The Relative Native Hau Books
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE RELATIVE NATIVE Hau BOOKS Executive Editor Giovanni da Col Managing Editor Sean M. Dowdy Editorial Board Anne-Christine Taylor Carlos Fausto Danilyn Rutherford Ilana Gershon Jason Throop Joel Robbins Jonathan Parry Michael Lempert Stephan Palmié www.haubooks.com THE RELATIVE NATIVE ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS CONCEPTUAL WORLDS Eduardo Viveiros de Castro Hau Books Chicago © 2015 Hau Books and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro Chapter Two is a reprint of Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. “(Anthropology) AND (science),” an after-dinner speech at “Anthropology and Science,” the 5th Decennial Conference of the Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain and Commonwealth, 14 July 2003. Published in Manchester Papers in Social Anthropology, 7, 2003. © 2003 University of Manchester Department of Social Anthropology. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder. Chapter Three is a reprint of Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2004. “Perspectival anthropology and the method of controlled equivocation.” Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America 2 (1): 3–22. © 2003 Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder. Chapter Four is a reprint of Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2011. “Zeno and the art of anthropology: Of lies, beliefs, paradoxes, and other truths.” Common Knowledge 17 (1): 128–45. © 2011 Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder, Duke University Press. www.dukeupress.edu Chapter Five is a new translation of Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2002. “Atualização e contra-efetuação do virtual: O processo do parentesco.” In A inconstância da alma selvagem (e outros ensaios de antropologia), 401–56. São Paulo: Cosac & Naify. © 2002 Cosac & Naify. All rights reserved. Published and translated by permission of the copyright holder, Editora Cosac & Naify. http://editora.cosacnaify.com.br Chapter Six is a reprint of Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2009. “The gift and the given: Three nano-essays on kinship and magic.” In Kinship and beyond: The genealogical model reconsidered, edited by Sandra Bamford and James Leach, 237–68. Oxford: Berghahn. © 2009 Berghahn Books. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder, Berghahn Books. www.berghahnbooks.com Cover and layout design: Sheehan Moore Typesetting: Prepress Plus (www.prepressplus.in) ISBN: 978-0-9905050-3-7 LCCN: 2014953508 Hau Books Chicago Distribution Center 11030 S. Langley Chicago, IL 60628 www.haubooks.com Hau Books is marketed and distributed by The University of Chicago Press. www.press.uchicago.edu Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper. Contents PART I: METHODS chapter one The Relative Native 3 chapter two And 39 chapter three Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation 55 chapter four Zeno and the Art of Anthropology: Of Lies, Beliefs, Pardoxes, and Other Truths 75 PART II: VIRTUAL KINSHIP chapter five Along the Spider Thread: Virtuality, Actualization, and the Kinship process in Amazonia 97 chapter six The Gift and the Given: Three Nano-Essays on Kinship and Magic 139 vi THE RELATIVE NATIVE chapter seven Immanence and Fear: Stranger-Events and Subjects in Amazonia 169 PART III: COSMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVISM IN AMAZONIA AND ELSEWHERE preface to the lectures 191 chapter eight Cosmologies: Perspectivism 195 chapter nine Culture: The Universal Animal 229 chapter ten Nature: The World as Affect and Perspective 249 chapter eleven Supernature: Under the Gaze of the Other 273 afterword Facts force you to believe in them; perspectives encourage you to believe out of them By Roy Wagner 295 Bibliography 325 Index 349 part i Methods chapter one The Relative Native Translated from the Portuguese by Julia Sauma and Martin Holbraad The human being, such as we imagine him, does not exist. —Nelson Rodrigues GROUND RULES The “anthropologist” is a person whose discourse concerns the discourse of a “native.”1 The native need not be overly savage, traditionalist nor, indeed, na- tive to the place where the anthropologist finds him. The anthropologist, on his part, need not be excessively civilized, modernist, or even foreign to the people his discourse concerns.2 The discourses in question (and particularly that of the native) are not necessarily texts, but rather may include all types of meaning 1. The original article was prefaced by the author with the following preamble: “The pages that follow have been adapted from the introductory remarks of a book, currently in preparation, in which I develop ethnographic analyses that have been sketched out in earlier work. The main one is an article published in Mana, ‘Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism’ (Viveiros de Castro 1996 [this appeared in English in JRAI in 1998]), whose metatheoretical premises, as it were, are rendered explicit in the present work. While the text presented here requires no previous familiarity with that earlier work, the reader may bear in mind that such notions as ‘perspective’ and ‘point of view,’ as well as the idea of ‘indigenous thought,’ are elaborated there also.” —Trans. 2. The use of the masculine is arbitrary. 4 THE RELATIVE NATIVE practice.3 What is essential, however, is that the discourse of the anthropolo- gist (or the “observer”) establishes a certain relation with that of the native (or the “observed”). This relation is one of meaning or, when the anthropologist’s discourse aspires to be Scientific, a relation of knowledge. By this token, an- thropological knowledge is also a social relation, since it is the effect of the relationships that reciprocally constitute the knowing subject, on the one hand, and the subject he comes to know, on the other. As with all relations, this form of knowledge brings about a transformation in the relational constitution of anthropologist and native alike.4 The (meta)relation between anthropologist and native is not one of identity: the anthropologist always says and, therefore, does something different than what the native says or does, even when he intends to do nothing more than repeat the native’s discourse in a “textual” form, or when he tries to establish a dialogue—a dubious notion—with the native. This difference is nothing other than the knowledge effect created by the anthropologist’s discourse, which is produced by the relation between the meaning of this discourse and the mean- ing of that of the native.5 Clearly, this kind of discursive alterity is grounded in an assumption of simi- larity. The anthropologist and the native are of the same species and share in its 3. The fact that, canonically as well as literally speaking, anthropological discourse takes the form of texts has a host of implications, which cannot be explored here, though the topic has received exhaustive attention in recent currents of auto- anthropological reflection. The same can be said of the fact that native discourse is, generally, not a text, as well as of the fact that it is often treated as if it were. 4. “Knowledge is not a connection between a subject-substance and an object- substance, but rather a relation between two relations, one located in the domain of the object and the other in the domain of the subject; . the relation between two relations is a relation itself ” (Simondon [1964] 1995: 81; translation, emphases removed). I translated the word rapport, which Gilbert Simondon distinguishes from relation, as “connection”: “we can call a relation the disposition of the elements in a system, which is beyond the spirit’s simple and arbitrary target, and reserve the term connection for an arbitrary and fortuitous relation . the relation would be a connection that is as real and important as the terms themselves; consequently, we could say that the true relation between two terms is actually equivalent to the connection between three terms” (Simondon [1964] 1995: 66; translation). 5. For an analysis of the relational assumptions of this knowledge effect, see Strathern (1987). The author argues that the native’s relation with his discourse is not, in principle, the same as the anthropologist’s relation with his own discourse, and that this difference at once conditions the relation between the two discourses and imposes limits to the whole auto-anthropological enterprise. The Relative NatIVE 5 condition: they are both human, and each of them is positioned in their respec- tive culture, which could (even) be the same. But this is where the game starts to get interesting or, better, strange. For even when the anthropologist and the native share the same culture, the relationship of meaning between their respec- tive discourses serves to differentiate them: the anthropologist’s and the native’s relationship with their respective cultures are not exactly the same. What makes the native a native is the presumption, on the part of the anthropologist, that the native’s relationship with his culture is natural, which is to say, intrinsic, spontaneous, and, if possible, nonreflexive or, even better, unconscious. Thus, the native gives expression to her culture in his discourse. The anthropologist does so too, but if he hopes to be something other than a native, he must also be able to express his culture culturally, which is to say, reflexively, condition- ally, and consciously. The anthropologist’s culture is contained (in both senses of the word) in the relationship of meaning that his discourse establishes with that of the native. The native’s discourse, by contrast, is merely penned in by his own culture. The anthropologist’s deployment of his own culture is a necessary condition of his humanity, one might say, while for the native being deployed by his is a sufficient one. Obviously, these differences are not in the so-called nature of things. They are a feature of the language game that we are describing here, and serve to define the very characters we have been designating as “the anthropologist” and “the native.” So let us turn to some other ground rules.