1 Missing in Action

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1 Missing in Action 1 Missing in Action: The Human Eye Or Bassok• [This chapter was published in CONSTITUTIONALISM ACROSS BORDERS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 283-304 (Federico Fabbrini & Vicki Jackson eds., 2016). The numbers in brackets are the page numbers of the published version]. [283] INTRODUCTION In this chapter I argue that the growing involvement of lawyers in approving military operations, coupled with the disappearance of the soldier’s unmediated gaze of the battlefield, increase the probability for the execution of a certain kind of manifestly unlawful orders. In recent decades, western states have put their faith in jurists in their attempt to tackle the problem of human rights violations during warfare. Through setting up an international web of legal rules, now known as International Humanitarian Law (previously known as the law in war), and by enhancing the role of jurists as the most equipped experts to detect and prevent violations of this law, western states have tried to ensure a more humane battlefield.1 In this chapter I argue that this effort has inherent limitations. I show that the growing reliance on lawyers to approve the legality of military operations makes every order executed according to a lawyer’s “clearance” legal on its face. Militaries now prefer to expropriate the decision of legality from the combatants and view an order approved by lawyers to be legal. There are still grave concerns that even if militaries heeds the legal advice given by military [284] lawyers, • Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow, European University Institute. This paper was presented at International Association of Constitutional Law - Research Group on Constitutional Responses to Terrorism Roundtable: “Constitutionalism across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism,” held at Harvard Law School in March 2014 and at the “Law and War” workshop at the European University Institute. It is part of a project I began as a Robina Foundation Visiting Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School in 2012. I am grateful to Paul Kahn and Jim Silk for their support. Marina Aksenova, Nehal Bhuta, Gabriella Blum, Iris Canor, Miriam Gur-Arye, Yoram Dinstein, Stephen Ellmann, Federico Fabbrini, Pablo Kalmanovitz, Mordechai Kremnitzer, Vicki Jackson, Nimrod Karin, Liron Libman, Martin Scheinin, Catie Scott, and Jennifer M. Welsh offered excellent comments on an earlier version of this chapter. All errors are my own. 1 See, e.g., RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 4-8 (2011) (“The law and discourse of humanity law are penetrating the sphere of foreign policy decisionmaking, as can be seen in the increasingly frequency with which situations of conflict have hit a political impasse are being referred to court…”); FREDERIC L. BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT: ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI 319 (2001) (noting that in the U.S. after the My Lai massacre, “the Defense Department recognized that preventing similar incidents required a new approach to ensuring obedience to the Law of War. Requiring the Army’s legal corps to take primary responsibility…was considered the best way to implement this goal.”). 2 violations of humanitarian law will still occur because military lawyers are more prone to divert from accepted standards of legality.2 In this chapter, I want to present a different approach and argue that legality that is based on a lawyer’s reasoning is sometimes ill- equipped, through its language of expertise, to detect atrocities. At times, the eyesight and emotions of the combatant are the best metrics for determining that an order is manifestly unlawful. Moreover, the existence of legal clearance for military operations causes a greater disassociation between the combatant and his victims, thus facilitating, in certain scenarios, an easier violation of the values that the legal endeavor was set up to defend. Giving jurists the authority to approve military operations has great potential to absolve the combatant of the responsibility to consider the legality and morality of the order, relying instead on the legal authorities to make such judgments. In broader terms, making the issue of the legality of military operations the sole responsibility of military lawyers, absolves society from having to think about the morality of these operations. It transfers these issues into the hands of “experts.” Especially in societies in which military service is compulsory, leaving the question of whether an order is manifestly unlawful partly in the hands of combatants is a form of civilian accountability of military operations. In the first section, I distinguish between two different versions of the criminal defense that requires soldiers to disregard manifestly unlawful orders. These two versions are conflated in judgments and scholarly writings. According to the first version, when the order’s illegality is obvious, the soldier should refuse to obey. According to the second version, when the order is morally repulsive, the soldier should refuse to obey. Next, I explain that the history of military atrocities shows that unmediated eye contact plays a crucial role in breaking a soldier’s disassociation from potential victims and thus creates an emotional reaction of repulsion towards certain orders. Yet, in the modern battlefield, more and more of the killings are carried out without the soldier seeing the battlefield with his own eyes, without him experiencing the battlefield. Rather, the killings are carried out by aerial vehicles operated from afar. I argue that these 2 David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (2013) (arguing that the “cultural divide” between “military lawyers” and “humanitarian lawyers” explains why militaries that rely on the advice of military lawyers may still violate international humanitarian law). 3 developments distort the legal criterion that determines whether an order is manifestly unlawful. Then, based on the [285] Israeli experience, I explain why the rise in legal scrutiny of military actions further contributes to this distortion, hindering the protection of human rights rather than enhancing it. Thus, I conclude that, taken together, these two developments render more and more obsolete the version of the manifestly unlawful order doctrine that allows for disobedience to an order based on a soldier’s emotional repulsion. These changes increase the chances for obedience to a certain kind of manifestly unlawful orders that in the past might have been disobeyed. I. THE TWO APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF MANIFESTLY UNLAWFUL ORDERS The superior order defense relieves a soldier of criminal liability for violating the law when he acted in compliance with the obligatory order of a competent authority. This defense applies as long as that order is not manifestly unlawful.3 But if the order was manifestly unlawful, the defense will not apply. This structure of the defense exists in many national legal systems.4 While in the international arena there has been a debate on the scope and nature of the superior order defense in customary international law,5 the structure described above was reflected [286] in Article 33 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (hereinafter: the ICC Statute).6 3 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (2012) (reprinted edition); Ziv Bohrer, Clear and Obvious? A Critical Examination of the Superior Order Defense in Israeli Case Law, 2 IDF L. REV. 193, 202 (2006). 4 See, e.g., Andreas Zimmermann, Superior Orders in THE ROME STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 957, 964-65 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law, 10 EJIL 172, 176-77 (1999); Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939, 949 (1998) (“The majority approach in the industrialized democratic West appears to be the manifest illegality rule.”). 5 Compare Gaeta, supra note 4, at 172 (arguing that according to customary international law, obedience to orders is never a defense (absolute liability approach) and that the ICC Statute has departed from that rule, adopting the conditional liability approach) to Osiel, supra note 4, at 946-49 (“In both international law and the military codes of most states, the nutshell answer to the problem of due obedience is that the soldier is excused from criminal liability for obedience to an illegal order, unless its unlawfulness is thoroughly obvious on its face…. one must conclude that international law on the matter of due obedience is not fully settled.”). 6 See Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 970. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at xxii-xxiii (discussing the developments after the conclusion of the Rome Statute that do not comply with its understanding of the defense). 4 As long as an order is legal, a soldier must obey. But, even if the order is illegal, according to the superior order defense, a soldier can, and perhaps should, obey, as long as the order does not involve carrying out a manifestly unlawful act. Multiple rationales have been offered for awarding a criminal defense to soldiers who obeyed illegal orders. Many have raised the soldier’s grave dilemma as the basis for negating his culpability in the wrongful act. On the one hand, the soldier may face possible military proceedings (criminal or disciplinary), or even a summary
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