No. 219 Strategic Forum January 2006 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats by David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital and indirect approaches helps clarify how SOF Key Points for combating terrorism and the proliferation should be used both now and in the future. Special Operations Forces (SOF) of weapons of mass destruction. SOF promi- This essay argues that current and emerging already make major contributions to nence in these missions has only grown since forms of political violence not only make the national defense. However, the Department September 11, 2001, when the Nation realized two SOF approaches more important than ever, of Defense should adjust SOF operations, its unprecedented power did not shield it from but also require their use in organizations organization, and national-level command devastating unconventional attacks. While SOF transformed to handle such threats better. and control to deal more effectively with are consumed by their operations in the war terrorism and related forms of political on terror, national leaders need to acknowledge Political Violence violence. Almost 20 years after the Special neither Washington nor U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is organized for optimal An enormous spectrum of activity is cov- Operations Command was created, it is ered by political violence, from election brawls clear that to make strategic contributions use of SOF. To substantiate this claim, it is necessary to interstate warfare. Between these extremes, to defeating current and emerging threats, and of particular importance to the United SOF direct and indirect action capabilities to distinguish the two major approaches by which SOF accomplishes tasks. One facilitates States, is violence conducted or sponsored by should be organized in separate commands. nonstate actors. Transnational terrorism is an SOF’s so-called indirect action activi- or actually brings force to bear directly against the enemy. Examples include destroying a key example of such violence, as is insurgency. ties—typically performed by Special Forces, Neither the state as an entity nor war as an psychological operations, and civil affairs installation (direct action), reconnoitering the installation before the attack (special recon- activity will disappear within our planning when they work by, with, and through the timelines, but two attributes of contemporary forces and people of host countries, such as the naissance), and deceiving the enemy so an attack could be carried out (a subset of infor- political violence are likely to get worse. One, Philippines, Afghanistan, or Iraq—are critical the use of mass casualty weapons by small for reshaping the sociopolitical environment mation operations). The other approach works indirectly by, with, and through other military groups, is relatively new, and we are already in which terrorists and insurgents thrive. A adapting to it. The other, violence supported separate command will ensure resources and forces or civilians to achieve U.S. objectives. Examples include providing training and by traditional social and communication priority missions for indirect action capabili- networks, is longstanding, but we have largely ties that currently are underemphasized. The advice to help other countries defeat insurgents (foreign internal defense) or to reconstitute ignored it because it is foreign to our experi- new command’s indirect capabilities should be ence and ill suited to our modern way of war. augmented by improved abilities to understand institutions and infrastructure (civil affairs). These two broad approaches may be SOF can make critical contributions for dealing and influence traditional social networks. with both. SOF direct action capabilities that sup- mutually supportive, producing a greater effect port or bring force to bear directly against the together than separately. Also, not all core SOF enemy are proficient but require national-level tasks fall neatly within one approach. Uncon- Very Lethal Weapons decisionmaking reforms. Better command and ventional warfare, an indirect approach, might Although the proliferation of lethal tech- control mechanisms, including the Defense include direct engagement of enemy forces nologies is not a new problem, it is compounded Department and national-level horizontal by U.S. personnel. Psychological operations by small, very lethal organizations. In the past, integration teams with their own resources, can achieve effects by working directly on the political power came from having large numbers are necessary if direct action capabilities are motivation of enemy forces or indirectly on the of supporters. Violent groups wishing to gain to reach their full potential. willingness of the population to support them. power needed to win supporters through persua- Nevertheless, the distinction between the direct sion and intimidation. They had an incentive
No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum to limit the use of violence lest they alienate Traditional Networks process, which we have only a limited ability to potential supporters and stiffen the resistance of understand and affect. Second, we tend to think The 9/11 plotters, like the jihadist move- opponents. If they used excessive violence, they that strategic communication and the war of ment generally, used the Internet and jet travel. were unlikely to win and risked creating a back- ideas are important for winning the war on ter- They also used the hawala2 money transfer lash that might destroy them. Thus, in the past, ror, but, as far as our adversaries are concerned, system and a global network of mosques. They terrorist groups that wanted to grow into political that part of the struggle takes place largely at operated in the modern world of individualism, movements limited the amount of violence they the level of the individual imam or tribal elder. electronic media, centralized bureaucratic con- used. Some recent evidence suggests that this Our ability to understand or influence that trol, and cellular phones. They also operated logic apparently characterizes even the al Qaeda level of traditional communication is limited.4 in a traditional, nontechnical world of family jihadist movement.1 In security, recruiting, and communicating, and tribe and decentralized, socially based Nevertheless, the spread of increasingly traditional social networks provide our enemies authority. The terrorists operate in two worlds; lethal technologies complicates analysis of with significant advantages. we operate in only one. Thus, they have more terrorist violence. While it is not true, as often strategic depth than we do. supposed, that terrorists are free to choose a level The security advantage the jihadists Influencing Networks of violence or lethality based on religious, ethnic, acquire from using traditional networks is or idiosyncratic views, extraordinarily lethal Not all political violence or even all ter- most evident. Our information and intel- technology is likely to lead (indeed, has already rorism gets decisive support from the tradi- ligence collection capabilities are optimized led) some terrorists to think that this technology tional social world, but the kind that threatens for the modern world only. Human intelli- is a shortcut to power, circumventing the need us most now and in the foreseeable future does. gence as a bureaucratic enterprise developed to build political support. Thus, given advances Organizing SOF to deal with transnational net- in technology and their diffusion, we are likely works will demand a good deal of change. SOF to see small groups that have no ambition to already is organized to deal with small lethal traditional social groups, and doing so better requires relatively grow through traditional political means and, networks provide our hence, no motivation for moderation. Instead, fewer adjustments. they will seek political power through the pos- enemies with significant The United States has confronted tradi- tional networks consistently since the end of session of terrible weapons. We also occasionally advantages will face groups that want such weapons because World War II. We face them now in Iraq, the members see them as a way of ending the world Middle East, Central Asia, South and Southeast in Europe with the European state system. as we know it. There really is no solution to the Asia, Northern Africa, in some places in Latin Technical intelligence developed later and problem of small, very lethal organizations other America—in those areas where the writ of the reflects this system and its centralized bu- than taking all possible measures to prevent the modern bureaucratic state does not run strong reaucracies. Both human and technical acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and and U.S. personnel must often operate in aus- intelligence have adapted to that world. We directly eliminating the group or its members tere and possibly violent circumstances. can intercept electronic messages and track before they employ any such weapons they have. Only two organizations in the U.S. Gov- money through the international banking The SOF direct action approach is well ernment have expertise in preparing people to system better than we can track money in suited to combating small lethal organiza- operate in such circumstances and supporting the hawala system or understand what goes tions, and it receives much attention as the them once they are there: DOD and the Central on in religious brotherhoods. Department of Defense (DOD) emphasizes Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Directorate of The socially based security advantage hunting down the al Qaeda leadership. How- Operations (DO). Tasking the DO to penetrate that terrorists enjoy (and our corresponding ever, the way in which traditional social and and influence traditional social and communi- disadvantage) is perhaps the most glaring communication networks may support ter- cation networks would have serious drawbacks. consequence of our inability to operate in the rorism and violent political movements is an First, its training, structure, and incentives all traditional social world, but two others are also often-ignored dimension of political violence focus case officers on modern information and important. First, because they are organizations that also calls for SOF capabilities. Since we bureaucratic state-centric systems. Case officers at risk, terrorist groups tend to recruit from tend to pay little attention to this phenom- want to know what key decisionmakers have among those they trust, which typically means enon, it requires some explanation. decided. As collectors, they take this same ap- from among their existing social relation- proach to terrorist organizations; as operators, ships—family, kin, friends, mosque attendees.3 they want to disrupt these organizations. Case The strength of traditional social networks officers who operate in the midst of traditional is an important advantage in the recruiting networks hardly ignore them, but the director- ate is not structured, nor its personnel trained, to make traditional networks a priority, nor David Tucker is an associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. His should they be. The traditional DO approach contribution to this article is based in part on research supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. is necessary and needs to be done better, which Christopher J. Lamb is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National will consume its time and resources. Defense University. This essay is based on research and conclusions from the authors’ forthcoming book, U.S. Special Operations Forces, to be published by Columbia University Press in 2006.
Strategic Forum No. 219, January 2006 The second reason the directorate should into their new career track in their late 20s to U.S. personnel in the Middle East, France, not have the responsibility for understanding or early 30s with prior exposure to foreign and the tri-border region of Latin America, and influencing traditional social networks is cultures and languages. Upon completion as well as to analysts and policymakers in that association with the DO risks compromising of additional specialized military and other Washington. Their information would also be and limiting the influence of the indigenous useful to a range of Federal law enforcement people with whom it works. A clandestine ap- beyond reorientation of and intelligence agencies. proach should be taken only when necessary. In addition to assisting military forces The relationships of trust that characterize tra- SF, a separate cadre of and U.S. Government agencies, this new cadre ditional social systems can be developed overtly. specialists on traditional would wield its own influence, which would Clandestine tradecraft, the directorate’s core networks is needed come from the relationships of trust it develops competence, is not necessary for understanding and from its assistance to extant overt U.S. and influencing traditional social networks and Government programs. Ultimately, this cadre would actually be counterproductive. training requirements, their initial assign- should have its own funding to provide overt Since a new organization devoted to ment could be an overseas tour working in a assistance to key leaders and organizations in traditional networks is neither necessary nor U.S. Embassy, either for a defense attaché or the traditional social world. This would need likely, eliminating the DO as an option leaves on loan to the political, economic, or develop- to be done carefully, but in some cases might the Department of Defense as the choice to ment assistance sections of a given country consist of nothing more than a gift of food to understand and influence the traditional social team. As with all other accredited U.S. dip- a village. The point in such gifts would not be world. There are organizations in DOD that lomatic personnel, their specific (and overt) their munificence but rather the relationship already do this work. When Special Forces (SF)5 purpose would be to interact with the people within which they occurred. engage in the indirect approach, when they and institutions of the host nation in order to This brief outline raises a host of ques- work by, with, and through indigenous forces conduct bilateral assistance programs within tions about the personnel management of or personnel, they are often working within tra- their scope of duties; a greater understanding these specialists.6 For example, they do not ditional social and communication networks. of traditional social networks would be an in- need a highly differentiated rank structure. So, too, are civil affairs and psychological evitable consequence of that kind of contact. Those who enter this work will not have operations (PSYOP) forces. Some PSYOP teams How and with whom trust and knowledge are command of progressively larger numbers in Iraq gathered and disseminated information built would depend on the interplay of local of personnel. Hence, their status should cor- working through and with traditional social circumstances and the skills and background respond more to something like apprentice, networks, although this is not a doctrinal task of each individual. A second tour would follow journeyman, and master than to the tradi- for PSYOP. The work these forces do in this in a nearby country, and then a third, perhaps tional military hierarchy. However these and regard needs to be improved and augmented. in the country of the first tour, with time for other such issues are decided (and how they training and education. Long periods spent are decided will be critical to the success of Building New Capability in a subregion (for example, western sub-Sa- these specialists), the personnel system will haran Africa) and in one or two countries in be different from anything now found in the Improving SF capabilities to operate in that subregion are necessary to build relation- Defense Department. Since the organization the traditional social world will come largely ships, knowledge, and influence. will be small, certainly by Defense standards, from focusing their energies on that world. With their expertise in traditional social it must be part of some other separate orga- SF teams currently prepare for an array of and communication systems, these personnel nization within the department, or it will be missions. If they devote their finite time and should be key advisors if American forces need overwhelmed by the DOD bureaucracy. Given resources to the indirect approach, which to deploy to their country or region. They its function, this new organization should be must include maintaining their small unit would help prepare SF for their training mis- grouped with the other Defense components military skills, they will get better at it. They sions and other deployments, alerting them that focus on the indirect approach so that it will be able to focus selection and train- to key figures in traditional networks. These can complement them. ing on this mission, for example. They will specialists could assist the Embassy public learn more about it, and doctrine will begin affairs officers in shaping their messages. In Command Restructure to change and improve, as will the tactics, operational settings, they would assist PSYOP techniques, and procedures of engaging with personnel in the same fashion. They would Once the utility of grouping SF, civil af- the traditional social world. Deeper knowledge serve as eyes and ears in places that U.S. and fairs, PSYOP, and the new cadre of traditional of traditional networks will make SF not only even local officials seldom visit, which, for social and communication network specialists more capable for independent SOF missions that reason, are places where things of inter- is seen, further consideration suggests that but also better able to support conventional est to the United States happen. They would they constitute a separate organization within force operations. be able to assist State Department and other the department. A review of SOF history and Beyond reorientation of SF, a separate personnel in identifying individuals of inter- current activities shows that DOD and, more cadre of specialists on traditional networks est to the United States. Information they recently, USSOCOM have typically given lower is needed. Ideally, the kinds of professionals gathered from the Lebanese community in priority to the indirect approach and those who best suited for this mission would transfer West Africa, for example, might be of interest carry it out.
No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum Just as SOF did not flourish until separated personnel and what they do. The command to act against organizations when they have from the conventional military under its own will also have to sort out relations between its such weapons or to prevent their acquisition. command, the indirect approach of SOF will not components and the Intelligence Community To do so, the best strike and raid capability pos- flourish unless it is separated from SOF direct beyond CIA. For example, SF already collect sible will be needed. A confrontation with one action components. Thus, we suggest establish- information (and could learn to collect and of these organizations is likely to reveal that ing a separate joint command in DOD—per- report it better) that should interest the Intel- they possess technology as advanced as ours in haps called the Unconventional Warfare Com- ligence Community. Even if relations with enough categories to make them formidable mand—that would include SF, civil affairs, other agencies remain problematic temporar- enemies. Extremist sects, for example, have PSYOP, and the new cadre described above. The ily, the new command will give the indirect long had a tendency to retreat into compounds, command would draw upon all services for approach better standing within DOD and but in the future, commercially available tech- personnel and would in other respects func- will improve its ability to support the direct nology will be sufficiently developed to allow tion much as USSOCOM functions now, paying approach of SOF and conventional forces and these nonstate groups to build not just com- for training and equipment specifically related to carry on such independent indirect mis- pounds but daunting fortresses. While many to unconventional warfare but relying on the sions as foreign internal defense. Altogether, such groups will pose no threat to the United services for all other support. The command the various activities of the command will States, some may threaten Americans abroad, thus would have a Major Force Program in the give DOD and the U.S. Government the global while others will see the United States as the DOD budget and have acquisition authority. For scouts that SF are sometimes characterized keystone of the order they must destroy for a to be. new one to emerge and, hence, as their enemy. the indirect approach A critic might note the expense implicit in these proposals and wonder if they are neces- Integration Problem of SOF will not flourish sary. After all, DOD and SOF have already taken unless it is separated some steps to address the cultural and social The new Special Operations Strike Com- mand will not, in and of itself, give the United from SOF direct action aspects of warfare. Although these measures will help, the underlying phenomenon of States a more robust direct action capability. components terrorism and insurgency is not cultural but It will only improve this capability if it is used social. Unless we focus on the traditional social correctly. The U.S. Government is not currently example, it would take responsibility for modify- world, we will not get better at understanding well organized to do this. These organizational ing aircraft for PSYOP use. Access to transporta- and influencing it and at mastering and using defects are two-fold: lack of integration across tion resources for members of the new command to our advantage the indirect approach to our bodies of functional expertise and familiar- might require that it control some aircraft, enemies. Failing to do this, we will not deal ity with SOF capabilities. Lack of integration although it may be able to rely on Air Force or effectively with the major problem before us. undermines complex endeavors such as coun- Army assets for transport. It would also need terterrorism or counterproliferation. SOF direct action capabilities are critical in these activities authority to devise new personnel management Lethal Organizations procedures, since the current DOD procedures but should not be used without regard for a should not apply to the new cadre. Person- Establishing a separate command focused host of political, diplomatic, and legal issues. nel reforms would have to extend into all the on the indirect approach is critical for dealing The lack of regular communication between Services, however, since these personnel would with traditional networks. It will also have an civilian and even military decisionmakers and have a different career progression. Over time, it unintended benefit. SOF not in this new orga- SOF direct action forces also produces failures might be that the personnel system of the new nization—the special mission units, the Navy and suboptimal performance. Sea-Air-Land teams, the Army Rangers, the The integration problem results from cadre would better fit at least some civil affairs th and PSYOP personnel as well. 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment, a security bureaucracy organized around A four-star officer should lead this new and Air Force Combat Controllers and Parares- dominant organizations dedicated to expertise command. It will run into a host of bureau- cue personnel—will form a new organization in a single functional area. Yet many cur- (perhaps called the Special Operations Strike rent security problems are so complex and cratic problems and will need an officer at 7 that level, plus considerable assistance from Command) that would retain USSOCOM’s cur- fast-evolving that they require the integrated high-ranking DOD civilians, to establish itself. rent Service-like responsibilities and authorities expertise of many Government agencies and The primary problem in DOD for the new but would focus on direct action missions. This even nongovernmental organizations. To command will be the general disregard for organizational change would allow the Strike achieve this integration, we need new “hori- the indirect approach. The State Department Command to focus on small, very lethal orga- zontal integration” teams to draw upon but is likely to ignore the new command and its nizations. Such organizations will operate as cut across functional areas to produce sound, knowledge of traditional networks. The CIA terrorist groups, as radical religious sects that integrated, adaptive solutions. is likely to claim first that it already does develop into violent organizations, or as the this work; next, that the work is not neces- forces of countries that develop limited num- Integration Solution bers of advanced weapons that they seek to use sary; and finally, that it is cooperating fully, To build these teams, the Secretary of while it uses its chief of station authority to clandestinely for maximum effect. In all these cases, the U.S. Government may be compelled Defense would authorize an individual with restrict where the new command sends its relevant experience and leadership skills
Strategic Forum No. 219, January 2006 to bring together subject matter experts Executive Committees that the Clinton ad- light of developments in the field. As the Senate now divided among various organizations ministration used, but small permanent report on the Somalia expedition concluded, within DOD. The team would develop strate- organizations with authority, derived from the U.S. policies were poorly coordinated, and gies and plans for specific problems, such President, over both their agendas and their civilian officials and military leaders were not as terrorism, and oversee implementation own resources, devoted to developing policies carefully and continually reevaluating the SOF of these plans, as well as budgetary and and strategies and reporting directly to the mission to determine if the risks were too high.8 acquisition issues. The team would not be a Principals Committee (the national security This failure to coordinate policy and operations task force but a structure as permanent as Cabinet-level authorities). contributed significantly to the failure of the the problem it was designated to deal with. SOF mission in Somalia and to a strategic and Comprehending the problem and solution in SOF Familiarity Problem political failure for the United States. an end-to-end fashion, the team would use The argument might be made that a new its authority to intervene selectively to en- Solving the integration and coordina- and naïve administration was responsible for sure progress—mostly at the strategic level, tion problem within DOD and among other the confusion in Washington when Task Force where the efforts of functional organizations national security agencies would leave another Ranger was deployed to Somalia. However, such tend to compete and work at cross-purposes, problem specific to SOF direct action capabil- setbacks have characterized the administrations but down to whatever level of detail was ity. The command and control relationship of Presidents both new and seasoned. The fault required to ensure successful outcomes. between direct action units and senior civilian lies not only in poor leadership but also in poor Making the transition to new horizontal and military decisionmakers is too distant. Se- organization. An integrated team operating in organizations will be difficult. In particular, nior leaders must understand SOF tactical ca- DOD—or preferably across the relevant na- achieving unity of effort requires, at one level, pabilities and limitations to employ SOF most tional security departments and agencies—as violating the principle of unity of command. effectively and discreetly. This understanding the single authority for policy and operations The experts who populate the teams report and discretion can only be developed through could have eliminated or at least diminished to two leaders, one in the organization they direct contact with SOF operational leaders and the command and control problems that ulti- come from and the other the integration team familiarity with their modes of operation. With mately contributed to failure in Somalia. leader, who can reward or release them, if such familiarity, senior leaders are more likely they are not loyal and dedicated to producing to examine and guide strategic operations criti- cally from conception through completion. SOF Familiarity Solution SOF operations in Somalia in 1993 are Effective command and control of SOF civilian decisionmakers a perfect illustration of both the integration direct action missions will not come automati- and vertical command and control problems cally from linking direct action capabilities to often lack sufficient inherent in strategic direct action. SOF Task the integrated teams proposed here or to the understanding of direct Force Ranger was sent to Mogadishu in sum- President following their advice. The charac- action operations to mer 1993 to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed, teristics of both decisionmakers and operators a faction leader whom the U.S. Government tend to undermine effective command and oversee them effectively judged to be the key troublemaker in Somalia. control. For example, as the Senate report on Washington wanted Aideed captured in order to Task Force Ranger noted: establish the peacemaking capabilities of the the best overall solution. This “dual author- One of the weaknesses of a unit like Task United Nations, which had taken over the effort ity” problem is the single point of failure Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities to stabilize Somalia from the United States. for such horizontal integration teams. If the are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit This was a major policy initiative of the Clin- Secretary of Defense does not impress upon members and its commanders that they ton administration. The mission was high-risk, his immediate subordinates the importance can accomplish any mission. Because of the since it required U.S. forces to conduct raids of collaboration and information-sharing, supreme confidence of special operations on short notice into hostile territory, with high they may instruct the experts they send to the forces, the chain of command must provide political stakes for the administration. teams to protect organizational interests at more oversight to this type of unit than to In this setting, SOF commanders in the all costs. In such cases, the teams may pro- conventional forces.9 duce “least common denominator” products field and at USSOCOM needed to be aware of that satisfy individual team members but are how the Nation’s political-military strategy was However, civilian decisionmakers often lack inconsistent and ineffective. evolving. They needed to keep authorities in- sufficient understanding of direct action opera- However, if DOD can make the transition formed of developments in the field and evolv- tions to oversee them effectively. Senior military ing risks inherent in the course of action they commanders may also lack such understanding to empowered, collaborative teams, it will help 10 tackle some of the most intractable problems were pursuing. They did not do so, nor do they and often have prejudices against SOF. The that it faces. The effect would be even greater if appear to have been inclined to do so. But even result is that DOD integrated teams made up of such teams took hold across the Government if they had been, there was no single Washing- such civilian and military leaders alone will not to deal with key national security issues. Again, ton-based authority they could have reported be able to provide the oversight that SOF need. these would not be the customary interagency to that would have been able to provide defini- If special operations are to achieve deliberating bodies, or even the interagency tive guidance and to change course quickly in policymaker objectives, and if the risk of a
No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum military operation is to be commensurate with to fight. When it comes to direct action missions, Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists the importance of the policy objective it is this training must include decisionmakers. and operates outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’ banking or financial channels. . . . The components of hawala that intended to serve, then the goals and restraints distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the of policy must inform operational planning, The Reform Challenge extensive use of connections such as family relationships or just as the possibilities and problems of opera- regional affiliations. . . . hawala makes minimal (often no) tions must inform policymaking. Somehow, For the foreseeable future, SOF as practi- use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money senior policymakers and operators must learn tioners of both direct and indirect approaches take place based on communications between members of a to collaborate effectively when SOF direct need to be employed to the fullest extent pos- network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers. action is used in pursuit of strategic objectives. sible. The forces will take care of the challenges For additional background on traditional forms of banking To that end, the proposed Special Opera- of training, tactics, techniques, and procedures and its abuse by criminal and transnational terrorist groups, see tions Strike Command should work closely with if they are resourced and allowed to do so. Kimberley L. Thachuk, Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be But allowing them to do their best ultimately Severed? Strategic Forum 191 (Washington, DC: National Defense the DOD and interagency horizontal integration University Press, May 2002). requires major reforms in organization, com- 3 teams in Washington. These teams, and Cabinet On this point, consider Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to officials as well, should participate with operators mand and control, and policy oversight: High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” The American ■ Journal of Sociology 92 (July 1986), 64–90. in frequent, realistic simulations of the approval, separate commands for SOF direct and indirect 4 conduct, and possible consequences of direct actions capabilities to include a cadre of specialists on This limitation is widely recognized and a long-stand- traditional social and communication networks ing problem for transregional powers. See C.A. Bayly, Empire and action missions. The policymakers must include Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National ■ DOD and interagency teams with the au- in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, thority and resources to tackle the most important 1996), for a useful case study of some of the issues in this paragraph. Security Adviser, and, above all, the President. 5 Such officials will be in command of the most security problems the Nation faces The term Special Operations Forces refers broadly to forces from all the Services that conduct special operations, delicate and risky missions that SOF will be ■ frequent exercises with national decisionmak- whereas the term Special Forces—also know as Green Berets— called upon to perform. ers and the commanders of the special mission units. refers more specifically to the U.S. Army forces that specialize in Such exercises would give the civilian unconventional warfare. Two years ago, Secretary of Defense Don- 6 decisionmakers an opportunity to ask questions ald Rumsfeld queried his top officials11 as to Further details on a possible personnel system are available about the planning and thinking of SOF in set- in Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence whether the billions of dollars being spent to in the War on Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability,” tings that should reproduce the operational and defeat terrorists were having sufficient effect, submitted to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of political risk involved in potential missions. This and whether a new organization was needed. Defense, December 2004. 7 interaction also would educate military lead- He expressed particular concern about whether This name and the mission of the command would ers about the civilians for whom they work and the enemy was recruiting more to its ranks return U.S. Special Operations Command to something like the the political realities that must govern military original vision of Edward C. Meyer, a key early supporter of an than we were capturing, dissuading, or killing. improved direct action capability. See J.W. Partin, interview with operations. To be effective, these exercises need to The Secretary’s concerns were well placed, and General Edward C. Meyer, USA, Arlington, Virginia, July 14, 1988 be done with the officers directly responsible for his willingness to consider new organizations (typescript in author’s possession). 8 conducting direct action missions. and command and control relationships is Senators John Warner (R–VA) and Carl Levin (D–MI), Exercises of this sort do take place, but laudable. Such change is difficult and costly “Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on too often senior leaders do not participate. They October 3–4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia,” September 29, 1995, 50. but, in the case of SOF and the most challeng- 9 Ibid., 49–50. should. The exercises also need to occur often ing forms of political violence that threaten us, 10 For an example of a civilian decisionmaker failing to enough to erode the usual veneer of formality also necessary. understand the complexities and risks of a direct action mis- and politeness between decisionmakers and sion, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred operators, allowing realistic exchanges to occur. Notes Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 318. One might also consider Richard Shultz, “Showstoppers,” The Weekly Standard These exercises would not replace the briefings 1 Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, “Al Qaeda Tells Ally (January 26, 2004), 25–33. Shultz reports that senior military that Presidents and senior advisers receive about in Iraq to Strive for Global Goals,” The New York Times, October leaders did not trust SOF but fails himself to give due weight to particularly risky operations as part of the nor- 7, 2005. Terrorism experts have differed over al Qaeda strategy for the risks entailed by the direct action missions he touts. mal approval process. Instead, the scenarios pro- some time, and they debate the authenticity and meaning of the 11 The full text of the October 16, 2004, memorandum is captured al Qaeda document reported in this article as well. posed here are intended to educate all involved 2 available at
Strategic Forum No. 219, January 2006