Libya's Faustian Bargains
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Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST Libya’s Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle By Jason Pack, Karim Mezran, and Mohamed Eljarh Libya’s Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle By Jason Pack, Karim Mezran, and Mohamed Eljarh © 2014 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 ISBN: 978-1-61977-053-9 May 2014 Cover Art Credit: Jennifer Segal Table of Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................1 Setting the Context ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Current Threats............................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Policy Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 For the New Libyan Government .................................................................................................................................... 6 For the General National Congress ................................................................................................................................8 For the Constitutional Committee ................................................................................................................................. 8 For Libya’s Western and Regional Allies .....................................................................................................................8 For the United Kingdom .....................................................................................................................................................9 For Italy ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 For the United States ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 For the United Nations and the European Union ..................................................................................................10 Chapter 1. The Center and the Periphery: The Struggle for Post-Qaddafi Libya ................................... 11 The Political Process from NTC to Present .......................................................................................................................11 The Successes and Failures of the Central Authorities ...............................................................................................13 The Successes and Failures of the Local Authorities ...................................................................................................14 Chapter 2. Appeasement: Its Rationales, Costs, and Alternatives .............................................................. 17 The Proximal Cause of Libya’s Current Woes ..................................................................................................................17 The GNC as Appeasers ................................................................................................................................................................18 ............20 Alternative Views of the GNC: Could They Be Classified ............................................................................................................... As Temporizers or Over-centralizers? 20 TheViable Origins Alternatives and Implications to Appeasement of Appeasement and Subsidies ......................................................................................................21 Chapter 3. Meet the Militias, Their Leaderships, Alliance System, and Subgroupings ........... 25 ............................................25 Zintan The Players Militias in the. Struggle. .for . the. Post-Qaddafi. Future . 28 Tripoli Militias ....................................................................................29 Misrata Militias ...................................................................................30 ..................................................................................31 Islamist Benghazi Militias Militias...................................................................................31 Armed Eastern Federalists ........................................................................35 Chapter 4. The Official Security Sector and Infiltration by the Militias ..........................41 Supporters of the Militias and Islamists Inside the Government....................................41 The Libyan Populace ..............................................................................42 Libyan Military and Security Forces ...............................................................43 The Conventional Forces . 43 Attempts at DDR ..............................................................................44 Using the Brigades as Building Blocks .........................................................45 ......................................................................46 The Authorized Brigades .......................................48 TheInternational Nascent National Training Army of Security vs. the Forces Authorized...................................................... Brigades 49 Chapter 5. GNC Reform, Constitution Drafting, and the National Dialogue ...................... 53 GNC (and Successor Body) Reform.................................................................53 Constitution Drafting, Delimiting the GNC’s Mandate, and Creating a Functional Successor Body...54 The National Dialogue.............................................................................59 Medium-term Scenarios: Constitutional Failure or a Populist Constitution .........................60 .............................................................61 Conclusions Long-term.................................................................................... Scenarios: Pakistanization 63 Acknowledgements ............................................................................ 65 Appendix: Violence, Crime, and Oil............................................................... i Assassinations, Violence, and Terrorist Activity .....................................................i Criminal Activity.................................................................................. iv .....................................................................................v About Oil theDisruptions Authors .............................................................................viii Atlantic Council Board of Directors .............................................................ix Executive Summary The proximal cause of Libya’s current problems in the security sector, the economy, and the simultaneously working to create an environment transition to constitutional governance is the thatof the promotes specific driverspolicies that and sustaindecisions them, that while are not Libyan authorities’ policy of appeasement of their opponents. Some analysts have absolved the post- Paradoxically, such a conclusion gives reason for cautiousrooted in optimism, the practice as ofit istemporizing/appeasement. far easier to correct Council (NTC), General National Congress (GNC), the Libyan government’s practice of appeasement Qaddafi authorities—the National Transitional rather than attempting to fundamentally change agency and responsibility for the current problems the country’s tribal and regional structures, while government, cabinet, and ministries—of both their simultaneously constructing functional institutions social and regional structures, and the absence out of thin air. ofby institutions blaming Qaddafi-era (such as a policies, national Libya’s army or primordial civil society) for most challenges currently facing the The momentum of centrifugal forces undermining country. These factors are, indeed, key components the Libyan state recently culminated in the Morning Glory tanker loading pirated oil at al- of the troubles and constitute the root causes of the current situation. However, these preexisting Sidra terminal and eluding government forces to factors have been exacerbated and mutated by the escape into international waters on March 11, 2014. practice of appeasement. Selling pirated oil on the international markets had long been the goal of the self-styled Federalist leader Ibrahim Jadhran, whose supporters have maintained a blockade over some of Eastern Libya’s lackingThere is the no institutionaldoubt that Qaddafi’s capacity, legacy leadership is largely style, oil ports since early autumn 2013. In response, orresponsible collective for will the to post-Qaddafiface down their authorities opponents. Yet, it is possible to disentangle the impact of the and returned it to the Libyan authorities. This chainUS Navy of events,SEALS seizedcombined