The Role of North Korea in China's Civil War: the Soviet-Led North

Home , Huludao, Kim Chaek, Korean Liberation Army, Northeast China, Port of Dalian, Xiao Jinguang

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97

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The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War: The Soviet-led North Korean Assistance to the CPC in the Northeast Theater, 1946-1948

Tomer Nisimov The Hebrew University of Jerusalem [email protected]

Abstract

Previous studies of China’s civil war have concentrated on different aspects and causes leading to the Communist victory and focused on political, economic, and military explanations. Few studies, however, have examined the features of foreign intervention and assistance to the Communist Party of China and their contribution to the latter’s success. Sino-Soviet relations and cooperation during the war have received the attention of several studies, but the role of North Korea in the war has remained obscure. As information regarding North Korea’s actions during China’s civil war remains largely inaccessible, few studies have debated the question of whether North Korea had ever deployed its forces in China’s Northeast in order to assist their Chinese comrades. Relying on military and intelligence documents from the Republic of China, this article shows how by the time of the Soviet withdrawal from China’s Northeast, the USSR had become resolute about turning North Korea into a militarized state in order to protect its own interests in the region and assist the Chinese Communists.

Keywords

Chinese Civil War ‒ Cold War ‒ Kim Il-sǒng ‒ Northeast China ‒ North Korea ‒ Soviet Union

1 Introduction

The struggle over Northeast China (formerly known as Manchuria) came to an end in November 1948 with a Communist victory. Within roughly a year,

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/22127453-bja10002Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 66 Nisimov the Communist Party of China (CPC) had succeeded in terminating civil war on the mainland. For both the CPC and the Guomindang (GMD), the struggle over Northeast China was of great significance due to the region’s industrial and agricultural power. The two parties expended prodigious efforts in order to gain control over the vast region and to prevent the other side’s consolidation of power there. In spite of the GMD’s initial military and numerical advantage, the CPC succeeded in thwarting its rival’s offensives, ultimately to fight back and defeat the GMD forces. Scholars who discuss the reasons for this remark- able success focus on several factors that helped the CPC. First, the CPC swiftly entered the region following Japan’s defeat and took over administrative positions in large and small cities. Second, it simultaneously gained control over the arsenals of the Japanese and their puppet Manchukuo armies.1 Third, land reform and propaganda efforts generated massive support for the CPC, which improved its access to the region’s material and human resources.2 Fourth, the CPC forces in Northeast China under Lin Biao 林彪 (1907-1971) were success- fully transformed from guerilla units into a conventional army throughout the campaign.3 Last but not least, the CPC forces benefitted from overt and clandestine support from the Soviet Army during its occupation of the Northeast.4 Previous studies have analyzed the relations between the USSR and the CPC during the civil war in Northeast China and depicted the ways the Soviet Army assisted and cooperated with CPC forces. The Soviet Army had, for instance, assisted the CPC forces to enter Northeast China by coordinating joint attacks on Japanese and other puppet forces near Shanhaiguan Pass and other locations during the time of the Soviet occupation. On other occasions, the Soviet Army had supplied the CPC forces with weapons, ammunition, and equipment from the former arsenals of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Moreover, the CPC’s advance into and scattering in the Northeast was significantly facili- tated thanks to the Soviet Army, which had notified the CPC forces in advance regarding their withdrawal from certain locations, and even assisted them with fixing the railways and other logistical undertakings.5 The different aspects of assistance analyzed hitherto have overwhelm- ingly focused on the period of Soviet occupation of China’s Northeast, from August 1945 to May 1946. The period following the Soviet withdrawal from the region has not received much attention, with the exception of references to

1 Tanner 2013, 44-58; Westad 2003, 21-32. 2 Levine 1987, 87-121; Pepper 1999, 199-228, 229-330; Tanner 2015, 134-37. 3 Tanner 2015, 140-59; Westad 2003, 121-28. 4 Heinzig 2004, 90-97; Niu 1998, 53-57, 57-61; Wang and He 2005, 313-21, 324-29. 5 Heinzig 2004, 77-82; Tanner 2015, 142-45, 175-80; Wang and He 2005, 290-95, 313-21.

Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 67 trade treaties between the two sides and shipments of goods and weapons.6 Only a very few studies have ever mentioned intervention or participation of any sort in the civil war by Korean elements within China’s Northeast or from North Korea.7 In this article, I focus on the role of North Korea in assisting the Chinese Communists in the civil war in the Northeast, and how it became possible for this smaller state, under the guidance of the USSR, to intervene in the conflict. I show how following the Soviet withdrawal from Northeast China in mid-1946, and due to the escalation of tensions between the USSR and the USA, North Korea became a major conduit for directed Soviet assistance and an active participant by committing its forces and resources to the conflict in China. Thus, this article unfolds another dimension of the Chinese Communists’ success in the Northeast and sheds new light on relations between the USSR, the CPC, and North Korea. Finally, I contend that by exploiting North Korea’s resources, the USSR succeeded in ensuring its interests while simultaneously continuing to assist the CPC, even in the two years following its withdrawal from Northeast China in May 1946.

2 From Liberation to War: the Beginning of the Struggle over Northeast China

The defeat of Japan in August 1945 and the end of World War II early the next month permitted renewal of the old rivalry between the GMD and the CPC. By the time the war concluded, the ROC government was situated in the south- west, and the CPC in North China. Thus, as of August 1945 none of these parties had a presence in Northeast China, which was conquered by the Soviet Army.

6 Tanner 2015, 138-39; Westad 2003, 166-68. 7 The issue of Korean participation and intervention during China’s civil war in the Northeast has been referred to only briefly in previous studies, usually mentioning North Korea’s assistance in the form of supplying goods or referring to Korean units within the Chinese Communist forces in the Northeast. Tanner, for example, mentions that the Chinese Communists used North Korea as a military rear and received logistical support. Minnich indicates in his book that on one occasion, North Korea had dispatched about 30,000 troops to Northeast China during 1947. Minnich also mentions some Korean military units that operated under the CPC forces in the Northeast, such as the Yi Hong-gwang Detachment (YHD) and the 166th, 164th, and 155th Divisions. Relying on US intelligence documents, Cumings managed to draw a relatively broader picture of the North Korean military assistance to the CPC in the Northeast, showing a wider spectrum of military intervention, including estimated numbers of troops dispatched by North Korea and estimated dates for their dispatch and withdrawal. See Cumings 1990, 358-63; Minnich 2005, 33-37; Tanner 2015, 64-67.

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In pre-modern times, Northeast China played an insignificant role in the Chinese economy. In the late nineteenth century, however, it went through a process of industrialization and transportation development, and at the same time its agricultural sectors also developed. These changes occurred due to competition between foreign elements in the region (namely the Russian and Japanese empires), with Japan quickly becoming the dominant influen- tial power in the region.8 From 1932 to 1945 Northeast China, then known as Manchukuo 滿洲國, was a puppet state under Japanese control. As a result, after roughly five decades of intense development, by the end of World War II Northeast China, already well known for its raw materials, had become a highly industrialized territory with an extensive railway system and developed agriculture.9 With the capitulation of the Manchukuo and the Japanese military, the GMD and CPC competed for control over Northeast China. Both parties dispatched numerous political teams and military units to the region. In spite of its initially weaker position, the CPC, due to its relative proximity to the Northeast, enjoyed the advantage of deploying its cadres and military units before the GMD. Moreover, the CPC received essential assistance from the Soviet Army and the Korean Communists in consolidating its control.10 On August 11 and 12, 1945, Zhu De 朱德 (1886-1976)—commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, issued “Seven Orders” outlining to the Communist forces in North and East China the tasks necessary for improving their readi- ness in the upcoming struggle against the GMD.11 In this first dispatch of Communist forces to the Northeast, there were about 10,000 troops, more than half of whom were former soldiers of Zhang Xueliang 張學良 (1901-2001), the former warlord of Northeast China. Among them was Zhang Xueliang’s younger brother Zhang Xuesi 張學思 (1916-1970), who commanded the units dispatched from Hebei and Chahar. By November 1945 the CPC had managed to send as many as 101,700 soldiers and 22,100 cadres.12 In the Seven Orders, Zhu De also instructed Pak Hyo-sam 朴孝三 and Pak Il-u 朴一禹, deputy commanders of the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA, 朝鮮義勇軍), along with members of the Korean Independence Alliance (KIA, 韓國

8 Paine 2010, 24-26. 9 Matsusaka 2003, 250-58; Tanner 2015, 145-47; Zhibingtang bianjibu 2016, 11-12. For the industrialization and development of Manchuria, see Paine 2010 and Matsusaka 2003. 10 Cathcart 2012, 33-39; Heinzig 2004, 82-97; Kim 2014, 124-29; Wang and He 2005, 308-13. 11 In the orders, Zhu De instructed the various Communist units in North China to shift their location closer to the Northeast, while those already located there were instructed to advance further. On this see Wang and He 2005, 285-90. 12 Zhibingtang bianjibu 2016, 11-12, 18-19.

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獨立同盟),13 to follow the Eighth Route Army and the former Northeast Army that had been sent to the Northeast. They were given orders to fight there together with the Chinese Communists against Japanese and puppet armies, to reorganize and mobilize the local Korean population (which by late 1945 numbered approximately two million), and ultimately to liberate Korea.14 While Mao Zedong participated in the negotiations with the GMD in Chongqing from August 28 to October 10, Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇 (1898-1969) was left in Yan’an, which served as the capital of the Chinese Communists in North China, and was in charge of the mission to gain control over the Northeast.15 According to PRC materials, Liu Shaoqi seemed indecisive about sending numerous cadres and military units to the Northeast, but upon receiving news of contact and cooperation between Communist units sent earlier, and of the Soviet Army’s presence in the Northeast, he decided to dispatch greater numbers of personnel and troops and take advantage of the presence of the Soviet Army.16 As for the GMD, by October it had, with the assistance of US forces, managed to regain control over cities in northern and eastern China and started planning to dispatch its forces to the Northeast.17 However, as the GMD still encountered difficulties in dispatching its forces and officials to the Northeast, it thought that if the Soviet Army were to withdraw too soon, the Chinese Communists could easily gain control over the Northeast. The GMD therefore preferred that the Soviet Army maintain its forces on the ground so that at a later stage it could hand over control of the Northeast to the GMD.18 Hence, representatives of the GMD negotiated with the Soviet Army regarding the possibility of postponing the Soviet withdrawal and, with the latter’s permission, of sending military forces to the Northeast.19 Prevented from landing troops in the port of Dalian,20 the GMD landed its troops at the Huludao and Yingkou ports in late October, where they encountered resistance by Chinese Communist forces. Meanwhile, in early November the GMD’s National Revolutionary Army (NRA) attacked

13 Shi 1998, 85, 318-24. 14 Kim 2014, 121, 124-29; Shi 1998, 84; Wang and He 2005, 285-90. 15 Heinzig 2004, 71-77; Niu 1998, 53-57. 16 Tang 1986, 14-19; Wang and He 2005, 324-29. 17 Heinzig 2004, 90-91; Westad 2003, 70-79. 18 Levine 1987, 48-50. 19 Heinzig 2004, 90; Wang and He 2005, 313-21. 20 The Dalian and Lüshun ports are located in the Liaodong peninsula. They were of great strategic and economic importance to the USSR, which strove for privileges there. Unlike the rest of the Northeast, Soviet units in Dalian and Lüshun were stationed there even after the conclusion of China’s civil war and remained there until late May 1955. See Dalian shi Lüshunkou qu shi zhi bangongshi 1999, 27-29; Shen and Xia 2015, 103-4.

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Shanhaiguan,21 where the Chinese Communists had positioned themselves earlier. By November 16 the NRA succeeded in capturing Shanhaiguan, and the GMD was closer than ever to having its forces enter the Northeast.22 By December 1945, the GMD succeeded in gaining control over the Northeast’s key cities of Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar, and strategically important smaller cities such as Siping and Jinzhou. Before the GMD officials and military units had reached the Northeast cities, the Soviet Army had driven some of the Communist forces out of the cities and removed some of the Communists who held administrative positions in different municipalities. In so doing, the USSR wished to preserve the appearance of impartiality by not assisting the CPC and by honoring its agreement with the ROC. The CPC Northeast Bureau informed Party headquarters that it had pre- pared its military units and political cadres for withdrawal from the large cities of the Northeast, except for Harbin. Harbin was the only large city in the region where the Soviet Army had secretly allowed the Chinese Communists to continue operating underground.23 In accordance with the request of ROC government leader Chiang Kai-shek, who hoped that the Soviet withdrawal from the Northeast would allow the Soviet Army to more smoothly hand over control of the region to the ROC government, the Soviet Army announced in late December that it would complete its withdrawal by February 1, 1946. Nonetheless, on February 1 the Soviet Army announced that it was postponing its withdrawal, making it the third postponement by then, claiming this time that weather conditions were unsuitable. The Soviet Army then set the new withdrawal date for March 1, and by May 3 the last Soviet units in the Northeast had completed their withdrawal, thus allowing the ROC to expand its control and launch offensives against the Communists.24 When the Soviet Army began its final withdrawal from China’s Northeast in the spring of 1946, US special envoy George Marshall’s mediation mission seemed on course for irreversible failure. These developments were two key factors that further provoked the confrontation between the GMD and the CPC.25 At the time the Soviet Army had completed its withdrawal, the Chinese Communists managed to gain control over the regions north of Changchun, namely the cities of Changchun and Harbin, and other regions southeast of

21 Shanhaiguan, located in Hebei province, is the main pass from China proper to the Northeast. 22 Heinzig 2004, 91; Tanner 2015, 34-36. 23 Heinzig 2004, 95; Wang and He 2005, 387-91. 24 Heinzig 2004, 95-97; Pepper 1999, 158-72. 25 Heinzig 2004, 97-98.

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Shenyang, along the border with North Korea.26 The Soviet withdrawal occa- sioned patent disadvantages for the CPC; from that moment onwards, the CPC in the Northeast could no longer rely on the clandestine assistance previously provided them by the Soviet Army. It seemed that at the moment it had only itself to rely on and faced great challenges. In the early spring of 1946 the Communists had to abandon other cities following the advance of the NRA. In addition, on May 19 the Chinese Communists lost the Second Battle of Siping, and Lin Biao ordered the evacuation of the city. During the same month the Communists also withdrew from Changchun.27 These withdrawals and the loss of the strategic cities of Siping and Changchun forced the CPC into a predicament. At this stage, the CPC was driven into the Northeast’s periphery and was vulnerable to additional offensives by the NRA. The CPC in the Northeast made significant military adjustments and adopted new policies that benefited both itself and the local population, as noted in earlier studies,28 but it was still reliant on external assistance during this vola- tile period, albeit not directly from the Soviet Army as when it was present in the Northeast. At that point the Chinese Communist forces in the North east (the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, NDAA), were composed of various units engaged in guerilla warfare and began a transformation process to become a modern army waging conventional warfare.29 While the bulk of the NDAA was located in Harbin and elsewhere in the northern regions under the command of Lin Biao, the NDAA Third and Fourth Columns were situated along the border with Korea. These were mainly garrisoned around the cities of Tonghua, Andong, and Linjiang, and other coun- ties on the border. In October 1946 the NRA gained control over Rehe and Chahar, thus strengthening the ROC foothold in the region. Following that success, Chiang Kai-shek and the commander in charge of the NRA forces in the Northeast, Du Yuming 杜聿明 (1904-1981), were determined to smash these relatively smaller and weaker NDAA forces located in the southeast regions. Such an offensive would weaken the Communist hold in the Northeast and isolate the rest of the NDAA in the north, cutting them off from the North Korean border.30

26 Heinzig 2004, 97-101; Liu 1990, 101-4; Wang and He 2005, 401-3, 405-8. 27 The Communists withdrew from Changchun in part due to George Marshall’s request, but mainly because they understood it would be very difficult to defend the city from an impending NRA offensive. See Tanner 2013, 135-64; Wang and He 2005, 409-10. 28 Levine 1987, 199-229; Pepper 1999, 201-12; Tanner 2015, 51-53, 73-80; Westad 2004, 107-21. 29 Tanner 2013, 58; Westad 2003, 172-78. 30 Lew 2009, 66-73; Tanner 2015, 39-46.

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At this point it seemed that the GMD soon would succeed in consolidating its control in the region and critically threaten the Chinese Communists’ hold. This, in turn, would place the Soviet interests in the region at risk, as the Soviet Army had already withdrawn and the USSR was thus unable to dictate what was happening with troops on the ground, or by means of negotiations. Moreover, as the ROC was backed by the US, the USSR was certain that the ROC intended to thwart it from accomplishing its plans to gain special economic rights in the Northeast and, at the same time, would seek to promote US influence in the region.

3 Soviet Interests and Schemes in Northeast Asia

Historically the USSR, and Russia before it, had broad geopolitical interests in Northeast Asia. By fighting a war against Japan, the USSR could benefit its status in the region, and in particular restore the rights and privileges of the former Russian Empire in Northeast China. While its armies fought in Northeast Asia, the USSR had several objectives: (1) subjugating Manchukuo and the Japanese forces there; (2) taking over Manchukuo’s and the Japanese army’s arsenals and equipment; (3) occupying strategic locations such as Lüshun (Port Arthur) and Dalian; (4) pillaging local industries; and (5) in the larger perspective, ensuring that the region would be under the Soviet sphere of influence and not under that of the US.31 As will be explained below, the USSR assisted the CPC in order to thwart the GMD and its main supporter, the US, since both powers sought to enhance their influence in China, and particularly in the Northeast. However, the USSR wished to avoid a confrontation with the US, and therefore its patterns and features of assistance to the CPC varied throughout the time the Soviets occupied Northeast China. There are several indications that the USSR intended to turn Northeast China into a buffer zone under Communist control. It would thereby connect the Soviet Far East with the territories of

31 The entrance of the USSR into the war against Japan in the final stages of World War II was an opportunity for it to regain the privileges and rights of the former Russian Empire lost to Japan following the debacle of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. The Russian Empire had invested enormous amounts of capital and great human resources in the late nineteenth century in order to reinforce its position in the Far East, mainly for strategic reasons, but for economic ones as well. In a similar fashion to its predecessor, the USSR wished to guarantee its interests and privileges in the region and to stymie any attempt by another power to influence the region. The USSR was particularly concerned about the prospect that Japan, under US occupation, might again become a regional power that would jeopardize its interests in Northeast Asia. On this see Paine 2010, 13-23 and Pechatnov 2010, 91-95.

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Northeast China and North Korea and possess the potential to expand its influence into adjacent regions. In terms of economic and strategic interests, the USSR wished to regain its special rights over the ports in the cities of Lüshun and Dalian, which guaranteed its ability to trade in East Asia and at the same time, to maintain naval forces there. The USSR was concerned about securing its Far Eastern territories in light of the past threats from Japan.32 Following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, it was clear to the USSR that it would not be able to influence Japan, as it was believed the latter would become a US satellite state. Hence, there was concern among the Soviet leadership that Japan might rehabilitate its power and threaten Soviet interests again in the future.33 In addition, as has been pointed out, the ROC government was on good terms with the US, and that bolstered the concern that the GMD and the US would try to thwart the Soviet influence in China, and particularly in the Northeast.34 The USSR had similar interests with respect to Korea north of the 38th Parallel. After disarming the Japanese Army there, the Soviet Occupation Authorities in North Korea (SOANK)35 also took over industrial and military equipment. Strategically, North Korea could also serve as a component in the Soviet security line in Northeast Asia. Therefore, right at the beginning of the Soviet occupation, SOANK commenced promoting political elements that would follow their instructions and initiated a campaign to purge political opposition groups and former collaborators of the Japanese colonial regime in Korea.36 In Northeast China, however, the Soviet Army had to operate carefully as long as it was positioned there. When Japan announced its surrender on August 14, 1945, the USSR and the ROC signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, according to which the USSR officially recognized ROC sovereignty over the three northeastern provinces.37 Hence, the USSR was obliged to show that it honored the agreement so as to avoid a deterioration in the relation- ship with Western powers and the prospect of their intervention in China. In

32 Goldman 2012, 1-5; Matsusaka 2001, 15-17; Nish 2007, 65-77; Sella 1983, 655-57, 667-68. 33 Pechatnov 2010, 91-95. 34 Chang 1988, 70-71; Heinzig 2004, 86-87; Roberts 2006, 280-81. 35 The term “Soviet Occupation Authorities in North Korea” as used by Suh Dae-sook refers to the Soviet military leadership that administered and ruled North Korea following the occupation. Andrei Lankov mentions that on October 3, 1945, the Soviet authorities in North Korea had officially established the Soviet Civil Administration, but both terms refer to the same Soviet military leadership. See Lankov 2002, 15. 36 Lankov 2002, 27-30; Suh 1988, 66-73; Waijiaobu, June 2, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200- 00314-007. 37 Chiang 1969, 143-45; Foo 2011, 194-95.

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 74 Nisimov order to retain this appearance of impartiality, on several occasions the Soviet Army forced the Chinese Communists to withdraw from cities that it had previously permitted them to enter, when the NRA was about to enter those cities. Moreover, when it was clear that the ROC was about to enter Northeast China in November 1945, the USSR moderated its stance and was ready to negotiate with the ROC government regarding economic issues in the Northeast.38 This pattern could definitely be seen as neutrality on the USSR’s part and even as honoring its agreement with the ROC. In fact, the USSR operated in a cautious manner that allowed it to be perceived as a power that honored agreements with foreign countries and, at the same time, was neutral towards China’s in- ternal struggle. All these, however, derived from Soviet concerns over possible US intervention and the prospect of military confrontation. The USSR also hoped to be seen as a power that did not support subversive elements such as the CPC in foreign countries. Nonetheless, the USSR and its army continued to act clandestinely in support of the Chinese Communists. It should be noted that the ROC and US governments were aware of Soviet pro-CPC actions in the Northeast on several occasions, such as in the cases of the continuing postponements of their military withdrawals and the Soviet prohibition against the ROC landing its forces in Dalian and Lüshun. Nevertheless, it was difficult for them to regard the USSR as completely one- sided, due to its elusive operations and apparent maintenance of relations with the ROC.39 Moreover, Stalin himself had told American diplomats in 1944 and 1945 that the USSR would not support the CPC and that it recognized Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC as the legitimate ruler and government of China. To a certain extent, these declarations reflected a degree of truth, since Stalin did not consider the CPC ready to control China, nor did he at that time regard the ROC as too weak.40 Therefore, both Soviet operations on the ground and Soviet leaders’ statements succeeded in perplexing the ROC and the US. Nonetheless, the potential disappearance of Soviet influence in the region at the time of its withdrawal, which they feared might lead to emerging US influence in the region, bolstered Soviet support of the CPC.41

38 Heinzig 2004, 93; Niu 1998, 57-61. 39 Chang 1988, 104, 119; Levine 1987, 27-33, 237-48; Pepper 1999, 212-16; Wang and He 2005, 401-2; Zheng Jiemin 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080104-00014-010. 40 Heinzig 2004, 21-23. 41 Since the USSR doubted the prospects of a Communist victory, it wished to avoid a deterioration of the war that might lead other powers, in particular the US, to intervene. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership wished to first guarantee its interests and rights in China’s Northeast, which it hoped to retain through Communist control in the region. As it was not clear until late 1948 that the CPC had the upper hand on the battlefield, and due

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The Soviet Army played a crucial role in the Chinese Communists’ success in consolidating their power in the Northeast. Both sides had cooperated many times together, for example in subjugating Japanese forces and on other occasions when the Soviet Army allowed CPC members to hold office in municipal administrations and their cadres and military units to enter cities and towns.42 In addition, the Communist forces had advance notice of the Soviet Army’s upcoming withdrawals before the GMD was informed of them, and thus the Communists could gain control over positions immediately following Soviet withdrawal.43 Moreover, during the period of Soviet occupation and withdrawal from Northeast China, the Soviet Army supplied the CPC with very substantial amounts of weapons, ammunition, and equipment captured from the former Manchukuo and Japanese armies.44 Beyond shared ideology, the USSR had practical reasons to support the CPC. First, its negotiations with the ROC government over the status of the port cities of Lüshun and Dalian were not successful, and the demands for Soviet economic rights in the region were not granted. The Soviet Army had entered the war in China’s Northeast and occupied the region, but ROC diplomats could not reach agreements with Soviet commanders regarding Soviet economic rights in the region, payments for Soviet military expenditures, or an agreement regarding railway management.45 Second, the USSR was concerned about the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia and wished to strengthen its own position via local parties such as the CPC. The USSR was concerned not only about the prospect of the ROC government granting the US economic rights at its expense, but also about the possibility of US military presence in the region in general, and in North and Northeast China in particular. This could threaten the borders of the Soviet Union and its new satellite state of North Korea, while the South Korean regime under Yi Seungman (Syngman Rhee), a man known for his bellicosity and aspiration to unify the Korean peninsula, had US backing.46 A US military presence in North and Northeast China might even threaten the future of North Korea itself, which could easily become isolated. Considering

to the uncertainty regarding intervention by the Western powers, the USSR maintained a more cautious stance regarding the Chinese Communists’ military campaigns outside the Northeast. On this see Heinzig 2004, 129-30; Kim 2010, 189-95; Westad, 2003 216-17. 42 Niu 1998, 53-57; Wang and He 2005, 313-21. According to an intelligence report, the municipal administrations in Lüshun and Dalian were headed by Chinese Communists who cooperated with the Soviet Army in those cities. On this see Tang Enbo, Jan. 1946. Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00304-065. 43 Wang and He 2005, 405-8. 44 Westad 2003, 21-32; Tanner 2013, 44-58; Tang 1986, 14-19. 45 Chang 1988, 70, 101; Foo 2011, 201-3. 46 Lankov 2002, 44; Suh 1988, 112.

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 76 Nisimov these elements, the USSR was resolute about assisting the CPC in its struggle in the Northeast and preventing the GMD consolidation there. By creating a buffer zone in China’s Northeast, it could ensure the security of its borders as well as the fate of North Korea and its interests in Lüshun and Dalian.47 During the final months of its withdrawal, the USSR continued to work on schemes to guarantee its economic and strategic interests in Northeast China. By May 1946, after the Soviet Army had managed to postpone its origi- nal November 1945 date of withdrawal by six months, it withdrew.48 Up until that time the Soviets exploited and plundered the Northeast’s industrial companies, mines, and other enterprises, thereby ensuring economic profits to compensate for military expenditures.49 In addition, they assisted the CPC in gaining control over several areas, in particular north of Changchun. However, since the Soviet Army finally had to withdraw, it could not guarantee the possible scenarios once it left the Northeast. Therefore, it had to find other means to ensure its plans would work out. According to reports made by General Tang Enbo 湯恩伯 (1898-1954), in late March 1946 representatives of the Soviet Army in Lüshun convened for a political and military conference together with representatives from other Communist parties in Northeast Asia: the CPC in Yan’an, the CPC Northeast Bureau, and the Communist Party of Mongolia. A later report by Tang Enbo noted that representatives of the Japanese and Korean Communist parties had also participated in the conference. Those representatives had discussed issues of foreign relations between their countries and other political and military issues particularly with respect to China’s Northeast. Another prospect discussed in the conference was the establishment of a Communist state in the Northeast which would be called the Manchurian Autonomous Republic (MAR, Zizhu Manzhou Gongheguo), most likely raised by the Soviet representatives. The representatives also discussed appointing officials to the MAR and other issues regarding its administration. It is clear from the content of the reports that the USSR had intended to lead the East Asian Communist parties to work together in order to expel American and British influence from the region.50 As for the Soviet leadership, it is probable that a military confrontation in China was not necessarily desired, and it is quite reasonable to assume that the USSR had thought of other means to guarantee its interests in the

47 Heinzig 2004, 85; Tang Enbo, Jan. 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00304-065; Wang and He 2005, 308-13; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 48 Foo 2011, 194-95. 49 Chang 1988, 115; Levine 1987, 68; Zheng Jiemin 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080104-00014-010. 50 Tang Enbo, Apr. 2, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00022-126; Tang Enbo, Apr. 3, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-090400-00003-294.

Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 77 region. Throughout most of the civil war, the USSR was concerned about two matters: the capabilities of the CPC, which it believed were insufficient during the early stages, and the prospect of US military intervention. Accordingly, the USSR was very cautious and probably had doubts about Communist victory in China. On certain occasions it even put pressure on the CPC to restrain its actions, as has been pointed out in other studies. Regardless of the Soviet leadership’s preferences, the GMD-CPC confrontation intensified. In fact, in the early stage of the confrontation, Stalin and the Soviet leadership believed that a military confrontation might be disastrous for the CPC, as the GMD was regarded as having the upper hand at that time.51 Nonetheless, by the time of the Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet leadership knew that military disengagement from Northeast China would imperil their interests in the region, and there is a little doubt that the new situation had led them to bolster their assistance to the CPC in consolidating its hold in the Northeast and ensuring the expulsion of the GMD from the region. The prospect of the Chinese Communists establishing a Manchurian Autonomous Republic exemplified their resoluteness in that matter.52 On the surface, the USSR operated prudently and tried to avoid criticism or suspicion on the part of the ROC government or the Western powers with ref- erence to its actions in the Northeast. This cautious strategy was manifested by its diverse actions that could benefit the GMD and harm the CPC and, at other times, vice versa. It altered its attitude and actions toward the GMD and the CPC swiftly, in accordance with developments on the ground and with the aim of protecting its own interests. Hence, the USSR was often perceived as a power that did as it pleased. In fact, the USSR found several ways to very efficiently assist the CPC while still maintaining appearances that did not arouse suspicion. One of the ways in which the USSR was able to further assist the CPC in Northeast China, and which has not yet received much attention in research, was through the use of the occupied territory and resources of North Korea, where Soviet forces were located until December 1948.53 The USSR directly encouraged and urged the use of North Korea’s resources, including human resources, for the benefit of the Chinese Communists in the Northeast. This article’s aim is to show how the USSR and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) cooperated to actively and significantly assist the CPC. It contends that by utilizing North Korea’s resources, the USSR succeeded in safeguarding its own interests

51 Heinzig 2004, 21-23; Levine 1987, 27-33. 52 Tang Enbo, Apr. 2, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00022-126. 53 Minnich 2005, 53-54.

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4 North Korean Incursion into China’s Northeast

North Korea, which was under Soviet occupation at the time, did not remain in- different to the evolving situation in China’s Northeast. In order to understand how North Korea came to intervene in the situation in China, it is essential to pay attention to the actions and changes made by SOANK during that period. From early 1946, SOANK began creating a separate regime represented by Korean leaders and parties, and concurrently it developed and assisted in the establishment of its security organs.54 During that process, Kim Il-sǒng rose to prominence as a leader of the North. In February 1946, SOANK established the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee, an organ allegedly designated to concentrate the governance and administration of the country in the hands of the Korean leadership. Kim Il-sǒng was appointed as head of this organ.55 The Soviet administration was supposedly turned into a consultative organ to the committee, but in reality it continued to make the bulk of the decisions.56 From 1946 onwards, SOANK started to develop the North Korean Army, as Soviet advisers and officers trained North Korean troops who were often armed with Soviet weapons and equipment. Nonetheless, SOANK was concerned that openly militarizing North Korea on a wide scale might raise suspicions among US forces in South Korea and even lead to an open confrontation. Therefore, these newly established units were initially disguised as police force or railway defense units.57 During and after the Soviet occupation of Northeast China, both the USSR and the CPC sent Korean Communist leaders from their territories, whether from the USSR or Yan’an, to Northeast China and North Korea.58 Those who were sent to the Northeast were assigned tasks that included organizing Korean farmers, workers, youth, intellectuals, and women into unions with communist affinities; establishing political movements for the independence of Korea; and mobilizing capable young men to serve in military units.59

54 Lankov 2002, 8. 55 Suh 1988, 66-73. 56 Lankov 2002, 27. 57 Lankov 2002, 37; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 58 Minnich 2005, 22-25; Shi 1998, 85, 318-24; Suh 1988, 72-73; Ye Xiufeng, Nov. 11, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00322-065; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 59 Cathcart 2012, 33-39; Kim 2014, 124-29; Shi 1998, 85; Wang and He 2005, 285-90.

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Simultaneously, the CPC sent several Korean Communists to North Korea on the pretext of preparing for the imminent independence of Korea. In reality, however, the purpose was to bolster relations between the CPC and the incipi- ent state.60 Unlike the CPC which could send only a limited number of Korean members and other Korean Communists to North Korea, the USSR sent tens of thousands of Soviet Koreans from its territories into North Korea, and about thirty thousand of them served as officials in the new regime. Those Soviet Koreans spoke Russian and were acquainted with Soviet politics and institu- tions. With their help, the USSR could guarantee its influence over the evolving state and provide it with trained personnel who would occupy the senior of- fices of the government, the party, and the army.61 While the Soviet authorities worked on establishing and designing the regime in North Korea, the perilous situation of the CPC in 1946 led to the tight- ening of cooperation between the CPC and the Soviet authorities in North Korea. From mid-1946, if not earlier, the Northeast Bureau was working on promoting the scope of cooperation with, and assistance from, these authorities. The reality of NRA armies advancing deep into the Northeast not only endangered the CPC but also threatened Soviet interests in the region (since it put its foothold in Dalian and Lüshun at risk) and created serious concerns about the prospect of expanding US influence in the region. Thus, by summer 1946 the two sides had reestablished their cooperation, this time in the form of North Korean assistance. In July 1946, the Northeast Bureau sent NDAA senior commander Xiao Jinguang 蕭勁光 (1903-1989) to North Korea together with the secretary of the North Manchuria Sub-Bureau, Zhu Lizhi 朱理治 (1907-1978). There they consulted with the Soviet command and leaders of the North Korean Workers’ Party Center (officially established in August 1946).62 Together, they resolved to establish an institution that would coordinate cooperation and relations between the CPC and North Korea. This secret institution was called the Pyongyang Office (Pingrang banshichu).63 Chen Yun 陳雲 (1905-1995), who was a member of the Northeast Bureau at that time, defined its core responsibilities

60 Suh 1988, 101-2. 61 Minnich 2005, 24; Suh 1988, 66-73; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702- 00044-004. 62 Lankov 2002, 31; Suh 1988, 75. 63 This institution had a few other names, and in China it was also known as “the Northeast Bureau’s Office in Korea” (Dongbei ju zhu Chaoxian banshichu 東北局駐朝鮮辦事處). The Soviet Army in North Korea feared that the institution might be discovered by the GMD and the United States, and it therefore used several different and ambiguous names. On this see Lü 2013, 51-52.

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 80 Nisimov this way: transferring the wounded from battles in the Northeast to North Korea; conveying supplies and equipment; enabling secret passage of Koreans into CPC operation bases in the Northeast in order to provide additional man- power and equipment; and promoting economic and commercial relations between North Korea and the CPC, including the sale of weapons and transfer of grain from North Korea. According to Zhu Lizhi’s letter to the Party Center in late 1946, North Korea managed to provide more than two thousand train-car loads of weapons, equipment, ammunition, uniforms, and medicines during that same year.64 In addition to assistance in the form of equipment and other materials, the NDAA forces were permitted to cross the North Korean border on several occasions. According to reports made by NRA commander Du Yuming, in November 1946 Communist units had been seen crossing the border from Andong to North Korea’s Sinǔiju 新義州.65 Although the GMD was aware of this sort of activity, it was incapable of preventing Communist forces from flee- ing to North Korean territory and finding sanctuary there. In December, the forces of NRA generals Zheng Dongguo 鄭洞國 (1903-1991) and Du Yuming attacked Xiao Jinguang’s units in Linjiang. These offensives broke down due to the success of Xiao’s defensive units and the simultaneous offensives carried out by Lin Biao’s units from the north, known as the “Three Expeditions South of the (Songhua) River and Four Defenses of Linjiang” (January-March 1947).66 During this period, North Korea provided the NDAA with weapons, ammunition, and other equipment, using hiding places along the border. In this manner, on one specific occasion North Korea was able to send as many as a hundred truckloads of weapons for the Chinese Communists to Sakju 朔州, in North Korea near the Chinese border. From other locations along the border, North Korea provided weapons as well as grain to the NDAA. According to the same intelligence report received by the GMD high command, during the NRA offensive on Andong in November 1946, about 40,000 Chinese Communist soldiers had crossed the border to Sinǔiju, where they left two companies of troops. The report’s author assumed that the bulk of this force planned to cross back to the Northeast through Yanbian.67 At this point, however, North Korean assistance had not reached its peak, but had only just begun. The crucial year of 1947 marked significant developments in the region. Due to the commencement of the Cold War between the USSR and the US, Soviet

64 Lü 2013, 51-54. 65 Du Yuming, Nov. 6, 1946, Guoshiguan 002-090300-00146-209. 66 Lew 2009, 66-73; Tanner 2015, 62-83; Xiao 2012, 155-62. 67 Waijiaobu, Feb. 6, 1947, Guoshiguan 002-080200-00314-007.

Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 81 concerns and willingness to assist the CPC in the Northeast intensified all the more forcefully, and this was also apparent from the USSR’s policies and actions in North Korea. At that time North Korea had been through extensive mobilization and militarization, while its People’s Army had undergone professionalization and armament led by the Soviet Army situated in Korea, and also by the Northeast Bureau, although to a far lesser extent. As for the CPC in the Northeast, it managed to turn the tide, from being the hunted to becoming the hunter. When the Soviet authorities in North Korea began promoting mobilization and militarization in 1946, it was primarily for the safety of the new regime. In 1947, however, the Soviet authorities accelerated mobilization of the North Korean population and worked on its professionalization and modernization with the goal of unifying the peninsula, an objective enthusiastically sup- ported by Kim Il-sǒng and the North Korean leadership. According to GMD intelligence reports, following the failure of the meetings of the US-USSR Joint Commission in Korea in May-October 1947, the USSR utterly rejected the possibility of joint trusteeship over Korea and began drawing up plans for unification by military means. Consequently, the North Korean People’s Committee convened in October 1947 to discuss prospects and plans for military unification.68 This led the Soviet authorities to establish military schools in various locations, arm and train North Korean troops, and send thousands of Korean military cadets and technicians for training in the USSR.69 Thus, while the evolving North Korean army was slated to unify the country in the future, the USSR and the CPC worked on a plan to use this massive force to assist the NDAA in the Northeast Theater, an objective shared by the North Korean leadership, which wanted its army to gain experience in warfare. Among the North Korean leadership the main advocates of such a plan were Kim Il-sǒng, Kim Chaek 金策 (1903-1951), and Kim Keun 金根.70 Throughout 1947, the Soviet Army in North Korea led the comprehensive development of the North Korean military. Aside from enforcing recruitment law,71 the Soviet Army had established at least twelve military schools of various types in North Korea in which Korean officers, cadres, air crew, and technicians were trained. Additional thousands of young Koreans who proved capable were sent for military and technical training in the USSR cities of

68 Lee 2006, 106-10; Lin Cang, Nov. 14, 1947, Guoshiguan 002-080200-00322-064; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 69 Waijiaobu, May, 17, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00377-008; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 70 Xiong Shihui, Apr. 7, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00011-009. 71 Lin Cang, Nov. 14, 1947, Guoshiguan 002-080200-00322-064.

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Vladivostok, Voroshilov (now called Ussuriysk), Khabarovsk, Moscow, and so on. Estimates of the numbers of North Koreans sent to the USSR are hard to draw, but it was mentioned that during August 1947 alone, some three thousand North Koreans were sent for training in the USSR. The USSR also pledged to arm about 50,000 North Korean troops with Soviet weapons by August 1947.72 The use of the developing North Korean army, therefore, was considered a valuable opportunity for the Chinese Communists in the Northeast. As early as March 1947, the Northeast Bureau started to work on agreements with the North Korean leadership for the entire year. According to the ROC Counterintelligence Bureau, on March 1 representatives of the Northeast Bureau and of North Korea convened in Harbin to conclude a cooperation and assistance agreement. The agreement’s clauses were as follows: beginning in March 1948, the NDAA would transfer the 70,000 Korean soldiers then serving in its armies to North Korea; former Korean soldiers and officers of the Japanese Army would be allowed to remain in the Northeast and would be moved to the CPC’s military and political university and to the Peace Preservation Corps for training; and the CPC would send delegations of military and political ad- visors on a regular basis to North Korea in order to assist the North Korean People’s Committee and train the North Korean “Liberation Army” and political cadres.73 This was apparently one of the first agreements between the two sides, and unlike the Pyongyang Office which handled ad hoc tasks, this and subsequent agreements emphasized military and political cooperation between the CPC and North Korea in a broader perspective. The presence of North Korean troops in China’s Northeast became apparent as early as spring 1947. While the Northeast Bureau and the North Korean leadership discussed prospects for mutual assistance and cooperation, North Korea started dispatching more and more units into China’s Northeast. In mid- 1947 Kim Chaek was already in command of a force comprising nearly 30,000 troops.74 According to ROC Military Affairs Bureau estimates, by June 1947 there were as many as 110,000 Korean soldiers in the Northeast (see Fig. 1). They were situated along the Korean border, while many others penetrated further north to the vicinity of Changchun, or even farther to Jiamusi (see Fig. 2).75 ROC intelligence reported that all the Korean units in Northeast China—those of the NDAA, the former “Korean Volunteer Army,” and the “People’s Volunteer Forces” (renmin zhiyuan dui)—had reorganized and were under unified

72 Qingbaosi, June 24, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00011-103; Waijiaobu, May 17, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00377-008; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702- 00044-004. 73 Baomiju, June 22, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-114. 74 Chen Cheng, June 17, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00317-028; Cumings 1990, 359. 75 Junwuju, June 2, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00015-043.

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FIGURE 1 Course of fighting: Soviet and Korean Communist Armies, June 13, 1947 command. The report implied that under the guise of the “People’s Volunteer Forces,” North Korean forces were placed under the command of the NDAA.76

76 Kim Mu-chong, commander of the Korean forces of the NDAA, together with his deputies Pak Il-u and Pak Hyo-sam, moved to North Korea between late 1945 and early 1946, where they were appointed to political positions on behalf of the Yan’an faction. Nonetheless, GMD intelligence reports continued to regard those figures as if they were still command- ing over those units. It is not clear what kind of influence they had on these units after their shift to North Korea. See Baomiju, Jan. 13, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-138. Shi 1998, 310-14, 318-21, 321-24.

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FIGURE 2 Military strength and positions: Korean Communist Army in the Northeast, June 2, 1947

During the course of 1947, North Korea continued mobilizing and training its population and even moved many of its units from the interior of the country (except from the border with South Korea) and relocated them along the border with China.77 In the summer of that year, North Korea dispatched thousands of additional troops to China’s Northeast (see Fig. 3). It was noted that before the arrival of North Korean forces at the border with China, Soviet units

77 Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004.

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FIGURE 3 Movements of the North Korean Army, September 30, 1947 garrisoned along the Yalu River around Sinǔiju had gradually withdrawn, and Korean forces were seen replacing them there and preparing for an upcoming incursion into China. According to Du Yuming’s report from mid-June 1947, more than 30,000 Korean troops had crossed the border to China and were in position in Yanji, where they were undergoing military training.78 In July, more than 8,000 North Korean troops had crossed the border from Sinǔiju to Andong. By the mid- dle of the month more than 10,000 troops armed with Japanese weapons had moved within North Korea, from Anju 安州 and Kanggye 江界 to Manpojin 滿浦鎮, where they were trained by Soviet officers. Later that month another 30,000 unarmed troops moved to Tonghua, where they were apparently training for battle. In early August a unit from a larger force of 30,000 troops moved to Liaonan. At the same time, the Soviet Army ordered the Korean forces in Dalian, Jinzhou, and other places to move to North Korea for additional training.79 ROC intelligence estimated that by late 1947, the Yang Jingyu Detachment (YJD) and the Yi Hong-gwang Detachment (YHD)—which were part of the KVA under the command of Kim Mu-chǒng 金武亭 (1904-1952) and Pak Hyo-sam—were composed of 30,000 soldiers in total. Another major

78 Du Yuming, June 16, 1947, Guoshiguan 002-090300-00165-391. 79 Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004.

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Korean force that had operated in the region of Yanbian, which was supposedly called the “Peace Preservation Army” (Baoan jun), numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 troops under the command of Kang Shintae 姜信泰 (better known as Kang Kǒn 姜健; aka Choi Lim 崔林, 1918-1950).80 If the YJD, the YHD, and the “Peace Preservation Army” can be considered Korean forces originally affiliated with the NDAA, then the total number of Korean troops under the CPC in the Northeast amounted to at least 70,000,81 as estimated by Du Yuming and the ROC Counterintelligence Bureau during the first half of 1947.82 At the same time, evidence of North Korean incursions and positioning along the border by mid-1947 led to an estimated total of as many as 108,000 North Korean troops. This estimate relied on the ROC intelligence surveillance of North Korean encroachments, and since it may not have included some other unknown instances and local recruitment conducted by the North Korean army, the total number could have been even higher. In other intelligence documents regarding the Korean military presence in Northeast China around the same time, there were similar estimates of the total number of troops.83 While some ROC intelligence documents seem exaggerated, others indicate a total of 145,000 Korean troops in Northeast China by late 1947, but without distinguishing between those Korean troops who came from Northeast China and those who came from North Korea. Similarly, Bruce Cumings, who relied on US intelligence documents, indicates the same possible number of 145,000 Korean troops in Northeast China during the civil war, but the distinc- tion between the groups remains unclear.84 According to ROC intelligence, this gigantic force was headed by Commander-in-chief Kim Hyo-san 金曉山, who officially served as Kim

80 Ye Xiufeng, Nov. 11, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00322-065. 81 It is not clear whether smaller Korean divisions and designated units such as artillery, which were affiliated with the NDAA at that time, were included in those estimations. Note that Kang Shintae’s “Peace Preservation Army” in all probability was founded sepa- rately from the NDAA right after the Soviet occupation of Northeast China, and was some- time later merged into the NDAA. 82 Baomiju, June 22, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-114; Du Yuming, Feb. 13, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00015-006. 83 The estimates of the North Korean troops as well as other military units affiliated with the CPC might vary due to a couple of factors. First, the GMD intelligence agents might have conveyed inaccurate numbers. Second, the number of enemy forces in the Northeast Theater might have been overstated by the NRA commanders (as had happened in other theaters of the civil war) in order to emphasize the difficulties they had encountered and demand more resources. 84 Cumings 1990, 363; Hou Sheng, Aug. 24, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-146; Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004.

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Il-sǒng’s deputy commander of the North Korean forces in China’s Northeast, and it stands to reason that it bolstered Kim Il-sǒng’s superior position among the military and political leadership of the North. This force was designated the “Thirteenth Army Group” (Shisan jituan jun). There are indications that this army group received political advice and instructions from the Soviet Army, and many of its officers were North Korean cadres who trained in the USSR. The gradual incursion of the North Korean forces into China’s Northeast was well planned. It seems that the North Korean People’s Committee expressed its concerns over the civil war going on in the Northeast, where about 1.5 to 2 million Koreans lived at the time. Therefore, North Korea sent in troops under the guise of protecting its compatriots from the carnage of civil war. ROC Lieutenant General Zheng Jiemin 鄭介民 (1897-1959) noted that North Korea and the CPC reached an agreement allowing North Korean forces to be garrisoned in the region and assist the CPC in carrying out offensives against the NRA and pinning down its forces around Shenyang and Changchun. North Korea, for its part, demanded that the CPC provide similar assistance in the future, implying that plans to unify the peninsula already existed and that the CPC would establish a Korean People’s Autonomous Region (Chaoxian ren min zizhuqu) for the Korean communities in the Northeast.85 The CPC also encouraged North Korea to recruit young Koreans from that region to serve in its forces in the Northeast.86 These mutual conventions were most likely discussed and agreed upon during the conference of the North Korean People’s Committee of October 1947 in Pyongyang. At this conference the North Korean leadership, notably Kim Il-sǒng, Kim Mu-chǒng, Choi Yong-gǒn 崔庸健 (1900-1976) and Kim Kwa-bong 金科捧, discussed plans for unifying the peninsula following the US military evacuation. Joining them was a member of the Northeast Bureau’s political committee named Lin Feng 林楓 (1906-1977), and together they discussed enhancing cooperation and a military alliance between the two sides. In the same intelligence report it was noted that Lin Biao was urged to make use of the North Korean forces soon. There were worries that they might return to North Korea to prepare for unification before the NDAA was in control of the Northeast, and Lin Biao therefore contacted the Soviet Army in the region and requested that the North Korean forces extend their presence in the Northeast. Due to Lin Biao’s concerns and the Soviet intervention to solve the problem,

85 Zheng Jiemin’s report provides one of the most elaborated ROC intelligence reports on the military developments that took place in North Korea at that time. See Zheng Jiemin, Oct. 9, 1947, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00044-004. 86 Ye Xiufeng, Nov. 11, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00322-065.

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 88 Nisimov the CPC and North Korea reached a compromise: the CPC would designate the entire region between Yanji and Tonghua in the east for the North Korean troops, enabling them to return to North Korea at any time necessary. This way the North Korean forces in the Northeast could remain there until the final Communist triumph in the region, assist the CPC in its fight against the GMD, and retreat if it became necessary.87 After the North Korean People’s Committee’s conference was held in Pyongyang, where prospects for mutual assistance and cooperation were discussed, the two sides’ representatives convened once more in Harbin on November 20 and ultimately concluded the Mutual Assistance Treaty. The Northeast Bureau was represented by Li Lisan 李立三 (1899-1967), Lin Biao, Lin Feng, and Peng Zhen 彭真 (1902-1997). North Korea’s representatives were the deputy chairman of the North Korean People’s Committee, Kim Chaek; the director of the Foreign Bureau of North Korea, Lee Kang-guk 李康國 (1906-?); and the chairman of the Korean Patriotic Fighters Society (Chaoxian aiguo zhanshi xiehui), Kim Chang-man 金昌萬. In this treaty the two parties agreed to increase their political and military cooperation, particularly in the field of intelligence activities and political and military training. North Korea guaranteed that it would continue its supply of weapons and other equipment and assist the CPC in fighting its revolutionary war. Both sides also recognized each other’s legitimacy: the CPC recognized the North Korean People’s Committee as the sole sovereign with the right to rule Korea, while North Korea recognized the legitimacy of the CPC to rule China. The treaty was to take effect in December 1947 for a period of twelve years.88 Through its mobilization and assistance to the Chinese Communists under Soviet guidance, North Korea had succeeded in deploying massive forces in China’s Northeast by late 1947. During that year several agreements were concluded between the CPC and North Korea specifying the role of North Korea in assisting the Chinese Communists, and they started defining the two entities’ political relations and expectations for the future. The Soviet Army, which had pulled out of China’s Northeast more than a year previously, diligently continued training and arming North Korean forces. These forces ultimately facili- tated the military operations of the Communist forces against the NRA in the Northeast up until the final stage of the war in that region. By early 1948 the North Korean military presence in Northeast China amounted to roughly 108,000 troops, not including Korean units affiliated with the CPC. Their presence in the region had significant implications for the

87 Lin Cang, Nov. 14, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00322-064. 88 Baomiju, Jan. 13, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-138.

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CPC’s imminent victory there. First, their presence assisted the NDAA, since their forces had grown significantly, giving the NDAA a numerical advantage over the NRA in the region and allowing the NDAA troops to more easily make preparations and train. Second, the North Korean forces could help the NDAA through joint offensives against the NRA forces in the region and, by eliminat- ing NRA units in the countryside, could contribute to the isolation of NRA forces and their concentration in the cities. Third, their presence along the border allowed the CPC to further utilize North Korea as a logistical rear. At this stage, it was much easier for North Korea to send supplies to Northeast China and treat the wounded Communist soldiers in its hospitals, since the NRA had lost its control and was situated far from the border (see Fig. 3). Following its significant growth and development into a modern and conventional military force, the NDAA89 could prepare for its final offensive against the NRA in the Northeast, which would become known as the Liaoshen Campaign (Liaoshen zhanyi).90 In the spring of 1948, NRA forces had already become concentrated and isolated in the cities of Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou, while smaller units were positioned in Huludao, Shanhaiguan, and Yongji. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek was working on a plan to dispatch massive armies to the Northeast, rescue the isolated and encircled forces in the cities, and reverse the situation.91 By summer 1948 both parties were concentrating their forces and drawing up plans to defeat the other in that theater of war. In late August a work unit of the ROC Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics in Shenyang received a report from a local Japanese intelligence agent named Yamamura Yoshiaki 山村駕昭. According to Yamamura, the CPC in the Northeast was coordinating the participation of the North Korean forces with Soviet authorities in Pyongyang ahead of the September offensive.92 When Lin Biao ordered the Northeast Field Army (NFA, formerly known as the NDAA) to carry out the offensive on September 12, 1948, the bulk of the North Korean forces that had been deployed in Northeast China were still situated there. During the Liaoshen Campaign, the North Korean army in Northeast China was gradually pulled back to North Korea. Although it did not originate in North Korea, the YHD was the first Korean force to leave the Northeast Theater and move to North Korea. However, some 10,000 YHD troops remained

89 In January 1948 the NDAA changed its name to the Northeast People’s Liberation Army (NPLA). Its name was changed again in August 1948, on the eve of the Liaoshen Campaign, to the Northeast Field Army (NFA). See Zhibingtang bianjibu 2016, 25. 90 Tanner 2015, 140-59; Wang and He 2005, 405-8; Westad 2003, 121-28. 91 Du 1991, 19-21, 58-60; Fan 1991, 71-75; Tanner 2015, 114-18. 92 Shenyang Diaocha Tongji shi, Aug. 21, 1948, Guoshuguan, 002-080200-00332-055.

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 90 Nisimov in the Northeast and were later integrated into a local NFA force in Liaodong.93 Two other similar main movements occurred between late 1948 and early 1950: on the eve of (and during the first half of) the Liaoshen Campaign, about 30,000 to 50,000 North Korean troops returned to North Korea, while during February-March 1950 about 40,000 to 50,000 troops returned. Other smaller forces probably made their way back during the interim period.94 These movements back to North Korea indicate the diminishing role of the North Korean military by the final stage of fighting in the Northeast Theater, but even after the initial withdrawals during the Liaoshen Campaign, the North Korean army in the Northeast still amounted to roughly 50,000-80,000 troops, a significant force. By that time, the Chinese Communists had developed huge armies that could overwhelm the NRA and expel them completely from the region and push forward into the civil war in China south of the Wall. Nonetheless, North Korea played a crucial role in assisting the Chinese Communists militarily from 1946 to 1948. Deliberate Soviet intervention in the unstable situation might have worsened the Communist position in Northeast Asia, and this concern had ultimately led the USSR to prudently instruct the developing North Korean leadership and apparatuses on how to establish a powerful military capable of securing its interests in the region and, at the same time, assisting the Chinese Communists. Therefore, once the GMD was wiped out of the Northeast and the prospect of US influence in that region had seriously diminished, the North Korean army could gradually withdraw. Evidence regarding participation of the North Korean army in concrete operations during the Liaoshen Campaign, however, is hard to find for several reasons. The first reason is secrecy: all three allied parties, namely the USSR, the CPC and North Korea, were clandestinely collaborating in order to expel common enemies and rivals and to serve their common interests in the region. Russian/Soviet and PRC archives are not yet ready to reveal documents dealing with such a sensitive issue, and meanwhile some scholars who rely on such sources have ruled out the possibility that a North Korean military intervention in China’s civil war ever took place.95 It should be remembered that the main reason for the clandestine collaboration between these parties was the USSR’s concern over prospects for US military intervention, which led it to camouflage the North Korean army’s operations as much as possible. Another reason is national pride: PRC materials tend to marginalize or conceal this military cooperation during the civil war period almost completely. And lastly, as

93 Hou Sheng, Aug. 24, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-146. 94 Hou Sheng, Aug. 24, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-146; Cumings 1990, 362-363. 95 Kim 2012, 227-28; Shen and Xia 2018, 20.

Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 91 has been shown, since the North Korean forces were well integrated with the Chinese Communist forces in the Northeast, it would have been very difficult to identify them as a separate group. Nonetheless, the North Korean forces remained until the last stage of the campaign and took part in militarily assisting the NFA in several ways, such as intercepting NRA reinforcements, hindering their advances and offensives, and participating in encircling some cities under ROC control (which included at least Shenyang, but probably also Changchun and others). It can also be contended that in and of itself, the presence of the North Korean forces in China’s Northeast contributed greatly to isolating and paralyzing the NRA in 1948, helping the NFA to carry out the Liaoshen Campaign.96 Altogether, North Korean assistance to the CPC comprised valuable logistical support from early 1946, when the CPC was at its most vulnerable stage in the Northeast. Later, from early 1947 until the end of 1948, this assistance was expanded to include military intervention and participation in the civil war itself. Considering that at its peak the North Korean army in Northeast China was composed of 108,000 soldiers who were, on the whole, well-trained and armed, this was a significant force that contributed greatly to the Chinese Communists’ success in consolidating and defeating the NRA in the Northeast.

5 Conclusion

This article has focused on Soviet strategy and actions aimed at protecting the USSR’s interests in Northeast China during China’s civil war from 1945 to 1948. It highlights Soviet concerns over the possible increase in US presence there following the Soviet Army’s withdrawal and the NRA’s entry into the region. I contend that after its military withdrawal from the Northeast, the USSR worked on plans to exploit North Korean material and human resources in order to protect its interests in Northeast China, thereby continuing to assist the CPC via North Korea, which was under de facto Soviet military control at the time. The Soviet assistance to the CPC during the Chinese civil war has often been portrayed as elusive and ambiguous, serving Soviet interests first and foremost, while still keeping all options on the table and maintaining relations with the ROC government. To a large extent these notions are correct: the USSR’s interests were its top priority, and it did maintain relations with the ROC government owing to the belief that the GMD would remain the leading party in

96 Dai Pu, Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1957, Guoshiguan, 008-010702-00037-001.

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China in the post-World War II period and because it did not wish to provoke US military might. But as indicated in this article, by the time the Soviet Army withdrew, the USSR had reversed its policy. When it appeared that its interests were not guaranteed but even endangered by potential US influence in the region, the USSR formulated a plan to mobilize and militarize North Korea in order to help ensure the ROC would not retain control of the Northeast, and in so doing they would stave off an increase in US influence in the region. With its army out of the Northeast, the USSR could ensure neither its economic interests in Dalian and Lüshun through military intervention nor the strategic balance it had wished to create in Northeast Asia; otherwise, it would have risked a confrontation with the US. The USSR therefore resolved to assist the CPC which, in the spring of 1946, was relatively weak, and decided to enlist North Korea for that purpose. The Soviet authorities in Pyongyang led the political and military apparatuses of the embryonic state in assisting and cooperating with their Chinese comrades in various ways: initially by sending military equipment and grain and utilizing North Korea’s territories and facilities as a logistical rear and a place for treating the wounded; and later by dispatching tens of thousands of soldiers who had been trained and often armed by the Soviet Army. Altogether, the Soviet-led North Korean assistance proved the USSR’s determination to make the Chinese Communists’ revolutionary war succeed from the early stages of China’s civil war. Soviet-led North Korean assistance was an additional dimension of Soviet assistance to the CPC following the USSR’s withdrawal from the region, and it eclipses former notions of Soviet post-withdrawal assistance to the CPC report- edly being limited to trade treaties or weapons shipments.97 In fact, the presence of North Korean forces in China’s Northeast was much more beneficial to the USSR, since it avoided using its own forces and thus prevented potentially larger confrontations, military casualties, and expenditures. This was possible because the North Korean forces operated more freely than the Soviet Army could. North Korean assistance and participation in China’s civil war was significant not only in and of itself, but also because the USSR succeeded in consolidating these two neighboring forces to fight in what would eventually be seen as the opening round of the Cold War. In other words, Soviet assistance was not arbitrary; it was careful and well- calculated, direct and indirect. Above all, it proved successful. North Korean assistance and participation contributed greatly to the consolidation and military reinforcement of the CPC in the Northeast. On the other hand, this is not to understate other political and military changes that the CPC underwent during

97 Levine 1987, 175; Tanner 2015, 138-39, 142-45.

Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 93 the war. The triumph of the Liaoshen Campaign in November 1948 marked the protection of the USSR’s economic and strategic interests in the region, and also its ability to rely on its new neighboring allies, which may be indicated by the final Soviet withdrawal from North Korea in December 1948. The Liaoshen Campaign was undoubtedly a major cornerstone in the Chinese Communist struggle for victory over the GMD, realized a year later in late 1949. The establishment of the PRC and the existence of the highly militarized state of North Korea alleviated Soviet concerns over US influence in the region and in China particularly, and probably even exceeded their strategic desires and expectations. Finally, the Soviets’ pairing and encouragement of the CPC and North Korea during China’s civil war paved the way for the two parties’ cooperation during the Korean War, which ended catastrophically and with undesirable outcomes for the initiators, in contrast with the Northeast Theater.

Acknowledgements

The research leading to the results reported here received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Sev- enth Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement Num- ber 340124: “Judging Histories. Experience, Judgement, and Representation of World War II in an Age of Globalization”: Principal Investigator: Prof. Dan Diner.

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