Is the Present Ever Present? Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence
RUDOLF BERNET University of Leuven
In Heidegger's appropriation, by way of a retrieval [Wiederholung], of the tradition of philosophical thought, the question as to what time is and how it is given occupies a key position. The question regarding the relationship between Being and time shows itself to be the concealed vanishing point of the works of Aristotle, Augustine, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Bergson and so forth. The traditional treatment of logical problems (e.g., the principle of contradiction, the copula in a predicative sentence), psychological problems (the relationship between the res cogitans and the res extensa), metaphysical problems (the distinction between essentia and existentia) and theological problems (the concept of creation), presupposes a particular conception of time. Heidegger's endeavor to come to terms with the tradition thus implies, on the one hand, a particular way of reading the texts of the philosophical tradition with respect to their (concealed, unthought) presuppositions and, on the other hand, an attempt to explore the encompassing ground of all these texts with reference to a determinate (restricted) understanding of time. Heidegger calls the method of this procedure a destruction of the philosophical tradition and designates the understanding of Being and 2 time, presupposed by this tradition, as a metaphysics of presence. The most general framework of the discussion before us will be determined by the question regarding the essence of the destruction as a particular way of appropriating traditional philosophical texts and by the question regarding a metaphysics of presence [Anwesenheit] understood as the now-existing present [jetzige Gegenwart]. In what follows, this
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general framework, this heuristic principle of thoughtful reading will be put to the test by means of an interpretation of the concept of the present presence Lgegenwdrtige Gegenwart] in Husserl's phenomenological analyses of time. The choice of this starting point for a destructive retrieval of the metaphysical presuppositions of Husserl's phenomenology can finally be justified only by the result of the endeavor before us. Nonetheless, we may fairly anticipate from the outset that the metaphysical concept of presence [Anwesenheit], in a philosophy which determines Being as the (possible) being-given for a subject of cognition, must have undergone an unusually pregnant crystallization. Furthermore, it is the stated aim of the phenomenological reduction to reconstruct the sense and validity of all Being with respect to the present presence of an object for an absolutely present and presencing transcendental spectator. To be sure, the carrying out of this destructive analysis of the Husserlian concept of the present presence would bear little fruit philosophically were it merely to serve the purpose of convicting Husserl of an error characteristic for the entire pre-Heideggerian philosophical tradition. If destructive philosophy is necessarily critical, then we may not become so absorbed in the critique of Husserl as to forget the critique of Heidegger. In what follows, I should like to show that a critical interpretation of Husserl's analyses of time, an interpretation inspired by Heidegger, will at the same time make problematical Heidegger's concept of a metaphysics of presence as well as his procedure of retrieving the traditional philosophical texts by giving thought to the unthought. Husserl's analysis of the present presence can be interpreted at once (and ultimately indeterminably), on the one hand, as the zenith of the metaphysics of presence and, on the other hand, as an attempt to derive the presence of the now-existing present from the absence of the not-now. Thus, for example, Husserl's determination of the relationship between primordial impression and retention is by no means unambiguous. On the one hand, retention may be interpreted in the sense of the metaphysics of presence as a derivative modification of the consciousness of the now. On the other hand, however, it may be interpreted as a differential repetition [Wiederholung] of the primordial impression, a repetition in which, for the first time and after the fact [nachtrdglich], the consciousness of the now becomes conscious of itself. The latter interpretation finds additional confirmation in the circular definition of the primordial-impressional consciousness of the now, that is, in the impossibility of defining the now by means of the now. Also, Husserl's vacillation as to whether retention should be conceived as a perceptive or a re-presenting [vergegenwdrtigendes] consciousness is an expression of
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 87 the same ambilvalent attitude vis-a-vis the metaphysically inspired analysis of time. So, too, Husserl's description of the absolute, primordial- temporal consciousness and his determination of the relationship between the retentional and the reflexive self-consciousness of the absolute consciousness, may be interpreted at the same time as a confirmation and as an overcoming of a metaphysical concept of time. These ambiguities result from the fact that, while Husserl's reduction to the present presence begins with the exclusion and thus with the suppression of absence, yet this excluded element necessarily co- determines the sense of the reductive residue, that is, the repressed element returns. Conversely, these ambiguities are no less a sign of the fact that a thinking which wishes to overcome the metaphysics of presence destructively, at the same time necessarily presupposes this metaphysics. Accordingly, our question regarding the metaphysical presuppositions of Husserl's concept of the present presence will lead us to a result analogous to Derrida's critical retrieval of the Heideggerian interpretation of the analysis of time elaborated by Aristotle and Hegel. Derrida's careful and exemplary reinterpretation of the pertinent texts from Aristotle and Hegel shows that, in addition to the metaphysical conceptions emphasized one-sidely by Heidegger, these texts contain at the same time essential elements for an overcoming of the metaphysical concept of time. Heidegger's contrast of Hegel and Kant, as the respective representatives of the completion and the tentative overcoming of the understanding of time imprinted by the metaphysical tradition, is based upon a prejudgement, that is, upon a preliminary decision for which Heidegger gives no further account. This preliminary decision is no merely rhetorical and didactical matter. Rather, it is the expression of a prejudice which is itself still committed to metaphysics. Derrida himself avoids this prejudice, the character of which is yet to be more closely determined, by way of a double reading of the so-called metaphysical texts. On the one hand, such a reading confirms the limits of a metaphysics of presence; on the other hand, it presses on toward the displacement as well as toward the delimiting surpassing of these limits (de-limitation):
... a reading could be worked out which, in its own text, would repeat both this limitation and its contrary. And which should show that the de-limitation is still governed by the same concepts as the limitation. (Ousia ... , p. 70; trans., p. 86)
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1. Deconstruction vs. Destruction
Derrida calls this reading procedure deconstruction.4 Such a de- construction distinguishes itself from Heidegger's destructive interpreta- tion of metaphysics in that it constitutes a novel reading (lecture) of metaphysical texts. Those texts are metaphysical whose written production (ectiture) is distinguished by a particular understanding of the relationship among thinking, speaking (voix) and writing, as well as by a corresponding use of lingual signs. Such texts are metaphysical because their characteristic understanding of language is determined by metaphysical concepts as well as by metaphysical processes of subordination, negation, cancellation, eradication, exclusion and like operations upon these concepts. The metaphysical concepts themselves generally crop up within the philosophical tradition in the form of pairs of concepts or conceptual oppositions such as presence and absence, essence and existence, substance and accident, real and imaginary, eternal and temporal, and so forth. Metaphysical thinking arranges these pairs of concepts in a hierarchically structured conceptual system and, within each of the individual pairs, subordinates one concept to the other. Thus, for example, Augustine subordinates the temporally existing to the eternally existing and the temporally absent (the past) to the temporally present (the present or the present memory of the past). Derrida continually emphasizes the ethical, valuational component of this hierarchical proceeding and, on the model of Heidegger's talk about the "onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics,"5 designates such thinking as "ethical-ontological" (£thico-ontologique).6 Just as did Heidegger before him, Derrida, too, characterizes metaphysical thinking as a leveling or a forgetting of the difference. Unlike (certain earlier texts of) Heidegger, however, Derrida denies the possibility of overtaking this forgottenness by way of a retrieval and, hence, he denies as well the possibility of an overcoming of metaphysics. His differing with Heidegger in this regard results essentially from his interpretation of metaphysics as text, script, writing. Metaphysical texts cannot be translated ever further backwards into a forgotten, primordial text. Moreover, every new text attempting to deal critically with metaphysics, remains nonetheless indebted to the metaphysical text. Thus, for example, Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and a vulgar concept of time shows clear traces of an ethically inspired metaphysical thinking. Accordingly, the orientation through which Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence distinguishes itself from Heidegger's destruction of the metaphysics of presence is ambivalent. It has to do, on the one hand, with a radicalization of the Heideggerian procedure and,
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 89 on the other hand, with a restriction of the possible result of this procedure. Above all, the radicalization consists in the manner and the proportion of the encroachment into the metaphysical text. Not only is it the case that there belongs to every text that which is essentially unthought and which cannot be overtaken and gathered into some subsequent interpretation; rather, this necessarily unthought element lacks every characteristic of primordiality. That which remained un- thought within metaphysics is not more primordial than that which came duly into consideration; the forgotten did not remain concealed on account of its depth; and the memorial [andenkendes] thinking of this concealed ground is not devoted to what is most difficult for being nearest. That which has been forgotten in metaphysics is not simply the shadow cast by thought and covering over the unthought. Much rather, the boundary, the difference between the thought and the unthought, the written and the unwritten, is a merely derived and accidentally determined difference. It is a mere trace. Hence, the reversal (renversement) of metaphysical values is merely a first and preparatory step in the deconstruction. The privileging of Being over against the being, difference over against identity, iteration over against the origin, absence over against presence, the sign over against the intuition, the past and the future over against the present, and so forth, requires supplementation by way of a displacement (deplacement) of the distinction which structures these metaphysical pairs of opposites.
The destruction... by a double gesture, a double science, a double script, must practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. (Signature..., p. 392; trans., p. 195)
Such a displacement consists essentially in the differences (diffgrences) which structure the metaphysical oppositions being displaced, deferred (dijJérer). In this way, the metaphysical differences should remain undecided, the tension between what is said within the text and the unsaid which has been bracketed out of the text should not be neutralized but rather accentuated. The deconstructive reading of a metaphysical text displaces the accents of the text, undermines its express understanding of itself and attends to the symptomatic traces, which have been left behind inside the text by that which had been excluded from the text. Such reading by displacement is a movement without an end (annulment) [Aujhebung] and without a beginning (origin), a movement without a rationally and fully comprehensible logic (dialectic). It is the movement of metaphysical thinking as well as that of the deconstructive exposition
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 90 of metaphysics, for it is the movement of the script (ectiture) as such. It is the movement of the differance (djffi£rance) that steadily displaces itself from trace to trace. The radicalization of the Heideggerian onset consists in the assertion that there is no primordial form of the difference; it consists in the fact that the difference left unthought by metaphysics gets conceived as a movement, a differance différance) displacing itself throughout various differences (différences), and that this movement is a product of the employment of written signs, an employment which can no more be philosophically mastered (maitrise) than it can ever really be thought at all. Every difference is a written trace. Every trace is the trace of a trace, the sign of a sign and not the sign of a designated `thing', not the derived or possibly the falsified representation of the primordial truth. At the same time, however, every trace is the trace of a trace. There is no new and critical philosophical text able fully to loose itself from a preceding metaphysical text, much less to overcome that text. It is this which constitutes what we have already alluded to as the restriction of the result able to be expected from a Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics. Philosophizing is writing. Every writing necessarily refers to other texts, while various texts get linked together into a loose network without a primordial text and without a final text. There is no primordial text because there is no presence which would precede and determine such a text and there is no final text because every new text introduces anew an unsaid and unwritten moment. A text turned against the tradition of metaphysical texts is, to be sure, a "wholly different text," but as a text it is nonetheless prefigured in the metaphysical text.
In order to surpass [excgderl metaphysics, it is necessary that a trace be inscribed in the metaphysical text, a trace which points not toward another presence or another form of presence, but toward another text. Such a trace cannot be conceived more metaphysico [ ... J. It (is) that which must elude mastery [maitrise]. (Ousia..., p. 76; trans., p. 91 )
2. The Metaphysical Concept of Time
A formal and empty portrayal, such as this, of Derrida's conception of a possible deconstruction of metaphysics, will inevitably encounter lack of understanding and even downright scepticism. For this reason, in the remainder of this text, our portrayal must be critically tested and vividly elucidated by means of an interpretation of the Husserlian analysis of time, an interpretation which, though inspired by Derrida, is itself displaced in turn. Before we can devote ourselves to the deconstructive
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interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, however, we must first call to mind several theses which, according to the concurring judgements of Heidegger and Derrida, characterize in general what we would call a metaphysical conception of time. In doing so, we may confine ourselves to those theses which seem to be applicable to Husserl's analysis of time and whose concrete application we shall subsequently want to follow in the Husserlian text itself. This examination of the metaphysical context of Husserl's phenomenology of time will then lead us back to the question whether this (like every other) metaphysical text does not already prefigure a non-metaphysical text, a non-metaphysical conception of time and of phenomenology. The traditional philosophical understanding of time probably finds its most pregnant expression in classical physics, and especially in the Newtonian image of the world. In consequence of scientific theory "streaming into" the praxis of the life-world, this traditional concept of time from philosophy and physics has come also to determine the everyday, prescientific, "naturalistic-objectivistic" (Husserl) or "vulgar" (Heidegger) image of time held by modem humanity. In this view, time is closely associated with space and understood as a reference system which localizes things. Space-time, as a system of manifold points, allows diverse things to be distinguished from one another and, at the same time, placed in relation to one another. In virtue of their occupying a spatio-temporal point, things are individuated, their movement is determined as a successive occupation of diverse points in space and the movement of one body provides the impetus for the movement of another body. Hence, like space, time is a formal or empty coordinate system that localizes entities of determinate content but subsists independent of these entities, that is, in itself or "absolutely" (Newton). This formal system of possible temporal points is an encompassing, uniform nexus, a determining container of manifold events absolutely determined in relation to one another. Events are temporally determined insofar as they take up a place inside of this encompassing system. They are present-at-hand [vorhanden] in time, that is, "something intratemporally present-at-hand [innerzeitig Vorhandenes]" (Heidegger). As a uniform, encompassing, empty container, time has especial relation to a particular class of physical facts, namely, those bearing on the movement of bodies. The famous and to this day instructive reflections which Aristotle devoted to the connection between time and movement in Physics 0, yield the insight that time is the measuring and measured measure of an irreversible elapsation whose elementary structure is understood as a transition from one point to another. The analogue which immediately suggests itself, and whose temptation
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Aristotle sought bravely to withstand, is that of the line produced in the transition from one point to another point. The points represent the constantly, newly emergent now, while the line represents the temporal lapse, conceived as a continuous transition from the now to a new now following immediately upon it, and so on. The movement of the hands of the clock sweeping incessantly through the fixed divisions of the dial, was felt to provide such a happy means of illustrating this conception of time that the movement of the clock came more and more to count as the movement of time itself. For Newton, finally, the whole of nature was none other than a perfectly built clock. Yet even a cursory consideration of a classical timepiece comes up against the limitations and inadequacies of a linear image of time. The now, designated by the continually new positions of the second-hand, is, on the one hand, a constantly different now and yet, on the other hand, precisely the same, now-existing now. It thus becomes questionable whether the now flows in and with the temporal streaming or whether it does not much rather, standing constant, scan the temporal movement. One then begins to doubt as well whether the now, conceived as a point, may even be called temporal. Along the winding paths of his meditation on the mode of Being and the nature of time, Aristotle, too, had already encountered questions such as these. One finds in his work the reflection that the presently existing now, understood as a point, is not temporal, and that the temporal now is either not-yet or no-longer present, and hence is not at all. It can be concluded from this either that the now "is" and that time, accordingly, is not, or that time is not built up out of now-points and "is" only as the current process of the self-engendering line. The two conclusions result each from a different determination of the nature of the relation between point and line and, with a wonderworking application of the metaphysical distinction between potency and act, Aristotle attacks head-on the dialectical tension between the two determinations. Here we are interested in the Aristotelian doctrine of time only insofar as it operates with a system of theses, concepts and questions, of which Husserl, too, still makes use. First of all, there is the thesis that Being is temporally determined and must be understood as being present in the present. This presently existing presence is structured from the stand- point of the concept of the now as a maximal givenness on the borderline between streaming time and stationary eternity. This limiting concept of the present as a point is referred to a mode of temporality only when the now-existing present is brought into an insoluble, linear and irreversible connection with the not-now-existing future and past. In this way, the temporal absence of the not-now-existing present is grasped as the potential presence of a now, as a not-yet-now and as a no-longer-now.
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Thus, the now-existing present is at once source, motor and measure of all that is temporally. What is temporally, is in time; and time is thereby conceived in analogy with the mathematically determinable continuity of space. According to Aristotle, the mode of movement that is measured by time, as well as the measure of this movement, is not present in space at all but rather in the soul. Both counting and the counted, move within the inner space of the soul. Time is thus always sensed time and, ultimately, the sensations themselves, the movements of the soul, are temporally sensed. It would seem to us, therefore, that this reading of the Aristotelian analysis of time leads us to the verge of the Kantian concept of time as the pure self-affection which permits the sequence of self- succeeding nows to arise. Viewed historically, however, it is not Kant's concept of temporality as self-affection which follows upon Aristotle's insertion of time into the soul, but rather Augustine's determination of temporal Being as the object of a presently actual representation. Under the obvious influence of Aristotle, Augustine, too, occupies himself with the question concerning the non-Being of that which is not now. With him, however, the distinction between Being and non-Being, eternity and time, comes immediately to be understood theologically and with reference to ideas concerning the creation. What is important in the context of our investigation is the thought that-irrespective of the distinction between the temporal motion and alteration of human existence and the changeless, eternal Being of God-the human experience of time can be understood in analogy with the presence of the creation to its divine creator. Just as the world, in spite of its temporality, is present [anwesend] to God in constant presence [Gegenwart], so, too, not only the present, but also the future and the past and hence the whole movement of time, stretching out of the future by way of the present into the past, is presently and intuitively given to man. Man has the representational activity of his consciousness to thank for this wonderful command of time. Just as the present is comprehended intuitively in present attention, so the future is comprehended in present anticipation and the past in present memory. One may fittingly maintain that the tradition of the metaphysical analysis of time, following Augustine and on up to Bergson and Husserl, is nothing but a constantly thinking anew this same thought. Augustine distinguishes himself from Aristotle primarily by deflecting the ontological problem of the non-Being of past and future in the direction of the epistemological establishment of the possibility of a present and perceptive-intuitive representation of the past and the future. Therewith, the problem of time becomes the problem of the possible perception of temporally determined objects and the basic concept structuring the analysis of time comes to be understood as the
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 94 now-existing representation of a now-existing object. It follows from this that in addition to the time of the object there is, corresponding representationally with the latter, a time of the subject even such that true knowledge will be grounded in the concern for the conformity of these two forms of time with one another. The full coincidence of both forms of time, a coincidence which in turn is regarded from the standpoint of the now-existing comprehension of a now-existing object, functions thereby as the ideal. Insofar as it has now become questionable, however, whether the isolated now-point is still to be considered a modality of time at all, the ideal of a true knowledge of time would seem to be reached only in the overcoming or annulment of time. The meditation on time inaugurated by Augustine combines the presuppositions of a natural or "vulgar" understanding of time with a series of unnatural suspensions or reductions. Thenceforth time came to be contemplated in analogy with space, namely, as a uniformly encompassing container and coordinate system of events; as the measure of a continuous movement scanned by the now-point; as an irreversible passing away of the future, become present, into the present, now past. The epistomologically oriented analysis of time further enlarges upon the natural presupposition of the priority of the now-existing present. In doing so, however, it makes use of the unnatural reduction of the bygone present to the present memory of the past; the reduction of an absence mediated by signs, images, phantasy and so forth, to a representational and immediately intuitable presence; the reduction of a steadily changing self-differentiation to the reflection and scientific statements which mirror this differentiation in its unvarying structure. Husserl's concept of the reduction of all Being to its possible givenness for a present and transcendental consciousness which is absolutely present to itself, would thus seem to be inextricably intertwined with this metaphysical understanding of time. On the other hand, Husserl's onsets toward a different under- standing of time must be appreciated as onsets toward a distancing from that idea of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.
3. Basic Metaphysical Concepts in Husserl's Analysis of Time
It is primarily because of their onset and development within the compass of the problematic of perception that Husserl's analyses of time remain metaphysically inspired. Time is introduced as a determina- tion of perceptual objects which is analoguous to space, and phe- nomenology investigates the intuitive givenness of these objects in
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 95 intentional consciousness. Just as transcendent spatiality can be perceived only by a preempirical, spatial consciousness, so, too, the perception of objective time requires the assumption of an immanent temporality of time-consciousness itself. Furthermore, since perceptual givenness is understood as a mirroring representation of its object, the phenomenological analysis of the perception of temporal duration naturally leads to a description of the temporal duration of perception. Perception itself thus becomes an (immanent), temporal object whose temporal determinateness is comprehended by a new and deeper- seated perception. This is the setting in which Husserl's early analyses of time unfold and with which the Bemauer manuscripts of 1917 continue to attempt to come to terms. In what follows we want briefly to elucidate the metaphysical schema of the Husserlian analysis of time and in doing so to pay particular attention to the determination of the present consciousness of a temporally enduring object. Husserl defines perception as an intentional act distinguished from all other intentional acts by the eminent form of the intuitive givenness of its object. In perceptual consciousness, the object is not represented, for example, by means of signs, but rather is given itself in originary presence. The presence of the perceptual object distinguishes itself as well from that of the remembered object in that it manifests an immediate unity of the act with its corporeally given object. Accordingly, the perceptual presence is determined as the now-existing, intuitive comprehension of a now-existing, corporeally present object. Both determinations of this presence, its corporeality as well as its instan- taneousness in the moment, are explored within the framework of a representationalistic concept of consciousness. Perceptual conscious- ness is an inner stage upon which only conscious shapes can perform, but shapes which are themselves the reality being enacted as it appears. This paradoxical determination results from the fact that Husserl's concept of perception both presupposes and negates the distinction between immanent and transcendent Being. The double movement constituting this paradox is mirrored again in the way that perceptual consciousness itself is built up, consisting as it does of representational data of sensation as well as intentional acts. On the one hand, therefore, perception is determined empiricistically as an imprinted trace of reality while, on the other hand, it is determined intellectualistically as an intentional, doxical activity of consciousness. Husserl mediates this opposition by way of the thesis that sensations portray reality only insofar as they are intentionally apprehended and that intentional acts perceive reality only insofar as they are ap-
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 96 prehensions of sensations. We cannot now enter into a discussion of the descent of this model of perception from linguistic philosophy; nor can we take up the matter of the ambiguity of this model's concept of sensation, an ambiguity which was rather more sharply accentuated than overcome by Husserl. What is of great importance for Husserl's analysis of time, however, is the fact that the described process of perceptual representation is defined as a process of objective constitution. The intuitional interconnection of manifold perceptual acts or appearances, synthetically unified by way of fulfillment, deter- mines the sense and validity of the perceptual object. The reality of the perceptual object is not the cause of the perceptual representation. On the contrary, this representation first of all builds up the real object step by step. The phenomenological determination of the perceptual object thus converges with the epistemological and there- fore intuitively demonstrative experiential (re-)construction of this object. The unity between the content of sensation and its intentional apprehension must therefore be constituted in such a way that it can account for the material determination, for the spatial localization and extension, as well as for the temporal localization and, if need be, extension of the perceptual object. If the perceptual presence is a now- existing, intuitive comprehension of a now-existing object, then the question poses itself for the phenomenologist as to how the now of the object is to be constituted in the now of the act, this act consisting of the apprehension and its content. Husserl's answer to this question leads from the apprehension of the objective now, back to the analysis of the characteristic "temporal form of the
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 97 motivated priority of the now into excluding the possible perception of a not-now-existing object. He cannot shut himself off from the insight that even enduring objects like tones or melodies are perceived in their duration and not merely phantasized or reconstructed through the subsequent synopsis of isolated now-moments. To be sure, perceptual givenness is centered in the now, but it is surrounded by a horizon marked off by the retentional consciousness of past now-points and the protentional consciousness of future now-points. Examined more closely, the perceptual consciousness of the continuous succession of now-points is possible only because, taken for itself as future, present, past and still further past..., every now-point remains continuously within consciousness; because its coming-to-be and passing-away are perceived in the continuum of the steadily varying modes of appearance. We now want to see how Husserl attempts to determine this phenomenological finding within the boundaries of his metaphysical starting point. Husserl conceives the alteration of the mode of temporal givenness of a selfsame, objective tone-point, in analogy with the diverse, perspectival modes of appearance or "adumbrations" of a spatial object. Diverse perspectives refer to a system of spatial orientation centered in a "null- point of orientation" and structured from the standpoint of this center. The changing modes of appearance of the tone-point, which is given as future, present, past and still further past..., are diverse modes of the temporal orientation of a selfsame object. These modes of the temporal orientation of an object refer to a null-point in the orientation of a perceptual act, a point situated in the now-existing present. This centering in the null-point must be understood in such a way as to make clear that both the protentional givenness of the tone appearing as future and the retentional givenness of the tone appearing as past, are variations or "modifications" of the primordial-impressional givenness of the selfsame tone appearing as now-existent. The precise determination of the essence of this protentional or retentional modification of primordial- impressional givenness is the nucleus of Husserl's analysis of time and hence constitutes the site where the question must be posed, whether Husserl does not at the same time turn away from the metaphysical understanding of time. We shall later return to this question in detail. If for the time being, however, we continue to adhere to the metaphysical understanding of time which dominates the Husserlian texts, then "modification" means that retentional (as also protentional) givenness presupposes primordial-impressional givenness both genetically and logically.
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It is precisely this primordial consciousness which passes over into the retentional modification[ ... ]: were it not present, then retention would be unthinkable. (Hu X. App. IX)
Retention is thereby not only the retention of the preceding primordial impression but is moreover an interconnection of retentional givenness constantly modified and enriched by the continuous emergence of new primordial impressions. We have a 'first' primordial impression (= P.) and a subsequent primordial impression (= P1). Associated with the latter is a first retention (= Ro) of Po. Already with the further ensuing primordial impression (= P2), however, there is a second retention (= Tri) of the preceding primordial impression (= P, ) and of its concomitant retention (= Ro): P2 - Ri
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 99 objective past. But how is a now-existing apprehension of a now-existing phantasm supposed to make possible the perception of the past of a tone? This assertation becomes all the more incomprehensible if one recalls the argument adduced against Brentano right at the beginning of the lecture of 1905. According to this argument, the "idea of the past" could never spring from a content of consciousness that were characterized as 'past' but were present now (Hu X. § 6). More than three years were required for Husserl to realize that, in consequence of this, the now- existing interconnection between the "coexistent primary contents" and the likewise coexistent apprehensions "simultaneously" related to these contents, is never able to explain the perception of an objective duration (Hu X. No. 49). At the time this lecture was presented, however, Husserl was of the contrary opinion that the difficulty pointed out in Brentano's s doctrine could be overcome by way of a clearer distinction between apprehension and the content of apprehension. The reader can scarcely help ascribing this hope in a hopeless affair to a metaphysical belief. Husserl continued to preserve this hopeless belief even when he had already taken clearly into account the distinction between the perception of transcendent, temporal objects, and the experiences of immanent, temporal objects, as well as the consequence of this distinction for the systematics of the phenomenological analysis of time (cf., Hu X. No. 39). The appearances of transcendent objects no less than the purely temporally determined objects (e.g., tones, irrespective of their appercep- tive integration into physical, spatial reality) are immanent objects which are comprehended in a deeper-seated, "absolute," temporal conscious- ness. Thus, there are two stages of immanence or two stages of consciousness constitutive of temporal objects and Husserl does not hesitate to designate as "perception" or "representation" even the absolute "flow of consciousness" which "constitutes" immanent, temporal objects. Moreover, like the perception of spatio-temporal objects, the perception of immanent, temporal objects is supposed to be built up out of "apprehensions" and corresponding contents of apprehension. The most elementary form of the constitution of the temporal continuity of an immanent tone is consummated in a now- phase of the absolute consciousness, a phase of consciousness which,- as the uniform interconnection of retentional, primordial-impressional and protentional apprehensions, or of their corresponding contents,- perceives momentarily and simultaneously the past moments, the now- existing moments and the future moments in the succession of tones. In this case, of course, it can be objected that a now-existing, retentional apprehension of a now-existing content would never be able to perceive the past of an immanent temporal object. Also in this case, it is more
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 100 difficult than ever to see why the perception of objective, temporal forms, no less than the essentially merely partial perception of three dimensional spatiality, must be supported by intermediate terms in the form of representational contents. If Husserl believes it necessary to mediate the interconnection of two dimensions of consciousness, namely, the connection between absolute consciousness and immanent, temporal objects (such as acts of transcending perception or sequences of tones), by way of such representational intermediaries as we have described, then he once again falls victim to the metaphysical under- standing of time inspired by the model of spatial perception. By contrast with this, it is important to establish that the retentionally experienced past of immanent, temporal objects is never represented in now-existing, really immanent [reell] contents of consciousness; and that the constitution of a spatio-temporal, identical-objective past, is not the affair of a perceptual apprehension but rather an achievement of consciousness qua memory. This insight was granted Husserl only after his labors had won him a new understanding of the connection between present and past, an understanding which deviated from that of the metaphysical tradition. Before beginning to analyze these onsets toward a new understanding of time, we want to cast a final glance at the metaphysical determination of absolute consciousness. Intentional acts, but also tones and the like, are temporal processes whose temporality is "constituted" in the "absolute Being" of the "flow of consciousness." Without this "possible possessing and apprehending of the tone" by consciousness, the tone would be nothing (Hu X. No. 39). It is not only the determination of the absolute consciousness as "immanent perception" which is metaphysically inspired. Likewise metaphysical in its conception is the related determina- tion of immanent time as a time belonging to objects which, as inner temporal objects, are regarded as being analogous with outer, temporal objects. The thesis that all objects are in time and are given in another time is also metaphysically inspired: Things are in objective time and appear in immanent time; their appearances are in immanent time and are given in the flow of absolute consciousness. But what of the flow of absolute consciousness itself? Does it not, as a flow, consist of temporal phases existing within absolute time and hence given within a still deeper consciousness (etc)? Both the metaphysical understanding of temporal experience as perception mediated by representational contents and the double structure of the metaphysical concept of intratemporality become entangled in the classical difficulty of an infinite regress. The transcendental-philosophical ideal of catching one's own tail issues in Achilles' unavailing hunt for the turtle. We shall see further on, that the
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 101 new description of the self-appearance of the absolute flow, even though it turns away from the metaphysical model of self-reflection, does not yet succeed thereby in freeing Husserl from the bane of an infinite regress. Even in the Bemauer manuscripts (L I21, 1917), Husserl seems still to be tempted to put up with this inconvenience and, against all his principles, to grant the existence of an "unconscious" consciousness of time. He is willing to do so for the sole sake of salvaging the possibility of an immediately actual presence to itself on the part of the flow of absolute consciousness. In all of its aspects, and without exception, Husserl's appropriation of the tradition of the metaphysical analysis of time appears to be aligned toward the ideal of the now-existing consciousness becoming absolutely present for itself. The current self-presence of consciousness is at once the source and the culmination of all perceptual givenness of intratemporal objects. The distinction between the temporality of perception and that of the perceived as well as their representationally conceived connection; the divergence of objective, temporal positions, as well as their mediation by means of the linear movement of the temporal flow; the difference between the now-existing present and the past as well as their annulment in memory in its identical re-presentation of the bygone now, and so forth; are, as different configurations of consciousness, at the same time, indices of that identity of subject and object by which the essence of Being-conscious {Bewusst-Sein} is ultimately determined. This identity of now-existing self-consciousness is at once the origin, the measure and the annulment of temporal and spatial distance. All of this is true and Husserl's analyses of time can properly be appreciated as a highpoint of what we have described as the metaphysical tradition. Nevertheless, Husserl's assertions regarding time are not always metaphysical. On the contrary, they are at times quite unmetaphysical. His unmetaphysical assertions are not somehow better than his metaphysical assertions, however, and their saying what they say always points to something metaphysically unsaid, as it were. Moreover, Husserl's texts are not only cleft into a metaphysical and an unmetaphysical side; they also unfold on different levels. The difference among levels of primary concern to us here is that between the phenomenological description as such and the methodological reflection related to this description, that is, the arrange- ment of the phenomena described into an integrated, philosophical system. Let us state the matter somewhat schematically: Very few of Husserl's phenomenological analyses actually proffer what Husserl expected from them and Husserl's texts usually accomplish something quite different from what Husserl pretends to accomplish. What Husserl pretends to accomplish is usually metaphysically determined, whereas
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 102 what he describes often runs counter to his metaphysical understanding of himself. In order to eludicate this assertion, we want to have another look at Husserl's decisive statements regarding the connection between primordial impression and retention as well as that between absolute consciousness and the self-givenness of this consciousness.
4. Primordial-impressional and Retentional Consciousness of the Now
Husserl defines retention as "a momentary consciousness of the elapsed phase" (Hu X. App. IX; cf. also, § § 11-13, No. 47). Retention is a rather peculiar form of intentional consciousness, for it is neither an independent, intentional act, nor is it directed toward an intentional object. Retentional consciousness is the appendage of a currently present, primordial impression, which holds both the preceding, primordial impression and the concomitant, preceding retention firmly within consciousness.
Inasmuch as every phase is retentionally conscious of the preceding phase, it encloses within itself, in a chain of mediate intentions, the entire series of elapsed retentions. (Hu X. App. IX)
The succession of elapsed retentions, that is, of elapsed but retained primordial impressions, is not, however, "really-immanently" [reell] enclosed within the retentional consciousness. Nevertheless, the primordial impression retained in retention is not merely represented as if by an image. Rather, it itself is given in intuition. Retention, accordingly, is an intentional, present and intuitive consciousness of a past presence of consciousness which is presently maintained even though it is not experienced as an intentional object. However finely balanced and carefully elaborated this definition of retention may seem to be, it nonetheless occasions the greatest embarrassment for the experienced reader of the Husserlian texts. What is an intentional consciousness without an intentional object? How can Husserl continue to designate retention as perception if retention is the present conscious- ness of a bygone present-consciousness? And how can retention be in turn designated as "sensation," if it is supposed to refer intentionally to a moment of consciousness which does not really-immanently inhabit it (Ms. L / 75; 6a, 1917)? All of these questions are warranted and necessitate a more precise determination of that which Husserl calls
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 103 retentional consciousness. What suggests itself immediately is that we search for possible answers to these questions by way of clarifying the foundational relationship that holds sway between the primordial- impressional and the retentional modes of consciousness of the now. Most of Husserl's statements leave little doubt that he regarded retention as a mere appendage of the primordial-impressional conscious- ness of the now. He compares the flowing consciousness of the now with the shining path of a comet and the steadily self-modifying retentional consciousness with a "comet's tail" (Hu X. No. 54). The "retentional tail" (Hu X. § 16) is thus not a fixed existence which the primordial impression would drag along behind it like the tail of a paper kite. It is much rather the trace left behind in consciousness by the flow of the now- point. According to the common understanding, a trace is a temporally displaced indication of the existence and movement of some entity, whether known or unknown. So, too, one can leave traces behind or subsequently detect traces. Now according to Husserl, retention should be a trace left behind by a primordial impression: Were the incipient phase of a mental process [Erlebnis] "experienced only by retention, then it would remain unintelligible what it is that confers upon it its " distinction as a 'now' at all (Hu X. App. IX). But how does the definition run regarding this consciousness of the now, this consciousness which is "characterized thoroughly positively," which is not "experienced only post-factually [nachtrdglichl" but rather primordially and pre- liminarily ? Husserl's answer, as honest as it is astonishing, runs as follows:
The primordial impression is the primordial temporal form of sensation, [...] the temporal form [...] of the sensation of the momentary now-point, and it is only this. But actually the now-point must itself be defined by the primordial sensation, so that the proposition just uttered need hold only as a hint of what is supposed to be meant. (Hu X. § 31 )
The primordial impression distinguishes itself over against other sensations as a sensation of the now-point, and the now-point distinguishes itself over against other temporal positions as a primordially-impressionally experienced point of time. This circular definition of the connection between the primordial impression and the now, as well as Husserl's concession that there can be no question here of a proper definition, is an expression of philosophical embarrassment. This embarrassment results from the fact that it is perhaps not at all possible to speak in a proper
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 104 fashion about the now-existing present and, in any event, not without referring to a not-now. Husserl himself concedes this in the sequel to the passage just cited.
The whole now-point, the whole originary impression under- goes a modification by the past, and only by means of this modification have we exhausted the concept of the now, insofar as it is a relative concept and points to a `past', just as 'past' points to a 'now'.
If the now cannot be phenomenologically defined in exclusive relation to its unmodified, perceptually intuitive mode of givenness, neither can it function any longer as the "primordial-source-point" of the consciousness of time. One is even tempted to reverse the foundational relationship and derive the possibility of the consciousness of the present now from the possibility of the post-factually, retentionally experienced consciousness of the past now.8 Some of Husserl's texts point in this direction. Thus, for example, in a vein reminiscent of Aristotle, Husserl writes that "the consciousness of primordial sensation [...] Gis> a boundary point for two continua, the not-yet and the no-longer" (Hu X. No. 54). Since, however, in the case of retention, the boundary runs between the now of retention and the retained now, the now will be found at the same time both inside and outside the primordial-impressional boundary. The no- longer-now, which bounds the now-point, is a different now. The real question now is whether not only the concept but as well the consciousness of the now does not presuppose the no-longer-Being-now, and presuppose it necessarily.9 Certain utterances of Husserl admit of such an under- standing. Thus, for example, he says that "[...] consciousness of the continually new primordial present [...] is only possible owing to the sinking of each phase [...] into the past" (Ms. L / 75: 4b, 1917). In the same breath, however, and brooking no exception, Husserl seeks to ward off the consequence enclosed in this insight, namely, that a newly emergent now will be experienced in its individuality as a newly emergent now only post-factually in the form of a past now which is retained by retention.
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'now'. [... It is plain nonsense to speak of a content of which we are 'unconscious' and of which we would become conscious only post-factually. (Hu X. App. IX; emphasis mine, R.B.)
If we survey Husserl's remarks on the foundational relationship between primordial-impressional and retentional consciousness of the now, we stand before a paradoxical result. On the one hand, the retentional consciousness of the now always presupposes the primordial- impressional consciousness of the now. The latter is the source of the concept as well as of the "positive" "distinction" of the phenomenon of now-existing, intuitive (self )givenness. On the other hand, from the very beginning, this positive, phenomenological definition of the primordial- impressional consciousness of the now gets caught up in a circular movement. It would seem that this circular movement could be interrupted only by someone stepping out of the closed circle of the immediate self-reference of the now and grasping the now with respect to retentional consciousness as a consciousness of the now affecting itself by means of another now.'° Husserl shrank from this consequence not out of what would be the perfectly understandable alarm at the methodologically, wholly unmediated introduction of an unconscious, but primarily because he was not able to extract himself from his fascination with notions of absolute and ultimately fulfilled self- presence. This fascination can also be recognized in Husserl's insistence upon understanding retention as a perceptual consciousness, even despite his phenomenological descriptions.
Being-just-past is [ ... ] a given matter of fact, self-given, hence 'perceived'. In opposition to this, in recollection the temporal present [ ... ] is a re-presented [vergegenwartigt] presence. (HU X. § 14; cf. also, § 17). 11
It is to be objected to this, that retention is not a recollection, to be sure, but that it is nonetheless a re-presentation in which, at least implicitly, two different presents diverge from one another. Retentional consciousness is "consciousness springing forth" and, as such, it is, "to be sure, the present, but the present characterized as the modification of another consciousness, and what it makes conscious is characterized as the modification of something else already made conscious. Thus, it is a present which makes another present, a primordial present, conscious" (Ms. L. / 75; 4a, 1917). Retention "does not 're-present' in the manner of a recollection, but [...] re-presents or holds back what was previously
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 106 consciously experienced as a now in a primordial sensation" (Hu X. p. 376; cf. also, pp. 312 and 382). As long as the principal distinction between retentional, originary self-givenness and reproduction in memory is not endangered, the question of whether to define retention as perception or re-presentation seems to be for Husserl an essentially terminological concern. The readiness with which Husserl concedes the designation of retention as a special kind of re-presentation, and the decisiveness with which he rejects the post-factuality of the consciousness of the now, cause one to sit up and take notice. His attitude can be explained by the fact that in the one case he sees endangered the possibility of the perceptual self-givenness of now-existing presence, whereas in the other case he does not. Should the retentional conscious- ness of the immediately bygone now prove to be a re-presentation rather than a perception, according to Husserl's conviction it would nevertheless remain an originarily self-giving re-presentation of a bygone now which had already been primordially self-given as a present now. We thus find ourselves referred back to the undecided question regarding the possibility of a now-existing perception of a now-point. This question, with which we began our investigation, has now been sharpened into the question whether the now is, for itself and absolutely, present now. This question, too, must be made more precise, for do the now-existing primordial-impressional consciousness and its now-existing object really belong to the same consciousness or the same stage of consciousness? And may one really say that the primordial-impressional consciousness is not only the consciousness of a now but also a now- existing consciousness? Is this primordial-impressional consciousness itself given for consciousness and how is one to understand this appearance of consciousness to itself ? Finally, how is this self-appearance of the primordial impression to be distinguished from the givenness of the now which appears within the primordial impression?
5. The Reflective and Retentional Self-Presence of the Flow of Absolute Time
The experiencing of immanent, temporal objects is an affair of what we earlier called, following Husserl, the "flow of absolute consciousness." We now ask how this flow of consciousness can function, on the one hand, as consciousness of a sequence of tones and, on the other hand, as consciousness of the flowing experience of a sequence of tones, that is, as consciousness of the flow of absolute consciousness itself. Husserl's answer to this question is staggeringly simple. He tells us that both forms of consciousness are "inseparable" achievements of the selfsame
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 107 process of consciousness, namely, the constant modification of retentional consciousness (Hu X. § 39, No. 50). As we have seen, this modification is so structured that, with the emergence of a new, primordial impression, the entire retentional consciousness is articulated anew and the entire (moment-within-a-moment [verschachtelt]) sequence of the retentional consciousness recapitulated. Every retention "is in itself [in sich selbst] a continuous modification which bears within itself the legacy of the entire preceding development" (Hu X.' No. 50). This present inheritance of a retained past concerns, on the one hand, the retention of a tone-point (or sequence of tones) which sinks away further and further into the past along with its temporal position and, on the other hand, the retention of the temporal lapse during which this tone-point was retained, that is, given differently again and again. Thus, the present retention retains the individual tone by means of its constantly modified modes of givenness. Husserl speaks either of retentional "transverse intentionality" or of retentional "longitudinal intentionality" according to whether attention is being devoted to the tone retained or to the flowing consciousness retaining the tone. Retentional, longitudinal intentionality is the absolute consciousness of that 'segment' of the flow of absolute consciousness which is bound up with the sinking away of this tone-point. It is the post factual "appearance of the flow to itself [ ... ]. What is brought forth to appear in the momentary currency [Momentan-Aktuellen] of the flow of consciousness is nothing else than the bygone phases of that flow of consciousness appearing through the series of retentional moments" (Hu X. § 39). Before we enter into a more detailed discussion of this remarkable phenomenon, this essentially post-factual self-consciousness belonging to the flow of absolute consciousness, we shall have to determine more precisely the character of the temporality of this "flow." May one say that the flow of absolute consciousness itself, in which the duration of an immanent, temporal object is experienced, elapses "parallel" with the lapse of this duration? And is it correct to maintain that the primordial impression and the retention occur "simultaneously" within a determinate phase of the absolute flow, that is, that both are consummated "now"? Husserl's answer to these questions did not come until 1908/09 but then left nothing to be desired in the way of clarity.
The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process. The consciousness of the now is not itself now. The retention which exists 'together' with the consciousness of the now is not 'now' either, it is not simultaneous with the now. (Hu X No. 50; cf. also, § § 36, 38, 39)
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This nontemporality of the flow is, on the one hand, a merely negative determination which is supposed to ward off the threat of an infinite regress in the constitutively determinate interconnection of the different stages in the consciousness of time (Hu X. No. 50). On the other hand, Husserl already hints at a positive determination of the flow when he writes that it is "nontemporal, that is to say, not something within immanent time" (Hu X. No. 50, p. 334; cf. also, No. 54, p. 369). Hence, the temporality of the flow of absolute consciousness cannot be grasped by means of concepts which are oriented toward that which is intra- temporally present-at-hand. Between the flow of consciousness and the occurrences falling within immanent time, there lies a radical difference. In the description of the retentional appearance of the flow to itself, that is, in the definition of the retentional, longitudinal intentionality, this difference meets with a treatment suited to its demands. With Husserl, however, the recognition of the difference goes hand in hand with its bridging, leveling and misconstruing. The misconstrual appears to be essentially connected with Husserl's concept of constitution, the meta- physical presuppositions of which we have already pointed to. Of course, the flow is not an immanent, temporal object, not an object within immanent time. Instead, according to Husserl's conception of the matter, the immanent, temporal object is indeed constituted and experienced within the flow. This constitutive connection allows us after all, guided by the immanent temporal objects constituted within the flow, to describe that constituting flow as a quasi-intratemporal object.
We can say nothing else than: This flow is something which we so name after that which is constituted [...]. For all of that we are wanting in names. (Hu X. § 36)
Retentional, longitudinal intentionality offers a well-suited (and non- metaphysical) description of the appearance of the flow to itself, primarily because it neither transforms the flow into a perceptual object nor besets the flow with forms of objective identity. As we have seen, retention is not directed toward an object in the true sense and, accordingly, the 'bygone' flow does not appear in retentional, longitudinal intentionality, as an objective duration. So, too, the flow always appears in this retentional, longitudinal intentionality, as 'past'. Thus, the originary self-appearance is surely not a perceptual givenness of the flow. Retentional self-appearance alters with every new 'phase' of the flow and does so in such manner that every new 'phase' recapitulates the whole 'elapsed' flow in an ever new way. The flow thus appears exclusively as past and this mode of appearance is itself constantly
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altering. We called this mode of appearance 'post-factuality'12 and distinguished it from all primordial, immediately-now present, perceptual givenness. The retentional appearance of the flow to itself is distinguished from a possible memory which would return to the 'bygone' flow and repeat it as identical. As a nonobjective, post-factual and differentially iterative appearance of the flow, retentional, longitudinal intentionality also points the way to a suitable, unmetaphysical description of the temporality of the flow itself. It also points the way to a new understanding of self-consciousness as well as of consciousness as such. It demands a new style of phenomenological description oriented not toward perception or recollection of mental processes but toward retention and its structure of differential repetition. The task is, in place of an objectifying mirroring of the visible, to search for the "wanting names" of those phenomena which cannot be named in the language of reflective phenomenology. Though he prefigured it, Husserl himself never walked this path consistently. The thing which primarily hindered him from doing so was his demand for a reflective objectification of the phenomena constituting time-consciousness, a demand which characterizes those texts from the years 1905 through 1917 which we have drawn on. According to Husserl's opinion, the phenomenon of the retentional self-appearance of the retained flow first becomes a fulfilled object of scientific research when it has been subjected to a reflective vision directed upon it.
But because I have a grip on it
This is a metaphysical assertion, for it defines the retentional self- appearance of the flow privatively as a merely provisional datum, teleologically aligned toward the reflective perception of the retained flow. If the retentional givenness of the flow is converted into a perceptual givenness, it does not thereby become more clearly "visible"; rather, paradoxically, it completely vanishes from sight. In perception, the "nontemporal," non-objective structure of the flow, as well as its differential movement, is objectified and thereby transformed into an immanent, identical, temporal object. Moreover, as an act of conscious- ness, such perception is an immanent, temporal object that can be understood only on the basis of the absolute flow and its retentional, transverse intentionality. Thus, the flow does not come into view in
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 110 perception at all, precisely because the intratemporal domain `constituted' by the flow may not serve as the guiding thread for the phenomenological analysis of the nontemporality of the 'constituting', absolute flow. The essence and the primordial appearance of this absolute flow can be understood only from the standpoint of the structure of retentional, longitudinal intentionality. Husserl screens this insight from his own view when, under the influence of metaphysical prejudices, he reinter- prets the retentional, non-objective, constantly changing and only mediately intuitable self-givenness of the flow, in such a way as to make of it a reflective-perceptual datum. The same metaphysical prejudices also hinder Husserl from acquiescing in the post-factuality of the retentional self-appearance of the flow. For Husserl, only that can be post-factual which was initially given in present actuality. Husserl is thus on the lookout for a phenomenon in which the flow is presently and immediately present to itself. This current self-presence may not, however, be understood as perceptual consciousness, since perception always refers to temporal objects. We thus come upon "primordial processes which were not perceived but which must in principle be perceptible" (Ms. L I21: 10a, 1917). If Husserl wishes to uphold the belief in the possibility of an immediate and present self-possession or self-consciousness of the flow, he finds himself forced paradoxically to appeal to "unconscious presentations [Vorstellungen]" (Ms. L 21: 16b, 1917).
The question now, however, is whether we must not say that, over and above all consciousness within the flow, there yet rules the ultimate consciousness. In accordance with this, the momentarily present phase of inner consciousness would be something of which the ultimate consciousness were conscious. [...] It is to be seriously pondered, however, whether one must assume an ultimte consciousness such as would be a necessarily 'unconscious' consciousness. (Hu X. No. 54)
Upon closer reading, all those utterances of Husserl which we have drawn upon concerning the phenomenon of time-consciousness, prove to be ambivalent. Therewith, it is precisely Husserl's careful analyses of time-consciousness which would seem to afford the compelling arguments for a modification of the metaphysically determined self-understanding which ostensibly guides these analyses. Husserl's texts unfold thoroughly within the field of tension which pervades the opposition between the ideal of an absolute, perceptual presence of the flow to itself, and the impossibility, evinced in the phenomenological analysis of the flow, of
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 08:08:15PM via free access 111 ever realizing this ideal. This tension marks the relationship between perception and re-presentation, between primordial impression and retention, between reflective and longitudinally intentional self-givenness of the flow; that is to say, it marks the whole of Husserl's relationship to the metaphysics of presence. Pondering these oppositions in the course of retrieving them and enduring the tension that binds them together proved to be a fruitful way to think through anew the presupposition of the traditional understanding of time. Fruitful as it may have been, however, it did not yield a wholly new understanding of time which might take root and flourish free of all nourishment from the soil of metaphysical conceptuality. Yet we had not counted on such a result either, for from the very beginning such an overcoming of metaphysics appeared to us to be an impossible and still metaphysically determined task. This impos- sibility lies in the fact that the recognition of the fascination exerted by the concept of the present presence does not suffice to enable one to extract oneself from the spell of this fascination.
How would the desire for presence ever permit of being destroyed? It is desire itself.'3
(translated by Wilson Brown)
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