Kenyan and Ugandan sides are historically the same people, the same tribes and frequently hold dual citizenships or national identity cards for both territories. In the Mandera Triangle the same clans can be found across the borders with Somali and Ethiopia. In both territories porous open borders have seen the free flow of people and cattle in cyclical movements for water sources and pastures. Whilst this has been a source of conflict it is also a source of unity that transcends notional concepts of border. The proposed construction by Kenya of a 440 km wall along the Somali border threatens to undermine this connection. Designed to improve security by preventing the easy movement of al Shabaab terrorists it risks causing more security problems than it solves. A wall will impact on the community’s core identity, their trans-border livelihoods and risks alienating the traditional authorities that have been excluded from consultation on the construction and management of the wall and crossing points. Investing instead in institutionalising people sensitive approaches to security that maximise relationship building between communities and security providers is likely to yield a far more stable and secure environment. By integrating traditional approaches to dispute resolution within the secular justice system, clan elders, religious leaders, chiefs can work in partnership with state / secular actors to prevent conflicts and resolve disputes in a manner that preserves and respects local traditions and cultural practices.

Institutionalise cultural orientation training Most police, military and central government administrators are appointed from other areas of Kenya on a rotational basis. They are therefore likely to have limited practical understanding of the local culture and norms, particularly with respect to the role of traditional authorities, dispute resolution and justice systems. A pre-deployment cultural orientation programme could help to increase awareness and respect for these local systems. A cultural orientation package is recommended to be of 3 to 5 days duration. Content could include instruction on the history, challenges, tribal/clan configurations and dynamics, conflict analysis, peace actors and infrastructure, culture and traditional norms of the region. An ideal cultural orientation programme would be designed with the participation of the communities themselves and their participation in the delivery of the content to maximise opportunities for pre-deployment relationship building and awareness-raising on local, practices, issues, constraints and concerns. Such training could usefully incorporate conflict management education, conflict sensitivity, third party neutral mediation and dialogue facilitation components as valuable skills for

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 21 deployed officers to the target areas that would also have application for deployment to other regions in the future. Cultural orientation will help support the establishment of long term security management in the Karamoja Cluster and Mandera Triangle by helping to build mutual trust and collaboration between local communities and security providers. Having a supportive local population in the borderlands will depend on how people are treated and cultural orientation training will help administrators and security personnel to adopt context, conflict and people sensitive approaches in their engagement with local communities. The Kenyan government must invest in winning the hearts and minds of the people in border areas. Security actors must not feed historical grievances by cases of mistreatment of local people. Enhancing a sense of belonging to Kenya is key (a sense of patriotism if you like). Sustained community – security provider dialogue is critical.

Expand direct presidential involvement to other areas The President of Kenya’s direct involvement in improving collaboration between local government and political elites in West Pokot and Turkana to improve safety and security was widely regarded as an important example of how a calculated top down approach can help to galvanise change and improvement. The timely replication of similar initiatives by the President in Mandera and other border areas is recommended on an as required basis.

TO THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION AND NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE Build capacity of National Police Reserve There is often an extremely weak chain of command and control resulting in significant issues of discipline, professionalism and accountability within the NPR. As a relatively untrained and uncontrolled entity of armed and locally appointed security providers the NPR are potential liabilities in the effective administration of community safety and security. However, as a community integrated force with extensive network of local contacts and a first-hand knowledge of the dynamics and terrain, they are also a potential key actor in facilitating the flow of intelligence from the grass roots and for providing an effective first response in dealing with and preventing conflict and crime. The key needs for the NPR are the development of a functioning command and control system, capacity strengthening training, and a strategy for their recruitment and effective deployment as front line actors in conflict / crime reduction and security management.

Ensure the close collaboration of county and national level security and peace related institutions The security providers at a county and national level, and indeed their respective government ministries should ensure that all security providers work collaboratively with clearly delineated yet strategically interconnected roles and responsibilities. This should be extended to an improve awareness of, and close working collaboration with national and county peace and cohesion institutions.

Provide training on identifying and mitigating new forms of conflict risk The NPS and NPR will be at the forefront of dealing with conflicts arising from new forms of conflict such as political rivalries over county resources and land rights issues

Danish Demining Group (DDG) Borderlands – Lessons Learned (March 2016) 22 concerning the emerging extractive industries in northern Kenya. Dealing with these dynamics will require knew skills and an awareness of stakeholders and relationships involved. Security providers need to be better informed about the legal parameters that extractive industries are supposed to operate within so that they can help ensure compliance. Issues of competing claims on resources, land rights, access and thoroughfares, water rights, development induced forced displacement, and extractive pollutants are all potential conflict sources that the national and reserve police forces need to understand and develop strategies to deal with. Those strategies, as mentioned throughout need to be predicated on a close collaboration with the communities themselves and traditional authorities.

TO THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE AND KENYA DEFENCE FORCE Institutionalise CME / CMCS/TPN Mediation training Conflict management and conflict sensitivity education should be institutionalised as part of the training curriculum for police of all ranks and for military officers and non- commissioned officer. This would enable all police and military personnel to strengthen their capacities for collaborative community engagement and conflict sensitive policing and security operations. Comparable examples include DDG’s experiences of introducing similar training into the Uganda Defence Force.

TO THE COUNTY GOVERNMENTS Develop county peace plans Using the role model of Turkana County invest in the development of county level peace plans that include consultation with a wide range of local stakeholders including neighbouring counties and cross-national border administrative counterparts.

Coordinate peace and security actors County governments should improve the coordination of national and international peace and security actors to ensure that they support and align with local priorities, promote synergies and avoid duplication of efforts. The two levels of county and national governments need to collaborate more effectively in jointly coordinating the efforts of their security and peace actors. Borderland authorities should be encouraged to establish institutions that will promote inclusivity in security matters. In Kenya, the new constitution provides for the formation of a County-level Policing Authority which has a membership of all the stakeholders in the county. Community security initiatives can and should complement formal security sector patrols. Programming that empowers communities to articulate their own security needs and address them in an inclusive and transparent way, involving local authorities, religious leaders, women and other important stakeholders, will help to build vital security partnerships between state and society in the borderlands.

Institutionalise and interlink cross-border / community-security provider dialogues Though the current environment is not ideal for this, cross-border collaboration by neighbouring communities remains an essential long-term ingredient for safe and secure border areas.

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Counties should institutionalise country level cross-border dialogues on issues of security management and conflict prevention. These should be held on a regular basis, ideally monthly and involve reciprocal visits counterparts in the other countries involved. The meetings should integrate national as well as county administrative and security provider actors and be informed from the bottom-up through an institutionalised process of regular community-security provider dialogues. Facilitation of dialogue between communities and security providers along the border will help security providers to develop a better understanding and familiarity of the community in which they serve. Programmes that strengthen crime reduction and address the problem of gangs will have an immediate and positive impact on security for populations in some of the border areas most affected by violent crime.

Include extractive industry actors in tripartite dialogues Where extractive industry actors are present they should be encouraged to be included in tripartite dialogues with community representatives and security providers in order to identify and address problems before they emerge or transform into serious security issues.

Focus on providing peace dividends for the youth in terms of economic and political opportunities Most violence in the borderlands, whether perpetuated by gangs, clan militias, or insurgencies, draw principally on young men as gunmen. Programming in the borderlands should prioritise the needs, perspective, and likely response of at-risk youth. Youth alienation is widely seen as a driver of conflict and radicalisation. County governments should take the lead in identifying opportunities to help provide a mainstream political voice for the youth and an avenue to support their economic aspirations and livelihoods as an alternative to channelling their angst towards destabilising criminal and terrorist activities. Other measures for involving the youth include:  Facilitating dialogue forums to strengthen inter-generational cohesion i.e. between at-risk youth and elders.  Identifying and training youth role models in legal/legitimate behaviours for effective conflict management in consultation with community representatives and local authorities.  Supporting literacy/numeracy courses, entrepreneurship and vocational training and start up kits for youth at risk.  Supporting community economic infrastructure and capacity building in market linkages and value chain development within border areas in order to increase economic opportunities for youth.

Borderlands Policy There is a strong need for the development of national and regional borderlands policies. There are several good practices and lessons from other parts of the world that can be drawn on but it will be critical to involve borderlands communities and local formal and informal authorities.

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DDG (2015) Borderlands Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster, Project proposal submission to East Africa Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) DDG (2015): Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland, Written for Danish Demining Group by Dr. Ken Menkhaus DDG (2015): Somalia Borderlands Conflict Mapping / Analysis, Written for Danish Demining Group by Dr. Ken Menkhaus. DDG (2015) Community Driven Conflict Prevention and Management in the borderlands areas of the Mandera Triangle and the Karamoja Cluster, Concept Note, project level supplementary information, East Africa Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) DDG/DRC (2015) High Level Meeting on the Small Arms Management, Mandera Town, Mandera County, Kenya 24-25 November 2015 DDG/DRC (2015) High Level Meeting on the Small Arms Management Lodwar Town, Turkana County, Kenya 19-20 November 2015 DDG/DRC (2015) People Sensitive Border Security management in Kenya-Somalia- Ethiopia Borderlands, Red Sea Hotel, Mandera, KENYA 16-17 December 2015 DDG/DRC (2015) People Sensitive Border Security management in the Pokot- Turkana-Karamoja Borderlands, Leslona Hotel, Moroto, Uganda Mkutu Agade, K. (2015) Changes and Challenges of the Kenya Police Reserve: The Case of Turkana County, African Studies Review, Volume 58, Number 1, pages 199- 2 Njuguna, E., Ndung’u, J., and Musoi, K. (2015) Matching Needs with Resources: National Police Reserve and commun5ty security in Kenya’s frontiers, Saferworld, November 2014

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