The Real Problem in US–Israeli Relations

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Real Problem in US–Israeli Relations Dov Waxman The Real Problem in U.S.—Israeli Relations Of all the foreign relationships of the United States, perhaps none is as closely watched and incessantly scrutinized as its relationship with Israel. Like a couple in counseling, U.S.—Israeli relations are the subject of endless analysis. Both supporters and critics are forever on the lookout for the slightest signs of tension or unease, with the former anguishing over them, and the latter celebrating. While there was little to pay attention to during the years of the Bush administration, given its tight and largely uncritical embrace of Israel, the tenure of the Obama administration has provided ample opportunities for U.S.—Israel watchers to speculate on the troubles between Washington and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. By now, the nature of this debate is entirely predictableÑon one side are those who decry President Obama’s alleged failure to resolutely support Israel,1 and on the other are those who defend the president’s pro-Israeli record.2 Both sides, however, are focusing on the wrong issue. The real debate is not over whether Obama is pro-Israel enough. The real debate we should be having is: how much do U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East really overlap today? Put simply, the fundamental problem in U.S.—Israeli relations is not a matter of individuals, however important they may be, but increasingly divergent interests. The ‘‘Blame Obama First’’ Crowd To many Israelis, and Israeli supporters in the United States, the reason for the tensions between the United States and Israel in recent years is simple: Dov Waxman is an associate professor of political science at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). He is the author of The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending / Defining the Nation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), and co-author of Israel’s Palestinians: The Conflict Within (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Copyright # 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 35:2 pp. 71Á87 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.666172 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 71 Dov Waxman President Obama is not really pro-IsraelÑor at least not in the way that right-wing, hawkish Israeli and American Jews, and most Republicans, understand the term. For them, being ow much do ‘‘pro-Israel’’ means providing uncritical support H for Israeli governments. It certainly doesn’t mean U.S. and Israeli lecturing Israel on what’s best for it, or applying interests in the any kind of pressure on itÑboth of which Middle East really President Obama has done. By this narrow definition, Obama is certainly not ‘‘pro-Israel,’’ overlap today? but then neither are many American Jews, nor even Israelis for that matter, who also don’t blindly support the Netanyahu government. But it is not only right-wing Israeli and American Jews who question Obama’s pro-Israel credentials. There is a widespread sentiment within Israel and the American Jewish community that President Obama is not emotionally or instinctively pro-Israel in the way that his recent predecessors have been (notably, presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton). While Obama is credited with helping Israel on occasion (at the United Nations for instance,3 or when the Israeli embassy in Cairo was under siege), he is not regarded as a ‘‘true friend’’ of the country. However baseless this belief may be, it has endured despite the best efforts of President Obama and his supporters to dispel it. Indeed, within parts of the American Jewish community, it has become something of a cliche´ to say that Obama does not have a feeling in his ‘‘kishkes’’ (meaning ‘‘guts’’ in Yiddish) for Israel.4 The persistence of the belief that Obama is not sincerely pro-Israel is also, it must be noted, a result of the constant efforts of Republicans to woo Jewish voters and donors. There is nothing new about this attempt by Republicans, but with Obama in office it has gained new momentum and hope. Republicans appear to be convinced that this time, unlike all previous instances when the great Jewish defection from the Democratic Party was supposed to occur, large numbers of Jewish voters will really abandon their traditional Democratic affiliation and vote for a Republican presidential candidate. Although this scenario remains highly unlikely (notwithstanding last year’s upset Republican win in New York’s heavily Jewish 9th congressional districtÑAnthony Weiner’s former seat),5 it entices Republicans who hope to make Obama’s stance on Israel a partisan ‘‘wedge issue’’ in 2012. Thus, the incessant criticisms of Obama’s attitude toward Israel by Republican politicians and commentators should really be seen as electioneering, not objective analysis. 72 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 The Real Problem in U.S.ÁIsraeli Relations Not only is much of the criticism of Obama’s approach to the U.S. relationship with Israel tendentious (and quite possible disingenuous), it is also highly selective. The assertion that Obama has ‘‘thrown Israel under the bus’’ (in Mitt Romney’s words) is belied by the fact that U.S.—Israeli defense ties have actually increased during the Obama administration.6 This is not to say that Obama’s handling of relations with Israel has been flawless by any means. The president and others in his administration have undoubtedly made numerous tactical mistakes, some of which have been very costly. Most egregiously, Obama has not visited Israel or directly spoken to the Israeli public, although he has addressed the Muslim and Arab publics in Ankara in April 2009, Cairo in June 2009, and at the State Department in May 2010. But while the administration has been guilty of mishandling the relationship at times, it cannot fairly be accused of reducing U.S. support for Israel, as many of its critics charge. If President Obama, therefore, is not to blame for the recurrent U.S.—Israeli tensions that have arisen during his term, who or what is? Some analysts have suggested that the trouble lies in a clash between two very different At the root of today’s 7 leadersÑObama and Netanyahu. Politically, tensions are they come from different campsÑObama is a liberal, Netanyahu a conservativeÑand increasingly differing personally they don’t seem to like or trust each strategic perspectives. other very much.8 The lack of personal warmth between them has been on full display in their White House meetings, most notoriously in May 2011 when Netanyahu publicly lectured a stern-faced Obama in front of the press, after the president stated in a speech at the State Department the day before that the borders of a future Palestinian state should be based upon the 1967 ‘‘Green Line’’ with mutually agreed land swaps. Although the personal chemistry of leaders can certainly make a difference in interstate relationshipsÑthink of the close relationship between President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for exampleÑit does not fully account for the tensions in U.S.—Israeli relations during the Obama administration. After all, these tensions are not just limited to Obama and Netanyahu. They are more widespread and deeply rooted. They stem from more than merely a personality clash between the two leaders. At the root of the tensions are differing strategic perspectives. Only by recognizing this can we really understand the problem in U.S.—Israeli relations today. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j SPRING 2012 73 Dov Waxman Common Interests, Divergent Strategic Perspectives Over a century ago, British Prime Minster Lord Palmerton famously stated that, ‘‘Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests,’’ and ever since the expression has become one of the guiding dictums of a Realist approach to foreign affairs. When it comes to discussing U.S.—Israeli relations, however, there is a tendency to ignore this hard truth. Instead, both American and Israeli officials tirelessly insist that, as President Obama put it in his address to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference on May 22, 2011: ‘‘The bonds between the United States and Israel are unbreakable.’’9 While these words may be comforting to supporters of the informal alliance between the two, they evade the fundamental reality that both states are guided by their perceived national interests, and it is these interests, not their mutual affection, that will ultimately determine the nature of their relationship. The more these interests are perceived to align, the better this relationship will be. To be sure, the United States and Israel continue to share many common interests in the The two countries Middle East. They both oppose Iran’s nuclear also don’t see eye- program and want to weaken Tehran’s regional influence; they both want to counter the to-eye on how to proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of achieve the things mass destruction in the region; they both want to they both want. stop Islamist-inspired terrorism (whether by al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, or other Islamist and jihadist groups); and they both want to support pro-Western regimes, such as Jordan’s, and maintain some kind of stability in the region. In principle, both also want a peaceful resolution of the Arab—Israeli conflict, involving ‘‘two states for two peoples’’ (i.e., a Jewish state and a Palestinian state) and ‘‘normalization’’ between the Arab world and Israel. On paper, or in speeches then, everything looks good. The challenge, however, comes when translating these broad goals into actual policies and deciding which to prioritize. All too often, the United States and Israel have different priorities and favor different strategies.
Recommended publications
  • NPR Mideast Coverage April - June 2012
    NPR Mideast Coverage April - June 2012 This report covers NPR's reporting on events and trends related to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians during the second quarter of 2012. The report begins with an assessment of the 37 stories and interviews, covered by this review, that aired from April through June on radio shows produced by NPR. The 37 radio items is just one more than the lowest number for any quarter (in July-September 2008) during the past ten years. Over that period, NPR programs have carried an average of nearly 100 items per quarter related to Israel, the Palestinians, or both. I also reviewed 20 news stories, blogs and other items carried exclusively on NPR's website. All of the radio and website-only items covered by this review are shown on the "Israel-Palestinian coverage" page of the website. The opinions expressed in this report are mine alone. Accuracy I carefully reviewed all items for factual accuracy, with special attention to the radio stories, interviews and website postings produced by NPR staffers. NPR's coverage of the region continues to be remarkably accurate for a news organization with very tight deadlines. NPR has posted no corrections on its website for stories that originated during the April-June quarter; two corrections were posted in April concerning items dealt with in my report for the January-March quarter. I found no outright inaccuracies during the period, but I will point out two instances of misleading use of language. Freelance correspondent Sheera Frenkel reported for All Things Considered on May 8 about the status of a hunger strike among Palestinian prisoners.
    [Show full text]
  • Issue No. 486 AUGUST 2021
    Issue Brief ISSUE NO. 486 AUGUST 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme Kunal Singh Abstract Israel believes that the use of force is essential to stopping Iran from making the nuclear bomb. A vocal section of the strategic affairs community in the United States agrees with the proposition. This brief argues that military means are unlikely to sabotage the nuclear weapons programme of an advanced-stage bomb-seeker like Iran. Moreover, use of force could be counterproductive as it can incentivise Iran’s pursuit of the bomb, and it may erode the confidence required for diplomatic negotiations that can possibly help cease the weapons programme. Attribution: Kunal Singh, “The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” ORF Issue Brief No. 486, August 2021, Observer Research Foundation. 01 n early April in Vienna, the Biden administration initiated efforts with Iran to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, from which the United States (US) had exited during the tenure of former US President Donald Trump. A week later, an explosion at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment Ifacility caused a power blackout. Israel, the state most vocally opposed to the JCPOA, is widely believed to have
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction Chapter 1
    Notes Introduction 1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1970). 2. Ralph Pettman, Human Behavior and World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 275– 76. 3. Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” Commentary, January 1976; Ofira Seliktar, The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq (New York: Palgrave Mac- millan, 2008), 4. 4. Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in Amer- ica (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). 5. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 24– 49; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Chapter 1 1. Quoted in Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemma of Human Rights (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 11– 12, 114– 15, 133, 138– 39; Hedley Donovan, Roosevelt to Reagan: A Reporter’s Encounter with Nine Presidents (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 165. 2. Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 357; Peter Meyer, James Earl Carter: The Man and the Myth (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 18; Michael A. Turner, “Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5 (1991): 275– 86. 3. Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World’s Intelligence (Washington, DC: Brassey’s [US], 1993), 169; Robert M.
    [Show full text]
  • Rise and Kill First: the Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations
    All articles published in the Journal of Special Operations Medicine are protected by United States copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published without the prior written permission of Breakaway Media, LLC. Contact [email protected]. Rise and Kill First The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations Bergman R. Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York, NY: Random House; 2018. Hardcover: 784 pages. ISBN-10: 1400069718, ISBN-13: 978-1400069712. Review by COL (Ret) Warner “Rocky” D. Farr, MD, MPH his New York Times bestseller is the first definitive his- fully into focus, including the assassination of Gerald Bull, tory of the Mossad, Shin Bet, and the Israeli Defense Sadam Hussain’s large gun developer, killed in Belgium, and TForce’s targeted killing programs. The New York Times the killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists with motorcy- hailed it as “an exceptional work, a humane book about an cle bombs in Tehran. Israeli attack failures are also discussed, incendiary subject,” and it won the National as are the fairly common operational issue Jewish Book Award in History for 2018. Jen- of civilian casualties. Assassination methods nifer Szalai at The New York Times named it varied from AK-47s to poisoned toothpaste. one of the 10 best books of the year. It was Female agents seemed to have better timing of also named one of the best books of the year detonations used on moving vehicle targets. by The Economist, The New York Times Assassination targets varied from Palestin- Book Review, the BBC History Magazine, ians to ex-Nazi scientists developing rockets Mother Jones, and the Kirkus Reviews.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolstering U.S.-Israel Defense of Shared Interests: an Agenda for the Biden Administration
    Bolstering U.S.-Israel Defense of Shared Interests: An Agenda for the Biden Administration JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy January 2021 DISCLAIMER The findings and recommendations contained in this publication are solely those of the authors. Cover image credit: Getty Policy Project Staff and Contributors JINSA Staff & Contributors Michael Makovsky, PhD President & CEO Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Charles B. Perkins Director for U.S.-Israel Security Policy Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst Table of Contents Executive Summary 7 Strategic Context 12 Next Steps for a U.S.-Israel Security Agenda 16 Appendix 25 Endnotes 26 Executive Summary Urgent challenges and opportunities await the new Biden Administration and 117th Congress in the broader Middle East. Though the Administration may prefer to first address domestic priorities, unfortunately the world won’t wait – especially the Middle East. Shia extremist Iran and Sunni revisionist Turkey actively threaten U.S. national security and international stability more generally, while Israel faces challenges as it continues to defend U.S. interests ably. At this inflection point, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) is releasing a series of three related policy papers on the major issues confronting the Middle East. This first paper details the benefits to the United States of, and specific ways to build upon, strong security cooperation with Israel and the diplomatic breakthroughs of the Abraham Accords. Succeeding reports will lay out the twin threats from Iran and Turkey and will provide additional recommendations for American policymakers.
    [Show full text]
  • UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title History in the Public Courtroom: Commissions of Inquiry and Struggles over the History and Memory of Israeli Traumas Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3vf2g7r0 Author Molchadsky, Nadav Gadi Publication Date 2015 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles History in the Public Courtroom: Commissions of Inquiry and Struggles over the History and Memory of Israeli Traumas A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In History by Nadav Gadi Molchadsky 2015 © Copyright by Nadav Gadi Molchadsky 2015 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION History in the Public Courtroom: Commissions of Inquiry and Struggles over the History and Memory of Israeli Traumas by Nadav Gadi Molchadsky Doctor of Philosophy in History University of California, Los Angeles, 2015 Professor David N. Myers, Co-Chair Professor Arieh B. Saposnik, Co-Chair This study seeks to shed new light on the complex web of relations among history, historiography and contemporary life. It does so by focusing on Israeli commissions of inquiry that have taken rise in the wake of major national traumas such as failed battles in the 1948 War, the Yom Kippur War, and the assassination of the Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff. Each one of these landmark events in the history of Israel was investigated by a state or a military commission of inquiry, whose members and audience operate as authors of history and agents of memory. The study suggests that commissions of inquiry, which have been studied to date primarily as legal, administrative, and political bodies, in fact also operate as a public historian of a unique kind.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Background and U.S. Relations
    Israel: Background and U.S. Relations Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs February 27, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33476 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of Congress have demonstrated a commitment to Israel’s security and to maintaining close U.S.-Israel cooperation. Bilateral closeness has been based on common perceptions of shared democratic values and religious affinities. The question of Israel’s security regularly influences U.S. policy considerations regarding the Middle East, and Congress provides active oversight of executive branch dealings with Israel and other actors in the region. Israel is a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and a frequent purchaser of major U.S. weapons systems. By law, U.S. arms sales cannot adversely affect Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over other countries in its region. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, and the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner. Israel has many regional security concerns. Aligning U.S. and Israeli policies to address these concerns has presented persistent challenges. By voicing criticism of international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may seek to give Israel a voice in an ongoing negotiating process in which it does not directly participate, though observers debate whether his efforts are more likely to boost or diminish his influence over outcomes. Netanyahu is scheduled to address a joint meeting of Congress on the matter on March 3, 2015. In addition to concerns over Iran, Israel’s perceptions of security around its borders have changed since 2011 as several surrounding Arab countries have experienced political upheaval.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and the Middle East News Update
    Israel and the Middle East News Update Monday, October 29 Headlines: ​ ● PA Condemns Deadly Attack at Pittsburgh Synagogue ● Minister Bennett Meets with Mourners in Pittsburgh ● Three Gazan Teens Said Killed in Israeli Strike ● Omani Official Visits Abbas After PM Meets Sultan ● In Oman, Minister Katz to Promote Rail Line to Gulf ● Abbas: No Palestinian State in – or Without – Gaza ● Israeli Official Says State Preventing Palestinian Building ● Oren: Recognize Non-Orthodox Jews After Shooting Commentary: ● Ha’aretz: “Gaza Fuse Getting Shorter as PM Risks Losing Control” − By Amos Harel, Senior Columnist ● Ynet: “Oman is Israel’s Link to the Middle East” − By Ronen Bergman, Analyst S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 The Hon. Robert Wexler, President ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● Aaron Zucker, Associate Editor ​ ​ News Excerpts ​ October 29, 2018 Times of Israel PA Condemns Deadly Attack at Pittsburgh Synagogue The Palestinian Authority Foreign Ministry on Sunday condemned the deadly shooting attack at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, calling it “a terrorist act.” “The Foreign Ministry condemns this terrorist act that targeted a Jewish synagogue in Pittsburgh,” the PA Foreign Ministry said in a statement published by the official PA news agency Wafa. “The ministry condemns the targeting of places of worship by these terrorists who hold fascist and rotten beliefs based on the supremacy and dominance of white people.” Jerusalem Post Minister Bennett Meets with Mourners in Pittsburgh Minister of Education and Diaspora Affairs Naftali Bennett addressed a vigil in Pittsburgh on Sunday. "Nearly eighty years since Kristallnacht, when the Jews of Europe perished in the flames of their houses of worship, one thing is clear," Bennett said.
    [Show full text]
  • Rise and Kill First by Emil Archambault
    Book review: Rise and kill first by Emil Archambault This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. On 6 August 2018, an article by David Halbfinger and Ronen Bergman appeared in the New York Times, reporting on the death of a Syrian scientist working on a missile program (Halbfinger and Bergman, 2018). Syrian sources were quick to blame Israeli agents for the car bomb which killed the scientist, accusations which Israel was quick to dismiss. Yet, as Halbfinger and Bergman note, this car bomb followed a suspicious pattern: ‘Israel did not claim responsibility. It never does. But the Mossad has a long history of assassinating scientists developing weaponry seen as a threat’ (Halbfinger and Bergman, 2018). This long-standing pattern of targeted assassinations is the focus of Ronen Bergman – a correspondent for the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth and for The New York Times, author of the article quoted above – in his monumental book Rise and kill first. As Bergman notes, ‘Israel has assassinated more people than any other country in the Western world’ (Bergman, 2018, p. xxii). Accordingly, this book demonstrates the central – and constant – presence of targeted assassination in Israeli policy since the beginning of the twentieth century, before even the foundation of the state of Israel. To some measure, the result of a disadvantageous military situation, diplomatic isolation, the Holocaust trauma and path dependency, Bergman argues that targeted killing often became the default option for the resolution of diplomatic, political and military crises. In this book, Bergman traces the use of targeted assassination by the Israeli Defence Forces and by intelligence agencies, noting broad shifts in doctrines, the means and restraints on the use of assassination, and strategic imperatives.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control
    AVNER COHEN Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control AVNER COHEN1 Dr. Avner Cohen is Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, as well as the Program on Security and Disarmament, at the University of Maryland. He is the author of Israel and the Bomb (New York Columbia University Press, 1998). n April 1948, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding Klingberg espionage case, as well as the 1991 Gulf War father and first prime minister, wrote a letter to Ehud and the subsequent revelations about Iraq’s chemical and IAvriel, one of the Jewish Agency’s operatives in Eu- biological programs, have aroused public curiosity and rope, ordering him to seek out and recruit East European speculation regarding Israel’s capabilities in the CBW field. Jewish scientists who could “either increase the capacity Yet details about these programs—their history, strategic to kill masses or to cure masses; both are important.”2 rationale, and technical capabilities—remain shrouded in One of the scientists Avriel recruited was a 30-year old secrecy. epidemiologist and colonel in the Red Army named A comparison with Israel’s nuclear weapons (NW) pro- Avraham Marcus Klingberg. In time, Klingberg became gram highlights this point. Although Israel has not acknowl- one of Israel’s leading scientists in the area of chemical edged possessing NW and has declared that it “will not and biological weapons (CBW). He was among the found- be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle ing members and, subsequently, the deputy director of East,” the existence of the Israeli bomb has been the the Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) in Ness world’s worst kept secret since about 1970.4 That is not Ziona, a dozen miles southeast of Tel Aviv.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mughniyeh Mystery: Calculations and Betrayals
    Journal of Strategy and Politics (2020), Volume 2, Number 3, pp. 79-107. © Institute for the Study of Strategy and Politics 2020. Published subject to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The Mughniyeh Mystery: Calculations and Betrayals Anonymous On the night of February 12, 2008, Imad Mughniyeh was wrapping up a meeting at a Damascus safe house controlled by the Syrian intelligence service. Mughniyeh, one of the most senior-ranking members of Hezbollah, had been on the run for almost his entire adult life. He lived like a ghost, rarely spending more than one night in the same location and constantly staying on the move. Having spent most of his life in his home country of Lebanon, Mughniyeh had recently moved to Damascus, where he believed the protection offered by the Syrian government would better shield him from his Israeli hunters. For a time, he had been right, but that night his luck had officially run out. After leaving the meeting around 11 pm, Mughniyeh walked around his car to open the driver’s side door. When he passed by the car’s trunk, a small bomb hidden inside the spare tire detonated, cutting Mughniyeh in half and killing him on the spot.1 This is but one account of Mughniyeh’s death, an event which remains as clouded in mystery as the man’s life. Conventional wisdom holds that his death was primarily a revenge killing carried out by the Mossad (with some CIA 1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations (London: John Murray Publishers, 2019), 602.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
    Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Updated January 27, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44245 SUMMARY R44245 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief January 27, 2021 The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations. Jim Zanotti Domestic issues: March 2021 election. After the collapse of its power-sharing Specialist in Middle government in December 2020, Israel is scheduled to hold another election for its Eastern Affairs Knesset (parliament) on March 23, 2021. The election will be Israel’s fourth in the past two years—a frequency without parallel in the country’s history. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has managed to maintain power despite an ongoing criminal trial on corruption charges that is set to resume in February 2021. Netanyahu apparently hopes to create a coalition government that will grant him legal immunity or to remain indefinitely as caretaker prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) by preventing anyone from forming a coalition without him and his Likud party. Palestinians and Arab state normalization. On the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump Administration policies largely sided with Israeli positions, thus alienating Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. In the second half of 2020, the Administration pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach agreements—known as the Abraham Accords—on normalizing its relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity have accelerated since then.
    [Show full text]