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Viewpoint Multi-brand groups: A winning approach in the hyper-competition era?

Arthur D. Little analyzes the winning strategies of airline groups for owning and operating multiple carriers

Legacy have long struggled with choosing the best strategy to adopt in the era of hyper-competition, having been faced with i) the rise of low-cost carriers, first in the short-to-medium-haul segment, and now also in the long-haul segment; as well as ii) the natural trend of travelers in a maturing industry increasing in sophistication. Legacy airlines (mostly in Europe and Asia) therefore have decided to create “multi-brand airline holdings” to seize the opportunity of new segments and protect their key markets, but this comes with the risk of cannibalization. In this viewpoint, Arthur D. Little explores winning strategies for operating a multi-brand airline portfolio: What is the right trade-off between integration and independence? Which airline product has the best fit with legacy carriers? `

Multi-brand airline holdings are key to competing Traditional airline customer New airline customer in the hyper-competition era and propose “mass- segmentation segmentation customization”

Luxury Sur Mesure Smart Luxury Airline It is critical for legacy carriers to offer a large spectrum First NetJets Virgin Atlantic ) Premium

Boutique

of services and experiences to face both the ever-more- Comfort airline

La Cnie. Mass-tige Me-too competitive environment and customers’ expectations heading « Mini-Major » Business ? (Price, Time, towards more customization. Like in the similar hospitality Main- Air Caraïbes Brussels Type of cabine What stream Airlines industry, key market segmentation criteria in the aviation Best Price Always

Basic XL Airways Norwegian industry are evolving from a “socio-demographic” approach to Eco Cebu Pacifc Scoot Modern / Sober Under- Tradi- Casual Avant- Classisc- Ground tional a “behavorial” approach, in which what the travel experience is Leisure VFR Business Garde ism made of and how it is delivered to customers are key. Purpose of travel How ? (Experience, Simplicity)

The challenge for airlines that achieve profit with efficient Besides decreases in costs and quality of overall products, as utilization of assets, including the aircraft cabin and brand, is well as large increases in capacity, in order to stop new entrants, that this “mass-customization” dilemma is difficult to overcome a direction many airlines have chosen has been to create using this branding and operating model. Many legacy carriers (acquire) and operate “LCCs”. Since their emergence, more than have thus chosen to go way beyond traditional airline alliances 30 LCCs have been created by legacy carriers in Europe, the US (such as ) and consolidate into multi-brand holdings, and Australia. However, many carriers have learned the hard way gathering not just other legacy carriers, but also hybrid and that the key success factors for running a low-cost operation low-cost carriers to address new geographies and customer are radically different from those for running a parent company. segments. Indeed, more than 20 of the newly created airlines disappeared, The first moves from legacy carriers to address and compete sometimes after just a few months of operation. were triggered by the emergence of low-cost carriers in the The strategic moves of legacy carriers seem to have stabilized late 1990s. Legacy carriers adopted various types of strategies for the short- and medium-haul segment, but are still active in to contain the growth of those new entrants and protect their the long-haul segment. These include the launch of Scoot (SIA), market shares. 1 Viewpoint

Joon (Air -KLM group), (IAG) and the fleet and terms of costs. Indeed, we estimate that the CASK difference network extension of Eurowings (Lufthansa Group). can be as high as 45 percent for a similar stage length.

LCCs created by legacy carriers but no longer in operation Without assessing the local market differences underlying the variations in CASK, a few drivers seem to be meaningful:

Commenced CASK – stage-length comparison: independent and owner LCCs operations (2016 levels)

1992 2015 CASK (€ cents) Owned LCCs Independent LCCs 9

8 Eurowings Ceased operations, 7 merged or Nok acquired 6 Vuelling Easyjet 5 Westjet Transavia Indigo Ryanair Norwegian 4 Citilink Source: Arthur D. Little analysis Jetstar Vietjet Scoot 3 Cebu Pacific Wizz Nowadays, airline groups are using “multi-airline brand holdings” 2 Air Asia with different profiles, rather than trying to create “carriers 1 within carriers”. The most common profile is to segregate 0 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 brands according to i) operating model and ability to rotate Average stage length (km) assets (i.e., medium versus long haul) and ii) level of service to Source: SRS analyser, annual reports, Bloomberg, Arthur D. Little analysis be provided (basic versus premium). Another option is to invest in comparable airline business models that will address different nn Size: Independent LCCs competing with owned LCCs are geographies. usually larger in seat production and benefit from economies of scale.

Lufthansa Group AF KLM Group nn Agility: IAGOwned Group LCCs can be constrained by the network

FSC (premium FSC (premium Different catchment FSC (premiumchoicesDifferent catchment of the legacy player, which limit their ability to rotate + hub) + hub) areas + hub) areas (France, ) (, UK) Different catchment areas their assets to their full extent. (each capital city) nn Airtightness: Insufficient or inefficient differentiation

Different catchment areas

Positionning measures with regards to staff employment conditions and (, ) Different offering & Different offering & Positioning Positioning experience experience OPEX control.Different offering &

Model & experience 1 ? ? In addition, the results for legacy carriers have not been fully LCC LCC LCC (Budget + Markets (budget + Markets (budget + Markets P-to-P) Medium-haul Long-haul P-to-P) Medium-haul Long haul positiveP-to-P) Medium on-haul the yield side.Long -Indeed,haul the LCCs branch has allowed 1 domestic international domestic international domestic international the carriers to capture new passengers and protect market shares, but unfortunately not protect their own yields. Of all ANA Group Qantas Group the airlinesSingapore owning Airlines LCCs, Group almost all experienced unit revenue

FSC (premium + FSC (premium + FSC (premium + hub) hub) decreaseshub) in 2016 on their LCCs’ focus markets. Different offering & experience ? Yield – Legacy carriers’ unit revenue evolution on main markets

addressedDifferent by catchment LCCs – 2016 versus 2015 areas (Singapore, other) 3%

Different offering & Positioning Positioning Positioning Different offering experience & experience Different catchment areas (Osaka, Narita) 1 LCC LCC LCC -1% Markets Markets Markets (budget + (budget + (budget + -2% P-to-P) Medium-haul Long-baul P-to-P) Medium-haul Long-haul P-to-P) Medium-haul Long-haul domestic international domestic international domestic -3% international -4% -4% -4% ANA Garuda KLM-Air Quantas Singapore Thai France Airlines Airways LCC Peach Citilink Transavia Jinair Jetstar Scoot Nok Owning “low-cost” carriers is still a major challenge

for legacy carriers LCC focus Domestic Domestic Medium haul Intl Domestic Intl Domestic

Unit Despite the lessons learned from the bankruptcies of LCCs Yield Yield RASK Yield Yield Yield Yield revenue created by legacy carriers in the early 2000s, independent LCCs Source: Annual reports, Arthur D. Little analysis seem to still have an edge over their owned counterparts in

1 2 Multi-brand airline groups: A winning approach in the hyper-competition era?

1 Viewpoint

Multi-brand airline portfolios should be used for On international routes, the majority of legacy-owned LCCs are four key network objectives used to address low-yield markets, while defense of market share seems to be a higher priority for LCCs on domestic LCCs and other airlines gathered into holdings are key routes. components of the network structure of airline groups, and there are key differences in the way they are deployed. For instance, the LCC share of seats in the parent group can vary Multi-airlines “platform” is key to achieving smart from 5 (Eurowings with Lufthansa) to 38 percent (Jetstar with differentiation and synergies Qantas), and 40 percent seems to represent the threshold for Multi-brand airline holdings can adopt six strategic models historical data. according to i) the level of integration between airlines and ii) the LCC share of seats in percentage (LCC+Legacy carrier) positioning and products developed by “non-legacy” airlines: 40 Jetstar (2003)

35 Possible models for “new” airlines in a legacy’s portfolio

Citylink (2012) 30 Nok (2004)

Rouge (2012) High level of 25 integration with Mango (2006) legacy carrier Jin Air (2008) 20 Air India Express (2005)

15 Transavia (2007) Scoot (2011) Stand alone – 10 Peach (2012) limited integration China United (2005) with legacy carrier 5 Eurowings (1993) Vanilla (2013) 0 Hyper low-cost Basic Hybrid 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: SRS analyser, Arthur D. Little analysis Source: IATA, Seabury consulting, Arthur D. Little analysis (-): operation start under current airline code nn Defend the market share: Most routes with high competitive Level of integration: Key elements are related to either top-line intensity are jointly flown with the legacy carrier. or operations and asset management. nn Prevent new competitors from entering key markets: The nn In terms of revenue synergies, the key focus is on low-cost carrier has a high share of routes flown in common distribution platforms, frequent flyer programs, hub with the legacy carrier, but the routes have a low competitive feeding (while not lowering aircraft utilization), code-share intensity. possibilities and the definition of a dual brand/network nn Extend the legacy carrier market (fly off base): The routes strategy. From that perspective, Jetstar from Qantas Group operated by the additional airlines are done on a stand- is the most integrated airline, with a full dual-brand strategy alone basis, and mostly on routes with limited competitive while, on the other end of the spectrum, airlines such as Nok intensity. and Peach are operated as separated entities. For cost items nn Address low-yield markets: The routes operated by additional such as fuel or aircraft and MRO supply, integration at group airlines are also operated without the legacy carrier, but on level is necessary to exploit synergy opportunities. 1 high competition routes with pressure on yield. nn In other revenue and operational aspects, strict segregation Network strategies for airlines owned by legacy carriers is needed to ensure a low cost base and avoid false 1 efficiencies of shared operations in terms of fleet planning, International routes Domestic routes crew management and employment conditions, product and Competitive intensity of Competitive intensity of routes served by LCC routes served by LCC revenue management, marketing and communication, etc.

Address Defend Address Defend market share Positioning and product: LCCs owned by legacy airlines low-yield markets market share low-yield markets operate with three main models: ultra-low cost, basic and High High hybrid. Aside from a limited number of ultra low-cost carriers (Air India Express and China ), most owned airlines Prevent new Prevent new Extend legacy entrants from Extend legacy entrants from carrier market entering carrier market entering have basic to hybrid operating and product models. All have key markets key markets used significant brand differentiation between the parent and Low Low

Low High Low High the low-cost subsidiary to prevent dilution of the parent’s brand Share of LCC routes operated Share of LCC routes operated in common with Legacy carrier in common with Legacy carrier premium, as well as brand confusion between the two airlines.

Source: SRS analyser, Arthur D. Little analysis

Multi-brand airline groups: A winning approach in the hyper-competition era? 3

1 Viewpoint

A solution to achieve both “integration” and “differentiation” Contacts is to leverage a “multi-level and multi-airline” platform with, for Latin America example: [email protected] [email protected] nn Level A: a group corporate platform to leverage some key Belgium Middle East dimensions, such as fleet management, MRO and fuel [email protected] [email protected] contracts. Brazil Netherlands nn Level B: a business unit platform associated with each [email protected] [email protected] brand to manage network, product, revenue and distribution China Norway management, as well as marketing and communication and [email protected] [email protected] supply chain on the ground. Czech Republic Singapore nn Level C: a “flight production” platform, with several AOCs [email protected] [email protected] enabling the airline to achieve lowest cost base. France Spain [email protected] [email protected] To be successful and maximize value, multi-brand Sweden airline holdings should master these factors [email protected] [email protected]

Looking at actual results, there is no strategic model that seems India Switzerland to emerge as the key winner in terms of financial performance. [email protected] [email protected] Although high integration (leveraging economies of scale) and Turkey hybrid positioning seem attractive, they do not automatically [email protected] [email protected] lead to profitability. The relevance of each option is clearly related Japan UK to the maturity of airlines in the portfolio and the competitive [email protected] [email protected] environment they evolve into. Airlines like Eurowings, Transavia, Korea USA Jetstar or Citilink thus posted mixed results. [email protected] [email protected] The frontier between success and failure lies, then, in two factors: making clear choices for the positioning and management of multi-airline brands, as well as swift and Authors rigorous implementation of “dos and don’ts” derived from Mathieu Blondel, Nicolas Cougot, Akitake Fujita, Coskun Baban successesPossible models and failuresfor “new” in airlinesaviation in and a legacy’s other portfolioindustries.

Dos Don’ts Arthur D. Little Create clear rules of the game for each Let the airlines position strategically in a airline positioning to avoid fully independent way as the risk of Arthur D. Little has been at the forefront of innovation since cannibalization: define clear cannibalization and internal geographical focus, service-level focus competition will be high, plus key 1886. We are an acknowledged thought leader in linking synergy opportunities will be lost strategy, innovation and transformation in technology-intensive Ultimately define a clear “Why?” vision and converging industries. We navigate our clients through for each brand/airline in the portfolio Hesitate to foster (because “What?” and “How?” different/decentralized corporate changing business ecosystems to uncover new growth dimensions of the offering/positioning culture, employee management and can be easily copied) innovation practices opportunities. We enable our clients to build innovation capabilities and transform their organizations. Invest in each airline to reach a critical Let airlines try to operate in a fully size on their respective market integrated way, which would limit the segments on both production and agility of owned airlines to compete Our consultants have strong practical industry experience marketing dimensions with their stand-alone competitors combined with excellent knowledge of key trends and Leverage group synergies in selected Assign a limited fleet to the airlines – dynamics. Arthur D. Little is present in the most important functions that have no strategic impact economies of scale are key for owned on the business & operating model of airlines to compete in their segments business centers around the world. We are proud to serve most each airline (e.g.: joint purchasing of of the Fortune 1000 companies, in addition to other leading MRO services, aircrafts, etc.) firms and public sector organizations. Source: IATA, Seabury consulting, Arthur D. Little analysis For further information, please visit www.adl.com.

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