University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Economics 2013 Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis David S. Evans Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation David S. Evans, "Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 627, 2013). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. ATTENTION RIVALRY AMONG ONLINE PLATFORMS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST ANALYSIS David S. Evans* 2 January 2013 Email:
[email protected] Abstract Many online businesses, including most of the largest platforms, seek and provide attention. These online attention rivals provide products and features to obtain the attention of consumers and sell some of that attention, through other products and services, to merchants, developers and others who value it. The multi-sided business of seeking and providing attention is fluid with rivalries crossing boundaries defined by the features of the products and services. It is also dynamic. Rivals introduce new products and services, some involving drastic innovation, frequently. Online attention rivals impose competitive constraints on each other. Product differentiation tempers the significance of these constraints in particular situations.