Alfredo Canavero Milan State University – Centre for Foreign Policy and Public Opinion
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Testo provvisorio. Si prega di non citare Alfredo Canavero Milan State University – Centre for Foreign Policy and Public Opinion An International Player without Territory: the Holy See from 1870 to 1929 Holy See Diplomacy has several records. It created one of the first diplomatic roles, sending permanent envoys to the Byzantine emperor (V-VIIth c.); a Pope (Gregory X) theorized the principle of diplomatic immunity; another Pope, Clemens XI, founded the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy (1701), to training priests to embrace diplomatic career, which is the most ancient institution of this type. Holy See had diplomatic relations with almost every State during Medieval and Modern age, sending nuncios (nuntii) and receiving ambassadors. Reports by papal nuncios are among the most accurate and important sources to study the history of Europe in Medieval and Modern age. After the Italian conquest of Rome and the debellatio of Papal States in 1870, the Holy See had no more a territory, but it kept on having diplomacy and a diplomatic corps. Even this is a record, shared with the Sovereign Order of Malta, another State without a territory. The Law of Guarantees, enacted in 1871 by Italian government just for guaranteeing the international position of the pontiff, recognized clearly the right of the Pope to continue to send nuncios and to receive diplomats. The word is important. Italian Government “recognized”, did not “create”, Pontiff’s international rights. According to the juridical doctrine of the time, only a State could have international rights. How could the Holy See maintain a diplomatic activity without a territory? As a jurist put it in 1878: «From the theoretical point of view there is here a flagrant anomaly. The only persons in international law are the states». Holy See was not a State; nevertheless she kept on exercising the right of embassy and negotiations. «Where is the mistake? Is it on the side of theory? Or is it on the side of practice?»1. After the end of Pope’s temporal power some countries were wandering if to maintain a diplomatic representative to a sovereign without a territory was a good idea. Some anti-clerical thinkers wrote that Catholic Church was a mere private association and not a subject of international law. This involved –they thought- practical consequences such as the suppression of diplomatic relations with the Holy See2. But the Holy See still remained a great power, albeit only moral, with a great influence on Catholic public opinion and, let alone bad relations, very few were 1 Cited by R.A. GRAHAM, S.J., Vatican Diplomacy. A Study of Church and State on the International Plane, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1959, p. 199. 2 See R.A. GRAHAM, S.J., Vatican Diplomacy., cit., pp.187-200. Testo provvisorio. Si prega di non citare the States which interrupted diplomatic relations with papal Rome. It was important to have links with the centre of Catholic Church, even if the State was non-Catholic or inclined to anticlericalism. Holy See’s diplomatic relations are influenced by the personality of the Pope and his policy. Pius’s IX diplomacy, for instance, was not so satisfying. Let alone the Roman Question, which prevented to have normal diplomatic relations with Italy, Pius IX had problems with several States. The enactment of the Syllabus (1864) had already raised protests, particularly in States where Catholics were the majority. The Council Vatican I (1870) was another source of troubles. The Papal bull of convocation of the Council ailed the Orthodox and Protestants, whilst heads of State, breaking an ancient tradition, were not invited. The decision to declare the infallibility of the Pope made relations with States more difficult, deepening the gap between the Church and contemporary society. The Bavarian Prime Minister, prince Chlodwig Karl Victor zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, suggested to find a common line among States against the Council; Italian Government proposed a declaration to reaffirm the rights of the civil power in front of the Church; Austria presented a note of protest to the Holy See. But Pius IX and the majority of the Council fathers approved the dogma of infallibility. Many European chancelleries were concerned by this decision3. Austria had the pretext to denounce the Concordat of 1855, since the Roman partner had become different and declared himself infallible4. When Pious IX died in 1878, Holy See was almost completely diplomatically isolated. In France and Spain Catholic Church had sponsored the losing movements, the Carlist in Spain and the Monarchist in France, and now it had to face anticlericalism and laicism rising in those countries. Austria did not intend to support Pope’s protests for the loss of temporal power. Relations with Switzerland were very low, after it had approved a new Constitution (1874) which forbade the foundation of new convents and entrusted primary school to lay people. Diplomatic relations with Netherlands were closed in 1872 and with Russia in 1877. In Germany Otto von Bismarck had launched the Kulturkampf: discriminatory laws against Catholics and expulsion of religious orders became common. Paradoxically enough, the Holy See had good relations with Great Britain, one of non-Catholic great powers. In September 1870 a British battleship was sent to Civitavecchia to protect British subjects in case of disorders in Rome, but also to bring the Pope to Malta, a catholic territory under British rule, had the Pope wanted to go into exile5. Nevertheless, when Disraeli replaced Gladstone as Prime minister (1874), Great Britain retired its non-official representative to 3 See L.P. WALLACE, The Papacy and European Diplomacy 1869-1878, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1948, pp. 85-115. 4 J. BERENGER, L’Austriche-Hongrie. 1815-1918, Armand Colin, Paris 1998, p. 107. 5 U. CASTAGNINO BERLINGHIERI, Le relazioni tra Santa Sede e Regno Unito dal Venti Settembre allo scoppio della Grande Guerra, in Fede e diplomazia. Le relazioni internazionali della Santa Sede nell’età contemporanea, a cura di M. De Leonardis, EDUCatt, Milano 2014, p.53. Testo provvisorio. Si prega di non citare the Holy See. The Pope thought Bismarck had influenced the decision. The reason was perhaps another. England thought that the loss of temporal power had caused the loss of importance of an informal presence to a sovereign who had now only a spiritual power. With Leo XIII’s papacy, things started changing. Leo XIII realized that the Holy See should leave the idea of a Catholic Church isolated and under siege, but it had to intervene in international affairs and in the life of the States, taking position on the main issues of the modern world. He did so in different ways: with Encyclicals and Apostolic Letters, mobilizing associations and Catholic political parties, utilizing the press, but also through diplomacy. «Leo restless diplomatic activity has always constituted one of the axes of the historiography on his pontificate»6. He intervened about social (letter In plurimis against slavery; Rerum Novarum about the condition of workers) and political questions (Diuturnum, Immortale Dei, Libertas, Sapientiae Christianae, on the civil power and the Christian constitutions of States). The Pope spoke to the world and intervened into the world affairs to promote peace7. He instructed his diplomats to take every opportunity to include Catholic Church in international life at equal conditions with states. His politics was marked by success, but also by some failure. The most important failure was the impossibility to bring Roman Question to international level. Even Catholic Austria did not want to go too far. The conclusion of Triple Alliance among Germany, Austria and Italy in 1882 was a real setback for Vatican diplomacy, which dreamed of a remake of Franco-Austrian alliance, like that of 1756 against Fredrick the Great, in order to solve the Roman Question8. The alliance between two Catholic great powers was a dream, but it remained in the background for the Eighties and influenced Vatican policy. In other fields, on the contrary, Leo XIII’s policy was very successful. He succeeded in ending the Kulturkampf and re-establishing relations with Germany, or better, with some German States (Bavaria and Prussia). In 1885 Bismarck asked Leo XIII to mediate in the dispute between Spain and Germany about the Caroline Islands9. The Holy See did not waste the opportunity to present it as the recovery of a central role of the papacy in international politics. It seemed to the pope also the occasion to count on Germany in order to reach three strategic objectives: the 6 V. VIAENE, Reality anf Image in the Pontificate of Leo XIII, in V.VAENE (ed.), The Papacy and the New World Order. Vatican Diplomacy, Catholic Opinion and International Politics at the Time of Leo XIII. 1878-1903, Institut Historique Belge de Rome, Bruxelles – Rome 2005, p. 12. 7 J.D. DURAND, Léon XIII, Rome et le monde, in V.VAENE (ed.), The Papacy and the New World Order, cit., p.65. 8 See L. TRINCIA, The Central Government of the Church in the System of European Powers, in V.VAENE (ed.), The Papacy and the New World Order, cit., p. 120. 9 See J.M. TICCHI, Aux frontières de la paix. Bons offices, médiations, arbitrages du Saint-Siège (1878-1922), Ecole Française de Rome, Rome 2002, pp.61-115. Testo provvisorio. Si prega di non citare dissolution of Triple Alliance, alignment of France and Germany and isolation of Italy10. This plan asked for the acceptance of the French republic, leaving every hope of a restoration of the monarchy. The encyclical Au milieu des solicitudes (February, 16th 1892) invited French Catholics to accept «without reservation» the republican democratic regime of Paris. France was indeed interested in having the support of Catholic Church for its colonial policy, but internal policy was another question, as we will see later.