The Real Problem in US–Israeli Relations
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Dov Waxman The Real Problem in U.S.—Israeli Relations Of all the foreign relationships of the United States, perhaps none is as closely watched and incessantly scrutinized as its relationship with Israel. Like a couple in counseling, U.S.—Israeli relations are the subject of endless analysis. Both supporters and critics are forever on the lookout for the slightest signs of tension or unease, with the former anguishing over them, and the latter celebrating. While there was little to pay attention to during the years of the Bush administration, given its tight and largely uncritical embrace of Israel, the tenure of the Obama administration has provided ample opportunities for U.S.—Israel watchers to speculate on the troubles between Washington and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. By now, the nature of this debate is entirely predictableÑon one side are those who decry President Obama’s alleged failure to resolutely support Israel,1 and on the other are those who defend the president’s pro-Israeli record.2 Both sides, however, are focusing on the wrong issue. The real debate is not over whether Obama is pro-Israel enough. The real debate we should be having is: how much do U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East really overlap today? Put simply, the fundamental problem in U.S.—Israeli relations is not a matter of individuals, however important they may be, but increasingly divergent interests. The ‘‘Blame Obama First’’ Crowd To many Israelis, and Israeli supporters in the United States, the reason for the tensions between the United States and Israel in recent years is simple: Dov Waxman is an associate professor of political science at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). He is the author of The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending / Defining the Nation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), and co-author of Israel’s Palestinians: The Conflict Within (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:2 pp. 71Á87 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.666172 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 71 Dov Waxman President Obama is not really pro-IsraelÑor at least not in the way that right-wing, hawkish Israeli and American Jews, and most Republicans, understand the term. For them, being ow much do ‘‘pro-Israel’’ means providing uncritical support H for Israeli governments. It certainly doesn’t mean U.S. and Israeli lecturing Israel on what’s best for it, or applying interests in the any kind of pressure on itÑboth of which Middle East really President Obama has done. By this narrow definition, Obama is certainly not ‘‘pro-Israel,’’ overlap today? but then neither are many American Jews, nor even Israelis for that matter, who also don’t blindly support the Netanyahu government. But it is not only right-wing Israeli and American Jews who question Obama’s pro-Israel credentials. There is a widespread sentiment within Israel and the American Jewish community that President Obama is not emotionally or instinctively pro-Israel in the way that his recent predecessors have been (notably, presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton). While Obama is credited with helping Israel on occasion (at the United Nations for instance,3 or when the Israeli embassy in Cairo was under siege), he is not regarded as a ‘‘true friend’’ of the country. However baseless this belief may be, it has endured despite the best efforts of President Obama and his supporters to dispel it. Indeed, within parts of the American Jewish community, it has become something of a cliche´ to say that Obama does not have a feeling in his ‘‘kishkes’’ (meaning ‘‘guts’’ in Yiddish) for Israel.4 The persistence of the belief that Obama is not sincerely pro-Israel is also, it must be noted, a result of the constant efforts of Republicans to woo Jewish voters and donors. There is nothing new about this attempt by Republicans, but with Obama in office it has gained new momentum and hope. Republicans appear to be convinced that this time, unlike all previous instances when the great Jewish defection from the Democratic Party was supposed to occur, large numbers of Jewish voters will really abandon their traditional Democratic affiliation and vote for a Republican presidential candidate. Although this scenario remains highly unlikely (notwithstanding last year’s upset Republican win in New York’s heavily Jewish 9th congressional districtÑAnthony Weiner’s former seat),5 it entices Republicans who hope to make Obama’s stance on Israel a partisan ‘‘wedge issue’’ in 2012. Thus, the incessant criticisms of Obama’s attitude toward Israel by Republican politicians and commentators should really be seen as electioneering, not objective analysis. 72 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 The Real Problem in U.S.ÁIsraeli Relations Not only is much of the criticism of Obama’s approach to the U.S. relationship with Israel tendentious (and quite possible disingenuous), it is also highly selective. The assertion that Obama has ‘‘thrown Israel under the bus’’ (in Mitt Romney’s words) is belied by the fact that U.S.—Israeli defense ties have actually increased during the Obama administration.6 This is not to say that Obama’s handling of relations with Israel has been flawless by any means. The president and others in his administration have undoubtedly made numerous tactical mistakes, some of which have been very costly. Most egregiously, Obama has not visited Israel or directly spoken to the Israeli public, although he has addressed the Muslim and Arab publics in Ankara in April 2009, Cairo in June 2009, and at the State Department in May 2010. But while the administration has been guilty of mishandling the relationship at times, it cannot fairly be accused of reducing U.S. support for Israel, as many of its critics charge. If President Obama, therefore, is not to blame for the recurrent U.S.—Israeli tensions that have arisen during his term, who or what is? Some analysts have suggested that the trouble lies in a clash between two very different At the root of today’s 7 leadersÑObama and Netanyahu. Politically, tensions are they come from different campsÑObama is a liberal, Netanyahu a conservativeÑand increasingly differing personally they don’t seem to like or trust each strategic perspectives. other very much.8 The lack of personal warmth between them has been on full display in their White House meetings, most notoriously in May 2011 when Netanyahu publicly lectured a stern-faced Obama in front of the press, after the president stated in a speech at the State Department the day before that the borders of a future Palestinian state should be based upon the 1967 ‘‘Green Line’’ with mutually agreed land swaps. Although the personal chemistry of leaders can certainly make a difference in interstate relationshipsÑthink of the close relationship between President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for exampleÑit does not fully account for the tensions in U.S.—Israeli relations during the Obama administration. After all, these tensions are not just limited to Obama and Netanyahu. They are more widespread and deeply rooted. They stem from more than merely a personality clash between the two leaders. At the root of the tensions are differing strategic perspectives. Only by recognizing this can we really understand the problem in U.S.—Israeli relations today. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 73 Dov Waxman Common Interests, Divergent Strategic Perspectives Over a century ago, British Prime Minster Lord Palmerton famously stated that, ‘‘Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests,’’ and ever since the expression has become one of the guiding dictums of a Realist approach to foreign affairs. When it comes to discussing U.S.—Israeli relations, however, there is a tendency to ignore this hard truth. Instead, both American and Israeli officials tirelessly insist that, as President Obama put it in his address to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference on May 22, 2011: ‘‘The bonds between the United States and Israel are unbreakable.’’9 While these words may be comforting to supporters of the informal alliance between the two, they evade the fundamental reality that both states are guided by their perceived national interests, and it is these interests, not their mutual affection, that will ultimately determine the nature of their relationship. The more these interests are perceived to align, the better this relationship will be. To be sure, the United States and Israel continue to share many common interests in the The two countries Middle East. They both oppose Iran’s nuclear also don’t see eye- program and want to weaken Tehran’s regional influence; they both want to counter the to-eye on how to proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of achieve the things mass destruction in the region; they both want to they both want. stop Islamist-inspired terrorism (whether by al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, or other Islamist and jihadist groups); and they both want to support pro-Western regimes, such as Jordan’s, and maintain some kind of stability in the region. In principle, both also want a peaceful resolution of the Arab—Israeli conflict, involving ‘‘two states for two peoples’’ (i.e., a Jewish state and a Palestinian state) and ‘‘normalization’’ between the Arab world and Israel. On paper, or in speeches then, everything looks good. The challenge, however, comes when translating these broad goals into actual policies and deciding which to prioritize. All too often, the United States and Israel have different priorities and favor different strategies.