XII UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

September 22-25, 2014 Rivne NPP Kuznetsovsk, UKRAINE

The Conference Organizers: George Kuzmycz Training Center for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material SS “Rivne NPP”

The Conference Sponsors: Swedish Radiation Safety Authority NNEGC “Energoatom”

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The Conference Organizing Committee

Head of the Committee: Oleksandr Onyshchenko – Ministry of Energy and Coal Indystry of Ukraine

Members of the Committee: Zlatan Delalic - Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Oleg Makarenko – NNEGC “Energoatom” Volodymyr Konyuk –Rivne NPP Viktor Kushka – State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine Sergiy Lopatin – State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine Sergiy Boryshkevych – Rivne NPP Viktor Gavryliuk – George Kuzmych Training Center Anna Gavryliuk-Burakova – George Kuzmych Training Center (Secretary of the Committee)

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KUZNETSOVSK is a town of regional subordination in Volodymyrtsi district, Rivne oblast, Ukraine. The town is located on the river Styr 18 km from Rafalivka railway station of Kovel – Sarny line and 156 km from Rivne city. The town was founded in 1973 in lieu of the former Varash village dating back to 1776. The town was named after the intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union N. Kuznetsov.

Administrative level: town of regional significance. Town status: since 1984 Area: 1131 ha. Population (as of 1 March 2014): 41.7 thousand people. Kuznetsovsk is a unique and special town. Its roots extend far back into the past and its intellectual summits reach state-of-the-art nuclear power technology of the 21st century. The town is the satellite of Rivne Nuclear Power Plant. They were built simultaneously in 1973 and are inseparable. On 25 May 1973 minister of energy and electrification Petro Neporozhniy drove the first symbolic wedge into the ground of the would-be power plant site. On 10 August, ground was broken at the site of the future nuclear giant. Construction of the town began at the same time. On 14 November, Volodymyr Korovkin, now president of the Ukrainian Nuclear Society, was appointed director of the West-Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant by order of minister of energy and electrification, to hold this tenure for 29 years to follow. Igor Kuts has been acting as the town mayor since April 2013. On 29 January 2001, Kuznetsovsk town council by its resolution adopted the current coat-of-arms and flag of Kuznetsovsk. Coat-of-arms: three silver NPP cooling towers with three green fir- trees in the front and a silver atom pictogram above; escutcheon is crowned with a silver urban coronet. Flag: a rectangle with a 2:3 sides ratio, formed by two broad stripes, blue and green, and a white wedge directed from a pole towards the middle of the cloth serving as a background for the town coat-of-arms. Fir- trees, yellow and blue colours signify the location of Kuznetsovsk in the Polissya historical region; cooling towers and the atom pictogram emphasize the role of atomic energy in the town history.

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RIVNE NPP

Beginning of construction — 1973 Start up of Unit 1 — 1980 Number of power units — 4 Type of reactor — VVER-440 (units 1 and 2), VVER-1000 (units 3 and 4) Total capacity — 2835 MW NPP satellite town — Kuznetsovsk, Rivne region Designing of West-Ukraine NPP started in 1971. Later, the plant was given a new name — Rivne NPP. Rivne NPP is the first nuclear power plant with the VVER-440-type reactors (pressurized water reactor type) in Ukraine. First two VVER-440 power units were put into operation in 1980 and 1981, and Unit 3 with VVER-1000 reactor was put into operation in 1986. In 1990 construction of power units on the site was stopped according to resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On Moratorium for Construction of New NPPs». The construction was resumed in 1993, and Unit 4 was put into operation in October, 2004. In April, 2006 the state acceptance commission admitted Unit 4 of RNPP to commercial operation. When unit 4 of RNPP was started up, annual electricity production exceeded 17 billion kWh. IAEA OSART missions have reviewed the level of RNPP operation safety in 1988, 1996, 2003 and 2008. The IAEA experts highly assessed the safety level of Rivne NPP and qualification of its personnel. The European Union has selected this nuclear power plant as a lead site for implementing several international projects. In 2009 Rivne NPP successfully passed through the re-certification audit conducted by the international company TUV NORD to check RNPP compliance with international standards of ISO 9001:2008 “Quality Management Systems” and ISO 14001:2004 “Environmental Management Systems” Rivne NPP employs automated radiation monitoring system ASKRO. Supervision is carried out automatically on a continuous basis that allows obtaining on-line information for systematic analysis and forecasting. ASKRO complex, in terms of quantities, frequency and accuracy of collected parameters and characteristics is unique not only for Ukraine — it is one of the best complexes of this kind in the world. On December 10, 2010 during the collegium meeting in Kuznetsovsk SNRIU had resolved the decision on prolongation of an operation term of power units 1 and 2 up to 20 years. RNPP power units meet the modern international requirements to nuclear and radiation safety that are evidence of IAEA (1988, 1996, 2003, and 2004) and WANO (2001, and 2004) inspections. RNPP personnel – 8400 staff – team of experienced professionals. Professional training of the staff and its highlevel advanced training are conducted at the RNPP training center where full-scale simulators of VVER-440 and VVER-1000 power units are.

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List of participants of the XII Ukrainian MPC&A Conference

№ Name Organization Address 1 Kushka Viktor Head of Department on 01011 Kyiv Nuclear Security – State Inspector, State Nuclear Arsenalna Str, 9/11 Regulatory Inspectorate of Phone 044-254-35-17 Ukraine Fax 044-254-33-11 e-mail: [email protected] 2 Chorna Nadiya Deputy Head of the 01011 Kyiv Division on Safeguards – State Inspector, State Arsenalna Str, 9/11 Nuclear Regulatory Phone 044-254-35-13 Inspectorate of Ukraine Fax 044-254-33-11 e-mail: [email protected] 3 Klos Nataliya Chief Specialist of Division 01601, Kyiv of Physical Protection, Antiterrorist Activity and Khreshchatyk Str, 30 Control Service, Phone 044-206-38-71 Department for Physical Protection, Industry Fax 044-206-38-71 Security and Protection of e-mail: [email protected] Labour, Ministry for Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine 4 Luchkov Head of Division of 01601, Kyiv Vyacheslav Physical Protection, Antiterrorist Activity and Khreshchatyk Str, 30 Control Service, Phone 044-594-59-06 Department for Physical Protection, Industry Fax 044-594-59-06 Security and Protection of e-mail: Labour, Ministry for [email protected] Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine 5 Onyshchenko Director of Department for 01601, Kyiv Oleksandr Physical Protection, Industry Security and Khreshchatyk Str, 30 Protection of Labour, Phone 044-206-38-30 Ministry for Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Fax 044-206-38-30 e-mail: aleksandr.onischenko@ mev.energy.gov.ua

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6 Glushenkov Engineer of the 2nd 01032, Kyiv Roman Category of Fuel Handling Vyetrova Str, 3 Division, SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” Phone 044-277-78-08 Fax 044-277-78-89 e-mail: [email protected] 7 Korobenko Head of Department of 01032, Kyiv Oleksandr Physical Protection of Vyetrova Str, 3 Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials, SE Phone 044-277-78-94 “NNEGC “Energoatom” Fax 044-277-78-94 e-mail: [email protected] 8 Makarenko Oleg Director on NM and NF PP 01032, Kyiv and Security, Directorate Vyetrova Str, 3 for Physical Protection and Security SE “NNEGC Phone 044-277-78-19 “Energoatom” Fax 044-277-78-94 e-mail: [email protected] 9 Mandziy Vasyl Chief of Division of 01032, Kyiv Physical Protection of Vyetrova Str, 3 Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials, Phone 044-277-78-94 Directorate for Physical Fax 044-277-78-94 Protection and Security, SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” e-mail: [email protected] 10 Artyukh Ivan Team Head for Perspective 71504 Zaporizhzya region Development, Planning Energodar and Analysis of PP System, SE “ZNPP” Phone 06139-560-60 Fax 06139-560-60 e-mail: [email protected] 11 Zamozhny Deputy Нead of PP Service 71504 Zaporizhzya region Volodymyr for Operational Control of Energodar PP System, SE “ZNPP” Phone 06139-559-98 e-mail: [email protected]

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12 Tyekhova Alla Production Engineer of 1st 71504 Zaporizhzya region Category, Division for Energodar Nuclear Safety, SE “ZNPP” Phone 06139-552-48 e-mail: [email protected] 13 Derlyuk Ivan Head of PP Service, SE 34400 Rivne region “RNPP” Kuznetsovsk Phone 03636-642-23 Fax 03636-375-58 e-mail: [email protected] 14 Konyuk Deputy Director General 34400 Rivne region Volodymyr for Physical Protection and Kuznetsovsk Regime, SE “RNPP” Phone 03636-643-40 Fax 03636-626-54 e-mail: [email protected] 15 Soltys Yuriy Engineer of PP Service, SE 34400 Rivne region “RNPP” Kuznetsovsk Phone 03636-629-11 Fax 03636-627-22 e-mail: [email protected] 16 Trotsyuk Alina Engineer of Division for 34400 Rivne region Nuclear Safety, SE “RNPP” Kuznetsovsk Phone 03636-610-86 Fax 03636-354-67 e-mail: [email protected] 17 Boyko Anatoliy Deputy Director General 30100 Khmelnytsky region for PP and Regime, SE Netishyn “KhNPP” Phone 03842-635-00 e-mail: [email protected] 18 Novak Yuriy Engineer of the 2nd 30100 Khmelnytsky region Category on PP, Team for Netishyn Perspective Development, Planning and Analysis of Phone 03842-625-52 PP System, SE “KhNPP” e-mail: [email protected]

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19 Tkachenko Engineer -Radiophysicist 30100 Khmelnytsky region nd Marta of the 2 Category, Netishyn Laboratory for Fuel of Division for Nuclear Safety, Phone 03842-636-36 SE “KhNPP” e-mail: [email protected] 20 Gusenko Pavlo Assistant for Director 55000 Mykolayiv region, General of NPP on Special Yuzhnoukrainsk Security, SE “SUNPP” Phone 05136-430-35 e-mail: [email protected] 21 Yermolenko Leading Engineer on PP – 55000 Mykolayiv region Oleksandr Team Head for Yuzhnoukrainsk Organization of Access and Inside Modes, SE “SUNPP” Phone 05136-30-34 e-mail: [email protected] 22 Nikolayev Engineer of Physical 55000 Mykolayiv region Oleksandr Protection Service, SE Yuzhnoukrainsk “SUNPP” Phone 05136-412-10 e-mail: [email protected] 23 Brodyagin Leading Engineer – Team 07100 Kyiv region Maksym Head for Technical Means Slavutych of Division for PP Regime, SSE “ChNPP” Phone 04593-439-89 Fax 04579-263-92 e-mail: охр@chnpp.gov.ua 24 Solovyov Head of Laboratory for 07100 Kyiv region Vladyslav Nuclear Materials and Slavutych Safeguards of Division for Nuclear Safety, SSE Phone 04593-431-13 “ChNPP’ Fax 04579-263-04 e-mail: [email protected] 25 Fatakhov Instructor of Training 07100 Kyiv region Oleksiy Center, SSE “ChNPP” Slavutych Phone 04593-442-08 Fax 04579-256-70 e-mail: [email protected]

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26 Volochiy Yuriy Head of Regional Division 79045, Lviv for RadWaste Accounting, Tadzhytska Str, 4 SSE “Lviv SISC” Phone 032–251-18-90 Fax 032-251-19-00 e-mail: [email protected] 27 Ivanov Ruslan Engineer for Physical 65031, Odesa Protection, SSE “Odesa Brativ Podzhio Str, 10 SISC” Phone 048-778-24-96 048-778-17-26 Fax 048-778-24-96 e-mail: [email protected] 28 Koval Olga Head of Sector for 03026, Kyiv, RadWaste Accounting , Komunalna Str, 1 Radiation Safety Service and Environment Phone 044-259-41-12 Protection, SSE “Kyiv SISC” Fax 044-259-41-12 e-mail: [email protected] 29 Ovcharenko Assistant of the Head, SSE 03026, Kyiv, Oleg “Kyiv SISC” Komunalna Str, 1 Phone 044-259-41-12 Fax 044-259-41-12 e-mail: [email protected] 30 Pushkash Head of Regional Center 49061, Dnipropetrovsk Oleksandr for Accounting of Geroyiv Stalingradu Str, 24b RadWaste and Radiation Monitoring, SSE Phone 0562-31-31-82 “Dnipropetrovsk SISC” 0562-31-31-23 Fax 0562-31-31-82 e-mail: [email protected] [email protected] 31 Chudnovsky Head of Regional Division 61115, Kharkiv Dmytro for RadWaste Accounting, Sokolova Str, 1 SSE “Kharkiv SISC» Phone 057-293-41-59 Fax 057-717-46-85 e-mail: [email protected]

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32 Valdman Ivan Head of Headquarters of 34400 Rivne region Military Unit 3045, Kuznetsovsk National Guards of Ukraine Phone 067-685-20-63 Fax 03636-64-840 e-mail: [email protected] 33 Golovinov Oleg Head of Department for 03151 Kyiv Vital State Objects Narodnogo Opolchennya, 9-А, Guarding, Headquarters of Main Department, National Phone 044-249-27-69 Guards of Ukraine 044-249-40-67 34 Borovyk Yevgen Director General Adviser of 03057 Kyiv the State Concern «Nuclear Metalistiv Str, 20 Fuel» Phone 044-456-62-00 Fax 044-456-35-25 e-mail: [email protected] 35 Ivanov Pavlo Head of Department of 03056 Kyiv Physical Protection, Polova Str, 24 Protection of Labour and Vital Activity Safety, Phone 044-390-03-27 Factory «Nuclear Fuel» Fax 044-390-03-27 e-mail: [email protected] 36 Kuznyetsova Deputy Hear of 61108 Kharkiv Tamara Department on Security Akademichna Str, 1 and International Contacts, NSC Kharkiv Institute of Phone 050-323-19-63 Physics and Technology Fax 057-335-19-48 e-mail: [email protected] 37 Ludanova Chief of Srvice of Control 03680 Kyiv Tetyana and Accounting of Nuclear Prospect Nauky, 47 Materials and Radioactive Substances, Institute for Phone 044-525-39-22 Nuclear Research of NAS of e-mail: [email protected] Ukraine 38 Tryshyn Head of Ecological 03680 Kyiv Volodymr Problems of Atomic Prospect Nauky, 47 Energetics, Institute for Nuclear Research of NAS of Phone 044-525-43-50 Ukraine Fax 044-525-43-50 e-mail: [email protected]

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39 Movchanyuk Chief Specialist of the 01030 Kyiv Galyna Division for Chernobyl NPP O. Gonchara Str, 55а, Issues and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management of the Phone 044-585-44-54 Department for Fax 044-585-44-54 Implementation of e-mail: [email protected] Chornobyl Programs, State Agency for Management of Exclusion Zone 40 Gavryliuk Viktor Head of George Kuzmycz 03680 м. Kyiv Training Center for Prospect Nauky, 47 Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Phone 044-525-28-49 Nuclear Material Fax 044-525-14-02 e-mail: [email protected] 41 Gavryliuk- Leading Engineer of 03680 Kyiv Burakova Anna George Kuzmycz Training Prospect Nauky, 47 Center for Physical Protection, Control and Phone 044-525-36-21 Accounting of Nuclear Fax 044-525-14-02 Material e-mail: [email protected] 42 Drapey Sergiy Leading Engineer of 03680 Kyiv George Kuzmycz Training Prospect Nauky, 47 Center for Physical Protection, Control and Phone 044-525-36-21 Accounting of Nuclear Fax 044-525-14-02 Material e-mail: [email protected] 43 Kyryshchuk Senior Staff Scientist of 03680 Kyiv Volodymyr George Kuzmycz Training Prospect Nauky, 47 Center for Physical Protection, Control and Phone 044-525-25-16 Accounting of Nuclear Fax 044-525-14-02 Material e-mail: [email protected] 44 Levina Olena Leading Engineer of 03680 Kyiv George Kuzmycz Training Prospect Nauky, 47 Center for Physical Protection, Control and Phone 044-525-25-16 Accounting of Nuclear Fax 044-525-14-02 Material e-mail: [email protected] 45 Romanova Deputy Head of George 03680 Kyiv Olena Kuzmycz Training Center Prospect Nauky, 47 for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Phone 044-525-36-21 Nuclear Material Fax 044-525-14-02 e-mail: [email protected]

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46 Maslov Oleg Head of Sub-Faculty, Odesa 65044 Odesa National Polytecnical Prespect Shevchenka,1 University Phone 048-709-12-15, 048-705-85-22 Fax 048-705-83-02 e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Representative of Sweden 1 Delalic Zlatan Swedish Radiation Safety SE-171 16 Stockholm Sweden Authority Phone + 46 8 799 41 04 Fax +46 8 799 40 10 e-mail: [email protected]

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Companies that are Participants of the Conference Exhibition

1. Aspect Service Company 2. Agency on Information Security “Yugo-Zapad” Company 3. Sparing-Vist Company (ECOTEST) 4. Scientific Production Small Joint Enterprise “Opyt” 5. “BOSCH” Company 6. Expert Systems Company 7. ITV Company 8. DataLink Company

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DEAR PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS OF THE CONFERENCE!

XII Ukrainian Confernece on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials will be conducted according the the decision of the XI Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials that had defined the main topics of the Conference. For the first time all SSE SISC Ukrainain State Corporation RADON participate in XII Ukrainian Confernece on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials. This makes it possible to listen at the Conference the problems associated with the physical protection of radioactive waste and other SIRs, and problems of control and accounting of radioactive materials, which are characteristic of these enterprises. Organizers of the Conference are hoping for a successful job and productive results.

Organizing committee of the Conference

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THE CONFERENCE TOPICS

I. Issues related to establishing physical protection systems, control and accounting of nuclear materials in the course of constructing the new nuclear facilities;

II. Interaction of nuclear security and nuclear safety, their effect on safety operation of nuclear facilities;

III. Implementing the guidelines of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material as reflected in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities into the Ukrainian legislation;

IV. Legal and economic aspects of physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials;

V. Nuclear forensics;

VI. Using the national methods of preventing cybercrime in the context of physical protection.

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ARRANGEMENT OF PRESENTATIONS OF XII UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS BY TOPICS

I. Issues related to establishing physical protection systems, control and accounting of nuclear materials in the course of constructing the new nuclear facilities.

Number of presentation: 10

II. Interaction of nuclear security and nuclear safety, their effect on safety operation of nuclear facilities.

Number of presentation: 11

III. Implementing the guidelines of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material as reflected in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities into the Ukrainian legislation.

Number of presentation: 1

IV. Legal and economic aspects of physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials.

Number of presentation: 4

V. Nuclear forensics.

Number of presentation: 3

VI. Using the national methods of preventing cybercrime in the context of physical protection.

Number of presentation: 2

Total numbers of presentations – 31

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PROGRAM OF XII UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

September 21, Sunday

Arrival of the Conference participants to the VARASH Hotel, Kuznetsovsk

September 22, Monday

9:00 – PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION. CONFERENCE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE 10:00 MEETING 10:00 – Opening of the Conference 10:45 O.Onyshchenko P.Pavlyshyn Z. Delalich 10:45 – Coffee-break 11:15 11:15 – Formation of Committee for the development of Conference Summary 12:00 document (Conference Decisions) and Group for definition of best presentations 12:00 First session Head – Oleksandr Onyshchenko 12:00 – Oleksandr Korobenko 12:30 Certain aspects of legal framework for operation of the state system of physical system of physical protection in Ukraine 12:30 – Nadiya Chorna 13:00 IAEA safeguards application report 13:00 – Lunch 14:00 14:00 Second session Head – Oleksandr Korobenko 14:00 – Anatoliy Boyko 14:30 Establishment and Implementation of Nuclear Security Culture at Kmelnytska NPP 14:30 – Olena Romanova 14:50 Results of security culture survey at nuclear facilities 14:50 – Volodymyr Tryshyn 15:20 Nuclear forensics in Ukraine 15:20 – Coffee-break 15:50

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15:50– Vyacheslav Luchkov 16:10 Problems of Improvement of Protection System for Critical Infrastructure in Ukraine 16:10 – Tamara Kuznyetsova 16:30 Physical protection during construction of novel nuclear facility 16:30 – Ruslan Ivanov 16:50 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators and their physical protection 16:50 – Oleg Maslov 17:10 Implementation of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear security requirements during refuelling machine reconstruction

September 23, Tuesday

9:00 Third session Head: Anatoliy Boyko 9:00 – Pavlo Gusenko 9:30 NPP sanitary protection area as a function of physical protection 9:30 – Roman Glushenkov 10:00 Classification and analysis of operational results and nuclear fuel accounting at nuclear power plants 10:00 – Coffee-break 10:30 10:30 – Nataliya Klos 10:55 Implementation of IAEA physical protection recommendations into national legislation of Ukraine 10:55 – Sergiy Drapey 11:20 Organization of information security at informating-controlling comlex of physical protection technical means based on Ukrainian legislation and international recommendations 11:20 – Yuriy Soltys 11:45 Information security as part of physical protection equipment computerised information and control system 11:45 – Ivan Artyukh 12:10 Synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety and their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities 12:10 – Alina Trotsyuk 12:35 Synergy of nuclear security and nuclear safety and their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities at Rivne NPP 12:35 – Oleksiy Fatakhov 13:00 Application of nuclear safety incidents investigation experience in nuclear security

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13:00 – Lunch 14:00 14:00 Demonstration of PPS ETM and Systems of Dosimetry Control (Presentations of Companies-Suppliers)

September 24, Wednesday

9:00 Fourth session Head: Viktor Gavryliuk 9:00 – Volodymyr Tryshyn 9:30 Creation of a nuclear forensic laboratory 9:30 – Oleksandr Pushkash 10:00 Certain aspects of identification of nuclear material in illicit trafficking from experience of a special enterprise 10:00 – Coffee-break 10:30 10:30 – Vladyslav Solovyov 11:00 Chernobyl NPP experience in identifying abnormal criteria 11:00 – Yuriy Novak 11:30 Sunergy of nuclear security and nuclear safety and their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities 11:30 – Marta Tkachenko 12:00 Implementation of interface between physical protection system and nuclear material accounting and control system at Khmelnytska NPP 12:00 – Alla Tyekhova 12:30 Nuclear material accounting and control for SNF dispatch from nuclear power units to stationary SNF storage 12:30 – Volodymyr Tryshyn 13:00 Development of nuclear forensics database in Ukraine 13:00 – Lunch 14:00 14:00 Fifth Session Head: Nadiya Chorna 14:00 – Volodymyr Kyryshchuk 14:30 National skill improvement system for nuclear material accounting and contol specialists 14:30 – Volodymyr Zamozhny 15:00 Challenges of building a construction phase physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control system for a new nuclear facility 15:00 – Coffee-break 15:30

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15:30 – Yevgen Borovyk 16:50 Certain issues regarding development of a construction phase physical protection system for a new nuclear facility 15:50 – Maksym Brodyagin 16:10 Concept for creation of nuclear facilities and nuclear material physical protection systems 16:10 – Ivan Valdman 16:30 Legal and economic aspects of physical protection 16:30 – Oleksandr Yermolenko 16:50 Physical protection principles, elements and role in general safety and security of South-Ukraine NPP 16:50 – Pavlo Ivanov 17:10 Algorithmization in nuclear hazardous facility physical protection control systems

September 25, Thursday

9:00 – 10:00 Discussion of draft XII Conference Decision 10:00 – 10:30 Coffee-break 10:30 – Round Table 12:00 Head: Anatoliy Boyko 12:00 – Round Table Work Results 13:00 Report Anatoliy Boyko 13:00 – Lunch 14:00 14:00 – Results of the Conference best presentations contest 14:30 Report Volodymyr Konyuk 14:30 – Conference Decision-making 15:30 Report: Head of decision-working committee 15:30 – XII Conference Closing 16:00 16:00 Coffee-break

September 26, Friday Departure of the Conference participants (bus to Kyiv will depart from VARASH hotel at 8 AM)

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Rules of Best Presentation Contest at the XII Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Conrol and Accounting of Nuclear Materials

Organising committee of the XII Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials will run a best presentation contest. The goal of the contest is to inspire and motivate Conference participants to prepare excellent presentations and deliver them at the Conference. The contest is open to all Conference participants whose presentation abstracts have been accepted by the organising committee of XII Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials. The contest jury will select 3 best presentations at the Conference in accordance with best presentation contest rules described below. Winners will be recommended for and provided holistic support in publication of results in Nuclear Physics and Energy journal issued by the Institute of Nuclear Research of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences (provided presentations meet requirements of the journal’s editorial panel). Winners will receive commemorative awards.

The organising committee has appointed the following contest jury for the Conference: 1. Volodymyr Konyuk, SS Rivne NPP – chairman; 2. Nadiya Chorna, State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine; 3. Nataliya Klos, Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine; 4. Sergiy Drapey, George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material; 5. Alina Trotsyuk, SS Rivne NPP.

Contest assessment criteria have been worked out by the organising committee in accordance with the rules applied previously at the Ukrainian Conferences. Contest jury members will assign scores to presentations by each of the following criteria (1 being the lowest score):  Presentation topicality (scored 1 through 3);  Novelty (scored 1 through 5);  Content (scored 1 through 5);  Quality of presentation (scored 1 through 3);  Quality of delivery (scored 1 through 5);  Clarity and completeness of answers to questions asked on the presentation (scored 1 through 5). Thus a maximum score that may be achieved by any participant is 26. Assessment form is attached below to this document as its integral part. Decisions of the contest jury will be final and conclusive.

These rules apply to the best presentation contest at the XII Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Conrol and Accounting of Nuclear Materials.

Chair of organising committee: Chair of contest jury: O. M. Onyshchenko V.V. Konyuk

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Presentation evaluation form XII Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Conrol and Accounting of Nuclear Materials

September 22-25, 2014 Kuznetsovsk, Rivne region, Ukraine

Topic: Physical Protection Control and Accounting of NM Author: Title:

Reviewer: Date: Evaluated criteria Score 1 2 3 4 5 Presentation topicality X X Significance for MPC&A Novelty New approach New idea Old idea with new approach Content Daily issues are considered Existing problem-solving is proposed Quality of presentation X X Quality of delivery Strict adherence to a time schedule Quality of slides Knack of slides using during the presentation delivery Clarity and completeness of answers to questions asked on the presentation Total score:

Note: Each point will be scored from 1(the lowest score) up to 3 or 5 (the highest score). Maximum presentation score is 26.

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LIST OF THE ABSTRACTS

№ Speaker Name Title of the Presentation Page 1 Artyukh Ivan Synergy between nuclear security and nuclear 42 safety and their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities 2 Boyko Anatoliy Establishment and Implementation of Nuclear 28 Security Culture at Kmelnytska NPP 3 Borovyk Yevgen Certain issues regarding development of a 55 construction phase physical protection system for a new nuclear facility 4 Brodyagin Maksym Concept for creation of nuclear facilities and 56 nuclear material physical protection systems 5 Valdman Ivan Legal and economic aspects of physical protection 58

6 Glushenkov Roman Classification and analysis of operational results 38 and nuclear fuel accounting at nuclear power plants 7 Gusenko Pavlo NPP sanitary protection area as a function of 36 physical protection 8 Drapey Sergiy Organization of information security at 40 informating-controlling comlex of physical protection technical means based on Ukrainian legislation and international recommendations 9 Yermolenko Oleksandr Physical protection principles, elements and role 59 in general safety and security of South-Ukraine NPP 10 Zamozhny Volodymyr Challenges of building a construction phase 54 physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control system for a new nuclear facility 11 Ivanov Pavlo Algorithmization in nuclear hazardous facility 61 physical protection control systems 12 Ivanov Ruslan Radioisotope thermoelectric generators and their 33 physical protection 13 Kyryshchuk Volodymyr National skill improvement system for nuclear 53 material accounting and contol specialists 14 Klos Nataliya Implementation of IAEA physical protection 39 recommendations into national legislation of Ukraine 15 Korobenko Oleksandr Certain aspects of legal framework for operation 27 of the state system of physical system of physical protection in Ukraine

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16 Kuznyetsova Tamara Physical protection during construction of novel 32 nuclear facility 17 Luchkov Vyacheslav Problems of Improvement of Protection System 31 for Critical Infrastructure in Ukraine 18 Maslov Oleg Implementation of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear 35 security requirements during refuelling machine reconstruction 19 Novak Yuriy Sunergy of nuclear security and nuclear safety and 48 their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities 20 Pushkash Oleksandr Certain aspects of identification of nuclear 46 material in illicit trafficking from experience of a special enterprise 21 Romanova Olena Results of security culture survey at nuclear 29 facilities 22 Solovyov Vladyslav Chernobyl NPP experience in identifying 47 abnormal criteria 23 Soltys Yuriy Information security as part of physical 41 protection equipment computerised information and control system 24 Tyekhova Alla Nuclear material accounting and control for SNF 51 dispatch from nuclear power units to stationary SNF storage 25 Tkachenko Marta Implementation of interface between physical 50 protection system and nuclear material accounting and control system at Khmelnytska NPP 26 Tryshyn Volodymyr Nuclear forensics in Ukraine 30 27 Tryshyn Volodymyr Creation of a nuclear forensic laboratory 45 28 Tryshyn Volodymyr Development of nuclear forensics database in 52 Ukraine 29 Trotsyuk Alina Synergy of nuclear security and nuclear safety and 43 their impact on safe operation of nuclear facilities at Rivne NPP 30 Fatakhov Oleksiy Application of nuclear safety incidents 44 investigation experience in nuclear security 31 Chorna Nadiya IAEA safeguards application report 27

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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATION OF THE STATE SYSTEM OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN UKRAINE

O.M. Korobenko, O.V. Makarenko, V.G. Mandziy SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”

The state system of physical protection has the legal status defined in the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation (the “LOU On Physical Protection”) and operates in accordance with the Cabinet Decree dated 21/12/2011 No. 1337 On Approval of the Procedure for Operation of the State System of Physical Protection (the “Procedure”) and other regulations. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Procedure, the state system of physical protection may function in the following modes: normal operation; high alert; emergency operation; recovery to normal operation. No current regulations concerning physical protection define the term “high alert” or specify actions of the operator or other parties involved in the state system of physical protection in case of transition of the system to a “high alert” or an “emergency operation” mode. A crisis situation and an emergency situation are defined in paragraph 1.2 of the Requirements to Defining Operational Procedures for Personnel of Physical Protection Division and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Division in Emergency or Crisis Situations. These Requirements specify events that may cause a crisis or an emergency situation. Furthermore, subparagraph 1.4.1. of this regulation sets responsibilities and tasks of physical protection personnel in case of emergency or crisis at the facility. In all of the above events a NPP should trigger the Facility-Level Response Plan in Case of Sabotage, one of its tasks being to secure successful response to any attempts of adversaries, characterised in the facility-level design basis threat, to commit sabotage, theft of nuclear material, radioactive waste (RAW) or another source of ionising radiation (SIR), or any other illicit act against the facility. Facility-level response plans and tactics of NPP guard forces should be developed and drilled based on this design basis threat. Facility-level response to various illicit acts against nuclear facilities (NF) and nuclear material (NM) is governed by various regulations and should be drilled as part of training events and exercises at various levels. At the same time, the new revision of the Ukrainian Design Basis Threat regarding NF, NM, RAW and other SIR provides for a number of beyond-design basis threats being the prerogative of the Ministry of Interior, Security Service and Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Neither response to beyond-design basis threats nor coordination of appropriate assets and personnel are contemplated in LOU On Physical Protection or any other regulation. The presentation will elaborate on a number of shortfalls in operation of the state system of physical protection in emergency and in response to beyond-design basis threats and will formulate proposals for correction of these shortfalls.

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IAEA SAFEGUARDS APPLICATION REPORT

N.V. Chorna State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

The paper won't be superfluous to remind general requirements of regulations related to Safeguards, in particular, to focus on changes in the Rules of Accounting made in accordance with the Order of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine № 117 of 21st October 2013. The paper also considers the results of Safeguards implementation since the application of integrated Safeguards. Particularly, it is noted that there is a decrease in the number of additional accesses compared with the early years of implementation of the Additional Protocol. However, the number of requests under Article 2c, which relate to the historical aspect, has not decreased. Decrease of number of inspections has not yet taken place. Annual meeting of the working group Ukraine-IAEA on the issues of Safeguards implementation (SIRG), which was held on 26th June 2014, in whole has stated positive progress of Ukraine on the issues of implementation of the Agreement on Safeguards. For example, the necessary conditions were created at all NPPs to ensure that the Agency inspectors are able to perform their functions (installed handrail pads for work with DCVD devices, performed works on integration of servers); information regarding schedules of planned and preventive maintenances are received promptly. According to the results of implementation of Safeguards in 2013 in Ukraine, it is confirmed an enhanced conclusion. In addition to current issues that are purely technical and related to implementation of Safeguards, the Safeguards Department is also involved in political issues of implementation of Safeguards, which solution could be assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particular, these are issues of implementation of Safeguards to so-called “pure” natural uranium concentrate, and, in fact, transfer of the initial point of Safeguards. The Department of Safeguards is also consistently provides methodological assistance and methodological materials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna concerning theoretical and practical issues of implementation of Safeguards prior to various international events, for example, negotiations on the Agreement on comprehensive prohibition of production of fissionable materials. Due to the events that took place in Ukraine in winter 2013/2014, several Agency inspections were cancelled; after occupation of territory of the Autonomy Republic of Crimea and the loss of control over two facilities by Ukraine, the special report was sent to the IAEA. Regarding the impact of these events on the overall picture of implementation of Safeguards in Ukraine, this issue is subject to further negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Mission. Finally, the participants will be invited to review several purely practical problems of implementation of Safeguards in Ukraine that are also subject to discuss.

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ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE AT KHMELNYTSKA NPP

A.V. Boyko SE “NNEGC Energoatom”, SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

1. Progress made by administration of SS Khmelnytska NPP (KhNPP) towards further establishment and implementation of nuclear security culture at the facility during the period from the previous, XI Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials. Specific attention to formation, development and maintaining at appropriate level of nuclear security culture among facility personnel and employees of contractors and other organisations who provide services or perform work in the interest of the nuclear power plant. 2. Regular meetings of nuclear security culture establishment and implementation workgroup to review and collectively approve drafts of relevant action plans, visual and information materials, media publications etc. 3. Approval by the order of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) of regulations Procedure to Establish and Develop Nuclear Security Culture at Nuclear Installations and Facilities Handling Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation and Instruction on Evaluation of Nuclear Security Culture at Nuclear Installations and Facilities Handling Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation as a new impetus to a more active work in the area of nuclear security culture. 4. Implementation of the above regulations at KhNPP; development and approval of relevant actions. 5. Appointment of officer in charge of nuclear security culture and nuclear security culture coordinator. Appointment of divisional officers in charge of nuclear security culture; development and approval of tasks, rights and responsibilities of nuclear security culture coordinator and divisional officers in charge of nuclear security culture at KhNPP. 6. Development and approval, jointly with STC, of training programmes for personnel and officers in charge of nuclear security culture for the current year. 7. Creation of the guideline Measures to Establish Nuclear Security Culture in Divisions of KhNPP in order to improve effectiveness of nuclear security implementation work at divisions of Khmelnytska NPP. This guideline will include recommendations to division leaders and nuclear security culture coordinators on materials for and forms of work with personnel to be applied to make divisional personnel understand tasks of nuclear security culture. 8. Provision of information materials on nuclear security culture (memoranda, materials on communiques of Washington, Seoul and Hague Nuclear Security Summits, publications in facility-level and regional media on establishment of nuclear security culture at KhNPP, posters and other visual aids prepared by physical protection service) to officers in charge as required for work at KhNPP divisions. 9. Publication and illustration of materials on measures to establish nuclear security culture at the facility in KhNPP newspaper Perspektiva, local and regional media in Khmelnytska and Rivne oblasts, as well as on local TV, in order to promote nuclear security culture knowledge among population of towns of compact habitation of nuclear facility personnel.

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RESULTS OF SECURITY CULTURE SURVEY AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

V.I. Gavryliuk, A.V. Gavryliuk-Burakova, S.S. Drapey, V.V. Parkhomenko, D.V. Proskurin, O.P. Romanova Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material has been polling students of advanced training courses for Ukrainian physical protection specialists in 2012 – 2013 in order to assess effectiveness of work aimed to establish and develop security culture at nuclear facilities. Respondents were proposed to fill out two types of questionnaire forms. Questionnaire form 1 was designed to obtain information on level of assurance of physical protection experts regarding existence of credible threats to nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities; their understanding of the nature of such threats; attitude of physical protection specialists to their duties. Questionnaire form 2 had the task of acquiring information on evaluation by physical protection specialists of level of attention paid by state authorities to physical protection issues and get their opinions concerning status of nuclear security culture at facilities where they work. Analysis of questionnaires has shown the following: establishment of nuclear security culture at physical protection divisions of nuclear facilities has been completed; measures to improve nuclear security culture in these divisions are underway; there is a lasting trend towards reduction in number of violations of access control and internal security regime by personnel of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, which evidences continuous improvement of the culture level.

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NUCLEAR FORENSICS IN UKRAINE

V.V. Tryshyn Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Illicit trafficking in and contraband of nuclear material create global threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Effective countermeasures could be assured by a combined effort of state authorities and organisations and by strong international cooperation. Nuclear forensics plays a decisive role in suppression of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Main goal of nuclear forensics is to identify origin and potential use of interdicted nuclear material. This information is vitally important and necessary for effective suppression of contraband of nuclear material. It may be obtained from analysis of characteristics of nuclear material such as isotopic composition of uranium or plutonium, trace contamination and isotope ratios of stable elements, time from fabrication of material (age), porosity, granular or crystalline structure of material etc. Since such analyses require availability of highly qualified personnel and very expensive state-of-the-art ultrasensitive precision equipment (alpha, beta gamma and mass spectrometers, neutron counters, XRF analysers, scanning and transmission microscopes), as well as a set of appropriate metrologically assured measurement techniques, they may only be provided by scientific centres of forensic analysis. By the Cabinet Decree No. 813 dated 2 June 2003, Institute for Nuclear Research (INR) of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences was appointed the chief expert organisation for analysis and characterisation of radioactive materials recovered from illicit trafficking. In many years INR has gained substantial experience in nuclear forensics, has qualified experts and appropriate analytic equipment and works in coordination with world’s leading nuclear forensic laboratories. Inter alia, INR was provided a mobile laboratory to survey incident scenes and a modern Element-2 precision inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) to identify trace elements in nuclear material and environment samples as part of TACIS and Instrument for Stability (IfS) programmes. In 2010, in pursuance of measures contemplated in section 2, paragraph 2 of Implementation Plan for Presidential Decree No. 1035 dated 15 November 2010, INR proposed to establish a regional network of nuclear forensic laboratories with a base laboratory located in Ukraine. This idea was supported both in Ukraine and in other GUAM countries. This project will be implemented jointly by forensic research organisations of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The European Commission will provide partner support to the project, which will be supervised by the Institute for Transuranium Elements of the EC Joint Research Centre. The importance of development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine was emphasised in the Presidential Decree No. 73/2013 On Approval of the National Plan for the Implementation of Provisions of Communique of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit for 2013-2014, providing for development and approval of a concept for the state target programme for the development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine.

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PROBLEMS OF IMPROVEMENT OF PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN UKRAINE

V.I. Luchkov Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine

Taking into account the limited resources, as well as the objective inability to provide absolute protection and safety of all infrastructure systems, many countries worldwide implement the concept of critical infrastructure which allows to focus on the systems, networks and separate objects, the destruction or malfunction of which would have the most serious negative consequences for the national security. As a rule, the critical infrastructure includes energy and transport backbone networks, oil and gas pipelines, seaports, high-speed communication channels and government communications, life-support systems (water and heat supply) of megalopolises, recycling systems, emergency and response services, high-tech enterprises, military-industrial complex enterprises, as well as central authorities. The meaning of term «critical infrastructure» is somewhat different from one country to another, but these differences are not significant. Now, the lack of clear definition of the term «critical infrastructure» in Ukrainian legislation and, as a consequence, the lack of specification of objects related to this category obstruct the effective implementation of item 6 of the Resolution of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 1, 2014 «About Urgent Measures on Ensuring of National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine» (enacted by Decree of the President of Ukraine №189/2014 of 02.03.14). According to the Decree, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is obligated to ensure «intensified protection of the objects of energy and critical infrastructure». The presentation will highlight problem issues associated with the use of this term in Ukrainian legislation, and will analyze its usage in legislation of other countries.

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PHYSICAL PROTECTION DURING CONSTRUCTION OF NOVEL NUCLEAR FACILITY

T.Yu. Kuznyetsova NSC “Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology”, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences

In accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the US Government and the Government of Ukraine concerning cooperation in nuclear safety dated 26 September 2011 and Presidential Decree dated 11 February 2013 No. 73/2013, National Scientific Centre Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is developing the Neutron Source subcritical nuclear installation (the “Neutron Source”). With regard to the construction of the Neutron Source the following issues will be reviewed in the presentation: – compliance with physical protection requirements at construction and commissioning stages; – functions of the physical protection division and the guard force; – support for work to create the Neutron Source physical protection system.

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RADIOISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC GENERATORS AND THEIR PHYSICAL PROTECTION

I.M. Zvereva, R.O. Ivanov, S.O. Tumanov State Specialised Enterprise “Odessa State Interregional Special Complex” (SSE “OSISC”)

A radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) is a source of electric power fed by thermal energy of radioactive decay. Strontium-90 is used as a fuel for RTGs and plutonium-238 for high energy consumption generators. RTGs are used in navigation beacons, radio beacons, at weather stations and with similar equipment deployed in areas where other sources of power supply are not technically or economically feasible. RTG as a rule is the most acceptable source of power supply for self- contained robots consuming several hundred watts or less with operational time too long for fuel elements or batteries. RTGs are used as principle sources of power at space vehicles with extended missions operating remotely from the Sun in areas where use of solar cells is inefficient or impossible. During the Soviet period, over one thousand RTGs were fabricated. Lifecycle of an RTG may vary between 10 and 30 years; most of them are now obsolete and need disposal. RTGs present a potential threat since, being deployed in desolate locations, they may be stolen and subsequently used to create a dirty bomb. RTGs are known to have been cannibalised by nonferrous metal scrap chasers. Say, late in March 2006, colour scrap hunters looted 4 out of 8 unattended RTGs with highly-active strontium-90 near Norilsk in Krasnoyarsk Krai. An interdepartmental meeting took place at OSISC in Odessa in November 1999 to discuss further use of RTGs owned by the State Hydrography Service of Ukraine. The meeting was attended by representatives of OSISC, Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies, Environmental Inspectorate under Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Safety, State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU), Ukrainian Health Ministry, STC KORO, State Hydrography Service of Ukraine, and Isotop Enterprise (15 persons altogether). The meeting resolved to refer to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for funding required to arrange temporary storage of RTGs at the site of OSISC RAW disposal site and to develop and solicit approval for terms of reference for acceptance, transport and temporary storage of RTGs. In April 2002, STC KORO worked out Terms for Acceptance, Transport and Temporary Storage of RTGs at the Site of OSISC in respect of RTGs owned by the State Hydrography Service; the Terms were agreed with SNRCU, Odessa Oblast State Department of Environmental Safety, Odessa Oblast State Department of Public Health, and Radon Enterprise. Based on Protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Cabinet of Ukraine of 27 February 2002, all RTGs were transported by Odessa Special Complex, accompanied by traffic police patrols and emergency crews of OSISC radiation safety service, for storage at RAW disposal site pending dispatch to Vector Complex currently under construction at the Exclusion Zone, during the period between 30 July 2002 (Snake Island) and 05 April 2005 (State Hydrography Service branches). Between July 2002 and April 2005, works for transportation and temporary disposal of RTGs from Snake Island were carried out under contract between OSISC and State Hydrography Service. Following completion of RTG acceptance procedure at the Special Complex generators were accommodated at a specially prepared site. Since fast unauthorised access to radioactive material inside an RTG is not possible and structural damage to RTGs from atmospheric effects during the storage time will be insignificant the RTGs have been located at a concrete platform protected from unauthorised

33 access by a metal fence at least 1.5 m high. The fence is supplied with radiation hazard signs and “Radioactivity” placards. Signs and placards are clearly visible from a distance of at least 10 m. No persons other than those involved in radiation monitoring or control of RTG physical condition are allowed inside the fenced area. The site where RTGs are stored has a reliable physical protection system that includes: 1. alarm system: – vibration detectors; – magnetic contact detectors; – infrared detectors; – sound and light alarm; 2. CCTV system. Continuous radiological monitoring is carried out and appropriate physical protection level is maintained and enhanced at Odessa SISC RAW disposal site and the site where RTGs are stored.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS DURING REFUELLING MACHINE RECONSTRUCTION

O.V. Maslov Odessa National Polytechnic Institute

Operation of VVER type reactors involves annual reloading of nuclear fuel (NF); part of physical barriers do not function during that period. It is important that during this refuelling operation at a NPP human errors and malicious acts have practically identical consequences that may lead to a nuclear accident involving destruction of fuel assemblies and, accordingly, to a communal radiological accident or to unauthorised removal of nuclear material – that is, goals of nuclear safety and nuclear security are here the same. Reconstruction of a refuelling machine had the task of removal of safety deficiencies and achievement of compliance with requirements of applicable safety regulations, as well as increase of the level of nuclear power facility safety. Conceptual solution for refuelling machine reconstruction was based on analysis of existing safety regulations, including of the nuclear security requirements. The factor mentioned above of refuelling process has been reflected in modern documents governing nuclear safety during refuelling that now also include relevant nuclear security requirements. Nuclear security requirements have been formulated to the fullest extent for refuelling machine control system (RMCS); they have been implemented during the reconstruction process. Firstly, RMCS design used the principle of defence-in-depth; say, in formation of control actions to refuelling machine mechanisms at least three levels of their validation have been used via several independent channels based on different physical principles; besides, strict hardware and software lockups have been implemented. Secondly, integration of RMCS with the automated refuelling programme preparation system and the system for automatic recognition of numbers of fuel assemblies and other reloaded items enables automation of NM accounting and control and accounting records preparation procedures with a provision made for compliance with information security requirements. On the other hand, need to comply with nuclear safety requirements caused modification of refuelling machine design, namely, integration of an emergency manual drive for main mechanisms. This creates an opportunity for unauthorised movement of a fuel assembly in a mode overrunning RMCS restrictions. In this situation, nuclear security may be sustained by way of physical protection of the refuelling machine. All nuclear safety and nuclear security related solutions have been described in the safety assessment report.

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NPP SANITARY PROTECTION AREA AS A FUNCTION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION

P.A. Gusenko SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “South-Ukraine NPP”

In the modern context of operation of nuclear power facilities, involving factors of potential terrorist activity and sabotage against such facilities, accommodation and operation of business enterprises around a nuclear facility and their potential use as a cover for such activity becomes an issue of significance for Production Enterprise South-Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SS SUNPP). This issue relates to arrangement of sanitary protection areas around nuclear power plants and is topical for SS SUNPP, with nearly 50 business entities operating around its site – some of them in close proximity to this nuclear facility. In accordance with article 45 of the Law of Ukraine On Use of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Safety, size and boundaries of a sanitary protection area (SPA) around a nuclear facility should be established in the nuclear plant design based on norms, rules and standards for nuclear energy use, should be agreed with state regulatory bodies in the area of nuclear and radiological safety and should be approved by local legislatures. Parts of sanitary protection areas around nuclear power facilities, provided in permanent use to SE NNEGC Energoatom, are qualified as lands of the power grid per article 76 of the Land Code of Ukraine; transfer of these lands, being a state-owned asset, in communal or private ownership is not permitted, as provided in article 84 of the same Code. In order to improve conditions for reliable and safe operation of SUNPP, based on resolution of Nikolayev Oblast Executive Committee dated 05 May 1985 No. 197, executive committee of Yuzhnoukrayinsk town council passed Resolution No. 299 On Sanitary Protection Area of SUNPP on 24 October 1990, setting SPA boundary at 2.5 km from the stack of each power unit used for controlled release of radionuclides into natural environment. No residential or public facilities, children’s, medical or recreation establishments, industrial enterprises, catering facilities, nor any auxiliary or other buildings not related to the operation of a nuclear facility or a radioactive waste handling facility are allowed within this SPA. However, in the course of construction of the nuclear power plant and the town of Yuzhnoukrayinsk local authorities allocated a large number of land plots within SPA to business entities whose activity in most cases is not related to NPP (garage cooperatives, administrative and residential buildings etc.) Over the thirty-year period a certain number of objects built in these land plots changed ownership and profile of activity. Some of the buildings presently remain empty. On the other hand, SS SUNPP has not been paying proper attention to this issue either. Only in 2013, SPA boundaries were delimited and outfitted on site; however, Nikolayev oblast state administration has not yet approved the appropriate land planning design that would define SUNPP SPA boundaries. Furthermore, SS SUNPP is working to achieve compliance with applicable laws in accordance with the Guideline on the Procedure for Agreement with SE NNEGC Energoatom of Intent of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs to Use for General Economic Purposes Land and Water Reservoirs within NPP Sanitary Protection Areas (document PL-D.0.28.597- 13 dated 20 December 2013). Inter alia, all business entities carrying out activity within SPA have been identified and notices have been sent to their addresses regarding the need to obtain land use permit from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine; some of

36 them have already submitted documents for review by the newly-established SUNPP comission for approval of intent to use the said land etc. At the same time, this issue becomes imperative considering close proximity of certain business entities to SUNPP perimeter, which allows potential terrorist or saboteur teams to use this to the advantage of their illicit activity. An opportunity is created for them to identify engineered protection systems used at the NPP, learn about order of guard service provided by personnel of unit 3044 of the National Guard of Ukraine responsible for protection of SUNPP, their numbers and weapons, the most vulnerable areas of the perimeter etc. Considering the above circumstances, SS SUNPP jointly with law enforcement agencies continues the work to secure compliance with applicable laws and to analyse the setting within SPA in order to prevent illicit activities of terrorists or saboteurs.

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CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL ACCOUNTING AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS R.S. Glushenkov SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”

Operation and expansion of a modern enterprise is unthinkable without an efficient system of accounting, classification and analysis of operating data based on key performance indicators. Databases that, if properly organised and harmonised, address an immense amount of tasks are a principal instrument to address these needs. Reviewed in this presentation are existing models to arrange and analyse NPP operational results and nuclear material accounting records, as well as to identify main avenues of their improvement based on available technology. Upgrade of existing systems would result in a single system of computerised accounting for and support of the handling of nuclear fuel both at existing Ukrainian NPPs and newly built nuclear facilities. Such system will help automate and integrate information support for process operations involving nuclear fuel and for preparation of accounting and analytic records and reports in consistency with applicable technical guidelines by the regulator, the operator, and nuclear fuel manufacturers and suppliers. This system should build on an automated nuclear material accounting and operation database that would minimise or rule out error in operations with nuclear fuel and in preparation of analytic and accounting records and reports, exclude unnecessary duplication of reports, reduce their numbers, and secure control of nuclear fuel parameters during operation. The presentation will illustrate approaches to creation of such a database, principal requirements to it and its potential functions.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA PHYSICAL PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS INTO NATIONAL LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE

N.M. Klos Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine

The Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation (hereinafter the “Law”), passed by the Parliament of Ukraine on 19 October 2000 under No. 2064-III, was developed by a team of physical protection experts based on recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), their knowledge and experience. Ukrainian specialists, in realising danger of illicit proliferation of radioactive materials, had made a forward-looking assumption that physical protection would be required not for nuclear material and nuclear facilities only, but also for radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation, which pre-empted the international community by a decade. It is quite illustrative that IAEA recommendations on physical protection, originally published in 1975, only applied to nuclear material (INFCIRC/225). It was not before 1998 that, based on extended experience of operators and, in particular, lessons learned from the Chernobyl disaster, requirements to protection of not only material but also main equipment of a nuclear facility were formulated: the new revision of INFCIRC/225 was entitled Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; it included a new section concerning protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage.1 Time and experience dictate new adjustments that require flexible approach from all stakeholders. The said IAEA document was revised five times and was changed significantly. Having analysed existing threats, IAEA developed two new documents: Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control and Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. Considering new international community approaches and requirements to nuclear security there is a need to analyse the Ukrainian regulatory framework on physical protection for consistency with existing international practice and experience. The presentation will dwell on main innovations in IAEA nuclear security recommendations and on how they are reflected in the national legislation of Ukraine and will analyse the need and expediency of their implementation in the Ukrainian legislation.

1 From experience of implementation of fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear and other radioactive materials – I. Kuzmyak, V. Kravtsov, Nuclear and Radiological Safety 4 (56).2012, pages 67-73

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ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY AT INFORMATING- CONTROLLING COMLEX OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION TECHNICAL MEANS BASED ON UKRAINIAN LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

V.I. Gavryliuk, A.V. Gavryliuk-Burakova, S.S. Drapey, V.V. Parkhomenko, D.V. Proskurin, O.P. Romanova Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Nowadays, Information Technologies are widely used to implement many of the vital functions at nuclear facilities. Such condition leads to multiple benefits in the field of operating safety and the efficiency of protection systems. At the same time, for the proper operation of computer systems it is necessary to create adequate and balanced security levels that provide maximum protection against malicious acts and do not impede system operation. Therefore, all the facilities should formulate and implement information security policy. The policy should define the general objectives of information security at the facility. Information security is a method of organization and development of informational structure of the complex of technical means of physical protection at the facility, in which employee knows and is able to implement his knowledge and skills in the information field, is able to recognize the negative impacts of information that threaten the normal operation of information system, and is able to use threat protection technologies. The International Atomic Energy Agency in its publication “Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities” (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 17, Technical Guidance, Vienna, 2012) recommends creating of multiple levels of information protection.

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INFORMATION SECURITY AS PART OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT COMPUTERISED INFORMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Yu.P. Soltys SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Rivne NPP”

Physical protection equipment computerised information and control system is a set of physical protection equipment integrated into a single information and control system designed to perform tasks in physical protection of a facility. Information security in this computerised system relates to the following aspects: accessibility, or such property of a system resource that allows user and/or process assigned certain authority to use the resource in accordance with the rules set by security policy without having to wait longer than a pre-set (brief) time period, i. e. its ability of being in a format, in place and at time required by the user; integrity, or such property of the system where none of its components may be removed, modified or added against security policy; confidentiality, or such property of information where information may not be obtained by an unauthorised user and/or process. Implementation of information security aspect as part of the physical protection equipment computerised information and control system at Rivne NPP is aimed to address the following tasks: to secure protection of automated equipment system from failures during operation and unauthorised (deliberate or inadvertent) disclosure, modification or destruction of automated system; to emphasise importance of information security for all users of the automated system and expressly identify their role in sustaining this security; to assign responsibilities for security of data and information, as well as of the automated system itself.

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SYNERGY BETWEEN NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

I.O. Artyukh SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Zaporizhzhya NPP”

1. Synergy is a combined effect of factors in which their joint action much exceeds effect of each of them separately or of their plain sum. 2. Safe operation of nuclear power facilities requires adherence to the so-called 3S principle (safety, security, safeguards), as specified by IAEA in [2]: “Operation of nuclear power plants requires careful attention to nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards:” - nuclear safety means achievement of proper operational conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, which assures protection of personnel, the public and environment from excess radiological hazard; - nuclear security means prevention and detection of theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, unauthorised transfer or any other malicious act in respect of nuclear material, other radioactive substances or associated facilities, as well as response to such acts; - IAEA Nuclear Safeguards means control to prevent conversion of nuclear energy from peaceful use to use for military purposes. 3. Conflicts between nuclear security and nuclear safety elements and their common features. 4. Areas of activity to assure nuclear security and nuclear safety are complementary and have the common goal of achievement of NPP safety and security by protecting people and environment from unacceptable radiological exposure.

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SYNERGY OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT RIVNE NPP

A.V. Trotsyuk SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Rivne NPP”

Synergy is combined effort to achieve a common goal, based on the principle that a whole is something more than a sum of its components (2+2=5). Nuclear security means prevention and detection of theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, unauthorised transfer or any other malicious act in respect of nuclear material, as well as response to any such act. Nuclear safety means achievement of proper operational conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, which assures protection of personnel, the public and environment from excess radiological hazard. Thus, nuclear safety and nuclear security have a common goal: to protect personnel, the public and environment. Organisation of a nuclear material physical protection system at Rivne NPP (RNPP) is based on the category of nuclear material. RNPP handles nuclear material of categories 2 (spent nuclear fuel) and 3 (fresh nuclear fuel). Coordination between nuclear security and nuclear safety depends on a stage of nuclear material handling cycle. Main stages of nuclear material handling at Rivne NPP are as follows: 1. Supply of fresh nuclear fuel (FNF) to Rivne NPP and its temporary storage inside the protected area. 2. Transfer of fresh nuclear fuel to fresh fuel storage (FFS) and its storage there. 3. Transfer of FNF from fresh fuel storage to reactor building and its loading into reactor. 4. Unloading of spent nuclear fuel from reactor into storage pool. 5. Storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in storage pool. 6. Preparation of SNF shipment and its shipment to reprocessing factory. Conclusions.

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APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR SECURITY

O.R. Fatakhov State Specialised Enterprise “Chernobyl NPP”, Training Centre

Basic principles of nuclear security largely build on approaches applied in nuclear safety. This concept gives access to time-tested safety principles, shortens implementation time, provides the account of lessons learned and, ultimately, secures a higher level of nuclear security. Identification and investigation of so-called “near-misses” is one of the methods to improve nuclear safety. This method is based on continuous analysis of safety activity in order to identify potential failures and/or operational incidents and to reveal minor failures/incidents that may have potentially resulted in more serious events. After identification such “near-misses” are investigated as if incidents had in fact occurred. Any such investigation follows the pattern similar to the one applied to actual failures; it results in development of actions aimed to prevent the identified “near-miss.” Identification and investigation of “near-misses” is efficient primarily as a tool for prevention of operational incidents. This is one of the methods for safety self-assessment. It is also one of the methods to establish and improve safety culture. Finally, it is one of the training methods. The procedure described, along with other nuclear safety principles, may be applied in the area of nuclear security, specifically, in assessing nuclear security culture. References: 1. Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture, INSAG-15; 2. Guidelines for Organisational Self-Assessment and for ASCOT Team Missions, IAEA- TECDOC-743/R.

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CREATION OF A NUCLEAR FORENSIC LABORATORY

V.V. Tryshyn, A.M. Berlizov, I.A. Malyuk, O.F. Rudyk, O.V. Gaydar, O.P. Zhukov Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Effective suppression of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials is assured by an assembly of administrative and technical measures specified at the government level by the Cabinet Decree No. 813 of 02 June 2003. By this Decree Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences Ukraine (INR NAS) was appointed the chief expert organisation for analysis and characterisation of radioactive materials recovered from illicit trafficking within Ukraine. In order to support this task a nuclear forensic laboratory was established at INR NAS with the backing of the Ukrainian government and technical assistance of the European Commission and the US Department of Energy. The laboratory includes: - mass spectrometry lab using Element-2 Thermo Scientific inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) with relevant infrastructure to support its operation, such as ventilation, air conditioning, power supply, water supply, and facilities for radiochemical treatment of samples; - gamma spectrometry lab using state-of-the-art radiometry and dosimetry equipment and gamma and alpha spectrometers; - mobile lab using equipment required for complex radiologic surveys in the field. The nuclear forensic lab at INR NAS was certified by the State Metrology System of Ukraine (Ukrmetrteststandart) in 2013.

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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING FROM EXPERIENCE OF A SPECIAL ENTERPRISE

O.L. Pushkash, A.M. Galushka State Specialised Enterprise “Dnipropetrovsk State Interregional Special Complex” (SSE “Dnipropetrovsk SISC”)

The report will cover certain aspects of identification of nuclear material of unknown origin found in illicit trafficking. It will give examples of circumstances of identification of nuclear material in illicit trafficking from practical activity of SSE Dnipropetrovsk SISC. Practical aspects of radiometric and spectrometric survey of radiologic hazard objects that may be identified in various circumstances, including during input radiometric control of scrap at steel works and as the result of National Security Service investigations, will be discussed. Examples of nuclear material (depleted uranium) field identification by spectrometry equipment will be offered. The presentation will also dwell on certain aspects of legal regulation of the activity of the Special Enterprise in detection of radioactive, and specifically nuclear, materials in illicit trafficking and on coordination between SSE Dnipropetrovsk SISC radiological safety service and law enforcement agencies. Certain issues will be discussed concerning level of supply of special enterprises with requisite dosimetry, radiometry and spectrometry equipment.

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CHERNOBYL NPP EXPERIENCE IN IDENTIFYING ABNORMAL CRITERIA

V.V. Solovyov State Specialised Enterprise “Chernobyl NPP”

In September 2013, radiological scanning of standard canisters with failed spent nuclear fuel (FSNF) was performed at Unit 1 of Chernobyl NPP. Results of radiological scanning and control weighing operations showed absence of spent fuel assemblies in one of the canisters. The abnormal criteria investigation commission decided to perform TV survey of special canisters; it was found that one of the canisters contained a spent fuel assembly without an extension bar and a central rod. In order to identify actual quantity of FSNF in special canisters, TV survey was performed of accessible canisters at Unit 1, as well as of bottoms of fuel assembly storage pools 1 and 2 and of the process channels storage pool. The survey showed that: amount of FSNF in special canisters was in line with accounting records; survey of the bottoms of storage pools 1 and 2 for fuel assemblies and of the process channels storage pool indicated presence of a relatively large quantity of foreign items such as control rods, thermo-couples, in-vessel control sensors, graphite rings, “forks,” canister lids etc. In May 2014, Chernobyl NPP hosted an IAEA technical mission to verify equipment operability. Neutron and gamma radiation was measured in process channels of Unit 1 in order to assess possibility to verify absence of nuclear material in cores of Units 1, 2 and 3 using the same equipment. In the process of equipment testing neutron activity was registered near process channel 62-44 of Unit 1 (neutron activity in itself does not necessarily evidence presence of abnormal criteria). An accident in this process channel occurred on 9 September 1982 that resulted in partial melting of a fuel assembly, with the other part penetrating into graphite stack after graphite had been diluted by coolant following rupture of process channel pipe. IAEA equipment allows not only confirming absence of nuclear material in cores of Units 1,2 and 3 but also identifying, based on available methodology, quantity of nuclear material remaining in graphite stacking of Unit 1 after the 1982 accident. The report will present results of TV survey of special canisters at Unit 1, findings of the survey of storage pools 1 and 2 for fuel assemblies and of the process channels storage pool, and will dwell briefly on the methodology for core verification at Units 1, 2 and 3 and on the assessment of nuclear material quantity in graphite stacking near process channel 62-44 of Unit 1.

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SYNERGY OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Y.M. Novak SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

Nuclear security arrangements at Khmelnytska NPP (KhNPP) follow the principle of defence-in-depth, realised through application of a system of barriers. A Model of Unauthorised Adversary Acts that May Cause Radiological Accident or Unauthorised Removal of Material for Reactors VVER-1000 (B-320) (the Adversary Model) was developed by Kiev Institute Energoproekt (release of 12 March 1998) as a basis for design of physical protection systems. Identification of facilities (rooms) requiring protection. Potential threats to the facility and constraints regarding their protection. Need to update and adjust to specific nuclear power units at the site. Building the Adversary Model required completion of a qualitative analysis of effects of failures of power unit systems critical for safety. Such a qualitative analysis should be based on a list of safety critical systems of a power unit. Identification of protection targets and vital areas should be based on qualitative analysis results and should account for prior assumptions and methodology guidelines (including the Adversary Model). Probabilistic safety analysis provides quantitative assessment of importance of equipment for assurance of safe operation of a nuclear facility and identifies equipment whose failure will lead to consequences unacceptable from the safety standpoint. Comparison of data obtained as the result of probabilistic safety analysis versus deterministic data that served as the basis for building physical protection system (PPS) engineered facilities at KhNPP gave an assessment of the required physical protection upgrades. Vital areas were identified on the basis of qualitative assessment of likelihood of an accident caused by power unit safety-critical systems failure as the result of unauthorised adversary actions, as well as of opportunities for unauthorised removal of nuclear material, with account for internationally accepted principles of their localisation. Probabilistic safety analysis for active KhNPP units, identification of potential adversary targets unauthorised acts against which may cause unacceptable radiological consequences. Based on vulnerability assessment plan, KhNPP safety analysis team together with physical protection service have developed a List of Adversary Targets at Khmelnytska NPP approved by the plant administration. Approach defined in Adversary Models was used to identify potential adversary targets. The following was analysed and identified: - list of rooms inside containment area accommodating vital process systems and equipment; - list of rooms inside reactor auxiliary building, connected to process systems and equipment; - list of rooms containing power supply system equipment; - list of rooms containing automatic process control system equipment; - list of rooms connected to systems of nuclear fuel loading, storage, and transport (except containment area). In order to identify adversary targets, unauthorised acts against which may cause unacceptable radiological consequences, vulnerability assessment team has reviewed the following documents: - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5, IAEA, Vienna, 2011) as concerns requirements to

48 physical protection against sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material, as well as against unauthorised removal of nuclear material during use and storage. - List of Adversary Targets at Khmelnytska NPP (of 31 January 2012), as approved by KhNPP chief inspector. - Adversary Model research paper by Kiev Institute Energoproekt (of 12 March 1998) Within the framework of vulnerability assessment: - vulnerability and reliability of physical protection system engineered facilities was accounted for and analysed; - trustworthiness and qualification of personnel immediately responsible for physical protection were accounted for; - adequate analysis and registration of failures of PPS engineered facilities was performed; - physical protection procedure effectiveness was analysed. In accordance with applicable laws, KhNPP physical protection is provided by physical protection engineered facilities assembled into an integrated complex within the physical protection system. KhNPP has established a defence-in-depth physical protection system, which involved: - organisation of limited access areas separated by physical barriers and equipped with intrusion detection and access control equipment at the boundaries; - implementation of the principle of stronger protection from periphery towards centre by way of: a) arrangement of new physical barriers and access control points on pathways to vital locations and at their boundaries; b) limitation of number of persons having right of unescorted access to vital areas and vital locations of Units 1 and 2; c) higher special work clearance requirements to persons having right of unescorted access to vital areas and vital locations of Units 1 and 2; - balanced approach to all physical protection elements; - implementation of automated complexes of physical protection engineered equipment for active Units 1 and 2, as well as for the special building; - implementation of a multi-level system of information collection and processing in order to secure its operation in case of failure or disruption of one of system elements; - implementation of a routing function; - making arrangements for fast and effective action of guards and response forces. Physical protection system effectiveness based on findings of vulnerability assessment Effectiveness of administrative and legal measures. Effectiveness of PPS engineered facilities. Recommendations for increase of physical protection system effectiveness. Vulnerability assessment report compilation, agreement, and approval. Implementation of recommendations.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERFACE BETWEEN PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SYSTEM AT KHMELNYTSKA NPP

O.V. Arsenina, M.A. Tkachenko SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

Interface between physical protection system and nuclear material accounting and control system is one of the integral elements of continuous control of presence of NM inventories at their locations or during on-site transfers, as well as of inventory changes. The report will describe ways in which these goals have been achieved at KhNPP. It will also dwell on issues regarding organisation of interface between physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control systems during normal operation and in emergency or crisis. Allocation of responsibilities between NM accounting and control personnel and physical protection personnel during performance of work with NM. Use of special equipment in the process of NM storage and transport. Development of procedures for NM physical protection and interface between NM accounting and control personnel and physical protection personnel in the handling of NM. Assurance of preparedness of NM accounting and control personnel and physical protection personnel to perform their functions in the area of nuclear material use.

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NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL FOR SNF DISPATCH FROM NUCLEAR POWER UNITS TO STATIONARY SNF STORAGE

A.S. Tyekhova SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Zaporizhzhya NPP”

Design basis for nuclear power plants operating VVER-1000 reactors provided for export of spent nuclear fuel for storage at a stationary facility in the Russian Federation. Export of spent nuclear fuel was stopped in 1993 – 1995, following collapse of the Soviet Union. According to forecasts made by experts, shortage of vacant cells in storage pools would have necessitated outage of Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP) units already in 1998, leaving one- fourth of Ukrainian population and companies without power supply. On 16 July 2001, NNEGC Energoatom received a license for pilot operation of a new nuclear facility. The first phase of a dry SNF storage project designed to accommodate 100 ventilated storage casks VKH-VVER was commissioned on 24 August 2001, with the first VKH-VVER cask placed on the storage site. Placement of this VKH-VVER was the starting point for dry SNF storage pilot operation. On 10 August 2004, ZNPP was granted a license for the nuclear lifecycle activity referred to as “operation of Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant nuclear facility,” which included the dry SNF storage. Spent nuclear fuel dry storage system is schematically comprised of three areas: loading area; transport area; and storage area. Spent fuel assemblies to be loaded into a multi-cell airtight basket should meet the following requirements: time of spent fuel assembly at SNF pool before loading: at least 5 years; maximum decay heat of any spent fuel assembly: no more than 0.99 kW; maximum original enrichment in U-235 of each spent fuel assembly: no more than 4.4%; no breach of integrity or deviations in geometric dimensions above design limits are present; detected fuel cladding failures should not reach the failure criterion; no damage of fuel cladding should be present that allows direct contact of fuel with water. NM inventories are chacked at the time of VKH-VVER casks delivery to dry SNF storage site by way of verification of their numbers and locations in accordance with dry SNF storage site map. Routine NM physical inventory takings are carried out by means of counting and verification of numbers of inventory items (VKH-VVERs) and their locations in accordance with dry storage site map based on NM Book Inventory Listing.

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DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS DATABASE IN UKRAINE

O.V. Gaydar1, V.M. Kushka2, S.D. Lopatin2, T.G. Ludanova1, V.V. Tryshyn1, A.I. Ustynov1, K.B. Knight3, T.M. Kayzar3, M. Robel3 1 Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 2 State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 3 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA

A nuclear forensic survey requires processing of large amounts of information that may be available in different formats: spreadsheets, text documents, maps, charts, diagrams, photos, audio and video materials. Where a database is based on information from published sources a number of specific tasks will be faced, including: storage of data that differ in types and level of completeness avoiding data duplication and loss; creation of a sophisticated system of relationships between entries and their attributes; development of structured glossaries of terms and definitions. Nuclear forensics is a discipline strongly in need of such an analytical system. Nuclear forensic surveys are more than a mere characterisation of material or identification of a physical origin of a sample. For final attribution and interpretation of evidence and material properties it needs to retain knowledge and expertise of various sciences, traditional forensics, and nuclear technology in line with a relevant application. Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (INR) has been appointed by the Cabinet Decree the chief expert organisation for analysis and characterisation of nuclear and other radioactive materials recovered from illicit trafficking in Ukraine. Presidential Decree concerning national plan to implement provisions of the communique of the Seoul Summit sustains further improvement of technical capabilities of INR nuclear forensic laboratory and promotes international cooperation and creation of a database of nuclear properties of material, of radioactive sources and protective containers. A pilot project to create a nuclear forensic survey database in Ukraine is underway at INR to support surveys of nuclear and other radioactive materials outside regulatory control. The overall scheme of the database pilot version builds on the client-to-server architecture. Client part of the system is based on standard internet browsers and requires no special software. Proposed architecture for a web-server is similar to the generally known LAMP server architecture including Linux, server operating system; Apache, a web server component; MySQL, relational database; and PHP, applied programming system. For avoidance of significant changes to database structure in the process of its operation we proposed the approach for introducing new entries or their attributes into the database based on the relational database concept involving a limited number of spreadsheets and using a complex system of relations between entries and their attributes. It is assumed that the proposed approach will address tasks, both present and future, without substantial modification of database structure and, hence, without significant effort for modification. Particular attention is being paid to database population procedure. Discussions with potential Ukrainian database users and preliminary analysis of open-source data helped identify the basic data set. Another area in the focus is selection of existing glossaries of terms and definitions, as well as of approaches to data collation approved by international community.

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NATIONAL SKILL IMPROVEMENT SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SPECIALISTS

V.I. Gavryliuk , V.I. Kyryshchuk Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

In the last year, George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material of the Institute for Nuclear Research (INR) of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (hereinafter the Training Centre), jointly with the European Commission, completed development of 10 training courses in nuclear material accounting and control. These courses were developed with the involvement of leading Ukrainian experts in nuclear material accounting and control; due to our combined efforts the Training Centre has succeeded in maximum adaptation of these courses to the needs of Ukraine. Furthermore, equipment for a new containment and surveillance training laboratory was supplied within the framework of this same project. The new training lab expands significantly the capabilities of the Training Centre to improve practical skills of the Ukrainian specialists in nuclear material accounting and control. The number of training courses in nuclear material accounting and control may be varied (at present, more likely, reduced, since Ukraine yet is not much in need of some of the developed courses). Content of the courses will be extended and further adapted to Ukraine. Nonetheless, Ukraine has created a core capability for the national system of skill improvement for specialists in nuclear material accounting and control. The main problem this year has been the funding of nuclear material accounting and control specialist skill improvement efforts: only 2 training courses occurred with the support of our sponsors, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. We hope, however, that since next year specialists and experts from all Ukrainian nuclear facilities, State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and relevant ministries and authorities involved in nuclear material accounting and control will be able to improve their qualifications regularly in practically any aspect of nuclear material accounting and control.

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CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A CONSTRUCTION PHASE PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR A NEW NUCLEAR FACILITY

V.P. Zamozhny SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “Zaporizhzhya NPP”

A physical protection system of a nuclear facility, nuclear material, radioactive waste or any other source of ionising radiation is a combination of administrative, legal and technical efforts aimed to make arrangements for minimisation of opportunity for sabotage, theft or any other unauthorised removal of radioactive material and for the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regime. In building a physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control system during construction of a new nuclear facility its operator should arrange for: - delimitation of new facility construction site; - survey of nuclear facility construction site for presence of explosive items or substances; - fencing and guarding construction site before commencement of nuclear facility construction; - limitation of access for individuals and vehicles to the site of the nuclear facility during construction; - control of access to locations where vital technical elements and main equipment of the nuclear facility are being installed; - measures to detect items and substances that may be used for sabotage in locations where vital technical elements and main equipment of the nuclear facility are being installed and completed; - development of designs and budgets for PPS engineered facilities; - state due diligence of the PPS engineered facilities design in accordance with applicable law and approval of physical protection system design documentation; - development of administrative documents and instructions relevant to the building of PPS engineered facilities; - appointment of person in charge for the building of PPS engineered facilities; - staffing PP division with specialists in operational control and technical operation of PPS engineered facilities; - training personnel and checking their knowledge in physical protection; - development of physical protection procedures; - reflection of physical protection requirements in emergency preparedness and emergency response plans; - vulnerability assessment of the nuclear facility; - development and approval of the facility-level design basis threat.

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CERTAIN ISSUES REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTRUCTION PHASE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR A NEW NUCLEAR FACILITY

Y.G. Borovyk SC “Nuclear Fuel”

Introduction. Background brief historical overview of the outset of practical implementation of the Nuclear Fuel of Ukraine State Target Programme; overview of requirements set forth in the government document concerning the subject and the establishment of SC Nuclear Fuel whose main purposes include construction and operation of a nuclear fabrication plant (a new nuclear facility); main design characteristics of the nuclear fabrication plant (the new nuclear facility) based on the status to-date. Legal and economic aspects analysis of international and Ukrainian legal and regulatory framework used as basis for commencement of design and construction of the nuclear fabrication plant (the new nuclear facility); description of challenges related to improvement of existing and development of new regulations on the subject; analysis of some similar documents from the CIS experience (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus); focus on economics, budgeting and budget performance – one of the key components of design and construction of the new nuclear facility. Establishment and development of physical protection system during nuclear facility construction overview of current status of compliance with appropriate Laws of Ukraine and orders of the regulator, inter alia as regards combination of theoretical findings with practical design and construction efforts, particularly as relates to identification and analysis of design basis threat, facility vulnerability etc.; effectiveness of practical measures aimed to create a construction phase physical protection system for the new nuclear facility; importance of accumulated experience for further operations, involving the commissioning of the nuclear fuel fabrication plant and transformation of the construction phase physical protection system into a system for an operating facility, as well as for construction of other new nuclear facilities in Ukraine (Х3, Х4 etc.)

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CONCEPT FOR CREATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

M.V. Brodyagin State Specialised Enterprise “Chernobyl NPP”

In my presentation I will briefly dwell on a vision for establishment of physical protection systems (PPS) for nuclear facilities (NF) and nuclear material (NM). My presentation will give an idea of designation, structure, composition and functions of subsystems included in a PPS. I will also touch on the regulatory framework for NF and NM physical protection. Prior to establishment of a PPS we should have clear understanding and idea of PPS as a complex man-machine system based on a conflict of interest of the parties (adversary vs. protection system). Furthermore, note that physical protection tasks have to be addressed in the environment of uncertainty, as there is only a general idea of goals of likely adversaries, their strategy and tactics. As the result, there is an issue of how to build a system characterised above. In order to do this one needs not only to have an idea of NPP components but also to take account of their relationships and interaction in time. Let us review a plain example. Detection equipment provides information on intrusion (penetration through facility security perimeter, contraband of nuclear material through access control post, etc.) Physical barriers hamper actions of an adversary. Response forces, having received this information, will perform their ultimate task of facility protection. All links of this chain should be well-balanced. That is, three principal subsystems should function in a chronologically coordinated way such that response forces are on time to prevent the adversary from completing their task (sabotage, NM theft). Generally, the PPS creation process may be defined as conceptual planning (in a general sense) since the design effort covers not only technical systems or civil structures but also organisation structures and algorithms of their operation. Besides, while creating a PPS one should continually address system analysis and synthesis tasks. Identification of system properties (characteristics etc.) based on predefined structure and composition is a function of system analysis. Synthesis is understood as definition of proposed system structure and composition based on predefined requirements to the system (based on characteristics, functions etc.) Analytical tasks typically arise many times during the synthesis process. In addition to ability to define PPS characteristics credibly and with pre-set accuracy one should have criteria for system synthesis. In a general case, synthesis tasks are addressed by multiobjective optimisation methods. The two-dimensional case – synthesis of a complex system by effectiveness/cost criterion – is the most widespread example. As it will be shown in the presentation, PPS effectiveness may be characterised as likelihood of protection of a nuclear hazardous object against a predefined adversary model. Cost parameters may include capital costs related to creation of PPS and its individual components and operational expenses, including labour of response forces and technical personnel. Thus, this presentation, Concept for Creation of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material Physical Protection Systems, will highlight main principles and procedures for creation of PPS as a complex system, as well as key methods of assessment of certain PPS quality indicators used in design. Furthermore, in my presentation I will discuss such issues as classification of nuclear hazardous facilities, formalisation of threats and adversary models, and stages and phases of PPS creation (pre-design, design, implementation). Particular attention will be paid

56 to the concept design phase where the “shape” of the system and its main characteristics will be defined.

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LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION

I.V. Valdman1, I.V. Ugolkov2 1Military Unit 3045, National Guard of Ukraine, 2Chief Directorate, National Guard of Ukraine

1. Legal basis for facility guard actions outside protected facility (including as regards execution of administrative offence reports) 2. Creation of additional barriers against free movement within a sanitary protection area (for pedestrians and vehicles) 3. Assistance to guard force from outside

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PHYSICAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES, ELEMENTS AND ROLE IN GENERAL SAFETY AND SECURITY OF SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP

O.M. Yermolenko SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”, SS “South-Ukraine NPP”

Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is one of the critical tools in assuring international nuclear nonproliferation regime and reduction of nuclear terrorism threat. Effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities together with nuclear material accounting and control, export control and suppression of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials should provide security of nuclear material (NM) and nuclear facilities (NF), i. e. their protection against unauthorised or malicious acts. Formation of legal and regulatory framework for NM and NF physical protection is one of the elements of regulation of safety and security of nuclear energy use and therefore it should be considered as part of the entire legal and regulatory framework for safety and security in this area. Physical protection has become a focus of international cooperation and attention. Need for international cooperation becomes obvious in situations where effectiveness of physical protection in one state depends on another state taking similar adequate measures to prevent or interdict acts against nuclear material or nuclear facilities, particularly during transboundary transports of such material. Physical protection system (PPS) is a combination of administrative, legal, investigative and engineered efforts aimed to make arrangements that would render impossible acts of nuclear terrorism, theft or any other unauthorised removal of nuclear material, radioactive waste or other sources of ionising radiation and would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regime. A physical protection system includes three subsystems as follows: - administrative (subsystem of administrative and legal measures); - engineered; and - investigative. Administrative and legal measures include: - state-level and sectoral regulations in the area of physical protection; - organisation-level guidelines on physical protection, including orders, directives, provisions and instructions that provide for: - measures to minimise number of people authorised to operate within limited access areas and vital areas; - measures to organise and implement special background checks of persons seeking clearance for special works; - measures to organise registration of persons who had access to limited access areas and vital areas; - measures to sustain security regime in respect of limited access information on physical protection; - joint action plans with law enforcement agencies in case of emergency. Guard and response functions at Ukrainian NPPs are provided by units of Interior Troops under the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior whose personnel strength is defined based on a statement of interdepartmental commission. Engineered measures. Engineered security equipment is used for protection and defence of facilities, typically as an integrated system, in prohibited areas, secured rooms and structures, as well as at

59 access control points. Engineered PP equipment is part of a nuclear facility or nuclear material physical protection system. Engineered protection equipment includes varied engineered structures and barriers, as well as equipment and devices applied in security systems for facilities or special shipments to increase reliability of guard function and make arrangements required for guard force to perform their service and combat tasks. Effectiveness of a physical protection system of a nuclear facility or nuclear material is largely defined by composition and quality of physical protection engineered equipment. In the recent time Ukrainian NPPs have been using automated complexes of physical protection engineered equipment, or automated physical protection systems. Investigative measures include: - collection by law enforcements of information on sabotage of terrorist intents with respect to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, on international terrorist centres, extremist organisations and separate individuals; - search activities carried out by law enforcements at nuclear facilities and in their vicinity; - timely information by law enforcements of nuclear facility administrations on potential acts of nuclear terrorism; - special background checks of persons seeking clearance for special works.

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ALGORITHMISATION IN NUCLEAR HAZARDOUS FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION CONTROL SYSTEMS

R. V. Arsiriy, P.A. Ivanov, N.A. Kononenko Private Corporation “Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant”

The area of organisation and creation of control systems for complex technologies and industrial facilities unavoidably faces the expansion of processes and successive transformations involving replacement of direct manual control with progressing automation technologies. Eventual displacement of human factor in control systems – or, to be more precise, minimisation of its role – will unavoidably and simultaneously be entailing increased productivity, expanded functionality, higher speed, reactivity, intellectualisation, interactivity and, as the result, efficiency. Systematic and structural expert analysis of these trends applied to organisation and effective operation of physical protection systems (PPS) of critical industrial facilities (particularly the ones involving nuclear hazard) provides comparative assessments of three types of algorithms: 1) for manual control (MC); 2) for partial automation (PA); and 3) for advanced automation (AA) including fully automated or automatic segments. In the hierarchy of an automated control system of an industrial facility, particularly the one involving nuclear hazard, a physical protection automated control system (PPACS) should structurally be part of an automated production control system as one of its safety and security subsystems. MC requires a sequential algorithm generalised to the highest degree. Comparative analysis of the three algorithm types – MC, PA and AA – proves that risks related to a final decision in the first case, with the MC type, are higher than similar risks in the second case (PA) and substantially higher than in the third case (AA). In this light generic content of algorithms for PPACS with advanced automation and real- time active feedback with interactive automatic segments is of practical interest. A characteristic feature of the conservative and passive traditional MC based approach is that response is actuated by a fact of distinct, detectable threat or hazard that may quite easily be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. At the same time there is a certain time delay relative to conditions, processes and situations created by threats or hazards. On the other hand, the progressive active AA based approach provides for antecedent efforts and actions targeted primarily for search and early detection of threat or hazard signs before they have formed and materialised as irreversibly destructive factors. Active approach should be viewed as a prospective constructive step towards high technology supported security culture. Algorithmisation in physical protection control system involving real-time interactive automatic segments (components), as described above, is a topical and multi-purpose tool for suppression of threats and hazards diverse in range and nature (technical, technologic, environmental, social etc.), particularly as relates to nuclear hazardous facilities.

61