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Case Study Report Deliverable 4.1 CASE STUDY REPORT DELIVERABLE 4.1 Project title/acronym: EXIT Europe Grant Agreement No. 823675 Project Start Date 01-01-2019 Duration of the Project 27 months Deliverable Number D4.1 Bundesministerium für Inneres – Bundesamt für Deliverable Lead Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung Contractual Deadline PM25 Submission Date 10-03-2021 This project was funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police under grant agreement No. 823675. AMENDMENT HISTORY Version Date Author/Reviewer Description / Comments Ester Kövérová, Karina Andášiková, v0.1 24.02.2021 Finalisation of Case Studies in Slovakia Natália Pindrochová, Peter Kulifaj v0.2 02.03.2021 Luca Guglielminetti, Mariachiara Giorda Finalisation of Case Studies in Italy v0.3 02.03.2021 Harald Weilnböck Finalisation of Case Studies in Germany v0.4 02.03.2021 Victoria Steinek Executive Summary and Introduction Eduardo Valenzuela, Elyamine Seytoul, v0.5 03.03.2021 Finalisation of Case Studies in France Hasna Hussein, Farhad Khosrokhavar v1.0 10.03.2021 Victoria Steinek Final Deliverable for Submission Contributors / Authors Name Organisation Victoria Steinek Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) / Cultures Harald Weilnböck Interactive e.V. (CI) Eduardo Valenzuela Association Dialogue Citoyens (ADC) Elyamine Seytoul Association Dialogue Citoyens (ADC) Farhad Khosrokhavar Association Dialogue Citoyens (ADC) Hasna Hussein Association Dialogue Citoyens (ADC) Luca Guglielminetti Fondazione Benvenuti in Italia (BIT) Mariachiara Giorda Fondazione Benvenuti in Italia (BIT) Ester Kövérová Mládež ulice (MLADEZ) Karina Andášiková Mládež ulice (MLADEZ) Natália Pindrochová Mládež ulice (MLADEZ) Peter Kulifaj Mládež ulice (MLADEZ) Reviewers Name Organisation Victoria Steinek Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) Harald Weilnböck Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 2 PROJECT CONSORTIUM Project Coordinator Bundesministerium für Inneres - Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (BMI/BVT) Consortium Partners Association Dialogue Citoyens ADC France Cultures Interactive E.V. CI Germany Fondazione Benvenuti in Italia BENVENUTI Italy Mládež ulice – Youth Street Work MLADEZ Slovakia Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik OIIP Austria Türkische Gemeinde in Schleswig-Holstein TGSH Germany Vrije Universiteit Brussel VUB Belgium Legal Notices The information in this document is subject to change without notice. The Members of the EXIT Europe Consortium make no warranty of any kind with regard to this document, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The Members of the EXIT Europe Consortium shall not be held liable for errors contained herein or direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages in connection with the furnishing, performance, or use of this material. The content of this deliverable represents the views of the author(s) only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 3 ABBREVIATIONS CVE Countering Violent Extremism D Deliverable EU European Union GDR German Democratic Republic FRG Federal Republic of Germany PVE Preventing Violent Extremism RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network WP Work Package EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT HISTORY ..................................................................................................... 2 ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 8 1 CASE STUDIES IN FRANCE .......................................................................................... 11 1.1 Case Study “Emma”: from family crisis to inner subjectivation, after a radicalisation journey .......................................................................................................................... 11 1.2 Case Study “Vincent”: getting out from a low-level radicalisation process after an identity crisis ................................................................................................................ 22 1.3 Case Study “Mary”: conversion as a solution of youth crisis and timid prospects for change ........................................................................................................................... 29 1.4 Case Study “Oscar”: an illness and the feeling of exclusion leading to radicalisation & a follow-up which had not begun ................................................................................. 38 2 CASE STUDIES IN GERMANY ...................................................................................... 44 2.1 Case elaboration “Client X.” including the earlier account of the so-called "Arrest Training" ....................................................................................................................... 44 2.2 Case Study B.: Descriptive case analysis of a distancing training by cultures interactive e.V. .............................................................................................................. 81 2.3 Case description of EXIT Europe distancing work in a group setting ......................... 98 2.4 Reconstructive case description of the course of two sessions of distancing work in a group stetting, conducted in a school with one half of a class of ninth graders, partly afflicted by regional right-wing extremism ................................................................ 124 2.5 Reconstructive description of a case of distancing work .......................................... 131 3 CASE STUDIES IN ITALY ............................................................................................ 168 3.1 Case Study S.: The Young Conservative.................................................................... 168 EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 5 3.2 Case Study I.: The Lonely Justice Collaborator ......................................................... 178 3.3 Case Study E.: Pride & Anger .................................................................................... 184 3.4 Case Study D.: Female Bullying ................................................................................ 189 4 CASE STUDIES IN SLOVAKIA ................................................................................... 193 4.1 Case Study: Group work in a school setting ............................................................... 193 4.2 Case study “Martin”: The client in the probation process .......................................... 205 4.3 Case study “Karol”: Distancing work with a former member of a radical group ...... 210 4.4 Case study “Miro”: The member of a paramilitary group .......................................... 218 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 222 ANNEX I: Template for Session Reports .......................................................................... 224 ANNEX II: Template for Entrance Interview(s) Reports ................................................ 226 ANNEX III: Template for Case Studies ............................................................................. 229 EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY While implementing operational activities of the “EXIT Europe” project (in particular WP4), one key objective was to produce case studies over the course of exit/distancing work, and give recommendations on how to implement good practice and built up local exit programmes – and how to effectively continue and improve casework in the future, even after the life of the project. The case studies of exit/distancing work, as developed and provided by each local formative evaluator of partner countries France, Germany, Italy and Slovakia, arguably can be seen as innovation in the European PVE/CVE field. For case studies are rare to begin with – and case studies from newly beginning local exit initiatives are practically non-existent. They offer the possibility to get a more in- depth view and thus gain more extensive knowledge of individual radicalisation and deradicalisation/distancing processes in different social and regional environments throughout Europe. Moreover, the glimpse into partner countries’ casework shows various methodological perspectives, ranging from the different methods used and the professional progress made – and provides indications on how to evaluate the process and implementation of exit work. Considering this, the case studies will not only support the continuation of exit programmes through practitioner and community networks – which have been equally established in each partner country to provide long-term after-care – but also nationally and EU wide, feeding into a multi-agency exchange among stakeholders in partner countries and beyond. This Case Study Report (D4.1) therefore aims to inform about the developed case studies of each operational partner aforementioned. EXIT Europe D4.1 – Case Study Report 7 INTRODUCTION Author(s): Victoria Steinek (Project Coordinator, Bundesministerium für Inneres) The key activities
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