Malicious Programs Are Referred to As
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The Evolution of Ransomware
The evolution of ransomware SECURITY RESPONSE The evolution of ransomware Kevin Savage, Peter Coogan, Hon Lau Version 1.0 – August 6, 2015 Never before in the history of human kind have people across the world been subjected to extortion on a massive scale as they are today. CONTENTS OVERVIEW ..............................................................................3 Key information ......................................................................5 Types of ransomware .............................................................5 How ransomware has evolved ...............................................7 Targets for ransomware .......................................................13 Systems impacted by ransomware ......................................14 Ransomware: How it works ..................................................18 Ransom techniques ..............................................................27 How widespread is the problem of ransomware .................33 What does the future hold for ransomware? .......................37 Conclusion ............................................................................45 Appendix ..............................................................................47 Mitigation strategies ............................................................51 Symantec detections for common ransomware families 54 Resources .............................................................................56 OVERVIEW Never before in the history of human kind have people across the world been -
Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09
REPORT: SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY SYMANTEC REPORT: Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Published October 2009 Confidence in a connected world. White Paper: Symantec Enterprise Security Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Contents Introduction . 1 Overview of Rogue Security Software. 2 Risks . 4 Advertising methods . 7 Installation techniques . 9 Legal actions and noteworthy scam convictions . 14 Prevalence of Rogue Security Software . 17 Top reported rogue security software. 17 Additional noteworthy rogue security software samples . 25 Top rogue security software by region . 28 Top rogue security software installation methods . 29 Top rogue security software advertising methods . 30 Analysis of Rogue Security Software Distribution . 32 Analysis of Rogue Security Software Servers . 36 Appendix A: Protection and Mitigation. 45 Appendix B: Methodologies. 48 Credits . 50 Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Introduction The Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software is an in-depth analysis of rogue security software programs. This includes an overview of how these programs work and how they affect users, including their risk implications, various distribution methods, and innovative attack vectors. It includes a brief discussion of some of the more noteworthy scams, as well as an analysis of the prevalence of rogue security software globally. It also includes a discussion on a number of servers that Symantec observed hosting these misleading applications. Except where otherwise noted, the period of observation for this report was from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009. Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network. -
Watch out for Fake Virus Alerts
State of West Virginia Cyber Security Tip ALERT West Virginia Office of Information Security and Controls – Jim Richards, WV Chief Information Security Officer WATCH OUT FOR FAKE VIRUS ALERTS Rogue security software, also known as "scareware," is software that appears to be beneficial from a security perspective (i.e. free virus scan) but provides limited or no security, generates erroneous or misleading alerts, or attempts to lure users into participating in fraudulent transactions. How does rogue security software get on my computer? Rogue security software designers create legitimate looking pop-up windows that advertise security update software. These windows might appear on your screen while you surf the web. The "updates" or "alerts" in the pop-up windows call for you to take some sort of action, such as clicking to install the software, accept recommended updates, or remove unwanted viruses or spyware. When you click, the rogue security software downloads to your computer. Rogue security software might also appear in the list of search results when you are searching for trustworthy antispyware software, so it is important to protect your computer. What does rogue security software do? Rogue security software might report a virus, even though your computer is actually clean. The software might also fail to report viruses when your computer is infected. Inversely, sometimes, when you download rogue security software, it will install a virus or other malicious software on your computer so that the software has something to detect. Some rogue security software might also: Lure you into a fraudulent transaction (for example, upgrading to a non-existent paid version of a program). -
Adware-Searchsuite
McAfee Labs Threat Advisory Adware-SearchSuite June 22, 2018 McAfee Labs periodically publishes Threat Advisories to provide customers with a detailed analysis of prevalent malware. This Threat Advisory contains behavioral information, characteristics and symptoms that may be used to mitigate or discover this threat, and suggestions for mitigation in addition to the coverage provided by the DATs. To receive a notification when a Threat Advisory is published by McAfee Labs, select to receive “Malware and Threat Reports” at the following URL: https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/sns/preferences/sns-form.html Summary Detailed information about the threat, its propagation, characteristics and mitigation are in the following sections: Infection and Propagation Vectors Mitigation Characteristics and Symptoms Restart Mechanism McAfee Foundstone Services The Threat Intelligence Library contains the date that the above signatures were most recently updated. Please review the above mentioned Threat Library for the most up to date coverage information. Infection and Propagation Vectors Adware-SearchSuite is a "potentially unwanted program" (PUP). PUPs are any piece of software that a reasonably security- or privacy-minded computer user may want to be informed of and, in some cases, remove. PUPs are often made by a legitimate corporate entity for some beneficial purpose, but they alter the security state of the computer on which they are installed, or the privacy posture of the user of the system, such that most users will want to be aware of them. Mitigation Mitigating the threat at multiple levels like file, registry and URL could be achieved at various layers of McAfee products. Browse the product guidelines available here (click Knowledge Center, and select Product Documentation from the Support Content list) to mitigate the threats based on the behavior described in the Characteristics and symptoms section. -
A Crawler-Based Study of Spyware on the Web
A Crawler-based Study of Spyware on the Web Alexander Moshchuk, Tanya Bragin, Steven D. Gribble, and Henry M. Levy Department of Computer Science & Engineering University of Washington {anm, tbragin, gribble, levy}@cs.washington.edu Abstract servers [16]. The AOL scan mentioned above has provided simple summary statistics by directly examining desktop in- Malicious spyware poses a significant threat to desktop fections [2], while a recent set of papers have considered security and integrity. This paper examines that threat from user knowledge of spyware and its behavior [6, 29]. an Internet perspective. Using a crawler, we performed a In this paper we change perspective, examining the na- large-scale, longitudinal study of the Web, sampling both ture of the spyware threat not on the desktop but from an executables and conventional Web pages for malicious ob- Internet point of view. To do this, we conduct a large-scale jects. Our results show the extent of spyware content. For outward-looking study by crawling the Web, downloading example, in a May 2005 crawl of 18 million URLs, we found content from a large number of sites, and then analyzing it spyware in 13.4% of the 21,200 executables we identified. to determine whether it is malicious. In this way, we can At the same time, we found scripted “drive-by download” answer several important questions. For example: attacks in 5.9% of the Web pages we processed. Our analy- sis quantifies the density of spyware, the types of of threats, • How much spyware is on the Internet? and the most dangerous Web zones in which spyware is • Where is that spyware located (e.g., game sites, chil- likely to be encountered. -
AV-TEST Security Report for 2016/2017
FACTS AND FIGURES SECURITY REPORT The AV-TEST Security Report 2 WINDOWS Security Status 5 macOS Security Status 10 ANDROID Security Status 13 INTERNET THREATS Security Status 16 IoT Security Status 19 2016/17 Test Statistics 22 FACTS AND FIGURES Declining malware statistics It remains positive to note that the declining malware trend in 2016 The AV-TEST provided some relief, at least quantitatively. Thus, compared to 2015, detection systems were required to seek out and defend against 14% fewer Security Report malware samples. In total, this amounted to precisely 11,725,292 fewer newly developed malware programs than in the previous year. It should not be The best news right off the bat: forgotten, however, that the volume of newly developed malware in 2016 still represented the second-highest since the beginning of measurements by Compared to the previous year, the AV-TEST systems. In addition, 2015 saw skyrocketing growth in malware the detection systems of AV-TEST showed programs and in comparison to 2014, practically a doubling of the sample statistics. The overall number of malware programs for all operating systems a slight decline in the development currently exceeds 640 million. of malware programs for the year 2016. Without wanting to belittle the positive trend for 2016, the fact remains that Overall, that is a pleasing trend, however there have been several short-term downward trends since the beginning of by no means any reason to celebrate, measurements in 1984, a total of six times, without seriously influencing the clear, long-term trend – towards more malware. Despite declining numbers, as evidenced by the AV-TEST Institute‘s in 2016, the AV-TEST analysis systems still recorded an average of 350,000 statistics of this year‘s Security Report. -
Bibliography
Bibliography [1] M Aamir Ali, B Arief, M Emms, A van Moorsel, “Does the Online Card Payment Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?” IEEE Security & Pri- vacy Magazine (2017) [2] M Abadi, RM Needham, “Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering v 22 no 1 (Jan 96) pp 6–15; also as DEC SRC Research Report no 125 (June 1 1994) [3] A Abbasi, HC Chen, “Visualizing Authorship for Identification”, in ISI 2006, LNCS 3975 pp 60–71 [4] H Abelson, RJ Anderson, SM Bellovin, J Benaloh, M Blaze, W Diffie, J Gilmore, PG Neumann, RL Rivest, JI Schiller, B Schneier, “The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption”, in World Wide Web Journal v 2 no 3 (Summer 1997) pp 241–257 [5] H Abelson, RJ Anderson, SM Bellovin, J Benaloh, M Blaze, W Diffie, J Gilmore, M Green, PG Neumann, RL Rivest, JI Schiller, B Schneier, M Specter, D Weizmann, “Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications”, MIT CSAIL Tech Report 2015-026 (July 6, 2015); abridged version in Communications of the ACM v 58 no 10 (Oct 2015) [6] M Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want”,International Security v 32 no 4 (2008) pp 78–105 [7] M Abrahms, J Weiss, “Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study – Maroochy Water Services, Australia”, ACSAC 2008 [8] A Abulafia, S Brown, S Abramovich-Bar, “A Fraudulent Case Involving Novel Ink Eradication Methods”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences v41(1996) pp 300-302 [9] DG Abraham, GM Dolan, GP Double, JV Stevens, -
Cyber Threat Metrics
SANDIA REPORT SAND2012-2427 Unlimited Release Printed March 2012 Cyber Threat Metrics Mark Mateski, Cassandra M. Trevino, Cynthia K. Veitch, John Michalski, J. Mark Harris, Scott Maruoka, Jason Frye Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced from the best available copy. -
Crimeware on the Net
Crimeware on the Net The “Behind the scenes” of the new web economy Iftach Ian Amit Director, Security Research – Finjan BlackHat Europe, Amsterdam 2008 Who Am I ? (iamit) • Iftach Ian Amit – In Hebrew it makes more sense… • Director Security Research @ Finjan • Various security consulting/integration gigs in the past – R&D – IT • A helping hand when needed… (IAF) 2 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 Today’s Agenda • Terminology • Past vs. Present – 10,000 feet view • Business Impact • Key Characteristics – what does it look like? – Anti-Forensics techniques – Propagation methods • What is the motive (what are they looking for)? • Tying it all up – what does it look like when successful (video). • Anything in it for us to learn from? – Looking forward on extrusion testing methodologies 3 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 Some Terminology • Crimeware – what we refer to most malware these days is actually crimeware – malware with specific goals for making $$$ for the attackers. • Attackers – not to be confused with malicious code writers, security researchers, hackers, crackers, etc… These guys are the Gordon Gecko‟s of the web security field. The buy low, and capitalize on the investment. • Smart (often mislead) guys write the crimeware and get paid to do so. 4 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 How Do Cybercriminals Steal Business Data? Criminals’ activity in the cyberspace Federal Prosecutor: “Cybercrime Is Funding Organized Crime” 5 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 The Business Impact Of Crimeware Criminals target sensitive business data -
Bots and Botnets: Risks, Issues and Prevention
EMEA MSSD The Journey, So Far: Trends, Graphs and Statistics Martin Overton, IBM UK 20th September 2007 | Author: Martin Overton © 2007 IBM Corporation EMEA MSSD Agenda . The ‘First’ IBM PC Virus . Statistics, 80’s . Statistics, 90’s . Statistics, 00’s . Malware Myth-busting . Putting it all Together . Conclusions . Questions The Journey, So Far: Trends, Graphs and Statistics | Martin Overton © 2007 IBM Corporation EMEA MSSD Disclaimer . Products or services mentioned in this presentation are included for information only. Products and/or services listed, mentioned or referenced in any way do not constitute any form of recommendation or endorsement by IBM or the presenter. All trademarks and copyrights are acknowledged. The Journey, So Far: Trends, Graphs and Statistics | Martin Overton © 2007 IBM Corporation EMEA MSSD Brain . The very first malware written for the IBM PC [and clones] used ‘stealth’ to hide its presence[1]: . Here is a short extract from the description of Brain from F-Secure explaining how the stealth function it used works: . “The Brain virus tries to hide from detection by hooking into INT 13. When an attempt is made to read an infected boot sector, Brain will just show you the original boot sector instead. This means that if you look at the boot sector using DEBUG or any similar program, everything will look normal, if the virus is active in memory. This means the virus is the first "stealth" virus as well.” [1] Source : http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/timeline.htm [2] More data can be found here : http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/brain.shtml -
Global 2000 Bank Secures 9,000 Android Smartphones to Fulfill Internal Compliance Requirements
CASE STUDY Global 2000 bank secures 9,000 Android smartphones to fulfill internal compliance requirements Customer Profile This financial services firm is based in the middle east, has an international network of 1400 branches globally, and is a member of the Forbes Global 2000 list. Industry: Financial services Mobility Policy: COPE EMM Solution: VMware AirWatch The Solution The Challenge • Lookout Mobile Endpoint Security To enable their Corporate Owned, Personally Enabled (COPE) mobility policy, The Results this leading bank needed a mobile security solution that would comply with their • Achieved compliance with internal internal policy for data protection, integrate with VMware AirWatch, and provide policies for endpoint protection visibility into mobile threats encountered by their international workforce. • Gained visibility into high-risk The IT team decided to implement a COPE mobility policy in order to reduce threats support time by having a limited number of device models and Android versions • Improved employee productivity to maintain. In addition, the bank has developed their own enterprise application with no increase in support tickets that enables their employees to deliver banking services to customers via mobile devices. With no visibility into threats or data leakage on mobile devices, the IT mobility team knew that their unprotected mobile endpoints were an attack surface that presented a major security risk. 1 CASE STUDY The Results Lookout delivers a solution that collects The bank is very happy with how quickly they were able to “ deploy Lookout, including pushing the Lookout For Work app threat data from around the world, and out to 2,000 devices a day towards the end of the process. -
VOL.80 August, 2016 ASEC REPORT VOL.80 August, 2016
Security Trend ASEC REPORT VOL.80 August, 2016 ASEC REPORT VOL.80 August, 2016 ASEC (AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center) is a global security response group consisting of virus analysts and security experts. This monthly report is published by ASEC and focuses on the most significant security threats and latest security technologies to guard against such threats. For further details, please visit AhnLab, Inc.’s homepage (www. ahnlab.com). SECURITY TREND OF August 2016 Table of Contents 1 01 Malware Statistics 4 02 Web Security Statistics 6 SECURITY STATISTICS 03 Mobile Malware Statistics 7 Ransomware Disguised as PokemonGo to Catch 10 2 Users SECURITY ISSUE Locky Ransomware Disguised as .DLL File 13 3 Appears IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS ASEC REPORT 80 | Security Trend 2 1 SECURITY STATISTICS 01 Malware Statistics 02 Web Security Statistics 03 Mobile Malware Statistics ASEC REPORT 80 | Security Trend SECURITY STATISTICS 01 Malware Statistics According to the ASEC (AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center), 8,793,413 malware were detected in August 2016. The number of detected malware decreased by 955,541 from 9,748,954 detected in the previous month as shown in Figure 1-1. A total of 4,986,496 malware samples were collected in August. 11,000,000 10,000,000 10,467,643 9,748,954 9,000,000 8,793,413 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 Detected Samples 3,022,206 6,121,096 4,986,496 Collected Samples June July August [Figure 1-1] Malware Trend * “Detected Samples” refers to the number of malware detected by AhnLab products deployed by our customers.