The Role of North Korea in China's Civil War: the Soviet-Led North

Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97 brill.com/jcmh The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War: The Soviet-led North Korean Assistance to the CPC in the Northeast Theater, 1946-1948 Tomer Nisimov The Hebrew University of Jerusalem [email protected] Abstract Previous studies of China’s civil war have concentrated on different aspects and causes leading to the Communist victory and focused on political, economic, and military explanations. Few studies, however, have examined the features of foreign intervention and assistance to the Communist Party of China and their contribution to the latter’s success. Sino-Soviet relations and cooperation during the war have received the attention of several studies, but the role of North Korea in the war has remained obscure. As information regarding North Korea’s actions during China’s civil war re- mains largely inaccessible, few studies have debated the question of whether North Korea had ever deployed its forces in China’s Northeast in order to assist their Chinese comrades. Relying on military and intelligence documents from the Republic of China, this article shows how by the time of the Soviet withdrawal from China’s Northeast, the USSR had become resolute about turning North Korea into a militarized state in order to protect its own interests in the region and assist the Chinese Communists. Keywords Chinese Civil War ‒ Cold War ‒ Kim Il-sǒng ‒ Northeast China ‒ North Korea ‒ Soviet Union 1 Introduction The struggle over Northeast China (formerly known as Manchuria) came to an end in November 1948 with a Communist victory. Within roughly a year, © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/22127453-bja10002Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 66 Nisimov the Communist Party of China (CPC) had succeeded in terminating civil war on the mainland. For both the CPC and the Guomindang (GMD), the struggle over Northeast China was of great significance due to the region’s industrial and agricultural power. The two parties expended prodigious efforts in order to gain control over the vast region and to prevent the other side’s consolidation of power there. In spite of the GMD’s initial military and numerical advantage, the CPC succeeded in thwarting its rival’s offensives, ultimately to fight back and defeat the GMD forces. Scholars who discuss the reasons for this remark- able success focus on several factors that helped the CPC. First, the CPC swiftly entered the region following Japan’s defeat and took over administrative posi- tions in large and small cities. Second, it simultaneously gained control over the arsenals of the Japanese and their puppet Manchukuo armies.1 Third, land reform and propaganda efforts generated massive support for the CPC, which improved its access to the region’s material and human resources.2 Fourth, the CPC forces in Northeast China under Lin Biao 林彪 (1907-1971) were success- fully transformed from guerilla units into a conventional army throughout the campaign.3 Last but not least, the CPC forces benefitted from overt and clan- destine support from the Soviet Army during its occupation of the Northeast.4 Previous studies have analyzed the relations between the USSR and the CPC during the civil war in Northeast China and depicted the ways the Soviet Army assisted and cooperated with CPC forces. The Soviet Army had, for instance, assisted the CPC forces to enter Northeast China by coordinating joint attacks on Japanese and other puppet forces near Shanhaiguan Pass and other locations during the time of the Soviet occupation. On other occasions, the Soviet Army had supplied the CPC forces with weapons, ammunition, and equipment from the former arsenals of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Moreover, the CPC’s advance into and scattering in the Northeast was significantly facili- tated thanks to the Soviet Army, which had notified the CPC forces in advance regarding their withdrawal from certain locations, and even assisted them with fixing the railways and other logistical undertakings.5 The different aspects of assistance analyzed hitherto have overwhelm- ingly focused on the period of Soviet occupation of China’s Northeast, from August 1945 to May 1946. The period following the Soviet withdrawal from the region has not received much attention, with the exception of references to 1 Tanner 2013, 44-58; Westad 2003, 21-32. 2 Levine 1987, 87-121; Pepper 1999, 199-228, 229-330; Tanner 2015, 134-37. 3 Tanner 2015, 140-59; Westad 2003, 121-28. 4 Heinzig 2004, 90-97; Niu 1998, 53-57, 57-61; Wang and He 2005, 313-21, 324-29. 5 Heinzig 2004, 77-82; Tanner 2015, 142-45, 175-80; Wang and He 2005, 290-95, 313-21. Journal of Chinese MilitaryDownloaded History from 9 Brill.com09/29/2021 (2020) 65-97 04:44:04AM via free access The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War 67 trade treaties between the two sides and shipments of goods and weapons.6 Only a very few studies have ever mentioned intervention or participation of any sort in the civil war by Korean elements within China’s Northeast or from North Korea.7 In this article, I focus on the role of North Korea in assisting the Chinese Communists in the civil war in the Northeast, and how it became possible for this smaller state, under the guidance of the USSR, to intervene in the conflict. I show how following the Soviet withdrawal from Northeast China in mid-1946, and due to the escalation of tensions between the USSR and the USA, North Korea became a major conduit for directed Soviet assistance and an active participant by committing its forces and resources to the conflict in China. Thus, this article unfolds another dimension of the Chinese Communists’ success in the Northeast and sheds new light on relations between the USSR, the CPC, and North Korea. Finally, I contend that by exploiting North Korea’s resources, the USSR succeeded in ensuring its interests while simultaneously continuing to assist the CPC, even in the two years following its withdrawal from Northeast China in May 1946. 2 From Liberation to War: the Beginning of the Struggle over Northeast China The defeat of Japan in August 1945 and the end of World War II early the next month permitted renewal of the old rivalry between the GMD and the CPC. By the time the war concluded, the ROC government was situated in the south- west, and the CPC in North China. Thus, as of August 1945 none of these parties had a presence in Northeast China, which was conquered by the Soviet Army. 6 Tanner 2015, 138-39; Westad 2003, 166-68. 7 The issue of Korean participation and intervention during China’s civil war in the Northeast has been referred to only briefly in previous studies, usually mentioning North Korea’s assistance in the form of supplying goods or referring to Korean units within the Chinese Communist forces in the Northeast. Tanner, for example, mentions that the Chinese Communists used North Korea as a military rear and received logistical support. Minnich indicates in his book that on one occasion, North Korea had dispatched about 30,000 troops to Northeast China during 1947. Minnich also mentions some Korean military units that op- erated under the CPC forces in the Northeast, such as the Yi Hong-gwang Detachment (YHD) and the 166th, 164th, and 155th Divisions. Relying on US intelligence documents, Cumings managed to draw a relatively broader picture of the North Korean military assistance to the CPC in the Northeast, showing a wider spectrum of military intervention, including estimated numbers of troops dispatched by North Korea and estimated dates for their dispatch and withdrawal. See Cumings 1990, 358-63; Minnich 2005, 33-37; Tanner 2015, 64-67. Journal of Chinese Military History 9 (2020) 65-97Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:44:04AM via free access 68 Nisimov In pre-modern times, Northeast China played an insignificant role in the Chinese economy. In the late nineteenth century, however, it went through a process of industrialization and transportation development, and at the same time its agricultural sectors also developed. These changes occurred due to competition between foreign elements in the region (namely the Russian and Japanese empires), with Japan quickly becoming the dominant influen- tial power in the region.8 From 1932 to 1945 Northeast China, then known as Manchukuo 滿洲國, was a puppet state under Japanese control. As a result, after roughly five decades of intense development, by the end of World War II Northeast China, already well known for its raw materials, had become a highly industrialized territory with an extensive railway system and developed agriculture.9 With the capitulation of the Manchukuo and the Japanese military, the GMD and CPC competed for control over Northeast China. Both parties dispatched numerous political teams and military units to the region. In spite of its ini- tially weaker position, the CPC, due to its relative proximity to the Northeast, enjoyed the advantage of deploying its cadres and military units before the GMD. Moreover, the CPC received essential assistance from the Soviet Army and the Korean Communists in consolidating its control.10 On August 11 and 12, 1945, Zhu De 朱德 (1886-1976)—commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, issued “Seven Orders” outlining to the Communist forces in North and East China the tasks necessary for improving their readi- ness in the upcoming struggle against the GMD.11 In this first dispatch of Communist forces to the Northeast, there were about 10,000 troops, more than half of whom were former soldiers of Zhang Xueliang 張學良 (1901-2001), the former warlord of Northeast China.

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