Party System Developments and Electoral Legislation in Italy (1948-2009)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Bulletin of Italian Politics Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, 49-68 Party System Developments and Electoral Legislation in Italy (1948-2009) Carlo Fusaro University of Florence Abstract: This article analyses the evolution of the Italian electoral laws after World War Two and the entry into force of the 1948 Constitution with the establishment of a party system built around the pivotal role of the DC which lasted until the 1990s. Later it focuses on developments after the crisis of that party system, and the introduction of two new electoral laws (in 1993 and in 2005). Great attention is devoted to the relationship between the electoral formulas adopted, and the structure, format and mechanics of the party system. However, relevant supporting provisions are not ignored, because of their effect on the party system and on governance (or the form of government as constitutional lawyers call it): the reference is to parliamentary regulations, access to the media, public financing of parties and lists. All these developments are considered within the more general framework of the institutional changes in the way local and sub-national entities have been run in Italy since the middle of the 1990s. Special attention, finally, is devoted to the strikingly different outcomes of the 2006 and 2008 elections and their impact on the most recent party-system developments. Keywords: Italian party system; Electoral Legislation in Italy; Italian transition; Parties’ Strategies and Electoral laws. Introduction This article focuses on the most recent developments in the Italian party system and system of governance. It first analyses the evolution of electoral laws after World War Two until the profound crisis which affected political institutions at all levels, formal and informal. The new governance arrangements introduced in the 1990s are then investigated as well as the electoral laws and their implementation along with the significant changes in the party system. Special attention is devoted to the new electoral system adopted in 2005, its flaws, its first controversial application in 2006 and the rather peculiar but fortunate conditions which prompted the major parties to choose entirely different, and coordinated, line-up strategies in view of the 2008 elections. These different strategies brought about a strikingly Bulletin of Italian Politics ISSN 1759 – 3077 www.gla.ac.uk/bip 49 C. Fusaro different outcome which laid down the preconditions for the potential establishment of a new and unprecedented party system. This article will evaluate these developments and discuss their future prospects. Electoral systems in Italy from World War Two until 1993 Within the Constituent Assembly (1946-1947) no one argued against the view that proportional representation had to be the main criterion for elections to the lower Chamber. After all, proportional representation had been introduced in 1919 and was in force before Fascism; the system used for election of the Constituent Assembly itself had been very similar to the law of 1919. However proportional representation as such was not entrenched in the text of the 1948 Constitution. Even though a deal was struck to elect the new Senate on the basis of the single-member, simple plurality system, and even though the Alcide De Gasperi cabinet introduced proposals that pushed in this direction, a few weeks later an amendment proposed by a prominent leader of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), Giuseppe Dossetti, and backed by the left, ensured that the Senate would also be elected according to an almost purely proportional system. 1 This test confirmed what had already become evident from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly: post-war Italy was destined to become a democracy based upon mass political parties (Bettinelli, 1982; Scoppola, 1991) and run by cabinets supported by coalitions formed by a plurality of parties. Soon the 18 April 1948 elections laid the premises of the party system that would characterise Italy for the next 45 years. The DC led by De Gasperi won a striking victory and conquered 305 seats out of 574 in the Chamber (53 percent) and 130 out of 237 in the Senate (55 percent). At that time however, with the exception of larger cities, proportional representation was not applied to the election of municipal and provincial councils. A few months before the next elections, in part inspired by French precedents, De Gasperi decided to try to free his party from the need to obtain the support of more than one or two minor parties. The immediate goal was to free himself from Vatican interference aimed at forcing the DC to take on board the neo-fascist extreme right; the more general goal, given that the DC was already a party of rather autonomous factions, that of limiting the need for the lengthy and difficult negotiations that seemed to be required prior to almost every single cabinet initiative. The institutional tool meant to deliver this goal was a change in the Chamber electoral law that would introduce a kind of majority-assuring proportional system with a threshold: the list or the coalition of lists that obtained a majority of votes (that is, at least 50 percent of the valid votes plus one) would be able to lay claim to 380 of the 590 seats (that is, 64.4 50 Party System Developments and Electoral Legislation in Italy percent). Among winners and losers the allocation of seats would be proportional. This would have ensured the DC a comfortable majority and the opportunity to negotiate with potential partners from a very strong position without being dependent on them and of course without the need to deal with the extreme right. The potential number of extra seats was very high (up to 14 percent) but the problem was that, with such a large number of seats accruing to it thanks to the law, the winning coalition would have been extremely close to the number of seats required to amend the Constitution (393). With 49.85 percent, the De Gasperi-led coalition fell short of the threshold by about 40,600 votes: a clear political defeat. De Gasperi’s leadership of the DC soon came to an end and the new ruling group within the party changed strategy: the lack of institutional support forced it to look for a new approach to coalition building, one based upon the search for more reliable and larger allies, and more specifically, the enlargement of future coalitions to the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI). A fundamental step was to free Pietro Nenni’s PSI from its close alliance with the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI): to this end the repeal of the 1953 system was a necessary step, as was the broadest possible extension of the principle of proportional representation. 2 The electoral systems used to elect the provincial and municipal councils became proportional and in 1964 the systems were extended to all municipalities over 5,000 inhabitants. 3 The significance of this development cannot be overstated because proportional representation in all relevant municipalities was instrumental in allowing even small parties to take root all over the country and proved to be a fundamental tool of electoral mobilisation. Further measures designed to ensure the consolidation of both a proportional democracy based upon a plurality of political parties, and the Repubblica dei partiti (Scoppola, 1991), followed. They included the new proportional law for the first elections of the Regional assemblies (Law 17 February 1968, no. 108); exemption of the parties already represented in Parliament from the requirement to collect the signatures otherwise necessary for the participation of candidates in a wide range of elections; the introduction of public party financing both through the reimbursement of election expenses and through an annual contribution to the costs of parties’ central offices; new parliamentary regulations designed to grant equal powers to all parliamentary groups regardless of their size, combined with very low thresholds for the formation of parliamentary groups (20 members in the Chamber and 10 members in the Senate, about 3 percent of the total); the most proportional of all Italian electoral laws, the law for the election of Italian members of the European Parliament (Law 24 January 1979, no. 18). Under these circumstances, the increase in the number of groups within the Chamber of Deputies – which rose from 7-8 in the 1950s 51 C. Fusaro to 9-10 in the 1970s and 1980s, to 12 in the eleventh legislature (1992-1994) – should come as no surprise. La Repubblica dei partiti in turmoil, a flawed system of governance under stress and the resort to new electoral laws By the end of the 1960s Italy was in crisis and a few years later it had become apparent to many that it would be much more difficult to overcome the problems highlighted by the students’ and the blue-collar protests than in other European countries. Between 1968 and 1976 the nation was run (so to say) by no less than 11 different cabinets – staffed by the DC alone or by the DC in coalition with between one and three other parties – and led by five different prime ministers. Furthermore, Parliament was dissolved five times before the end of its natural life (in 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983 and 1987). Scholars started talking about a new form of government from the early 1970s; the first of a series of government reports stressing the need for institutional reform was presented in 1979; in 1982 the first parliamentary committees on constitutional revision met. The most sustained attempt to achieve change came with the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee on institutional reform formed by members of both chambers and which met between 1983 and 1985. However not a single amendment was adopted.