Commission on the

The Zero Brigade Option ( A Reservoir of Forces )

This submission focuses primarily on Structures set out in Part 2. The second priority is Governance set out in Part 4.

THE ZERO BRIGADE OPTION (A Reservoir of Forces)

1. Capabilities –

101. Capabilities emerge from the DF Roles derived from the Defence White Paper. Despite the difficulty faced today by most states in framing a security response to a complex, multi- dimensional and rapidly evolving threat environment, they still retain a conventional military capability as a key pillar of their defence architecture.

102. Restated Capabilities:

a. to deter and resist external military aggression.

I. The DF that Ireland will fund might only be capable of very limited conventional operations but in certain circumstances even that could be crucial. II. A conventional military organisation takes a very long time to stand up even starting from a para-military force base. Permitting a threat manifest itself before organising a conventional military force is neither prudent nor realistic. III. Conventional military forces are also needed for overseas Peace Support Operations units. Such missions normally operate at low levels of conflict intensity but must have a conventional combat capability for self-defence or mandate enforcement. IV. If there is a significant worldwide or regional European deterioration in the security environment, the conventional military force Ireland equips in peacetime is the only force it can utilise. Training extra manpower at that stage is feasible; acquiring extra defence equipment is not. For various reasons, other states will have priority call on that. Given past parsimony in defence procurement, Ireland is unlikely to acquire reserve stocks of crucial defence equipment. Therefore, the DF is not a cadre upon which to expand in an emergency. V. Consequently, with the strength currently sanctioned and current equipment levels, the Land component could at best provide one fully manned combat-ready light infantry brigade. Increasing that capability to two combat brigades would be very costly. VI. To enable the Air component monitor national airspace, a radar surveillance network is necessary. However, Ireland is unlikely to fund a high performance interception capability, relying instead on the assistance of a friendly neighbour. Therefore, an expensive radar network has very limited value. VII. A small non-combat military aviation capability is feasible for the present Air component. VIII. A very modest naval combat capability is feasible for the Naval component.

b. A capability to assist in the internal security of the state. This mainly involves support to An Garda Siochana in dealing with terrorist threats and major public order crises. The DF could also be independently tasked with other security missions under appropriate legislation.

c. A capability to assist Government Departments, Local Authorities and other agencies with a wide range of Aid to Civil Authority tasks in time of crisis or disaster. It is very desirable that the State can call at short notice on a force of mobile, logistically self-sufficient, multi-skilled personnel organised in units which are deployable nationwide for significant periods. An ability to deploy in NBC environments is crucial. See Para 405 in Part 4.

d. A capability to conduct Peace Support Operations. While PSO participation plays an important role in national foreign policy, it also brings crucial benefits to the DF in terms of: • operational experience in conflict environments (with desirable challenges in skills and leadership) • experience in multi-national HQ’s. • a welcome variety of service for individual personnel • bench-marking exposure to other military forces’ modus operandi.

e. A capability to provide a Maritime Force which, with air support, can undertake specified fishery protection tasks and concurrently maintain national surveillance over maritime zones as well as providing ATCP/ACA support to the Gardai and other bodies.

f. A capability to undertake other Government Taskings such the Ministerial Air Transport Service. DF should not be assigned a plethora of non-defence tasks. The air ambulance service is an example. The DF reputation for carrying out tasks efficiently and willingly should not be abused.

103. Professional Development.

a. With a small DF, it is difficult to master a full range of military expertise and the DF must maximise it’s exposure to key foreign training courses. b. There is a cost but it is a crucial investment. As a rough template, trebling the present numbers/budgets is needed. c. The net must be cast wider in selecting appropriate foreign courses; there is too much reliance on UK and US courses. Lessons from other smaller military organisations can have greater relevance.Language issues with courses not conducted through English are normally easily overcome (e.g. the ). d. In the case of Air Command and Naval Command, there is a cost-based argument for having most senior officers train abroad instead of trying to organise such training at home for unviable numbers.

2. Structures – The Zero Brigade Option – (A Reservoir of Forces)

201. STRUCTURES.

a. This part is detailed but necessarily so to flesh out the underlying concept. b. Discussions of the Army structure inevitably focus on the number of brigades. The present Brigade Structure is not what is needed. It brings an unduly restrictive concept of a structure doubling up as tactical formation and geographical command. The resulting assumption is that each brigade must have a quota of infantry battalions with a slice of artillery, cavalry, engineer, signals and logistics units to make it viable. c. I propose a more flexible alternative: a country-wide Reservoir of Forces, a pool of units of various Corps, not tied to any fixed Tactical HQ, which can be task-organised in various groupings for major deployments. d. For such major deployments, a Stand-by Deployable Formation-level HQ (SDF HQ) is on call. e. In summary, eliminate the brigades and create a reservoir of forces with an SDF HQ. Then establish a Land Forces Command to oversee the reservoir of forces.

Note: the Structures set out in this Part 2 do not increase the assessed land force wartime capability in Part 1. It does provide for a better peace-time organisation of that land force.

202. HIGH LEVEL COMMAND & CONTROL

a. A new Defence Act (see Para 401) should create two distinct entities under the control of the Minister:

I. A Dept of Defence II. The Defence Forces (DF)

b. Overall command of the DF to be vested in the Minister. c. Day to day command of the DF to be vested by the Act in the Chief of Defence (CHOD), a 3 Star officer (The CHOD NOT to be part of the Dept, unlike the present Chief of Staff). d. The CHOD to exercise day to day command in accordance with the policy and directives of the Minister. The CHOD to function effectively as the CEO of the DF and be the Accounting Officer for the DF budget. e. The CHOD to exercise command over the 3 Components of the DF, the Land Forces Command, Air Command and Naval Command. f. The CHOD to also exercise command over DFHQ, a Joint Forces HQ, and over certain units designated as DFHQ units. g. McKee Bks , in it’s entirety*, to accommodate DFHQ (Joint Forces HQ). This installation is large enough, most of DFHQ is already there and the location would also delineate the separation from the Dept Defence. h. A Deputy CHOD ( 2 Star Officer) to control HR and Logs matters. CHOD to control all other matters, aided by an Assistant CHOD ( 1 Star Officer).

* Field Artillery Regiment moves to Cathal Brugha.

203. LAND FORCES COMMAND ( essentially the Army but some Army units remain under DFHQ)

a. Commander Land Forces (CLF)

I. CLF an Army Major General with an Army Brig Gen as Deputy. II. Land Forces HQ ( LFHQ) located in Athlone, exercises command mainly through Military Regions but with certain units retained under direct command.

b. Military Regions ( MR )

I. To provide CLF with an organisation for command & control of the country-wide units, nine Military Regions are proposed, each corresponding to a grouping of counties. MR’s to be commanded by a Colonel, except for Dublin-Wicklow which has a Brig-Gen.

II. The MR’s are designed to:

• Provide a suitably senior commander to represent the CLF in each region • Command all units assigned to the MR by CLF. • Act as a point of contact and coordination with regional/divisional Garda HQ’s. • Act as a point of contact and coordination with Local Authorities and other national/regional agencies. • Provide Camp Command elements for each military post in the MR (except McKee Bks & Camp). • Manage all Land Forces infrastructure and property in the region (except McKee Bks & ) • Relieve commanders such as battalion commanders of having to deal with the above issues and allow them concentrate on preparation for and conduct of operations.

III. Proposed MR’s:

• North-West: Donegal, Sligo & Leitrim with HQ in Finner • West: Mayo & Galway with HQ in Galway • Mid-West: Clare, Tipperary & Limerick with HQ in Limerick • South-West: Kerry & Cork with HQ in Cork • South-East: Waterford, Wexford, Carlow & Kilkenny with HQ in Kilkenny • Midlands: Roscommon, Longford & Westmeath with HQ in Athlone • Leinster Laois, Offaly and Kildare with HQ in the Curragh Camp • North-East: Meath, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth with HQ in Dundalk • Dublin-Wicklow: with HQ in Dublin ( Cathal Brugha Bks) commanded by a Brig Gen.

Six MR’s correspond to 6 of the 8 Major Emergency Management Regions. Other variations could work.

IV. MR’s only require a small HQ. These are not brigades or formations. MR’s are essentially administrative HQ’s with a limited operational function in the area of coordination with other state agencies.

c. Land Forces Units:

I. Military Region Units. Each MR is assigned one major Combat or Combat Support unit. Dublin-Wicklow has two. Seven Infantry Battalions, one Field Artillery Regiment, one Air Defence Regiment and one Cavalry Regiment, are located as follows:

• North West infantry battalion (-) Finner • West infantry battalion (-) Galway • Mid West air defence regiment Limerick • South West infantry battalion (-) Cork • South East infantry battalion (-) Kilkenny • Midlands infantry battalion Athlone (-) • Leinster cavalry regiment Curragh Camp • North East infantry battalion (-) Dundalk • Dublin-Wicklow infantry battalion (-) and field artillery regiment, both in Cathal Brugha Bks.

II. Size of Major Units in the Military Regions: • Infantry Battalions to have one full rifle company and a full support company with a HQ company. These reduced battalions can still deploy a significant manoeuvre force and act as lead unit for an oversea/domestic deployment. • Field Arty Regiment to have 2 field batteries, a HQ battery and a Depot. • Air Defence Regiment to have 2 air defence batteries, a HQ battery and a Depot. • Cavalry Regiment to have 2 cavalry squadrons, a HQ squadron and a Depot.

III. Land Forces HQ Units The following HQ/units would remain under the direct command of LFHQ:

• A Stand-by Deployable Formation HQ ( SDF HQ) located in the Curragh. See Para 203.d below. • A Field Engineer Regiment based at Athlone, comprising two combat engineer companies, one field construction company and a Corps Depot. • A Field Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Regiment based at the Curragh, with a field CIS Company, a field CIS Counter-Measures company and a Corps Depot. • A Field Supply & Transport Regiment based at the Curragh with one supply company, two transport companies, one field maintenance company and a Corps Depot. • A Field Medical Regiment based at Curragh with one field Level 1 company to provide unit medical teams , one field company to provide a Level 2 Field Medical Facility and a Corps Depot.

• A Field Military Police Company based at the Curragh, with two field platoons, an Investigation Section and a Corps Depot. • The Infantry School moves to Cork with a campus at Kilworth.

IV. Corps Schools The Field Artillery, Air Defence, Cavalry, Field Engineer, CIS, Supply & Transport and Field Medical Regiments and the Military Police Company will each include a Corps Depot element which incorporates a Corps School. The Corps Schools will provide all specific-to-Corps training for designated personnel. There are major advantages in having a Corps School co-located with a unit of the Corps. An Air Defence School separate from the Field Arty School is recommended. The Infantry School in Cork/Kilworth incorporates a Potential NCO Training Wing, an Infantry Tactics Wing, an Infantry Support Weapons Wing, an NBC Ops Wing and an APC Training Wing.

d. Stand-by Deployable Formation HQ ( SDF HQ)

I. SDF HQ Located in the Curragh and normally manned by a small cadre but reinforced for operations or exercises by LFHQ or other HQs. For formation-level operations, the Deputy CLF may assume command. The SDF HQ to have modular air-transportable facilities.

II. For Joint Operations, DFHQ can have the SDF HQ to be placed under it’s command.

III. SDF HQ is available for Command Post Exercises at the Military College and elsewhere, as well as for PSO Mission Readiness Exercises.

203. DFHQ UNITS & ESTABLISHMENTS

a. Certain units and establishments will remain under direct DFHQ command:

I. DFHQ Camp Command : to support and administer DFHQ & McKee Bks to include a security and transport element II. DFHQ CIS Company: to provide comms/IT support to DFHQ, including Signals Intelligence support for Military Intelligence. III. : unit at the Curragh IV. Curragh Camp Command : commanded by a Colonel, it provides administration and security for the Camp. It has no command over units “in location”. V. Military College in the Curragh, provides leadership training for officer cadets, Sergeant and Senior NCO candidates as well as middle & senior rank officers. It includes the Peace Support Operations School. The Infantry School moves to Cork under Land Forces control. VI. Defence Forces Logistics Depot in the Curragh, provides DF-level logs support to all DF Commands. It incorporates an Ordnance Company ( tasked with DF-wide EOD) which includes an Ordnance School. VII. The Defence Forces Band & School: one pipe band and a DF School of Music.

204. AIR COMMAND No high-performance air combat assets are envisaged. Air Command should provide:

a. Rotary Wing: light observation and utility-assault helis which support all DF Commands. b. Fixed Wing Transport: long-range medium-lift tactical aircraft (a minimum of two aircraft) to allow the State and the DF an airlift capability for a variety of scenarios ( e.g. PSO support, emergency extraction of citizens). c. Maritime Surveillance: a Maritime patrol element to support Naval Command operations and provide maritime air surveillance. Can also support some Land Forces ops. d. Training and Maintenance: Air Command must retain a core in-house training and maintenance capability but every effort should be made to out-source certain training and maintenance tasks.

205. NAVAL COMMAND

a. General. no comments on structure b. Training and Maintenance: The same point as for Air Command applies.

206. RESERVE DEFEFENCE FORCES

a. Benefits of a Reserve. It enables the DF to mobilise trained and experienced manpower in time of crisis, without the cost of full-time personnel. Former regular personnel should be the main target of a reserve programme.

b. First-line Reserve (former regulars)

I. This is a very cost-effective means of accessing manpower in which the DF have invested heavily in terms of training and experience. II. Induction could be part of the signing-on engagement or alternatively could be made attractive at discharge/retirement. The latter suggests a financial inducement, e.g. a signing-on gratuity at time of reserve engagement and an annual gratuity conditional on meeting certain requirements. III. a fully trained regular should not need refresher training in the first three years after departure. Thereafter, in Year 4,7 and 10 of Reserve Service, a 2 week refresher training course at their Corps School should be organised. Failure to attend involves losing the annual gratuity but does not annul the legal engagement. IV. As an added incentive, a limited number of First Line Reservists could be allowed serve overseas. V. It is difficult to estimate the likely uptake on a first-line reserve. The gratuity would be a significant factor but personnel might want to maintain ties with the DF for a number of years, particularly if the time commitment was reasonable and overseas was a possibility. VI. A suggested scale of gratuity is 4 weeks’ pay for signing on and the equivalent of two weeks pay as an annual gratuity. The two weeks refresher training every third year should also be paid in addition. VII. In a time of crisis, if a major unit could count on having 30-50 experienced former regulars reinforcing the unit, it would be of immense value . (In the August 1969 crisis, the First Line Reserve, though not particularly well organised, did provide significant numbers.)

c. Part-Time Reserve ( A Volunteer Reserve – VR)

I. General. There is a pool of manpower interested in military service for which a full-time career is not an option. Accessing this pool provides additional personnel to reinforce the regular force in time of crisis. A crisis might mean general mobilisation or local part-time assistance ( e.g. helping with local duties if the parent unit has to deploy troops elsewhere).

II. This VR also helps the DF to maintain desirable links to communities where there is no military garrison.

III. Target Population The VR needs to attract recruits committed for a number of years, ideally for five years plus because of the longer training time needed. This suggests targeting those who are settled into their career path. It must avoid inductees seeking short-term commitment.

IV. Training A challenge for a VR is achieving an adequate level of training. An introductory period of full-time training (3-4 months) is ideal but unlikely to be financed and off-putting for some candidates. If so, the VR must rely on well organised part-time training with an annual full-time camp. This can achieve a lot of over an extended period. Training must not be compressed and progress through the ranks must be suitably paced. Otherwise, the VR professional credibility suffers. Apart from mid-week training nights, all training should take place at the parent unit HQ. Monthly overnight weekends should form a crucial part.

V. Organisation it is difficult to estimate achievable strengths. I believe the equivalent of a rifle company (minus) per infantry battalion is possible if suitable resources are allocated. A carefully selected and rotated training cadre is crucial. Elements of VR should be raised in various towns around the MR.

VI. Success. A properly supported VR can provide valuable reinforcements. The regular unit must buy in, with leadership from the top. In a major crisis, some members will need further training but many VR with a few years service are likely to integrate smoothly with the regulars.

d. Special Reserve.

I. General In addition to the other reserves, there is merit in a small cohort of specialist personnel providing a Special Reserve. This comprises individuals who have a special competence that the DF need for a known situation or for a potential crisis.

• Example 1: DF wish to deploy a Level 2 Medical facility overseas during 2 specific six-month rotations. This requires a number of medical specialists whose permanent retention in DF is not necessary/viable.

• Example 2: the DF need a number of cyber specialists. They have a certain number serving but need a “surge” capacity for potential crises.

II. Method of Operation The DF identifies the specialist positions it wishes to fill for a specific number of overseas rotations or on a rolling “on-call” basis. Suitable candidates are identified and offered positions in return for a financial retainer. The specialist commits either to a specific period of full-time duty such as an overseas rotation or a longer on-call arrangement. Military orientation training can be organised. III. Retention of Special Reservists It would be desirable to retain those specialists inducted for specific deployments in the Special Reserve ( e.g. retaining the medical specialists ) as they would be very suited to future deployments or national emergencies. A mechanism should not be difficult to establish. IV. Cost: the Special Reservist might be attracted by the nature of the experience but ultimately it would still require an attractive level of remuneration. However the numbers involved are likely to be small and the duration of certain full-time deployments on full pay might be short.

3. Staffing – The Zero Brigade Concept ( A Reservoir of Forces)

301. MANNING LEVELS

a. The structures in Part 2 are likely achievable within a strength envelope of 8,000 to 9,000 regular personnel and civilian staff. b. Conditions of service should encourage engagements/re-engagements of desirable length to reduce the loss of expensively acquired expertise and the cost of training replacements. c. However the retention of personnel should not prejudice the need to have a DF staffed by personnel suited to robust operations. d. Contract extensions should be more individually targeted rather than having standard retirement ages. Personnel with similar lengths of service might be offered different extensions. Based on employment and experience, Sgt A might be offered an X year extension and Sgt B might be offered Y years. This represents a HR challenge.

302. CIVILIANISATION. Taking on certain duties from the Dept Defence and critically reviewing existing staffing right down to unit-level, the DF has great scope for civilianisation, including quite senior positions, thus freeing up expensively-trained military personnel for military roles.

303. DISCIPLINE. A new disciplinary process is recommended, linked to a new Defence Act. See Para 403 in Section 4.

304. RANK NOMENCLATURE. The DF needs a different way of referring to certain ranks. Terms such as “Non-Commissioned”, “ Other Ranks” should be set aside. Highly valued personnel should NOT be referred to in terms of what they are NOT. Terms such as “members” or “all ranks” are more appropriate. The origins of the present system are understandable but it belongs to a previous age.

4. Any other comments - The Zero Brigade Concept. (A Reservoir of Forces)

401. Defence Act

a. The present Defence Act is not fit for purpose. It never was, being more suited even in 1954, to earlier decades. It provides an archaic structure of governance and delves into a totally inappropriate level of administrative detail.

b. A new Act needs to be minimalist (perhaps 50 pages) simply providing a basic legislative framework for Ireland’s defence organisation.

c. The Act should have the Minister for Defence responsible for two separate elements:

I. A Dept of Defence and II. The Defence Forces

d. A more compact Dept Defence should be excused the inappropriate and duplicative workload of micro-managing DF matters. It should be allowed concentrate on policy matters and policy-related liaison with other national and international stake-holders (e.g. other Govt Depts, EU, UN, OSCE). The Dept could have a role in the high-level approval of the DF budget and in the shared management with the DF of major defence procurement projects.

e. The CHOD should be responsible directly to the Minister for:

I. Commanding the DF in accordance with the policy and directives of the Minister. II. Advising the Minister on the organisation, staffing, equipping, training, readiness, deployment and operations of the DF. III. Advising the Minister on DF’s assessment of the security environment and threats to national security. IV. Exercising executive control and accountancy of the Defence Forces budget. V. Liaising with the Sec Gen Dept Defence on Defence Policy related issues, DF budget preparation and major defence procurement projects.

f. The Act should set out offences which if committed by any person, civilian or military, can result in trial in a specified court ( e.g. treason, and offences such as entering military lands)

g. All specifically military disciplinary sections should be removed from the Defence Act and re-stated elsewhere in DF regulations issued by the CHOD.

402. Governance. The entire system of law, regulation, directive and instruction governing the DF needs to be greatly simplified and codified. The present system is hugely complex and difficult to update. The following is one possible system that would derive it’s authority from the Act:

a. The Minister. To issue Directives and Instructions:

I. Directives should deal with long-term issues such as the basic structure of the DF (the Components, the Authorised Strength)

II. Instructions to deal with shorter-term issues ( An Instruction to deploy a contingent to a particular PSO).

b. The CHOD to issue:

I. Defence Forces Regulations, a codified body of long-term regulations covering most domains of DF activities. II. DF Manuals prepared for various specialist areas of activity by the experts in that domain but signed off by the CHOD. III. Various other Orders and CHOD Instructions for shorter-term matters

c. Commanders of Commands, Regions and Units To issue appropriate orders and instructions to complement and refine CHOD orders/instructions.

403. Discipline

a. The CHOD’s DF Regulations should include provisions replacing the disciplinary sections of the Defence Act ( perhaps a Defence Forces Code). b. The disciplinary process should be more akin to the Garda Siochana process. Modern HR practice demands a more arms-length and less judicial system to replace the existing system of courts-martial, commanding officers’ investigations of charges and “summary disposal” by sub-units. Even on “active service”, internet technology can enable distance processing of matters.

404. Defence Forces Oversight Authority (DFOA) or alternative title.

a. Similar to the earlier Garda Siochana Authority model, an independent part-time DFOA could provide external oversight of the Defence Forces strategic organisational plans and their implementation. The DFOA should not have a role in relation to current DF operations.

b. Proposed composition:

I. Chaired by a very senior figure with highest-level management experience in the public service, semi-state organisations or public bodies. II. An experienced senior management figure from the private sector , III. HR specialist, IV. Finance specialist V. a person experienced in security affairs/security studies. VI. A small number of non-political persons who have expertise in areas deemed of value VII. Military expertise to be provided by a very senior retired foreign military office- holder and perhaps a second middle-ranking retired foreign military office- holder

Serving and former members of the DF and Dept Defence would not be eligible to serve on the DFOA.

404. Miscellaneous Taskings: over the years, the DF have been allocated certain taskings which are no longer appropriate:

a. Equitation School there may be a need for an agency to promote the Irish equitation industry but in the 21st century, the DF is not the appropriate host. The task should be re- assigned to a civilian agency housed in a non-military location.

b. Security at Government Buildings

I. In the formative decades of the State, a military presence at Government Buildings was needed. II. The security environment there has evolved. It now requires a 24/7 sophisticated rapid intervention capability by highly trained armed responders. III. A Garda Armed Support Unit (ASU) team in that location could liaise efficiently with other Gardai on duty around the complex, react in a graduated manner to an escalating range of threats, rapidly summon and integrate reinforcement from other ASUs in Dublin City and cooperate efficiently with the Garda Emergency Response Unit if that is deployed. IV. The DF element there at present ( MP & Fire Picquet) is diligent but not suitable. The inherent division of responsibility with the Gardai could lead to dangerous confusion in an emergency.

405. Nuclear, Biological & Chemical ( NBC) Operating Environments. The DF are partially equipped and trained to operate in NBC environments. However, it is a skills-area that at times can be neglected. Ability to operate in NBC environments is not just a warfare issue. It could be of critical importance in certain crises. A Directorate of NBC Operations at DFHQ could assist the DF remain focused on NBC.

406. Defence Infrastructure. A case could be made for the DF handing over responsibility for the maintenance of it’s infrastructure to the OPW, which has a country-wide network of staffs already employed in this role. This could allow the DF Engineer Corps concentrate more on it’s combat engineer role, which at times is overshadowed by the infrastructure role. The option is worthy of study.

407. Physical Fitness.

a. The DF have a good fitness culture. But apart from career courses and other periods of collective training, much is left to individual efforts. This does not achieve a suitable organisational level for all personnel. b. Collective physical training should be part of daily routine for all ranks from the CHOD down and for every part of all units and HQ’s. c. This requires a suitable gym in every barracks and a basic covered area for collective training in inclement weather, as well as adequate ablutions.

408. The . The DF are well disposed to the language and do make certain provisions to promote it. I suggest this effort needs to be intensified. This does not involve trying to make Irish the DF working language but it could be more prominent in its everyday life.