TOWARD A SHIFT IN THE MIGRATION PARADIGM:

INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, IMMIGRATION,

AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

PEDRO FERREIRA JOSE-MARCELINO

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Abstract

This thesis analyses Cape Verde's pivotal position as a transhipment centre for Sub- Saharan African migrants in transit to Europe, suggesting the islands have become a liminal space and, often, a final destination for individual migratory projects. The study discusses the early stages of public engagement with immigration, and how the debate is affecting the construction of identity and ideas about national development. It proposes that the islands should be understood within a wider migratory context that includes the changing geopolitics of Europe. While also suggesting, from a strategic perspective, that immigration policies in the EU have pushed the de facto European border westwards and southwards to the West African coast between Morocco and Cape Verde, the thesis uses a postcolonial theoretical framework and proposes a specific model of inclusion and exclusion to understand the unique features of the integration of Africans in Cape Verde, with its specific racial ideology, hybridism. VI

Dedication

To my father—wherever he might be—for bestowing on me the sometimes bewildering, often disconcerting, but mostly wonderful gift of 'otherness,' and for injecting onto my very soul the love and—unknowingly—the critical eye for a second motherland I barely know. I'm certain he's toasting to me with a vintage manecon and dancing away to Nha Fidjo Matcho, a sedate morna by lido Lobo.

Toronto, Canada, January 31st, 2010 VI

"Our revised Negritude is humanistic. [l]t welcomes the complementary values of Europe and the white man, and, indeed, of all other races and continents. But it welcomes them in order to fertilize and reinvigorate its own values, which it then offers for the construction of a civilization which shall embrace all mankind. The neo-humanism of the twentieth century stands at the point where the paths of all nations, races and continents cross, 'where the four winds of the spirit blow'. "

—Leopold Sedar Senghor, "What is Negritude?" (October 1961) vii

Acknowledgments

At the onset of this work, I owe some people a journey to its roots. Firstly, to Prof. Eduardo Raposo de Medeiros (Superior Institute of Social and Political Science—ISCSP, Lisbon) who not only instilled in me his own passion for the deeper, and profoundly humane workings of economics, but was also the first one to accept my view that Cape Verde was an economy worth watching (even if I had to "twist his arm"). Eleven years later, Dr. Rita Abrahamsen, then my advisor at the University of Wales Aberystwyth (currently at the University of Ottawa), took me under her supervision, allowing and encouraging me to explore the early ideas that would eventually lead to an abridged article masterfully edited by Jonars Spielberg (University of Michigan at East Lansing). To both of them, and to the anonymous peer reviewers, I owe a note of appreciation and many of the ideas that landed in these pages. In spite of theirs, and other valuable contributions, however, I alone bear the burden of any shortcomings this thesis may contain.

My gratitude is, in the present, first and foremost due to my thesis supervisor at York, Dr. Pablo Idahosa, a fellow Aberystwyth alum who—if that was not enough coincidence—frequently surprised me with his refreshing knowledge about the obscure islands of Cape Verde, and continuously provided me with the tools and the advice to make this the best thesis it could be, certainly by often putting me back on track. My appreciation is extended to my supervisory committee members, Dr. Amin Al-Hassan, whose thoughts on hybridity shaped some of my most recent ideas, and Dr. Viviana Patroni. I also benefited from comments and sources suggested by other York University scholars, notably Dr. Alan Simmons, who consistently gave sound, yet sophisticated answers to framework puzzles, theoretical dilemmas and analytical conundrums that arose not in relation to my thesis but in relation to a joint project on migration and development in Latin America; Dr. Fahim Quadir, Dr. Maria Joao Dodman, Dr. Sharada Srinivasan, Dr. Rina Cohen, and Dr. Uwafiokun Idemudia. York International very generously funded part of my research, and Orlene Ellis, our Graduate Programme Assistant, was a bright star in several steps of the way. Among my York colleagues, I owe very special thanks to Leah Reesor for her minutious proofreading, Monica Stillo for brainstorming ideas with me before and after they hit the paper, and my very own, very fun—and very useful—discussion group, Rahma Kerim, Sara Mohammed and Nausheen Quayyum.

Beyond York, Dr. Slawko Waschuk has spent innumerable days reading through my often-dry prose, and making sure I did not create (too many) new English verbs. Dr. Maria Joao Pereira (ISCSP, Lisbon) offered invaluable advise on the early conceptual stages and Dr. Ana Maria Marcelino, my sister, listened to my doubts and kept some of my ideas at bay. Dr. Jorgen Carling (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo), Dr. Godfrey Baldacchino (University of Prince Edward Island), Dr. John Connell (University of Sydney), Dr. John W. Berry (Queen's University), and Dr. Cecil Foster (University of Guelph) generously gave me access to unpublished or otherwise not easily available material. Dr. Hein de Haas (International Migration Institute, University of Oxford), and the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC, kindly allowed me to reprint their outstanding Trans-Saharan Migration map.

Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to the many people in the islands who helped me throughout the research process: Dr. Ana Cordeiro (University of Oporto) and Dr. Lia Cordeiro Medina (University of Cape Verde); Mamadou Bhour Guewel Sene; Carmen Presa and ACCVE; Rosa DeNictolis; Carmita and Djibla Mascarenhas; Sueli Leite, Samira Pereira and the Amilcar Cabral Foundation; Orsola Bertonelli; and all my anonymous interviewees across the archipelago. A very special thanks is owed to my dearest friend Corinne Molza, who throughout the summer of 2009 heard me talk about migrants more than she would ever care to, with remarkable gracefulness and insightful interventions. She was the perfect companion for many islands-hopping travels—an incredible, unforgettable, bumpy and often emotional journey that I partly report in the pages that follow. For this I am deeply grateful to her. N' ta agradezi besot's tcheul Vlll

Table of Contents

Abstract iv Dedication v Epigraph vi Acknowledgments vii Index viii List of Figures x List of Tables x List of Abbreviations xi

Prologue: 1460-1999, the story of ten little clumps of dirt xiii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Research questions 5 Theoretical framework 8 Cape Verde as a magnifying glass, or why we should care 9

Chapter 2: Methodology 12 Research design 12 Site and sample collection 15 Data collection and data analysis 19 Validity and ethical issues 21 A tale of two people, many island, and mistaken identities 23 Research scope (benefits and limitations) 24

Chapter 3: Literature Review 26 Cape Verdean historiography 26 Postcolonial literature 28 Literature on globalization, migration and diaspora 29 Studies on contemporary Cape Verdean economy and society 30

Chapter 4: Islands in transition 33 The eleventh island 34 Oh, that home in the sun 39 Of mandjakos, chines and bronks 45 ix Morabeza and "tcheu sabura": how tranquillity sells the brand 49 Proposing a framework for integration and interaction 57

Chapter 5: Processes of arrival, interaction and differentiation 61 The integrated expat and the disconnected migrant 64 The archipelago as an extension of the European jigsaw 74 The ghettos of difference, illegality and (not much) understanding 77

Chapter 6: Contending discourses of nationhood 85 All African, but not so fast: contrasting voices of acceptance 88 Hybridity and Gentrification: just another warmwater archipelago 100 The eleventh island wants in: internal and external boundaries of the nation ... 105

Chapter 7: Forging an immigration policy for development? 112 Europe's "farwest": the islands as a maritime border outpost 116 "We want to remain what we are!", or to policy or not to policy 123

Chapter 8: In the end there was migration—a final note 128

Appendices 136 Appendix A: Sample semi-structured interview questions 136 Appendix B: Interview subjects 137 Appendix C: Informal conversations 138 Appendix D: Media and comment boards consulted 139 Appendix E: Glossary of Creole terms 140

Bibliography 142 Bibliography of Referenced Local Media 153 VI

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of the Cape Verde Islands (1747) xiv

Figure 2: Map of the Cape Verde Islands, present day xviii

Figure 3: Distribution of Cape Verdean Diaspora, largest concentrations 37

Figure 4: Trans-Saharan migration routes 55

Figure 5: Migrant's perceived occupation, ethnicity and level of integration 59

Figure 6: Internal migrations, external migration and economic activity map 80

List of Tables

Table 1: Estimated international migrant population 46 xi

List of Abbreviations

ACIDI: Alto Comissariado para a Imigra^ao e Dialogo Intercultural —High Commissariat for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue [Portugal] ACO-SHAPE: Allied Command Operations, Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe ANGOP: Agenda AngolaPress BORCV: Boletim Oficial da Republica de Cabo Verde —Official Bulletin of the Republic of Cape Verde CEU: Council of the European Union CIA: Central Intelligence Agency CNDHC: Comissao Nacional para os Direitos Humanos e a Cidadania —National Commission for Human Rights and Citizenship [Cape Verde] CPLP: Comunidade de Pafses de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa —Community of Portuguese Language Countries EC: European Commission ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council [UN] ECOWAS: Economic Organization of West African States EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit EU: European Union GDP: Gross National Product HDI: Human Development Index IC: Instituto das Comunidades —Institute of the Communities [Cape Verde] IF AD: International Fund for Agricultural Development INE: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica —National Statistical Institute [Cape Verde] IOM: International Organization for Migration JMN: Jose Maria Neves [Prime-Minister, Cape Verde] LNEC: Laboratorio Nacional de Engenharia Civil —National Laboratory of Civil Engineering [Portugal] MAOC: Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre [EU] MCA: Millennium Challenge Account MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation MDA: Millennium Development Account MDG: Millennium Development Goals MHOT: Ministerio da Habitasao e do Ordenamento do Territorio Xll

—Ministry of Housing and Territorial Planning [Cape Verde] MIS: Migration Information Source MpD: Movimento para a Democracia —Movement for Democracy [Cape Verde] MPI: Migration Policy Institute NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization PAICV: Partido Africano da Independencia de Cabo Verde —African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde PAIGC: Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guine e de Cabo Verde —African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde PPP: Purchase Power Parity PRB: Population Reference Bureau PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations UNDP: United Nations Development Program UN-ESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization US/USA: United States (of America) WSJ: The Wall Street Journal WTO: World Trade Organization Prologue: 1460-1999, the story often little clumps of dirt

Cape Verdeans often refer to the creation of their own territory, ten mid-Atlantic clumps of rocky red dirt, as "God's idea of a joke."1 Over a glass of grog—the hardy drink of

Cape Verde's hohemian nights—foreigners are then typically beckoned to note the blessings that grace the islands, despite it all: their quintessential tranquillity ("// sim e sab p 'afronta, n 'e devera? "2); an open sea of possibilities ("nos tem tude ess mar IV. "3); and the bespoke morabeza4 of the islanders. This was not always the case, however. In the early days of colonization, Cape Verde was known as a tropical hell, isolated and rife with disease. Among the Europeans sent over to colonize selected islands5—mostly southern Portuguese, Catalan, and Genovese—there were often those who had not necessarily picked their destination: lower nobility tasked by the King with settling the

1. According to an oft-repeated legend, the fate of the Cape Verde Islands was sealed at Creation. After seven days of hard work, God would have shaken his hands to cleanse them off dirt. The pieces of reject clay would have scattered off the coast of Africa, and God would have looked away. With all that He had created, He thought Man would never set foot there. He was wrong. Man did come and resiliently survived until this day. Cape Verdeans jokingly tell this story to foreigners, attempting to justify both the poverty and the blessings of their islands: their ten little pieces of leftover dirt have barely any resource, and yet are as peaceful as only dirt shaken off God's own hands could be. 2. In the Soncent variety of Cape Verdean Creole—or Kriolu—literally "it's really pleasant here, isn't that right?," presuming a rhetorical "yes." 3. Literally "we have all this sea," denoting a sense of ownership and the possibility of departure. 4. "The fact that Cape Verdeans aspire to travel, to know new lands and peoples, to have close friends or relatives living overseas, as migrants or even students, may have developed in them a natural predisposition to receive visitors—from their neighbour to an individual from out of town, island or another country—amicably. It is this friendly, congenial and gentile attitude in hosting and sharing that expresses morabeza, the way in which one would hope to be received." See Brito-Semedo, Morabeza, 736-737. 5. First Santiago (the main island) and, shortly afterwards, Fogo. xiv new colony; priests, Crown officers, and amanuenses (judges came by very rarely); degredados, or convicted criminals; political exiles; and choiceless peasants.6 Slaves had no say and, if they had opinion, no one cared to record it.

Figure 1:'Karte von den Eylanden des griinen Vorgeburges'' [Map of the Cape Verde Islands] by Nicolas Bellin, circa 1747.

Throughout the centuries the archipelago maintained a reputation of a land of

"heathens and savages," over time embracing many European men who had gradually

6. Boxer, Seaborne Empire, 314; Lobban and Halter, Historical Dictionary, 67, 108; Madeira Santos and Albuquerque, Histdria Geral Vol. I, 10-100. VI taken to the "bastardized" lingua franca that was Kriolu,7 or formed open concubinage ties with freed, indentured, or even enslaved African women.8 Neglected by Lisbon and abandoned to its insular solitude of quasi-lawlessness, routine droughts, starvation, and inconstant economic cycles, the local population grew increasingly self-reliant and almost cunningly defiant of the metropole, although rarely so bold as to openly complain.

Throughout the centuries, the islands' luck varied up and down with the uncertain, and sometimes unpredictable, winds of globalization. By the eighteenth century sailors referred to Mindelo—then a major resupply entrepot—as "the dungheap of the Atlantic," and by the early twentieth century its existence was all but forgotten.

Cape Verde's unforgiving climate, combined with the geographical, economic and political isolation of the islands, notwithstanding their status as Portugal's favourite colony, help explain the democratization of poverty in the territory, an imposed, and mostly inescapable despondency that affected everyone in varying degrees. Shared poverty partially justifies the cross-class merger that occurred throughout the centuries, coming to be perceived today as racial homogeneity through deeply ingrained tropes that use hybridity to ascertain a belief mechanism based on racial blindness, or at least racial tolerance. The novelist and essayist Germano Almeida, who has often found the best words to refine the portrayals of Capeverdeanness, neatly illustrates this when he suggests that, unlike racial relations elsewhere, for people historically forced to survive

7. Llyall, Black and White, 99. 8. Almeida, 52; Lobban and Halter, Historical Dictionary, 40. xvi side by side in the barren islands, "to live with the daily normality of no one ever noticing the next man's skin colour" is perhaps the blessing of the country's troubled past.9

Fast forward to today: in spite of limited reliable and comprehensive statistical information, and allowing for various head-counting methodologies, it is generally accepted that for a national population of roughly 515,000 at least an equal number of first, second, and third generation Cape Verdeans live abroad (although, by some wildly exaggerated accounts, the diaspora could be closer to a million).10

Until recently, the perception of a national homogenous identity—or

Capeverdeanness—much of which cultivated in the fleeting 35 years since independence, was mostly undisturbed. This premise, of course, encapsulates strong internal contradictions: while the country is geographically African, Cape Verdeans do not necessarily think of themselves as such; and while the archipelago is part of the

Macaronesia Crescent,11 an underwater mountain chain culturally construed as European, contemporary Cape Verdeans are likely to hesitate in considering themselves Europeans either. Racially and culturally, the conundrum is none the simpler. It is unsurprising, in this amorphous context, that the radical changes in the national ethnoscape since the 1991 election unsettled an already precarious racial and cultural balance by exposing it to the

9. Almeida, Historia das Ilhas, 20. Translated by the author. In the original: "a gente tern que ter estado noutras paragens do mundo e depois aqui entre nos, convivendo com a diaria normalidade de ninguem reparar na cor de pele do outro." N.B.: Henceforth, Portuguese and Creole texts cited in this work should be presumed as translated by the author, unless otherwise stated. 10. See, for example: Carling, Emigration Return, 114; Carling, Cape Verdean Transnationalism, 336. There are large Cape Verdean communities in Boston, Lisbon, Rotterdam and Paris; significant numbers in Rome, Madrid, Sao Tome and Dakar; and smaller or residual communities in Luxembourg, Libreville, Luanda, Bissau, Banjul, Toronto, Montreal, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Older estimates (see, for example, Carling, Cape Verde Atlas, Diaspora Map) set the diaspora at 390-650,000 in 1990). 11. Macaronesia includes, from northwest to southeast, the Portuguese Azores, Madeira, and the Savage islands, and the Spanish Canaries, finally ending in the Cape Verde islands. xvii oft violent economic forces of globalization. In the last decade the country became growingly inviting for those who can dictate the terms by which they move—notably

Cape Verdeans with some financial capital and sophisticated composite identities,12

European sojourners and some Chinese, Brazilian, and Angolan expatriates.

If the gradual establishment of newcomers in privileged positions was not enough to unnerve the local social, economic and racial status quo, then the supplemental arrival of a large number of mostly economic—and sometimes political—migrants from all over

West Africa certainly added a key element to the equation. For the best part of five centuries, Cape Verde has been an often-troubled conduit of modernity, which has now moved into a contemporaneity where rules are not always easy or unproblematic, where social change occurs faster, where global cultural relations are more complex than anytime in the past, and where modernity—as ever before—affects real lives.

12. In this paper they will often be referred to as hyphenated Cape Verdeans. xviii

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Figure 2: Map of the Cape Verde Islands (Source: wiki site www.18dao.net, public domain,) 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

How do microstates respond to migration? How do they address and cope with the

complex effects of migration on development, and how do they address the multiple consequences of immigration, economic struggles, and identity? Such are some of the dilemmas facing the tiny insular Republic of Cape Verde. These questions, although deeply embedded in Cape Verde's history, came into sharper focus in 1991, when the archipelago was one among the encouraging cluster of Sub-Saharan African nations holding free elections for the first time. It was an uneventful transition from a single- party system that had been in place since independence in 1975, negotiated by the incumbent, Commander Pedro Pires, and Carlos Wahnon Veiga, leader of the Movement for Democracy (MpD).1 Veiga was elected on he promise of pushing through a series of democratizing bills, as well as the pledge to introduce neo-liberal economic reforms conducive to a business-friendly environment. Over the following decade, direct foreign

1. Veiga, a Lisbon-trained lawyer, was instrumental in the country's psychological transformation from a post-independence state into a modern African republic. During his mandates as Prime Minister, a series of important democratizing bills were passed into law, while the economy was speedily—some say hastily—modernized. According to Basil Davidson, PAIGC/PAICV had invested much of the external aid received in fundamental infrastructures and social projects (see Davidson, Fortunate Isles, 133-135). By the time Veiga reaches office the needs of the country had started to change. A decade of privatizations ensued, with a tax regime welcoming direct foreign investment while still focusing in many of the social ideals initiated by the former single party. Unlike Pedro Pires, who had been directly involved in the independence struggle, Carlos Veiga seemed less interested in partnering with Africa and more in strengthening ties with Europe—where, like MpD, the most successful parties of the time were following centrist, neo-liberal orienting lines, such as Tony Blair's "New Labour" or, in Portugal, Antonio Guterres' "Terceira Via," or third way. See Veiga's political biography in Manalvo, Carlos Veiga Biografia. 2 investment and development aid packages poured in at first from Europe and the United

States, and later, often branded as technical co-operation packages, from China, Japan,

Brazil, and even Angola. Twenty years later the quality of the country's democracy compares very favourably with most of its African peers,2 and a sizeable section of the population lives comfortably by regional standards, with a yearly income per capita many times that of most neighbouring states.3 Neo-liberal reforms modelled after European economies effectively brought about economic growth, but also alienated the socialist drive of the early years of independence under the African Party for the Independence of

Cape Verde (PAICV).4

Chronically high unemployment levels5 and rural poverty6 continue, however, to be the islands' Achilles' heel, but unequal income distribution is nowadays also apparent in urban settings. These examples of uneven development are reinforced by the booming tourism and real estate industries, which feed an economy with above-average growth rates—even in a moment of global economic crisis—affording the impression that, in this little nation, life is indeed becoming easier than in many of its continental neighbours.

Consequently, in addition to the attending growing pains of any major economic restructuring, Cape Verde has had to learn how to cope with an increasing inflow of

2. Baker, Most Democratic Nation?, 493-494; EIU, Country Profile, 2; Meyns, African Exception, 153-154; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions 2009. 3. GDP per capita (PPP) was estimated at $3,900 in 2009 (see CIA, World Fact Book) while GDP growth averaged 5.3% between 2001-2005, and an estimated 7% in 2007 (see EIU, Country Profile, 15). 4. Formerly known as African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). The two parties/countries followed separate paths in 1980, after the mysterious death of the independence leader Amilcar Cabral. 5. 21% in 2006 (see EIU, Country Profile, 15-16). 6. Baker, Most Democratic Nation?, 507; Davidson, Fortunate Isles, 178-191; IF AD, Ruraux Pauvres. 3 migrants from mainland Africa, seeking to reach Spain from the islands. Seen as a stable, and well-to-do archipelago, word spread it had also become an adequate transit option in the long journey to Europe, at a time when the Mediterranean border is slowly closing, pushing away many of the migrants. While waiting—and some wait so long that they end up settling—they work in menial or occasional jobs in construction or cleaning, and in an array of activities in the informal sector, including a limited number of women in the sex trade, and surely a few good men and women live of expedientes—or shady business.

Many African migrants sell commodities, while many others market African cultural goods7 to Cape Verdeans and tourists alike in the streets of Praia and Mindelo, and in the sandy hotspots of Sal and Boavista. Most are jobs that, in a weak economy, are quickly gone, either because a large construction project halts on its rails, or because a cleaning job previously held by an African woman is suddenly given to an unemployed Cape

Verdean instead, upholding longstanding solidarity ties.8 Xenophobia (and possibly racism) aimed at mainland Africans is a growing symptom of this situation and, as Bruce

Baker posits,9 a notorious exception to Cape Verde's apparent ethnic harmony.

It is this fundamental discrepancy between an ongoing renegotiation of identities and the processes of material inclusion and exclusion that will be the main focus of this paper. Africans, unlike other newcomers to the islands, force the debate on identity—on what Cape Verde is, and what it is not. Although Europeans carry the cultural load of a colonial past, their presence is equally aspirational, and pushes the envelope of self

7. See, for example, Stoller, Marketing Afrocentricity. 8. Known as "djuntamon," or hands together. 9. Baker, Most Democratic Nation?, 503-504. 4 identification. The "European habits" of Cape Verdeans' have historically stomped out its

Africanity to create a society that, while syncretic, is apparently also deemed by many in the country to be "superior" to others in the mainland. In this way, while the European component of migrant stock is seen as "familiar," the inflow of African migrants is seen less positively, as this particular group is seen as only contributing with confusion, crime, and competition for jobs that Cape Verdeans still need—and certainly, if we add an economic dimension to this assessment, no capital.

Existing literature on migration generally suggests little correlation between the extent to which a community, society, or country has a history of migration (what one might call migrant pedigree of a community) and its receptivity and tolerance towards immigrants. Confirming the rule of thumb, Cape Verde's fabled hospitality, or morabeza, is seemingly reserved to selected groups of people, reifying the idea that, as in other places, the level of receptivity depends on the migrant.10

Being a continental African migrant in Cape Verde is increasingly challenging, particularly in the most developed islands, where the looming conflicts are at their most visible: Santiago, where the capital is located and most business is conducted; Sao

Vicente, home to an important deep water harbour and gateway to Santo Antao, a major supplier of fresh produce; Sal, a flat island peppered with mass market tourist resorts and, until recently, the country's only international airport; and Boavista, the rising star of

Cape Verdean tourism, where everything goes for a premium. There is no simple path to

10. In the last few decades Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland all moved from being source countries to net receivers. Varying degrees of social tension ensued and remain, as yet, unsolved. See, for example, Castles and Miller, Age of Migration (different sections on discrimination in these countries). 5 recognition, and no easy route towards integration. In this paper I systematically identify and analyse (where data is available) the overarching migratory movements and practices of new settlers in Cape Verde over the last decade, assessing their measurable impact on the socio-economic landscape of the islands and arguing that adequately regulating immigration not only serves the immediate end of reducing the irrational fears of the

Other, it also serves the longer-term development objectives of generating wealth, enhancing productivity, and ensuring multicultural coexistence. Ultimately, I contrast

Basil Davidson and Bruce Baker's optimism with Robin Cohen's less definite "migration and development paradoxes," essential to understanding Cape Verdean society.11

Research questions

Addressing the above argument requires a phased approach, in which parts of these relationships can be identified gradually and broached from a variety of standpoints. First

I will discuss how the recent processes of immigration from continental Africa to Cape

Verde have lead to socio-economic tensions, and demonstrate what some of these points of contention might be. In the critically substantive part of this second section, I will analytically engage with both the explicit and the tacit backlash against urban Cape

Verde's new ethnoscape, and examine how a variety of popular reactions and strategies aimed at continental Africans distinguish themselves from those aimed at other

11. Cohen, Migration and its Enemies, 113-114. 6 newcomers, specifically the presumption that they are mostly—if not all—affiliated with criminal syndicates, the assumption that they do not contribute towards the development of the country (as do, presumably, wealthy Europeans and Chinese investors) or the generalized idea that they compete for lower-end jobs at lower-end prices. By ethnoscape

I understand the modern element of social disjunction that Arjun Appadurai defined as

the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals [who] constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree.12

In the third section I engage more closely with the discourse of identity, nation building and, particularly with the practical demonstration of my model of inclusion and exclusion of migrants. The fourth section will outline possible immigration scenarios, and how different government attitudes may contribute to Cape Verde's broader development policy-making, departing from immigration-specific legislation and using as a model the events in other locations undergoing similar transitional periods. Considering the essential role migrations have played in the country's economy and society, I provisionally suggest the state should step up to play an active role in optimizing the new reality of the archipelago. Throughout all these sections, I will also discuss how Cape

Verde's pre-existing economic fragilities were most recently compounded by the ripple effects of the global economic crisis in 2009, complicating the national identity equation with increased (and unexpected) social tension in the foreseeable future.

Cape Verde's socio-economic uniqueness derives from both its insular location and its colonial and post-colonial history. There is, thus, a fundamentally multidimensional

12. Appadurai, Disjunction and Difference, 469. 7 approach to understanding developmental and migratory processes in the islands. Cape

Verde cannot be understood without looking at global migratory policies, notably those in its traditional host countries for Cape Verdeans; and it cannot be understood without consideration for regional integration, regional conflict and economic dynamics in continental Africa. In this work I take a substantially different approach from other studies on Cape Verdean migration and diaspora in that, while recognizing the role of the latter, I am more interested in the processes of coming in, and in how they are affecting not only economic development prospects, but also social development and the interconnectedness of the islands the global system. This thesis, thus, fundamentally seeks to combine often-neglected facets of the process of national development: migrants' essential role in socio-economic development and its relationship with the process of nation building—understood here as the partly symbolic construction of an acceptable "common future." This link is relevant in that migrants have an amplified impact in the islands economy, but also in the notions of self and identity, particularly in an archipelago with its own deep history of migration and identity renegotiation. This relationship is as pivotal to understanding present day Cape Verde, as it is to understand external migration policies (US Immigration Policy, Schengen, etc). As always, Cape

Verde survives on a limbo of multiple, competing spheres of influence, and its balancing act is as intrinsic to the understanding of the new migratory phenomenon as are migrants themselves. 8 Theoretical framework

Inevitably, as would be expected from a paper in development studies that focuses on issues of immigration, economic struggle, and identity, this thesis uses a multidisciplinary toolkit to tackle its primary hypothesis and research questions, framing the discussion within a post-positivist theoretical approach—by this I understand an updated positivism that acknowledges my bias as an observer and researcher, recognizing the limitations of my position but also engaging with it as a possible source of another type of warranted knowledge. Insofar as possible, in my data review I attempt to connect empirical research methods to a postcolonial analytical framework. Here, I will also pay particular attention to the undertones expressed in the open-endedness of postcolonial thought, and best explained by a discussion of ambivalence, mimicry and hybridity, that might be applicable to Cape Verde's presumed position along the path to development, and modernity. The principal point of departure is the relationship between immigration movements today and the particularities of Cape Verde's historical political economy.

It is in this context that I find Benedict Anderson's analytical framework apposite.13

Cape Verde's ethno-national imagined community, I argue, is still deeply ingrained in the ideas of the modernist movement Claridade,14 which concisely excludes anyone not

13. Anderson, Imagined Communities. 14. Ana Cordeiro defines Claridade (enlightenment) as the movement "created with the objective of thinking Cape Verde, reflecting a Capeverdeanness that the islanders accepted as genuine because they recognized themselves in it. It is consensually accepted that [the magazine and its main writers] have not only capeverdeanized (sic) literature but also created a new Creole identity, marked mostly by insularity. Opting for a less grandiloquent writing closer to the way people spoke, it originated a new literary language in which elements of Portuguese mingled with Creole [and] adopted a local theme with strong social contours— drought, emigration, the decadence of the Grand Harbour [of Mindelo]—marking the beginning 9 conforming to what early twentieth century intellectuals codified as the values of

Capeverdeanness. Although this happens mostly at the level of national consciousness,

there are real power relations at play on the ground. This is especially so when

considering Cape Verde's established elites and their attempts at nation building through

the shrewd intervention of the state's economic apparatus and maintenance of the status

quo. The invocation of Capeverdeanness also resonates loudly when contrasted with the

arrival of new, aspiring elites—the wealthy returned migrants, and affluent Europeans—

on the one hand, and with the growth of a broad-based, diversified ethnoscape that poses

daily challenges to any unilateral definition of nationhood that does not include them, on the other.

Cape Verde as a magnifying glass, or why we should care

While it is true that Cape Verdean identity is rooted in the islands' very unique geography, history, and diasporic dynamics, there are new economic factors at play that propose a shift toward something else, perhaps even the racialization of specific groups.

Under the pretence of a threat to Capeverdeanness, African migrants are being singled out and made into scapegoats, denounced as the cause of some of Cape Verde's economic woes, and perhaps even its problematic sense of self. The economic factors at

of a new literary historiography in the archipelago. As a consequence of the impact of this enlightened movement, [earlier writers are seen as] minor, alienated from the things of the islands, simple reproducers of Portuguese themes and aesthetics." See Cordeiro, Nos, Cabo-Verdianos, 14. 10 play, I argue, are common to other nations around the world. Island nations are possibly the most appropriate locations to study anthropological and demographic phenomena, since they provide bite-size models that, with some care, might be extrapolated onto broader realities.

Thus, in the words of Godfrey Baldacchino, "[r]ather than justify why studying islands is important, it would appear more appropriate to try and explain why 'island studies' remain a largely unacknowledged field of study."15 Laurie LaPorte suggests that as scholars "talk about hybridized, fragmented, and multi-local representations of identity that have emerged within the conditions of modernity, the case of Cape Verde illuminates how these are familiar and even traditional ways of being for some populations."16 This experience suggests sophisticated processes of cultural negotiation that are likely to be transferable—and certainly not only to other islands. It also suggests that construing migrants as a mass of disenfranchised, undemanding, and underpaid workers competing for the few available jobs and contributing little to the economy is a disingenuous strategy uttered as a conduit to what are, by and large, economic concerns, although there is possibly a race component to be taken into account.

Following the methodological and literature review sections, Chapter 4 initiates this critical discussion with considerations of Cape Verde's relative position in Euro-

Mediterranean and Afro-European geopolitics, and a discussion of how this dynamic has profoundly changed the historical nature of the archipelago as a key intersection in the mid-Atlantic to an outpost of European foreign policy. In many ways, the translation of

15. Baldacchino, Island, Island Studies, 1. 16. LaPorte, Continuities of Modernity, 7. 11 European legislation into Cape Verdean reality results in the exacerbation of negative attitudes towards the African Other. The model of integration and interaction that I suggest in Chapter 4 is, thus, an attempt at explaining part of these constructs, based on

(imported) European and Cape Verdean narratives. 12

Chapter 2: Methodology

Research design

As with so much research in this area, my research began from the informed assumption that there are identifiable discrepancies between the social practices and discourses on immigration directed at continental African migrants and those directed at Europeans and

Chinese by Cape Verdean citizens, the national media and policy-makers. Colour blindness, often justified using the hybridity card,1 appeared too convenient to be true. I had been to Cape Verde on multiple occasions prior to the fieldwork for this project, and had perceived things differently. While there certainly seemed to be racial peace, it did not look like race was a non-issue. It was, however, not recognized as an issue. The language in the streets, in the media, even in political speeches, reproduced racial tropes without a second thought, especially when camouflaged behind the colourfulness and playfulness of Kriolu. After a few visits, and particularly after a six-month stay on the island of Sao Vicente in 2006, my command of the language appeared to be acceptable.

Yet, with Portuguese being used mostly in formal circumstances, I quickly realized that its use was raising unnecessary barriers to significant relationships, and reverted to an

1. The idea that, if all Cape Verdeans are "mixed race," how can there be space for racism? 13 almost permanent use of Kriolu Soncent2 for the length of my fieldwork. Although my command of the formal aspects of the language was surprisingly strong this time around,

I did often miss out on idiomatic expressions and the incredible tendency of Kriolu to create puns through neologisms. I admitted, of course, that words could have different meanings, different subtexts. Yet, the context of many conversations had and heard often confirmed that my perception of underlying, or perhaps inbuilt, xenophobia externalized in the shape of moderately racist attitudes was not imagined. It did risk, however, confronting and discrediting inherited ideas of how Cape Verdeans supposedly feel about race, a subject about which, to my knowledge, there is yet to be a scientific study.

I attempted to tease out possible indicators and variables that would enable me to validate my hypothesis, and in so doing created a triangular focus on the dialectical relationships occurring among three key areas: immigration and responses to it; economic wellbeing and resource distribution; and nation building moments and challenges to the values of national identity. My understanding of nation building, in this specific context, lies with the construction and reconciliation of multiple, simultaneous, or even competing imagined futures, in an attempt to merge them into one common national project behind which the whole nation can congregate. Central to each of these three areas is the concept of what immigration is, with ancillary considerations of race and class. It did not go unnoticed that European migrants, sometimes with their families, who settle in Cape

Verde for the long term, are often referred to as "tourists", or "expatriates", and Chinese migrants are referred to as "merchants" or "investors," regardless of how long they have

2. The local variety of the Kriolu language. 14 been living in Cape Verde. Although this attitude pays tribute to a history of comings and goings, I would claim that there is more to it, and that, in the best of all possible circumstances, one needs to look at popular and media articulations of tolerance, race, racial bias and racial difference, resource distribution, poverty, illegality, insecurity, social tension, and how these link back to the ongoing re-negotiations of identity and nationhood.

Some of the indicators rely more on evaluating perception than reality. This is the case with increasing violent criminality (fact), often attributed to "those Africans"

(unsubstantiated); it is also the case with a growing unemployment rate in the wealthier islands (fact), where the argument is the classical "they're taking over Cape Verdean jobs for lower pay." While it is apparently true that some African construction workers work for less, mega-developments in Sal and Boavista would probably have taken Cape

Verdean labourers if they were available, and the pay, in any case, would not vary widely. In any event, it is also important to contrast how Cape Verdeans claim to see

Africans—that is, as well integrated—and how Africans, on the other hand, perceive to be seen by Cape Verdeans as not quite integrated yet.

Eventually, I shaped my hypothesis to focus on the relationship between economic resource availability, mobilization and distribution, and on the challenges to nation building and national development, originating in the collusion of economic, migratory and identitary concerns. 15 Site and sample collection

Over the last decade, an astounding diversity of academic work on Cape Verdean migration patterns and diaspora has been published, as have several works updating the ethno-anthropological characterization of the country, all of which dramatically strengthening the available scholarly bibliography for this case study. Significant work on the evolution of the Cape Verdean economy and its social model has also appeared. In this interval, a new phenomenon emerged: Cape Verde went beyond being a source to become also, remarkably, a destination and a transhipment platform for individuals originating in mainland Africa, China, and Europe. Although in different shapes and with different motivations, these migratory movements started right after the country's independence in 1975, and increased in the years following the 1991 election, but it was only in the first decade of the twenty-first Century that they became numerically significant. Limited research has been conducted on the Chinese community in Cape

Verde, but not much has been researched or published on specific issues of gentrification in Cape Verde, or on the dynamics of African migration to the country, and its respective processes of integration. There is, thus, space for a further contribution on the Cape

Verdean case, as well as a clear rationale for focusing on issues related to one of the main corridors of migration from continental Africa.

The largest communities of African migrants live in the capital city of Praia,

Santiago, and in the port city of Mindelo, in Sao Vicente. There are also significant communities in the islands of Boavista and Sal, both of which are dominated by the 16 tourism industry. Santiago, however, was the first island to be colonized, the one with the

largest slave population and the island whence most of the slaving ships departed. Its

population is, as a result, of considerably darker complexion than elsewhere in the

country, making mainland African migrants racially less distinguishable. In tourism-

dominated Sal, conversely, while the presence of African migrants is quite prominent, it

is also diluted in the myriad other communities that compose the island's current

ethnoscape. Local inhabitants have grown accustomed to foreigners in their daily

dealings and, until recently, the island's unemployment rate was among the lowest in the country,3 leaving locals little reason to complain about economic hardship. Although definitive numbers are unavailable, Boavista is equally home to a significant amount of

African migrants. It is the closest island to the mainland, and as such it is the first to be reached when voyaging to Cape Verde by boat. These are, however, circumstances as young as Boavista's now pivotal role in the national tourism industry, and hence perhaps too recent to analyse meaningfully.

The central location chosen for this research project was the city of Mindelo, on the island of Sao Vicente.4 This island presents a wide diversity of migratory phenomena in a limited space: Mindelo, the country's second largest city, maintains an aura of bohemia and intellectual life that attracts not only economic migrants but also many

Europeans looking for a new permanent or summer holiday residence; it is the most urbanized island in the country, with about 95 per cent of the island's population living in

3. See, for example, Semana, Crise Paralisa Empreendimentos (29/05/2009). 4. Few people live out of the city of Mindelo. Generally speaking, Sao Vicente, Soncent and Mindelo are used interchangeably around the country to mean both the city and the island. 17 the city;5 it attracts internal migrants from several Windward Islands, but mostly from rural Santo Antao;6 it has a high urban unemployment rate; and, as it has been Cape

Verde's main international port for most of its history, Mindelo grew as a diminutive yet diverse and relatively cosmopolitan city with a transient population and a laissez-faire attitude built on the back of economic need and interest; internal and external migrations, and over a century of port life have made the city's population diverse; it is also reputed for maintaining a very "European" lifestyle. For the reasons above, Mindelo is an appropriate location to test deeply ingrained ideas about the oft-proclaimed colour blindness of Cape Verdean society. Pre-existing contact networks in Sao Vicente further facilitated the choice of this island.

Lacking either the time or resources for full-fledged field research that might have involved a survey comprising hundreds of interviews, this study focused on backing up institutional and analytical information with an in-depth analysis of a limited sample of primary sources. Interviews were initially conducted with mainland Africans, Europeans, and Cape Verdeans of different gender, ages, and with diverse educational levels and social standing. Although most were conducted in Mindelo, a few were conducted also in

Cidade Velha and Tarrafal, Santiago,7 as well as in Sao Filipe, Fogo.8 Given the

5. Carting, Cape Verde Atlas, Urbanization. 6. The Windward Islands—Ilhas do Barlavento—are the northern group: Boavista, Sal, Santo Antao, Sao Nicolau and Sao Vicente; the Leeward Islands—Ilhas do Sotavento—are the remaining ones. 7. Cidade Velha (Old Town), or Ribeira Grande de Santiago, was the first permanent European settlement in Africa, and for several centuries the imposing capital of Cape Verde. Although once sizeable, the city declined following relentless pirate attacks and the eventual decline of the archipelago's economy. It is nowadays an important tourist destination—listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site since July 2010—located about 15 km away from the capital, Praia. Tarrafal is the northernmost town in the mountainous island of Santiago. Famed for its natural landscape, it is particularly infamous for the remains of the Tarrafal Prison, also known as "Camp of Slow Death," a concentration camp set up by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, a Portuguese dictator (1932-1968) to jail political dissidents at the onset of the Spanish 18 significant demographic and socio-economic differences between the islands, however, my views should be understood to apply mostly to the largest urban centres—Praia and

Mindelo, and perhaps more loosely to the islands of Sal and Boavista. A note of caution is due regarding the latter two, which are likely to require specific studies, given the current global economic climate, its impact on their highly dependent economies, and the disproportionate ratio of migrants per local.

In July 2009 the authorities officially admitted the country was facing uncertain economic prospects in the wake of the global economic crisis. While Santiago's more diversified economy stayed its course, Mindelo's stagnation was compounded by disturbing news from the vulnerable economies of Boavista and Sal, facing racing unemployment rates, particularly among the immigrant community, and spiralling petty criminality. This has easily escalated to the level of national panic. Interviewees' answers often reflect this last development. Much of this work is informed by a limited number of rather long, semi-structured interviews with both Cape Verdeans and migrants. For practical reasons, they do not appear in the form of direct speech in the text, but should be assumed to inform it throughout. Smaller snippets of direct speech are the proceeds of fruitful mining in several online discussion forums on issues of migration.

Civil War. In the 1970s the camp was re-opened, this time serving as a prison camp for Portuguese anti-war leaders and other dissidents, as well as independence struggle leaders from all the colonies. It is currently home to a small African community serving its dwindling tourism industry. 8. Sao Filipe is Cape Verde's second oldest settlement, and the country's third largest city. With an impressive colonial architecture and serving as a gateway to the island's natural park—Fogo Volcano— the city attracts a significant number of cultural and eco-tourists, and accommodates a small but growing community of African migrants. The city maintains the aura of its "founding families," and is often assumed to have aristocratic roots—which is not necessarily the case. 19 Data collection and data analysis

The fieldwork stage of this research aimed at collecting different kinds of data: media reports (and readers comments) on immigration and the state of the economy; official statistics, institutional reports, and interventions by policy-makers; and interviews with individuals representing different groups of stakeholders. In a preliminary phase, I identified African, European, and Chinese migrants, as well as Cape Verdean returned migrants and locals. On the ground, I decided to eliminate returned Cape Verdeans from this cohort, as they pose specific challenges, both social and economic that could not be addressed here.91 also came to learn that, despite the abundance of Chinese migrants in

Mindelo, access was not necessarily easy, and it certainly required more time, despite the fact that I was based on a street where a good 30 per cent of the inhabitants were Chinese.

The fact that many declined to be interviewed about these issues is, in and of itself, interesting. There is, fortunately, prior literature on this specific community of Mindelo. I was left with three key groups of interviewees, which seemed strong enough to further the understanding of issues of post-colonial race and/or ethnic relations. The answers given by Africans can be contrasted with the answers given by fellow European migrants, and both with those given by Cape Verdeans themselves. The interviews were conducted

9. The challenges and opportunities brought back to Cape Verde by returned emigrants, and increasingly second- and third-generation Cape Verdeans, are of a specific nature, and pertain to issues of relative power, identity re-negotiation within the community, and financial precedence. Both the government and scholars regard the Cape Verdean diaspora as central to national development, but its complex dynamics require studies of their own, the scope of which go well beyond the brief, contextualized considerations I make in the forthcoming chapters. On this subject, see for example: Batalha and Carling (eds.), Transnational Archipelago', Carling, Policy Challenges; Grassi, Cabo Verde Pelo Mundo; Melo, Cape Verdean Transnationalism. 20 in the language that was most comfortable for the interviewee, often a mixture of several

(Kriolu, Portuguese, French, and English).

Organizing a focus group on an issue that proved divisive was not an easy task, and it certainly was not made easier by the absence of many people of interest during the summer holiday, the period of my fieldwork. However, in my second week in Mindelo I was fortunate to attend a documentary film screening on immigration issues10 at a local university, followed by a debate between Cape Verdeans and Europeans, all with higher education. On consistently hearing of an "invasion" during this informal event, I knew my assumptions were not far off the mark.

Throughout this paper, the data above will be analysed in depth, and measured against statistical information (where available), media discourses and official policies.

Contributions from the media will be used not only to take into account the frequency and representation of immigration issues in media outlets, but particularly to test for user responses to specific news on immigration, as posted on comment boards of newspapers and discussion forums online. These online venues are invaluable windows to ongoing and upcoming patterns of behaviour, which change on a daily basis at the speed and with the intensity of current events. They, thus, deserved significant attention.11

10. Lobo and Pinho, Bab Sebta. 11. A list of web forums consulted is available at the end of this paper. Please note that, at this moment, most Cape Verdean newspapers do not maintain long-term online archives. Older news, and consequently their comment boards, is deleted after some months. Comments retrieved over one year ago might, therefore, no longer be available online. 21 Validity and ethical issues

Every effort has been made to ensure the appropriate application of a systematic method of evaluating and collecting the data used in this research. Its findings are, thus, valid and constitute warranted knowledge that can be reproduced and reiterated in future studies.

However, the post-positivist framework used means that some of the data is necessarily uniquely interpreted by this researcher, and might be otherwise understood by others. On this point, there were ethical concerns to be addressed, which I attempted to negotiate at

12 every step of the way, hopefully with reasonable success.

An engrossing question was that of my position and my reflexivity as a researcher.

I was born and raised in Lisbon, Portugal, and am a Portuguese citizen, although I have acquired "token" Cape Verdean citizenship as an adult. My light-skinned paternal family is originally from the island of Fogo, the second to be colonized and one where relationship structures were considerably stricter than in Mindelo—as dictated by centuries of stewardship by more conservative rural bourgeoisie and classes of lower nobility. However, all but a few distant relatives remain on the island, while most of the others moved to Boston, Amsterdam, and Lisbon one or two generations ago. This is relevant question of positionality, as it often affects the way I am perceived by Cape

12. An important issue, for example, relates to full disclosure. While I was always forthcoming about the nature of my research whenever asked, I also consciously attempted not to say too much on my hypothesis, particularly to interviewees, for two reasons: firstly, so as not to influence their answers; and secondly—specifically in the case of Cape Verdean interviewees—so as not to be seen as insinuating racist attitudes, which might have generated very different levels of participation. The nature of the study was clear to all participants, and patent in the signed informed consent forms and sample questions, as approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee of York University's Ethics Review Board. Samples are provided at the end of this paper. 22 Verdeans and enables me to play (or not) the insider-outsider card as required.

Following my path of adaptation but also of perception by others, I was—at first sight—a relatively affluent, educated white Portuguese male,13 who happened to live in

Canada, dressed like a tourist, and got sunburnt just like one. After a couple of weeks, however, I was feeling more confident about my language skills, wearing flip-flops— because they were simply more comfortable—and, like everyone else, a bracelet gifted to me by one of my Senegalese acquaintances. My skin looked darker by the day, or, as I was told, healthier like "people's skin."14 In conversations in Kriolu, it often transpired that this was not my first visit and that my family was from Fogo. I was asked why did I speak Kriolu Soncent and not Kriolu di Fogo. In certain social groups, the question that followed would enquire about my last name and the geographic origin of my family, perhaps in an attempt to determine how aristocratic—if at all—it was (it wasn't). In other contexts, I would be told that I had a typical "Fogo face" or that I had a typical Fogo character.15 I would also be asked if my family lives there, or abroad. Navigating these questions inducted me one step further in the scale of trust. In general, I did not attempt to interview anyone to whom I had not talked for a few weeks. In this manner, I was able to recognize what questions were more relevant for each specific interviewee.

Fielding questions about my own identity without constraints appeared, in a way, to legitimize my presence to many as a researcher, enabling me to ask the questions I

13. Despite my Cape Verdean papers, after only a few weeks in Mindelo a couple of street kids would greet me from afar, shouting "Oh, PortuguesV ("Hey, Portuguese!"), and would often come closer to engage me in a chat. This friendly approach and thumbs up simultaneously acknowledged my presence, and assigned a position of relative privilege to my perceived identity. 14. Literally, "Pele de gente," as opposed to the pitiful pale white/pink-ish skin I had landed with. 15. Literally, my face is "cara di genti di Fogo," and my character is "propio kel caracter digenti la di vulcon," that is to say stubborn, proud, confident, feisty and laconic ... or in other words, "volcanic." 23 wanted to ask. It also continuously reminded me of who I am as a researcher, and how my bias could be influencing my process. The constant reassessment of my own intersubjectivity, and its possible impact on my findings, undoubtedly forced me to be, at all times, mindful of the process. Generally speaking, being "from Fogo" appeared to command respect and appreciation from islanders, as did the fact that I moonlight as a journalist/writer. All these factors played to my advantage on many occasions. Yet, not revealing them upfront could sometimes be a virtue too. Retaining this information at times offered me insight into sets of assumptions I would otherwise not have directly experienced—as the following closing anecdote portrays.

A tale of two people, many islands, and mistaken identities

During my fieldwork I was lucky enough to visit five other islands—Santo Antao,

Sal, Boavista, Santiago, and Fogo—with a friend in the travel industry, which gave me the opportunity to observe how their socio-economic realities diverged steeply from

Mindelo's. One of the most revealing aspects of this travel, however, was how others perceived us. She is a Paris-born female of French West Indian descent, with dark skin and long braided hair who, after ten years in Cape Verde, is also fluent in Kriolu Soncent.

On a daily basis, when eating out in restaurants or checking into hotels, we were greeted by a variety of amusing episodes uncloaking gender and racial bias. Firstly, we were often assumed to be married (white man, black woman, what else could it be?); secondly, 24 menus or room keys were consistently handed over to me, to my friend's bewildered amusement—and, later, bewildered frustration. Confusion also usually settled in when she was addressed in Kriolu and I was addressed in Portuguese only to have my reply in

Kriolu met with surprise and a new sequence of questions (as described above).

The conundrum over identity then deepened further when our host requested our passports—mine, Cape Verdean, hers, French. She would then be asked if she was

Creole, which is an underlying question about possible Cape Verdean ancestry. The response was "yes, but Antillean Creole," which in turn would prompt a new flurry of questions. In the southern islands, where I understood the language better and had key vocabulary at hand (as this was the version spoken by my father), she was often at a loss for words. This would mystify people with whom we interacted, who by now knew she had been living in Cape Verde for a decade, and that I lived abroad. So why did I speak

Kriolu and she did not?

Not only was this story a reason for many laughs over the course of two weeks, it was also revealing of a pattern of constant curiosity about identity, with many possible layers of interpretation. On the field, as in my writing, I kept myself in check to ensure that my analysis, inasmuch as possible, overcame heritage.

Research scope (benefits and limitations)

This thesis does not cover the full scope of immigration to Cape Verde. It does, however, 25 open a window to a particular issue rarely breeched in the context of migration patterns in the country. Undoubtedly, a larger, lengthier, and fully funded investigation will be carried out in the future as the need for a coherent, and proactive, immigration policy insinuates itself.

The present analysis provides insight into the specific correlations among the immigration of Africans, nation building, and economic struggles in Cape Verde, based on the vertical mining of interview data and its triangulation with different types of sources. Widening the interview sample by at least a few dozen interviews in each category of migrants, as well as policy makers and key civil society leaders, would make a considerable contribution to scholarship in the field. Ultimately, however, these would be two very different studies. In my work, it appears more relevant to focus on the deeply postcolonial tropes that dictate normative assumptions of boundaries and identification with a fixed ethnoscape. These, by definition, or perhaps by virtue of the fact that they cannot be philosophically justified, require a degree of reflection and questioning, leading to a re-iteration of identity in light of processes of neo-liberal globalization and where the rise in ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and cultural nationalism has been consistently present. 26

Chapter 3: Literature Review

Much of the analysis contained in this paper relies on institutional data (statistical information, policy papers, official speeches, and legislative documents), discourse analysis (interviews, media coverage, and online comment boards on immigration) and field notes, but another important group of works provides a fundamental theoretical backbone to this thesis. This literature can be roughly grouped into four typologies (listed: works on Cape Verdean historiography, identity formation, and state formation; postcolonial literature; theoretical treatises on globalization, migration, diaspora, and development; and, finally, contemporary analyses of Cape

Verde's migration patterns, society, and economy; The following is a brief overview of key works utilized in my analysis.

Cape Verdean Historiography

It is impossible to write about immigration in Cape Verde without a reflection on its own postcolonial condition and, particularly, its seminal history of migration. The

Historia Geral de Cabo Verde trilogy co-ordinated by Maria Emilia Madeira Santos 27 and Luis de Albuquerque is a joint-publication between the Cape Verdean Ministry of

Culture and a Portuguese research institute, and is widely recognized as the primary and most extensive scholarly work on the history of Cape Verde to date.1 As such, these volumes were kept at arm's length, forming and informing an essential part of this paper in the sense that they provides much of the historic glue binding the research together, from colonization to race relations, from migration to economic history. C.R. Boxer's Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire and The

Portuguese Seaborne Empire, and Richard Lobban's Historical Dictionary of the

Republic of Cape Verde3 also offer compelling historic and ethnographic data, as does

Germano Almeida's Viagem Pela Histdria das Ilhas.4 Almeida, Cape Verde's most celebrated writer prefers to call himself a storyteller. Much of his work, in fact, fictionalizes oral tradition from across the islands. In turn, these versions go back to popular lore, creating a new reality and recycling old stories. His reflections reproduce the perceived conditions of Cape Verdean nationhood—for example, its insularity, continuous departure, deprivation, and hybridity. His work provides an interesting synthesis of events and social realities, and also lays bare Cape Verdeans' underlying self-conceptions and sense of history.

1. Madeira Santos and Albuquerque (eds.), Histdria Geral, Vol. I; Madeira Santos (ed.), Histdria Geral, Vols. II and III. 2. Boxer, Race Relations', Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire. 3. Lobban and Halter, Historical Dictionary. 4. Almeida, Viagem Pela Histdria. 28 Postcolonial Literature

The intersection of these works with essential early postcolonial texts such as Franz

Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks,5 and Memmi's Decolonization and the

Decolonized6 will be instrumental in mapping out identity charts.

Other invaluable postcolonial pieces include the aforementioned Benedict

Anderson's Imagined Communities,7 which constitutes an important element of my assessment of the internal consequences of immigration to Cape Verde. The archipelago's history as a source of migrants places it in a pivotal position as to the definition and constant renegotiation of its identity. Contrasting the values of

Capeverdeanness with the imagined community proposed by Anderson will reveal important paths of self-identification, exclusion, and recognition. Bhabha's The

Location of Culture8 appears to have been purposefully written for the postcolonial reality of Cape Verde. It will be important to focus on his ideas of place, hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence, which undergird the postcolonial subject's (the creolized islander) self-conceptions, notably in what purports the creation of a culture and the maintenance of an ideology based on its past.

5. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. 6. Memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized. 7. Anderson, Imagined Communities. 8. Bhabha, Location of Culture. 29 Literature on Globalization, Migration and Diaspora

Another important group of works furnishes a theoretical background to my analysis, addressing issues of migrant and diasporic communities, multiculturalism and globalization. These include Robin Cohen's Migrations and its Enemies,9 offering insight into the intricacies—and contradictions—of migration and providing operational tools to assess the growth of conflict in as a result of a new phenomenon in the country.

Stephen Castle and Mark Miller's The Age of Migration,10 Gabriel Scheffer's Diaspora

Politics,u and Jan Nederveen Pieterse's Pants for an Octopus provide additional insight.12 Further to migration, it is challenging to think about a more instrumental location to modernity than Cape Verde with its unique position in the crossroads of the modern world, constant since the inception of settlement and colonization. Cape Verde is arguably one of the earliest true examples of globalization.13 Arjun Appadurai's

Modernity at Large,14 in which the author postulates a penta-dimensional view of global cultural flows and the disjunction that allow them to happen (and is a product of them) will equally offer a strong analytical tool. I focused only on his concept of ethnoscape. In

Fear of Small Numbers,15 Appadurai discusses the ideas, ambiguities, and interactions of majorities and minorities, useful in the last chapters of this thesis.

9. Cohen, Migration and its Enemies. 10. Castles and Miller, Age of Migration. 11. Scheffer, Diaspora Politics. 12. Nederveen Pieterse, Pants for an Octopus. 13. Duncan, Atlantic Islands, 195-252. 14. Appadurai, Modernity at Large. 15. Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers. 30 Studies on Contemporary Cape Verdean Economy and Society

Finally, as unknown as the subject "Cape Verde" once was, the last twenty years have

seen a large production of works cutting across themes related to its migrations, diaspora, society, politics, economy (and economic development), often intersecting with the areas of study listed above.16 Much of this work, both old and recent, provided me with a stepping-stone for contextualization, upon which I base much of my analysis. Although, because of a need for an update, I deviate from Basil Davidson's classic The Fortunate

Isles,17 it is important to remark that, as the first modern scholar legitimately writing about Cape Verde, Davidson's landmark work is an essential piece of the puzzle. Much of it rings true today as it did in the late 1980s, although his own political sympathies deserve reappraisal and a very careful critique. Yet, arguably, The Fortunate Islands remains the most important political and ethnographic title on Cape Verde, and much of what has been done since requires a reference to it. As with Davidson's Marxism, it is important here to refuse most Portuguese scholars' writing before 1974, as a consequence of their colonial biases and often apologies. But those that followed, of both Portuguese and Brazilian extraction, as well as many from Cape Verdean diaspora in the United

States and in Portugal, produced a wide array of useful studies.

16. On the particular issue of the development of Cape Verde as a case study, see for example: Grassi, Cabo Verde pelo Mundo. 17. Davidson, Fortunate Isles. 31 Marcia Rego's Echoes from an Empire, Voices of a Nation,18 and the later

Understanding Competing Discourses of 'Nation' at Home and Abroad19 which touch an essential point in the formation of nationhood in Cape Verde: the different visions of those who stayed in the islands and those who left have. These two sometimes diverging, sometimes converging perspectives inform each other and set a background against which newcomers are measured. Isabel Feo Rodrigues' Crafting Nation,20 Dixon Abreu's

Islanders in Transit,21 and Laurie LaPorte Continuities of Modernity22 complete the list of reference works on identity in Cape Verde.

A final dimension is added by a group of young, well-networked scholars that have been complementing each other's work and enlarging the library on Cape Verde as never before. These include Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling, editors of

Transnational Archipelago23 and authors of an immense bibliography on migrancy;

Carling is arguably the leading scholar on aspects of Cape Verdean migratory patterns and his groundbreaking work on the diaspora, return migration, and what he calls "an ideology of migration," produced a seminal oeuvre.24 On occasion his work has been co-authored with Lisa Akesson,25 Heidi Haugen,26 and Chris Alden.27

18. Rego, Echoes from an Empire. 19. Rego, Competing Discourses of Nation. 20. Feo Rodrigues, Crafting Nation. 21. Abreu, Islanders in Transit. 22. LaPorte, Continuities of Modernity. 23. Batalha and Carling, Transnational Archipelago. 24. Carling, Policy Challenges; Carling, Emigration, Return; Carling, Cape Verdean Transnational ism; Carling, Cape Verde Atlas; Carling, Towards End of Emigration; Carling, Return and Reluctance; Carling, Aspiration and Ability. 25. Carling and Akesson, Mobility at Heart. 26. Haugen and Carling, Edge of Chinese Diaspora. 27. Carling and Haugen, Mixed Fates of Minority. 32 This paper undoubtedly owes credit to their work and will often critically refer to many of their findings, including exciting new areas of study such as the Chinese community in Cape Verde, a community of much interest to my work, as a control group. Pedro Gois (Low Intensity Transnational ism28), Bruce Baker29 and Marzia

Grassi30 complete the batch of new voices building the framework out of which I work.

28. Gois, Low Intensity Transnationalism. 29. Baker, Most Democratic Nation?. 30. Grassi, Cabo Verde pelo Mundo. 33

Chapter 4: Islands in transition

Virtually every aspect of global migration can be seen in this tiny West African nation, where the number of people who have left approaches the number who remain and almost everyone has a close relative in Europe or America [...]. The intensity of the national experience makes this barren archipelago the Galapagos of migration, a microcosm of the forces straining [...] politics and remaking societies across the globe.

—Jason DeParle, The New York Times (June 24th, 2007)

While the particular conditions of Cape Verde's geography, history, and society greatly dictated its often ambiguous position in the international system, generally speaking the social, political, and economic challenges faced over the last decade are not much different from those already faced by other large and small nations around the world, even if the responses and coping mechanisms might reflect the singularities of this archipelago. For a variety of country-specific reasons, Cape Verde is part of a global trend of decreasing migration, with increased regular and undocumented in-flows to certain countries along specific migration corridors. As a key passageway in one such corridor, Cape Verde is equally part of a global struggle against it. While the absolute numbers involved might be greater for many other countries, their relative effects, 34 proportional to territory and population, are likely to be stronger in smaller, more vulnerable states by virtue of their limited room for political and policy manoeuvring.

In this chapter I will discuss how migration patterns in Cape Verde have changed decisively in recent years, from a gradual reduction in the number of departures to a slow return of Cape Verdeans living abroad, but also to the very significant arrival of Chinese and African migrants, in addition to European summer sojourners, tourists, investors, and other permanent or temporary residents. The new settlers become immediate actors in the national ethnoscape and, eventually partake, however involuntarily, in the nation building process, whether the nation wants them included or not. The consequences are felt at the social, economic and, increasingly, also at the political level. It is this amplification of results, combined with its geography that makes Cape Verde an intriguing case study.

The eleventh island

For most of its history, Cape Verde's geographical location has been central to its economy. At the crossroads of multiple Atlantic routes connecting Europe to South

America and Africa to North America and the Caribbean, the small archipelago was consecutively used as a slave and textile entrepot, and later as a key ship re-supplying outpost. In between the peak economic periods between the early sixteenth and the mid- eighteenth centuries the islands were mostly abandoned to their own luck, leading to 35 significant emigration as early as the eighteenth century.1 Although it has slowed down in a few historic moments, the outflow of Cape Verdeans has seldom stopped, resulting in a diasporic community easily outnumbering the resident population today, and with a cultural and economic influence to match.2 Often referred to as "eleventh island" the

Cape Verdean diaspora is most significant in the United States, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, although it spreads to a handful of other locations in Europe and along the

South Atlantic coasts of Africa and the Americas. This is an inchoately connected transnational community that Pedro Gois characterized as practising "low intensity transnationalism,"3 and Gina Sanchez Gibau calls a "dispersed nation" and a "fractured diaspora."4 In other words, the diaspora is closely knit and interacts across its different nodes but has limited access and contact with the host communities, thus reducing its potential for vertical mobility—that is, the ability for movement up through hierarchies and status. Over time, it in fact loses influence whenever it is confronted with challenges from other communities, notably in labour market access.5 Still, there are currently several projects attempting to know the Cape Verdean diaspora and to tap its potential.

Explaining the complexity of this dynamic relationship goes beyond the scope of the present paper, although it could briefly be suggested—as per the findings of Dixon

1. See, for example, Halter, Cape Verdeans in U.S., 35-38. 2. A beacon of particular influence is the Congress of Cape Verdean Professionals of the Diaspora (www.congressocv.org), but there are other important clusters—some more organized than others—in the US, Portugal, the Netherlands and Italy. 3. Gois, Low Intensity Transnationalism, 271. 4. Sanchez Gibau, Cape Verdean Diasporic Identity, 260-265. 5. A good example would be the fast increasing unemployment rate among Cape Verdeans living in Portugal, when new Brazilian and Eastern European migrants started to dispute many of their traditional labour market niches, and gaining a significant share despite the historical prominence of Cape Verdeans. 36 Abreu6—that the phenomenon of insularity is carried on through by the diaspora, reinforcing the condition of Cape Verdeans overseas as "eternal migrants" undergoing perpetual processes of hybridization and complicating the stabilization of their identity.

In the United States, as noted by much of the literature on this specific node, a good example of "insularity" that perhaps justifies the maintenance of a diaspora memory is the very late ethnic recognition of Cape Verdeans. In the early days of Cape Verdean migration to the US, immigrants would be logged as "black Portuguese" or "Africans," and later bunched up with "Afro-Americans," all of which were denominations that denied Cape Verdeans' self identification as islanders with a specifically mixed ethnic background. Thus, while the nature of Cape Verde's migratory networks and the maintenance of symbolic capital across generations might help explain current connections, identity politics in their host communities and the dilution of their own identities possibly explain the patchy nature of diasporic transnational practices.

Although the behavioural patterns of the diaspora are not the focus of this research, they are good indicators of similarly ambiguous and intricate relationships occurring in the Cape Verde islands today. There, local residents face newcomer communities that either practise a more intense kind of transnationalism,7 or possibly penetrate the social fabric at a higher level, by virtue of their social or economic status— which is often the case of many Europeans. We will return to this dynamic in Chapters 5 and 6.

6. Abreu, Islanders in Transit, 177-195. 7. As per the description offered by Pedro Go is, Senegalese and, to a lesser extent, Lebanese, might fall under this category—see Gois, Low Intensity Transnationalism, 271-274. 37

Paris (metro) - * 20,000 Rotterdam - s 15,000

Europe

Portugal - 70,000 - 100,000 France - 20,000 - 40,000 The Netherlands - 20,000 - 25,000 Italy - 10,000 -12,000 Spain - 4,000 -10,000 Luxembourg - 3,000 - 5,000 Germany - < 3,000 Switzerland - < 3,000 Scandinavia - < 2,000 Belgium - < 1,000

Cape Verde 516,733 (2010 est) Praia -150.102 (2009) Mindelo - 76,736 (2003) The Americas

USA - 350,000 - 500,000 Brasil - 5,000 - 8,000 Africa Argentina - 5,000 - 8,000 Canada -1,000 - 7,000 Senegal - 25,000 Venezuela - < 1,000 Angola - 20,000 - 45,000 Sao Tome and Principe - 7,000 - 25,000 Guinea-Bissau -1,000 - 5,000 Cote d'tvoire -1,000 - 5,000 Gabon - 500 - 4,000 Mozambique - < 1,000 South Africa - < 1,000 Zambia - < 1,000

Map compiled using low and high diaspora estimates from research H on the theme, national and foreign governmental sources. Numbers are indicative wily. More reliable figures are currently being compiled by the IC. forthcoming in 2010. © Pedro F. Jose-Marcetirra, 2010.

Figure 3: Cape Verdean Diaspora, high and low estimates, main nodes, 2010. (Adapted from Carling's Diaspora Map, 2001)

Despite its transnational tradition—or perhaps due to it—J0rgen Carling suggests that recent changes in immigration policies in North America and in Europe may be dictating an upcoming "end of emigration" from Cape Verde.8 Increasingly, traditional

8. See, for example, Carling, Towards End of Emigration?. 38 destinations of the Cape Verdean emigration are harder to access legally, and as Carling

points out, unlike nationals from neighbouring nations, Cape Verdeans seldom enter their

host countries illegally, although many do overstay their visas, or believe it is possible for

regularize their situation with, for instance, a bogus marriage after a visa overstay.9 These external changes, much stronger since 9/11—reinforced since Europe's informal

"pushing back the chain" policy was initiated10—are actively contributing to the looming phenomenon posited by Carling as increased migration pressure, which he describes as a strong "mismatch between desires to emigrate and the restricted opportunities to do so."11

This has now reached a critical level in Cape Verde and, combined with the arrival of new residents from Africa, China, and Europe, as well as the return of Cape Verdeans, is,

I suggest, a key factor in explaining why tolerance levels might have lowered in recent years.

9. Carling, Aspiration and Ability, 144-151. 10. This informal and rather inchoate policy, loosely linked with Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, has been more or less openly implemented by several European countries—notably the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—with manifold objectives: firstly, preempting irregular immigration by addressing the causes of migration pressure in the source countries; secondly, tackling migratory chains as close to the source communities as possible, by increasing aggressive border controls in sensitive locations, thus making a section of the migratory path more difficult to accomplish (e.g., aggressive maritime controls around Lampedusa, Italy; raids in the forest dwellings of hundreds of migrants known as LaJongle, in Calais, France; heat sensors to scan trucks and cargo ships for stowaways in Dover, England; or the wall built around the Spanish territoiy of Ceuta, in the north of Morocco); thirdly, consistently deporting migrants to their countries of origin; fourth, where the latter is not possible for lack of documents—often the case—migrants are confined to "transition centres," increasingly resembling jails. Privileged partnerships with key African partners—such as Libya or, increasingly, Cape Verde—are essential to "push back" the chain by one or two links, i.e., one or two further steps away from the European borders. 11. Carling, Towards End of Emigration? 39 Oh, that home in the sun...

Far from being paradise lost, Cape Verde has struggled to rise out of poverty for centuries, but never more strenuously so than since independence in 1975. After the profound political and economic reform process following the 1991 election, the attempted changes finally gained momentum. While Cape Verde's full re-entry into a globalized market economy made the economic position of many of its citizens fragile, the government's clear development goals—which I will review in Chapter 6—and strategies implemented to attain them, appeared to slowly pay off.

Consequently, and despite its continued dependence on remittances and foreign bilateral and multilateral aid,12 Cape Verde has been generally perceived as an example of good governance, and intelligent aid management—much of which applied to basic needs, but also to transport and energy infrastructure, two of the keystones of Cape

Verdean economic development policies. Its Human Development Index (HDI) has risen to the level of medium development in the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) 2009 Report,13 perceptions of democratic institutions are generally positive,14 and perceptions and experiences of corruption remain among the lowest in Africa,15 although occasional events have raised suspicion—and outrage—among Cape Verdeans.

The economy is stable and its currency—the Cape Verdean Escudo—exchangeable and safely indexed to the Euro, even if the banking system remains small and relatively

12. IRIN, Cape Verde Atlantic Survivors; EIU, Country Profile, 21. 13. Ranking 121st in 2009, and 6th in Africa—following only Libya, the Seychelles, Mauritius, Tunisia and Algeria. See UNDP, Human Development Report, 186-189. 14. Afrobarometer, Round 3 Status of Democracy. 15. Afrobarometer, Round 3 Citizen and State, 34-39. 40 unsophisticated. The perceptions of its business atmosphere remain soundly reserved, mostly due to delays in updating legislation to meet international standards required by the World Trade Organization (WTO),16 which Cape Verde joined in 2007. Yet, foreign direct investment has significantly increased in the last decade, which is viewed nationally as a positive step, since internal resources for wealth creation are limited.

With these developments in mind, apprehension about Cape Verde rumoured

"graduation" to the level of a "middle income" or "medium development" country has been widely diffused in the country, and is clamoured as a reason for perceived reductions on aid availability from traditional partners. However, such a classification does not officially exist.17 Instead, any decrease in aid levels is most likely due to a combination of factors, including the effects of several consecutive economic crises, the perception by some donors that other nations have more urgent needs or present better strategic advantages, and the simply re-allocation of funds within Cape Verde. Not only does aid, however, remain an important source of financial resources, but it is nowadays routed through alternative actors independently from the state. Targeted aid projects are increasingly implemented by experienced transnational organizations, sometimes with local counterparts, possibly contributing to the notion that the state is now less involved in the development process. Official aid programs have been gradually commodified and tied in to security issues, in line with the global trends for the securitization and commodification of aid.

16. EIU, Country Profile, 15. 17. Carling, Policy Challenges, 43-44. 41 Cape Verde is currently well placed to achieve most of the ambitious Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) proposed by the United Nations (UN) by 2015, endearing it to Western nations eager to show successful results on this particular global project. In

December 2009, the Board of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) chose Cape

Verde as the first country selected to receive a second block of funds.18 Aid, in general, has compounded a process of profound social and economic transformation cemented over a period of 18 years, with advantages and disadvantages (which will be addressed later) trickling down to the general population. The overall positive ratio, however, has made

Cape Verde a very attractive location for investors, and for a variety of newcomers. It is this fairly new phenomenon in Cape Verde that has yet to be sufficiently studied at length.

The country's new residents include continental African migrants,19 generally working as manual labourers or as street vendors, Chinese economic migrants working in small commercial ventures, as well as large Chinese and European investors operating in a variety of fields. Small numbers of Brazilians and Angolans can be accounted for in the national economic fabric. Europeans have also started to arrive in significant numbers, and certainly not only as tourists. As per John Connell's findings, "in islands of a particular perceived charm [...] populations have been boosted by both the emergence of second homes and retirement migration [...] stimulated by relatively cheap property, climate and environment, low crime rates, a semblance of home amenities, and adequate

18. MCC, Status Report January-March 2009, 1; Na^ao, MCC Admite Atribui?ao (17/11/2009). 19. Their countries of origin are mostly ECOWAS member states, particularly Senegal and Guinea- Bissau (with Cape Verde, also a member of CPLP. Although there appears to be a variety of nationalities, the other largest contingents are likely from the Gambia, Conakry, Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana and Nigeria. 42 air connections."20 These factors all apply to Cape Verde, but a recent rise in violent urban criminality21 and the ballooning prices of real estate will deserve further attention in Chapter 6.

In addition to the new migrants, as living conditions in Cape Verde improved an unknown—but admittedly large—number of emigrants and hyphenated Cape Verdeans are also returning or settling either permanently or temporarily in the islands. J0rgen

Carling admits that the dynamics of return in Cape Verde are not much different from those among other migrant communities, confirming the '"rule of thumb' in migration theory that original intentions of return often dwindle with time." He recognizes that for

Cape Verdeans "return is an important aspect of migration dynamics," in that migrants do return in large numbers, even if many eventually settle permanently overseas (the privilege of their positions is that no return is irreversible). Critically, "the idea of return is central to transnational practices such as sending remittances and constructing houses."22 In a previous work, Carling tentatively distinguishes between three different typologies of returning migrants, which he calls "empty-handed returnees," "moderate returnees," and "classic returnees," the latter of which have earned full pension rights abroad, thus living comfortably by Cape Verdean standards.23 Carling goes on to cite one

20. Connell, Island Migration, 471. 21. See, for example, Carling, Policy Challenges, 28, and much of the local newspaper clippings collected for the purpose of this study. Reducing criminality is currently considered a priority task, with the government recently re-structuring the National Police and allocating Military Police resources to reinforce civilian patrols in both Praia and Mindelo. See: BORCV, Decreto Legislativo; Semana, Policia Militar. 22. Carling, 2004, Emigration, Return, 120 (based on the findings of: Boyle, P., KH Halfacree, and V. Robinson. 1998. Exploring Contemporary Migration. Longman: Harlow; and King, R. 2000. Generalizations from the History of Return Migration. In Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?, ed. B. Ghosh, 7-55. Geneva: IOM). 23. Carling, Return Reluctance, 6-8. 43 of his informants who states that "those emigrants, they already have a pension. [...]

Then they receive their money just sitting down around here. Their own money, just sitting down." He adds that "[s]uch statements are uttered with respect more than with envy, since these migrants' achievements are very much in line with 'the Cape Verdean dream' if there is such a thing."24

Almost a decade after this statement was made it can perhaps be qualified by adding the new factors currently at play. Although Cape Verde has never been a "cheap" country in which to live, due to its insular condition and import dependency, it has become considerably more expensive with the growth of the tourist industry and the arrival of European residents over the last few years. Not only are Cape Verdeans who have always resided in the islands having to cope with higher inflation, often absurdly priced real estate and inflated commodities, utilities, telecommunications, and air travel prices, but returning migrants have to deal with the same reality. Whereas life continues to be hard and expensive—perhaps more so today—for those who never left, for Cape

Verdeans who have been away for 25-30 years and very likely seldom returned throughout those years, the new reality comes as a shock. While a European pension might, as Carling suggests, have been enough to open a small business and live modestly but comfortably in retirement before,25 I oppose that the new circumstances today render that money insufficient to survive, or at least not in the same conditions. One might, thus, assume a degree of disappointment and resentment toward Europeans, who are often perceived as driving prices upwards. This approximates a similar sounding sentiment and

24. Ibid., 8. 25. Carling, Emigration, Return, 121. 44 grievance that can be overheard in Mindelo during the summer months, when holidaying migrants with demanding consumption habits drive prices significantly up, and depleting many of the commodities and resources that are usually enough to go around.

I suggest that the mixed feelings for holidaying migrants that observed in resident

Cape Verdeans during the summer season could likely be transposed to what returnees might experience towards Europeans, and duplicated among sectors of the population, including the traditional urban elites. T. Bentley Duncan proposes "long exposure to international influences has given some of the islanders, particularly the upper classes in the port towns, a certain cosmopolitanism that is sometimes so culturally deep-rooted as to be almost instinctive and unconscious."26 Suddenly, these elites, used to hold the social and economic upper hand in their communities, are vastly out-moneyed and simultaneously bypassed as points of reference and influence, although they often have alternative resources not available to the middle classes. The latter are left to compete for the same goods and services but find themselves increasingly out-of-pocket... or out of stock.27 Such conditions, I propose, are an idiosyncratic example of Cape Verde's social complexity and inherently insular character, although there are certainly others 28

26. Duncan, Atlantic Islands, 5. 27. In a country where goods have to be shipped in, produce is often simply unavailable. Thus, eggs will typically run out just before Christmas, when many emigrants come back on holiday, and many other products disappear from the shelves weeks at a time. Specific examples out of Mindelo include local complaints that the island has to go without fresh fruit/vegetables off-season, when there is hardly enough to go around (shipments prioritize Praia, and only then go elsewhere); or the unavailability of fresh tuna and sword-fish—local favourites—from the city's fish market, as restaurants, hotels, and frequent visitors with local networks pre-order whatever little stock is available. The extent of these apparently minor grievances should not be underestimated, particularly when multiplies by the number of products and services affected, and the frustrating frequency of such events. 28. Zooming in on one of the exceptional groups that make up this complex reality, Carling's category of "empty-handed returnees" includes deported Cape Verdeans—a few hundred first- and second- generation individuals returned to the country on convictions of illegal immigration or drug-related crimes. 45 Of mandjakos, chines and bronks

Although the return of retired migrants offers an interesting behavioural parallel to this study, its main focus is the ongoing relationship between Cape Verdeans and continental

African immigrants, and how it is re-shaping the socio-economic landscape. I suggest that this particular binomial is significantly different from other relationships (with

Chinese, European, or other migrants) in the sense that it goes to the root of

Capeverdeanness and what who Cape Verdeans are.29

Importantly, the phenomenon of international migration towards Cape Verde is relatively recent, and only starting to be addressed by the authorities with specific policies and public debate. Precise data on foreign citizens residing in Cape Verde, however, is presently difficult to obtain, partly because the information is not yet covered by a publicly available national statistical system, but also because at any time there is likely to be a significant variation in the number of individuals in the country irregularly, who would have outstayed their legal permanence, or that would be semi-temporary residents, leaving every few months. This data is further skewed by the amount of foreign passports circulating among Cape Verdeans.

Social relationships are uneasy, among other things because rumours are rife that some of them are involved in the violent criminality, which increasingly plagues Cape Verde's largest cities. Identity is also a matter of contention, as many of them were either born overseas or emigrated as young children. They do not necessarily hold a foreign citizenship, but neither do they have sufficient command of Kriolu or Portuguese to facilitate integration. Yet, the old local mantra nos ku nos—transmitting a degree of mutual help within the community—ensures that at least the minimum support exists for them. 29. The three Kriolu terms used in the subheading are often utilized to refer to continental Africans, Chinese and European, respectively. The racialized word "Bronte simply translates as "white," and "Chines" as "Chinese"—although the more pejorative "Chinoka" ("Chin") is also used. "Mandjako," on the other hand, is the name of a West African ethnic group, generalized in Cape Verde to include anyone looking dark enough to be continental (or "too dark" to be thought of as Cape Verdean). 46

Indicator 2000 2005 2010

Estimated number of international migrants at mid-year 10,375 11,183 12,053

Estimated number of refugees at mid-year 0 0 0

Population at mid-year (thousands) 439 477 513

Estimated number of female migrants at mid-year 5,229 5,637 6,075

Estimated number of male migrants at mid-year 5,146 5,546 5,978

International migrants as a percentage of the population 2.4 2.3 2.4

Female migrants as a percentage of all international migrants 50.4 50.4 50.4

Refugees as a percentage of international migrants 0.0 0.0 0.0

Table 1: Estimated international migrant population (Source: United Nations)30

New data might become available after the 2010 Census, currently being prepared following updated methodologies and extended public information policies. Meanwhile, official numbers put the number of legal international residents at 12,053 (Table 1). This number, representing 2.4 per cent of the country's population, seems rather low.31

Considering the difficulties of measurement listed above, and the admitted permeability of the Cape Verdean borders, it is very unlikely that between 1990 and 2010—a period in which the local economy grew consistently32—only an additional 2,000 people moved into the country (up from 8,93133) in spite of empirical and circumstantial evidence that strongly suggests otherwise. The Chinese community, for example, barely existed in the

30. UN-ESA, Trends in International Migrant Stock. 31. Retrieving reliable statistical information on migration is a reportedly complex task requiring permanent methodological fine-tuning not yet practiced in Cape Verde—although the National Statistical Institute (INE) appears to be progressing in long strides. However, it is not always in the best interest of states to reveal exact numbers on issues that might be seen as problematic. In this respect, see, for example, Poulain and Perrin, Can UN Migration 32. See progress between the objectives/achievements presented in 1994 and 2008, respectively: Silvestre, Rota da Internacionalizaqao\ EIU, Country Profile. 33. UN-ESA, Trends in International Migrant Stock. 47 early 1990s, but boomed in the middle of the decade, spreading across the archipelago.34

Mainland Africans are free to enter the Cape Verdean territory legally for short stays, if they hold a valid passport issued by a member state of either the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Community of Portuguese Language Countries

(CPLP).35 Europeans, on the other hand, do not have major concerns with entry and permanence. As tourists, they can easily purchase a visa upon arrival; as temporary residents they are allowed to be in the country for six months. Those that file for permanent residence find the bureaucratic process slow and punishing, which might help explain the anecdotal evidence suggesting that many of the semi-permanent residents regularly outstay their temporary visas while waiting for permanent documents, or delay the renewal of these to avoid the inevitably Kafka-esque procedures.36

Lacking official statistics with exact data, one might be tempted to rely on empirically impressionistic perceptions from all major urban or cosmopolitan spaces in the islands, including Praia (the capital) and Santiago's hinterland, Mindelo, Sal,

Boavista, and, to a lesser extent, Santo Antao and Sao Filipe in Fogo. While in the early

1990s it was nearly impossible to detect the presence of any significant foreign communities outside Praia, by 2006 the presence of Africans, Europeans, Chinese, and

34. Haugen and Carling, Edge of Chinese Diaspora, 640-641. 35. CPLP includes Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Timor Lorosa'e and Brazil. Portugal is only partially compliant with the free movement agreements, in compliance with its own obligations as a member state in the Schengen Agreement. 36. Several European interviewees gave such accounts based on personal and second hand experience. References to these episodes have also been obtained in a variety of informal conversations. While not constituting factual information, the fact that the state cannot keep pace with individuals who, rather than actively attempting to subvert its authority, are most likely just negligent, suggests an ultimate lack of bureaucratic capacity to deal with individuals who actively set out with illegal objectives. In light of this, determining the number of foreigners seems impossible. 48 others was conspicuous. Communities of Europeans are now found in all major cities and towns, and even in the most remote corners of the mountainous island of Santo Antao.37

In Sal and Boavista, two islands with relatively few inhabitants but extensive tourist infrastructure, the permanent or seasonal communities of Europeans account for a large slice of the local population. Chinese stores (the baihuo38) are conspicuous in any mid- sized town. Most importantly, the continental African population has soared to unknown, but large, numbers. In Santiago, where people are often darker-skinned, and the pulse of the city tends to be "more African" than anywhere else, this distinction is not always evident but has started to create social friction. In other islands African migrants are more easily detected. In Boavista, for instance, the number of African migrants (legal and illegal) is unknown and seen locally as a serious social problem—an issue to which I return in the following chapter.

Others sources also seem to suggest that numbers are likely to be much higher than the government cares to admit. According to a recent media report citing Guinean sources, there are an "estimated 6,000 Bissauans39 in Cape Verde, and possibly a similar number of Senegalese."40 Believing this report, the two communities alone would account for the number of migrants the Cape Verdean government officially assumes.

Speculatively, the real figure could be twice as high. On a revealing twist, a more recent decree regularizing the status of Bissauan migrants in Cape Verde lead to the tacit

37. Many invested in small businesses servicing the island's booming eco-tourism industry. 38. Haugen and Carling, Edge of Chinese Diaspora, 646. 39. Guinea-Bissau was one of Portugal's earliest colonies and, as such, has an intrinsically tight connection to Cape Verde's slaving economy. 40. See Semana, Guine Bissau Consulado (20/04/2009). 49 admission by the Government that their number might be in the region of 10,000—or about 2 percent of the population.41 This number is, on its own, close to the official number of foreigners legally residing in Cape Verde.

Morabeza and "tcheu sabura": how tranquillity sells the brand

A clarification on how and why migrants are arriving to the Cape Verde islands is necessary. This should, however, be considered in light of the fundamental fact that the resilience of Cape Verdean migratory traditions is maintained at this point, in spite of the increasing barriers to their circulation. The World Bank Development Indicators database registered a net loss of 12,000 Cape Verdeans in 2000, and of 13,000 in 2005,42 whereas

INE registered the total loss of 1,327 inhabitants in 2009 43 It is fair to assume that the difficulty in controlling the absolute number of entries in the country extends to counting the number of departing nationals. The number of departures is, thus, as likely to be a low official projection as is the number of immigrants likely to be high. The Population

Reference Bureau (PRB) estimates that the Cape Verdean resident population will reach

682,000 by 2025, and 778,000 by 2050. These figures are easily justified with a fertility rate well above replacement, improved health conditions, and lower infant mortality 44

The projections, however, do not appear to consider two essential variables: a gradual

41. Semana, Cidadaos Guineenses (22/03/2010). 42. World Bank, Development Indicators Database. 43. INE, Base Dados Estatisticas Oficiais. 44. PRB. Data by Geography. 50 stoppage in the number of Cape Verdeans historically leaving the islands, because of improving economic conditions as well an harsher immigration prospects, and Cape

Verde's own growing attractiveness as a final or intermediate migrant destination.

Of course, Cape Verde's history has never been solely one of departure.

Foreigners have been part of the national fabric from the early colonial days. As in other contexts, the type of migrants varied greatly over time, and although, again, exact numbers are scarce, the migrants probably ranged from Cuban and Angolan in the post- independence period, to Lebanese,45 and Senegalese merchant pioneers immediately after, as well as residual populations from every corner of the dismantled Portuguese

Overseas.46 Although many Portuguese with double allegiances or fluid Cape Verdean-

Portuguese identities remained after 1975, it was not until after the 1991 election that the new climate of economic liberalization and the pro-business atmosphere attracted a significant number of Europeans: at first adventurous tourists, then investors, and eventually mass tourists in search of the newest "untouched" warmwater island.

Initially, investors and tourists arrived from Portugal,47 but were very soon followed by others: Spanish, due to the proximity to the Canaries and a small migrant community in Galiza promoting the destination; Italian, exploring historical connections with Sal and Boavista, and bypassing the northern European markets that had saturated other islands; French, whose interest spanned from the huge cultural capital of a sizeable

45. Cohen, Global Diasporas, 83-103. See especially Table 4.3 on page 99 (The Lebanese diaspora by country of residence): 200,000 Lebanese are estimated to live in West Africa, many of which now dual citizens (although the number in Cape Verde is minimal, there are some). 46. Ultramar Portugues, in the original (including Goans, mostly via Mozambique. 47. The Portuguese parastatal conglomerate Grupo Caixa Geral de Depositos was among the earliest large-scale investors. See, for example, Silvestre, Rota da Internacionalizagao. 51 Cape Verdean community in Paris, including musical icons such as Cesaria Evora; and

Dutch and German, who sought off-the-beaten-track adventurous high-mountain thrills in

Santo Antao or Fogo. By 2005 the country's reputation had grown across continental

Europe, finally reaching the mass market in the United Kingdom when a national travel industry award identified Cape Verde "as one of the few safe and secure holiday destinations in Africa [...] located closely enough to Europe to sustain charter tourism," and dubbing it an up-and-coming holiday and second home destination. A number of business missions resulted in significant English, Irish, and Scottish capital being invested in multiple real estate projects in several islands.48 Although the holiday property market boomed, fuelling the Cape Verdean economy and attracting large quantities of African workers, it remains to be seen how the industry will recover from the 2009 economic crisis that depleted the portfolio of buyers.49

Chinese migrants, who may be part of a forthcoming Chinese merchant diaspora in West Africa, also discovered the barren Cape Verde islands as a destination that

"offered a rare combination of political stability, security, high price levels and relatively high purchasing power."50 Although ship crews from China, Japan, and Korea have been stopping in the islands since the 1980s, it was only in the mid-1990s that the Chinese community boomed, reaching an estimated 200-300 migrants by 2005, where there had been only a handful in the early to mid-1990s.51 Conceivably, and judging by the exponential increase in Chinese business ventures in the main cities, at present this

48. AfrolNews, Tourism Boom Fuels Cape Verde (05/05/2005) 49. AfrolNews, African Property Boom Drying Up (09/10/2009). 50. Carling and Akesson, Mobility at Heart of Nation, 22. 51. Haugen and Carling, Edge of Chinese Diaspora, 640. 52 number has probably doubled. Initially involved in importing cheap Chinese goods and selling them in a network of small stores, Chinese investment has now picked up pace and branched out to other activities,52 as China classified several regions in Africa— including Cape Verde—as one of six strategic economic areas overseas. Albeit still small, the Chinese community is now Cape Verde's main visible minority and has had interesting impacts on the relationships between self and other, as well as in the domestic sphere, now widespread with Chinese consumer goods adapted to Cape Verdean preferences. Although the cultural differences are substantial, J0rgen Carling and Lisa

Akesson found "remarkable similarities between the contexts of emigrants in Cape Verde and in the region of Zheijiang from which the majority of Chinese immigrants come."

Most notably, there seems to be an overlap between the "migration ideology in Cape

Verde" and the Chinese notion of "qiaoziang [i.e. overseas Chinese area] consciousness."

In both cases, the authors argue, the "discourse about place and belonging presents the local area as special by virtue of its active linkages with the wider world."53

Despite the impact that thousands of Chinese and Europeans have on the local economy, no group of migrants affects day-to-day life in the islands more than mainland

Africans. However inchoate, deriving from several ethnicities and countries, not only are they the largest combination and most visible sets of communities, they also tend to concentrate in urban areas where unemployment is rampant. The Nigerian demographer

52. This gradual move towards larger investments in Africa starting with smaller experiments follows the model proposed by Alden, China in Africa, 37-58. 53. Carling and Akesson, Mobility at Heart of Nation, 23. 53 Aderanti Adepoju54 describes increasing xenophobia across the continent, with undocumented migrants becoming "scapegoats in periods of economic recession [...] accused of stealing jobs from nationals [and] stigmatized as criminals." In the Cape

Verdean context, Carling and Akesson note the concerns voiced by Julio Correia, former

Minister of Interior in a PAIC V Government,55 that "Cape Verdeans may become a minority in the archipelago."56 It is obviously far from being the case, it has nonetheless resonated with public opinion and generated a discourse on identity politics among certain political sectors. Carling and Akesson note, for example, that this statement came from a PAICV politician, historically a party founded on and receptive to ideals of pan-

African solidarity and brotherhood.57

As noted earlier, African nationals carrying passports from ECOWAS or CPLP member states do not require a visa to enter Cape Verde. Yet, generally speaking, they are expected to provide sufficient (discretionary) proof of having enough funds to sustain themselves for the length of their stay. Migrants arriving from mainland Africa rarely have this money readily available, particularly as Cape Verde is considerably more expensive than its neighbours. The temptation to enter the country irregularly thus increases. As word on Cape Verde's quality of life and booming economy made its way

54. Adepoju, Changing Configurations of Migrations. 55. PAICV is affiliated with the Socialist International and has strived to strike a balance between its early social projects (between independence and 1990) and the liberalization of the economy that has spread poverty and imposed new social and economic problems, but was also responsible for the only glimmer of economic light Cape Verde has seen in over a century. 56. Carling and Akesson, Mobility at Heart of Nation, 20. 57.Ibid., 22. 54 to the mainland a fair number of legal and illegal migrants started to arrive.58 Some decided to stay, but many more use the islands as a platform to reach more desirable destinations, particularly Spain.

Over the last two decades Europe's and America's circumstances and stance clearly changed, first with an asylum-phobia throughout the 1990s and, after the 9/11 attacks, with the speedy restriction of migration. In the old continent this took the shape of what has been dubbed as "fortress Europe."59 Although 9/11 resulted in stronger border controls in most traditional immigration countries, legal immigration frameworks have changed also as a response to ever-increasing numbers of illegal arrivals. Martin

Baldwin-Edwards, at the Mediterranean Migration Observatory in Athens, argues that the complexity of the migratory circumstances along the southern coasts of Europe has been compounded by three major factors: the opening of the Balkans to illegal migratory routes after the fall of the Wall; the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta in the EU; and the difficult balance that Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece have had to find between the adoption of stricter immigration and territorial controls, and "their economic attractiveness to migrants and general bureaucratic incapacity to regulate efficiently."60

These factors have decisively influenced migrant routes from Sub-Saharan Africa to

Europe (Figure 4). Severe migrant crises in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco (2005) and

58. Papademetriou, Global Struggle with Illegal Migration. The author discusses the inexact nature of any such measurements, between estimates, "guesstimates" and rough approximations, between innocent short term immigration infractions that statistical systems ignore and those that they cannot capture without tools especially tweaked to do so. He categorizes illegal migrants in four main types: undocumented/unauthorized entrants; individuals who are inspected upon entry into another state, but gain admission by using fraudulent documents; violators of the duration of a visa; violators of the terms and conditions of a visa. All these categories can be found in Cape Verde. 59. Castles and Miller, Age of Migration, 106. 60. Baldwin-Edwards, Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migrations. 55 in the Canary Islands (2006), followed by episodes off the coast of Malta, Italy, and

Cyprus made abundantly clear that the migratory pressure was not about to contract, and

European countries reacted vehemently—particularly Italy, where illegal immigration is now criminally punished. These events, and the dramatic images of boats loaded with cadavers that filled TV screens around the world, did not go unnoticed in Cape Verde, to where illegal immigrants were now re-routing.

In the last decade, both Spain and Portugal also enacted more robust immigration

Figure 4: Trans-Saharan Migration Routes (Source: Original by Nuala Cowen, George Washington University, reprinted by courtesy of MPI, © MPI2006-2010)61

61. De Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration. 56 legislation, stricter maritime border controls, and punitive legal frameworks to return

migrants to their points of departure.62 In 2006, a coalition of European nations initiated

regular patrols in Cape Verde's sovereign maritime space in an attempt to curb the rising

number of migrants crossing from Senegal or Mauritania to the country, or directly to the

Canary Islands, and from there to continental Europe.

The highly symbolic Operation STEADFAST JAGUAR, under the auspices of a

new partnership with NATO, and a looming special partnership with the EU gathered an

unprecedented number of military forces in Cape Verde.63 Human smuggling64 to the

islands has possibly decreased following this development but so has the possibility for

migrants already "trapped" in Cape Verde to depart. Carling and Akesson suggest that

there are basically three possibilities for entering Europe illegally from Cape Verde. First it is possible to go as a stowaway on a commercial ship headed for Europe [...]. Second, it is possible to pay the crew of commercial ships or yachts to be taken to Europe with their knowledge [...]. Finally, there have been smuggling operations in which substantial numbers of people are taken to the Canary Islands on ships that are used only for this purpose.65

As all three of these possibilities seem to have been severely limited by the processes just

described, where many migrants now linger for years in sub-standard conditions,66 as has

been the case in other transitional sites in Northern Africa or in Calais, France. In Cape

62. Ortega Perez, Spain: Forging Immigration Policy; Malheiros, Portugal Seeks Balance. 63. Approximately 7,000 soldiers and dozens of vessels, which was—very significantly—the largest troop contingent to set foot in Cape Verde since World War II. 64. Laczko, Human Trafficking Data. The author defines smuggling as the "procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, or the illegal entry of a person into a State [...] of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident." As per the UN's Protocol to prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, Protocol to Prevent Trafficking), and for the purposes of this paper, '"[trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion [...]." People smuggling, rather than human trafficking, is assumed to be the prevalent situation in Cape Verde. 65. Carling and Akesson, Mobility at Heart of Nation, 20. 66. On "transit" migrants turned residents see, for example, De Haas, Irregular Migration, 19-20. 57 Verde a sadly notable location is the informal township of Barraca,67 in Boavista Island, quite possibly one of the country's largest African settlements.

Proposing a framework for integration and interaction

In spite of the fact that absolute numbers on legal and illegal migrants are hard to obtain

(in Cape Verde as elsewhere68), perhaps it may be productive to step back from these limitations and observe the phenomenon from a statistical standpoint, in order to gain a better comparative understanding of the social landscape. The probabilistic framework I am proposing is, thus, admittedly based on a combination of partial statistical information, empirical observation, and soft data from different sources and time periods.

This data is surely stronger for some issues than for others, but sufficiently compelling to put forward a tentative model. It does not constitute any type of definitive conclusion on the subject, rather it intends to open up the debate on an issue that has not been adequately explored in this context.

The model will require further proofing pending the availability of hard data, whether absolute numbers or feasible and methodologically sound statistical projections.

Considering the attention both the Cape Verdean government and the EU are now affording to the issue of immigration, greater precision is expected from the extensive

Population Census 2010, with results available later in the year.

67. Barraca literally means "shanty house." 68. Papademetriou, Global Struggle with Illegal Migration. 58 My model (see figure 5) proposes that there is a correlation between occupation, or stereotyped occupation, of migrants, their nationality/ethnicity and the level of acceptance, interaction, and tolerance of migrants in Cape Verdean society. The central part of the chart indicates the history of the community in Cape Verde, its main

(perceived) occupation(s) and the relative social level associated with a profession. The column on the right indicates different levels of integration in the Cape Verdean social fabric. This is a fluid position, variable across community, and even within each of them—as there are always individuals who do not fit a model, and must, therefore, be assumed as the exception that confirms the rule.

Following this model, some patterns are noticeable: migrants from smaller communities, and communities that have arrived earlier, or over a long period of time, tend to be well integrated; ethnicity does not seem to be a deterrent, although there appears to be an exception in the case of continental African migrants. Still, newcomers with a professional status or substantial capital might be directly inducted into higher levels of acceptance. Education can, in fact, trump race, following the old precepts of

"black" and "white," which in Cape Verde have more to do with class than race. Those coming from Portuguese-speaking nations appear to have facilitated access to a "fast- track" process of integration. Hence, Angolans (despite their ethnicity) are fairly well integrated. Conversely, other African migrants—with a cautious exception for

Bissauans—generally have less personal contact with Cape Verdeans beyond the simple interaction in a commercial setting. This establishes an interesting continuum between their ethnicity and the petty occupations many take up while waiting for an opportunity to •9

OSTRACISM, SEGREGATION LnTLE, Mo INTERACTION o WIDESPREAD iMTiRACTIOM ^ACCEPTANCE, INTEGRATION

Figure 5: Tentative model of inclusion/exclusion: (1) perceived professional activity, ethnicity and class; (2) level of integration in Cape Verdean society (2010). 60 leave toward Europe.

Models based on interaction and occupation are not new, but have not—to my knowledge—been applied to the Cape Verde case study. John W. Berry discusses social and psychological acculturation and the different manners in which a group of newcomers negotiate their inclusion following the nature of the migrant community's relationship with the host community (this he calls "acculturation strategies").69 More recently, Dennis Cordell discussed the paradoxes of the incorporation of Nigerians in the

US, resorting to a list of descriptors that include status, education, income and employment as relevant in the process of social exclusion.

While Berry selects a vocabulary related to "acculturation stress," Alejandro

Portes70 refers to categories of "hostile," "non-hostile" or "poorly integrated interaction" and Tony Richmond attempts a similar diagram of incorporation in Global Apartheid.71

Richmond proposes an operational model of migration and occupational status, building

72 on John Porter's earlier work on immigrants in post-World War II Canada, where he proposes the categories of "behavioural assimilation" and "structural assimilation," speaking of a correlation between ethnicity, entrance status, occupational roles and segregation. My model, instead, puts forward a tentative vocabulary that might be more suitable to the Cape Verdean case: acceptance/integration; widespread interaction; limited interaction; no interaction/ostracism. I will return to it in the next chapter.

69. Berry, Acculturation Living Successfully, 1-7; Berry, Immigrant Acculturation, 2-5. 70. Portes, Economic Sociology of Immigration, 1-39. 71. Richmond, Global Apartheid, 117 (model on page 120). 72. Porter, Vertical Mosaic, 29-103, see esp. 68-91. 61

Chapter 5: Processes of arrival, interaction, and differentiation

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there are currently several transitional processes well underway in Cape Verde, setting the archipelago at the heart of some of the most prominent contemporary migratory dynamics. Although many of the changes hold considerable sway over local livelihoods and life styles, John Connell notes that, as in other islands, in Cape Verde "a culture of migration has evolved where migration is anticipated and expected, and [is] pervasive, based on historical precedents, and accepted as an appropriate and legitimate means to economic and social well-being [being also] neither rupture nor continuity with island experiences, but an integral and normative part of life."1 Although they are debated and performed as legal novelties, obstacles to emigration are not in essence new phenomena, rather contemporary manifestations of historic barriers always associated with the process of departure.

It is unsurprising that several among the ten most prominent global migration issues, reviewed in 2005 by the Migration Information Source (MIS), neatly illustrate the challenges faced by the islands over the last decade, in both emigration and immigration.

The MIS reports major changes in US and EU immigration policies, as fundamental shifts in global migratory flows, insofar as it limits the corridors available to many migrants,

1. Connell, Island Migration, 461. 62 namely Cape Verdeans, making international movement more complex. Although these factors contribute to increase migration pressure in the islands, one would inevitably note that it is among the issues pertaining to immigration to Cape Verde that the most significant phenomena posited by MIS can be placed. Chronologically speaking, the first problem affecting the islands is the severity of policy changes in most of Europe, but also the lack of consensus among EU member states. The realization by middlemen and migrants themselves that different countries have distinct approaches in a number of areas has resulted in an increased number of attempts to reach Spain via the Canaries, rather than attempting riskier crossings to hardliners Italy and France. This is not only because the conditions in targeted European countries vary, but possibly also because conditions vary in intermediary countries as well. If sudden policy changes occur that force migrants to wait longer for the opportunity to cross, a place like Cape Verde is a better choice of limbo than is Libya, where, despite a stronger economy, the authorities have not been generally lenient toward undocumented migrants. Asylum seekers, for instance, would have a better chance of making it to Europe via Cape Verde than via

Libya these days—the obstacles in the Mediterranean now include an Italian Navy unwilling to let boats with irregular migrants even dock in Italian territory.3 The second issue is that, despite broader controls along the entire external border of the Schengen

Space, the motivation of migrants is still stronger than the dangers involved. This has

2. Namely: asylum processing and granting; treatment of and benefits for undocumented migrants; policies regarding capture and repatriation—taken to the extreme by Italy; penalties for human smuggling; and the criminalization of illegal immigration. 3. Berlusconi's Italy was not the only country to make an unprecedented move that defies international conventions. Australia has resorted to similar practices to keep refugees away from its coast. See, for example, Rundle, Calm Before Immigration Storm. 63 resulted in more frequent and desperate attempts to cross in overcrowded rickety boats that often wash ashore with dramatic stories of extortion and death. Finally, MIS points out the increasing challenges to immigrant integration, notably where migrants from substantially different cultures are involved4—a subject I will return to later in this chapter.

This global process of securitization modified the migratory landscape beyond recognition, enforcing an "involuntary immobility" for many. The departure conundrum described and eternalized in popular lore in early-twentieth century Cape Verdean literature as "wanting to stay but having to leave (or wanting to leave but having to stay)"5 by default may be about to end. If, as Carling suggests in different articles, Cape

Verde is reaching "the end of emigration," and if we are to also account for the persistence of private emigration projects despite the unwelcoming international scene, then it is indeed foreseeable that the migration pressure might increase in the country..

This has the potential to generate social and economic tension in a context where the available resources are already scarce, and in which there will be more people disputing them—both Cape Verdeans and newcomers. Any inbuilt racial by-product would more likely be a secondary issue in a context that is centrally of an economic nature.

In this chapter I argue that the unenthusiastic reception given to mainland African migrants (and, in a different manner, to Europeans), or their portrayal as the unwanted

Other, is partly a by-product of the migratory pressure caused by the tensions just described. This reception suggests a set of considerations about the character of

4. MPI, Top 10 Migration Issues. 5. In the original: "Querer ficar mas ter quepartir (ou querer partir mas ter que ficar)." 64 boundaries, relationships at the boundaries, citizenship and membership, gentrification, and hybridity. In the context of these multifaceted and inherently changing concepts, it is important to analyse the ongoing processes and discourses of arrival, social interaction and differentiation since they will amplify and illustrate the relationships between Cape

Verdean identity, current economic challenges and migration pressure.

The integrated expat and the disconnected migrant

As per the integration model proposed in the previous chapter, the extent to which the interaction between Cape Verdeans and new settlers is practised appears to have substantial variations. I suggest that many of the variations are connected to economics, the use of social networks, identity, and perceived social status. There are, however, some paradoxical aspects of racial discourse that are striking when considering the

"mythology" of Cape Verde's supposed colour blindness and racial equality. Germano

Almeida's statement that "the issue of skin colour ha[s] very early on lost its social significance in Cape Verde"6 deserves some reflection, as it might appear to be particularly out of place amid contemporary negative discourses on African immigration and blackness, in spite of a pervasive view of Cape Verde as a "country whose island location and external orientation have made it an open and open-minded society."7

6. Almeida, Viagem pela Histdria, 55-56. 7. Meyns, Cape Verde African Exception, 160. 65 Almeida's description of early Cape Verdean society as "miscegenated, if not completely in skin colour, at least in its various cultural expressions,"8 glosses over the fact that many of the historical references he uses in his argument are interpreted without adequate consideration for the vaguely paternalistic nature of old accounts, apparently complimentary about Cape Verde's cultural syncretism, yet racist most of the time— which is the case of Black and White Makes Brown, by Welsh writer Archibald Llyall.9

While Almeida makes a valid argument when he says that race was bypassed early on as a fundamental marker in Cape Verdean society, I would suggest that it continued to, and indeed still does play a strong role in every single process of integration and interaction, even when economic factors and identity politics likely take precedence.

The "fluidity and contingency of ethnic identification finds expression in several ways—in the selection of markers of identity; the salience, meaning, and application of markers; the definition of boundaries; and the meaning of identity, ambivalence, and multiple identity," notes Jan Nederveen Pieterse.10 At the heart of this debate are complex issues of boundaries and belonging. On the one hand, Cape Verde is a nation whose identity is largely exogenous to its limited geography, whilst internally other identity challenges escalate with the landing of every outsider; on the other hand, the factors that increasingly limit Cape Verdeans' own ability to move away are in stark contrast with the unhindered arrival of Europeans (and hyphenated-Cape Verdeans), or the seemingly uncontrolled crossing of the country's border by mainland Africans, thus accentuating the

8. Almeida, Viagempela Historia, 55. 9. Archibald Lyall wrote one of the first extensive English language accounts of Cape Verde in the twentieth century: Llyall, Black White Brown. 10. Nederveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture, 48. 66 islands' already intense migration pressure. Over the next decade, presumably, we will see a return to guest worker programs in Europe, and possibly a pattern of circular migration evolving from the current paradigm.11

Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi describes the border as human boundary predicaments "that divide and territorialize space [and] are political and contested, because they inevitably order and structure social relations [as] practices and discourses

[that] are the medium where the consciousness of state sovereignty, of 'we' as an abstract community, and the relations with the Other are created and reproduced."12 Cape Verde's

Atlantic border is not only a condition of its geography but also a remote space of transition and contact, "in the sense that borders can become transformed into the frontiers (in the most positive sense of the term) where people or groups who have traditionally kept themselves distant [...] make the first attempts at contact and interaction."13 Thus, this interaction with newcomers happens from the moment of arrival, just as is the case when Cape Verdeans move abroad. Although the process of integration starts at that primary moment, it does not immediately extend to further processes of membership and belonging. Newman reminds us that, "our belonging to cosmopolitan social and cultural groups is increasingly becoming hybrid."14 However, I argue that this fluidity of identities is not quite so apparent when set against the superimposing factors of race and economics, which often test any sense of belonging and further test the local society's wish and ability to integrate minorities, or to allocate

11. See, for example: Newland, Agunias and Terraza, Learning by Doing, 3-12. 12. Paasi, Re-construction of Borders. 13. Newman, Lines that Continue to Separate us, 150. 14. Ibid., p. 150. 67 membership rights to them. This appears particularly true in periods and spaces of transition.

The reason why "some countries turn most of their settlers into ethnic minorities, while others marginalize only far more limited groups," claim Stephen Castles and Mark

Miller, lies not "primarily in the characteristics of the migrants, but rather in the histories, ideologies and structures of the societies concerned."15 The second case corresponds, I argue, to a reality in which the unresolved inheritance of colonial and post-colonial bias, and an ingrained ideology of hybridity,16 are consciously (or unconsciously) manipulated to safeguard a sense of local integrity, and which supposedly preclude locals from being seen as exclusive, while in fact practising exclusion—in this case, of Africans. This worrying idiosyncrasy in Cape Verdean identity can be traced back to its ambivalence, following an identity grammar proposed by Homi Bhabha.

Exclusion, however, does not prevent foreigners from entering the country— either legally or illegally— and thereafter asserting their own identities, engaging in a fluid re-negotiation of what becomes an ongoing hybridization of themselves and of

Capeverdeanness. Once in the islands, the integration process is already underway, and

Cecil Foster's notes that

[e]ach time an immigrant arrives [...] at least two things happen: [first] [s]he seeks to re-open and even restructure the compact that is the existing social order. Consensus, no matter how long it had taken to achieve, is threatened. And if there are many of them and the state is truly democratic, the new arrivals should be able to undo, rewrite, to change the constitution and the social order, [immigration means the story that is the national identity will always be in flux, unstable and of a version unbelievable for some. Second, the immigrant revitalizes older communities within the state by daily reinserting them into a Diaspora of some kind, so that links with a motherland or fatherland that might atrophy with time are constantly renewed and re- freshened. By atrophy I am talking about what happens when [...] immigrants go back [...] and

15. Castles and Miller, Age of Migration, 242. 16. Marcelino, Postcolonial Identity, Transition, 56-62. 68

find that [they] do not quite know the latest—the codes and behaviours have moved on in [their] absence. So through immigration, [national identity] is always in the state of becoming [and] the

culture statewide is never settled.17

At this stage, it is necessary to consider the substantial differences in types of migration landing in Cape Verde. According to Carling and Haugen, the Chinese, who almost exclusively arrive as merchants and investors, at this moment hold a special position in the national ethnoscape, as "people [...] hold a strikingly positive view on immigration from China." They go on to delineate two factors: firstly, the positive change effected in daily life by the appearance of small-scale Chinese baihuo stocked with low-cost goods; and, secondly, the "absence of negative consequences of Chinese immigration for the majority of the population."18 Interestingly, there appears to be an unconscious sympathy for the Chinese and their entrepreneurial habits, to such an extent that they might have started to be seen as a "model minority," a term that describes the position of the Chinese community in the US, where "they raised themselves up by their bootstraps, in contrast to "non-achieving" minorities like the African [...]."19 This attitude is certainly in tune with the overall benevolence with which Chinese entrepreneurs are seen across Africa, as suggested by Deborah Brautigam, among others.20

A small group of Lebanese merchants have also made their way to Cape Verde.

This group appears to be typically accepted as an integral part of the country's urban society, possibly as a result of several decades of interaction. Generally speaking,

17. Foster, Racial Democracy and Official Multiculturalism. 18. Carling and Haugen, Mixed Fates of Popular Minority, 328-329. 19. Ong, Edge of Empires, 763-764. 20. Brautigam, Close Enconters: Chinese Business. 69 "Lebanese businessmen in West Africa [...] hail from different regions and

denominations within Lebanon. Although they belong to a nationality different from that

of the host country, their social and economic competition need not be among Lebanese

and still less likely on an "ethnic" basis."21

A handful of Koreans and Portuguese-speaking Goans involved in other

commercial ventures have mostly been in the country long enough to represent an

unproblematic slice of its varied ethnic landscape. The majority of Brazilians, Cubans,

and Angolans possibly entered the country carrying significant social and financial

capital, often being involved in business, educational, medical, or technical cooperation

activities. They seem to be either generally accepted or otherwise insignificant in the

overall count of migrants. I shall, thus, leave all these groups aside and focus instead

solely on the more prominent interactions of Cape Verdeans with Africans and

Europeans. Within these two groups there are certainly different incoming patterns worth

distinguishing, not all of which constitute immigration. Europeans, for instance, started to

arrive (or return) a few years after independence, and had an exponential increase in the

mid-1990s, as Cape Verde's economy took off to what appeared to be a future promising

growth in the real estate and tourism services market. By 2009, hundreds had moved

from all over Europe to every island, with particularly large settlements living in the

country's two main cities—Praia and Mindelo—and in the mass tourism destinations of

Sal and Boavista. Not necessarily the largest local minorities, they are, however, the most influential, and are perceived as the wealthiest. Although their individual level of

21. Nederveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multicultural, 69. 70 acceptance by, and interaction with, Cape Verdeans varies with each case, a degree of integration is granted by their social and economic position, or even by their status as a

"European foreigner," about whom people are at least curious. In cities like Mindelo, it is fairly easy for a European to establish a network of relationships, at least superficially.

Many Europeans acquired second homes routinely used for one or two seasons every year. Although they, too, became part of the new Cape Verdean ethnoscape, they are simply seasonal sojourners and cannot be considered immigrants. Unless there is a personal contact or local knowledge of individual routines, locals do not necessarily know if these residents live in the country permanently. Besides, in cities like Mindelo coming and going is such a natural part of daily life that not seeing someone for years and still assuming the person was somewhere is nothing out of the ordinary.22 As with the previous group, they are seen as leading an affluent existence encompassing attractive living arrangements—often in privileged locations— as well as an enviable amount of dolce far niente and many a sunset pontche sipped at the beach bar.

Africans live a profoundly different reality. Castles and Miller refer to the dynamics of migration and settlement as extending over time from economic migration by "target-earners" to a return home possibly followed by longer sojourns in the destination country 23 In wealthier nations, where higher income opportunities are available for immigrants, this process could result in families moving in with the primary

22. The Kriolu Soncent greeting "dias-ha urn k'oiobeT ("I haven't seen you in days!") neatly expresses this reality. The phrase is often used to address someone whom one has not, literally, seen in several days; but is equally used for someone who has been absent for weeks, months, or even years. The greeting is uttered with the same excitement, almost inviting the other party to inform of his/her whereabouts that justify an absence. The conversation then seems to continue almost as if a long absence did not alter the reality of the relationship. In Cape Verde, absence is routine. 23. Castles and Miller, Age of Migration, 30-31. 71 migrants, and eventually in a greater tendency towards permanent settlement.24 This is, however, not the case in Cape Verde, where unemployment is high and opportunities for unskilled labourers rare,25 and where the average West African migrant really intends to make it out to Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Benelux, or Germany, and in some cases from there to the US, particularly as news of racist behaviour in Europe reaches their shores—killings in Moscow, beatings in Germany or Greece, racist attacks and anti- immigrant demonstration in Italy and Spain, not to mention governments that have taken a ferociously xenophobic stance on immigration.26

These motivations are not always evident for Cape Verdeans, many of whom not unreasonably believe African immigrants are in the country to stay. Many migrants do indeed end up staying for want of a better alternative; but for most the islands are simply a point of transhipment leading to an assumed better life further afield. The nomenclature applied to this group of migrants by the state and quickly appropriated by the media and the citizens, easily establishing who is in and who is out, and demonstrating how clearly it is in the state's power to attribute immigration and membership rights.27 Robin Cohen questions the significance of labels such as "immigrants, guest workers, illegals, refugees, asylum-seekers, expatriates and settlers," and states "that although there are

24. Less sympathetic family reunion legislation is now leading to a new phenomenon— marriages of convenience—as an alternative to enter the EU or the US legally. 25. A notable exception was the real estate boom in Sal and Boavista (mostly fuelled by the construction of mega-developments for the European second home markets), which employed large proportions of mainland African workers over the last decade. However, with the downfall of the global economy and the domino effect of the subprime mortgage crisis leading to the collapse of the real estate markets in the UK and in Spain, boom soon turned to bust. Hundreds of migrants employed in construction projects that are now abandoned quickly found themselves unemployed, ostracized, and regarded as a nuisance. 26. Adepoju, Changing Configurations of Africa. 27. As posited by Michael Walzer and further analysed by Linda Bosniak (see Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, 50-53). 72 considerable similarities between international migrants of all types, the modern state has sought to differentiate the various people under its sway by including some in the body politic and according them full civic and social rights, while seeking to exclude others."28

From the analysis above, it is clear that African migrants occupy the lowest relative position in Cape Verde, being often referred to as clandestinos (clandestine) or ilegais

9Q

(illegal), assumptions that presume this to be the case for all continentals.

Cohen defines particular subgroups within the nation: what he calls "citizens" might be, in the case of Cape Verde, either established immigrants or convention refugees—for which the examples of Lebanese and Cuban, respectively, could be given.

Cohen's "denizens" might then roughly correspond to holders of dual citizenship—either foreigners who acquired a Cape Verdean passport, or hyphenated-Cape Verdeans—and the rare asylum applicants and special entrants. The category of "helots" might finally include illegal entrants, undocumented workers, asylum-seekers, overstayers, and project- tied unskilled workers, which encompasses the realities of the vast majority of mainland

African migrants in the country.30

Under Cohen's categorization, most of these migrants—but, significantly, not others—fall under the "helot" denomination, regardless of the existence of the three framework agreements between Cape Verde and the other ECOWAS member states, asserting their mutual citizens the right to enter, get settled, and establish themselves in

28. Cohen, Migration and its Enemies, 149. 29. Throughout this paper I make undifferentiated usage of the normative denomination illegal, irregular, and of my preferred descriptor, undocumented. 30. Ibid., 150-153. 73 the country.31 Clearly, this places Cape Verde between multiple decision-making centres—an issue to which I shall return in Chapter 7. Denomination is, thus, central to a policy of inclusion or exclusion, as illustrated in the strong language of a comment posted online by an angry reader of Cape Verde's main weekly newspaper:

I wonder if he is guilty only because he is an African black, an immigrant [...]. And why is it that we call immigrant to a black man from another African country [...] whereas when speaking about a white person [...] we'll say koperanti [development worker], foreigner, researcher, Portuguese, Spanish, but never immigrant.32

As with many other subjects, immigration and the nature of Cape Verdean identity as a member of a community of African nations have also become deeply divisive issues. Partisanship is felt along political fault lines, but also along social and racial lines, and differs between islands, as well as between rural and urban communities.

As elsewhere, integrating the Other is anything but a peaceful process.

31. ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to Free Movement. This was followed by amendments reinforcing specific stipulations of the protocol in 1985, 1986, 1989 and 1990. 32. Comment posted online by a reader nicknamed "Djuntamon Afrikanu" (literally "African Unity") on April 1st, 2009 following two articles published on the same day: Pina, Imigrante Serra Leoa (01/04/2009); and Pina, Atropelou San9a Gomes (01/04/2009). N.B.: In the first article an immigrant from Sierra Leone blows the whistle on an unlawful detention and alleged aggression at the International Airport of Praia where he had been apprehended with an illegal amount of undeclared funds. The criminal police officers would have proceeded to unlawfully "relieve" him of the funds. The second article reported a controversial hit-and-run in Sal Island, in which a Portuguese expat working as a civil engineer at one of the island's real estate developments killed an esteemed member of the community while DUI. The driver was convicted to a brief prison term with suspended sentence. Although the media did not appear to exploit either of the cases, readers posted a barrage of comments clearly connecting them and implying that the country was favouring white residents whilst racial profiling and criminalizing mainland Africans. Many more, however, gave in to the stereotype that an African arrested with some money must somehow be involved in drug trafficking. 74 The archipelago as an extension of the European jigsaw

Undeniably, the story of African immigration to Cape Verde is bound by radical policy changes imposed remotely and unilaterally from decision centres in Washington,

Brussels, Rome, Paris, Lisbon, or Madrid. The ratification of the Schengen Agreement, a border convention that enables freedom of movement within and in between the member states, by removing systematic border controls, while enforcing stricter rules in external border, obliged member states to restrict the entrance of certain foreign nationals, and to consult with their peers before accepting others within the common space. The mechanisms later proposed and ratified under Schengen III predict the "continued harmonization on issues such as the management of visa policy [and] immigration policy

(on both legal and irregular immigration)."33

One of the precepts of Schengen was the mandate for joint patrols of vulnerable external borders, namely maritime, to an extent never before practised. The strengthening of these borders had a strong impact on the vast territorial waters bathing Portuguese and

Spanish insular possessions off the African coast, around the EU's Mediterranean islands, and along its extensive northern Mediterranean coast. A fleet supplied by a coalition of four European countries now regularly patrols territorial Cape Verdean waters, up to 12 nautical miles offshore. The close military co-operation following the 2007 special partnership agreement between Cape Verde and the EU is not dissimilar to ad hoc agreements signed with the Libyan Republic, and intending to neutralize the growing

33. Gelatt, Schengen and Free Movement. 75 human disaster of precarious boats taking off from Libya's northern coast to attempt the crossing. Libya's co-operation resulted "in a partial westward shift of Trans-Saharan migration routes" towards the Maghreb, particularly to Morocco.34 Proving that migrants across Africa are reasonably aware of, and up-to-date on, shifting immigration policies,

"intensified patrolling in the Strait of Gibraltar" lead to a gradual re-routing southwards, while further down "an increasing number of West African migrants circumvent the

Saharan migration routes by sailing from the Mauritanian, Cape Verdean, Senegalese and other [coasts]" to the Canaries.

The above evidence demonstrates not only the versatility but also the interconnectedness and reactive immediacy of migratory dynamics. Although a complete change in patterns and routes probably takes several years to accomplish, the effects of policy shifts usually start to trickle down fairly soon after implementation. There is, thus, a quasi-permanent disconnection between policy-making and the reactions among migrant networks, who try to adapt as quickly as possible, but may need time and repeated experiments to ascertain the extent to which the changes affect them. In this manner, the perception of Libya's recent falling out with Switzerland,35 and consequent halt in its co-operation with Italy's immigration authorities may predictably open a temporary window for east- and northwards redistribution and rebalancing of all Saharan routes, although the ultimate goal is still setting out to sea. Writing about migrants attempting desperate boat crossings in Asia, Donald Carter affirms that

34. De Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration. 35. The interruption of Libya's relationship with Switzerland follows the referendum that banned minarets in the country's mosques, and has consequences for fellow Schengen members—especially Italy—who this time seem reluctant to jeopardize such a pivotal partnership, erratic as it may be. In this respect, see for example: WSJ, Libyan Leader Calls for Jihad (26/02/2010). 76

[o]ne of the most haunting images of the late twentieth century has to be that of the tiny, wave- tossed crafts of the so-called 'boat people' [...] cast out in the seas in the least seaworthy of vessels, subjected to pirates, violation and violations of the body and spirit, [and] providing] us with emblematic forms of desperation and human tragedy, both in popular culture and in the world of expert or scholarly discourse. Such powerful images define the contours of the popular imaginary of forced dispersal, dramatic changes of state/status and the seeming powerlessness of the victims in process.36

The imagery is imposing, and indeed applicable to a diversity of other geographical contexts,37 but it also denies migrants their own agency. As we have seen earlier, and in spite of portrayals put forward by policy makers and media alike, a clear distinction between human trafficking and human smuggling—as seen earlier—must be made. Although at one stage or another most migrants do require the services of smugglers for logistically challenging sections of their travel, "the vast majority migrate on their own initiative,"38 and are far from being simply "scruffy, dirty victims," instead •JQ being active agents in the attempted change of their socio-economic condition. Cape

Verde lies further away from the final destination countries than does, say, Malta. Still, the islands are increasingly the safest option, particularly when aggressive "interception- at-sea" tactics are now being utilized by Italy's coastal guard, which, under direct orders from Silvio Berlusconi's government, has systematically turned away precarious boats with dozens of people aboard, in direct contravention of the "strong and ancient code that

36. Carter, Preface New African Diasporas, xvi. 37. Most prominently from Cuba and Haiti to Florida, and along the Mediterranean shores. 38. De Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration. The author notes that, in research conducted by the Moroccan scholar Mehdi Lahlou, Morocco-Spain and Libya-Italy crossings for Anglophone or Francophone sub-Saharan African adults ranged from roughly US$800 to US$1200 in 2003. Allowing for price hikes based on time gone by and the increased dangers of the crossing, a Senegal-Cape Verde fee possibly averages US$1000-US1500 today. 39. Rotschild, 77 binds seafarers" and dictates going "to the aid of those in danger."40 Yet, as we have also

seen, the political atmosphere has begun to change. Although boats are typically not forced to return when found in Cape Verdean jurisdiction—now a more frequent occurrence—the authorities have been observing a consistent policy of returning passengers to their countries of origin if that information is available 41 Pablo Cernadas suggests European agency on the subject is closely connected to this policy, not always respecting the rules that would apply in Europe.42

The ghettos of difference, illegality, and (not much) understanding

Stopping undocumented immigration in Cape Verde will not be an easier task— or cheaper, for that matter—than in Europe, even when new resources are regularly added to the arsenal accessible to the state.43 For Cape Verde, as for Europe, however, it is a fundamental predicament. Using the case study of Mali, Sally Findley proposes that disenfranchised citizens are "buffeted by internal and external forces that propel—or

40. Newland, Troubled Waters. 41. See for example: Expresso das Ilhas, Emigrantes clandestinos de Pedra de Lume (09/10/2008); Semana, Cumprido o Periodo de Quarentena; Expresso das Ilhas, Dez Senegaleses Repatriados Ontem (10/06/2010 "Dez senegaleses foram repatriados ontem". In many cases, however, migrants attempting the crossing by boat dispose of papers or do not carry them at all, making the task of repatriation nearly impossible, except in the case of A>;o/«/Portuguese-speaking Bissauans. Unlike European nations, Cape Verde has no stick, and seldom any carrots to offer to its African neighbours in exchange for their cooperation in this process 42. Cernadas, European Migration Control, 3-11. 43. See for example the new English and Irish frigates initiating commissions under Cape Verdean jurisdiction, and in coordination with the EU's Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (MAOC-N), based in Lisbon: Expresso das Ilhas, Patrulhamento dos Mares de Cabo Vede (03/03/2010) passa a ser feito com apoio da Royal Navy e Royal Fleet Auxiliary. 78 compel—migration [...] underpin[ed] [by] economic factors." She goes on to establish that in the dynamic migratory puzzle that constitutes West Africa, it is evident that

Malians, like others, will continue to move abroad insofar as possible to avoid social and military conflict or utter economic despondency.44 Adama Konseiga notes that "several authors find in intra-African migration flows the base and the engine for the regional integration process 45 This probably is the case in most of the ECOWAS member states, whose internal migratory flows in every direction have a solid history 46 Given the internally controversial membership of Cape Verde, this is possibly not the case there, particularly noting the crucial difference that sizeable African migration to the islands did not initiate until the mid-1990s.

At this juncture, Cape Verdean society is deeply divided between the pan-African ideals of solidarity and the (understandable) apprehension, or even fear, about the growing number of African migrants arriving on its shores with little more than their entrepreneurship and the will to succeed. Although the powerful imagery of rickety boats loaded with many frightened, exhausted gazes is pervasive in local popular discourse, this is certainly not the only, and possibly not the most common, method of accessing the islands. Boats have been intercepted or known to arrive in Sal, Boavista, and Maio islands (the closest to the continent), while others are reported to have landed in Sao

Vicente—the transit hub for migrants attempting their luck in reaching the Canaries— and, more recently, in larger, inaccessible, and recessed Santo Antao.

44. Findley, Mali: Seeking Opportunity Abroad. 45. Konseiga, New Patterns of Migration in West Africa, 23. 46. Ibid, 29 (see esp. table 1). 79 The desperation and bravery of these acts does not go unnoticed by the average

Cape Verdean. In almost every interview conducted in Mindelo, Cape Verdeans of both genders, young and old, employed and unemployed, showed an understanding for the reasons that lead African migrants to seek the islands, as epitomized in this statement:

"Their countries are in constant disarray, and that's why they come to Cape Verde. We're not rich, but at least life is tranquil here." Yet, as Africans follow the same internal migration routes as Cape Verdeans do (figure 6), the pressures inevitably fall on the same few locations. In the following chapter I will review the key integration and exclusion dynamics of these islands.

Meanwhile, in Boavista—where paradisiacal luxury hotels and affluent residential developments are surrounded by pristine sand dunes peppered with date trees—the dire consequences are visible. Once paraded as the country's pearl, Boavista today boasts one of the highest costs of living in the country fuelled by its tourism industry, beginning to exhibit "unexpected" symptoms of social conflict. Nowhere in the archipelago is the disparity between rich and poor as shocking as in this large and sparsely populated island.

Almost every African who has landed, directly or indirectly, in Boavista ended up segregated in the outlying shantytown of Barraca. Official estimates put the local population at over 3,000 in 2008, and growing daily. The realistic number was thought to be closer to 4,000-4,500,47 mostly African migrants of undefined provenance, and islanders from Santiago 48 In February 2010 a study ordered by the Ministry of Housing

47. Based on popular commentary. There was an official count of shacks in this shantytown (more than a thousand), but new ones are put up every day, and it is unknown how many people are sharing. 48. Frederico, Destaque: Barraca Passada a Pente Fino (21/11/2008). 80

Santo Antao Mrrrce o is Pre ma..*? hub for Aft. can migrants, mjr.y of which arriving by fcoat.Reeerrty . fo'kwtng increased pciicing in Sao Vicente, evidence about landings in the remote shores of Santo Antao have been reported.

Multiple landings in Sal and Boairsta. Those seized by the authorises have been deponed amid media elation.

Major Urban Area (Major) Agricultural Island (Major) Tourist DeKination Majw Deep Water Pert Major international Airport Upcoming Radar Station (in cooperation with Spa;n) >; Leve? of Income (High. Med,. Low) ^ Nat Aver. = US$3,742 per capita Net im/migrant serater Net irWmigraflJ receiver West African myants depart from Mauritania and Senegal in IUpdated map based on the 20D2 fcckety boats. Zodiacs or. (ess often. chart of iMernaf miration, sn fishing trailers and cargo ships. Alias de Cabo Verde. Dragceiro. com, a personal webs-re by Estimated prices range from USS500 Jorpen Carting on Cape Verte. - US$2,000. depending on crossing, Additional infomtaston compiled patrolling activity and vessel type. from current statistical data, media reports and research on interna! and external migration. © Pedro Jose-Marcelino. 2010.

Figure 6: Internal migration flows as compared to (legal and illegal) immigrant arrivals, economic activity per island, and approximate income/price level per island/region. and Territorial Planning (MHOT) to the Cape Verdean consultancy AfroSondagem and

LNEC, the Portuguese Laboratory for Civil Engineering, revealed that the number of inhabitants is probably just around 2,800.49 The community is rife with unemployment, malnourishment, infectious diseases, alcoholism, drug abuse, and drug trafficking, as well as petty and violent criminality. Worryingly, and predictably, as the economic crisis

49. Frederico, Estudo Desmistifica Barraca (26/02/2010). 81 settles in, violent criminality50 is overflowing from the boundaries of this isolated ghetto to the islands' main urban centre, Sal-Rei, "risking spoiling Boavista's positive image and damaging its tourism potential."51 While municipal authorities confess to not having the capability to resolve this urban time bomb—a flagship case for immigration mismanagement—much of the public discourse on Barraca to date seems to revolve around negative projections to the exterior rather than focus on integration and exclusion processes. AfroSondagem confirmed many of these problems and recommended possible solutions that include the demolition or re-qualification of the neighbourhood. LNEC's brief included recommendations on the process of eradication of sub par housing. The

MHOT has yet to state what the new direction of Boavista will be. For the time being, the dire situation of Barraca eerily resembles that of many Cape Verdeans in Portugal in the early 1980s, an anathema of despair and destitution.

In Sal the tensions are apparent. Local merchants and hoteliers state that street sellers harass tourists to the point of exhaustion, and accuse them of establishing a "bad reputation" for the resort island and drastically reducing the return rate 53 Although there is an imposing presence of mainlanders in Santa Maria, the island's sleepy main town, some of the accusations are not only unfounded, but may constitute scapegoating. The troubles of Sal may have been compounded by the global economic crisis, more so than in any other island. Gigantic mixed-use real estate projects lie half-abandoned across the

50. Assault, and robbery or, as the combination of the two is known locally, cago-body—from the English phrase "cash or body." Rape is also on the rise. 51. Ibid., 4. 52. Frederico, Estudo Desmistifica Barraca (26/02/2010). 53. See for example: Conde, Comerciantes do Sal Descontentes (08/07/2008); Expresso das Ilhas, Sal Assedio e Inseguran?a (02/09/2009). 82 islands like concrete ghosts waiting for the real estate market to take off again, and leaving hundreds of migrants now unemployed.54 But Sal's economic woes most likely lie in its own development model: basic, unoriginal resort tourism that appears to be in decline, just as Boavista—a prettier, wilder island with an edge—ascends to a similar, and higher quality, position, while Fogo, Santo Antao, and Sao Vicente are increasingly cementing a reputation for high quality, diversified tourism alternatives, namely sports and adventure travel, rural and mountain tourism, cultural immersion tourism,

"solidarity" tourism, or eco-tourism, among other initiatives. It does not help Sal's case that most business traffic was diverted to the capital once the second international airport was built there.

It is a waiting game. While it is true that hundreds of migrants were left unemployed by halted construction sites, and some possibly thickened the ranks of street vendors and other petty businesses, it is highly unlikely that Africans are generally to blame for any of Sal's development planning—or lack thereof. This is particularly the case when, up until July 2009, the authorities vehemently denied that the crisis had reached Sal or Cape Verde, or that it was going to 55 Yet, in the words of Amartya Sen,

"[a]mong its manifold effects, unemployment contributes to the "social exclusion" of some groups."56 The convenience and exclusion of the African Other as a conduit to venting social and economic frustration is, thus, evident. This is especially true when

54. Semana, Crise Paralisa Empreendimentos (29/05/2010), 1-4. 55. For better or worse, it is worth noticing that the reports on social disruption rarely appear on media outlets currently closer to the government. While the publication of such reports in Expresso das Ilhas and A Nagao could be seen as an attempt to generate contention, one cannot help but wonder why the silence of A Semana—more sympathetic to PAICV—on this prominent debate. 56. Sen, Development as Freedom, 20-21. On general benefits and losses from immigration, see also: Somerville and Sumption, Immigration andLabout Market. 83 considering that "the space between the bashing of other [...] cultures and deeply conservative self-praise has not been filled with edifying analysis or discussion,"57 notably a consequent public debate on immigration, the generation of an immigration policy and its wider development implications— although there are early proponents of this dialogue 58

What the extreme cases of Boavista or Sal illustrate is the increasing prominence, as it were, of a set of concerns pertaining to border controls, gentrification, immigration, and local responses to changes in immigration policy along political and economic cycles. As members of a nation in which migration is at the centre of social life, arguably every Cape Verdean is well aware of the predicaments it entails. They realize that other states are increasingly controlling their borders, and wonder why Cape Verde's remain so vulnerable when they themselves cannot travel as freely as they wish, elsewhere in the world. Local newspaper articles mentioning African migrants in any context are routinely tagged with comments from vehement readers urging the government to opt out of

ECOWAS, or at least out of the border protocols. With a PAICV government in place, this is a very unlikely scenario, but Cape Verdeans wonder if there will be at least a semblance of a national immigration policy to regulate their inflows any time soon. On the other hand, one might also wonder about the growing indicators of economic segregation within the country, with scarce resources—such as prime land—being

57. Extrapolated from a different political and geographical context, in Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, 328. 58. Carvalho, Imigrantes: o que Nao Sabemos?, 9 (20/08/2009); Expresso das Ilhas, Cabo verde: Destino de Emigra9ao, 13 (09/09/2009). 84 allocated to wealthy foreigners, usually Europeans,59 or to Cape Verdeans living overseas. Cape Verdeans have tended to respond passively to these challenges, but the likely amplification of these events is bound to meet some resistance. While increasing and repeated contacts at the border are typically a step toward integration, it might ironically be the lack of border regulations, by transmitting the idea that nothing is being done to reduce migrant intakes, which dictates the prevalence of intolerance rather than acceptance of migrants.

This chapter clarifies some of the dynamics of differentiation, acceptance, and segregation suggested in the integration model in chapter 4. It is apparent that, while the

(perceived) occupation of certain individuals and groups of migrants determines both the entry level and the degree of interaction with and integration in Cape Verdean society, these perceived occupations are determined by pre-conceived ideas of what specific groups of migrants might do, and how they might contribute to the economy. From the examples given above, it is evident that race and ethnicity play a role in establishing which migrants are supposed to be what, perhaps with the exception of Angolans and

Bissauans, following a grammar of cultural and linguistic proximity based on a common colonial past. Other African migrants, however, are assumed to occupy relatively low professional positions, thus dictating their migrant status. The following chapter focuses on the articulations of fear and ostracism that depart from this model.

59. Fonseca, Cabo Verde a Venda (part I); Fonseca, Cabo Verde a Venda (part II). 85

Chapter 6: Contending discourses of nationhood

In the previous chapter we analysed two examples of the ongoing ghettoization of continental African migrancy in Cape Verde, following multiple processes of gentrification, differentiation, and exclusion that, apparently, limit individuals' mental transition from self-declared "understanding" to "tolerance" or "acceptance."1 It is challenging to pinpoint where the feelings of Cape Verdeans about immigration truly lie without a wide-scope opinion survey. Still, based on the available data, is it possible to make the conjecture, after Arjun Appadurai, that the answer might lie somewhere between the two linked co-factors of globalization and the extreme resentment towards minorities? I argue that two elements within a common nexus might be added to this line of thought: the fear of dilution of identity, on the one hand, and the fear of socio- economic subalternization and loss, on the other. Appadurai notes that "majorities can always be mobilized to think that they are in danger of becoming minor (culturally or numerically) and to fear that minorities, conversely, can easily become major [...]."

1. This is clearly not a unique feature to Cape Verde, but one that is as relevant as it is prolific. See for example Min Sook Lee's El Contrato (www.nfb.ca/film/el_contrato), a 2003 short documentaiy on Mexican contract workers in Canada, where southern Ontario employers and residents employ similar vocabulary: "we understand that... but," or "I know they're human beings too, and not to be discriminatory or anything, but..." 86 The fear of dilution of identity is perhaps illustrated by this statement, but equally compounded by current events in southern Europe and within Cape Verde's own shores, where the occasional boatload of undocumented transit migrants moors, building on ideas of "invasion" of which locals came to be wary. At the other end of the spectrum, and consistent with Appadurai's idea that "globalization intensifies the possibility of this volatile morphing,"2 the fear of socio-economic loss is clearly intersected by multiple variables, namely the growing difficulty in emigrating from Cape Verde, associated with the global economic crisis and the general aggravation of the cost of living in the country.

Appadurai has perhaps captured it best when he implies that the root of the tension

has much to do with the strange inner reciprocity of the categories of "majority" and "minority" in liberal social thought, which produces what [he] califs] the anxiety of incompleteness. Numerical majorities can become predatory [...] with regard to small numbers precisely when some minorities (and their small numbers) remind these majorities of the small gap which lies between their condition as majorities and the horizon of an unsullied national whole, a pure and untainted national ethos.3

Perhaps there is, then, an ongoing dialogue between sociocultural and socio-economic factors, although the threat of raw xenophobia, and possibly even racism, cannot be discounted as contributors to this debate.4 Here we are reminded of the long-term effects on the overall fabric of a society of a type of colonialism that Ashis Nandy has claimed colonizes the mind,5 as well as spatiality, structures of inequality, and discrimination through forms of segregation. Claude Ake notes that

2. Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers, 83. 3.Ibid., 8. 4. Ultimately, this "colonial racism" could be a sad remnant of Cape Verde's past and its very prominent post-colonial present, as implied by Franz Fanon about the typical post-colony, albeit in another geographical context that shares a the post-colonial creolized subject with Cape Verde. See: Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90. On the issue of a migrant "invasion" or "flood," see De Haas, Irregular Migration. 5. Nandy, The Intimate Enemy, xi. 87

[i]t is one of the problems of the state-building project in multinational societies of Africa that in seeking to integrate it has instead produced disintegration," by creating a "multiplicity of interpretative communities which, despite their subordination to central power, remain sharply and consciously differentiated by their cognitive maps, political practice and political morality.6

It is arguably in this manner that the ghettos described in the previous chapter become as normalized as they are feared. The ghetto, wrote Albert Memmi, "is both a rejection and a reaction to rejections, real or imagined, by the others. The ghetto [...] supports and feeds the separation, but it is also its expression."7 In extreme cases fear gives way to the infamous suggestion that a form of segregation should be safeguarded, this is the case with the recently circulated idea that the shantytown of Barraca, in

Boavista, ought to be fenced off—allegedly following suggestions of the residents themselves.8 Memmi, however, pointed out long ago that

the immigrant soon discovers that the ghetto is not the solution to his torment. The ghetto is a refuge, not a prison or confined space. He comes and goes for work, for amusement, for bureaucratic red tape. For better or worse he is forced to confront this outside world, which increasingly becomes a part of him.9

Thus, although African immigrants in Barraca (and elsewhere in the country) might find it "safer," or more comforting to remain secluded, contacting the external social realities cannot ultimately be avoided.

The web of economic struggles and identity questions hovering over Cape Verde involve the entire country, the diaspora, and beyond, in a debate about where it is going, who is leading it, what development paths to choose, and what pitfalls to avoid. This unconscious process (for most) of drafting a national project, poses pertinent questions

6. Ake, Democratization of Disempowerment, 72. 7. Albert Memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized, p. 84. 8. See, for example, Frederico, Barraca a Pente Fino, 4. 9. Memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized, 85. 88 about what is, at the core, an exercise in nation building. This concept is not understood here as the basic political construct of the nation—which Cape Verde accomplished culturally very early on, solidified in the early twentieth century and politicized after

1975. Rather, and to re-iterate, I understand nation building in this context an exercise in amalgamating multiple, simultaneous, and often competing images of a common future with generalized national support. Whether migrants are included or not in this project hangs in the balance.

This ambitious objective is common to young and not-so-young nations the world over, yet intensely elusive, considering the fluid nature of the current global system. In this chapter I explore the ways in which Cape Verde's quest for a consensual national future relies on a myriad of sub-debates between different agents, starting with the ad hoc inclusion/exclusion of non-national individuals, and the definition of whether diasporas are included in this group or not, whether political leaders and elites are conducting this process in the name of everyone else, whether everyone else is in on it, or even whether a consensual national project can actually be coined at all.

All African, but not so fast: contrasting voices of acceptance

A striking aspect of the social exclusion of African migrants in Cape Verde—that is, the lack of social interaction beyond the superficial contact engaged in while performing a commercial transaction, for example—is the cohabitation of two powerful, yet competing 89 views of the continent with equal pull in local society. Africa is seen by some Cape

Verdeans as the "black," perennially under-developed, even primitive continent, following a commonplace view held for centuries.10 On the opposite end, a degree of pan-African solidarity can be heard from voices in the media and on the streets. In a simplistic manner, perhaps, a rough line splitting the two camps follows the same rule of thumb as most other divisive issues in Cape Verdean society do: the partisan lines of politics in which PAICV—heir of the pan-African independence party—generally confronting the younger but influential MpD. Depending on the political sources, for instance, comments will either show a level of veneration for the "African brothers," or, at times, a level of disdain.11 In the past—and, I argue, also in the present—Cape

Verdeans asserted their own Africanness, only to react vehemently whenever outsiders designated them as "Africans" (usually perceived as a negative connotation comparing them to continentals),12 as celebrated by the jovial line "[n]ot all Africans are black; not all blacks are drunks; not all drunks are... white."13

Assembling a collection of ideas that expose the common perceptions of and/or suspicions about Africans is uncomplicated on the surface, yet revealing when underlying assumptions have been teased out. Three key issues stand out in interviews with Cape

Verdeans on possible reasons for these perceptions: language barriers; extreme cultural

10. Cordeiro, Nos Cabo-Verdianos, 124-126; Llyall, Black White Brown, 71. 11. Most prominently whenever the pejorative word mandjako is used to refer to all Africans. 12. Note that, historically, the proportional number of mixed race (mestigo), or assimilated (assimilado) Cape Verdeans was far superior to the number of such individuals in any of the other Portuguese colonies. Technically, Cape Verdeans were quasi-citizens of the Portuguese Overseas, while others were not. Again, the colonization of the mind seems to play a fundamental role. See for example Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, 32; or Madeira Lopes, Histdria Geral, volumes I-III. Similar examples are available for the nomenclature applied to Cape Verdeans in the American racialized system. 13. Cordeiro, Nos Cabo-Verdianos, 122, quoting Felix Monteiro. 90 differences; and the vast increase in urban criminality (particularly in Praia and Mindelo, but also, as noted before, in Boavista). These arguments can fairly simply be deconstructed. Firstly, although language is factually a barrier to communication with some Africans, many urban Cape Verdeans speak either enough French or English to ensure minimal exchanges happen. Moreover, the fact that a migrant learns the language of the host does not automatically open the doors for integration.14 Secondly, many cultural traits are not as profound as they seem to be—despite the proximity, they are new to most Cape Verdeans, which could account for the skewed perception. Finally, criminality rates are indeed rapidly increasing, but there seems not to be a direct correlation between crime and foreign population. Still, whenever the media runs a story on a drug bust involving an African, the discourse on online comment boards quickly veers towards the xenophobic, often ignoring the case at hand and generalizing to other cases and the African community at large.

It is more likely, I argue, that the dominant, agglutinating nature of a Creole culture that has assimilated and synthesized others in the past simply met in Africans an obstacle with which it cannot cope, that it cannot quite process in the way it was used to doing. Lacking recent experience in dealing with large migrant groups from Africa, Cape

Verdeans are at a loss, which may explain the difficulty in connecting. For centuries,

Africa's closeness has been one ocean away when compared to the close bonds connecting the islands to Europe and the US. In his opinion column in a national newspaper, the scholar Francisco Avelino Carvalho took the uncommon stance of

14. Shown in a South African case. See: Zodwa, Cultural and Ethnic Accommodation, 219-220. 91 exhorting fellow researchers and Cape Verdean authorities to investigate the diaspora community, because

the absence of knowledge and its public dissemination constitutes fertile ground for the appearance and solidification of prejudiced attitudes that may compromise the construction of social relationships between migrants and locals.15

I thus submit that overarching comments regarding Africans—in particular

Nigerians, but also Sierra Leoneans and Bissauans—can be best explained by the knowledge that there are Nigerian organized crime syndicates operating in West Africa, and the oft-expressed view that Nigerians landing in Cape Verde must therefore be involved with said crime syndicates. Guinea-Bissau, undergoing severe political turbulence, has reportedly been "taken over" by criminal gangs, and the aura of lawlessness and impunity that describes Sierra Leone may also be perceived as facilitating the participation in organized crime. Stephen Ellis recently traced the routes of narcotraffic in West Africa, shedding light on its mechanisms, and highlighting its hotspots.16 Another recent story featured in the Cape Verdean media involved a Malian woman and a detailed description of the system she utilized to import drugs, which drew a barrage of criticism. This type of coverage enthrals readers, but, I suggest, also greatly influences the way people view Africans overall, as the following pages will exemplify.

Since Senegal is the closest continental neighbour, and Bissau the old political ally in the independence struggle, unsurprisingly, Senegalese and Bissauans are by far the largest foreign communities in the country.17 Although those Senegalese is a phrase

15. Carvalho, Imigrantes, o que nao sabemos. 16. Ellis, West Africa's Drug Trade, 171-196. 17. Independence leader Amilcar Cabral was a Bissauan of Cape Verdean stock. 92 occasionally used to pejoratively refer to Africans in general, there seems to be a special acceptance reserved for Senegalese, particularly when compared with others:

I always said that we don't get much with Nigerians in our land. They do not work and only bring trouble. We should definitely revise the [protocol for the] free movement of people within ECOWAS. The best would be to sign a protocol with Guinea Bissau and Senegal, with whom we have a common past, and get rid of those Nigerians. Many of those circulating here today are citizens from Central and even East Africa.18

Another four readers commented that

[fifteen out of ten Nigerians living here are traffickers. We usually generalize and call the continental migrants Mandjakos, but the truth is that those Nigerians have nothing to do with the Bissauan or even the Senegalese. Those coming from Nigeria are here with the express intent of developing the powerful Nigerian mafia.19

[m]ost of the Nigerians living in Cape Verde do not work during the day and earn their life at night, thus in obscure dealings. They should be convicted for crimes committed in the country and then deported. They do not bring anything good.20

[a] woman from Mali, a man from Nigeria, others from Ghana, and elsewhere in ECOWAS, are caught every day in Cape Verde and taken to court for criminal acts. Is it not time to opt out of that treaty and forbid the entrance of these Muslim, criminal strangers [...]?21

if Nigerians [denounce criminal elements within their national community] they will all end up in jail. Amokaki denounces Ammuneke, Ammuneke denounces Yekkiki, Yekkiki denounces Amokaki and so on. We would need a (really) big jail for Nigerians alone.22

This somewhat reductive—if not outright pejorative—view of Nigerians is strikingly similar to the findings of a study conducted in South Africa, concluding that

those who have never interacted with them appeared to be full of negative assumptions and hatred. When asked if they think that immigrants are involved in crime, some said that immigrants are involved in drug-trafficking and prostitution. And one could hear people say, "Those Nigerians are involved in those dirty things-criminal activities.23

18. Reader Acut on online forum at www.asemanaonline.cv, following the publication of an article about two Nigerian citizens detained in Sal Island for dealing in crack (01/04/2009). 19. Reader Mandjako Criolo, Ibid. 20. Reader MLPB, Ibid. 21. Reader Miss Universo, on online forum at www.asemanaonline.cv, following the publication of an article about a Malian woman apprehended while trafficking cocaine (26/02/2010). 22. Reader CEDEAonde (roughly translated, "ECOWhat"), following an article on the arrest of Onochie Francis Obaziek for drug traffic, see Semana, Tribunal do Sal (10/03/2010). 23. Zodwa, Cultural and Ethnic Accommodation, 223. 93 The study goes on to explain, that

some of the immigrants and especially Nigerians were involved in drugs, but now all non-South Africans are considered as Nigerians, and as such are also victimized.24

These views, I believe, are based more on perceived cultural difference and broad generalizations of the propensity toward crime than on actual facts. Certainly, it would be unfair to assume that every Nigerian immigrant either is a trafficker, a sex worker, or both. Likewise, it would be naive to presume that drug crimes in Cape Verde are the exclusive domain of Nigerians, when there is evidence to the contrary.25 Still, the prevalence of media coverage portraying this specific national group as being involved in criminal activities appears to embolden both critics, and purely racist elements within

Cape Verdean society. In March 2010, at least three high profile cases hit the news, leaving behind a reinforced sense of identity and national security danger brought over by

Nigerians specifically.26 When, however, Nigerians are victims of crime, suspicion seems to replace the normal solidarity, as seen recently in the case of a Nigerian video store owner robbed by Cape Verdean youth delinquents in Sal:

How is it possible that a Nigerian has a video club with [about CA$500,000] in merchandise?27

Ha ha ha, thieves are already stealing from thieves.28

24. Ibid., 223. 25. In fact, many of the individuals arrested in recent years have been Sierra Leoan, Bissauan, Gambian, Ghanaian, and Malian. The involvement of Cape Verdeans, Brazilians and other South Americans, and the occasional European has also increased—as reported by the local media. 26. The conviction of Onochie Francis Obaziek for drug trafficking in Sal (see: Semana, Tribunal do Sal); the arrest of Okoly Onyekwelu, an alleged follower of Al-Qaeda (see: Semana, Suposto Terrorista); and the arrest in Luanda of Kizito Chizuba Mbanaza, an alleged Nigerian drug trafficker residing in Cape Verde (see: Semana, Traficante Nigeriano). One new fear associated with Nigerians and other continental migrants is, according to interviews, the fear of islamization, as demonstrated by strong reactions against a public Cape Verdean convert, Lenine Barbosa, a.k.a. Abdul Rachid, the son of a national MP (see: Liberal, Blog Cabo Verde Islamico). 27. Reader Escravo, following a robbery report: Semana, Santa Cruz Encapuzados (19/02/2010). 28. Reader Carvalho, Ibid. 94 Interestingly, though, Senegalese interviewees cautiously detached themselves from Nigerian migrants in their statements, claiming that they "look for confusion" and that Senegalese must not be seen to socialize with them. When asked about criminality among the African community, a male Senegalese interviewee in Mindelo vehemently stated "Senegalese are different from Nigerians."29 It is difficult to speculate on what comparative data from other geographical areas might show, but the scope of these comments suggests either genuinely similar assumptions about Nigerians by Senegalese, or simply an understanding and appropriation of the mistrust for Nigerians among Cape

Verdeans, which we might dub an eagerness to adapt and conform in the interest of self- preservation. I suggest it is probably both.

A middle-aged female interviewee who introduced herself as "one of the first

Senegalese in Cidade Velha" (Santiago) pointed out, that "Africans demonstrated, [they] were rude to the Government," and as a result "people [we]re angry at them." She did not condone the "criminal activities, rudeness and abuses of those Africans in the Plateau [the capital's Government district]," adding that they should behave in a country that is not theirs.30 "Mandjako e so fastentura," she sighed in conclusion—Africans are trouble. The reproduction of these tropes and the use of the word mandjako by members of a minority that objects having it used on itself31 speak to self-perceived levels of integration. In this case, not only did the interviewee live in Cidade Velha—a small town outside the capital,

29. The interview questions never mentioned specific nationalities or ethnic belongings. 30. A number of demonstrations for immigrant rights or against police abuse have been held in the Plateau in the past, allegedly organized by Nigerian and Bissauan community leaders—Nigerians, apparently, tend to be more vocal about their rights, whereas Bissauans have the logistical advantage of sharing both Cape Verdean languages. 31. Consistently, every Senegalese interviewee complained about being called mandjako.. 95 where everyone knows everyone—she had also settled into a pattern of circular migration that sustained her small scale commercial activity selling ethnic items in a site with growing cultural interest. She felt that she was part of the local social fabric, and claimed to be well integrated after six years in the country. Another interviewee in the same town square reacted joyfully when UNESCO awarded Cidade Velha the status of World

Heritage,32 and said that it was "a victory for us all, it's our common history."

A sense of belonging is apparent in these statements, bringing us back to the model of interaction, integration, and acceptance I proposed in Chapter 4. Senegalese, more so than other communities, seem to have adapted to the role of a trade diaspora, with the construction of circular ties, aided by geographical proximity, between Senegal and Cape Verde. These encourage a simultaneous co-dependency on the home country and the host country. Many among the Senegalese community—including most of the interviewees—take advantage of Cape Verde's insularity to import products that market a sort of Africanicity and, adapting it to local sensitivities (Capeverdeanness).33 This particular "diaspora externality" of overseas Senegalese, which is a type of high intensity transnationalism based on constant remittance flows, and on trade between host and source countries through the institution and strengthening of business networks.34 It is probably part of the reason why perceptions about Senegalese in Cape Verde are slightly more positive. Street merchants insistently trying to make a hard sell are sometimes

32. On 24 June 2009. 33. The process of adaptation of Senegalese through mimicry—copying and marketing cultural icons perceived as "African" locally—and the engagement in a "self-sustaining system of network linking ties of belonging, trade" and mutual help has been studied in other destinations of the Senegalese trade diaspora, namely in Italy. See: Riccio, More Trade Diaspora, 99; Stoller, Marketing Afrocentricity, 81. 34. To employ the term suggested by Adama Konseiga, see: Konseiga, Patterns of Migration, 28. 96 referred to as "annoying" —or "dark," if a racial category is involved. Yet, in none of the interviews held with Cape Verdeans were Senegalese singled out as criminals, despite that fact that a significant contingent of Senegalese can indeed be found among the national prison population. Thus, despite the reality on the ground, there is perhaps also some room for labelling that might be considered positive.

What the case above illustrates is the fact that pre-formatted ideas—positive and negative— about migrants are based on assumptions and perceptions rather than necessarily on reality. It is possible to infer that reactions to migrants, the level of interaction in daily life, and consequently the level of integration and eventual acceptance and membership,35 all directly at least associate, or even correlate with the professional activities Cape Verdeans suppose Africans and other foreigners to have. Thus,

Angolans—who tend to be educated and work in a business environment—are highly regarded and well integrated, while Bissauans—whose cultural proximity gives them credit with at least a section of Cape Verdean society—are referred to as "brothers" and prioritized as members of the foreign community. Similarly, although to some Senegalese may be seen as annoying, they are also thought to be "hardworking" members of society that simply want to "make a living." Nigerians, on the other hand, are branded as

"criminal" and "a threat to the country," while most other African nationalities are relegated to the reductive category of "mandjako."36 Integration is, thus, not only a

35. As limited by the government, see Bosniak, Citizen and Alien, 50-57. 36. Implying they are worthless, and that the country would be better off without them. 97 function of skin colour, education, and occupation, but also prominently connected to

perceptions of cultural proximity and, therefore, lack of cultural threat.37

Despite the worrying signs observed in this section, it should be noted that there is

some level of public debate about immigration in Cape Verde, and that not everyone holds negative opinions about migrant communities. Although some of the interviewees revealed ambiguous views about Africans,38 for each negative—often times bigoted— online comment in discussion forums there is usually a positive, polished, and well- drafted rebuttal from Cape Verdean citizens that would rather not see the country go in this direction, demonstrating the vitality and plurality of Cape Verdean public opinion.

The following are a few eloquent examples of this alternative discourse:

We need to reflect on Cape Verdeans' respect for and behaviour towards our continental brothers. In my opinion, yes, there is widespread racism here, many treat continental migrants as garbage, which clearly does not happen with European visitors or residents. Evidently, these people use the pretext that they are traffickers to justify acts of discrimination and calumny. Not all are traffickers, many are also normal, honest people. I am ashamed when I read news like this.39

Cape Verde is losing its place among African communities, [and] is in the list of African countries with racist and xenophobic behaviours. I don't like it. We have enough regionalism to go around here, with the good old separation between badius and sampadjudos40 that isn't going anywhere.

37. Note as African communities most highly regarded are either Portuguese-speaking (Angolans) or Kriolu-speaking (Bissauans), and/or geographically close (Senegalese). This policy of proximity is extended to Brazilians and Europeans, whose cultures form a substantial part of Cape Verde's own, whereas resistance starts to exist for any other communities, excepting the Chinese, for the reasons explained in chapter four. 38. The interviews included cross-referencing possibilities, requesting opinions in a number of contexts. In many cases, Cape Verdean interviewees stated sympathy for African migrants when asked directly, but later reverted to stereotypical statements about criminality and cultural differences, suggesting the prevalence of ambiguous feelings about immigration—between understanding and concern. 39. Reader Osvaldir Rodrigues, on online forum at www.asemanaonline.cv, following the publication of an article about a Sierra Leonean man detained at an international airport and allegedly assaulted and robbed by the criminal police, 1 April 2009. 40. Badius are the inhabitants of Santiago Island. The word's etymological origin seems to be the Portuguese "vadio," used to describe runaway slaves in the early times of colonization. Many of them settled in the high mountains and were freemen from very early on. Sampadjudos are the inhabitants from all other islands. Although the distinction is more of a regional rivalry nature it is impossible to ignore its racial underpinnings. Santiago inhabitants are in average much darker than elsewhere in the country (Cidade Velha was the continent's first European slave trade outpost), and said to "carry knifes," "liking a 98

With our African brothers, the reaction is of pure racism, and discrimination at the highest levels. We forget that we're all African, that we're all the poorest people on Earth, that we're only alive because of international aid and because we are received in other people's lands, particularly in the African continent—in Senegal, Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, etc. Down with discrimination and xenophobia in Cape Verde. Out with racists and xenophobes. Viva an African Cape Verde.41

Foreigners in Cape Verde must be counted [...], identified [and] remain in Cape Verde following the approval of immigration authorities [...]. If we start marginalizing foreign residents like this, we will aggravate the situation, as happens with foreigners in Portugal.42

It's high time Cape Verdean people stopped with these racist comments. Those of us who live abroad feel discrimination in our skin, [but] I am proud of my colour. You have no idea what is it like stopping to help an elderly person and sense they're worried they are going to get robbed. This is what is happening to our African brothers in Cape Verde [...]. Why would a people who suffer so much discrimination discriminate against its own brothers?43

What's this [behaviour] all about? Why assume that eveiy Nigerian is a trafficker? We should not be closing our eyes to what is in front of us. We have youth delinquents that need to be punished. Let's not pretend it's not there just because the victim is Nigerian and the perpetrator Cape Verdean.44

These statements raise a variety of issues that have been unpicked earlier: the

stereotypical association of some Africans with criminality and drug trafficking, the prejudiced vocabulary used to describe migrant communities, Cape Verde's own internal disputes, and its position as host when it still greatly depends on emigration. The last comment proposes, in fact, that the country needs an immigration policy—an issue hinted at in the previous chapter, and one to which I will return. The debate is ongoing, and very likely so for a long time to come.

fight," "having cuts in their faces," and being generally "noisy trouble makers." The dimensions of race may go beyond what Cape Verdeans are comfortably admitting, and clearly in opposition to the idea of "colour-blind hybridity." 41. Reader Jacinto Semedo, ibid.. 42. Reader Pedro Antonio, on online forum at www.asemanaonline.cv, following the publication of an article about two Nigerian citizens detained in Sal Island for dealing in crack, 1 April 2009. Note as all the positive comments are signed by readers identified with a full name, rather than an anonymous, sheltering nickname—as is generally the case with negative comments. 43. Reader Madil, following an article on a robbery in Sal, see: Semana, Santa Cruz Encapuzados (19/02/2010). 44. Reader Aramis, Ibid. 99 Most importantly, although African migrants are routinely apprehended for involvement in illegal activities, there is little indication that the incidence of such arrests is any higher than the average for Cape Verdean nationals. The worrying patterns of urban violence in Praia and Mindelo, for instance, appear to be mostly imputable to gangs of male Cape Verdean youth—known locally by the English term thugs—and are seemingly perceived as such by the general public. In some cases, often those involving more sophisticated (and violent) methods, the organized groups include youth repatriated from the US, the Netherlands or Portugal. The government has now earmarked this issue as a major security priority being handled directly by the Prime Minister's office.

Migrants are often singled out for their involvement in drug trafficking, people smuggling or selling pirated products, but the amount of Cape Verdeans arrested both in the islands and abroad in connection with this type of cases suggests that, while the main criminal networks might be based in the continent, there are probably as many Cape

Verdeans involved as there are African migrants. The isolation of the latter for their

"criminal associations," thus, constitutes blatant racial profiling and xenophobia by sectors of the public and the authorities. In the recent past, high profile cases of alleged police violence against migrants, both in international airports and in raids to residences and markets, resulted in loud demonstrations in the Plateau, Praia's government district, to which there seems to have been, however, little empathy by the public. Senegalese interviewees spoke of these events negatively, but in several conversations maintained with migrants from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, there was an apparent willingness to confront the authorities. Increasingly, migrants are organizing in 100 formal and informal networks to reinforce their positions and protest for injustice committed against them. In and of itself, this agency and public engagement might be understood as another indicator of permanence in the country.

Hybridity and gentrification: just another warmwater archipelago

The incertitude about whom to include in the current nation building process, and the urgency of strengthening Capeverdeanness in the face of globalization have Cape

Verdeans worried, more so in the islands most affected by mass tourism (Sal, Boavista), and in the cities most affected by African migration (Mindelo, Praia). These are, once again, the privileged hotspots for all manner of social change. In the former, the debate is between economic wellbeing and the dilution of national values in a sea of external influences. In the latter, most concerns seem to be about security, universal employment and general wellbeing. In the words of Bruce Baker, "[immigration is becoming a contentious issue as workers from West Africa enter the country and, according to popular opinion, work for lower rates than Cape Verdeans," noting also that half of all

Cape Verdeans agree that Africans bring "more problems than improvements to the country."45 Interviews held in Sao Vicente and Santiago seems to confirm this. He goes on to sum up the difficult balance between race, economic expectations, and social unrest:

45. Baker, Most Democratic Nation in Africa?, 493-511. 101

One economic expert interviewed noted that: "the economic expectations of the people are far behind our economic power." Their widespread travel and their contacts with emigrants makes them well aware of the standard of living of those in the West. Their educational levels have given them high expectations in terms of employment. Consequently, the government is under considerable pressure to provide or face the wrath of its frustrated body of citizens.46

Baker reinforces the idea that the rise of intolerance in Cape Verde is intimately connected with economic circumstances, more so than to race. In addition to being mostly undocumented, Africans are indisputably the poorest of all newcomers, and some would indeed appear to be involved in illegal activities, tempting Cape Verdeans to doubt their possible positive contribution to the local economy and society. This is in stark contrast with the privileged circumstances in which most Europeans arrive, and that catapults them into the higher echelons of integration, at least among a limited—more affluent—group of Cape Verdeans with whom they directly interact.47

Europeans, however, bring a different set of challenges to nation building. The real estate boom, for instance, has led to large portions of prime land being sold to foreign investors for the construction of gated communities and tourist resorts, at times through allegedly unlawful land seizure by the authorities. These properties—found on, or projected for almost every island—are owned, marketed, and sold mostly to foreigners, and sometimes to the diaspora, for a premium, which has pushed the prices of land and housing to levels untenable for average Cape Verdeans. This is not only the case with new constructions unaffordable to the middle class, but in some cases also extends

46. Ibid., 507. 47. This, in fact, has changed very little since 1967, when Frantz Fanon commented that "[m]any Europeans go to the colonies because it is possible for them to grow rich quickly there. [W]ith rare exceptions the colonial is a merchant, or rather a trafficker." This is, he added, what aroused in the autochthonous population the "feeling of inferiority."" See Frantz Fanon, White Skin, Black Masks, p. 108. 102 to the customary colonial-style housing used by many,48 and now also out of reach because it has been deemed "typical" and "picturesque" and can therefore be sold for a premium to someone coming from abroad. As a result, much of the prime real estate in places like Mindelo, Boavista and Sal is increasingly in the hands of foreigners or non- residents whose priority is the valuation of an investment. In Boavista, the need for these projects to be built led to the migration of a large number of continental Africans that eventually settled in Barraca.

A study on conflicts over space, or what has become known as "space wars," led by Eric Clark, and focused on a small archipelago off the coast of Sweden, notes that

"gentrification is an inherently conflict-ridden process" and that "real-estate agents know that the market for island properties is "hysterical." There is nothing extraordinary about the gentrification of the Cape Verde islands, as there was nothing extraordinary about the gentrification of these Swedish islands, or "many other islands around the world."49 It is, at the end of the day, part of an ongoing process that warm- and coldwater islands everywhere have undergone, are undergoing, or will undergo, in which paradises are discovered, occupied, developed, possibilities realized,50 but in which something is necessarily lost. When the economy goes wrong, the project is often abandoned—as was the case with mega-real estate projects in Sal and Sao Vicente hit hard by the global economic crisis and now standing empty and half-built until further notice. When a newer, more enthusing island is discovered, the previous is left to dwindle—and, in Cape

48. For example, Mindelo's colonial houses, known as caza ingles, or "English house," which are small but solid street-level constructions, painted with bright colours and often located in the inner city. 49. Clark et al, Island Gentrification Space Wars, 506. 50. Ibid., 506. 103 Verde, Sal has learned this lesson the hard way, first with the loss of its monopoly on transcontinental flights, and then with the dislocation of much of its tourist market to

Boavista, as seen earlier in this work.

"Gentrification of an area," Clark's study states, is "characterized by two outstanding features: a marked shift in occupancy upward in terms of class/socio- economic position, and, reinvestment in the built environment."51 A direct consequence is, thus, the forced displacement and exclusion of those who cannot afford the new spaces created in this process, being therefore relegated to the outskirts of the cities. In some

Cape Verdean islands, gentrification is arguably leading to fundamental space wars, encouraging corruption and creating a degree of animosity against foreign investors, seen as poaching every available property because they are the only ones who can afford them.52 What these two extremes expose, finally, is the type of racial, social—and developmental—ambivalence proposed by Bhabha, reaching far into the islands' past and dominating conflict and nation building dilemmas until today. Bhabha notes that:

with the projective past it [the post-colonial time lag] can be inscribed as a historical narrative of alterity that explores forms of social antagonism and contradiction that are not yet properly presented, cultural enunciations in the act of hybridity, in the process of translating and transvaluing cultural difference. The political space for such a social imaginary is that marked out [...] between emergent and residual practices of oppositionality.53

51. Ibid., 484. 52. The idea that Cape Verde is up for grabs has reached influential diaspora circles, and they are fighting back, accusing the Government of selling properties it does not own (see, for example: Liberal, EUA Grupo de Cidadaos). Recent cases include a three-way dispute between a wealthy Cape Verdean- American, the Municipality of Boavista, and the central Government, after the latter appropriated extensive landholdings that allegedly belonged to him, and that can yield large profit to the state (considering the absurdity of property prices in the island). The case is yet unresolved but prominently followed by the national media. In Mindelo, the municipality—whose mayor has championed the discourse against corruption—has seen itself involved in a property transfer corruption scandal that may have cost her the position of MpD national party leader at any point in the near future, if it has not killed her stellar and controversial career. On the real estate dynamics and controversies, see for example Constantino and Graga, Turismo Imobiliario Cabo Verde; or Fonseca, Cabo Verde a Venda (parte I) and (part II). 53. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 361. 104

This postcolonial process, I argue, lies at the root of whatever definition of identity each individual Cape Verdean has, and is ultimately what dictates the elements that should be included in a national project. Despite being itself a product of hybridity, however, Cape

Verdean society seems ill prepared and unreceptive to change its Capeverdeanness by inducting new elements, or, as it were, creating new hybridities.

Centuries-old dilemmas on race, class and ethnicity, or the dilemmas of the third space continuously test the country's ideology of hybridity, as much cultural and social as it is genetic, intimately linked and produced partly as a result of the archipelago's geographical location and partly as a result of its past. Cape Verde's hybridity encompasses the post-colonial experience and testifies to an ideology of difference, an "- ism" that is characterized by the insistence on the islands' crossover role as the cultural and genetic bridge between Europe and Africa, which both resists and asserts multiple understandings of identity. This, I suggest, might be termed hybridism, or an ideology of hybridity evident in the ambiguity with which Cape Verdeans reassess racial positioning and the relative importance of socio-economic factors depending on the interlocutor.54

Hybridity, while not named as such, is used as the reason racism/xenophobia or other similar forms of exclusion are supposedly absent from Cape Verdean society. Yet, in its vehement affirmation in popular culture, hybridity in fact becomes hybridism, a self-righteous allegation of post-racial "goodness" that is not matched by actions or proved by the evidence thus far produced about clear, and participative acts of verbal and

54. Marcelino, Postcolonial Identity Transition, 61. 105 physical exclusion of Africans from Cape Verdeans' everyday life. And, by excluding

Africans from their daily life, Cape Verdeans tacitly exclude them also from the nation- building project. Africans are, however, already an intrinsic part of it.

Although the historical and sociological reasons for hybridism clearly require a study of their own, I might suggest here that the politics of this discourse is subject to intricate politics and underrated racial dimensions of Cape Verdean society. While politicians have been slow and inactive in admitting and tackling growing racism, they are also not directly fomenting differentiation. Indirectly, however, some politicians' preferences vis-a-vis Europe versus ECOWAS, might hint at racial dimensions at play, even if not necessarily perniciously meant. Evaluating the embeddedness of this ideology of difference at the level of citizenry would require much deeper considerations that might take us back to the early days of colonization. For the purpose of this paper, I will, thus, simply assert that the ideological dimensions of hybridism might be partly responsible for the "migrant pedigree," adding an important racial layer to the integration model exposed earlier.

The eleventh island wants in: internal and external boundaries of the nation

A final category of actors in the construction of a common project for the nation is the diaspora, which—as seen in Chapter 4—is as diverse as it is vast, and whose bonds are maintained in a variety of ways, remarkably also using music as a powerful transnational 106 tool for the affirmation of Capeverdeanness, as much as it is a tool of national promotion.55 The behaviour of the diaspora is an excellent indicator of how intricate relationships are in today's Cape Verde, where local residents face newcomers practising more intense modes of transnational citizenship than they do (e.g., Senegalese) or entering the country in privileged positions (e.g., Angolans). The behaviour of Cape

Verde's diaspora implies that it is willing and eager to participate in the construction of the nation.

The Cape Verdean diaspora in Africa is not only the smallest but also the poorest, which—assuming the power of the diasporas in nation building— partly justifies the lack of influence of the African continent in the making of a national project for Cape

Verde.56 After all, in a transnational community such as this the diaspora is more often than not the cultural broker that establishes particular links between different nodes of

Capeverdeanness around the world, and the vehicle that makes the constant exchange of information and influence possible. Contrasting it with the wealthier American,

Portuguese, and Dutch diasporic communities, the lines along which the nation is presently being built could start to be identified.

It is not only the diversification of multilateral partnerships, tourism, education, and services that are helping recreate and redesign Cape Verde, it is also the competition for political influence and financial participation in the construction of a modern nation.57

And on these two last elements, the wealthier overseas Cape Verdean communities have

55. On musicology and diaspora, see for example: Dias, Emigration in Cape Verdean Music, 173- 188; Cidra, Migration Music Recordings, 189-204; Hoffman, Diasporic Networks, 205-220. 56. Nascimento, Diaspora in Sao Tome, 55-60. 57. See, for example, Scheffer, Diaspora Politics. 107 proven to hold the upper hand, and how strongly they sway nation building projects. For example, in 2001 and 2006 the diaspora vote—particularly from the New England community—was decisive in electing two presidents, perhaps reflecting a generational preference for PAICV. It remains to be seen how long this voting block will continue to influence home politics. For the time being, however, the continuation of PAICV's economic development and polity solidification projects owes its fortunes largely to the fidelity of this group. The advent of the Internet has certainly enhanced the levels of interaction and engagement between the diaspora and the home country (or even

fD independently from it), as shown by Sonia Melo.

Marcia Rego specifically addresses the dichotomies exposed in the previous section, which are compounded by several diaspora-related issues, and proposes that [i]f [...] one agrees that one of the movements of the modern nation-state is effacing differences and imagining a community of equals (although some inequality is inevitable, for its very functioning) one would think that an important set of differences to be effaced in the Cape Verdean nation would be the one of hierarchical tones of skin color. [The] tension between [...] contradictory constructions of "race" and "ethnicity" is further complicated by the experience of the Cape Verdean diaspora and their insertion in (or evasion of) "foreign" racial categories.59

Rego goes on to describe a variety of encounters between members of the diaspora and local residents, noting the enthusiasm with which the capital welcomed emigrant hyphenated Cape Verdeans in the summer months. But relationships with diasporic communities are not always smooth and unproblematic, or at least not everywhere. While my childhood experiences in Fogo Island have taught me that the visitors—particularly the merkanos—are the highlight of the year, I would equally contrast this with the return

58. Melo, Transnationalism on the Internet, 166-170. 59. Marcia Rego, Echoes from Empire, p. 491. 108 of holidaying Cape Verdean migrants to Sao Vicente, a less peripheral island. Although the first arrivals to Mindelo are marked by excitement,60 the city is soon overwhelmed by the presence of too many relatively affluent individuals.61 Here and there one hears emigrants commenting about "those Africans loitering in the streets," as frequently as the comments by local residents about holidaying emigrants buying out everything in stores and supermarkets, crowding up flights, beaches, and restaurants. In some cases the tone is playful, in others not quite. The apprehension, thus, is not always reserved for African migrants, but is easily expanded to include anyone with the potential of upsetting local balances.

James Clifford describes the diaspora and its practices as exceeding, criticizing, and subverting the nation-state, although it is not completely separate from it.62 The state, on the other hand, realizes the potential of the diaspora—through the brightest of its members, the investment, the remittances—and attempts to co-opt it into its own nation building project. Cape Verde's Institute of the Communities' appeal to "Djunta mo pa disenvolvimentu di Kabu Verdi"63 is a fundamental part of this nexus. It is responsible for a variety of other policies at home and abroad that aim to foster and maintain productive contacts between the diaspora and the home country. It follows a very successful model adopted by Portugal decades ago in creating a multi-nodal nation centralized at home.

60. The stagnant economy receives a boost, streets and cafes are lively, and people see faces that they had not seen in months or even years. This process of arrival marks the start of the summer. 61. Some examples include the unavailability of ferry tickets to the neighbouring island of Santo Antao—where many locals like to go away for a weekend—or the general unavailability of many staples foods and beverages that sell out within days. 62. Clifford, Diasporas, 1-10.. 63. Literally, "putting our hands together for the development of Cape Verde," a call for action appealing to well trained members of the diaspora to donate their time and skills in areas where Cape Verde is especially needy, including education, tourism and health. 109 Although Rego agrees with Clifford in that "by refusing to identify with the hegemonic categories [of immigrants]" the diaspora "constitutes a critique of the national narrative," she adds that there are multiple levels of subversion, depending on the political engagement and interconnectedness. "The fact that one does not identify with a given categorization does not guarantee that it will be read as a critique, nor does it preclude the 'continued' categorization by others."64

A final economic layer can be added to the analysis. In a country still largely dependent on remittances to stabilize the balance of payments and to ensure the circulation and storage of hard currency, encouraging ties between the diaspora and home is a crucial piece of the puzzle. The Cape Verdean diaspora in Portugal and in the US sponsor party financing, which suggests they still hold significant sway in internal politics. Occasionally—but increasingly—the diaspora starts to partake in large investments fully initiated overseas, enunciating a clear desire to play a role in the economic progress of the country, and to writing a new page in its national narrative.65

Still, there are those within Cape Verde that disagree with this model and see a different phenomenon, as demonstrated by this interpellation at a post-conference discussion on Cape Verdean emigration in Mindelo, in 1998:

64. Rego, Echoe of a Nation, 593. 65. This was the case with the Cabo Verde Fast Ferry, a project partially funded by members of the US diaspora, backed by four banking institutions (one Portuguese, one Angolan, and two Cape Verdean) and accompanied by a large public shares offer marketed in the country and broadly to the diaspora, intending to finance part of the project by tapping into the economic power of emigrants, their attachment to the home country, and their desire to see it succeed. This was a first in Cape Verde. (Closing note: information obtained off the record, however, confirms that the financial institutions involved, although apparently engaged, considered this a "non-starter," a project without feasibility or future.). On the fast increasing economic role of the Cape Verdean diaspora, see, for example, the two comprehensive 2008 PRIO reports: Carling, Policy Challenges', Melo, Consultations with the Diaspora. 110

Why are you talking about the Cape Verdean Diaspora? We are not like the Jews who had to leave the Holy Land. Our people are not in Babylonian captivity. We are emigrants, we have emigrant communities not a Diaspora. We are emigrants of necessity. Cape Verdeans in these communities are not the Diaspora they are our ' terra longe'[far away national territory].66

For the reasons explained so far, this is a view that I challenge, proposing instead that what Cape Verdeans overseas constitute is an "insipient diaspora[s]"67 or what has been called a low intensity transnational community. An emigrant community does not necessarily retain the degree of connection and engagement that the Cape Verdean diaspora does not do, nor the engagement that has become a yearly routine rehearsed across several generations. In any case, unlike the denominations attributed to migrants, deciding what to call Cape Verdean overseas communities does not affect the final outcome: they are linked and, despite the sedentarization in host nations, active and engaged from the outside, want to exert influence and partake in the discourse of the nation today and tomorrow, and in the confluence at which one currently finds Cape

Verde.68 A final word should be said on return migration, an increasing tendency among

Cape Verdean diasporic communities—not only first generation69— modestly contributing to alter the islands' ethnoscape, "homecomings" that are "understood and treated as messy points of convergence between personal desires for authentic and satisfying lives bolstered by various cultural imaginaries, nourished in social groups and

66. Quoted by Feo Rodrigues, in Crafting Nation, 269. 67. Scheffer, Diaspora Politics, 131. 68. Vieira, Diaspora Cabo Verdiana, 1-2. 69. A paradigmatic case I came across at a beach in Sao Vicente is that of a young second generation Swiss-Cape Verdean Rastafarian surfer who decided to move back home and open a travel agency specializing in active, adventure tourism. When I asked him how long he was staying, his eyes glimmered; he nodded and said "I'm here for good. This is my home now." Clearly, he always has the option—inexistent for others—of leaving whenever he so wishes. Nonetheless, the realization of this tendency spells a new chapter for the already confusing national project. Ill implemented through the practical action of moving."70 In Cape Verde, return migrants are another possible permutation in the multiplicity of identities peppering the islands.

They, as well as the diasporas on both shores of the Atlantic, all the migrants and new residents in Cape Verde—and not resident Cape Verdeans alone—seem to be actively deciding and performing in a multitude of ways what the country is today, what it will be tomorrow, and how it will be it. It is at the confluence of all these actors that the nation is being built, although perhaps not as cohesively some would have it. In early 2010, the

Cape Verdean National Assembly postponed an important vote on changes to the nationality law that would grant first- and second-generation descendants of Cape

Verdeans electoral rights, among others. Although this protracted the decision making process, it is clear that the nation building project is ongoing. It remains to be seen what the end product of this debate will be, what common future will be drafted for the modern

Cape Verdean nation, and who its architect will be. This will be the theme on which the next chapter focuses.

70. Markowitz, Homes of Homecoming, 22-23. 112

Chapter 7: Forging an immigration policy for development?

As other discussions about politics and polity go, the present paper finally also reverts to fundamental issues of power, the efficient management of complex power relations, and the balance of competing spheres of influence in a way that gives the state a seat at the global round table and the tools to solve the intricacies of place-making and nation building, as seen in Chapter 6. To some extent, today as in the past, Cape Verde's unique geography at the crossroads of four continents affords it an invaluable bargaining chip with which to dispute and build power and influence, countering the idea of the expendability of some states by cashing in on what Polibio Valente dubbed as the exceptionality of a small, powerless state instrumentalizing "affinities, prestige and power"1 inasmuch as larger nations instrumentalize the small state. For example, the EU's immigration policy nowadays presumes Cape Verde's co-operation, which is equally the reason for the country's single leverage. The "historical rule," he affirms, "is that regardless of the internal or external reasons [...] each weak entity seeks out assistance or eventually becomes dependent on a strong entity."2

The path Cape Verde has followed since 1975 is one of quasi-choiceless dependence on numerous external entities. Although the state could have opted out of

1. Valente de Almeida, Poder do Pequeno Estado, 238-244 2. Ibid., 239. 113 some relationships, that is, chosen not to partake in them, this would simply have given it access to fewer resources. Thus, although another choice was present, the act of choosing financial capacity ensures the maintenance of power by alternating political elites, and the provision of services to the citizens to the present day, at least partially. This is a tendency that the state has strived to counter by actively pursuing policies to induce the type of socio-economic development that can be sustained in the long run. Yet, as Seydou

Badian Kouyate—a former Minister of Planning in Mali—once laconically stated, "[y]ou cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital."3 In 2003, Jose Maria Neves, current

Prime Minister of Cape Verde, admitted that, "nobody wants to be dependent. But, for the time being [Cape Verde] do[es] need outside support." He added that 28 years after a successful take-off it would still take Cape Verde another 10-15 years before it could fly safely.4

Although the country and the diaspora's collective human capital is significant for this purpose, and its closest partners and allies include major Western nations, the reality remains that the delivery of fiscal self-sufficiency, security, productivity, probity in public office, goods and services, and political plurality and freedom5 remains an tiber- ambitious task. Ultimately this is the quintessential challenge. State leaders must, daily, weigh in the debt of cementing their own positions within a postcolonial political entity, against the costs of solving issues of economic sufficiency, social inclusion, stratification, and identity search. These objectives, however, are not all achievable at the same time,

3. Pitcher and Askew, African Socialisms and Postsocialisms, 20. 4. IRIN, Atlantic Survivors Want More. Judging by this statement, JMN believed in 2003 that Cape Verde could have a measure of self-sufficiency between 2013 and 2020. Although the prospects are mostly very positive, this goal seems humbly unachievable for now. 5. See, for example, Ayodele. States Without Citizens. 114 and nation building leaders may find themselves advocating for coherence and veering for power against leaders that favour economic development and the creation and free circulation of capital. Although the objectives might ultimately be similar, the methods are not, and neither are the outcomes.

Policy options can delineate a country's path for success—or failure. For instance, while PAICV aims for a vice-presidency seat at the ECOWAS commission,6 many of the interviews conducted on site in Cape Verde, and online comment boards consulted reveal at least a degree of apprehension vis-a-vis Cape Verde's membership in the organization.

Surely, there might be a degree of xenophobia in this public attitude, but possibly also a sense that the benefits, at least as they are perceived, might not be enough to offset the losses.

Cape Verde's ferociously bipartisan politics illustrates this quandary, with one party seeking a greater closeness to Europe,7 while the other attempts to do so while also maintaining a strong bond with Africa,8 each of them wrangling for the support, and the money, of the diaspora, each ignoring the migrant communities that are quickly reaching a critical mass within national borders, and both courting the US, China, Brazil, and

Angola—in this order.9 And, while the country's implementation of the MDG has been

6. ANGOP, Cabo Verde Ambiciona Vice-Presidencia; Semana, Cabo Verde Ambiciona Vice- Presidencia. 7. See, for example: Lopes, Elei?oes Parceria Especial, 11 (11/06/2009); Conde, Cabo Verde Nao Precisa Sonhar, 19 (10/06/2009); Silva, Macaronesia e Parceria Especial, 30 (03/06/2009). 8. See, for example: Silveira, Parceria Especial e Integraijao Regional, 8 (05/06/2009); Semana, Guine Vai Ter Consulado (20/04/2009); Semana, Cabo Verde Quer Comissario, 1-3 (12/02/2010); Vieira, Combate por Cabo Verde, p.29. 9. See, for example: Expresso das Ilhas, Cabo Verde e China, 2 (09/09/2009); Brito, Chineses Interessados na Cabnave, 1-2 (10/10/2008); Semana, Relates Sino-Africanas, (18/12/2009); Semana, Lula Condecora JMN (24/11/2009); Semana, Senado Brasileiro Aprova Perdao (17/03/2010). 115 hailed as a success by the international community, granting it a second round of the

Millennium Development Account with crucially-needed additional funds,10 it does not go unnoticed that it is quite possibly the last time Cape Verde will receive this much

"free" money. Africa's good pupil is now facing the prospect of adulthood, with foreign aid dwindling as it is diverted to poorer nations, and incoming aid strictly limited in scope, forcing the state into a procedural exercise to take advantage of whatever funds are still available.11 Thandika Mkandawire argues that

many donors now lean heavily towards targeting ~ directly through projects specifically aimed at the poor or indirectly through support to sectors more likely to benefit the poor than the well off. The PRSP process, upon which many developing countries have embarked and to which most donors now contribute, has further reinforced this turn towards "targeting" the poor. Furthermore, setting up global targets, such as the [MDG], points in the same direction.12

If, on the one hand, this scenario ensures that the money invested is applied to areas where it could have the strongest impact, on the other hand, it is clearly not making

Cape Verde's growing pains any easier at a time when foreign investment has slowed to a sluggish pace, and structural unemployment is threatening social peace and forcing a generational brain drain that could prove catastrophic in the coming years.13 Still,

Felisberto "Filu" Vieira, the popular PAICV mayor of Praia, insists on making an optimistically note:

Cape Verde will realize, until 2015, the eight MDG. We say proudly—and without faking modesty—that we negate the predestination that development is an exclusive of the rich. In the last 31 years we went from what the World Bank called an improbable and unviable country, to

10. See, for example: Na?ao, MCC Admite Atribui?ao de Pacote (17/11/2009).. 11. EIU, Country Profile, 21 -22. 12. Mkandawire, Targeting and Universalism, 2. 13. See, for example: Correia, Drama do Desemprego (05/08/2009); Matos, Desemprego Outro Debate (20/05/2009); Cardoso, Emprego e Futuro, (22/05/2009). Unemployment remains high, although it fell from 26 per cent to 18 per cent between 1998 and 2008. For some age groups it reaches 40 per cent, and there are also strong discrepancies between rural and urban areas, and between the different islands. 116

one that is a middle income, viable and probable. This was only possible because we have outlined our own destiny very close to the MDG, long before there was any consensus about [them].14

Unfortunately, while the successes of these implementations take time to trickle down, endemic economic problems already in existence are being aggravated by the global economic crisis. In a book that drafts Filu's vision of Cape Verde's current opportunities and challenges, few words are said about the role of African immigrants and their integration into the national polity. Migrants are caught in the midst of social upheaval precisely when the state has limited resources to help—or shows little interest in doing so. Yet, in this penultimate chapter I want to argue that identifying, supporting and integrating the migrant community must be a policy priority for the Cape Verdean state before what is an opportunity becomes a threat to national stability. This is, in fact, a protective and developmental role that the Government has itself pledged to uphold, as stated in the National Action Plan for Human Rights and Citizenship, approved by the

Council of Ministers in 2003, but seldom enacted in the stipulations that pertain solely to the migrant community.15

Europe's "farwest": the islands as a maritime border outpost

It follows from Cape Verde's de facto dependence on external actors and from the requirements and, as stipulated above, obligations imposed on the state, that the

14. Vieira, Combate por Cabo Verde, 201. 15. CNDHC, Piano National Acqao, 14, 47-48. 117 government often finds itself stretched thin between multiple, and certainly not always compatible, decision-making centres. Thus far, it has been capable of managing contrasting interests with just enough skill to benefit from the full diversity of privileged partnerships cultivated over 35 years. However, as the archipelago's strategic position gains a higher profile, irreconcilable differences are bound to surface. In a "virgin" territory such as Cape Verde, with trustworthy governance and promising economic prospects, it is predictable that a degree of bitterness will ensue among rival partners, making the task of managing contending interests increasingly difficult, as some examples below will suggest.

Hillary Clinton's recent visit to the islands, and her repeated references to Cape

Verde's successful MCA campaign thereafter, was likely something Chinese diplomacy took notice of.16 China has been making bolder investment moves and advancing in large strides in the fields of technical co-operation and technology transfers (in exchange for golden deals). In this framework of south-south partnerships, Angola's financial interests also increasingly appear to alternate between the complementarity and the competition with well-established Portuguese banking interests. In fisheries—one of the few abundant natural resources the country owns—both Iberian fleets vehemently complain about the lack of regulations imposed on Asian factory-ships competing for stocks in territorial waters. And on the cultural front, Cape Verde is the third corner of a troika that carries most of the weight at CPLP, along with Portugal and Brazil (who seldom see eye to eye in

16. China's Embassy in Praia, nearby the American diplomatic representation, is by far the largest in the country, and has been this way for well over a decade, indicating how China's strategy for West Africa is all but haphazard. 118 this context).17 This open competition between various spheres of influence determines internal influence, to a certain extent, by forcing political elites to align themselves, as is the case with the current debate over the induction of Kriolu as an official language, basically opposing the "pro-Africa" elites to the "pro-Europe" sectors. The result of this contest has direct impacts in migratory inflows.

However, the reality on the ground highlights a more prominent bone of contention, involving Cape Verde's two closest regional co-operation partners, and ultimately evoking its historical quest for identity significance: ECOWAS on the one hand, and the EU on the other, with particular attention to a bilateral agreement signed between the Canaries and Cape Verde. As we have seen, ECOWAS migrants have an enshrined right of movement, residence, and establishment,18 which has posed significant obstacles to the simplification of access to the Schengen space, long coveted by Cape

Verdeans.19 Still, accosted by growing waves of undocumented migrants, Europe looks at

Cape Verde as an opportunity. The privileged relationships between Cape Verde and

Portugal and Spain are pivotal in the construction of effective partnerships for security and local development—the stick and the carrot of Europe's external policy.20

17. Portugal sees CPLP as its sphere of influence and a tool affording it extra leverage within the EU, while Brazil, with nearly 200 million Portuguese speakers, sees itself as the natural leader of the group. In reality, this dispute benefited Cape Verde—who often acts as a middleman—but it does also force it into the awkward position of having to align with either one of two strategic partners. The significance of CPLP, and the privileged access that the members have to each other's markets, has been growing in recent years. Half of its members are now confirmed owners of significant oil reserves (Angola, Brazil, East Timor and Sao Tome—who shares some of the output of Nigeria's off-shore oil fields). 18. ECOWAS, Protocol to Free Movement. See 1979 and later amendments. 19. As ECOWAS and EU do not share any freedom of movement agreement, two such documents would not be reconcilable, particularly given the consultation rules in the Schengen side. See, for example: Gelatt, Schengen and the Free Movement. 20. A carrot based on the EU's wide-scoped policy for cooperation and development (see, for example: Militao Ferreira, Politica Externa Europeina, 234-255), that interacts with a stick implemented 119 By the year 2000 Cape Verde was comparatively successful within the West

African context, attracting transit migrants from neighbouring countries and spearheading fundamental changes in its own migration patterns—although not yet investing in a consequent immigration policy. This, of course, was not the result of Cape Verde's own economic attraction, but rather of its closeness to the Canaries, the easiest Schengen territory reachable from the African coast.21 Transit migration was not (and perhaps still isn't) quite perceived as Cape Verde's own problem. Ten years on, and despite increased maritime surveillance, it is probably safe to assume that a considerable number of transit migrants have settled down and may consider staying, and that this migratory flow may have solidified as a semi-structural phenomenon.

Meanwhile, profound policy changes were affecting Mediterranean geopolitical constructs, particularly following 9/11 and immigrant crises in northern Africa. The evident need for stricter security controls restricting illegal immigration leaking through the EU's southern border enabled multilateral initiatives of Euro-Mediterranean co- operation, including the umbrella European Neighbourhood Policy, or the rapprochement to Libya.22 Regional migratory movements consequently shifted, altering trans-Saharan routes and effectively partially dislocating the pressures of the southern Mediterranean westwards and southwards to the edge of the African continent, making Cape Verde a

gradually as an extension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as some of the threats get transferred from the North of Africa to the area surrounding Cape Verde (see for example: De Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration; Poulain and Perrin, UN Recommendations; Newland, Troubled Waters). On the closer cooperation with Portugal and Spain, see for example: Carling, Policy Challenges, 11. On Spain's motivation for closer cooperation with Cape Verde, see, for example: Ortega Perez, Spain: Forging Immigration Policy. 21. Particularly following increased controls in the southern Mediterranean, as seen in Chapter 5. 22. Interrupted at this time. 120 pivotal, unsuspecting transhipment centre for undocumented migrants.23

By 2006, and in the context of the Frontex operation—part of a wider EU immigration framework—several European navies had started patrolling Senegalese and

Cape Verdean waters to capture, detain, and repatriate any and all illegal migrants caught in open seas.24 European migratory controls imposed in the African continent, however, lack due process and often infract a number of human rights stipulations Europe usually abides by. The political artifice used is that of omitting the extraterritorial character of such obligations, a time-consuming issue that will hardly be tackled any time soon.25 Yet, eager to reinforce the strong ties newly created with Europe, Cape Verde offered to host a major NATO operation in its territory—Operation STEADFAST JAGUAR,26 hinting that closer formal co-operation with the Atlantic defence organization could be forthcoming.27

In 2007, Cape Verde's Special Partnership with the EU was signed, followed by a "Joint

Declaration on a Mobility Partnership" the following year. This old design of the Cape

Verdean state strengthened its multilateral link to the EU, but also made clear that the ultimately desired EU membership is very unlikely. Maritime patrols in Cape Verdean territorial waters have increased ever since, involving Portuguese and Spanish means, occasionally co-operating with French, Italian, Brazilian, American, and Canadian assets,28 and joined in 2010 by Irish and English frigates (Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet

23. De Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration; Baldwin-Edwards, Changing Mosaic. 24. European Commission, News Frontex,. 25. Cernadas, European Migration Control, 3-11. 26. STEADFAST JAGUAR was the "largest deployment of NRF forces to date", testing "command, control and support functions of the expeditionary force," and being "held with the kind permission and full cooperation of the government of Cape Verde". See NATO, STEADFAST JAGUAR 2006. 27. An idea not confirmed by NATO officials. 28. Carling, Policy Challenges, 11. 121 Auxiliary).29 In March 2010, the Government signed a protocol with the Kingdom of

Spain to purchase (on credit) a sophisticated maritime traffic management system to be installed in the outer islands of Boavista, Maio, Santiago, Fogo and Brava. It is unclear whether the system is aiming to control large-vessel circulation or to detect illegal activities, which usually use much smaller—often undetectable—vessels.

Although multilateral and bilateral co-operation clarifies the early stages of a securitization process similar to that in the Mediterranean Sea, it has been lacking in informed and widespread public debate on the urgent need for an integrated immigration policy. Tackling undocumented migration, human smuggling, and even Cape Verde's own migration pressure cannot be done ad hoc, relying wholly on external forces and on someone else's external policy. The use of a deterrent may prevent criminal bands operating in drug trafficking and human smuggling from using Cape Verde as they have used continental locations.31 Ultimately, however, a critique must be levered against the

Cape Verdean government and its failure to take steps to defuse the internal consequence.

While what happens on high sea is beyond the scope of its capacities, the acceptance of an internal migration debacle is crucial to the development of adequate policies. What are neatly obviated are the social contrasts and the economic strain provoked by a wholly unexpected dual position of a migrant country that becomes a transit destination, and

29. Expresso das Ilhas, Patrulhamento dos Mares (03/03/2010). 30. Liberal, Governo Aprova Convenio (26/03/2010). 31. Carling notes that the two have on occasion been connected, as smuggling "often involved vessels with a history of involvement in drug smuggling" (see: Carling, Policy Challenges, 10). This worrying development suggests that the stakes have been raised: with the involvement of criminal elements in organized human smuggling, the risk of casualties rises exponentially. Where there is a judicial crackdown on people involved in the organization of this activity, there have been cases of migrants forced overboard by smugglers when there is the danger of interception. 122 eventually a country where it can be assumed that some migrants are settling.

These sovereignty issues open a unique precedent: the social problems resulting from irregular immigration reflect the symptoms of Cape Verde's real "comparable," which, I argue, at this point are the countries in southern Europe that underwent similar transformations with equally short notice, rather than its own continental African neighbours. Thus, this section concludes that the increasingly extemporaneous nature of

European external policy—and, from a Cape Verdean perspective, perhaps even NATO's

Mediterranean Dialogue32— constitute a re-assembly and reconstruction of the whole

Mediterranean region, technically testing the extension of its borders towards the western edge of the African continent, while simultaneously transferring many of the political predicaments and social disturbances of the borderland. In assigning the security of its own territorial waters to foreign powers, Cape Verde is also strategically ensuring a direct line of contact.33 But, while it has been involuntarily transformed into a buffer zone, one could also cynically suggest that there might be a veiled interest by the local Government in maintaining a semi-continuous stream of migrants, a sine qua non condition to guaranteeing the continuation and reinforcement of its close connection to the EU.

At a time when there are substantial difficulties with border and visa control enforcements, it remains to be seen what the destiny of Cape Verde's relationship with

ECOWAS will be, at a time when there are substantial difficulties with border and visa control enforcements. Cape Verde just placed a special envoy on the mainland, but the

32. As with the EU's external policy, NATO's Mediterranean policy gradually expanded beyond the Med's borders. Operation STEADFAST JAGUAR was a strong example of NATO flexing its muscles away from "home". The Cape Verdean government could not be more thrilled. 33. On the "new EU border" see, for example, Amnesty International, Mauritania: Nobody, 12-16. 123 debate about a more limited partnership is likely to continue, particularly if (or when) the

MpD takes over a government cycle. One crucial factor remains: the regularization and integration of migrants already in the country is urgent, and requires consequent policy- making.

"We want to remain what we are!", or to policy or not to policy

There are encouraging signs that Cape Verde might be taking note of the multifaceted pressures on its economy and society that it is acquiring and experiencing, and is finally starting.34 Although incipient, there is a degree of debate on immigration occurring at the national level, particularly in the main media outlets. On occasion, public discussions on the conundrums presented by this novel reality have been held. Still, there seems to be an attempt at diminishing the severity of the problem, a resistance to recognizing that significant migrant communities now live in the islands, needed to get out of the parallel economy and be integrated into the productive social realm and into the formal economy.35

Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiff suggest that this is necessary in order to avoid social upheaval, as there are

34. Luxembourg's motto "Mir woelle bleiwe wat mir sin" translates beautifully what the choices presented to Cape Verdeans seem to be: reaping the profits of globalization, yet wishing to maintain everything else the way it always was... 35. In a recent debate in Mindelo, the local scholarly community present discarded immigration as a priority, also implying that this was a problem of "other countries," including Morocco, Algeria and Southern European nations. The fear of "invasion" does not seem to have translated into preventive and palliative action, as would be necessary. 124

implications for host countries' immigration policies, specifically, [make] it necessary to consider immigration policies in conjunction with social inclusion policies. Suppose that the immigrants belong to the minority ethnic group. Immigration, by increasing the size of the excluded minority, makes the majority better off. On the other hand, [...] the larger the minority group, the more attractive rebellion becomes. Thus, a more open immigration policy invites accommodation in the form of social inclusion so as to alleviate the rebellion threat. Casual observation suggests that countries that are more accommodating in terms of social integration (most Western democracies) are also the ones that have pursued more open immigration policies.36

Occasional demonstrations by immigrants against discrimination strongly indicate that the time has come to create specific policies before issues of segregation turn into open hostility from locals towards migrants and, most worryingly, resentment from migrants towards Cape Verdeans. This is possibly a greater risk at a time of economic uncertainty in which migrants who cannot find a way to depart to Europe are very likely to prefer facing the dire conditions encountered in Cape Verde than returning to their countries of origin, where their situation would likely be worse. As demonstrated in previous chapters, there seems to be an understanding among Cape Verdeans about the predicaments faced by African migrants, based on their own experience of migration, and the hardships it entails. Despite any initial reluctance, and concerns that Cape Verde might not be large or wealthy enough to host these communities, the national ethos on migration will probably ensure that a degree of empathy will be afforded to new migrants, eventually resulting in their unproblematic integration and productive inclusion, should the government opt for a clearly stated policy.

This might include a ban or a moratorium on the free circulation of people between other ECOWAS states and Cape Verde, as any immigration policy would have to

36. Gradstein and Schiff, Political Economy of Social Exclusion, 341. Although the paper mostly refers to minorities and majorities in the source countries, I propose that there may be a parallel with the dynamics that goes on in the host countries. 125 match problem-solving actions (e.g., normalization of ghettos such as Barraca, in

Boavista; migrant unemployment and under-employment; regularization of the informal sector; crackdown on criminal activities) with a strong and effective limitation of illegal immigration. The economic exchanges between Cape Verde and most ECOWAS member-states, it might be argued, do not justify the adhesion to the protocol, nor are they likely to do so in the near future. Enforcing a strong immigration policy does not have to preclude the maintenance of economic and political ties, but the Cape Verdean public will probably be reassured and more receptive to integration policies within the country if it is not an open-ended agreement that could potentially result in thousands more who overstay their visas. The restructuring, centralization, and consolidation of the

National Police, now incorporating immigration controls, was an important step in this direction.37

Although internal and external recommendation papers still ignore the need for an immigration policy, preferring to highlight the challenges and opportunities recurrent from reinforced links with the diaspora, there are indications that Cape Verde might slowly be moving toward an migration model similar to that used by Portugal, which combines "an expansive view of migration supported by links with the Portuguese diaspora," while having specific policies to regularize and integrate both qualified migrants and basic labour that are essential to the country's development.38

Growingly, Cape Verde's IC is implementing an overseas support network resembling that used by Portugal. The creation of an autonomous High-Commissioner for

37. BORCV, Boletim Oficial da Republica. 38. See, for example: Malheiros, Portugal Seeks Balance. 126 Emigration and Diaspora in Europe,39 and the opening of a bureau assisting national emigrants in Portugal are two examples of this move. Simultaneously, Cape Verde has started sending immigration technicians for overseas training sessions, which could hint at an upcoming move toward a policy paper finally owning immigration as an internal, rather than external, predicament (that is, Cape Verde's, rather than the EU's). If the government decides to attribute integrative jurisdiction to the IC, moving towards a gradual inclusion of ethnic minorities in Cape Verdean society, a key step will have been taken toward a new age of migration. Already active with the diaspora, the IC has the tools to help implement best practices toward immigrants. It is surprising, for instance, that the IC's striking similarities with Portugal's ACIDI have not been mined. A good step forward would be the publication of a guide for authorities and public servants for dealing with immigrant communities, and area in which ACIDI has been internationally recognized. The IC has the expertise—as demonstrated with its own Guia do

Emigrante40— but at the moment does not have the brief to follow on ACIDI's path.41

Rather than the "end of emigration" causing a socially hindering migration pressure, the nation can graduate as a mature actor in circular migrations, enhancing the advantages brought by its diaspora and embracing the capacities and opportunities offered by the entrepreneurial individuals that chose to make Cape Verde their temporary or permanent home. Not many developing nations are lucky to have a positive way out of a potentially thorny situation. It remains to be seen which model of integration Cape

39. Semana, Alto-Comissario para a Emigragao (07/11/2008). 40. IC, Guia do Emigrante. 41. ACIDI, Manual para Integragao dos Imigrantes. 127 Verde will select—this thesis sources multidisciplinary tools to develop hypotheses and map out frameworks that could be used for further inquiry within this ongoing process. 128

Chapter 8: In the end there was migration—a final note

For Cape Verde, this decade was one of significant, yet peaceful, political, economic, and social upheaval, deeply rooted in a process of developmental democratization and economic liberalization. The policies hitherto enacted resulted in a general overhaul of governance practices, development strategies, and corporate incentives, transforming

Cape Verde into a relative success story, and making it attractive to an increasing number of settlers, and even more transit migrants. New, albeit fragmentary, data suggests looming disturbances in the realms of class, race, and ethnicity—or, put simply, one can expect the inner conflicts of identity determination to potentially spill over into social life. For the late Amilcar Cabral—Cape Verde's enlightened independence leader—

"ethnicity cannot be separated from class, and conversely, class cannot be separated from that ethnicity."1 In other words, the issue is inherently of a socio-economic nature, lying at the confluence of the nation's uneasy sense of self, and the identity shock of finding the poor and the wealthy Other within it.

Irregular immigration and its root causes have become a political concern in Cape

Verde. One might be inclined to ask why do they come?, to which the simple answer is that they come because the islands are there—it is a question of geography. The gradual

1. Idahosa, Cabral's Materialist Theory, 54. 129 shift of Trans-Saharan migration routes and networks has lead to a rapid increase in the number of continental African migrants, today conspicuous in Cape Verde's main urban areas. The fluid geopolitical reality of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb also justifies my assertion that Europe's de facto southern borders have been pushed southwards to

North Africa, then westwards to Morocco, and then southwards again, bringing Europe to the Cape Verdean (and Mauritanian) coasts, or rather increasingly making Cape Verde an incomplete proxy to—and a tool of—European immigration policies, certainly a hypothesis deserving of further attention.

The resistance with which many migrants are being met requires a new evaluation model, so in the Chapter 4 I have proposed an experimental framework that operationalizes occupation, race and ethnicity, nationality, and levels of interaction and/or acceptance as the key indicators to understand who is being included or excluded, and why. It is a model that requires further fine-tuning, but that could potentially serve as a pilot study for future research, and contribute to the ongoing discussions and debates about immigration. At the theoretical level, it is perhaps the main contribution of this thesis to scholarship on Cape Verde and on international migration and integration processes. In Chapters 6 and 71 demonstrated how perceptions of migrants test this model in practical terms, and showed how the Cape Verdean model can be compared with nations elsewhere.

Immigration is changing both development and nation building, two processes occurring simultaneously: firstly through the gradual modification of the migratory character of the nation and, hence, the challenge of its own sense of identity and the its 130 "racial ideology"—which I have termed hybridism; and secondly, by opposing the resources brought in by migrants with the desire for national cohesiveness. This is a debate that must, with urgency, take place in Cape Verdean society. Generalized stereotypes on African migrants are, at this stage, clearly verging on the xenophobic, and that is dangerously unpredictable in a situation of prolonged economic crisis. In places like Barraca, the spillover has started to poison neighbourly relationships, and the level of social tension is worrying. Strikingly, Cape Verdeans appear dismayed about demonstrations of racism against their own fellow citizens in places like Portugal and the

US.2 The double standard is glaring.

The presence of Africans is not detached from the realities of neighbourhood politics. Onesimo Silveira—intellectual and former mayor of Mindelo—suggests that

integration in [the] sub-region is a stage towards the future and towards globalization. To think the contrary is anti-political and anti-historic. [...] Cape Verde has to gamble high and find part of the answers it seeks to its own interrogations about the country's geopolitical advantages. That is, to transform something that, every now and then, generates unsolved contradictions, namely the discomfort of belonging in Africa yet being closely connected to Europe. I have no doubts that this plurality of belongings may constitute a fundamental benefit [.. .].3

Considering that there is a sense of understanding about this natural partnership, why the backlash? I argue that Cape Verde's postcolonial condition is a key piece of this explanation. Could it be that ethnicity and race become hybridity and hybridity becomes hybridism—the self-righteous myth that there is nothing wrong with race relations in the country, since the whole country is a hybrids Or is race simply not as unproblematic as it

2. See, for example: Semana, Seguran?a Maxima para Luke (13/03/2010); Semana, Luke Volta ao Tribunal (09/03/2010); Semana, Segundos Mais Discriminados (14/03/2010). 3. Silveira, Parceria Especial, 8. The section in italics is a direct quote from a speech by Stefano Manservisi, a EU high representative visiting Cape Verde. Transl. by the author. 131 is made to be? Tracking the roots of racial tension takes us through and into a dwindling economy where the contagion of crisis makes the imagery of boat people increasingly harder to stomach, and where the image of Africans in the streets is so troublesome that it begets the ghetto, and the ghetto begets isolation and segregation, not hindering but also not contributing to the concept of national identity. Despite its post-racial ethnic identity claims, the ideology and politics of Cape Verde's hybridism requires further study.

Writing specifically about islands, Appadurai commented that they are

platforms for the emergence of national identity and for the affirmation of cultural specificity: critical resources, especially in a context of sweeping globalization and the death of cultures and languages. As prototypical ethno-scapes, islands have spearheaded the study of the production of locality.4

Managing expectation and fears, and absorbing the new ethnoscape, thus, becomes a priority for both the majority and the minorities in the islands. Unsurprisingly, the integrative paths to membership and inclusion are often met with struggle reminiscent of the fear of dilution of identity and of socio-economic subalternization and loss. This is, I contend, the argument of those who do not know, and hence ostracize the unknown. The reality is, in spite of its proximity, Cape Verde has not had extensive experience with

Africa in decades, and thus sees Africa with a stereotypical lens. The learning curve may be steep, but it is a crucial step towards the nation building (or nation wrecking) process—in the sense we described as the sorting through of material disputes and identity paradigms, and the definition of a common symbolic project for the future of the nation— of a country heading towards an image of development. It is, of course, wholly

4. Arjun Appadurai (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 180. 132 unknown what that nation will be like, especially because this dialogue involves multiple points of external connections and interdependencies, most especially a wealthy and active diaspora with plenty to say.5 Migration can, however, yield substantial long-term macro-economic benefits to the host country, through the enrichment of human capital and the job opportunities and wealth created as a result from migrant entrepreneurial activities.6 This is an articulation occurring as I write. Rita Abrahamsen posits that

[t]he postmodern condition of fragmentation and diasporic identities is seen to have given birth to postcolonialism, which is in turn perceived as the attempt of the privileged few to theorize and come to terms with their own positions as Third World intellectuals inside the Western academe.7

These outside-inside dynamics fuel the debate about who contributes to the modern nation, who defines it, in which terms (identity, economy?), and who is excluded by it.8 Ultimately, one important future lies in policy options that must see through opportunities, threats, and recommendations for development and choose a path that is inclusive, equitable, and sustainable for the entire complexity of Cape Verde's new ethnoscape. As stressed in an IOM council a few years ago, "[cjoherence begins at home

[and] is achieved by bringing together the relevant ministries with responsibilities on migration in order to avoid inconsistencies and co-develop common objectives."9 This constitutes, according to Robin Cohen, the "so-called 'everyday cosmopolitanism' or

5 Vertovec, Political Importance of Diasporas. 6. IOM, International Migration and Development, 3. 7. Abrahamsen, African Studies and Postcolonial Challenge, 194. 8. In a way, I am—somewhat unconsciously, I realize now—a reflection of Abrahamsen's note, as part of a remote, well educated, reasonably affluent, considerably connected and relatively influential diaspora that wants Cape Verde to be also its nation. Ultimately, this exercise in reflexivity proves only that one is prisoner of biases and cultural trappings even while actively striving not to. 9. IOM, International Migration and Development, 5. 133 'ordinary cosmopolitanism' where men and women from different origins create a society where diversity is accepted and rendered ordinary."10

In a recent PRIO report, Jorgen Carling identifies nine risks faced by Cape

Verdean society in this moment of change, and a list of recommendations to maximize existing opportunities and develop new ones.11 Although Carling's report is thorough, methodical, and extensive, I am compelled to contest his undervaluation of the phenomenon of immigration. Few words are said on the active role of immigrants in development, which I believe is central to understand a place where migration is absolutely fundamental to development. This is a dual factor that could be assessed as a challenge or an opportunity—a challenge because the country's economy is significantly unprepared, an opportunity because migration theory teaches us that migrants tend to be at least as resourceful and as entrepreneurial as their fellow citizens. This, I argue, is a degree of autonomy and initiative that Cape Verde cannot afford to waste. Yet, in

PAlCV's official Government program for the current legislature not a single word is uttered regarding immigration, migrants, or their possible role in Cape Verdean society or as active agents for national development.121 differ from Carling—and, apparently, the

Cape Verdean Government—in that he sees migrants as people in transit (to Europe) and devotes little attention to the issues surrounding them in Cape Verde. Conversely, I see borders closing and African migrants staying (not necessarily all of them, but we do not know how many "all of them" is), and the establishment and articulation of a consequent,

10. Cohen, Migration and its Enemies, 189-191 (citing Daniel Hiebert). 11. Carling, Policy Challenges, 48-49. For an evaluation on specific challenges and opportunities incoming from the diasporic communities, see partner report: Melo, Migration and Development. 12. PAICV, Programa do Governo. 134 multi-layered and versatile immigration policy as a key piece in the process of national development. Co-opting immigration into a common future before it becomes a problem is a viable solution. There are certainly benefits to the integration of migrants, both in

1 "X terms of social peace and in terms of economic output. Neither the PRIO report nor

PAICV's program, however, sufficiently address these challenges. Cape Verde's migration history and the example of other nations undergoing the same transition—Italy,

Spain, Portugal—suggests that immigration policy could be a section of a broadly-scoped migration policy with multiple nodes and multiple facets. In spite of being a complex and time consuming process, the centrality of every migratory phenomenon in Cape Verde enhances all possible permutations for the best outcomes.

In ending this paper I must defer to the wiser words of Basil Davidson—a scholar and historian who walked alongside Cabral—whose admiration for Cape Verde's resourcefulness and resilience over centuries leaves a glimmer of optimism: Here was an African people which has found a way to save itself, which has shown how the poorest and most despairing of the legacies of foreign rule can be challenged and thrown off, and which so far has prevailed against every forecast of failure. [T]he problems now and the problems for all the foreseeable future remain both 'ample and complex',' in the words of Aristides Pereira

But the amplitude and complexity of Cape Verde's problems can also yield assets.

With a growing recognition of the significant links between migration and development within both the migration and the development communities, it might be useful to further this study with a comparative analysis between Cape Verde and other nations in similarly ambiguous positions. Some of the possible candidates include Southern European

13. IOM, International Migration and Development, 5. 14. Basil Davidson, The Fortunate Isles, 195. 135 countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Malta, all of which underwent similar processes a few decades back; more likely Morocco and, to a degree, Mauritania, which are undergoing similar processes today; and perhaps even deeply distinct, yet equally

"weak" nations such as Canada, in which the comparable elements arise from cultural heterogeneity, geographical dispersion, postcolonial condition and influence of external powers. The first decisive step in pursuing the study of the Cape Verdean case study, and certainly a sine qua non in achieving the comparative goal, however, is the understanding of the problem through an extensive, serious and uncompromised study on immigration, its motivations, and its objectives, from the grassroots to the boardrooms. 136

Appendix A: Sample Semi-Structured Interview Questions

Unstructured Interview Questions (Guidelines) EUROPEAN, CHINESE AND CONTINENTAL AFRICAN MIGRANTS

1. Did you come to Cape Verde directly from your home country / city? 1.1 If so, why did you decide to leave your home country / city? 1.2 If not, what was the last place you lived in before coming here? 1.3 How long did you live there for? 1.4 Why did you decide to leave? 1.5 What other places have you lived in? 2. Why did you decide to come to Cape Verde? 3. When did you come to Cape Verde? (year / how long ago) 4. Did you consider immigrating to another country before coming here? 5. When you first arrived, how was your experience at the border control?

26. Did you ever run into any trouble with police or other authorities in Cape Verde? 27. Do you feel the economy in Cape Verde has been improving or worsening since your first arrived here? 28. Do you think the media portrayal of immigrants and other foreigners affects the way Capeverdians think about! talk about / react towards immigrants? 1.1 How so? 29. Do you feel the media talks differently about immigrants / foreigners with different national origins? (Immigrant vs. expatriate / investor / tourist / cooperation agent, etc.) 1.1 If so, how so? 30. Have you heard Capeverdian politicians talking directly about immigration? What was said? 1.1 Follow-up (depending on answer) 31. Do you think immigrants and other foreigners are contributing positively (and / or negatively) to the Capeverdian economy? 1.1 If so, how so? And if not, why not? 1.2 Is this contribution recognized by the media / authorities / Capeverdians? 137

Appendix B: Interview subjects *

STATED NATIONALITY NUMBER GENDER Cape Verdean 5 1 m,4f Senegalese 4 2 m, 2 f Bissauan (Guinean) 1 1 m Malian 1 1 m French 2 1 m, 1 f Italian 1 1 m TOTAL 14 7 m, 7 f

* Interviews conducted in Sao Vicente, Santiago and Fogo. 138

Appendix C: Informal conversations *

STATED NATIONALITY NUMBER GENDER Cape Verdean ** n/a n/a Senegalese ** n/a n/a Nigerian 4 3 m, 1 f Malian 3 2 m, If Mauritanian 1 1 m Ghanaian 1 1 m Gambian 1 1 m Liberian 1 1 m Sierra Leonean 1 1 f Chinese 2 2 f Portuguese ** n/a n/a Other Europeans ** n/a n/a Other nationalities ** n/a n/a

* N.B.: These conversations are part of my personal field notes and/or journal notes, and as such inform my thought process. They are, however, never used in the manner of Ethics Committee-sanctioned interviews.

** While I recorded the number of such conversations with most African migrants, it is difficult to estimate the number of random Cape Verdeans, Senegalese, Portuguese and other Europeans I have talked to. These conversations—dozens of them—were held in the streets and squares, in the markets of Mindelo and Praia, at the beach, in restaurants and cafes, waiting around in airports, inside airplanes, on board inter-island ferries, and on the back of packed Hiace mini-buses in the islands of Sao Vicente, Santo Antao, Santiago, Fogo, Boavista and Sal. 139

Appendix D: Media and comment boards consulted

MEDIA TYPE COLLECTION PERIOD A Semana weekly newspaper Jan-Jun 2006, May-Sept 2009 Expresso das Ilhas weekly newspaper Jan-Jun 2006, May-Sept 2009 A Nagao weekly newspaper May-Sept 2009 A Semana Online online edition; comment boards late 2005-March 2010 Expresso das Ilhas online edition; comment boards late 2005-March 2010 A Nagao Online online edition; comment boards Sept 2009-March 2010 Liberal online edition; comment boards Dec 2009-March 2010 VisaoNews.com news portal, US-based Sept 2009-March 2010 Afrol News news agency, Pan-African early 2007-March 2010 ANGOP news agency, Angola-based Sept 2009-March 2010 RTC national TV (news, special reports) May-Sept 2009 140

Appendix E: Glossary of Creole terms

Assimilado - lit. assimilated. Racial concept used by the late Portuguese colonial regime to distinguish Cape Verdeans from other colonial subjects. Although it was used as an acculturation tool, it fell short of recognizing full Portuguese citizenship.

Baihuo - in Mandarin, lit. Chinese shop.

Bronk - lit. white. Sometimes used descriptively, sometimes derogatorily.

Caboverdianidade - lit. Capeverdeanness. This fluid concept was used from the early 20th century onwards, in an attempt to rally Cape Verdeans around the idea of national identity, not necessarily a negation of the Metropole's, but certainly different. The core values have been described in Cape Verdean music and literature ever since, loosely comprising aspects such as insularity, morabeza, migration, suffering and resilience (against hunger, droughts, isolation, unemployment, poverty, departure).

Chines - lit. Chinese. Descriptive.

Chinoka - lit. Chin. Derogatory.

Claridade - Early 20th century literary movement with political ramifications, initiated in the Seminar of Sao Nicolau and in Mindelo's High School, then the two only senior level schools in the islands. The movement is credited with "codifying" Capeverdeanness.

Djuntamon - lit. hands together, or bringing hands together. Often transnational traditional community solidarity networks, in which the "haves" assist "have nots."

Expedientes — lit, shady business. Some times also used in the sense of "errands."

Grog - Cape Verdean sugar cane hard liqueur similar to rum. Abroad, a symbol of home.

Hiace- Toyota Hiace passenger vans used as mini buses across the islands. Originally equipped with 12 seats, they are customized and modified to seat 15—and have been know to always have space for "one more." Anecdotal evidence suggests a record of 30.

Ildo Lobo - Late Cape Verdean singer, living in Portugal. Initially part of Cesaria Evora's band, he later pursued a solo career and, like her, was widely seen as a modern day troubadour, a cultural ambassador.

Kriolu - lit. Creole. Spelled in this manner it implies the use of the ALUPEC spelling system, the first attempt to codify written Creole and thus equip it for officialdom. It is currently a highly contentious debate in the islands, particularly as the use of "k" is seen by the opposition as a reference to African, rather than European roots. For others, the use of this version, rather than the Europeanized and undifferentiated Crioulo, is a strong statement of national identity and pan-African revivalism. 141

Kriolu di Fogo — lit. Creole of Fogo Island. Based on archaic Portuguese, with strong American influences.

Kriolu Soncent— lit. Creole of Sao Vicente. It is the most cosmopolitan and versatile regional variety of Creole, influenced by two centuries of port life, and including elements of many European languages.

Mandjako - West African ethnic group. In post-independence Cape Verde, used derogatorily to describe Bissauans (the "darker" political brothers from the mainland) and, more broadly, any continental Africans, regardless of their legal or self-decided ethnic identity. In Mindelo it is also a popular disguise in Carnival parades, where it signifies the African Other, the dark African salvage of lore. The group of mandjakos is usually formed by young men, parading half-naked and smeared in black shoe wax, their private parts covered by straw skirts, and fake piercings in their noses and ear lobs. Troupes run around shouting unintelligibly and brandishing spears, scaring children and young ladies, and threatening to smear them. In general, real Africans in Cape Verde object to being called or referred to as mandjakos.

Manecon - Wine produced in the high volcanic plains in Fogo Island, a strong element of symbolic capital connecting Cape Verde to its American diaspora—where it sells hundreds of thousands of units per year.

Merkano(s) - lit. American(s). It refers to Cape Verdean-Americans, from the point of view of Cape Verdeans residing in the islands. The term could apply to first or fifth generation, or anywhere in between.

Mestiqo - lit. mestizo, mixed race. Descriptive. Unlike English, not understood as derogatory.

Mindelo - Capital of the island of Sao Vicente, and second largest urban centre in the country.

Morabeza - Untranslatable word defining the essence of Capeverdeanness. It is considered a national feeling, and could vaguely refer to hospitality towards strangers, melancholy, dreaminess, andjoie de vivre. Cape Verdeans use it aplenty, but few are able to define it, implying that a feeling cannot be defined. Not to be confused with sodade (or saudade).

Morna - The traditional Cape Verdean soulful song style, vaguely reminiscing of Portuguese fado and sharing its tempo with other musical styles. Popularized internationally by Cesaria Evora, it has been the key vehicle of transnational Capeverdeanness for almost a century.

Nha fidjo mat eh o - lit. my male son. A song by lido Lobo.

Nos Ku Nos - lit. us with us or us among ourselves. It suggests unity, and implies a degree of separation from the other.

Soncent- One of the different names to describe the island of Sao Vicente or the city of Mindelo.

Pontche - Cape Verdean sweet liqueur produced from a base of grog and different fruits and plants.

Tcheu sabura - lit. very pleasant. The adjective sabe means "pleasant," while tcheu sabura describes something particularly pleasant. The phrase is often heard to describe good moments spent on the islands. 142

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