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As a Potential Privacy Violation Digital Privacy at the U.S. Border PROTECTING THE DATA ON YOUR DEVICES Sophia Cope, Staff Attorney Amul Kalia, Analyst Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Technologist Adam Schwartz, Senior Staff Attorney DECEMBER 2017 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION EFF.ORG 1 Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................................1 Digital Privacy at the U.S. Border.............................................................................................1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................... PART 1: DIGITA# PRIVACY GUIDE F%R TRAVE#ERS...............................................& 'hat i( the Border)..............................................................................................................& Ri(* A((es(+ent Factor(.......................................................................................................& $actor( a-o.t Yo...............................................................................................................................& $actor( A-o.t Yo.r Data a,d Device(............................................................................................10 Before Yo. Arrive at the Border..........................................................................................11 Tal* to Yo.r Em1loyer....................................................................................................................11 Mi,i+i2e the Data 3at Yo. Carry Acro(( the Border..................................................................12 Protect 'hat Yo. Carry %ver the Border.................................................................................14 Social Media a,d %,li,e Acco.,ts................................................................................................17 'he, Yo. Are at the Border...............................................................................................18 'hat to Ex1ect...............................................................................................................................18 Ba(ic R.le( for Everyo,e.................................................................................................................19 Try to Avoid I+1licit “Co,(e,t:.....................................................................................................19 'hat Co.ld ;a11e, 'he, Yo. Co+1ly 'ith a, %rder)...........................................................4/ If Yo. Co+1ly 'ith a, %rder< Sho.ld Yo. State 3at It I( U,der Prote(t?.................................4/ 'hat Co.ld ;a11e, if Yo. Re0.(e to Co+1ly 'ith a, %rder)...................................................4/ Sho.ld Yo. Atte+1t to Per(.ade the Age,ts to 'ithdra= 3eir %rder)......................................21 A0ter Yo. Leave the Border.................................................................................................21 Ma*e a Record of 'hat ;a11e,ed................................................................................................21 Cha,ge Yo.r Pa((=ord( a,d #ogi, Crede,tial(.............................................................................44 "over,+e,t %>ce( 3at May ;el1 Yo........................................................................................44 PART 2: C%?STITUTI%?A# RI";TS< GOVER?ME?T P%#ICIES< A?D PRIVACY AT T;E B%RDER.............................................................................................4@ 3e Law o0 Border Searches and Sei2.res...........................................................................4@ 3e $o.rth A+e,d+e,t at the Border! Digital Privacy.................................................................45 3e Defa.lt Co,(titutio,al Privacy R.le...................................................................................45 3e Border Search Exce1tio,.....................................................................................................45 3e Exce1tio, to the Exce1tio,! 9?o,ARo.ti,e: Searche(........................................................4 Border Searche( of Digital Device(............................................................................................4 I,terior Chec*1oi,ts..................................................................................................................46 3e $ir(t A+e,d+e,t at the Border! $reedo+ to Privately S1ea*< A((ociate< AcB.ire I,for+atio,< a,d "ather ?e=(.......................................................................................................46 3e $i0th A+e,d+e,t at the Border! $reedo+ $ro+ Sel0AI,cri+i,atio,.....................................@/ ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION EFF.ORG 2 Pa((=ord(....................................................................................................................................@/ $i,ger1ri,ts................................................................................................................................31 3e $ir(t, $i0th, a,d $o.rtee,th A+e,d+e,t I,ter(ectio, at the Border! $reedo+ $ro+ Di(cri+i,atio,.................................................................................................................................@4 Co,(e,t: 'aivi,g Co,(titutio,al Rights at the Border..................................................................@@ 'hat If Yo. Are ?ot a U.S. Citi2e,).............................................................................................@@ $ederal Policies and Practices o, Digital Searches..............................................................@5 $ederal Age,cie( 3at %ver(ee the Border.....................................................................................@5 Device Search Policie(.....................................................................................................................@ Search.........................................................................................................................................@ Sei2.re........................................................................................................................................@C Searchi,g Social Media a,d %ther Clo.d Co,te,t 'itho.t U(i,g Traveler(D Device(.................@6 PART 3: T;E TEC;?%#%GY O$ PRIVACY PR%TECTI%?....................................@& E,cry1tio,..........................................................................................................................@& U,der(ta,di,g 'ea*er Scree,A#oc* or U(er Acco.,t Pa((=ord(.................................................@& Stro,g $.llADi(* Storage Encry1tio,.............................................................................................5/ Activati,g Encry1tio,.....................................................................................................................41 Choo(i,g a Stro,g Pa((=ord...........................................................................................................41 Do ?ot $orget Yo.r Pa((=ord........................................................................................................54 T.r, %E Yo.r Device......................................................................................................................5@ Sec.re Deletio, and Foren(ic(.............................................................................................5@ So+e 9Deleted: I,for+atio, I( ?ot Really Deleted.......................................................................5@ %vervie= of Sec.re Deletio,..........................................................................................................55 Built-i, $actory Re(et $eature(.......................................................................................................55 'i1i,g ;ard Drive( a,d Re+ova-le Media..................................................................................5 I,divid.al $ile Sec.re Deletio,......................................................................................................5C Cleari,g $ree S1ace.........................................................................................................................5C $la(h Media.....................................................................................................................................5C Encry1tio, a,d Sec.re Deletio,.....................................................................................................56 Clo.d Storage.....................................................................................................................56 3e Role of Clo.d Storage i, a Border Data Protectio, Strategy..................................................56 $ore,(ic(..........................................................................................................................................57 Ri(*( A((ociated =ith Clo.d Storage.............................................................................................57 Per(o,al Clo.d Storage...................................................................................................................57 More Elaborate Data Mi,i+i2atio, Ideas..........................................................................5& C%?C#USI%?..................................................................................................................... / ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION EFF.ORG 3 Authors: So1hia Cope< Seth Schoe,< Ada+ Schwart2 With assistance from: ;.gh D’Andrade< Gennie Gebhart<
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