Conflict Dynamics in Irregular Armed Conflict a Case Study of the Israeli

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Conflict Dynamics in Irregular Armed Conflict

A Case Study of the Israeli Independence War

Vincent R. Nieuwpoort

Student Number: S1201646

Supervisor: dr. Alastair Reed

Second reader: Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker

Date: 13-01-2016

Leiden University Institute of Security and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

This thesis is part of the capstone project: ‘conflict dynamics: understanding the escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflict’ ABSTRACT

Many factors cause and influence the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. Scholars either focused on single factors influencing conflict dynamics, the causes or the de-escalation of the conflict. Additionally, changing popular discourses in conflict studies influenced the way conflict has been researched. In order to identify the factors that could have driven the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict, a holistic analytical framework has been developed. The overall purpose of this project has been to create an extensive framework that can be used to research the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts.

The development of the analytical framework has been done by exploring the literature on conflict. Based on these insights, the framework included fifteen factors that seem to influence the dynamics of conflict: 1) social cleavages; 2) popular support; 3) grievances; 4) local politics; 5) national politics; 6) international politics; 7) natural disasters; 8) state action – coercive force; 9) state action – policy solution; 10) state capacity; 11) strong/weak government; 12) strategy of armed groups; 13) capacity of armed groups; 14) factionalisation; 15) criminalisation.

The framework has been applied to four historical cases, conflicts which experienced periods of escalation and de-escalation. The historical analysis offered in-depth knowledge on the changing dynamics of the following conflicts: the Israeli Independence War (1947-1948), the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Namibian Independence War (1966-1990) and the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009). Information about the cases has been gathered by analysing primary sources and secondary literature, and conducting interviews. To structure the analysis, the conflicts have been divided into distinct phases. In order to gain new insights and improve the analytical framework, a comparative analysis has been performed.

The comparative research offered several new insights. First, regional politics was considered to play a significant role in changing the dynamics in all four cases. Second, geography influenced the dynamics in both the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Therefore, these factors have been added to the analytical framework. Third, the comparative research indicated that the factors influenced the dynamics of the conflicts in different ways. Fourth, the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Still, several factors played a significant role in all four cases, for example, social cleavages, popular support, and regional politics. Fifth, a combination of factors tends to explain the dynamics of the conflict throughout the phases,

2 which indicates that focusing on a single driver or discourse is insufficient. This shows the importance of using a holistic approach.

The research has also revealed several limitations of the analytical framework. First, it must be noted that the analytical framework offers limited insights with regard to the direction of the interaction. Second, a combination of factors might influence the dynamics rather than one factor on its own, for instance, armed groups use grievances, caused by social cleavages, to acquire new recruits. The analytical framework might cause that the researcher focuses too much on individual factors rather than the interaction between them. Third, the exploratory nature of the research does not yet allow to generalise the outcomes. Hence, further research is necessary to improve the quality and applicability of the framework.

Keywords: conflict studies, irregular armed conflict, conflict dynamics, the Israeli Independence War, the Lebanese Civil War, the Namibian Independence War, the Sri Lankan Civil War.

TABLE OF CONTENT

Abstract ...... 2 Table of content ...... 4 1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Literature review ...... 8 2.1. Conflict emergence ...... 9 2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation ...... 15 2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution ...... 25 2.4 Conflict theory ...... 27 2.5 Conceptualisations ...... 32 3. Methodology ...... 42 3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods ...... 42 3.2 Comparative historical analysis ...... 44 3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies ...... 44 3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies ...... 45 3.5 Method of data-gathering...... 46 3.6 Analytical framework ...... 47 3.7 Case selection ...... 58 3.8 The utility of using phases ...... 63 4. The Israeli Independence War ...... 64 4.1 Introduction: ...... 64 4.2 Case Descrition ...... 65 4.2.1 Prologue: ...... 65 4.2.2 Phase 1: No resolution ...... 78 4.2.3 Phase 2: Terror in Palestine ...... 87 4.2.4 Phase 3: Civil War in Palestine ...... 96 4.2.5 Phase 4: The Jewish Offensive ...... 102 4.2.6 Phase 5: Interstate war of 1948 ...... 110 4.2.7 Epilogue: ...... 127 4.3 Analysis: ...... 129 4.4 Conclusion: ...... 139 5. Comparative analysis ...... 142 5.1 Context...... 142 5.2 State ...... 149 5.3 Non-state ...... 153 6. Conclusion ...... 156 6.1 Context...... 156

6.2 State ...... 157 6.3 Non-state ...... 158 6.4 Analytical framework ...... 159 7. Discussion ...... 161 8. Bibliography...... 163 Appendix A ...... 172 The international actors ...... 172 Jewish actors ...... 172 The main Arab actors ...... 175

1. INTRODUCTION

The post-cold war world has been marked by a number of high profile irregular wars, starting with the Balkan wars during the 1990s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s and the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolt’ that began in 2010. The total number of conflicts is high. This research will focus on identifying the factors driving the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts. In other words, what factors drive the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict?

Post-Napoleonic interstate wars receive a lot of research attention from scholars, who research the mechanisms and variations of conflicts, which contributes to developing the academic discipline. Irregular armed conflicts on the contrary, are less studied and draw less attention in the scholarly debate. Notwithstanding, the body of knowledge on irregular armed conflicts is evolving and growing. Most of the research focuses on causes and reasons of conflict. Limited research focuses on the mechanisms that influence de-escalation of the conflict. The least research has been done on the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. This appears to be an under-researched topic.

Irregular armed conflicts are often complex occurrences and scholars attempting to analyse modern day irregular armed conflicts are prone to failure. The academic literature demonstrates a gap of knowledge with regard to a holistic analytical framework. Previous research, focusing on single drivers and their effects, often analysed a small number of cases or even a single case. This research project attempts to contribute to narrowing the knowledge gap in irregular armed conflicts dynamics. New insights of the factors influencing the dynamics of conflict might contribute to more effective policies regarding irregular armed conflicts. Politicians, policymakers and NGO’s might benefit from an improved understanding of the effect of actions and policy. Additionally, the research aims to offer insights to future scholars exploring the subject, and analysts working in the field of irregular armed conflicts.

The central research question is: what causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflicts? The research consists of a comparative historical case study. Four historical cases are selected, researched and analysed, followed by a comparative analysis. The following cases have been selected for reasons that will be explained in a subsequent section: the Israeli independence war, the Lebanese civil war, the Namibian independence war, and the Sri Lankan civil war.

This thesis is structured as follows: first, an extensive literature review is provided, which offers a broad overview of the existing academic literature on conflict studies and, more specifically, on approaches used to research the emergence and termination of conflicts. Subsequently, the methodology chapter discusses, amongst others, the methodological choices, the method of data gathering and the case selection. It will also present the analytical framework that has been developed. This is followed by the case description and analysis of the Israeli independence war. The other individual cases are not included in this document. After this, the main findings of the comparative analysis are presented. The thesis concludes with several comments on the findings of the comparative analysis, and the discussion, in which is reflected upon the limitations of the analytical framework and recommendations for future research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The review of the extensive body of literature on conflicts indicates that the Cold War is a turning point in the history of conflict studies. The occurrence of conventional wars with states fighting states, such as World War II, diminished over time. Simultaneously, another type of conflict characterises the post-Cold War period: unconventional conflicts (also called irregular armed conflicts or civil wars). Despite the fact that civil wars have been the most common type of armed conflict since the 19th and 20th century, experts on conflict studies were focusing mainly on interstate warfare during the Cold War period. In the 1990s, a wave of civil conflicts took place (see figure 1) that, in combination with the end of the Cold War, shifted the focus of conflict studies (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601). Ever since, irregular armed conflicts have increasingly received attention from scholars, which leads to a wide range of literature, theories and conceptualisations. All this research aims to find out what factors cause conflicts and, to a smaller extent, what factors explain their dynamics (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Figure 1. Number and percentage of countries with ongoing civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999 (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 77).

2.1. CONFLICT EMERGENCE

2.1.1. GREED AND GRIEVANCE

The growing number of unconventional conflicts raised an interesting question: what causes these conflicts? The conceptual distinction between greed and grievance instigated probably one of the most influential theoretical debates in conflict studies. Paul Collier analysed statistical data of civil wars since the mid-1960s and concluded in 1999 that the grievance- based explanations of civil war were invalid. He argued that, in order to understand the causes of civil war, the focus should be on greed aspects (Berdal, 2005, p. 687). The greed thesis of Collier defines the circumstances under which greed driven wars are likely to break out, namely: a state that relies on primary commodity exports, in which the unemployment rate is high, and young, poorly educated men are in abundance. If such a state also experiences a period of rapid economic decline, a conflict is likely to break out. However, unconventional conflicts cannot be explained by economic factors only. They interact with grievances of socio-economic and political nature, which triggers the outburst of warfare (Berdal, 2005, p. 691). Grievance can cause a conflict when state actions fuel feelings of grievance among a minority population. For instance, when a minority group experiences a high level of exploitation for a long time, they can be tempted to start a rebellion. The grievances can be political, caused by, for instance, the absence of suffrage, but also economic and social of nature (Collier & Sambanis, 2002, p. 4; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 88).

2.1.2. GREED OR GRIEVANCE

A new perspective on conflict dynamics is given by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, who performed 18 case studies of internal insurgencies. Collier and Hoeffler, like Fearon and Laitin (2003), concluded that there is a significant correlation between a country's dependency on primary commodity export and civil war, and the role of the ethnicity. The findings of Collier and Sambanis suggested that these conclusions needed to be revised. In short, their research indicated that "resource predation might be the result of pure ‘greed’ or only a side product of ‘grievance" (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). This led to a clear, twofold conclusion. First, resource predation is not a correlation but a mechanism. Second, the correlation between the presence of natural resources and civil war is compatible with several alternative mechanisms (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Collier and Sambanis’ other major finding relates to the issue of ethnicity and its role in triggering civil war. In contrast to earlier quantitative studies, which

9 suggested that ethnic fractionation was not important in triggering civil war, several of their case studies led to different results. When ethnicity is operationalised into ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, the former can even contribute to peace by increasing the costs of coordinating rebellion across ethnic lines, whereas the latter can increase the risk of civil war.

Tarrow (2007) explained this contradicting finding by using the work of Collier and Sambanis, and other researchers to define three possible mechanisms: mutual recognition between members of the same and/or different ethnic groups; fear of victimisation or exclusion, especially when ethnic divisions overlap with class cleavages; and civil society segmentation or interaction, where ethnic differences are bridged by instrumental interdependencies among ethnic groups, and their interactions undercut political entrepreneurs’ calls for ethnic mobilisation (2007, p. 595). In addition to resource predation and ethnicity, Collier and Sambanis indicated other possible relevant factors that might complicate the analysis. Examples are neighbourhood and spill-over effects, as a nearby insurgency might spread to countries whose internal indicators did not predict disturbances. Furthermore, civil wars may be part of regional cycles of violence (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Finally, Collier and Sambanis promoted the following hypothesis: "government repression increases opposition and, if repression is incomplete, it can lead to violence" (Collier and Sambanis, 2003, vol. 1, p. 318, referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 595).

2.1.3. WEAK AND FAILED STATES

Fearon and Laitin wrote that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that increase the risk of insurgent wars. They argued that these factors are better predictors of insurgent wars than ethnic or religious diversity, or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination. They concluded that economic growth may only correlate to a limited extent with civil wars, but that the best chance for preventing civil wars is to make sure that the government is well-financed and administratively competent (2003, p. 88).

Rotberg focused on the dynamics of nation-state failure. A state fails due to internal violence and the inability to ensure political goods to the public (2010, p. 10). The government loses its legitimacy, and the public does no longer see the nation state as legitimate. Rotberg distinguished strong from weak states. The capacity of a state is defined by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. Strong states have control over their

10 territories and deliver a variety of high quality political goods to the public, such as the political good of security. In contrary, in weak states the ability to provide an adequate measure of political goods is diminished (Rotberg, 2010, p. 4). Overall, the idea is established that weak states are at risk of transforming into failed or collapsed states, which increases the risks of a civil war.

François and Sud (2006, p. 143) reinforced this idea that fragile states involved in civil wars are at risk of a conflict trap: a civil war causes the collapse of an economy and compromises the state system, which increases the level of conflict. Berdal (2005, p. 697) argued that the appearance of a conflict trap may actually be the evolution of a state. An alternative system of power might occur at a local level that takes over the core functions of government. While the international community perceives the state as fragile, the state is establishing a new social order amidst the chaos.

2.1.4. MOTIVES FOR REBELLION

Two leading scholars on the dynamics of contention in civil wars are Jeremy Weinstein and Stathis Kalyvas. Weinstein’s book Inside Rebellion represents a rational choice institutionalism approach, as it focuses on the organisation of rebellion by analysing the recruitment strategies of insurgency groups. Weinstein argued that recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. To make a distinction, he called highly committed individuals investors, and poorly committed individuals consumers. He argued that individuals make rational choices reflected by deliberate decisions, designed to maximise payoffs (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency based on a horizontal paired comparison between two forms of organisation of insurgency: activism and opportunism. - The first is opportunistic rebellions, where participation involves fewer risks, short-term gains are more likely, and low-commitment participants resemble consumers, whose commitment to the organisation is weak and who expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement (Weinstein 2006, pp. 9-10). The second type is called the activist rebellions. Here, participation is risky, short-term gains are unlikely, and high-commitment participants resemble investors dedicated to the cause of the organisation and willing to make costly investments of time and risk-taking in return for the promise of rewards in the future (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to

11 the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence (Weinstein 2006, p. 7).

2.1.5. CIVIL WAR ORGANISATION

Kalyvas analysed vertical relationships between centres and peripheries within civil wars. That is, relationships between the central ideological/political cleavage at the macro level, and the congeries of local conflicts and violence, which these relationships either trigger or adapt to. Like Weinstein, Kalyvas rejected the idea that people join insurgencies either to satisfy their greed or to right their grievances (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). Instead, he sought to explain civil war organisation by two parallel classical disciplines: a Hobbesian model and a Schmittian model. The Hobbesian model is "stressing an ontology of civil wars characterised by the breakdown of authority" (p. 376) in which violence is privatised. The Schmittian model "entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and beliefs", which "stresses the fundamentally political nature of civil wars and its attendant processes" (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). As Tarrow (2007) pointed out, Kalyvas found elements both from the Hobbesian and the Schmittian model in the civil wars he studied. His major finding indicates that the peculiar dynamic and the extreme brutality of civil war cannot be explained from either one of these models alone. As Tarrow summarised, Kalyvas saw violence as a process linking core and peripheral actors, which are connected by alliances, despite their differences in motives and ideologies.

Perhaps a more general comment with regard to the methodological discussion that both Weinstein and Kalyvas made, is that there is a wide variety of motives that drives participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592). This reaches beyond the ‘greed and grievances’ approach, and their detection requires a rich combination of methods.

2.1.6. SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

Social cleavages derive, for instance, from religious, ethno-linguistic, centre-periphery, and urban-rural differences. Every society has a cleavage structure. If the cleavage is not accommodated by responsive policies of the government, the divisions can lead to civil war or other types of severe conflict (Eagles & Johnston, 2008, p. 219). Rotberg (2010, p. 5) argued that most civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The presence of social cleavages within a society creates horizontal inequality, which leads to resentment or demands for equity. The lack of inclusiveness makes the costs of

12 insurgency acceptable, increasing the probability of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002, p. 29) confirmed that divided societies are more prone to social-ethnic conflict. Disputes among religiously divided societies are particularly difficult to mediate, raising the probability of conflict. Religious differences, more than other social cleavages, can generate violence due to the exclusivity of religion (2002, p. 32). A person can only have one religion, whereas a person can speak multiple languages. Østby (2008, p. 144) argued that if the group aspect of inequality is considered, it can be observed that inequalities between ethnic or religious cleavages enhance both grievances and group cohesion, thereby facilitating the breeding ground for conflict. These systematic inequalities between societal groups reflect socio- economic polarisation, and can be defined as horizontal inequalities. He argued that horizontal inequalities increase the potential for a violent conflict (2008, p. 155).

In recent years, studies of civil war seem to have concluded that inequality created by social cleavages is not increasing the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other factors than ethnic or religious divisions are mentioned to explain the causes of civil war, such as economic variables, political systems, and geographical conditions that favour insurgency.

2.1.7. CONTAGION

According to Forsberg (2009, p. 9), contagion effects in internal armed conflicts can be defined as a process whereby an internal conflict in one country affects the likelihood of a new internal armed conflict erupting in a neighbouring state at a later point in time. Historical and recent examples clearly demonstrate that intra-state armed conflicts are often connected to each other. Among the many examples are the civil wars fought in West Africa. Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. This finding, often referred to as the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, is considered empirically robust. In fact, it has been shown to be one of the most important predictors of civil war. Forsberg argued that this validates a growing consensus: one cannot focus exclusively on the domestic attributes of countries to explain civil wars. Identifying events and factors external to the countries experiencing civil war may be just as important (2009, p. 13). Forsberg focused in her study on when, how, why, and where conflicts generate contagion effects. Her analysis suggested that, given an on-going ethnic conflict among a set of neighbouring countries, those that share members of the groups involved in conflict are

13 more likely to be targets than those lacking such bonds (the effect of transnational ethnic kinship linkages) (2009, p. 31). Furthermore, concerning an on-going internal conflict (ethnic or non-ethnic), the variation in refugee flows to the neighbouring countries influences the probability of being a target of contagion effects. In addition, countries that are ethnically polarised, in the sense that there are a few equally (or roughly equally) strong contenders, are more likely targets of contagion effects. Finally, there was no support for the claims that concessions granted to rebel groups inspire other groups to rebel (2009, p. 32). Her other findings suggest that contagion is not limited to direct spill-over from conflict areas, but may be the result of inspiration and conflict by example. It may even indicate that the latter type of contagion process is more salient (2009, p. 33).

Kathman (2010) reflected upon the question of civil war contagion from a third-party intervention point of view. He stated that civil wars have a tendency to be geographically contagious. In other words, neighbouring third parties face the threat of being infected by another civil war’s hostilities (p. 990). According to Kathman, the main finding in his study of conflict processes is that violence tends to diffuse geographically. Research on the diffusion of inter-state war is well established. War is not randomly distributed across space. Instead, conflict tends to infect those states with links to the original belligerents. These links may include shared borders, a military alliance, or an adversarial relationship, leading wars to attract more participants. Therefore, civil wars exhibit a distinct interstate dimension, as the ramifications of civil conflicts are rarely confined to the original war state (p. 992). Kathman pointed out that more recent work has revealed a number of causal factors for the geographic diffusion of civil conflicts. Unrest tends to follow the flow of refugees. Cross-border ethnic ties also create opportunities for wars to spread. The territorial aspirations of rebel groups are also relevant, as secession breeds similar violence in contiguous territories, civil war creates demonstration effects for potential rebel groups in nearby countries, and civil war causes regional economic recessions. This can make rebel ideologies more appealing to recruits in neighbouring states (p. 992).

2.1.8. GEOGRAPHY

In three of the case studies in this research, geography appeared to be an important factor influencing conflict dynamics. Fearon and Laitin (2003) identified several factors leading to internal conflict in countries since 1945. They argued that ethnic or religious differences do not lead to conflict. Instead, they argued that the existence of conditions that enable rural

14 insurgency cause the onset of a conflict. These include poverty (1) political instability (2) and geography (3). Geography, mountainous and rough territory in particular, is highly related to the onset of a conflict. The countries with mountainous or rough terrain had a higher probability (a doubled risk) of civil war onset than countries with flat terrain.

With geography Fearon and Laiton (2003) referred to mountainous and rough terrain, in which insurgents can take refuge. In most cases, the insurgents are numerically weak in comparison to the state's security forces. Meaning, they need to be able to hide from the security forces and gain public support for their strife. Swamps and jungles, poorly served by roads, can be considered rough terrain that can be favourable to insurgents. Other aspects that might influence the conflict are the population distributions or food availability in mountainous areas. Do and Lyer (2010) reached a similar conclusion: geography is a predictor of conflict, since it influences the ability of the state to control insurgencies and the ease with which insurgents can start mobilising. Additionally, they argued that geography causes the intensity of the conflict to escalate after it has started, as the insurgency is able to persist. In this way, geography influences the persistence of rural insurgency.

2.2. CHANGES IN CONFLICT DYNAMICS: ESCALATION AND DE- ESCALATION

As the previous chapter shows, many scholars are focusing on the causes of irregular warfare. However, the study of conflict dynamics is emerging. The extensive amount of research on the causes of irregular wars has led to the assumption that both greed and grievance can cause conflict. Some presume that by applying these theories to the dynamics of warfare, the clarification of the continuation of violence can be explained. This seems to be too optimistic. Most of the insights on escalation of civil wars are derived from Cold War research. Increasingly, research has focused on the factors that could explain escalation and de- escalation in irregular warfare (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601-603). The next chapter will explicate theories on factors that might influence conflict dynamics.

2.2.1. SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

Toft choose the factors ethnicity, nationalism, secession and self-determination to explain the onset of violence, how violence affects the dynamics of the conflict, and how violence ends (2012, p. 582). She concluded that groups that live in a self-claimed ethnic homeland and

15 constitute the majority of the population are most apt to make ambitious claims about secession. If their claims are not accepted, they are most likely to use violence. Additionally, she also looked at the ending of conflicts. On this point, she concluded that in the case of secession wars, a negotiated settlement will only stop the conflict if the agreement includes a credible threat of harm, should one of the parties infringe the settlement. Additionally, there should be credible guarantees of economic, diplomatic, and administrative support for the parties to keep their word. Toft concluded with the statement that these inclusive settlements are the only way to stop the violence and to prevent violence from coming back. The settlements should include these conditions in order to de-escalate the conflict (2012, p. 594- 595).

2.2.2. WARTIME POLITICAL ORDER

Staniland (2012) argued that "bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence" (p. 243). According to Staniland, wartime political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. Orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty, to spheres of influence and tacit coexistence, to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder (2012, p. 243). Staniland continued that state and non-state actors both have cooperative and conflictual relationships that create dramatic variation in who rules, and how, in war. In turn, these wartime political orders shape patterns of violence against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war politics (2012, p. 243).

Staniland (2012) constructed a conceptual typology of six distinct wartime political orders (i.e. relationship between an armed group and a state): 1) active cooperation / shared sovereignty: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organisation retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability. Violence between the forces is minimised and institutionalised mechanisms for achieving joint goals are devised, even without monopoly of violence); 2) active cooperation / collusion: a situation in which the state actively cooperates with non-state armed actors that are geographically intermeshed with its areas of operation. The violence that accompanies these orders will be different than a purely adversarial clash of wills. It is coordinated to target mutual enemies and reflect the political bargains made between the relevant actors; 3) passive cooperation / spheres of influence: segmented areas of control in which the state and its armed group agree to limit the boundary violations across

16 each sphere. Ceasefire, informal truces, and agreements about where and when state and insurgent forces will tread are intended to manage spirals of escalation; 4) passive cooperation / tacit coexistence: involves the interweaving of state and non-state violent organisations in the context of fragmented, overlapping control. This order involves careful attempts to limit the degree of active conflict and violence between states and non-state armed groups in intermixed daily life. Violence follows the implicit rules of engagement about what is and is not acceptable to each side; 5) No cooperation / clashing monopolies: order characterised by violent competition between the state and an armed actor that each control a distinct territory. Politics shape war aims, but this contest is a primarily military struggle with an emphasis on logistics, manpower, and arms; 6) No cooperation / guerrilla disorder: situation of fluid violence in which there are few clear norms or rules about the infliction of lethal violence when insurgent and state forces are intertwined in the same physical spaces. Violence is an embedded part of political, economic, and social life, lacking clear or institutionalised rules for the management of lethality (2012, p. 248-253). Staniland concluded that the distribution of control and level of cooperation between states and non- state armed groups vary considerably, creating different forms of wartime order (2012, p. 255).

Mukherjee (2014) examined why the longest insurgencies are usually characterised by low violence. By analysing several insurgencies based on minority ethnic groups aspirations, Myron Weiner found that in the medium capacity states, given resource constrains, the political leaders of the state prefer to ‘live with’ an insurgency that is less threatening, rather than forcibly suppress it. This causes some of these conflicts to have both long duration and low severity (p. 173). Mukherjee elaborated that those insurgencies that occur in peripheral regions of the country and fight for these aspirations, are the ones for which their medium capacity states follow a policy of containment, resulting in a low-level equilibrium of persistence violence (2014, p. 173). In turn, while the rebels do not really quit the fight, they keep their level of violence below a threshold level and thus help maintain a low-level equilibrium of violence (2014, p. 184).

2.2.3. WAR ECONOMIES

The greed and grievance debate of the 1990s is built upon by, amongst others, Malone and Nitzschke (2005). They performed an in-depth analysis of the economic framework of irregular armed conflicts, and analysed the ‘war economies’, as they referred to it, and their links with international actors. While Colliers' ‘greed thesis’ is partially supported, Malone and Nitzschke (2005) argued that the correlation in the data is not a direct one, as bad governance is a common explaining factor. While greed might not be directly related to the onset of conflict, the analysis of Malone and Nitzschke (2005) showed that there is a big influence on conflict dynamics. These influences are direct, since, for instance, a grievance based conflict might transform and becomes difficult to terminate for economic reasons. This transformation also changes the dynamics of actors. If large amounts of revenue are easily accessed and claimed, this might result in factionalisation and spread of interests, increasing Stedman’s (1997) spoiler issues. An important policy implication is that, in order to create peace, it needs to be more profitable than war. Relating to this is 'military fiscalism', which implies that there is a functional relationship between increasing military expenditure and economic growth. Emile Benoit was one of the scholars that found this correlation in developing countries (1978). This situation can influence conflict dynamics, for instance, when military employment creates more stable socio-political conditions and it becomes beneficial for the state to prolong the war.

2.2.4. PUBLIC SUPPORT

In her book, Elisabeth Wood (2003) analysed El Salvador’s civil war by applying a wide range of methods from historical ethnography, supported by comparative analysis, to the micro level study. She focused on how collective action on a local level sustained in the face of state violence. Her analysis suggested that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately (Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). However, her analysis also revealed that no standard economic or social measures can predict which areas will support the guerrillas, and which will either remain neutral or support the government (Wood, 2003, p. 17-18, referred by Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). Wood explained this by arguing that "an emergent insurgent political culture was key to generating and sustaining the insurgency despite its high costs" (Wood 2003, p. 225, as referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 593). Meaning, people who joined the

18 insurgency had a shared view or idea of justification and were willing to give the ultimate sacrifice.

2.2.5. STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

Bapat (2012) started his work with the following question: "why do some states engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals?" (2012, p. 1). This might give militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but also may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups to a level that sponsors cannot control anymore. To answer this dilemma, Bapat applied a game theoretical model of state sponsorship. He argued that state sponsorship represents a form of costly signalling that is useful in coercive bargaining, as sponsorship increases the difficulty a target government will have in repressing the militants. This added difficulty can create a situation in which the government prefers making some policy concessions if the sponsor agrees to cease the militants’ attacks. However, with their new-found power, state-sponsored militants may be less willing to negotiate, and may punish the sponsor for making deals they believe are unacceptable. The increased risk of militant punishment can provide sponsors with substantial bargaining power (2012, p. 1).

The theoretical model argues that state sponsorship serves to signal the tying of hands in bargaining with rival governments in two possible ways. First, sponsorship decreases the probability of a militant group being repressed, thereby increasing the probability that the group will be effective in accomplishing the sponsor’s policy objective. This enables the sponsor to demand more in negotiation by improving the sponsor’s value for the outside option associated with bargaining failure. Secondly, sponsorship gives the militants the power to punish the sponsor if it negotiates an unfavourable deal, enabling the sponsor forces to demand considerable concessions from the target government in exchange for abandoning the militants. (2012, p. 26). Bapat concludes by stating that, while the previous literature supports the major power prediction, the empirical test in this study provides evidence that sponsorship is more likely to occur if the potential sponsor is moderately weak (2012, p. 27).

According to Byman (2007), there are many different reasons why states support terrorists. Starting from a historical context, he referred to an observation made by Boaz Ganor. Until the mid-1990s, international terrorism was generally considered to be state-sponsored, as two competing super-power blocs, USSR and USA, fought the cold war by supporting terrorist groups ´belonging´ to their ideological camp. These organisations were perceived as proxies, an inexpensive tool to promote the superpower´s interests around the world and in conflict

19 areas in particular. For other states, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, terrorism was considered a low-risk tool that could achieve various goals inexpensively in both the international and regional arenas (Byman, 2007, p. 87). Byman argued that among the reasons why states support terrorists, is that terrorists offer alternative means for states to influence their neighbours, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter U.S. hegemony, or achieve other aims of the state. Support for terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities, and it allows states to influence events far beyond their borders. Supporting terrorists can also serve a broader range of regime objectives from domestic to ideological (2007, p. 88).

Byman emphasised the need to make a distinction between different levels of state involvement in terrorism. He offers six categories of state support to terrorism: 1) strong supporters, 2) weak supporters, 3) lukewarm supporters, 4) antagonistic supporters, 5) passive supporters, and 6) unwilling hosts, each of them having its unique set of interaction dynamics. However, this co-operation might have negative consequences for the proxy organisations. They may find that they pay a high price for the support that they receive from a state, while losing their credibility, if it is perceived as being controlled by a foreign power. Furthermore, Byman concluded that a state’s influence sometimes leads a terrorist group to moderate its activities or become more pragmatic (2007, p. 88).

2.2.6. TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS

The decline of state sponsored terrorism led many scholars to believe that terrorists and transnational criminal organisations will engage in strategic partnerships. Dishman (2001, p. 43-56) reflects on the probability of cooperation between terrorist groups and transnational criminal organisation. He argued that the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation takes place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). Some terrorists might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to understand these transformations, Dishman looked into their aims and interests, and made the observation that terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). The conclusion is made that the two groups will not intensively cooperate with each other due to their different aims and interests. The terrorist group is searching for a revolution or an independent territory, while the transnational criminal organisation aims to benefit from illegal activities. Therefore, terrorist groups do not want to engage in activities that portray them as criminal, and transnational criminal organisations do

20 not seek unwanted attention and pressure of the government (2001, p. 50). Thus, the groups are more likely to use their so-called 'in-house' capacities to undertake criminal or political acts.

2.2.7. COUNTERINSURGENCY

As Gventer (2014) pointed out, Douglas Porch’s book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war (2013), comprises a strong case study in the perils of using historical analogies to derive recipes for today’s problems: a practice embraced by too many counterinsurgency converts during and after the Iraq Surge (Gventer, 2014, p. 250). Porch argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim (Gventer, 2014, p. 249). Even in Iraq, studies revealed that the upward spiral of violence had coarsened attitudes among US troops toward Iraqi civilians whom many saw as complicit with the insurgency (Porch, 2013, p. 299). Gventer pointed out that the stated purpose of the Iraq Surge and the alleged implementation of COIN techniques was to give ‘breathing space’ to the country’s warring factions so that they could reach a peaceful, political settlement. Instead, it seems to have facilitated a consolidation of power by the country’s leading Shia factions and their Iranian patrons. Meanwhile, true ‘reconciliation’ remains out of reach as the country’s internal conflicts simmer away (Gventer 2014, p. 250).

Solomon (2015), proponent of critical terrorism studies, argued that success (in using traditional counterinsurgency campaigns) in a traditional realist sense is far from assured. Traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter-productive, since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity, which is giving rise to radical Islamist movements. Therefore, traditional counterterrorism would only serve to perpetuate conflicts in these countries further, as is the case with, for example, the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency campaign against Islamist sect Boko Haram. Despite the enactment of an anti-terrorism bill, the closure of border, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of 30,000 security guards, the carnage in Nigeria continues (p. 219-220). Solomon aptly noted that the traditional counterterrorism perspective is short-sighted at best, as it has not served to ameliorate the terrorist threat in Africa (2015, p. 230).

In Nigeria, not only has the Nigerian state been unable to resolve Boko Haram’s challenge military, but its own counterterrorism violence has also rendered even more illegitimate in the eyes of northern Nigerians (2015, p. 231). Solomon argued that states are using the terrorist label to maintain the status quo and attract foreign support. This form of ‘othering’ allows states to delegitimise these non-state actors. The terrorist label also serves to deny the context and conditions that give rise to such movements. Additionally, it allows one to ignore the complexity and the individual character of each of the movements under discussion (2015, p. 231). According to Solomon, the lack of knowledge about the real grievances driving Al Shabab, makes it impossible to make the distinction between sub-state terrorism (terrorism directed at local goals) and international terrorism, or instance a global Islamic Caliphate pursued by Al Qaeda. When international actors do not distinguish between the two and support an illegitimate state with military training and equipment as well as intelligence and financial assistance, these groups often turn to the likes of Al-Qaeda to provide them with the means to conduct their attacks against the state. In this process, sub-state terrorism then morphs into international terrorism (2015, p. 231).

2.2.8. CRIMINALISATION OF A CONFLICT

To discover how international and national criminal law impacts insurgencies, McKnight (2015) analysed the various responses to violations in Uganda, focusing on, for instance, the Amnesty Act, International Criminal Court indictments, and International Crimes Division. She pointed out that "the conflict in northern Uganda presents a unique study of international criminal law and different responses to prolonged conflict, as seemingly every tactical and ideological method that has been implemented to instil and secure justice has failed to achieve either goal" (McKinght 2015, p. 193-194). As McKnight pointed out, in general the problem of bonding rebel groups to human rights treaties is the fact that those laws are established by state consent. Nevertheless, some human rights treaties place explicit obligations on non-state armed groups, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically applies to armed groups (2015, 198).

Any activity falling outside applicable treaties or humanitarian provisions may still constitute a violation of customary international law and jus cogens crimes, such as the acts of torture (McKnight, 2015, p. 198-199). In case of Uganda and the atrocities committed by LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation in 2004 and issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and war crimes. As McKnight

22 pointed out, these were targeted only against few central LRA personnel, leaving out all other insurgency groups, and government officials who had also violated humanitarian laws. This led to a decade of claims against ICC of ineffectiveness and failure (2015, p. 199-202).

Furthermore, McKnight pointed out the ICC´s incapability to enforce its decisions, as one week after the ICC announced the opening of its investigations, the LRA killed 50 civilians in a refugee camp in Lira (2015, p. 206-207). This was followed by a creation of International Crimes Division, a national institution prosecuting international crimes through domestic legislation. When the organisation started prosecuting criminals who had originally received amnesty, public trust and respect towards this institution was also put in question (McKnight 2015, p. 205). McKnight drew the conclusion from these observations that putting justice first, can lead to the impossibility of peace, as an insurgency leader feels he has to fight not only the government, but also the entire international community. Furthermore, careful timing and effective execution seems to be among crucial elements when international or national juridical processes are planned against insurgencies (2015, p. 207).

Dudouet (2011) examined the impact of anti-terrorist legislation, in particular the so-called ‘blacklisting’ regimes, on targeted entities, as well as on third parties interacting with them for peaceful and constructive ends, and argues their impact to be ambivalent (p. 1). She pointed to the fact that the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are typically asymmetric in nature, with internationally legitimised state actors opposing non-state armed groups, often labelled or legally proscribed as ‘terrorist organisations’ (2011, p. 3). She described how one of the most immediate responses to the New York and Washington attacks was the establishment of so-called terrorist lists by the US government and the UN Security Council (and subsequently UN and EU member states). Dudouet pointed out that, as there is no internationally-accepted legal definition of ´terrorism´, the task has been left to individual UN member states, which have interpreted it according to their diplomatic agendas or domestic interests (2011, p. 5). This received criticism, for example, from human rights lawyers, who have denounced blacklisting as an ideological and politically-biased tool that is blurring the distinctions between acts of violence against civilians and legitimate struggles for democracy or self-determination, by turning unarmed activists and their communities into ´terrorists´ (2011, p. 5-6).

Dudouet argued that the behaviour of non-state actors, such as underground guerrilla organisations, is less likely to be affected by international sanctions, as they already perceive themselves as stigmatised and isolated. In fact, some organisations might consider

23 proscription by their ‘enemies’ as a badge of honour (2011, p. 4). Furthermore, proscription can fuel radicalism and create direct impediments for humanitarian or political negotiations (2011, p. 5). For example, Dudouet described that while terrorist lists are supposed to encourage armed movements to adopt peaceful strategies, the proscription of such actors in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Colombia, the Philippines, Palestine, and Nepal took place precisely while they were demonstrating their readiness to engage in dialogue and consider non-violent political strategies, inevitably leading to their re-radicalisation (2011, p. 5). Therefore, she concludes that the banning and criminalisation of unarmed political or social movements associated with blacklisted organisations has severe consequences for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, by granting these organisations an air of ´victimhood´ and increase their popular support (2011, p. 7). Hence, when applied unwisely, terrorist lists might interfere with efforts to find a political solution to asymmetric intra-state conflicts (2011, p. 1).

2.2.9. NATURAL DISASTERS

Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman (2008), and Beardsley (2009) looked at the influence of natural disasters on conflict dynamics. Beardsley focused on how natural disasters can influence the trajectory of conflict and peace processes in intra-state conflict. He stated that if the insurgent group is depending on local support, it will be more responsive to community needs and therefore welcome disaster relief and diplomacy after a disaster. This will advance the peace process (2009, p. 641-642). Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman stated that after a disaster, informal networks are created, and disaster relief and diplomacy will occur. These will influence peace talks positively. On the other side, if, for instance, relief aid is distributed unequally, the conflict can escalate again (2008, p. 515). Although natural disasters do not occur frequently during conflicts, there are some important examples that show how disasters change conflict dynamics, such as the 1998 drought in Sudan, the 2001 and 2005 earthquakes in India/Pakistan, and the 2004 tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka (Gaillard, Clavé & Kelman, 2008, p. 515).

Devit and Tol (2012) pointed out that "existing empirical research on the role of climate change in violent conflict is limited and inconclusive. There is a consensus, however, that other, non-environmental factors dominate" (p. 130). Researchers refer to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who were the first to suggest an ‘economic theory’ of civil conflict (rent-seeking by violence) and to test their predictions with data (Devit & Tol, 2012, p. 130). According to this strand of literature, people may fight over resources that are highly

24 valuable and easy to smuggle, for instance diamonds, but they tend not to fight over bulky goods such as water and food. Climate- and weather-sensitive resources are therefore less conflict-prone (2012, p. 130-131). In an attempt to test this assumption, Devit and Tol developed a simulation model for the three-way interaction between civil war, climate change and development, in which they analysed civil wars in Sub-Sahara Africa. Their results indicated a clear statistical correlation between climate change and occurrence of civil war, therefore leading researchers to suggest that at least in certain situations and regions, climate change increases the probability of civil wars (2012, p. 141).

2.3. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2.3.1. SETTLEMENTS AND PEACE PROCESSES

Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) are not the only ones who have written about settlements and peace processes ending irregular wars. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012, p. 678-687) identified three paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist or insurgent organisations. The first paradox refers to the misuse of negotiations by the insurgents to stall time, in order to prepare for a next offense. It should be noted that the state can also misuse negotiations to stall for time. This abuse of negotiations is most likely to occur in the mid-phase of an irregular conflict, in which the state failed to defeat the insurgents, despite its advantages in power and resources. Insurgents misuse the negotiations to increase its military strength to ensure a decisive victory (2012, p. 678-681). The second paradox implies that negotiations may also lead to disagreements within the terrorist organisation, as not every member sees negotiations as a positive development. Thereby, negotiations can cause the group to split into factions, each subgroup defending their sphere of influence. The subgroups excluded from the negotiations might use violence to frustrate the process (2012, p. 682-684). Patrick Johnston (2007) suggested that some governments actually seek to fraction terrorist groups in order to exploit the largest factions, using them to combat the remaining subgroups. The third paradox relates to the durability of negotiated settlements. Negotiations sometimes lead to temporary peaceful settlements, but in most cases bring about lengthy peace processes. Also, parallel to the negotiations process, terrorist continue violent acts to increase their power. Therefore, it can be argued that military victories might offer better prospects for stability (2001, p. 685- 687).

2.3.2. SPOILERS

Stephen Stedman (1997) also studied the dynamics of the peace processes, and looked specifically into the factors that influence the peace process in a negative way, which he called ‘spoilers of the peace process’. Since conflicts are seldom straight forward proceedings with simple aims, Stedman argued that the negotiations to settle for peace are often seen by some actors as against their interest. This makes peace-making a dangerous and difficult endeavour. If spoilers succeed, the results of ongoing conflict are often disastrous. Examples given by Stedman (1997, p. 5) are Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, where the casualty numbers of the ongoing conflict were multiple times higher than the number of casualties of the original conflict. Stedman argued that in order to prevent spoilers from succeeding, a thorough analysis and strategy is needed to deal with them. He categorised spoilers based on their position, inside or outside the peace process, the number of spoilers, and the type of spoilers. The ‘type of spoilers’ is further divided into three types: limited, greedy or total. The framework also categorises strategies for coping with spoilers, inducement, socialisation and coercion. Choosing the right strategy is hampered by uncertainty in the analysis of the spoiler. Multiple factors should be taken into account when dealing with spoilers, amongst others, the strategic goals of the spoiler; the intent of its actions; the degree of commitment to the peace process; the degree of command and control on followers; and the degree of unity within the spoiler. There is often uncertainty regarding these factors and assessments have to be made based on estimations. A peacemaker has to take these complex factors into account and assess the effect of actions on the spoiler, other engaged actors and external stakeholders.

Reiter (2015) researched the occurrence of spoiling attempts during peace processes. He stated that the literature on civil wars points to the extreme difficulty of maintaining civil war peace agreements. Within this context, spoiling is defined by Reiter as: "actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process" (p. 92), who identifies it as a major threat to civil war peace agreements. For instance, Angola and Rwanda experienced catastrophic violence when peace agreements failed (p. 90). Reiter’s analysis finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not typically assumed as common, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements.

According to Reiter (2015, p. 89), when spoiling does pose a threat to peace, it occurs under specific circumstances, such as the moment at which powerful actors initiate a peace process, or when paramilitaries and/or state security forces have been excluded from the peace agreement. He concluded that the vast majority of spoiling is often dangerous and disruptive 26 for society. However, most actors who resort to the spoiling strategy typically fail in their goals and pose little risk to signed peace agreements (2015, p. 105). Finally, Reiter referred to recent research, which shows that the way the events are perceived by the public, influenced by media coverage, has a profound impact on the ultimate effect of spoiling, making the population either more or less willing to accept the loss of human lives as a cost of peace (2015, p. 107).

2.3.3. GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES

The United States Institute of Peace´s special report addresses the following question: what are the most successful governmental policies aimed at ending terrorism? This research is conducted by drawing experiences from several civil conflicts. The report suggests that one of the most efficient approaches might be to apply strategies aiming to diminish popular support for the terrorists, hence reducing their strength (1999, p. 1). The report stresses the importance of understanding how the terrorist organisation and its decision making process works, which is crucial in choosing the right governmental policies (1999, p. 11). According to Martha Crenshaw, this can be attempted by analysing terrorist groups’ internal factors on the one hand, such as decision making, internal psychological dynamics, and external factors on the other hand, such as organisation’s strength compared to government forces, motivation (ideological or ethnical) and ties with external support. In addition, other factors to analyse are the tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, such as deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations (1999, p. 2-3). Based on these factors, Crenshaw described that the end of terrorism may result from situations as success of terrorists, preliminary success, organisational breakdown of the terrorist group, dwindling support, and new alternatives (other options for political change emerge) (1999, p. 3). She pointed out that governments’ ‘get-tough’ approach can possibly only create more violence, leading to protracted conflict (1999, p. 4). Crenshaw emphasised the importance of a right timing for the peace process, ideally when the government is strong and the terrorist organisation is undergoing a period of introspection (1999, p. 1, 11).

2.4 CONFLICT THEORY

2.4.1.THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The literature review indicates that the conflict theory domain can be divided into classics and contemporary scholars. The foundation of conflict theory is commonly associated with

Marxism (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29-31), as Marx´s dialectical materialist account of history predicted that capitalism would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own destruction by a proletarian revolution, therefore emphasising the economic factors (Marx 1859, 1977). Two other classical conflict theorists are Ludwig Gumplowicz and Lester Ward, who introduced a more ethnological perspective to conflict. Gumplowicz´s approach emphasised that large complex human societies are evolved from war and conquest (Gumplowicz 1884, 1963), whereas Ward´s approach gave more attention to the ´human factor´ and emphasised that the root of the societal conflicts lies in the human conflicted nature itself (Ward 1897). Other classicists are Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim´s approach focuses on crime, which he saw as the chief form of the social conflict. He stated that "crime plays a role in the evolution of morality and law" (Durkheim, 1938, p. 70-81). Whereas Marx emphasised the importance of "social structure", Weber emphasised the importance of "social action". This is the ability of individuals to influence the nature of their social relationships in sociologically significant ways (Livesay, 2015).

C. Wright Mills is usually credited as the founder of the modern conflict theory (Knapp, 2015). Central in his writing is the concept of 'power elite', as the 'national upper class' owns most of the country´s wealth. Mills was also concerned of the rise of militarism among the elites, because according to him, the rise of the military state serves the interests of the elite of industrial societies (Elwell, 2013). Another contemporary theorist is Gene Sharp, who argued that the source of any ruler´s political power derives from those over whom (s)he rules. Furthermore, the cooperation of those around a ruler is essential if (s)he is to have any power at all (Sharp, 2013). Finally, contemporary conflict theorist William Hulius Wilson emphasised the impact of racial inequality and rising economic inequality as a source of societal conflict (Wilson, 2003, p. 1096-1114). As a conclusion, Guy Hungerford presented a useful overview of the whole conflict theory domain by describing that conflict theorists see "that the society is made up of different groups who have competing or conflicting interests", and history "as the product of struggle" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, conflict theorists believe the main engine of change to be the "changing balance of power between different groups and especially different classes" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29).

2.4.2. MODERN APPROACHES

While classic approaches have focused on certain factors as sources of conflict, modern conflict mapping recognises the need of analysing complex conflict systems. As pointed out

28 by Ramsbotham (2011), this has been integral in the conflict resolution field from the beginning (p. 118). However, this does not mean that there is one overarching approach agreed upon by all the researchers of the field. On the contrary, there are several parallel and colliding approaches, emphasising different perspectives, factors and levels of analysis. This research attempts to combine the most essential approaches, and to present a holistic model coming together of different transdisciplinary frameworks. In the following part several interpretative frameworks for conflict analysis from established researchers will be presented, such as Wallensteen, Ramsbotham, and Pahlavi and Ouellet, to serve as the basis of this research's theoretical approach, which will be presented at the end.

2.4.2.1. SHARED FRAMEWORK

According to Wallensteen (2007), the different modes of conflict analysis can be categorised under three headings, according to what kind of approach they emphasise: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) needs-based conflict origins, and 3) rational-strategic calculations (p. 31-32).

A classic understanding of conflict interprets conflict as a dynamic phenomenon: one actor is reacting to what another is doing, which leads to further action (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 32). The dynamic perspective on conflict analysis has been adopted by two well-known analytical tools, both developed in the 1960s: the game theory and Johan Galtung´s conflict triangle. The game theory is a way of illustrating how parties act within the confines set up by the game itself. If the parties follow the rules, the outcomes are predictable. However, it also raises the possibility that actors can change the dynamics by making particular moves or even breaking some of the 'rules' that the conflict has generated (2007, p. 32). Galtung´s model suggests that a conflict moves among the triangle´s three corners, where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behaviour and C to the conflict or contradiction itself (the incompatibility) (2007, p. 33). According to Wallensteen (2007, p. 33), understanding dynamics is the most important aspect in order to understand the transformational nature of conflict. However, this dynamic perspective is limited. As Wallensteen (2007, p. 36) pointed out, the dynamic perspective is weak in its understanding of why conflicts starts, as the underlying assumption is that they begin with conflicting attitudes, without taking into account the possibility that such attitudes could be a result of previous behaviours and pre- existing incompatibilities.

The third perspective, represented by, for example, William Zartman, assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own judgements, make decisions, pursue strategies and, thus, initiate the chain of events that lead to war (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42). This leads to the assumption that the parties initiate wars to win them. They make internal calculations showing that the benefits outweigh the losses when escalating a conflict to a violent confrontation. As time passes and nobody wins, the initial calculations are affected and have to be revised. The potential benefits from victory are reduced as the costs increase. At the same time, the fact that so much time, energy, resources and human lives have been invested, makes it difficult not to continue, until the final moment of victory is reached. If the parties find this stalemate to be painful, it may lead them to strategic rethinking (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42-43).

As Wallensteen points out, living with or dissolving incompatibility is a central element in conflict analysis, which has been learned from the dynamic approach to conflict as well as from the rational calculation approach (2007, p. 54). Wallensteen emphasised the focus on the needs and perceptions of parties, and the history behind the conflict (2007, p. 54). According to Wallensteen, these three approaches illustrate different elements in the conflict process, having many shared features, and are all useful, promoting a shared framework for the analysis (2007, 54).

2.4.2.2. MULTILEVEL MODEL

Ramsbothan et al. (2011, p. 111) recommended a five-level model focusing on the different levels of the conflict phenomena. These five levels comprise two 'international' levels (global and regional, and contextual factors), one 'state' level divided into functional sectors (structural factors), and two 'social' levels (conflict party and elite/individual, and relational factors). Global and regional levels represent contextual sources of conflict. The global level points at the global factors as a potential source of a conflict, such as the geopolitical transitions, global economic division, environmental constrains, weapon proliferation and ideological contestations (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 111). The importance of integrating a transnational perspective to the study of civil war is also emphasised by other researchers, such as Forsberg (2009, p. 35).

The regional level has been identified, since several sets of conflict data show clear regional differences in contemporary conflicts. Therefore, regional factors, which can be both outwards, such as spill-over effects, and inwards, such as intervention, should be carefully

30 taken into account. In addition, internal wars can have external effects, for example, in the form of diaspora. Conversely, regional instability can affect the internal politics of states through, for example, patterns of clientelism (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 112).

The state level, which represents structural factors of conflicts, can be divided into social, economic and political functional sectors. The social sector focuses on the major types of social division around which conflict fault lines may develop. The economic sector refers to the assumption that protracted conflict tends to be associated with patterns of underdevelopment or uneven development. The political or governmental sector refers to the issues of political controversies, government legitimacy and state control (law and order and security sector) as potential sources of conflict (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 116).

Conflict party and elite/individual levels represent relational sources of conflict. While conflict party level focuses on the group mobilisation and intergroup dynamics, the elite and individual levels point at the importance of leaders and individual advocates of action (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 117).

2.4.2.3 SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Pahlavi and Ouellet (2011) used a sociological institutional analysis to gain insight in the logic of stability and dynamics of change in irregular warfare. They distinguished three dimensions for their research: the regulative, the normative and the cognitive dimension. They looked at the interaction between these dimensions, which includes values, norms, ideas, worldviews, rules and policies. Although their main goal was to find new insights on the military approach of fighting an insurgent enemy, they made some interesting conclusions on studying irregular warfare. It shows that using a more holistic approach will result in finding out more factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict. It shows that what they call ‘soft factors’ offer more insight. For instance, changing values or worldviews can change a conflict drastically. The problem with their conceptual framework of institutional analysis was that it was hard to divide the factors between the three dimensions. Using these factors can be interesting, but will be more effective by applying another conceptual framework (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012).

2.5 CONCEPTUALISATIONS

This research focuses on conflict dynamics, more specifically, on violent conflicts between state and non-state actors. Although it seems as if 'war' would be the most encompassing concept, 'irregular armed conflict' as a type of war is more suitable, as the research focusses on conflicts that involve non-state actors as a combating party. Nevertheless, it is necessary to start from the founding concepts of conflict and civil war, and continue with the terms of irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism. The ambiguity of these concepts requires a clear conceptualisation.

2.5.1. CONFLICT AND CIVIL WAR

The heart of this research is understanding civil war and its dynamics, of which four cases are selected. A clear and precise definition of conflict and civil war is needed to sustain the understanding of this research. The definitions of conflict and war guide the types of information any research will collect (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18). According to Wallensteen, a good definition should: 1) be sufficiently general, 2) capture conflict both between and within states, 3) be precise, so as to guide data collection (operationalisation), and 4) delimit a particular conflict in time and space (beginning and ending) from other conflicts (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18).

To make things more complicated, there are three major competing or at least parallel projects within the peace research community, which all present their own approach and definition to civil war, subsequently to the reasons why conflicts occur or how they can be terminated. These projects, which are continuously mapping armed conflict patterns, are: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), (Uppsala University); Causes of War program (AKUF), (University of Hamburg); and Correlates of War (COW), (University of Michigan).

Basic to COW is the delineation of an international system consisting of states. Thus, wars are conflicts between states, where at least two states are a member of the international system. In addition, there are extra-systemic conflicts, where only one state is a member. The COW defines these civil wars as having a minimum of two parties, where one is a government, and causing at least 1000 battle fatalities per year, including civilian casualties. Therefore, COW focuses on understanding inter-state conflict by applying realist thinking with empirical approach, dealing with factors such as balance of power, military capabilities, interdependence and other variables of importance for the working of the international system. COW starts from the notion of a system that consists of a large number of independent states. 32

Therefore, the problem is found in the strategies for survival used by different states (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).

On the contrary, according to the AKUF project definition, membership of the international system is not a condition required for all conflict parties. However, it does require that a state is an actor on at least one side in a conflict. The actors should have, at a minimum, central command and practical control over the fighting. It is also stipulated that there has to be a measure of continuity in battle. There is no requirement for a particular number of deaths, which produces a broader set of cases than COW. The AKUF project draws from a fairly coherent theoretical approach, as it relates the onset of war to the development of capitalist societies and sees conflicts as a result of the new forms of production, monetarisation of the economy and the resulting dissolution of traditional forms of social integration. AKUF starts, on the contrary, from an understanding of an international system that is fairly integrated, almost having a purpose of its own, which is to promote a market economy and democracy. It is a highly hierarchical world, centred around the strongest actors in the system: the Western countries. This international system penetrates around the world, creating instability and pushing aside traditional forms of social relations (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).

The UCDP uses the concept of 'armed conflict' and its definitions and understandings of conflict can be placed somewhere between the AKUF and COW projects. The conflicts included are those that have at least one state or government as a party. It covers conflicts from a threshold level of 25 battle-related deaths in a conflict in a year. There are two thresholds (25 and 1000 battle-related deaths), resulting in three categories of intensity: 1) minor armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths but less than 1000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict; 2) intermediate armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths and less than 1000 for a year, but more than 1000 for the duration of the conflict; and 3) wars: conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in one year. The UCDP requires that the conflict should have an issue, an incompatibility, therefore drawing a clear line between political and non-political violence. The project includes only those events that concern control over government or territory, as armed conflicts. Control over government means that the issue is who should rule a particular state and demands for change include the change of rulers. Control over territory means that demands by one state for territory in another state, even the occupation of another state, are included, as are rebellions inside a state to achieve autonomy, independence or the joining of a particular territory to the neighbouring state. The inclusion of incompatibility into the conflict definition has theoretical reasons, as conflict

33 theory suggests that parties act for particular purposes. Thus, they need to be taken at face value (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 22-23).

In this research, the definition of civil war from UCDP is used, namely the definition by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), which provides a deeper understanding of the civil war complexities. According to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is an armed conflict that meets the following conditions:

1) Causes more than 1000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; 2) challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognised state; 3) occurs within the recognised boundary of that state; 4) involves the state as a principal combatant; 5) includes rebels with the ability to mount organised armed opposition to the state; 6) has parties with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war. (2000, p. 783).

This is based on the definition of civil war as given by Small and Singer (1982), who define war simply as a violent conflict with at least a 1000 deaths. Internal war is a violent conflict that occurs on state territory. The second condition is that the government that is in power at the beginning of the conflict, is an involved actor. Thirdly, there must be effective resistance, to distinguish a war from, for instance, genocide.

2.5.2. IRREGULAR WARFARE, INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

‘Modern warfare’, according to Boot (2015), refers to warfare where specifically trained, disciplined and deployed soldiers fight against other soldiers under a hierarchy. This first appeared around 3100 BC in het Fertile Crescent, and thus has a long history. Boot argued that irregular warfare is an evolution of tribal and nomadic warfare, which share many characteristics. He stated that the modern irregular guerrilla has inherited the tactics of small unit warfare, and linked those to an ideological agenda. This notion is shared by Pahlavi and Ouellet (2012), who found that irregular armed conflicts have a highly political nature. Two paradoxes are noted by Boot (2015). First, irregular forces are prone to become regular forces if great military success is achieved. Secondly, ever since the mid-19th century Taiping wars in China and the American Civil War most wars have seen elements of both regular and irregular armed forces. While elements of both might be found in most wars, both types of conflict can still be set apart, although their distinction remains unclear.

This long historic background is largely corroborated by Vacca and Davidson (2011), who argued that irregular warfare is actually a faulty term, because is sets irregular warfare conceptually apart from regular warfare, which it is not. Vacca and Davidson (2011) argued that irregular warfare is not only an integral part of the general warfare domain, it shares many characteristics with regular conflict. Underlining the notions of Boot (2015), they argued that irregular and regular warfare can occur within the same conflict, sometimes at the same time, while at other times during different phases of the conflict. By creating and accepting this artificial divide between both types of conflict, researchers are exposing themselves to both deductive as well as inductive logical failures, as they are not using the general body of knowledge according to Vacca and Davidson (2011, p. 18). Deductive failures consist of failing to apply existing knowledge to the specific challenge, while inductive failure consist of failing to generalize the created knowledge into the broader domain.

While Boot (2015) and Vacca and Davidson (2011) seem to argue the existence of a more ‘mixed’ form of warfare, Jeffrey White (1996) has found nine dimensions in which irregular warfare can be set apart from modern or regular warfare. The first dimension regards the organisation characterisation. Modern warfare is characterised by formal hierarchies, while irregular forces often use a less formal or even informal organisation structure, for instance, on a clan, company, or religious or territorial basis. A hierarchical organisation is often perceived by military scholars as the stronger military alternative. While the informally organised groups are often not able to achieve a military victory, they can still deal a blow to a regular force. The second dimension is technology. While technology plays a significant role in regular forces and regular conflicts, irregular units often use simple technology and light weapons, such as assault rifles and improvised explosive devices. This is exemplified by the Taliban, after the United States intervened in Afghanistan. Irregular forces might use, by exception, improvised, donated, captured or stolen heavy equipment. This has certain implications for the third dimension, logistics, as a lack of large troop formation and heavy military equipment means irregular forces are not as depended on or limited by logistical factors. This also reduces their vulnerability to strategic attacks.

The lack of military equipment and formal hierarchies also influences the fourth dimension of command and control (White, 1996). While conventional forces usually have a national authority that commands them, irregular forces are usually not directly commanded, but are far more loosely connected to the central leadership, if it exists at all. Command and control is

35 often executed by local leaders with crude means, such as walky-talkies. The fifth dimension considers the doctrine, the way the actor fights, how they will deploy, what weapons will be used, and their effect at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Irregular actors often only have a limited doctrine. Yet, it does not prevent them from achieving tactical successes. The doctrinal dimension shows that regular forces, especially in the west, prefer to have a quick and decisive military victory, while irregular forces can usually not mount enough forces to decisively win a war in one large battle. Irregular forces are often more prone to responsive engagements, using their tactical mobility and knowledge of the environment to choose the moment of engagement. The seventh dimension makes a distinction between the soldier and the warrior, and focusses mainly on the recruitment process. While a soldier enlists and is taken out of civil life and transformed into a soldier, a warrior is part of a local culture, integrated in his society and fights with the equipment available to him.

Another differentiating dimension (White, 1996) is that of the allies or accomplices. While alliances in regular conflicts are usually based on shared long-term interest and trust, in irregular conflicts allies can be hard to understand. An example given by White (1996) is that of the Arab allies to General Allenby, while fighting the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East coming from a totally different culture and striving for different goals than the British military. Another risk that exists to a regular party in an irregular conflict, is that an (accidental) alliance with an irregular party might make you an accomplice, making it harder to gain legitimacy in the eyes of some parts of the population. The final dimension considers the relationship between the societies and the wars that they wage. While a regular conflict is often something that is segregated from society, constituting a front line and a hinterland, an irregular conflict is often waged throughout the society, forming an integral part of it. While Boot (2015) handed an analytical tool to organisationally set irregular and regular conflicts apart, he did merely that, and did not capture the essence of what makes irregular warfare.

Setting irregular warfare apart from regular warfare is however an important step in finding the essence of the concept. This is also acknowledged by Gustafson (2014), who argued that a clear definition might not even be needed. While many sub-definitions exist, the broadest view is that "war is war, although the character of activities in the operational environment differ" (Gustafson, 2014, p. 42). While this hints to a traditional Western military perspective, it is also a broadening of the concept to overcome the difficulties in setting regular conflict apart from irregular conflict. Gustafson argued that while irregular conflict gained prominence in the military research community after 2006, it remained a less clear and more

36 diffuse concept as opposed to more specific concepts such as (counter-)insurgency, protracted war, and revolutionary warfare. Gustafson further argued that irregular warfare:

is characterised by limited, physical structures and greater mental goals and drivers, the endurance and will of the people, limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect, requiring skills and capabilities for covert, clandestine and low visibility operations. (2014, p. 46)

He continued to argue that parties in irregular wars are often not prioritising Western thought and standards when it comes to human rights. He stated that people are the target to be controlled by the irregular warfare actors, but does not differentiate between different forms of irregular warfare.

The United States Army has a similar definition of irregular warfare. They argued in their Field Manual 3-05.130 (Department of the Army, 2008) that irregular warfare is not as much about achieving military objectives by attaining a technological and military advantage, but by understanding the local politics and social structures. At the same time the notion exists that winning the population requires the specific resource of time, as irregular conflicts are often long and drawn out conflicts, which also require a long and substantial presence, both after conflicts and before conflicts erupt. This is one of the reasons for the U.S. Army to engage in long term partnerships with actors around the globe. Irregular warfare is seen as a broad overarching concept that harbours 14 core warfare activities. These activities include the waging of insurgencies, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defence and psychological operations (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-5). One of the core aims of an irregular warfare is to acquire the support of the population or to assure that another actor loses the support of the population. Irregular warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-8).

According to Larson, Eaton, Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008), irregular warfare can be divided into two distinct types. The so called ‘population centric irregular warfare’ and ‘counter terrorism operations’ (Larson et al., 2008, p. 14). The first one is said to focus on creating support among local populations for U.S. policy. This is a political goal rather than a military goal, such as the destruction of an opposing forces formation. The second type of irregular warfare, counter terrorism, is aimed at combatting small jihadist terrorist cells around the world. This does not require a large military footprint or a political effort. This type of

37 warfare is mostly fought by special units, within the military but also from civilian institutions, such as the police and intelligence apparatuses. A big issue with this definition is that it is, just as the Department of the Army, United States centric.

A distinction between two types of irregular warfare is also made by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009), which it is in some ways close to the one made by Larson et al. (2008). Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that the distinction between the two forms of irregular warfare should not be made at the tactical level or at the organisational level, but at the strategic level, as both are strategies in waging irregular war. Like the population centric irregular warfare (Larson et al., 2008), an insurgency strategy aims at capturing the population, which is to be used to affect political power. This means the support of the population for the insurgency is of great importance, as this is needed to give the actor the political strength and legitimacy as well as provide resources for the militant units. A traditional aim of the insurgency is to acquire control over all or part of the state functions, for instance, through secession or by a reorganisation of the state in general, as happens with federalisation. Less formal ways of control, or governance, can also be exerted. These do not entail the formal declaration of a state, or a settlement, but consolidation of some acquired powers, possibly by negative enforcement through intimidation. The ambition of an insurgence force to acquire governance in some form over a population and territory can result in the transformation of the irregular forces into a regular military force.

Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) pointed out that starting an irregular war with the insurgency strategy requires certain pre-set conditions, as control over population and territory requires a certain threshold minimal of conditions. This could, for instance, be modified by failing or collapsing of a state and its institutions, resulting in a power vacuum that can be taken advantage of by insurgent actors. If the relative strength needed for starting an irregular war with insurgency strategy lack, a terrorist strategy might be followed. The major advantage of a terrorist strategy according to Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009), is that it requires relatively little resources to start, as a few people with simple weapons can commit terrorism. The aim of terrorism is not the overthrowing of a state or controlling a population, but is meant as a provocation or 'propaganda by deed' (p. 30). The terrorism strategy aims to provoke other actors into taking actions that the fighter desires, or not taking an action that is seen as damaging the interest of the terrorist forces, in which case any other action is preferable. This means in case of terrorism it is not the act itself that will bring the desired result, but the response of the provoked opposing actor. The population itself does not

38 necessarily have a role and large popular support is not necessary for executing a terrorist campaign. Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that often the strategy of terrorism is chosen because the actor lacks the political and military power to force the desired political change, and thus chooses a strategy that brings about change to a more favourable situation in which the end goal can be achieved. It should also be noted that terrorist tactics are not the explicit domain of actors that employ a terrorist strategy. Actors that are engaged in an insurgency can still use terrorist tactics, yet do this within the frame of the larger insurgent strategy. It will be obvious that an actor that follows a terrorist strategy cannot employ an insurgent tactic. As said before, a terrorist actor lacks the needed competences to wage an insurgency, which is often the reason in the first place that the terrorist strategy is pursued.

Schuurman (2013) has noted that a generally, academically accepted, definition of terrorism does not exist, thus hampering any research in the field. He however used the often used 2011 definition of Schmid and Jongman:

Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. (Schuurman, 2013, p. 5)

He applied a framework consisting of five counterterrorism measures. First is ‘doing too little’, in which a government does not respond adequately or even ignores the issue. Another category is a policy of reconciliation, trying to appease the terrorist by taking a root-cause solution. ‘Legal reforms’ is a measure of changing the laws, giving the government more capabilities in fighting terrorism. The fourth category is about restricting the terrorist forces, disrupting their organisational capabilities. The last category consists of the hardest countermeasures, using violence to eliminate the opposing forces. Schuurman (2013) argued that whichever policy category is employed, the public support does influence the outcome of the operation. This is true in his cases, Italy, Northern-Ireland and Canada, not only for the response by government supporters, but also for the effect it has on the supporters of the oppositional actors. If an actor uses more violence than the supporters deem necessary or legitimate for achieving its goals, a loss of legitimacy and support of the actor, be it government or oppositional actors, occurs. At the same time, if an actor is following a low

39 activities policy to prevent alienation of the constituency of the opposite actor, it risks losing its own constituency as it might be perceived as not doing enough.

In this research the concepts as presented by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2008) will be used, since these have a neutral framework and allow, due to the focus on strategy instead of tactics or organisation, to explain possible changes in the organisation and policy of the actors that will be investigated in the four case studies.

2.5.3 STATE-BUILDING

State-building is an important concept in conflict studies. First, a weak state-building process of a state can prelude and cause internal conflict. Second, a state-building project can be established by an insurgent movement during a conflict as a first step towards the secession of their 'state'. Therefore it is important to include a clear conceptualisation of state-building.

State-building coheres with the capacity of the state. Hendrix (2010, p. 273) divided state capacity in three different capacities: military capacity, the bureaucratic/administrative capacity and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Sobek and Thies (2015, p. 52) distinguished several relations between state-building and civil wars. Civil wars reveal underlying grievances. Therefore they see a civil war as an opportunity of the state to redress these grievances, which will result in a stronger state. According to them, an important part of state-building is the capacity of the state to address its population’s grievances.

A state-building process can be implemented by a government within its own state; implemented by other states or the international community within another state; and within a region in a state, implemented by an insurgent group. In the first situation, the state-building process is implemented by the state itself, which, for instance, happens after independence. Fukuyama gives a clear and concise definition of state-building for these kind of situations: "a process by which new governmental institutions are created and existing ones strengthened" (2004, p. 17). Migdal has a corresponding definition, although his is more complete: "to denote the various dynamic formal and informal processes and the shifting linkages between the state (or state institutions) and society" (Migdal, 2001, p. 11). This definition will be used as addition to the definition of Fukuyama. In the second situation, state-building is mostly implemented by Western countries in other states, where the concept can be defined as "The attempt to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that can survive the withdrawal of external support" (Monten, 2014, p. 175-176). In the last option, state-building can de conceptualised as in the first situation. However, here the

40 implementation is done by a group that wants self-determination and the state-building process might be the start of a successful secession.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE METHODS

After the Cold War, theories of conflict studies needed to be reconstructed in order to explain the phenomena of civil wars. Simultaneously, new theories emerged, such as the greed thesis that focused on the causes of wars. Paul collier, like other scholars, relied on statistical analysis, which does not provide a deeper understanding of the conflicts (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Although his method and theory have been criticised, many scholars used Collier's theory, which identifies greed as a trigger of war, as a starting point (Kalyvas, 2001; De Soysa, 2002; Regan & Norton, 2005). David Keen argued the weaknesses of Collier’s work in his article greed and grievance in civil war (2012). His criticism focused in particular on the quantitative method that Collier used. The quantitative method in conflict studies refers to the use of databases that are, especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries, not completely reliable. Keen argued that the problem of missing data has been the exception rather than the rule (2012, p. 767). Duyvesteyn added that research cannot rely on data from the state-level only, since it cannot explain sub-state violence. A scholar needs reliable data from, for instance, the local level to investigate the course of conflict resolution, negotiation and settlement in the final stages of armed conflict (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Collier even suggested himself in his book Understanding Civil Wars, that the main shortcoming of the Collier-Hoeffler model is the lack of data. He claimed that the model would still be able to offer insights of factors causing violence or peace, despite this shortcoming.

Mats Berdal (2005) also questioned the use of the quantitative method in conflict studies. In his opinion, the truly interesting questions regarding violent conflict remain unanswered when quantitative method is used. A statistical analysis offers limited insight in the identification of factors that trigger and sustain civil war, the interaction between these factors, and the mutation of these factors over time. In order to gain a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics, it is advised to use a qualitative method. A quantitative approach can be interesting for research looking for a precise percentage, such as the chance the returning of a conflict. Unfortunately, it offers limited knowledge on the specifics of individual cases or the actual conflict dynamics. Another important limitation of the quantitative method that Berdal (2005, p. 690) mentioned is the requirement to choose empirical data that might leave out highly relevant factors of the case. In order to gain a deeper understanding of a conflict and its

42 dynamics, one should select a small N and consider many variables. It calls for a qualitative approach.

Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (2003) confirmed that statistical methods can be used to identify key variables across cases, which only highlight part of the situation. It proves a correlation between two factors, such as economic factors and intra-state conflicts. The explanatory weight of statistical methods is limited, as to whether and how specific factors promote or sustain conflict remains unclear (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 5). Qualitative methods can be used to go beyond the revelation of correlation and identify causality. In contrast to the quantitative approach, which assesses the occurrence of specific factors in an isolated manner, these qualitative methods can be used to ascertain the causal impact on conflicts of specific factors (for instance economics) in relation to and combination with other possible significant factors (for instance culture, ideology or politics) (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 6). While a case- specific approach might lack the rigor of large-number quantitative studies, it does offer a more precise understanding of how specific factors ignite a conflict, the extent to which the factors explain a conflict, and the influence of other factors.

The latter is also confirmed in Tarrow’s article Inside Insurgencies: "[…] not quantities but interactions are the key to the dynamics of violence in civil wars" (2007, p. 596). In this article, Tarrow argued why he thinks the quantitative method is not right in conflict studies. He stated that much of the used data in quantitative conflict studies is over aggregated and that analytical distinctions are ignored, such as the distinction between civil wars as a whole and violence in civil wars as a variable. Secondly, the operationalisation of variables is often incomplete, using only crude, incomplete or indirect indicators. Thirdly, a variable can have different effects in different phases of the war or in other wars, which is often not taken into account in many of the conflict studies using the quantitative method. The fourth comment refers to the same concern as Keen (2012) and Duyvesteyn (2012) had expressed with regard to the missing data from the subnational actors in civil war. The majority of the data is received from state actors. Finally, Tarrow stresses the lack of research on mechanisms or processes of civil war insurgencies, which is hard to measure using quantitative approach. Opposed to the quantitative study, a qualitative study enables better assessment of contextual factors, which gives more insight into the mechanisms and processes of irregular wars (Tarrow, 2007. p. 589).

3.2 COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Berdal (2005, p. 690) explained that case studies offer context related insights. The fundamental limitation of using statistical analysis is the incapability of capturing conflict dynamics. It has been claimed that statistical analysis is more objective in analysing a conflict and offers opportunity for generalisations. However, statistical methods lead to static research results, which lack cultural sensitivity and a historical background, as stated by Berdal (2005, p. 690). The outcome of statistical analysis also remains a description of the probability of risks, rather than factual descriptions of the dynamics of violent conflict.

In this research, the comparative historical analysis approach has been selected because of its beneficial features. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2008, p. 6) outline three features of comparative historical analysis: a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualised comparison. These features make the comparative historical analysis suitable for research on conflict dynamics.

First, the comparative historical analysis focuses on explaining and identifying causal configurations that generate major outcomes of interest. In other words, the analysis concentrates on the causes of important outcomes. This feature conflates with this research's aim on conflict dynamics to unravel its causal mechanisms. Secondly, the comparative historical analysis recognises the influence of temporal sequences and the unfolding of events over time. The research objects are not static occurrences that took place at one point in time. These are rather processes that unfold over time and intersect with one another. This enables this research to consider the effects and timing of events in relation to each other. Thirdly, the comparative historical analysis enables systematic and contextual comparisons of either similar and contrasting cases. It reflects the aim to explore causal effects in different contexts rather than produce universally applicable knowledge. This type of analysis enables this research to explore how variables may have different causal effects on the dynamics of conflict across heterogeneous contexts (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 6-13).

3.3 SINGLE CASE STUDY OR COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

Comparative historical analysis is applicable to both single case studies and a multiple case studies. Single and a multiple comparative case study have different possibilities. The advantage of a single case study is that the case can be intensively examined. However, the outcomes of a single case study are less generalisable than outcomes of a multiple case study, since the last might provide the same information in more than one case (Lijphart, 1971, p.

691). Rueschemeyer (2008) elaborated on the possibilities of single case studies. He argued that a single historical case study can yield significant theoretical gains, as it can contribute to the generation of new hypotheses and test and re-test theories. A single case study does not imply that there is only a single observation, he stressed, as within-case comparison enables analysis of factors that have been returning in the case over time (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 332). Single case study offers the exquisite opportunity to find out empirical relationships among a couple of variables, while all other variables are held constant. This ceteris paribus condition strengthens the observation of causal mechanisms and related variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683).

As single and multiple comparative case studies both have their advantages and disadvantages, a combination of both provides the opportunity to combine the advantages of both methods in a single research project. This can be done by analysing the factors in a single case study first, followed by a cross-case analysis of similar cases. This combination has three advantages. First, it offers the possibility to explore complex interactions and causal mechanism while other factors remain the same. Secondly, it enables to trace multiple paths of causation. Thirdly, it dismisses the assumption of a linear relation between dependent and independent variables, thereby, allowing a multiple regression analysis (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 324).

The main advantage of the multiple comparative case study design is that it enables the researcher to gain insights in new variables, influencing the dynamics of the conflict. This can be done by comparing the variables that occurred throughout the conflict in one case, and compare it to the variables found in the other cases. This way, similarities and differences between cases and even patterns of frequent occurrence can be identified (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 1-2), in order to develop an extensive analytical framework that can be applied to other irregular armed conflicts in research of conflict dynamics.

3.4 EMPIRICAL OR THEORETICAL CASE STUDIES

Lijphart (1971) discerned six types of case studies: the atheoretical, the interpretative, the hypothesis-generating, the theory-confirming, the theory-infirming and the deviant case study. The atheoretical case study and the interpretative case study are conducted due to an interest in a specific case. The former is a traditional single-case analysis and is mainly descriptive. This analysis does not have immediate theoretical value, as it is not led by established theoretical propositions or aimed to formulate hypotheses. The atheoretical case study is useful for data-gathering, which can contribute to theory-building in a later stage. The

45 interpretative case study does make use of explicit theoretical generalisation and applies these to a specific case. The aim is to gain insight in the case rather than to improve the generalisation. The other four types of case studies have a theory-building purpose. Hypothesis-generating case studies start with a possible hypothesis and aim to formulate a definite hypothesis. Their goal is to develop theoretical generalisations in research areas where no sufficient theory yet exists. The theory-confirming and the theory-infirming case studies test established generalisations by analysing single cases. Finally, the deviant case studies focus on cases that deviate from established generalisations. These aim to weaken probabilistic hypotheses in order to identify unknown variables or refine known variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-693).

This research has an exploratory character and aims to generate theoretical generalisations with regard to the escalation and de-escalation of irregular warfare. Theoretical insights are limited, as most scholars focus on a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a theoretical model that explains the dynamics of a conflict is lacking. The existing theories focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not yet possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations and mechanisms that might become visible in the case studies. This research contains two parts. The first part consists of the analysis of four, both a-theoretical and interpretative, single case studies. This offers the opportunity to gather more specific data on the specific cases, in which existing theoretical generalisations are used to create a better understanding of conflict dynamics. The single case analysis will compare factors along the timespan of the conflict. Nevertheless, these single case studies will function as hypothesis- generating case studies by comparing them with the other three cases. Hence, the second part consists of comparing the outcomes of the single case studies in a comparable cross-case study, with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework for irregular armed conflicts.

3.5 METHOD OF DATA-GATHERING

This research project consists of two separate parts, both using different methods of data- gathering. The literature study requires a literature review of different methods, theories and perspectives on studying irregular warfare. Reviewing this provides not only the opportunity to find the best method for studying conflicts, it also shows that there are many existing theories on escalatory factors. The ultimate aim will be to combine all these factors in one theoretical structure in order to generalise. By dividing these factors along three dimensions,

46 the state, the non-state and the context dimension, a clear framework of analysis is created. The aim of the first part of the project, the atheoretical and interpretative single case studies, is to gather new data and add knowledge about the specific case to academic resources of the conflicts. The gathering of data about the cases will be done in several ways. First, secondary literature will be used to describe and analyse the cases. Additionally, reviewing the secondary literature about the cases will indicate the knowledge gaps and possibly highlight misperceptions. From this point, information will be gathered from primary sources to fill the gap(s). Newspaper articles, biographies, news films and interviews in documentaries or news shows will be used for this. Finally, an attempt will be made to conduct interviews with persons that have experienced the conflict first hand or can be considered experts, such as researchers, diplomats, or persons working for NGOs that have been actively involved in the conflict.

3.6 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.6.1 GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH

This research is of explanatory nature. In order to answer the research question, parts of the grounded theory approach are used. Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 274) defined grounded theory as an approach for developing theory that is "grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed". The approach consists of a flexible research design for a constant comparative analysis. A simplified explanation: the researcher starts with a phase of data collection and data analysis, which is followed by a phase of reflection on concepts or categories. These reflections influence the choices made in the next phase of data collection. The approach offers the researcher the possibility to switch back and forth between data collection and analysis, in order to gain in-depth knowledge on concepts or categories. The ultimate goal is the development of a substantive theory.

The literature review reveals that the theoretical insights on the dynamics in irregular warfare are limited, as most scholars focus on a single variable or a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a comprehensive theoretical model that explains the dynamics of an irregular armed conflict is lacking. The existing theories only focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations that might become visible in the case studies. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the outcomes of the 47 single case studies will be subjected to a comparable cross-case study with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework.

In this way, elements of the grounded theory approach are used, as the researchers start with a phase of data collection and analysis, in which previously identified key factors that might influence conflict dynamics are analysed. This is followed by a phase of reflection, which includes a comparable cross-case study. This phase of reflection might offer new insights into the previously identified or new key factors. The outcomes can add to the final phase of data collection and analysis.

3.6.2 STRUCTURING THE ANALYSIS

The literature review offers a broad overview of the research that has been conducted to understand the dynamics of conflicts. The theories have been divided in those exploring the causes of the onset of a conflict, the causal mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the war, and the conflict resolution. In this research, we will focus primarily on the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of an irregular armed conflict. The aim is to find out the drivers of the dynamics. In order to identify these drivers, an integral approach is adopted, which will result into a comprehensive overview of the factors driving conflict dynamics. Stokke (2006) argued that the conflict resolution school only pays limited attention to the long-term developments of grievances, forces and strategies, focusing too much on negotiations and peace processes. Pahlavi and Ouellet underscore that using an integral approach, which will result in finding more factors that influenced the conflict. For instance, changing values, worldviews or strategies can change a conflict drastically.

The integral approach requires a certain degree of structuring, which is ensured by the following analytical framework. Stokke (2006) argued that conflicts should be approached broadly. However, he warned for becoming too vague and all-inclusive in analysing the conflict dynamics. The analytical framework was constructed to structure this study. Additions can be made after the single case, and the comparative analysis, since the grounded theory approach is used. The framework consists of factors that have either been identified in previous research projects or could be related to the state or the non-state dimension.

Thus, the analytical framework combines several theoretical insights that have been discussed in the literature review. By identifying the factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, an analytical framework is built. The framework has been translated into a conceptual model.

Because of the qualitative nature of the study, the conceptual model is a schematic representation of the key factors that influence conflict dynamics, and how they relate to each other. The framework is divided into three realms: context, state perspective and non-state perspective. The framework will be applied to the cases and used to answer the research question. However, as explained before, since a grounded theory approach is used, the framework is not static. New findings in the case studies expanded the framework with two more factors. First, regional politics are distinguished from international politics, making it a separate factor. In all four cases it appeared that regional politics had a big impact on driving conflict dynamics. This new factor is added to the analytical framework, since these regional dynamics were significantly important in the four studied cases. Secondly, geography has been important in three of our cases. Geography played an important role in, for instance, determining strategy of armed groups, state action and social cleavages. This had a significant impact on conflict dynamics in three of the studied cases, which is why geography had been added to the analytical framework. Theoretical foundation of the two added factors has been added to the literature review afterwards. A visualisation of these realms is shown in figure 1, explanations follow below.

Figure 3. The analytical framework

3.6.3 THREE REALMS OF ANALYSIS

State perspective

The state is one of the principal actors when it comes to wars and politics in general. The concept of what the state is exactly, has famously been worked out as a political science concept by Garner (1910). A state is “a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control and possessing an organised government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience” (p. 41). In order to grasp the role of state actors, first, the influence of governmental action on conflict dynamics will be considered. Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969) explained that governmental action follows from the process of public policymaking. The outcomes are policy responses that take different forms (regulations, subsidies, quotas and laws), and are implement at different levels (local, regional and national level). Stewart (2002) explained how state actions in Aceh, Indonesia, and Guatemala fuelled and prolonged the conflicts. The analysis will also take into account the influence of the capacity of state actors on the conflict dynamics. Rotberg (2010) explained the dynamics of nation-state failure, and defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. The underlying rationale is that a weak state is at greater risk of civil war.

Non-state perspective

As non-state involvement is a crucial element of the concept of irregular warfare, it is needed to analyse non-state actors as an important factor in the conflict. The actions of militant insurgent group are assumed to change the dynamics of the conflict due to their characteristics. One observation that continues returning in the theories on insurgent groups is the criminalisation of the militant groups. This criminal behaviour consists of trafficking arms and narcotics and other smuggling related activities, extortion, robbing banks or houses, amongst other things (Clarke, 2011, p. 163). Militants groups can use criminal activities only for financial support, but they can also engage in strategic partnerships with criminal organisations (Dishman, 2001). This criminalisation can influence the conflict, for instance, when it becomes financially profitable for civilians to engage with the militant group, because of their lucrative criminal activities. Factionalisation is another characterising factor of the non-state actor that can influence the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Duyvestein & Schuurman (2012) explain that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will

50 try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.

Contextual factors

The contextual factors refer to the remaining factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, which cannot be related to the actions of the state or the non-state actors.

The grievance-based explanations of civil war can be considered to explain a contextual factor. Tarrow (2007, p. 593) is one of the scholars stating that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Grievance will be considered as dissatisfaction or discontentment arising from acts that are perceived as unjust or unfair.

Rotberg (2010, p. 5) explains how conflicts may be rooted in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The existence of social cleavages creates horizontal inequality. Here, Neto and Cox's (1997, p. 152) definition of social cleavages will be used: "social differences that might become politicised, or might not, differences of ethnicity, religion, language or occupation […]".

The local, national, and international politics are also considered to be a contextual factors. As exemplified by Berdal (2005) substate polities, sometimes considered as fragile, may have the capacity to provide some of the core functions of government. This way, developments in local politics have explained the striking success of the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. One can also imagine how foreign support, as an outcome of international politics, might influence the dynamics of a conflict.

3.6.3 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE FACTORS

3.6.3.1 CONTEXT

Social cleavages

The presence of social cleavages within a society can result into inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional communities, which causes inter-communal tensions. Rotberg (2010) argued that civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. De Rouen (2007) identified the processes of dominance and polarisation in highly divided societies. The first occurs when one group forms an absolute majority; while the latter occurs when society is split into two groups. Internal divisions can 51 spark sectarian violence and escalate the conflict, if the indifferences cannot be resolved peacefully.

Popular support

Popular support, or the lack of it, relates to both the state-actor and non-state actor perspective. Popular support is needed to legitimate their action, whether this is armed resistance (need of recruits, access to local resources etc.), or counterterrorism operations (support of the citizens for government action). According to Wood (2003), repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force was used indiscriminately. Crucial for this support is an emergence of insurgent political culture, providing a shared view/idea of justification and nurturing a will of ultimate sacrifice. From state-actor point of view, Schuurman (2013) argued that public support is an important factor in counterterrorism operations, as it legitimises the applied policy. However, it also sets boundaries to that same policy for both the state as the non-state actors. The rise and fall of public support for both the government and the oppositional actors can partly explain the developments in levels of violence.

Grievances

Grievances are often invoked in a conflict as legitimation by parties in explaining the origin of the conflict or their motivation for continuing the conflict. Grievances, based on Collier and Sambanis (2002), can follow from different sources, such as economic, political or social basis, and are either objective or perceived. Objective grievances can be measured, such as the distribution of wealth according to the Lorenz curve. Perceived grievances are about the amount to which certain populations perceive the existence of a grievance that does not necessarily exist. Economic grievances constitute, for instance, the extent to which parties share in sources of national wealth. Political grievances are about power relations in communities, and can relate to, for instance, the legitimacy of the governance system. This refers to questions such as, whether there is democracy, what form of democratic system applies, and whether there is a form of political exclusion. Social grievances consider social issues, such as ethnic or religious dominance forms of social exclusion. Grievances are not limited to current grievances, but can also be the result of perceived past injustices that have not been acknowledged.

Local politics

Local political dynamics can be a casual mechanism for conflict dynamics, for example, new elections that change the political strategy of the region. It is also possible that the militants of a specific region are extremely divided, which can result in regional power struggles and rivalries between (political) leaders. Furthermore, when an insurgent group has the ambition of self-determination and secession, it is possible they begin a process of state-building in their region during the conflict. This creates a separate political institution, with its own sphere of influence. Strong state-building can result in a larger cleavage between the insurgents and the rest of the population and it can increase the popular support for the insurgents, since they provide welfare and security (Stokke, 2006; Berdal, 2005; White, 1996).

National politics

The significance of national politics in explaining civil wars is related to the question which system is better to implement in order to reduce conflict. Reynal-Querol (2001) observed that countries with alternative political systems have different probabilities of civil war. The central idea is that in a consociational, inclusive political system, the opportunistic cost of an insurgency rises, and lowers the probability of an insurgency. Therefore, besides the level of civil liberties and freedoms, the level of representation of the population in government can be analysed. In this way, the political system might have an explanatory power concerning the outbreak of a conflict. Additionally, the type of politics, for instance, coalition politics or patronage politics, can be observed to explain heightened levels of violence. Political turbulence can significantly impact the dynamics of the conflict, as a dysfunctional political system can cause significant tensions. From a different perspective, the political arena causes ongoing power struggles with great ramifications for society. In this way, national politics can also offer indications of a weak or strong government. At last, national political processes, such as elections, are an indicator for national politics.

Regional politics

Regional politics, as opposed to the national and international politics, is defined by Dreyer (1994) as ranging from such phenomena as cross-border movements to regional diplomatic, economic and military strategies. Therefore, what includes to the domain of regional politics are actions and decisions that do not occur and are not focused solely on national level, but on regional level, involving neighbouring countries and actors. Indicators for regional politics are support for the insurgent movement, an intervention of the conflict, or pressure exercised by

53 the regional power. Regional politics in the context of civil wars can be seen closely related to the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, as pointed out by Forsberg (2009). Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. Therefore, there is a need to analyse also external events and factors in civil wars, such as ethnic kinship linkages, the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries, ethnical polarisation, and impact of inspiration and example of existing conflicts.

International politics

The conflict dynamics can often not be perceived as occurring in an international vacuum, and the nature of the interaction will influence the conflict for the state and often for the non-state actors as well. Wallensteen (2007) argued that the western dominated international system penetrates into all parts of the world, forming a distinct form of social relations which sometimes replaces the traditional local traditions. Dudouet (2010) argued that non-state actors are less sensitive to international sanctions, as they are already operating in an often isolated position. Concurrently, Byman (2007) argued that non-state actors can benefit from cooperation with state partners, but risk losing credibility with the local communities. Ramsbothan et. al. (2011) provided another indicator by arguing that irregular armed conflict can result in diasporas, that itself influence the conflict, for instance, by ideological or financial support. A more economic explanation is used by Malone and Nitzchke (2005), who argued that international actors often get involved in the war economy. Foreign military intervention is the most pervasive form of international politics influencing the conflict dynamics. Accordingly, Bapat (2012) added that state sponsorship can be a form of strategic communication, and result in an improved negotiation position for an international actor, but comes at the cost of potentially losing control over the supported non-state actor.

Natural disaster

Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman conducted research about what influence a natural disaster can have on a conflict. Indicators for natural disasters can be tsunamis or volcano eruptions, but also drought. A disaster can de-escalate the conflict, for instance, because disaster relief and diplomacy can have a positive effect on the peace process. Both parties share grief caused by the same external factor that brings them together. However, natural disasters can also escalate the conflict, for instance, with unfair distribution of relief aid.

Geography

Fearon and Laitin (2003) implicated that geography influences the nature and the outcome of a conflict. They found that rugged terrain increases the probability of the onset of a civil war. This can be related to the strategic advantages that can be derived from geographical settings. In particular, rain forests and mountains complicate locating non-state armed forces. Thereby, the rugged landscape becomes an incentive to initiate a conflict. It also impacts the course of the conflict, as it influences the strategic choices of state and non-state actors. Another indicator for geography is the geographic diffusion (Kathman, 2010).

3.6.3.2 STATE

State action – coercive force

According to Schultz (1979), the core of this strategy is to employ ´pain and violence´ to make resistance ´terrible beyond endurance´. In the civil war setting, use of coercive force by the state actor against dissident groups is usually labelled as counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism. According to the United States Institute of Peace´s special report (1999), these tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, including deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations. In this framework, negotiations will belong to state action – policy solution. In addition, Solomon (2015) mentioned the closure of borders, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of additional security troops. As pointed out by Wood (2003), coercive force used to repress deeply felt grievances can lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Also Collier and Sambanis (2003) promoted a hypothesis that government repression increases opposition, especially in the case when repression is not total, which can promote and lead to violent confrontations. Porch (2013) argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim. Furthermore, Solomon (2015) argued that traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter- productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity giving rise to opposing movements.

State action – policy solution

Policies adopted by states influence the dynamics of a conflict. Schuurman (2013) developed a framework of five categories in which policies can be determined. This framework can be

55 useful in indicating policy solution used in the conflicts in this research, since it provides a broad picture of possible policies. The categories are: the lack of response, where the issue is ignored; reconciliation policies; legal reform policies, which consist of changing laws to increase the capability of the government to combat the terrorist groups, such as anti-terrorism legislation; policy that actively disrupts the terrorist group organisational capabilities; and active repression, including the use of violence to destroy a terrorist group. It has to be noted that in our research, the last category is part of state action – coercive force.

Complementary to these categories, Dudouet (2011) argued that proscription of non-state actors can result in increased radicalism, and is a direct impediment to negotiations and reconciliation. Adding to this, Mukherjee (2014) argued medium capacity states often prefer a containment policy, which could fit in several of the policy categories proposed by Schuurman (2011).

State capacity

Besley and Persson (2010) analysed the cohesion of the capacity of state actors and conflict dynamics. They state that states with a low capacity, which they call weak states, have a higher risk of conflict. Conflict theories mainly consider state capacity as an exogenous factor. However, in this analysis it will be treated as part of the state and possible causal mechanism to drive conflict dynamics, for instance, the quality and quantity of the army, and the state’s economic situation. They also concluded that a conflict is an incentive to invest in state capacity. A larger state capacity will increase the state's chances to control the insurgent conflict. Rotberg (2010) defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. This includes the capacity of providing security for its citizens.

Weak or strong state

Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that enlarge the risk of conflict. The capacity of a state is reflected by effective delivery of political goods to the public, which requires a well-financed and administratively competent government. This can be analysed by assessing the social services offered by the state, but also by reviewing the legitimacy of (para) military forces and the police. Other indicators for weak or strong state are weak or strong political coalitions, or the weak or strong control over the state apparatus.

3.6.3.3 NON STATE

Strategy of armed groups

Strategy of armed group in civil war context can be approached from the motivation perspective, as motives for rebellion can be argued to be represented in organisation´s strategy. According to Weinstein (2007), insurgency group´s recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. Following this, Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency, namely opportunistic rebellions (less risky, possibility for short-term gains, low-commitment participants), and activist rebellions (risky participation, unlikely of short-term gains, high-commitment participants willing to contribute for future rewards). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence. Other used indicators for strategy of the armed groups are the use of terrorist tactics (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2009), using peace processes, having ulterior motives (Stedman, 1997) and involving the international community to gain support for their cause. Nevertheless, researchers recognise that there are a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592).

Capacity of armed groups

The capacities of the non-state actor can differ markedly from that of states. After all, as pointed out by Pearlman and Cunningham (2012):

The imperatives and possibilities of a collective striving to attain statehood, secede from a state, or seize control of a state are quite different from those of the duly constituted government of a state with a monopoly on violence and internationally recognised sovereignty. (p. 4)

The capacity of non-state armed groups to effectuate authority and violence is determined by several factors. Legitimacy or public support is a factor in the capacity of armed groups, especially in relation to the policy of the non-state actor (Schuurman, 2013) or the relative legitimacy of the group versus the legitimacy of the government (Dudouet, 2011; Solomon, 2015). Furthermore, non-state actor´s affiliation with political organisations is an important indicator of its capabilities and motivation to push for policy change (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013, p. 521). In addition, according to Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2013) factors such number of troop size (p. 521), how capable the rebels are at procuring

57 arms and at fighting (p. 522), and whether they have centralised command structure (p. 522), and do they control territory (p. 523), are essential indicators of the capacity of armed groups.

Factionalisation

The factionalisation of an armed group can drive conflict escalation or de-escalation in several ways. Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) described the possibility that armed groups split into factions, each defending its own sphere of influence. Groups might use violence to frustrate the process, for instance, when they are not invited for peace negotiations. Jonhston (2007) even stated that governments could seek to divide armed groups in order to exploit one or several of them to fight the others. The factionalisation of an armed group can also result in the end of the conflict, when the factions have not the sufficient capacity to fight the state actor anymore. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012) explained that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.

Criminalisation

Dishman (2001) reflected upon the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation, which is believed to take place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). The terrorist groups might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to analyse the transformation, the aims and interests must be assessed. Terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). Indicators for criminalisation of an armed group are, aside from the presence of criminal activities as, for instance, bank robberies and drugs smuggling, the change of nature or motive of the armed group from the political goal to crime.

3.7 CASE SELECTION

Four cases are selected to provide insight into conflict dynamics. Similarities between the cases are required, in order to make a viable comparison. The selected cases are all irregular armed conflicts. They share the similarity of a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. The non-state actor is an insurgent group with the primary aim to control a territory and a population, which they try to achieve by using violence, including terrorism tactics. To ensure enough information is available, the conflicts have been brought to an end for at least five years. Also, the conflicts should be recent, which means that they took place in the 20th and/or

21st century. Finally, all cases have a colonial history. The cross-case analysis will offer insight into the causal mechanisms of conflict dynamics in the four cases. The possibility of a deviant case is taken into account. The deviant case might point out a different causal factor, offering a new, unspecified explanation for changing conflict dynamics. If applicable to other cases, it could culminate into a general proposition.

Israeli Independence war

The Israeli Independence War (1947-1948) can go by many names, showcasing its enduring effect even on modern day politics. The conflict took different forms, at times consisting of riots and use of terrorist tactics by some actors, growing into a full scale interstate war after initial insurgent successes. While many terrorist groups were active in the conflict, the main non-state actors had clear insurgent goals, the capture of territory and people and the creation of a state. Various non-state actors had different war goals, for instance, the Jewish groups were fighting for a Jewish state, while Arab groups wanted an Arab state in one form or another.

The area has a long colonial past. In the early 1500s it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, who maintained rule until the British conquest of the region during the Great War. At the end of the insurgency, rule of the British Empire had ended, and a new state was born. While the root of the broader conflict can be traced back to the late 19th century, the insurgent war started only during the 1940s, with the end of World War Two in sight and the beginning of the period of decolonisation.

Lebanese Civil War

The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975, after the Lebanese Army was deployed to end a fisherman’s strike. The controversy of the army being deployed against a civil demonstration was reinforced by the fact that the fishermen were Sunni Muslims and the Lebanese Army was seen as a tool of power of the Maronite Christian president. This fuelled inter-sectarian violence. However, it must be noted that the Lebanese had lived with ethno-religious tensions since its independence. Although the issues appeared to be religious, they were of political and economic nature (Ofeish, 1996, p. 432).

The sectarian tensions erupted in hostilities between the Lebanese army and armed factions. With the arrival of the Palestinians, the Maronite Christians and Muslims interests were driven further apart, and the Lebanese state collapsed in a civil conflict. A coalition of

Christians-rightist parties was placed against the joint forces of the Muslim-rightist parties. The civil war in Lebanon would last for 15 years. In 1989, the Taif Accord is signed, establishing a relative equitable political system, in which Muslims are given a greater voice in the political process and sectarian divisions are further institutionalised.

The region of modern Lebanon came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918. After World War I, the provinces constituting modern Lebanon were mandated to France. The French declared the Lebanese Republic in 1926. The colonial enclave was separated from Syria, but it was still administered under the French Mandate for Syria. In 1941, French and British troops occupied Lebanon out of fear that Germany would gain control of Syria and Lebanon. After Wold War II, the French dominance declined as a result of wartime losses and rising Arab nationalism. After 20 years of French mandate, Lebanon gained independence on the basis of the 1943 National Pact.

Namibian Independence War

As British historian Marion Wallace (2011) has pointed out, Namibia is "one of Africa´s least understood and studied countries" (Wallace, 2011, p. 13). Namibia acquired its modern boundaries in 1884-1885 when the European emperors divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference. The majority of Namibia went to the Germans and was given the name German South West Africa, while Britain held on to the tiny, natural deep-sea harbour of Walvis Bay. After the outbreak of the First World War, the South African army invaded Namibia and took control of the colony on behalf of the anti-German alliance. With the declaration of peace in 1918, South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer 'South West Africa'. By the end of the Second World War the United Nations took over responsibility for all League of Nations mandates with the purpose of leading the nations towards independence. In Namibia’s case these plans were thwarted by the rise to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which instead incorporated Namibia into South Africa as its fifth province. South African government imposed its policies of apartheid throughout the country, forcing indigenous population to live on segregated tribal 'reserves', providing only meagre resources for living, giving a first pulse for the resistance movement, later to become the leading liberation movement SWAPO, South West Africa People´s Organisation.

The first significant wave of black resistance to white minority rule emerged in December 1959, which South Africans responded by firing on unarmed demonstrators killing 12. Since

60 then freedom fighters started to advocate Namibia´s independence for the United Nations. The UN called on South Africa to withdraw, but took no concrete action to back up this demand. Liberia and Ethiopia took Namibia´s case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but after four years of deliberation, the court dismissed the case in 1966.

After these continues setbacks and forceful oppression by South Africa, SWAPO launched the armed struggle in a bid to forcibly remove South Africa from Namibia. The first clash between Swapo´s armed wing, the People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African security forces took place on 26 August, 1966. This started the decades long violent independence struggle, ended only by the 1989 UNTAG-mission and subsequent independence in 1990.

Sri Lankan Civil War

The Sri Lankan Civil War officially started in 1983, after a violent riot that killed thousands of Tamils. However, the post-colonialisation period is already characterised by discriminatory laws against minorities, non-violent demonstrations and eventually violent riots and terrorist attacks. The civil war began with several violent Tamil insurgent groups, but over the years the LTTE succeeded in eliminating the others. For 26 years, until the crushing 2009 military campaign by the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil Tigers fought their battle for secession against the government. They used terrorist tactics, such as political assassinations and suicide bombings, but they also stood out in conventional warfare practices. The LTTE had one goal: their own state called Tamil Eelam.

The island has a history colonisation by several Western powers. Portugal first discovered the island in 1505, calling it Ceilão. The stories about the fruitful island reached Holland and in 1658, the Dutch took over the island, which they called Zeylan. The British conquered Ceylon in 1796 and stayed until Ceylon became an independent state in 1948. The island’s population has always been diverse. However, after independence, peaceful coexistence became less easy because of several factors. The Ceylon Tamils benefitted from the British rule since they went to British schools, spoke English and worked together with the British occupier. Meanwhile, the Sinhalese population went to Sinhalese Buddhist schools and had a disadvantaged position compared to the Ceylon Tamils. The nationalist feeling of Sinhalese also rose because of the colonisation. The British occupiers slowly changed the political system from representation based on hierarchy to representation based on ethnicity, which declined political power of the

61 minorities. This was the foundation of circumstances that eventually resulted in the irregular armed conflict in 1983.

Overview Period State vs Non-state Groups with Colonial Insurgent history strategies

Israeli 1947-1948 British Empire vs. Found on both the Ottoman Empire Independence Jewish non-state vs. Jewish and Arab side (1500s-1917) and Arab foreign state and British Empire War non-state actors (1917-1948)

Namibian 1966-1990 South Africa vs. South African security German South Independence SWAPO/PLAN forces, PLAN West Africa (1884-1914), War South Africa (LN mandate 1915- 1945, as a captured province 1948-1990)

Ottoman Empire Lebanese Civil 1975-1990 Blurred lines between Communal (1517-1918) War state and non-state: a mobilisation along pro-status quo camp ethno-religious lines French mandate (Christian-rightist (1920-1943) parties) vs. the anti- status quo camp (Muslim-leftist parties)

Sri Lankan 1983-2009 Sinhalese government Several Tamil By the Portuguese Civil War vs. several Tamil non- insurgent groups, later (1505-1658), the state actors all eliminated by the Dutch (1658- LTTE 1796) and eventually the British (1796- 1948)

Figure 4. Overview of the cases

3.8 THE UTILITY OF USING PHASES

Some conflicts have a timespan of more than 20 years. Other conflicts have a dense character with a high frequency in important events. To provide a clear picture of a conflict and to structure the analysis, the conflicts will be divided into phases. This gives the opportunity to study a smaller part of the conflict more intensive and to expose more details. Furthermore, breaking the conflicts down into smaller parts, also gives a structure for the within-case analysis. It emphasises the changing character of conflicts and will show the different influences the factors can have within a single conflict, in different phases.

The division into phases will not be done on the basis of specific pre-determined factors, but this will be conflict-specific. The only condition will be that a new phase should herald a change in the nature of the conflict. For instance, when an actor’s strategy changes, or when elections have taken place and a new government has been installed. The division can also be based on a frequent returning factor, like peace processes or foreign support. The motivation or grievance behind the violence can change over the conflict, which can define phases. In each case the choice of basis of the division will be explained, using the in-depth study of the conflict.

4. THE ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE WAR

4.1 INTRODUCTION:

In the early afternoon of July 22, 1946, a bomb went off at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people and wounding another 46. At the time, the King David hotel was the centre of the British administration in the mandate of Palestine and Transjordan. The events are set against the backdrop of the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. Half of Europe was occupied by soviet troops, and many Holocaust victims were still living in refugee camps spread across Europe. While the Levant had not been a stable region for decades, with Arabs, Jews and Ottomans at times all facing each other, the 1940’s were particular volatile. This analysis focusses on the Israeli Independence War, which occurred in 1947 – 1948 in the region that was the British mandate of Palestine, and today is known for a large part as the state of Israel.

This analysis will start by introducing some of the main actors and their main characteristics. The dynamics of the conflict do not spring from nothing, so the next part is devoted to a compact description of the prologue leading up to the war. Then the war is described in phases, followed by an epilogue. Eventually an analysis will be made per framework driver and finally a conclusion. Many actors are involved in this conflict, often with the same actor going by multiple names. While all actors and terminology will be explained in-text, appendix A give an oversight and explain the main terminology and actors.

The terminology of the conflict is somewhat controversial. For this research the term ‘Israeli independence war’ has been chosen, as it seems to best cover the conflicts which started during the last phases of World War II, and ended in the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states. The often used term ‘Arab-Israeli war of 1948’ does not include the Jewish-British aspects of the war which dominated the 1945-1947 timeframe.

Research on the conflict has focussed mainly on available academic sources. Although the Israeli Independence War seems to be an understudied and heavily politicized conflict, good sources are available on the main, Jewish, Arab Muslim and British perspectives. Less sources were found to be available on the specific minorities that were living in Palestine during the mandate period, such as the Christian Arabs, Bedouins, Circassians and Arameans. Although local politics have probably played a role during the conflict, here too, a lack of sources was identified.

Phase Timeframe Title 1 1939 – May No resolution The enduring political tensions are brought to a height 1946 with the publication of the 1939 whitepaper and the onset of World War II. 2 May 1946 – Terror in Increasingly Jewish militants are willing to utilize terrorism November Palestine in an effort to oust Britain from the Palestine Mandate. 1947 3 November Civil War in Adoption of resolution 181 and announcement of British 1947 – Palestine withdrawal results in increasing intercommunal tensions March 1948 and violence between Palestinians. 4 March 1948 The Jewish Despite increasing pressure military pressure on the – May 1948 offensive Jewish communities, international acquisitions allows for a Jewish offensive to be undertaken, shifting the character of the civil war. 5 May 1948 – Interstate war As the mandate is formally terminated, the State of Israel December of 1948 is proclaimed and the Arab League armies invade the 1948 territory. Table 1: Overview of all phases of the Israeli independence war

4.2 CASE DESCRITION

4.2.1 PROLOGUE:

The Arab-Israeli conflict, as it is known today, has a long history, some authors, like James Gelvin (2014) start their timeline in the sixteenth century, this prologue however will start with World War I, which saw the capture of Southern Syria on the Ottoman Empire by allied forces. This effectively ended Ottoman rule over Palestine, or Southern Syria, as the Ottomans considered it. History could be traced back further, back to biblical times some could argue. However, as both space and time for this prologue are limited, it will start with the British takeover of the Ottoman provinces during World War I. The British occupation of the Middle-Eastern region of Palestine was a major political event, while the Ottomans had maintained relative stability through their century old institutions. British rule over the Middle East brought an end to this, and allowed many entrepreneurs and opportunists to take advantage of the situation. This would mark the start of political rivalries between the Jewish Zionist elites, the various Arab elites, aspiring Arab rule of the region in one form or another, and the British Empire seeking permanent control of a strategic region.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the Axis countries, to which the British Empire responded by attacking the Ottoman Empire from Egypt. A military campaign was launched from Egypt, aimed at conquering the Middle-Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. To achieve military victory, the British made use of a number of Arab irregular

65 forces for conducting small unit warfare against the Ottomans. In order to gain support from the local tribes, Britain had made promises to the Arabs such as self-government to be granted after defeating the Ottoman Empire. However, in the same period, the British made promises to the Jewish communities both in Palestine and to Zionist leaders in the form of the Balfour declaration (Balfour, 1917) that a Jewish national home would be established in Palestine. According to Sherman (1997), the Middle East, was perceived by the British imperial administration itself as a vital region to control, as it allowed access to the vast oil supplies and was a vital region for maintaining the links with the possessions of the British Empire in Asia, East Africa and Oceania. On top of this, it was of vital interest to the British Empire to maintain good relations with the Muslim communities, as a conflict with the Muslims could affect or even endanger stability in parts of the Empire where large Muslim populations lived (Sherman, 1997, ch. 1).

ASSUMPTION OF THE MANDATE AND ARAB VIOLENCE December 09, 1917, marked the capture of Jerusalem by British forces. British military rule of Palestine would last until 1920, when the mandate of Palestine was officially awarded to Britain by the Council of the League of Nations (1922). The mandate incorporated the principles of the Balfour declaration, giving British authorities the obligation to create a ‘Jewish National Home’ in Palestine. Civil administration took over from the military administration in June 1920, although the mandate of Palestine would officially only be assumed later, at the end of September 1923.

British assumption of the mandate resulted in increased friction with the Arab population, as Sherman (1997) argues the Arabs perceived that the British government would not be able to fulfil its promises to both the Arabs and to the Jews. In November 1919 the first Palestine Arab Congress met, and started to organize Palestinian Arab opposition to British rule of Palestine and to counter the growing Zionist influence on British policy. Miller (2010) reports the first organized violence by Arab Nationalists occurred in 1920, and was mainly aimed at the Jewish population of Palestine, the Yishuv. Anti-Jewish violence continued to occur, amongst which the notable Jaffa riots, in 1921, which held on for days and resulted in some 300 people getting either killed or injured.

The growing unrest resulted in the British prompting an investigation on what policy to follow in the Mandate Area, resulting in the 1922 whitepaper. This whitepaper contained plans for partitioning the mandate area of Palestine between Palestine, west of the river Jordan

66 under British rule, and Transjordan, east of the same river, under rule of a British controlled leader. The whitepaper also marked the first British attempt to limit Jewish immigration, as this was perceived as one of the main Arab grievances, by declaring that only the amount of immigrants that could economically be supported by the Palestinian economy would be allowed to immigrate. As Miller argues, the whitepaper was not specific on the long term outlook, leaving enough room for favourable interpretation by both actors. This ensured relative appeasement of the communities decreasing intercommunal tensions until the late 1920’s.

INCREASING INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE

Violence and intercommunal tension increased again after the Yom Kippur incident of 1928. Despite a strict building regulation code, prohibiting the Jews from erecting any permanent structure around the Western Wall in Jerusalem, in preparation for the celebration of Yom Kippur a screen was erected separating the male and female prayer areas. The Arabs demanded the removal of the screen as it was perceived as a violation of the agreements for use of the area, with the screen perceived as a potentially permanent structure. The British police eventually removed the screen (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1928). This would turn out to be the start of a spiral of new violence. While the British attempted to assert law and order, both Arab and Yishuv leaders were using the situation to increase political agitation and were using escalating language.

The escalatory language consisted of the accusation of both sides that the other was claiming the exclusive rights to the holy places in Jerusalem. The escalation resulted in riots, and the 1929 riots would culminate in a bloody event in what is known as the Hebron massacre. After riots in Jerusalem, false rumours spread throughout Palestine that during the riots the Jews had committed mass murder on Arab citizens in Jerusalem. In Hebron, these rumours resulted in retaliatory action, in the form of large-scale violent attacks on the Jewish community in the area. This violence subsequently spread throughout the mandate territory. In the end 249 people would be killed and 571 injured (Segev, 1999, Gelvin, 2014).

This is also one of the first events where the Hagana would come into action, ineffectively trying to protect the communities of the Yishuv from the Arab violence. The Hagana had been instated after the Jaffa riots of 1921, in order to protect the Jewish communities in Palestine in instances where the British Authority would be unable or unwilling to do so. The services could be offered in the cities, but were especially present in the small rural communities

67 living in the Palestine countryside, sometimes insufficiently prioritized or hardly affected by state policies and security services. The Hagana at this point was a very local self-defence militia, small in size, poorly armed and a hardly operationally effective force. Protection during the whole of the 1929 riots had mainly come from the citizens, the police and in some cases from Arabs, sheltering their Jewish neighbours.

RISING TENSIONS OVER JEWISH IMMIGRATION

After the riots the Shaw Commission investigated the riots and published its report in march 1930. It found that the riots were to blame on the Arabs, although no evidence was presented for a premeditated escalation by Arab leadership, it is highly likely that this was purposeful ignored (Ofer, 1985). The report concluded that the Arab grievance was based on the acquired economic advantage by the Zionists, coupled with a fear of large scale Jewish immigration. These claims by the Shaw Commission were quickly verified by the Hope Simpson enquiry (1930) into immigration, land settlement and development. The enquiry concluded that the land sales by the Arabs would in time have negative impact on Arab society. As the Jewish buyers were willing to pay high prices, the price of land increased, but once sold, the Arabs would be unable to take advantage of the land through leasing or other agreements, as the Jewish buyers in general would only lease the land out to Jewish tenants. In order to increase employment options for Jewish immigrants, all Jewish companies were to hire Jewish employees, and strongly motivated to refrain from hiring Arab workers. As Arabs were selling their land to Jewish investors, the Simpson (1930) enquiry found, a serious risk arose for diminishing future economic opportunities for Arabs. Simpson did note that Arab politicians might be exaggerating in order to increase the perception of the economic risks. This allowed them to utilize Arab unemployment as a political issue, instead of being held accountable for it. The report concluded by advising limiting the Jewish immigration to Palestine. The recommendations of the Simpson enquiry were taken over by British authority in the Passfield whitepaper (Bell, 1977). Under the whitepaper Jewish immigration was limited, and new regulations were put in place to prevent buying of land by Jewish organizations. This could be perceived, Bell (1977) argues, as rewarding the Arab massacres of the 1929 riots with pro-Arab policies.

The unrest and increasing violence in Palestine of the early 1930’s, collided with a deteriorating situation for the Jews in Europe. Pogroms, being organized anti-Semitic violence, had a long history of regular occurrence in central and Eastern Europe, but became more

68 popular and widespread during this time. This issue was aggravated by Soviet policies, which deteriorated the general living conditions in large parts of the Soviet Union, amongst which was the large scale Soviet Famine of 1932-1933. The famine specifically in the Ukraine, known as the Holodomor, was thought to be orchestrated and resulted in millions of deaths. These factors contributed to willingness of eastern European Jews to migrate to the Middle- East.

In Germany, the anti-Semitic NSDAP came to power in 1933, and started introducing anti- Jewish laws. Although life in Europe became harder for its Jewish citizens, most refused to emigrate and preferred to stay in their home-countries despite the increasingly problematic situation. The Jews that did emigrate from Europe, often coming from Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, did not all go to Palestine. Many sought refuge in other European countries or de United States. The growing number of Jewish refugees immigrating to Palestine, sometimes illegally, caused increased tension with both the British and the Arabs. While both feared the higher number of immigrants, it was mainly the quick increase in numbers and the realization that this was only a small fraction of the millions of Jews living in Europe, that was cause for concern. While in 1931 only 4.075 Jews immigrated, this number would double for 1932, reach 30.327 in 1933 and in the year of the pronouncement of the Nurnberg laws, 1935, 61.859 Jews arrived in Palestine (Bell, 1977, p. 26).

In 1936 the Arab revolted erupted and would only be suppressed by 1939. The Arab revolt evolved from several violent incidents early in the year between Arabs, Jews and British. By April, the Al-Husseini clan (see prologue - Arab Perspective) organized the Arab Higher Committee in a bid to unite and centralize the Palestinian clans, dominated by and under leadership of the Al-Husseini clan. The Arab Higher Committee was to organize the resistance to British authority and lead the rebellion. While the Arab revolt in the beginning mainly consisted of strikes, protests and small scale violent riots. Demands made to the British authority included the complete halt of Jewish immigration, Jewish land purchases and ceasing British taxation (Norris, 2008). The Arab Higher Committee activities in Jaffa had resulted in the death of nine Jews, and a rioting group of Arabs started to move towards Tel Aviv, where most of the Jews around that region lived. This caused the British police to take action in restoring the order (Bell, 1977).

THE ARAB REVOLT

By October, the strike was called off by the Arab Higher Committee, as it proofed to be ineffective at hurting the British or Jewish economy, both of which actually seemed to profit from the Arab strike. Requests for termination of the strike were made by both the Hashemite family ruling Transjordan and the Al-Saud family, who had formed and ruled Saudi-Arabia since 1932. The strike was perceived as actively hurting the Arab economies, that had profited from trade with and from Palestine, and directly suffered negative consequences from the general strike. At the same time, the strike was seen as having served its purpose, with the Arab Higher Committee believing the British would comply with their demands.

The general strike was ended, but general resistance to British authority was not. Small bands of Arab bandits would continue to attack Jews and British interests in the region, such as villages, farms, oil pipelines and railroads. They maintained the earlier demands. The violent nature of the resistance led to the British launching a large scale counter-insurgency campaign, or as it was called at the time, an ‘imperial policing operation’ (Hughes, 2010). Military means were brought in from around the empire and a counter insurgency strategy formed. This mobilization of capabilities took months to effect.

During the summer the Arabs were on the offensive, successfully executing offensive operations against Jewish settlements and British interests. Both the British and the Yishuv were at this time mainly concerned with defending their interests, and unable to conduct offensive operations against Arab armed groups in the countryside. This relative success boosted the Arab morale and there was a high belief that the political objective could be achieved. The earlier demands had transformed, and now Arabs were demanding self- government. Arab morale was aided and motivated by successful revolts in neighbouring countries. With negotiations ongoing between the French and Syrian leadership over Syrian independence, and Britain negating with both Egypt and Iraq in order to renegotiate their respective mutual relations (Gelvin, 2014).

In Europe, rising tensions between the Major European powers had their effect on the armed Arab resistance as well. The Italians were conducting their East-Africa campaign, a colonial war against amongst others Ethiopia. These activities caused the Italians to increasingly perceive Britain as a strategic opponent. This motivated the Italian government to lend financial and technical support to Arab armed groups (Bell, 1977; Fiore, 2010). Sympathy was also increasingly found by the Al-Husseini clan with the Italian and Nazi Germany

70 governments. In 1937, Amin Al-Husseini fled Palestine to prevent arrest by the British, from where he would make his way first to Italy, and later to Nazi Germany, with which he would cooperate until the end of World War II.

As the British Government commenced its Imperial Policing operation (Hughes, 2010), they enlisted help from the armed self defence units of the Jewish communities. The Notrim was the Jewish defence militia, founded and funded by the British, which was to be part of the British Palestine police (Bell, 1977). The Jewish Leadership however used the Notrim as a cover for the Hagana, which underwent a large reorganisation in order to be better able to protect the Jewish communities. The British equipped the Notrim with weapons and armoured vehicles. The Notrim was also used by the Yishuv to train and equip Hagana members, as the Hagana was still officially forbidden, and was not able to practice and train on themselves in the open, or risk being arrested by the British Police. This was partly offset by using the Notrim cover.

The increasing violence and increasing capabilities of both the Hagana and the Irgun resulted in a small change in posture. While both maintained their defensive posture, and adhered to their strict defensive strategy, this defensive strategy started to include defensive ambushes, decoy convoys and increased military training. While many different units were active, all were subject to one of the two commands, either the Hagana, or the Irgun. Some of these units would start to train for more offensive type of military operations, this would be the basis of the Palmach striking force subject to the Hagana (Bell, 1977, Heller, 1995b). The Irgun still harboured the ambition to execute offensive and retaliatory operations, but lacked weapons and finances, as the Hagana had prevented Irgun members from joining the Notrim.

As the general strike had ended, the intensity of the revolt was decreasing and the British effort seemed to be effective, a new commission was installed to investigate the root causes of the Arab Revolt. In July 1937 the Peel commission presented its report, in which it assessed that current British policy could not lead to a sufficient stable country, and recommended partition. According to Sinanoglou (2010) the Peel commission concluded that the biggest underlying issue in the mandate, was that it was a structure designed to create an independent state. This state would require citizens accepting their citizenship, rights and duties alike, but this was not achievable. The commission concluded that the Arabs had never accepted their citizenship as Palestinians, but strived for a Pan-Arabic citizenship. Without citizenship shared by the Yishuv and Arabs alike, an independent state would never be able to sustain its

71 institutions, or to function, thus, partitioning the mandate area, in a Jewish state, an Arab state with both their own citizens, and a British controlled area was the only viable option. The Commission also acknowledged that the proposition would be difficult to accept for all involved, but argued that self-determination and a chance for peace must have been a fair offer as well.

Figure 1 Peel commission proposal. Source: www.britannica.com/event/Peel- Commission (Retrieved 11-01-2016)

The Arab Revolt had not been fully suppressed, and presentation of the findings had caused increased grievance, as the Arab factions, both the Al-Husseini and the Nashashibi, perceived it to be a British diplomatic ruse (Sherman, 1997). Acceptance of the proposal would not lead to an Arab state, they believed, but to a British controlled Arab state. All Arabs rejected the plan of partition, and maintained their claim for self-government in all of the Arab world, which they claimed the British had promised before. The Peel commission report led to the 1937 whitepaper, in which the recommendation to partition the mandate territory was ratified.

This resulted in the Arab Revolt to escalate further, as the diplomatic path seemed to be increasingly closed for achieving the political goals for the Arabs. The British government decided to assign a technical commission with the task of investigating the actual possibilities for portioning schemes.

The technical commission (McCullough, 1938) was only able to conduct local research, which was part of its investigation, under heavily armed military escorts. The commission recommended to abandon the 1937 whitepaper, as a partition that was acceptable to all sides was impossible to implement. The official British retraction from the partition plan came on November 9, 1938, in the form of a Whitepaper calling for the London conference, in which delegates from the British, Arabs, neighbouring Arab states and the Jewish agency would meet to settle on a solution. Were no solution to be found, Britain declared itself willing to force a solution on the Palestine issue. The conference, which consisted of a range of meetings between the British government and the separate delegates, did not result in a joined proclamation, enabling the British to unilaterally implement a policy proposal. The new British policy abandoned the partition plan, and redefined the vague promises of the Balfour declaration (1917), on which the Mandate was based, in a way much more favourable to the Arabs. Jewish immigration and land purchases would be severely limited, with only 75.000 Jews allowed to immigrate in the next five years, and subjecting further Jewish immigration in the period thereafter to Arab consent. These measures were intended to create a unified, equal and unitary Palestinian state in ten years time (Sherman, 1997, p. 124).

According to Sherman (1997) the rationale for this pro-Arab stance by Britain lay in the increasing threat of war in Europe, and strategic considerations for the Middle East. Support from the Jewish communities was perceived as being relatively secure, as they could not align to the Axis. Support from the Arab tribes on the other hand needed to be secured, in order to prevent further spread of the Arab revolt or general Arab alignment to the Axis. The Arabs constituted a demographically large population, which was connected by Islam to Muslims all over the British Empire, with Muslim populations in India, Africa and Malaya.

In Europe, relations between the major powers had grown increasingly tense, with Germany increasingly breaking treaties and setting far reaching diplomatic goals. After invading Austria, the so called Anschluss, Germany was expecting to do the same to Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten crisis ended with signing the of the Munich treaty, although despite the treaty tensions between Great Britain and Nazi Germany remained High. Britain perceived an

73 increasing and realistic possibility of an armed conflict in in Europe (Sherman, 1997, p. 123). Preparing for a possible military confrontation in Europe also included ending other conflicts, such as the Arab Revolt, which was taking up sizeable numbers of British Forces. Besides requiring many of the British forces, the region of Palestine was seen as a region of high strategic interest were it to come to war with Germany or Japan. Resolution of the Sudeten Crisis also allowed for a temporary troop level increase in Palestine (Norris, 2008).

The Arab Revolt would be suppressed by 1939, by utilizing a combination of legal, diplomatic and large scale military means (Norris, 2008). These means included the destruction of homes, collective fines and physical punishment. According to Norris (2008), late 1938 the situation had deteriorated, with the British perceiving every Arab as a potential enemy. Despite brutal measures, pacification of the Arab population was hardly achieved. It was however also believed that any policy in favour of the Arabs, or conceding to any of their demands, could only be done after the revolt had been fully repressed, in order to prevent subjects in other British colonies from taking example from the Arab revolt. Suppression was achieved in 1939, but at this time large parts of the Palestinian Arab elite and upper middleclass had either fled to neighbouring countries or had fallen to poverty due to destruction of property and livestock (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010).

1939 WHITEPAPER:

When the Arab Revolt was repressed, the British Government initiated a new investigation an accepted a new whitepaper, known as the McDonald Whitepaper or the 1939 Whitepaper. This whitepaper too was considered pro-Arab, as it called for an eventual halt to Jewish immigration. It also called for a reversal of the decision of the 1937 whitepaper on the creation of two individual states. Land sales in general, but specifically from Arabs to Jews were regulated through the office of the High Commissioner. This policy was intended to prevent the loss of land. In combined with a growing population, the decrease of available land could result in a landless class, unable to sustain themselves economically.

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

Assumption of the Mandate and Arab violence

As the British authority assumed the Mandate the Jewish Zionist organisations were content. The mandate had the specific goal of fulfilling the promises made under the Balfour declaration. The Balfour declaration had been made after extensive lobbying by elements of

74 the World Zionist Organization, which was one of the most powerful and best organised Jewish organisations, and maintained contacts with several governments at the highest levels. The World Zionist Organization was represented in Palestine by the Jewish Agency, which had operated in Palestine since 1908. From 1930 onwards the Jewish agency would represent the Jewish interest in Palestine, and was officially acknowledged by the British authorities as the official representation of the Jewish people. Jewish immigration during the early 1920’s quickly resulted in increased friction with the Arab population of Palestine. As Arabs started to utilize increasingly violent means, the Jewish population, the Yishuv, felt threatened and started organizing their own defence. This gave rise to the Jewish Self Defence Organization Hagana.

Increasing intercommunal violence

The combination of anti-Jewish violence, economic hardship, and low probability of reaching an effective permanent settlement lowered support amongst Jews worldwide for Zionism. The ideal of the Jewish state also lost some traction with those Jews already living in Palestine, with more Jews leaving than arriving in 1927 (Sherman, 1997, p. 77). Until this point, in the words of Earl Berger, “Zionism was a failure, until Hitler came to power” (1965, p. 9).

The Arab Revolt

The Arab revolt resulted in decreased trust amongst the Jewish population in reaching a final peaceful Jewish National Home in Palestine in cooperation with the Arabs, which was what they aimed for. At this point they maintained good relations with the Mandate authorities, and Jewish organisations were even included in British plans for maintaining law and order.

The 1929 riots had effects on future policies and perceptions of both the Yishuv and Arab communities. For the Yishuv, the 1929 riots and their many dead had demonstrated the vulnerability of the Jewish population to armed attack. The Hagana, the self-defence organizations, had maintained the policy of Havlaga. This policy contained the continued restrained in response to threats, and force was only to be used in cases of a direct and imminent threat to the population or the settlement. To some in the Yishuv, the 1929 riots had proven this policy to be ineffective, as even the non-provocative defensive stance had not resulted in friendly relations with the Arabs. As the dissidents did not succeed in changing the policy of Havlaga, they decided to break away and form their own self defence organization. In the beginning, this organization was referred to as the Hagana-Bet (Bell, 1977), meaning

75 the alternative Hagana, but would soon be referred to as the Irgun. This split was largely symbolical until 1936, and the Irgun operated similarly restrained as the Hagana, as the Irgun too suffered from insufficient armaments, finances and capabilities to mount any military operation.

Many of the political left (Hagana) and right (Hagana-Bet) believed that the two groups should merge, as the Yishuv could not afford to afford to maintain two divided and separate defensive organisations. However, due to inability to unite the political views, the two Haganas could not reunite. Although many members eventually resigned from the Hagana- Bet to rejoin the Hagana, others started the reform of the Hagana-Bet. This would lead to adopting the name ‘Irgun Zvai Leumi’ for the organisation, or ‘Irgun’ for short. Many officers in the Irgun wanted to initiate reprisal and deterrence operations against the Arabs, but were still hampered by a lack of finances and arms.

The 1937 Whitepaper

The Whitepaper of 1937 introduced the concept of partition, a policy solution that found little support amongst the Jewish population (Sherman, 1997). A small Jewish state in the Middle East would not be economically viable or militarily defensible. The concept supported by most Zionists entailed a modern state of Palestine, in which both Jews and Arabs could live freely and equally. However, as the Zionist leadership realised the potential consequences of the partition plan could be enormous, they started to wage diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing the diplomatic bargaining power. If state creation were to become a reality, this state needed to be a large and viable as possible, increasing the chances for long term survival and prosperity.

The Peel commission members were presented with and Palestine press analysis by the Colonial Office, which concluded that both the Yishuv and the Arab press were negative about the partition proposal. There was a difference in emphasis however, and while Arab press completely rejected the proposal, “the Jewish press saw the alleged partition plan as ‘a counsel of despair’ and an attempt to ‘win Zionism with a toy state’ and to avoid the difficult issues placed before the commission” (Sinanoglou, 2010, p. 128).

The 1939 Whitepaper

The 1939 whitepaper was fully rejected by the Yishuv leadership. Especially as it placed severe constraints on Jewish immigration, and with European Jews increasingly at risk for

76 their lives, and a decreasing number of nations that offered refuge, the whitepaper proposals were badly received. For years during the Arab revolt, the Jewish communities had held a relative defensive posture, and cooperated with the British on security issues. Even though the Irgun had executed a terroristic punishment campaign on the Arabs, the Hagana and Jewish agency had cooperated with the British in trying to restore the order. This cooperation with the authorities and the prominent position of Hagana had made it a more mainstream non- partisan group, genuinely aimed at furthering the general Jewish interests (Sherman, 1997).

Private communication between high level British government officials and Zionist representatives, ensured Jewish cooperation, by privately committing to changing the policy after World War II, and the proposal for a unified state was not to be effected during World War II. It was recognized that another Arab revolt could endanger not just the British possessions but also the Yishuv itself. The response from the Irgun differed, having amassed more strength, the Irgun was able to start conducting minor militant operations. Although the Irgun had mainly talked about actively opposing the British, the 1939 whitepaper ensured that the schism with the Hagana would be enforced, and came at a time that the Irgun had the capability to use the motivation (Morris, 2008). During the Arab Revolt the Irgun had executed retaliatory actions against Arab targets (Sherman, 1997).

ARAB PERSPECTIVE When the British forces took possession of the lands of Palestine, the Arab society was still a largely feudal society (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). While many families and clans had influence, Arab society in the Mandate of Palestine was mostly marked by two rivalling families, the Al-Husseini and the Nashashibi families. Both clans vied for control of Palestine and destruction of the Jewish entity, but followed different political philosophies and were unable to cooperate to the level of even sabotaging each other. The Al-Husseini family clan, and its most prominent member, Amin Al-Husseini, propagated violent resistance and total rejection of cooperation with the British mandate authority and strived for total victory. The Nashashibi clan on the other hand, propagated a more diplomatic effort, utilizing the tools of the British mandate to reach a political solution.

In early 1930’s, the Arab Nationalists formed a new political party, the Palestinian Independence Party (Kupferschmidt, 1987). Although it was founded mainly by Palestinian Arabs, it held strong relations with the Syrians leadership, and envisioned a Palestinian state as part of greater Syria. This greater Syria itself was to be part of a larger pan-Arab state

77 including all Arab states. The notion of a Palestinian state limited to the mandate area west of the Jordan river had not gained much supporters. The borders between many of the Arab states had been drawn recently as result of western policy, and many Arab political programmes held to different borders, such as based on old Ottoman demarcation or tribal boundaries. The Palestinian Independence Party favoured a more offensive stance towards British occupation, and called for both passive resistance, such as boycotting British products, and active resistance through offensive operations towards the British authority.

The Arab Revolt

Arab population, as according to Sherman (1997) they realized that the British government would not be able to fulfil both its promises to the Arabs and to the Jews, as both societies had been promised rule over the land of Palestine. This duality in British policy caused friction with the Arab leadership. And the 1937 whitepaper was rejected to the fullest by the Arab representatives, as a Jewish state on Arab land was acceptable to none. The Arab press was said to characterize partition as ‘a deadly poison’ and a ‘criminal solution’ (Sinanoglou, 2010, p. 128).

The 1939 whitepaper was also rejected by the Arab Higher Committee, although its role had diminished as many of its members had either sought refuge abroad or had lost prominence during the Arab Revolt. The Arab Higher Committee assessed that an independent Palestinian State under the conditions of the 1939 whitepaper would still be vulnerable to Jewish machinations and would de-facto still be controlled by the British authorities (Morris, 2008). While the 1939 Whitepaper was not generally popular among Arabs, it proved enough to erode the strength and supporter base of many of the Arab rebel groups. By 1939 the Arab revolt was put down (Khalidi, 1986).

4.2.2 PHASE 1: NO RESOLUTION

The resolution put forward by the British in the 1939 whitepaper was never formally voted on in the League of Nations, who initially accorded the mandate (Council of the League of Nations, 1922), as on September 1, 1939, World War II commenced with the German invasion of Poland.

FIRST JEWISH ACTIONS

The 1939 whitepaper and the official communication by British authorities, proposing a pro- Arab solution, marked the start of a phase of Jewish violence against the British authorities. Even though violence was only committed by small Jewish fringe groups, it included acts such as sabotage and destruction of property. The by now mainstream Hagana and Jewish Agency cooperated with the British mandate authorities. The terrorist actions by the Irgun and Lehi against British interests further escalated tensions in Palestine, and create distrust between the British and Jews. As the relation between the Yishuv and the British government worsened, the mainstream Jewish Agency and Hagana started tolerating the active resistance committed by the fringe groups such as Irgun, although not cooperating in the campaign. This meant Hagana would not help the British arrest perpetrators, creating further irritation between the Yishuv and the Government.

WORLD WAR TWO

In Europe, strong anti-Semitic governments had risen to power, actively supporting the emigration of their Jewish citizens by proclaiming anti-Jewish laws. At the same time, most countries did not accept the millions of Jewish refugees and migrants, especially as those from central and eastern Europe were usually from poorer classes. Illegal migration to Palestine became a viable option, dangerous and costly, but with a large and active support network in place easier than going to the Americas or Oceania. A side effect of this illegal migration was that it caused increased friction with the Arabs, who perceived the illegal immigration as if it was condoned by the British. Italian and German propaganda made use of the illegal migration issue, in attempting to entice the Arabs to another revolt. The Jewish Irgun was making a profit from the increased illegal immigration, strengthening their position in respect to the Hagana (Sherman, 1997).

The strength of the Irgun was further increased through an agreement between one of its leaders and the inspector-general of British police, in which Irgun was given money and 25 percent of the immigration certificates, needed for legal immigration to Palestine. In return the Irgun, and its networks in Europe would provide Britain with intelligence on the axis and eastern European countries, and cease anti-British operations in Palestine (Heller, 1995a, p. 60). Illegal migration would continue during the war, but practically stop during 1941, when many of the European Jews were locked up in Ghetto’s and concentration camps.

AXIS THREAT TO PALESTINE

While some tensions between the Zionists and Britain continued to exist, the Zionist Congress of august 1939 had formally accepted the White Paper of 1939, by stating that it would work ‘within the borders of the 1939 whitepaper’ (Sherman, 1997). The Jewish Agency and Hagana protested the whitepaper and the Zionist congress decision, but they did so without violent acts, but protested with gatherings, political statements and lobbying. The revisionist movement and its Irgun decided to cease militant anti-British operation for the duration World War II. While the situation in Palestine was relatively calm, in June 1940 the allies had to evacuate Dunkirk, which meant a severe blow to the allied position in Europe. The allied position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East came under further pressure with Axis forces taking the Balkans, with Greece falling in April 1941. In May that year, pro-axis elements, supported by German and Italian efforts, attempted a coup in Baghdad, provoking a British military intervention preventing the coup from succeeding. The goal of the coup was to take over the country and proclaim full independence of Iraq from Britain, as opposed to the partial independence that was granted in 1932. The events where followed by a short war between the Allies and the Vichy regime that controlled the French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon, which resulted in an allied victory in July 1941.

While Axis advances on most fronts marked the year 1941, it also brought Britain two new major allies. The pact between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union was broken with the start of operation Barbarossa in June 1941, opening the Eastern front and presenting a large drain on German capabilities. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, indirectly fulfilling a long held British wish to commit the United States and its vast industrial resources to the war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was followed by a German declaration of war on the United States. While these developments where welcomed by the British, the tide of war had not yet turned. In the Far East Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942 after a protracted siege, costing the British one of their most vital, secure and strategic outposts. In North Africa, General Rommel and his Africa Corps advanced with the Italians in an attempt to take Egypt. The threat of war led the British to enter a secret cooperation with the Hagana. Hagana fighters would be trained and prepared for Special Forces warfare against the Axis, to be conducted if the axis were to invade Palestine (Bell, 1977). An Axis invasion of Palestine seemed a realistic option until late 1942, and a British priority was to prevent the Arabs from choosing sides with the Axis and starting a rebellion. This was one arguments for both the Hagana and the British to keep their cooperation secret.

The threat of an Axis invasion diminished after the axis forces where defeated during the second battle of El-Alamein, which occurred late October and early November 1942. Over the course of 1943 the Mandate region remained rather calm in respect to acts of war. Tensions between the Yishuv and Britain remained high over the fate of the Jews in Europe, and British refusal to give the refugees access to Palestine. Despite the tension between the communities, British-Yishuv cooperation remained on all fronts, exemplified by many Palestinian Jews serving with the British armed forces. Preparing for the uncertain future, the Yishuv kept stockpiling weapons and practicing in the use of them.

The relative calm of 1943 was used, according to Chazan (2010) by the British to start a new round of consultations with several leaders in both the Arab world as within the Empire, as for how the Palestine question could be solved in a post-war world. In addition, plans for reconstruction in Palestine were presented by the British Government, as Chazan (2010) argues there was a large and broad demand to envision the post-war world and how it would be developed, both physically and socially. The reconstruction plan for Palestine entailed mainly social institutions such as education, healthcare, housing and taxes. While some bombing had occurred in Palestine, the mandate area was hardly damaged by fighting, and the economy experienced a steady growth over the war years. The Jewish agency’s leader, Ben- Gurion, did not welcome the reconstruction plan. The specifics where perceived as very much geared towards implementing the rejected 1939 whitepaper. This was motivated by the British authorities by reasoning that in order to create a unified Palestinian state, the Arab society needed to advance. Given the backwardness of Arab society, it needed to be given a preferential position over the well-organized and better equipped Yishuv.

HUNTING SEASON

While the strength of the Irgun had hardly improved over the past year as it was re-established, by early 1944 Menachem Begin effectively declared the Irgun would revolt and restart its anti-British operations (Temko, 1987). Though the operations would not interfere with the war effort, the main aim was to humiliate the British, first with symbolic actions, but later also focussed at disrupting the functioning of mandate authorities (Temko, 1987, p. 75). Shortly after, the Lehi had recovered enough from its failed cooperation with the Axis and loss of its leader, Avraham Stern, and was aligning itself to soviet ideology and adopted a form of ‘National Bolshevism’ (Heller, 1995b, P. 88). While Lehi was even at its strongest a small organization compared to the Irgun or the Hagana, it was influential by committing high

81 impact operations. The Jewish Agency aimed at gaining political favour by the British by supporting the war effort to the fullest until the end, which would result in a favourable attitude needed for concessions on the 1939 whitepaper. The revolt started by the Irgun and Lehi endangered the political capital build up by the Hagana and the Jewish Agency. Internal tensions between the Jewish armed groups would rise during 1944, with both Irgun and Lehi actively attacking the British interest, and Hagana attempting to maintain its political capital.

The Irgun and Lehi committed bombings, kidnapping and assassinations. The most influential assassination was that of Lord Moyne, on November 6, 1944, by Lehi. Lord Moyne was the British Minister of State in the Middle East, and a close friend of Winston Churchill. The Jewish Agency and its leader, David Ben-Gurion, realised that this assassination was a big setback to their political abilities. While some attacks on police stations had occurred over the course of 1944, and some British civil servants had been killed, this assassination was by far the most important attack on the British authorities by Jews so far. The Jewish Agency leadership realised that they lost a lot of goodwill with the British Government that had been carefully build up over the past few years. To contain the damage, the Jewish Agency and its Hagana decided to actively repress the Irgun and Lehi. To this end it was decided to deny known and suspected Lehi and Irgun members functions at the Jewish agency, Hagana and many of its businesses and to deny the Lehi and Irgun access to operational resources. Repression of the Lehi and Irgun would even culminate in cooperation with the British, arresting and handing over Irgun and Lehi suspects to the British police (Cottrell, 2005, p. 39).

The hunting season, as this period is referenced to, created the real risk of a Jewish civil war in Palestine. This was averted by the explicit wishes of many actors, most importantly by the leader of the Irgun Menachem Begin, who explicitly stated that Hagana was not to be resisted or retaliated against, however grave their crime, from the Irgun perspective, was (Sprinzak, 1999, p. 38). In the Hagana, the Palmach and Jewish Agency many officers refused to take part in the operations against the Lehi and the Irgun. The operation never succeeded in capturing Menachem Begin or destroying the Irgun, however, it did succeed in forcing it to cease its operations against British interests. The hunting season ended in March 1945, the motivation for this was twofold, according to Sprinzak (1999), Jewish Agency leadership saw the objective of stopping the Irgun as completed, while at the same time frustrations over the British position regarding the whitepaper policy grew. During December 1944 the last German offensive was launched, in an attempt to capture Antwerp through the Ardennes, and failed. By March 1945, Allied troops had entered Germany and by April, the Soviets had

82 captured Berlin. Yet, despite continued Jewish support for Britain during the war, and with victory over Germany almost certain, there was no sign that the British would rescind the 1939 Whitepaper policies, to allow more Jewish immigration or recognize a Jewish state.

THE JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

With the end of the war in Europe, the full scale of the Holocaust became public knowledge, and the resulting mass of liberated Jewish concentration camp victims resulted in an urgent humanitarian crisis in Europe. British authorities held on to the restricted immigration policy for Palestine, and as a result, the concentration camp victims were not allowed seek refuge in Palestine. In Britain elections had taken place, and on July 26, 1945, Winston Churchill would be succeeded by Clement Attlee. This, Chaim Weizmann had hoped, would be the moment for the British to deliver on their promises (Bell, 1977). In the years leading up to the elections, Labour had always been a proponent of the Zionist cause, and had even suggested having the Arab population evacuate Palestine. Under the leadership of Clement Attlee, the Labour Party commenced on expanding the welfare state, and followed an anti-militaristic and anti-imperialistic policy. However, as the Labour government was in power the expected decisions in favour of a Jewish state were not forthcoming. The issue of Palestine seemed not to be a priority for the new government, and a Palestine divided in two states was perceived as a possible threat to British strategic and economic interests (Bell, 1977). The lack of actions or even outspoken intentions had disgruntled the Jewish factions, but also made governing increasingly difficult for the local British authorities, who had to cope with lacking a strategic plan in dealing with an unstable Palestine. The Jewish Agency leadership meanwhile still perceived the British as their partner rather than an opponent, and limited actions could hopefully motivate this partner in finally conceding. This assessment was increasingly not shared by the Hagana, which leaned more and more to the militant views of Lehi and Irgun.

In October of 1945 the growing tensions and disillusionment resulted in David Ben-Gurion ordering a large scale anti-British operation. This operation was to be conducted by the Hagana, in coordination and cooperation with the Lehi and Irgun, thus re-legitimizing both underground movements (Sprinzak, 1999). The cooperation is known as the ‘Jewish Resistance Movement’ or the ‘united resistance movement’, a cooperation which would last until July 1946. The objective was to show the British that ignoring Zionist demands would not be without a price, and they would risk losing more by retaining the mandate than by recognizing a Jewish state. Most of the operations by the Jewish Resistance Movement were

83 aimed at the main grievance, the refusal of British authorities to led Jewish refugees migrate to Palestine. Acts of resistance committed during this period consisted of freeing interned refugees, spreading propaganda, robbing arms depots and sabotaging coast guard vessels. According to Bell (1977) this period also marked the growing disconnect between the British political leadership in London and the sentiments in the communities in Palestine. The lack of actions or even outspoken intentions had disgruntled the Jewish factions, but also made it increasingly difficult for the local British authorities, who had to cope with lacking a strategic plan in dealing with an increasingly instable Palestine. The Jewish Agency leadership meanwhile still perceived the British as their partner, even though active resistance was committed. This assessment was increasingly not shared by the Hagana, which leaned more and more to the militant views of Lehi and Irgun.

The British authorities came under increasing pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union to resolve the situation in Palestine. With the end of World War II, many war journalists were in search of subjects to cover, and many decided to report on the Palestine conflict, contributing to internationalization of the conflict (Bell, 1977). In Washington D.C. President Truman had replaced the deceased president Roosevelt. Truman had long been known as being sympathetic to the creation of a Jewish state, a political position that had large popular support in the United States. The British Government also had to consider the strategic implications of the Egyptian demand for full independence, the relations with Transjordan and Iraq with which the British had favourable treaties, and the granting of independence to India, a project that required a large amount of resources in itself.

December 1945 marked the first signs of the breaking of the Jewish Resistance Movement, as Irgun and Lehi grew increasingly suspicious of the limited action of Hagana, and started planning their own operations outside of the cooperation framework. One of these operations resulted in ten killed and twelve wounded British officials. An incident of such gravity could not be ignored by British authorities, who responded with large scale search and arrest operations, curfew, collective fines and interrogations of all males in certain communities. The operation did not result in any arrests for terrorism, but further damaged relations with the Yishuv. With World War II ending, the British presence had increased and now consisted of a large ground force supported by a strong naval task force and air assets. By late 1945 the ratio for British troops to Jewish inhabitants was around one to five (Bell, 1977, p. 153). According to Bell, the Jewish population at large did not support the terrorist acts by the Irgun and Lehi, and major newspapers not only argued for condemnation of the violent acts, but

84 also called to take action against the terrorist groups, for fear they would corrupt and damage the communities of the Yishuv.

In perspective of this increasing instability in Palestine, the British and American government formed the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in January 1946. The committee was perceived by the British as a way to engage the United Stated on the Palestine issue and solicit their responsibility and support on the issue. The Anglo-American Committee concluded in May 1946 that 100.000 Jewish refugees should immediately be allowed to migrate to Palestine and to revoke the limitations on land sales. Palestine was to become a unitary state, which was neither Jewish nor Arab, but would protect the Christian, Muslim and Jewish interests equally, this state was to be part of a trusteeship under the United Nations (Anglo- American Committee of Enquiry, 1946). The conclusion to allow entry of the Jewish refugees and revoke the limitations on land sales was advocated by Truman, while he ignored the other conclusions from the committee, and without promising to contribute resources to the implementation of the two backed conclusions (Grose, 1986). The Arab League (See Arab perspective, phase 1) did not recognize the American authority, or the findings of the committee, and called for immediate Anglo-Arab negotiations on the forming of an Arab Palestinian state (Bell, 1977).

The Soviet Union had come out of World War II victorious, and while it had succeeded at acquiring the status of world power, the Soviet Union was also faced with many problems. It had suffered a large population loss, infrastructure was destroyed and the economy was fully mobilized as a war economy. While the Middle East region was not regarded as the highest priority to the Soviets, it was a region where soviet influence could only minimally be exercised. However, with the perceived threat of a possible war with the Allied countries, and the political schism forming between the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to exploit and pressure the weak point (Smolansky, 1986). Exploitation could take the form of aiding Jewish migration to the Middle East, and by delivering weapons and financial aid to armed groups. According to Smolansky (1986), this could sort two effects, it would increase tensions between the United Kingdom and the United States, and at the same time force both western powers to admit the Soviet Union to influence decision making regarding the Middle East.

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

Since the start of the war, one splinter fraction of the Yishuv remained bellicose to the British authorities, this was the Stern Gang, or Lehi. The Lehi split from the Irgun in 1940, as the Irgun entered a silent cooperation with the British. With the outbreak of the World War II, Avraham Stern and his Lehi were well aware of German anti-Semitism. While most Jewish groups chose to cooperate with Britain, Lehi chose to try to cooperate with Nazi-Germany (Heller, 1995a). This cooperation was based on the conviction that both parties shared an interest, as Germany desired a ‘Judenrein’ Europe, Lehi wanted the European Jews to migrate to Palestine. The main opponent from Lehi’s perspective was the British state, which was occupying Palestine through the mandate. Lehi itself adhered some Fascist ideologies. The proposed cooperation with Germany never came to fruition, and by 1941 Lehi was a tactically insignificant group. Most of its early actions where symbolic, attacking infrastructure and usually not resulting in deaths. Avraham Stern, leader of Lehi, was shot and killed by British police in February 1942, effectively ending operations of the group. The Irgun had many of its members serve in the British military, resulting in dwindling capabilities. By late 1943, when Menachem Begin took command of the Irgun, only around 600 members and 34 guns were left (Bell, 1977, p. 107).

In May 1942 an influential Zionist congress was convened in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. Attending the conference were amongst others, dr. Chaim Weizmann, an influential advocate within the Zionist movement, president of the World Zionist Organisation, and future president of Israel. The attendance of David Ben-Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency, further complemented and gave considerable significance to the conference (Levitats, 1944). The conference resulted in the Biltmore resolution, which marked a policy change, prior to the conference the Zionist leadership had been working on establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, but had always communicated that it would have been a bi-national state, which would be a home to Palestinian Arabs and Jews with both sharing equal rights. According to Levitas (1944) the pressure from the closed borders resulting from the 1939 Whitepaper and the war in Europe, together resulted in a catastrophically large amount of Jewish refugees that were exposed to high risks. This situation provoked Zionist leadership to alter its policy stance. Many of the Zionist leaders, among which dr. Weizmann, assumed that after World War II the conflict for Palestine would be internationalized, as more actors would take an interest in both the United Nations and the Middle East. Internationalization could be used, but also closed the door on a bilateral Anlgo-Jewish solution.

The Biltmore resolution pleaded for a Jewish state in Western Palestine, free immigration and proclaimed the 1939 whitepaper as being a breach of the Balfour declaration. The Biltmore resolution also proposed a Jewish military unit, to be trained and equipped to fight under its own flag, and contribute to the British effort. The Biltmore resolution is seen by some not only as a policy shift, but also as a leadership shift within the Zionist organizations. While Dr. Weizmann had always campaigned for a gradualistic approach based on good relations with the British and the Arabs. David Ben-Gurion on the other hand, proposed a more direct approach, supported immediate statehood in Palestine, leaving no land to the Arabs West of the river Jordan (Gelvin, 2014). The Revisionist faction, inspired by the ideals of Zeev Jabotinsky, even claimed all of what was perceived as ancient Jewish land, some of it east of the River Jordan. The Biltmore resolution also contributed to, or marked, the rising prominence of the United States in the Palestine issue, and the rise of the influence of the American Jewry as sponsors of the Yishuv (Khalidi, 1986)

ARAB PERSPECTIVE

The Arab League had formed in Cairo, 1945, and consisted of six founding members. It was a platform for cooperation between Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It was formed after Great Britain had promoted the idea of an Arab League during World War II (Marlowe, 1959). The main goal of the Arab League was to promote Arab cooperation, and it served as a platform for further growth of Pan-Arabism.

4.2.3 PHASE 2: TERROR IN PALESTINE

By May 1946 the terrorist campaign of Irgun and Lehi proved persistent and effective, as increasingly a wedge was driven between the Jewish Agency, the Yishuv in general and the British. While many operations had taken place during the first six months of 1946, the kidnapping of six British officers by the Irgun caused high tensions in Palestine, with both the Yishuv and the British increasingly distrusting each other. The British responded to the Irgun kidnappings by arresting Jewish Agency leaders, officials, and confiscating large parts of their administration and resources, disregarding the Jewish Agency’s opposition and open condemnation of the kidnapping campaign. This caused the remaining Jewish Agency leaders, among whom David Ben-Gurion to fear a total collapse of the Jewish institutes and infrastructure that had been build up over the history of the Mandate (Bell, 1977, p.168).

The British aimed at stopping the Jewish terror campaign, and specifically ensuring the release of kidnapped British personnel. Although the operations were mainly executed by Lehi and the Irgun, with the Hagana cooperation a closely guarded secret. When the British launched operation Agatha, intended on arresting terrorist cells, the Hagana became a prime suspect. British Mandate authorities had been executing relatively limited ‘cordon and search’ operations since the beginning of the Mandate, and especially after the Arab Revolt, but by 1946 the strategy changed and the cordon and search type operations became part of larger operation frameworks. Operation Agatha included the use over a 100.000 soldiers, executing cordon and search taskings, but also the capture of vital documents at the headquarters and offices of the Jewish Agency (Bell, 1977).

KING DAVID HOTEL BOMBING

The British authorities used the King David Hotel in Jerusalem as headquarters of the British administration, and it was considered by many a strong symbol of British Empire. An operation on this symbol had been talked about before by the armed group planning cells, yet due to concerns over the complexity and operational cost, this was never realised (Bell, 1977). The large-scale operation Agatha the British had launched in the past weeks had resulted in the seizure of many documents containing sensitive intelligence on the Jewish Resistance Movement, the underground organizations and on important individuals and locations. Many of these documents would be brought to the King David hotel, causing the Hagana liaison at the Jewish Resistance Movement Command to urge for an operation that would prevent this intelligence from being analysed and used (Bell, 1977, p. 169). Other motives have been argued, Gelvin (2014) for instance argues the main motive was the progress of the Anglo- American committee, which would result in an unfavourable partition plan for the Yishuv. On the morning of July 22, 1946, members of the Irgun executed the operation in which part of the hotel was blown up, resulting in over eighty casualties, including civilians, journalists and Jews (Sprinzak, 1999). The attack had major repercussions, Prime Minister Attlee condemned the attack the next day during a session of parliament as the most murderous and brutal crime to have been committed in Palestine (UK Parliament, 1946). The operation was widely criticized by the Yishuv newspapers, Jewish Agency officials and Jewish leaders in Great- Britain, the Hagana denied involvement and blamed Irgun for the operation, with David Ben- Gurion calling the Irgun “enemy of the Jewish people” (As cited in Bell, 1977, p. 173).

The King David hotel attack marked the end of the Jewish Resistance Movement. During the whole period of cooperation, Lehi and Irgun leadership doubted the commitment of the Hagana and Jewish Agency, resulting in cooperation without integration, which also made it uncomplicated for the underground organizations to cease cooperation and follow their own strategy again. After the dissolution of the Jewish Resistance movement Irgun and Lehi continued their operations, but at a slower pace. British military cordon and search operations continued after the attack on the King David hotel, causing continued agitation between the Yishuv and Mandate authorities.

ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

At the end of World War II the Soviet Union had its troops posted in parts of Turkey and Iran, although it was agreed upon that these would withdraw after the end of World War II. While no direct Soviet-Union interests were at stake in Palestine, Smolansky (1986) argues that the Soviet Union perceived the need to get involved, as involvement in global issues without direct interests that are being threatened, is a world superpower prerogative. With early political signals of the character of the cold war that was about to come, the Greater Middle East was perceived as a strategic interest to the western allies, Britain and thus the Soviet Union. Since the Palestine issue had been discussed in the side-lines of the Yalta conference in February 1945, the Soviet-Union might have anticipated a recognition of its role as a superpower in the resolution of the conflict. The Anglo-American committee did not allow for Soviet influence, which could have been exercised either by involvement in the committee or by referring the issue to the United Nations, a new institution in which the Soviet-Union held considerable influence. To achieve the Soviet strategic objective to weaken British presence in the greater Middle East, Palestine was a good target, as two opposing groups were present, while both wanting to expedite a British withdrawal.

Smolansky (1986) argues Soviet diplomatic manoeuvring was aimed at several fronts. In Europe, the Soviet Union supported Jewish displaced persons in migrating to western controlled territories such as in Germany. In doing so, it would become harder and more pressing for the allies to resolve the refugee crisis, while at the same time relieving the Soviet industrial base of the burden of supporting these people. The international front was marked by Soviet pressure to delegate the issue to the United Nations, seen as the successor to the League of Nations, the issuer of the original mandate for Palestine. On the local front the Soviets supported the Jewish groups, at this time mainly with political will and recognition of

89 the Jewish cause. It must be noted, that the Soviet Union did not allow its own Jewish citizens to migrate to Palestine (Heller, 1995a).

BRITISH INTENTION TO HAND OVER

The British military operations and improved operational procedures, combined with the disintegration of the Jewish Resistance Movement after the King David hotel attack resulted in a period that was less violent than the half year preceding the King David hotel attack. Between September 1946 and February 1947 a series of negotiations were held in London with both representatives from the Arab League and the Zionist Organizations (Louis, 1986). The intention of the meetings was to find a resolution that would be acceptable to both parties after the Anglo-American Committee proposal was rejected. Basis of these negotiations was the British proposal for a federated state under British trusteeship. This proposal was rejected by the Arabs, as it was perceived as an irreversible step towards partition, and rejected by the Zionists because it was seen as an irreversible step towards a unified Arab state.

The British military had a large amount of troops in the Mandate area, a 100.000 soldiers, constituting 1/10th of the total British forces, this constituted a tremendous cost in means and manpower, and increasingly the question was asked whether this was worth it (Louis, 1987). Considering post-war demobilization, security threats in several of the colonies, and increasing friction between the Soviet Union and the West, it became increasingly unattainable to maintain a large military force in the Palestine Mandate. Despite the relative reduction in anti-British violence after the King David attack, the negotiations did not seem to indicate the current strategy would bring about any resolution. American support for the recommendations by Anglo-American Committee had not been forthcoming and American troops would not be deployed to the Palestine theatre. This led the British Government of Attlee and Bevin to seek out a new strategy. Louis (1987) found that the British analysed the strategic and military implications of partition in late 1946, and decided the risk of long-term negative effects on relations with the Arab states was too big. Oil was a strategic and scarce resource, necessary for economic recovery of the industrial nations and paramount for winning the next war. The second contemplated strategy involved terminating the Mandate, as there was no United Nations majority for partition this would be an effective way of imposing the British proposal of a bi-national state.

By early 1947, it became clear that the negotiations between Britain and the Egyptian government had failed, and British troops would have to withdraw from their strategic

90 positions in Egypt. In London, the affairs of India and the debate considering its decolonization was high on the public agenda. By February 1947, the British cabinet decided to refer the Palestine Mandate to the United Nations. At this point Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin warned that the issue should be resolved with great speed, as delays at the United Nations could result in increased violence and terror in Palestine as a result of attempts at strategic communication by the various active groups. Abandonment and evacuation of the mandate was not considered a realistic possibility, as this would reflect negatively on British prestige. Perception regarding abandoning the mandate would change during the early months of 1947, as British civil society, parliamentary and governmental actors started to move towards accepting withdrawal from Palestine as a viable solution. In referring the issue to the United Nations, there was still a good chance of implementing the British proposal. As most actors recognized partition and withdrawal would lead to civil war, it would be improbable that the Zionist actors would gain majority support for their proposal of partition.

UNSCOP

By April 1947, Great Britain requested the issue of the future governance of Palestine to be put on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. This resulted in the decision to create the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), tasked with investigating the causes and potential resolutions to the Palestine conflict. The creation of this commission started a complex and persistent diplomatic campaign by the Jewish Zionist organizations, trying to foster a majority vote in favour of partition (Cohen, 1986). During July 1947 the Hagana tried for the first time to smuggle Jewish refugees into Palestine not by small clandestine means, but by forcing the blockade with a large ship, which was to be run aground on the shores of Palestine.

This ship was the Exodus (Sherman, 1997), and would eventually be boarded by British troops on July 20, close to the Palestine coast. The ship was sailed into Haifa harbour, where the passengers it was carrying where transferred to British transport ships, with the intention of sending the migrants back to France. Members of UNSCOP, who were in Palestine for research purposes, observed the transfer of the passengers in Haifa. The events and journey of the Exodus were also reported by international press. When the British ships with the 4.500 passengers of the Exodus reached Marseille, French authorities announced they would only allow those to enter France that did so voluntarily. After most had refused, the British decided

91 that the only location where they had enough capacity to house the passengers, was in Germany, housing the Jewish passengers in former concentration camps. The press coverage of the heavily resisted forced disembarkation and loading onto trains of the passengers, led to a “total propaganda defeat” (Sherman, 1997, p. 208) for the British Government. On September 26, Great Britain announced it would abandon the mandate, though no specifics were given.

UNSCOP CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED

The UNSCOP report (Israel Law Resource Centre, 2007) was accorded and signed on August 31, 1947, and unanimously recommended immediate termination of the mandate. UNSCOP was divided on their recommendation on the future governance of Palestine after termination of the Mandate, and thus included two proposals. The majority report, supported by seven out of the eleven committee members, proposed partition with the institution of an economic union between the Jewish and the Arab state, Jerusalem would be placed under an international trusteeship of the United Nations. Three committee members supported the minority proposal, which proposed a fully independent federal state with Jerusalem as capital. The majority proposal was accepted by the Zionists, but opposed by the Arab League. On November 29 a majority of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 181, following the UNSCOP majority proposal, and set the date for the creation of the two states to be October 1, 1948 at the latest. The majority of the Yishuv and the Zionist organizations perceived the adoption of resolution 181 as a major victory and celebrated the adoption (Sherman, 1997).

Figure 2 UNSCOP Majority proposal. Source: www.mythsandfacts.org/replyonlineedition/images/maps/1947-partition.jpg (Retrieved 11-01-2016)

During the months leading up to the adoption of resolution 181, The Arab League and Arab state leaders mounted and increasingly bellicose diplomatic campaign (Khalidi, 1986). Their main strategic pressure on the Western world was the threat to align with the Soviet Union in case of a vote in favour of partition. However, the Soviet Union itself declared to vote in favour of the resolution, voiding the Arab threat. The Arab strategy then focussed on the economic relations, threatening that adoption of resolution 181 would lead to adoption of the Bludan resolution, leading to a “collective reconsideration of the economic and political relations with Britain and the United States” (Khalidi, 1986, p. 117). The Arab League also decided on preparing the Palestine Arabs and supporting them with all means necessary to achieve control by military means over all of the lands of Palestine.

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

The policy of the Yishuv was aimed at motivating Britain to relinquish the mandate. A sudden withdrawal of Britain from the mandate was however also perceived as a big threat (Cohen, 1986). The operations that were carried out also risked alienating Britain further, and increasing British support for pro-Arab policies. To prevent this alienation, operations carried by the Jewish Resistance Movement were for a large part non-lethal and aimed at infrastructure. These operations showed the strategic capability of the Yishuv to harm British interest just as much as the Arabs were able to. As the Anglo-Egyptian relations had suffered, the prospect of Palestine as a strategic base for British forces would depend on local cooperation. A sudden British withdrawal would result, Ben-Gurion assessed, in immediate civil war and massive casualties due to unpreparedness by the Yishuv.

Cohen argues (1986) that the Zionist leaders, in the United States, Britain and Palestine, were never able to fully assess the British intentions regarding the future of the Mandate. Scenarios ranged from a feared sudden withdrawal, to simply relinquishing the mandate but maintaining a large British military presence, to collusion with the Arab states to have the Yishuv exterminated. Jewish agents and diplomats undertook, and kept undertaking missions to London in an attempt to discover the real British intentions.

ARAB PERSPECTIVE

The Arab position was to persist on the 1939 whitepaper proposal. Proposals that deviated from this policy were rejected. The Anglo-American Committee proposal which was released in April 1946, was fully rejected on the grounds that it was deviating from this proposal (Khalidi, 1986). As it called for a 100.000 Jewish displaced persons to be allowed to migrate to Palestine and that it would allow Jews to purchase land in Palestine. The proposal did not call for the creation of a Jewish or Muslim Arab state, but for one state for all citizens. To the Arabs at this point anything short of a Muslim Arab controlled state was “considered as a hostile act directed at the Arab countries themselves” (Khalidi, 1986, p. 110).

The Arab League convened to discuss the policy implications of the Anglo-American Committee (Khalidi, 1986). While the Iraqis assessed that the Zionists had succeeded in making the Palestine issue an American political issue, they assumed that hard limits had to be set, and acted upon, for the Americans and the British to respect the Arab concerns. The Saudi position was more diplomatic, and pressed for a diplomatic mission to be send by the

Arab League to the United States and Britain in order to increase influence on policy, influence which might lead to reversion of official policy back to the 1939 whitepaper proposal. The Arab League states reached a compromise, where the diplomatic efforts would be increased, but also a secret agreement was concluded, which entailed that if the Anglo- American Committee proposal would be accepted, all member states would refrain from concluding new economic agreements, and consider annulling existing ones with Britain and the United States. Diplomatically they would cease to support American or British interests in international bodies, such as in the United Nations. This agreement was kept secret from the public, as it might push for the resolutions to be accepted immediately, but diplomats from the United States and Britain were informed, as to assure that they realized that a pro-Zionist decision could result in severe repercussions (Khalidi, 1986).

The Arab Higher Committee, which had de-facto disbanded after the Arab Revolt, was reinstated at the initiative of Egypt (Khalidi, 1986). The reinstated Arab Higher Committee leadership would, just like the original, be dominated by Amin Al-Husseini, who was still officially exiled by the British, and detested by the Hashemite axis. Not only were the Al- Husseini members competing for control over Palestine with the Hashemites, during World War II they had held close relations with the Axis powers, and supported the attempted coup against king Faisal II in Baghdad, in 1941. The Al-Husseini clan had however gained support from many Palestinian Arabs and Jamal Al-Husseini served as the official Palestinian representative at the Arab League. Another concession secured by the Egyptian supported Al- Husseini clan was that the Arab League Council would recognize that the Arab League consisted of sovereign member states. Thus thwarting a possible annexation of Palestine by Transjordan. Diplomatic and financial support for the Arab states was requested, although military support was not specifically discussed.

The developments at the Arab League, and the competition for control over Palestine was dividing the Arab Leaders. During 1946, king Abdullah negotiated in secret with the Zionist Jewish Agency leadership for partition of Palestine between them, excluding an autonomous Palestinian state. According to Khalidi (1986, p. 113), the negotiations also included the assassination of Amin Al-Husseini. The Transjordanian leadership also publicly committed to the greater Syria proposal, a state to be formed under Hashemite kingship. which included Transjordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The greater Syria proposal was heavily objected by the respective countries leaderships. After Britian referred the matter of Palestine to the Security Council in 1947, Arab leaderships remained divided, impeding them from presenting

UNSCOP with a united Arab diplomatic offensive. King Abdullah of Transjordan convened a constituent council that would lead the formation of greater Syria, which by now also included Iraq (Khalidi, 1986). Despite the constituent council, the constitution of Greater Syria never happened.

4.2.4 PHASE 3: CIVIL WAR IN PALESTINE

After the adoption of resolution 181 the Arab Higher Committee called for a general strike in Palestine from December 1, lasting for three days. The general strike was marked by high levels of intercommunal violence, mainly in Jerusalem, in which Arab and Jewish communities attacked each other and retaliated. Violence levels escalated rapidly, and according to Morris (2008), this was the start of the civil war in Palestine. Despite high levels of violence and being formally responsible for the safety in the Mandate area, British forces did not intervene, even though sometimes being present at the site of the riots (Marlowe, 1959, p. 242). The adoption of resolution 181 did not only result in violence against the Jewish populations in Palestine. In other parts of the Arab world, amongst which Aden, Bahrein and Aleppo, anti-Jewish violence occurred as well, claiming several lives.

British government had decided that attempting to enforce a settlement that was violently opposed by both sides in the conflict would not serve any interest (Louis, 1986). The main debate that the Clement Attlee had to decide upon, was on the strategy of the withdrawal from Palestine. While some of his cabinet ministers preferred the withdrawal to take place within the shortest possible timeframe, others proposed that withdrawal should go orderly, in order to maintain Imperial dignity. Attlee decided that withdrawal should take place in the shortest possible timeframe, as to eliminate the exposure to military and financial risks. Increasingly, the partition and independence of India in August 1947 was perceived as a model on the policy to follow in Palestine. The date for withdrawal was set on May 15, 1948, with the intention of withdrawal starting in the south and evacuating from the northern port of Haifa (Khalidi, 1986).

Talks of the Arab League council in Cairo, during December 1947, had resulted in a declaration condemning resolution 181. The Arab League announced the use of decisive measures to prevent the partition of Palestine taking place (Marlowe, 1959, p. 242). Other measures including the sending of weapons to Palestinian Arabs for self-defence and financial support for the Arab Liberation Army where also agreed upon (Khalidi, 1986). The

Palestinian Arabs received little support from the Arab League or Arab states, as the agreed upon aid did often not arrive in Palestine.

Anti-Jewish violence and policies all over the Middle East, would later contribute to Middle Eastern Jews migrating to Palestine. Until 1947 only a relative minor part of the Middle- Eastern Jews had moved to Palestine, as was true for Europe as well. The Zionist leadership assessed that the adoption of resolution 181 was a major albeit temporary victory. After announcing the final date for withdrawal the British Authorities started to either hand over state functions, or simply discontinuing them. In December 1947, policing functions in certain areas where handed over to either the Jewish Agency in Jewish areas, or ceased in Arab areas, where armed bands assumed the role (Marlowe, 1959, p.243). Only in areas that were strategic for the evacuation or where mixed communities lived, British forces enforced public order. The main concern for the Jewish Agency was withdrawal of international political support for resolution 181. The United States State Department was waging an active campaign to propose a new resolution on Palestine, making withdrawal of international political support a realistic possibility (Cohen, 1986). It was therefor of paramount importance to maintain the public perception of the Jewish Agency being able to perform state functions, and thus be at the base of a strong state.

To the Arab communities, the Arab Revolt was still a recent memory. As the Arab revolt had resulted in the destruction of many of the Arab communities, their livelihoods and thousands of deaths, many of the Arab communities chose to negotiate a relationship with the Jewish communities, disapproving of the call to war from the Arab Higher Committee (Karsh, 2008). Many of the richer and middle class Arabs left Palestine for the neighbouring Arab countries, causing increased pressure on the organization of the Arab communities that had still hardly recovered from the Arab Revolt (Radai, 2007). The main concern of the Arab Higher Committee leadership at the time was the lack of weaponry, as large amounts of the weapons were outdated or unserviceable due to insufficient maintenance.

The Jerusalem riots and other disturbances of the first days of December, and the quiescent response from British security forces caused the Hagana to mobilize their forces (O’Ballance, 1957). Despite mobilization, the Hagana maintained a defensive posture, focussing mainly on defence of the Yishuv communities. Irgun and Lehi adhered to their offensive policies, and performed an active retaliation and counter-retaliation campaign (Heller, 1995a). The formal presence of the British mandate authority, restricted operations for both sides, although

97 weapon searches were not carried out anymore, and small military operations were allowed in those territories where the British forces had withdrawn. The Yishuv was more effected by the presence of the Mandate authorities in their operations than the Arabs, as their main supply route for weapons and fighters was over the sea, where the British blockade was still maintained. The Arabs on the other hand, where able to smuggle in fighters and weapons through the porous land borders with sympathising countries. During this phase of the war, both parties endured a severe shortage of weapons and military equipment. Britain maintained a formal policy of neutrality in the conflict, and acted to prevent military equipment from being left behind or actively transferred to one of the parties. Both the Jews and the Arabs made it a priority to occupy British military and police compounds, depots, airfields and fortresses as soon as they were abandoned, a race that was often won by the Jews (O’Ballance, 1957).

The analysis made by Dupuy (1978) gives the Arabs the advantage as they possessed heavy weapons, including artillery, aircraft and armour. The Jewish fighters were in general better trained, motivated and benefitted from more effective command and control. The first serious Arab operations were conducted by the Arab Liberation Army, operating from Syria. At January 10, 1948, the Arab Liberation Army, under command of commander Kaukji crossed into Palestine, only to be repelled by a British armoured unit. More operations would soon follow, and January marks the shift from small scale armed resistance by the Jihadists of the Holy War Army, under control of the Arab Higher Committee, to open involvement of the Arab League members.

The Arabs, mainly local militias and the Holy War Army, used numerical and territorial superiority to increasingly control the roads, which were vital to supplying the many small and scattered kibbutzim. Between march and November, these operations would result in 1200 Jewish casualties, and a probably equal number in Arab casualties (Dupuy, 1978). The Arab response during the first months was rather limited, and besides closing some roads to Jewish traffic, having snipers shoot at Jewish settlements and communities, and some bomb attacks. The British authorities condoned this insurgency (Bell, 1977), as it allowed them several future policy options. The Jordanian regular army, the Arab Legion, was still officered by British officers, and led by Sir John Glubb Pasha, involvement of Arab regular forces could still benefit British influence. At the same time, maintaining a neutral position would allow them to evacuate the mandate or to choose sides at any point if they so wished. If chaos

98 would engulf the mandate area, this could also result in calls for Britain to retain its position as mandate authority. If this were to happen, Britain could return on its own conditions.

The Arabs also gained increasing control over the road between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, where a quarter of the Jewish population of Palestine lived (Marlowe, 1959). By March, the pressure on the supply lines for Jerusalem effectively cut the city off, with only very limited amount of supplies reaching the city, and maintained reserves were estimated to run out in a few weeks (Levin, 1997). The situation in Jerusalem affected not only the morale of the Jerusalemites, but also of the local Hagana battalion, of which only 200 out of the 700 soldiers remained, exhausted and out of supplies, unable to carry out offensive operations (Shapira, 2011). Control of the roads was a vital asset, and accommodated a form of siege warfare by the Arabs, by starving the Jewish compounds into submission, guaranteeing an Arab military victory after the Mandate authorities would leave. The Arab Liberation Army had crossed the border early February and commenced operations in Palestine, with most of its forces in the Samaria region, where few Jewish settlements were. Some authors, such as Bickerton and Klausner (2010), O’Ballance (1957) and Cohen (1986) suggest this was due to an agreement between King Abdullah of Transjordan and the Jewish Agency leadership, offering Transjordan the partial annexation of the Samaria region in exchange for relative peace. Others, like Bell (1977), argue this was a unitary action by King Abdullah out of competition with his fellow Arabs. The Arab Liberation Army executed some assaults on Jewish settlements, but no Jewish settlement was successfully captured.

TRUSTEESHIP PROPOSAL

According to Sir Henry Gurney, by April 1, 1948 the civil war had resulted in more than 2,000 people having lost their lives, and around 7,000 being wounded (As quoted in Sherman, 1997, p. 227). The civil war in Palestine resulted in an increasing international debate on the future of Palestine, as even the supporters of resolution 181 started to question the Jewish competence to maintain and safeguard a functioning state. The continued Arab military successes and the increasing perceived threat of invasion by Arab regular armies supported the fear for a new Jewish catastrophe, leading to the United States proposing a truce to the Arab states, which was rejected (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). On March 19, the United Stated proposed a UN trusteeship to the United Nations Security Council, despite earlier promises to the Zionist leadership to fully support partition. President Truman argued that a

99 trusteeship would be the only way to achieve stability, prevent an Arab invasion and prevent UN Security Council action (Grose, 1986).

The issue of Palestine was not immune to cold war considerations, as the United States wanted to prevent Soviet involvement in the issue. Referral of the issue to the UN general assembly or Security Council could result in the deployment of a UN military force in order to implement the partition plan, which could result in the deployment of Soviet military assets. The use of Soviet military forces was especially feared as the Soviets were actively pursuing possession of a warm water port, and had “shown a tendency to remain in the areas they occupied” according to Secretary of State Marshall (as quoted in Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 87). As the UN diplomatic channels for Soviet influence were restricted by western manoeuvring, the Soviet Union might have pursued more direct intervention in the conflict. The conflict could also be used by the Soviet Union as a diversion, provoking a western military intervention, thereby limiting the military capability to counter Soviet military operations in Europe (Gelvin, 2014, p. 126). According to Smolansky (1986) the Soviet Union supplied the Yishuv with weapons, military equipment and training through its proxies, mainly Czechoslovakia and Romania. It should be noted that Czechoslovakian weapons were not only sold to the Hagana, but were sold to Arab countries as well. To what extend the military aid was Soviet policy, or an economic Czechoslovakian policy is unclear.

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

This period, from November 1947 until early April 1948, was mainly marked by terrorism, retaliation, counter-retaliation and some small unit operations. The main focus of past operations had been to ascertain that Britain would retreat from the Mandate, which by the acceptance of resolution 181 had been achieved. Although the resolution called for a Jewish state, Arab military assets could still enforce a different reality by sheer force. The Hagana quickly adapted to this new reality, and its strategy now included attaining a strong position in preparation for combat with irregular and possibly regular Arab forces (Bell, 1977). In improving its position, the Hagana also realized that it was of the utmost importance to not provoke Britain in retracting the resolution and seeking a different solution, or any of the other United Nations Security Council members advocating a different resolution. On the tactical level, too much provocation could result in a large scale British operation, arresting fighters and destruction of armament caches. Maintaining relative good relations with the British thus was of the highest importance.

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This was different for the Irgun and the Lehi, which both suspected that the resolution was a ruse, and a temporary diplomatic situation (Heller, 1995a). The resolution was, or so they believed, mainly intended as a way to create chaos in Palestine, requiring Britain to intervene, and thus, not bound by the Balfour declaration, could impose whatever policy solution they so desired. Another possible situation was that the temporary and partial retreat would allow the Arab puppets to conduct unchecked irregular warfare, and thus fighting the war for Britain. The Irgun took more time to adapted to the new reality, and accept that Britain would relinquish the mandate and to prepare for warfare against heavily armed regular Arab armies. Regardless, the Irgun also still planned for the situation that Britain would remain in Palestine well up until May 1948. Lehi never really transformed, and according to Bell (1977) was by late 1947 not of any consequence to the war. Politically, Heller (1995a) asserts, Lehi, a communist party, had some policy proposals, which might not have been de-jure accepted, but became a de-facto reality in due time. Most prominent of this was the proposal for demographic exchange, where the Arabs living in Palestine would be exchanged with the Arab countries for the Jews living in those countries. This way, an in their assessment fair deal could be achieved, necessary for further peace. Though the deal might never have been made, after the 1948 war many Arab countries evicted their Jewish citizens, and many of the Arab refugees were not allowed to return to live in Israel (Morris, 2004)

ARAB PERSPECTIVE

Although acceptance of resolution 181 triggered an Arab military response, an open war could not be committed in the mandate, as this would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Britain itself. None of the Arab League members was willing, at this time, to send regular troops to Palestine, and they supported irregular forces only limited. After adoption of resolution 181, the Iraqi general Safwat called upon the Arab League to establish an Arab high command, commanding all Arab forces, and a joined political command to which it would report (Khalidi, 1986). This Arab high command could command all Arab forces, if after British retreat a joint operation was to be conducted. Contributions to the joined command would have to be made up of the regular forces of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon supported by irregular volunteer forces. This irregular volunteer force became the Arab Liberation Army, funded by the Arab League member states and subject to the Arab League Military Committee in Damascus.

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The Arab Higher Committee leadership had called for Jihad before, and by now started to organize armed opposition in the form of the Holy War Army, also known as Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas or Holy Jihad Army (Radai, 2007, p. 969). The reinstatement of the Arab Higher Committee under Amin al-Husseini was officially sanctioned and supported by the Arab League council, there was however a high level of distrust between the two organizations. The Arab Liberation Army high command assessed the irregular forces of the Arab Higher Committee as ineffective, and proposed to subordinate these forces to the Arab Liberation Army command, a proposal that al-Husseini strongly objected to (Khalidi, 1986). The friction between the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League would limit the military effectiveness of both. The Arab Liberation Army, as one of the motifs, had been set up to prevent the Holy War Army from gaining to much influence. At the same time, it was also intended to counter the influence of Transjordan, which possessed one of the most capable regular armies of the Arab world. The Arab Liberation Army would operate out of Damascus, and be controlled mainly by Syrian and Lebanese commanders (Dupuy, 1978).

4.2.5 PHASE 4: THE JEWISH OFFENSIVE

By the end of March 1948, the Yishuv came under increasing military pressure. Several factors would contribute to a change in the tide of the conflict. During the first months the Hagana had been mobilizing over 20.000 fighters, and transformed form a mainly defensive stance, to a more aggressive force able of conducting offensive operations (Dupuy, 1978). A more aggressive stance required a more aggressive organization. The Hagana had traditionally been organized at kibbutzim level, with each small community forming its own part-time Hagana unit, the requirement to conduct offensive operations and the high threat of invasion from Arab regular forces made this militia organization ineffective. By April the Hagana had reformed and consisted of regional brigades and battalions, though lacking in military equipment (Morris, 2004). The Hagana commanded military production facilities as well, and by 1948 was producing hand grenades, munition, guns and mortars. The Irgun had expanded as well, and was transforming from a small underground resistance group, aimed at small unit warfare and terrorist tactics, to becoming a military force adjusted for modern military operations. This convergence in organisation, combined with the military pressure on the Yishuv, resulted in Menachem Begin and David Ben-Gurion agreeing that the Irgun would coordinate and subordinate to the Hagana high command. This agreement was only partially implemented, but none the less constituted one of the first official steps to a united military (Temko, 1987, p. 111). The Lehi leadership, which had aligned itself to the Soviet Union,

102 refused cooperation as it could not accept the Hagana demand to refrain from attacks on British security forces. Lehi declared it would not recognize the Hagana or the Jewish Agency, but would subordinate to a State and an Army, were it to control all of Palestine (Heller, 1995a).

PLAN DALET

The tactical situation for the Yishuv was looking grim, many of the small communities were besieged and the community in Jerusalem, where a significant part of the Yishuv lived, was running out of supplies. The reforms, cooperation between the armed organisations and the increasing level of armament, allowed the Hagana the creation of a new operational plan, this was ‘Plan Dalet’, Hebrew for ‘plan D’ (Bell, 1977). This plan would be the leading framework in 13 military operations, both in areas allotted to the Yishuv and land settled by the Yishuv, the operations were to be executed in areas where the British forces had withdrawn. The night of April 1 marked the arrival of the first significant arms shipment from Czechoslovakia, and allowed for the first operations of Plan Dalet, operation Nahshon, to be executed. The increased weapon and ammunition resources where used to equip a military force that would attempt to break through the blockade of Jerusalem. Further weapon deliveries would be used to equip other forces that would conduct operations in northern Palestine and in the Negev.

Expelling the Arab civilization was not the goal of the operations of plan Dalet, although it is still part of an active academic discussion whether it was an implicit goal of the operations or not. The goal of plan Dalet was to prepare the Yishuv for the invasion of Arab regular units, by securing an advantageous tactical position (Morris, 2004). To this end it was important to clear pockets of resistance endangering the lines of communication between the different fronts and the Jewish settlements. Arab villages that resisted disarming would be liable to expulsion or destruction, villages that did not resist would be garrisoned to prevent elements of opposing forces using the villages as logistical support. Expulsion rarely happened, as most Arab citizens fled before or during the battle, preventing the Hagana units from deciding on the issue.

ROAD TO JERUSALEM

With the Czechoslovakian weapons delivered, operation Nahshon was initiated. The Hagana force consisted of a brigade size force, 1,500 fighters divided between three battalions (Dupy,

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1978). The axis of attack was the road from Tel Aviv, where two battalions were assigned a sector of the road to be controlled. The third battalion was to be held in reserve to respond to Arab counterattacks. The situation in Jerusalem was dire, the contingent had almost run out of food and munition, and while the water supply was not blockaded, the pumping station were controlled by the Arabs. As British forces were also reliant in this water supply it had not yet been cut off, but it was feared that a large scale Hagana assault might have triggered an Arab sabotage attempt. In Tel Aviv, supply convoys were already being assembled to be send to the Jerusalem as soon as the road was secured.

The Jihadists of the Holy War Army controlled the area around Latrun, a strategic position along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, and also the position of a British build and controlled fortress. The operation, which started on April 5, commenced with an attack on the Holy War Army headquarters, quickly followed by an advance along the road. The positions that were captured in the vicinity of Latrun were taken over by the British, who forced the Jewish defenders out, but made an agreement to not abandon the positions for the Arabs to take. As the first convoys reached Jerusalem on April 7, the Arabs started to launch counterattacks, enabling them to block the convoys to Jerusalem once again. During these battles, the commander of the Holy War Army, Abd Al-Qadir Al-Husseini, got killed. Subsequent Hagana counterattacks, aimed at reopening the supply route, met with little resistance. The death of the Arab commander might have caused the disorganization, resulting in many fighters deserting (Dupuy, 1978). As control over the road was secured, a detachment under control of Colonel Yitzak Rabin was tasked with defending the road and the supply convoys. The operation would last from April 5 until April 20, a period in which many supply trucks managed to replete the resources of the Yishuv in Jerusalem. Control of the road was lost after April 20 when local Arabs succeeded in creating another roadblock which would hold out until May 9.

ARAB LEGION

The Arab Legion, a military force subordinate to king Abdulla of Jordan, maintained a security force in some Arab parts of Palestine in support of the British evacuation operation. As this force was equipped and organized by the British mandate authorities, it was one of the most significant fighting forces in Palestine, possessing artillery, armoured cars and a modern military organization. The Arab Legion was the main force opposing the Jewish movements in Jerusalem, and maintained the siege of the east Jerusalem. The Elements of the Arab

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Legion were deployed in Palestine, in support and under command of the British general staff. This gave Transjordan a strong intelligence position on Palestine. Although the Arab Legion would officially withdraw at the end of the mandate, withdrawal of the Arab Legion would only occur at May 13, followed by crossing the Jordan river back into Palestine on May 15. It is highly likely that some elements of the Arab Legion remained within the Palestinian borders.

DEIR YAZZIN

The day before operation Nahshon commenced, a Hagana patrol surprised the Arab village of Kastel, strategically located along the road to Tel Aviv, and captured the village. As Lehi and Irgun fighters were not formally cooperating with the Hagana, operation Nahshon was a strictly Hagana affair. Lehi and Irgun decided to cooperate, and contribute to operation Nahshon in their own way, the taking of the strategic Arab village of Deir Yassin. Upon gaining knowledge of the combined Irgun and Lehi plans, the local Hagana commander sanctioned the operation, on the condition that the combined force could maintain position at the village, denying foreign Arab units from using it as an outpost after the villagers had fled (Bell, 1977 p. 292).

Irgun and Lehi attacked Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948 with a force of about a 120 fighters (Bell, 1977). In order to prevent unnecessary casualties, the Irgun used a car with loudspeaker to order the evacuation of the village. The loudspeaker car hit a tank trap and was immediately fired upon, and this started the heavy fighting for the village. After taking severe casualties, the attacking force decided to use dynamite to blow up the buildings, as capturing them was not perceived as a viable option. The village had not been evacuated, as the first contact resulted in heavy firing, as a result the village suffered a high number of civilian casualties. There are several conflicting explanations for battle of Deir Yassin, whether the village actually resisted by force, whether Arab militia was active in the village, whether sufficient measures had been taken to safeguard civilians, whether the village had conducted armed operations prior to the attack and whether Palmach units were involved in the attack. Generally accepted is the fact that many civilians died at Deir Yassin, and the event was exploited by propagandists.

Hagana excoriated the “premeditated act which had as its intention slaughter and murder only” (Kurzman, 1970, p. 148). After receiving reports of what had transpired, High Commissioner Cunningham requested the Royal Air Force to bomb the village and its defenders in

105 retaliation, but cancelled the bombing after receiving reports the Hagana had taken over positions from the combined Irgun and Lehi force (Kurzman, 1970). International political and civil society response was disapproving of the events (Begin, 1977, p. 164). Arabic propagandists enthusiastically spread the narrative of the Jewish crime, either to deflect from the narrative of military defeat at a strategic location (Begin, 1977), or to rally support for the fight against the Yishuv (Kurzman, 1970). The propagandistic use of the battle of Deir Yassin, now an Arab narrative including rape, mutilation and summary executions, might have contributed to the spread of fear amongst the Arab population, causing a large group of Arabs to flee from Palestine, mainly the middle and upper classes, which itself resulted in further loss of Arab morale (Morris, 2004).

CAPTURE OF HAIFA

Breaking the siege of Jerusalem was a high priority for all Zionist actors, it was however not the sole and primary objective of plan Dalet, which focussed on all of Palestine. April 18 marked the capture of Tiberias in the lower Galilee by Hagana troops. Tiberias had been a town with a Jewish and Arab community, after Hagana success, the Arab population was evacuated with British army vehicles (Morris, 2004). The week before the capture of Haifa several battles between the Hagana and the Arab Liberation Army had been won by the former. On April 21-22, 1948, the Arab parts of Haifa were taken by Hagana units (Khalidi, 2008). According to Morris (2004), the operation was forced due to Arab pressure on Jewish lines of communication, as it had originally been planned to take place after the British withdrawal, which was dependent on the Haifa harbour and railway. British command decided against intervening in the operation due to low chances of success, as the British forces present would not suffice for restoring order. Khalidi (2008) contends that the capture of Haifa was planned weeks before in cooperation with the commanders of the British 6th Airborne division, which was at the time in charge of securing Haifa. As the British withdrawal from Palestine was progressing, handing over the city to the Hagana became opportune in exchange for safeguards for withdrawing British troops.

The capture of Haifa by Hagana resulted in an exodus of the Arab community. Battles and the ensuing capture of villages by the Hagana had resulted in Arab populations leaving before, and increased after the Deir Yassin massacre (Nazzal, 1974). Morris (2004) argues the Yishuv leadership grew increasingly uneasy with the mass exoduses of Arab populations, and feared this was a centrally coordinated order by the Arab League. The presence of Arab civilians in

106 cities and towns occupied by the Hagana, would be an operational obstacle to the invading Arab regular armies. Supporting this theory was the observation that even Arab villages that were unaffected by war were evacuating.

Concurrently, Morris (2004) argues that transfer thinking under Hagana commanders increased. The fear that motivated many Arabs to flee their villages, supported the fear that Yishuv commanders felt for the coming regular war, and motivated them in increasingly preferring to expulse the civilians in the villages as opposed to garrisoning the village, a choice that under most operations of plan Dalet was a discretionary decision for field commanders. The Arab thinking was not only influenced by fear, but according to Nazzal (1974) also affected by low morale. Many of the villages had been promised protection against Yishuv forces by Arab Liberation Army officers, yet most villages were not garrisoned by Arab Liberation Army forces and were dependent on their own defensive capabilities or the Holy War Army. The continuous successful offensive operations by the Yishuv, the failure of anticipated military support to arrive combined with the fear of the consequences of the Yishuv conquest, contributed to the low morale and Arab communities seeking refuge in Arab held areas. Following the capture of Haifa all of the Galilee would be captured by Hagana forces. Haifa was followed by Safed, which was captured on May 11, and the fall of Acre, on May 17 and Nazareth, on July 16 (Abassi, 2010)

HISTORY OF DRUZE, MINORITIES

Due to continued failure to build friendly relations with the Arab communities, the Jewish Agency attempted to forge friendly relations with the different minorities, specifically the Druze, a policy Gelber (1995) tracks back to the riots of 1929. These efforts were intensified during the Arab Revolt of 1936, but waned after the threat of an axis invasion of Palestine had been averted. The rising tensions after World War II caused renewed Jewish Agency interest in the Druze and other minorities of Palestine. The Druze community leadership had been sympathetic to the Jewish Agency initiative, although this was not universally shared and did not immediately result in an alliance. Villages with a mixed Druze and Arab community where more receptive to the Jewish initiatives, as were those that lived close to Jewish settlements and contrary to those living in Arab territory (Gelber, 1995, p. 229). As the Druze community was divided when the civil war broke out, the Druze leadership maintained a neutral position, yet, many of the Druze villagers and youngsters had joined various Arab

107 militias. By march 1948 the Arab Liberation Army had formed a Druze battalion of about 500 men.

Following the fall of Haifa, Druze units supported by local elements of the Arab Liberation Army were dispatched to capture two villages close to kibbutz Ramat Yochanan (Gelber, 1995). Several assaults were performed, but the Arab forces had to retreat after suffering heavy casualties. Following the defeat several Druze officers requested a meeting with Jewish representatives, a meeting that occurred on April 20. During the meeting the Druze offered to defect and fight for the Hagana, an offer that was not accepted. During negotiation that occurred a few days later, an agreement was reached in which the Druze would operate behind Arab lines, and endeavour to turn their fellow Druze that where still serving in the Arab Liberation Army units to defect as well. An attempt that might have been successful, as large numbers of Druze men defected from Arab units during April and May, although the sabotage operations appeared to have never been executed (Gelber, 1995).

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

During phase four, it was clear to the Hagana that Britain would leave the mandate area, and that the United Nations had sanctioned a Jewish state. With Britain having declared its intent to withdraw at May 15, 1948, the date was set. Two threats were perceived, withdrawal of resolution 181, resulting in renewed diplomatic efforts with an uncertain outcome for the Yishuv. The right wing Irgun and extremist communist Lehi were not convinced that Britain would actually leave, and maintained preparations for anti-British operations (Bell, 1977). All acknowledged the fact that the Yishuv needed military preparation, either for future operations against the British, or for maintaining the territorial integrity against invading Arab armies and irregulars.

ARAB PERSPECTIVE

Resolution 181 was perceived by the Arabs as a major threat to their position. As the Zionist had secured diplomatic support for their position, it now came to honouring the agreements made at the Arab League meetings, and militarily destroy the Jewish state. Superiority in number of fighters, superior equipment, including heavy military equipment such as artillery and armour, and command of an actual air force all but assured success. As the Arab jihadists of the Holy War Army, loyal to the Al-Husseini clan, were already successfully operating against the Yishuv, and the Arab Liberation Army effectively operating inside the mandate

108 area, by 1948 the deployment of regular forces was agreed (Bell, 1977). Due to internal Arab rivalries, none of the actors could afford not to take part in the operation, and lose either prestige, or see the other actors gain prestige, and assume a leadership role in a future united Arab world.

The main binding factor for the Arab countries was that all were at war with the Yishuv. Cooperation between the Arab states was barely functioning. The Arab League had intended to agree on a unified military command, but had failed to accomplish an agreement. This hampered the efforts to create a unified military plan, and the plans for invasion were adjusted only to national policy aims (Dupuy, 1978). The United Arab Forces were thus not united. In general, there was some agreement on the broad outline of the operational concepts, although this was mostly the result of circumstances and determined to national operational capabilities and aims.

The Arab advance would include pressure from north and south, with the main assault taking place from Transjordan (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). Although the broad outline of the national plans had been exchanged, cooperation was not agreed upon (Dupuy, 1978). The general concept entailed that Lebanon and Syria would attack from the north, with their main aim at the Galilee and the coastal plain taking Haifa. Iraq and Transjordan would assault over a wide front and advance on the coast, with the main Iraqi axis aimed at Samaria, with the Transjordanian Arab Legion advancing mainly through Judea, taking Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The Egyptian army, which included the Saudi-Arabian fighters, would advance through the Negev. The Egyptian plan was a two pronged attacked, with part of its force advancing along the coast and taking Ashdod, the other force would advance through the Negev and take Beersheba. This supported Egyptian political objectives, as it would result in Egyptian annexation of the Negev and southern Palestine, thus preventing Transjordan from gaining too much territory. The political main goal of the Egyptian participation in the war was to maintain its image as a leader in the Arab world, and obstruct Transjordan from claiming all of Palestine.

In response to this command vacuum created by the unwillingness by the Arab states to cooperate, on May 15, King Abdullah of Transjordan proclaimed himself commander-in-chief of all Arab Forces. The assumption of the commanding role was in effect symbolical, as except the Iraqi forces, none of the Arab forces subjected to Transjordanian command. As the Arab leaders perceived their position as strong, compared to the Israeli’s, internal rivalries

109 were given priority over the common interests (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). A broad operation concept was agreed upon, even though the concept mainly consisted of an amalgamation of uncoordinated national military plans (O’Ballance, 1957).

4.2.6 PHASE 5: INTERSTATE WAR OF 1948

END OF THE MANDATE – DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

May 14, 1948, marked the day before the end of the British Mandate of Palestine. While violence had already spread throughout the mandate area, many feared termination of the mandate would result in increased levels of violence, involving the regular armies of the Arab-League members. In the afternoon of May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel from Tel Aviv. King Abdulla of Jordan declared himself commander-in-chief of all Arab forces, a declaration that was largely ignored by non-Transjordanian forces, leaving the Arab forces divided and unorganized (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The United Nations Security Council appointed the Swedish diplomat Count Bernadotte as a mediator on May 20, assigned to negotiate a truce agreement between the warring parties in Palestine (Touval, 1982). The United States de-facto recognized the state of Israel on May 14, although de-jure recognition would only follow in January 31, 1949. The Soviet Union recognized Israel de jure at May 17, 1948. Britain refrained from recognition of Israel, as this might result in a treaty obligation towards Transjordan and Iraq to declare war on Israel. Formal recognition by Britain would only follow in April 1950.

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OPENING – INVASION

Figure 3 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (retrieved 11-01-2016)

The British Mandate formally ended on May 15, 1948. And as expected the Arab states set in motion their attack plans, with their regular armies attacking the newly proclaimed state of Israel. Dupuy (1978, p. 46), argues the Lebanese-Syrian invasion of the northernmost part of Palestine, is an example of successful Arab coordination at the tactical level. With the Lebanese attacking from the West, and the Syrians attacking from the East, both on the southern parts of the Huleh valley, the landmass could easily be cut off from the Israeli supply lines. Despite successful initial Israeli counterattacks, the valley would fall in Arab hands in

111 early June, breaking the defensive line to the central Galilee (Dupuy, 1978). Besides the attack on the southern Huleh valley, Syrian forces also advanced south of the sea of Galilee, towards the town of Tiberias. The Syrian contingent consisted of infantry supported by armoured cars, tanks, and artillery.

The Iraqi forces had aimed at taking Nablus, where the Arab Liberation Army headquarter was operating from, and captured towns as far west as Jenin. Israeli counterattacks were at first mainly focussed at Jenin, but met with superior Iraqi forces. Although the Israeli counterattacks succeeded in capturing ground north of Jenin, Jenin itself was occupied by Iraqi armour and infantry, supported by Iraq Air Force assets, elements of the Iraqi forces advanced and reached the coast, cutting the lines of communication between Haifa and Tel Aviv. The Arab Legion, the regular army of Transjordan, crossed the Jordan River and started occupying territory in Judea and Samaria, with its armoured units reaching Jerusalem the same day (O’Balance, 1957). By May 17, one of the Transjordanian brigades had occupied the area around Latrun, securing the lines of communication between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The second brigade assaulted the Israeli settlements in Judea and the towns around Jerusalem, such as Bethlehem. The battle for Jerusalem itself had been going on since February by mainly irregular soldiers, and would increase in intensity with the arrival of the Arab Legion brigades.

The Egyptian forces in the Negev region had consisted of Muslim Brotherhood volunteers, some Saudi-Arabian volunteers, and the regular Egyptian army units. The volunteers were ordered to raid the Negev settlements, while the Egyptian air force and army focussed on advancing over Gaza towards Ashdod and Tel Aviv (Dupuy, 1978). As the Negev was sparsely populated, the local Hagana units had a small population pool to draw its forces from. Egyptian motorized units, part of the Negev taskforce, took Beersheba on May 17, and was able to push through to Bethlehem at May 20. The coastal advance reached Ashdod on May 29. The Israeli Brigades had prepared defences, but were eventualy driven out by the combination of Egyptian infantry, artillery, armour and airpower. The Battle for Ashdod also marked one of the first deployment of the Israeli air force, which by know possessed 4 World War II fighter planes.

TRUCE – BERNADOTTE MEDIATIONS

Negotiations at the United Nations had not resulted in a peaceful acceptance of resolution 181, or any other peaceful solution. At the 20th of May, the Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte

112 was officially appointed as a mediator by the United Nations. After intense negotiations, he managed to attain a truce agreement which would start at June 11 for four weeks, until July 9 (Dupuy, 1978). While both sides in the conflict could benefit from a truce, according to Dupuy (1978) and Touval (1982) both actually badly needed a truce, as most actors were about to collapse. None of the militaries were mature organizations, and some, especially the Arabs were dealing with long logistical lines. The truce included a ceasefire and five additional conditions; “Neither would attempt to improve its military position; there was to be no movement of troop or materiel; no new fighting forces were to be introduced by either side; no immigrants of military age were to be allowed into Palestine, except with the specific approval of the UN mediator; finally, Jerusalem was to be supplied by convoy under supervision of the International Red Cross” (Dupuy, 1978, p. 67). None of the extra conditions were adhered to by either party, with the Red Cross convoys to Jerusalem as an exception, as most were allowed unhindered access.

All parties used the truce to their benefit, but in general adhered to the ceasefire. As of June 1, Israel had officially instated conscription and a central commanded Israeli Defence force (IDF), although the de-facto institution had suffered from the inability for reorganisations to take place during the Arab advances on all fronts (Dupuy, 1978). During the truce the Altalena affair took place (see Jewish perspective, phase 5), resulting in final absorption of the Irgun units in the IDF.

The Arab forces, although better organized needed the truce on the tactical level mainly to regroup, organize and supply the forces. On the strategic level, victory still seemed the most likely scenario, especially considering the UN involvement, renegotiating resolution 181 seemed possible. However, as Bernadotte presented his proposal for an armistice, in which Israel would be allowed to keep the conquered Galilee, and the Arabs the Negev, this was rejected by both sides (Touval, 1982). While Israel feared the diplomatic efforts, and fully appreciated having delivered an extraordinary feat of diplomacy on resolution 181, it preferred to continue fighting over and extension of the truce. This despite still lacking severely in heavy weapons. The Israeli forces did have a positive outlook, as they knew military equipment had been procured in Europe and was on its way. In this respect, from a military perspective, the Bernadotte truce could give enough respite for the equipment to actually arrive. To the Arab countries, the Bernadotte plan was unacceptable, as the plan was still based on the existence of a Jewish state. Despite not succeeding in agreeing on a strategic plan or central command, the Arabs had achieved large military successes before the truce,

113 and assumed that renewed fighting would further strengthen their position militarily and thus diplomaticly.

TEN DAYS OF WAR

Figure 4 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (retrieved: 11-01-2016)

As both the Arabs and Israel had prepared offensives for when the truce would expire, fighting immediately commenced. The Israeli focus was securing the lines of communication with Western Jerusalem, were still a large community and a small fighting force were surrounded and cut off from supplies by the Arab forces. After the lines of communication to

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Jerusalem were secured, the IDF would advance into the Negev, were many small settlements were overrun or surrounded by Egyptian regular or irregular forces. On the other fronts, the IDF would maintain a defensive posture. The defensive posture did not prohibit small scale offensive operations in order to take advantage of weaknesses in the Arab tactical situation. The IDF had inducted a small number of ten light tanks and three medium tanks, and formed some mechanized units based on halftracks. A small artillery unit had also been established, possessing some decade old European guns. The IDF air force, which before the truce had mainly consisted of agricultural and logistic airplanes, had by now acquired a few fighters from Europe and produced a few makeshift bombers.

The operation to secure the lines of communication with western Jerusalem, had as secondary goal to create and secure the tactical position to be able to take the old city. The operation, spearheaded by the new armoured unit of the IDF, was able to effectively outmanoeuvre the Arab forces, and secure the objective. Although the positions at Latrun, which were held by armoured units of the Arab Legion, was not taken, the corridor to Jerusalem was sufficiently secured. The Israeli units stationed in the Jerusalem area attempted a few assaults on the Old city, but although the walls were penetrated, no terrain was held. At the start of the second truce at July 17, the units withdrew to their positions outside the Old City.

The Israeli situation on the southern front was less secure. Egypt had brought in massive reinforcements, moved their headquarters to Gaza, and with the Egyptian air force effectively able to operate all over the Negev and southern Palestines, able to reach Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the Egyptian position was strong. The Egyptians launched a large scale offensive (Dupuy, 1978). The Egyptians controlled the line from Ashdod to Hebron, and had elements advance as far north as Bethlehem. The main aim of the Egyptian offensive was to ensure the lines of communications between its brigades, and secure the Negev, where still a few Israeli battalions were operating, and many Israeli settlements still held out, forming a potential danger to the Egyptian supply lines. The objective of the Israeli offensive was the recapture of Ashdod and to secure lines of communication with the Negev outposts.

The Egyptian assault on the Negev front commenced 36 hours before the official end of the ceasefire (Dupuy, 1978). Although the Egyptians initially succeeded in securing outposts, and securing their control over the Negev roads, the settlement of Negba, close to Ashkelon, successfully defended their position. After 24 hours of fighting, the Egyptians retreated to regroup and plan a new assault. The commander of the Egyptian expeditionary force Mawawi

115 created a new plan, which included reinforcing the assault with additional units and executing two diversionary attacks. Brigade commander Naguib, who was tasked with executing the renewed assault on Negba, refused this order, as he considered the operational concept not to be effective. After relieving Naguib of command, the assault commenced, but failed after incurring heavy casualties. At the start of the second truce, the Israeli’s had improved their position marginally at the expense of the Egyptians, who had lost control over some vital roads for their east-west connection. Losing two large battles consecutively, combined with the issue in the line of command, decreased Egyptian morale (Bell, 1977; Dupuy, 1978)

As circumstance had allowed for the IDF units on the northern front to advance, operation Brosh was launched, aimed at destroying the mainly Syrian forces east of the river Jordan (Dupuy, 1978). This operation failed as the Syrians effectively counterattacked, driving the IDF back to their starting positions. The Arab Liberation Army, which held positions in the Galilee, mainly around Nazareth, had planned two attacks on the Israeli positions. The Objective of the offence was to simultaneously capture Acre to the West, and Tiberias to the East, allowing free communications with the Syrians. The first offensive of the Arab Liberation Army was supported by Syrian artillery and air support, but failed to take any Israeli positions. As the IDF had been preparing a counterattack, this could immediately be executed, and mainly consisted out of taking defensible ground, in order to provoke an Arab counterattack. This tactic was successfully deployed, and when the second truce went into effect, the Arab Liberation Army, had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Moreover, as the Lebanese had not supported the Arab Liberation Army, the Israeli’s assessed that the Lebanese were either content with their current positions in the northern Galilee, or were simply unable to advance further.

TRUCE – BERNADOTTE ASSASSINATION

The second truce was enforced by the UN Security council at July 18, threatening sanctions on any actor breaking the truce (Dupuy, 1978). Bernadotte had from the beginning suffered from a lack of trust from both the Arab and the Jewish actors, as both accused him of acting in favour of the other party (Touval, 1982). Had Bernadotte intended the proposal during the first truce to serve as basis for discussion, this time his proposal was for an enforced settlement. His conviction was that an imposed solution could succeed, and was the only real alternative to combat, as currently none of the parties felt willing to negotiate a compromise. His proposal entailed that the Arab part of Palestine would be annexed by Transjordan, Israel

116 would receive a corridor to Jerusalem, which itself would become an international zone under control of the UN. Bernadotte did identify the difficulty in reaching a solution, as the Arab leaders were highly divided on the issue, and American and British support did not come forth. As opposed to during the first truce, this time all actors massively violated the ceasefire, although no offensive operations were conducted.

The renewed Bernadotte plan was altered, the Israeli corridor to international Jerusalem was scrapped from the agreement. Anglo-American consent began to form over the new proposal, and with the UN General Assembly due to meet in September, could be pressed and secured during that meeting (Touval, 1982). The new proposal was lacking in detail, such as it only stated that borders “should be established” (Touval, 1982, p. 47). To this end Bernadotte advised to discuss the plan at the General Assembly meeting, were a commission could be assembled that would negotiate an agreement that would be acceptable to both parties. Both the Arabs and the Israeli’s opposed the current proposal.

Lehi, a terrorist group that was not part of the defence forces of Israel and was not part of or imbedded in the state, feared that the Israeli provisionary government would accept the Bernadotte proposal, or that the United Nations would enforce the proposal through military or economic means. As it was perceived both by Lehi and the Soviet Union as a British strategy to regain control over Palestine (Touval, 1982), Lehi acted to prevent the proposal from becoming reality. While moving through Jerusalem, Bernadotte was assassinated by a Lehi hit team on September 17. Bernadotte was succeeded by his deputy, Ralph Bunche. While his renewed proposal was put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly meeting, it was not accepted, as American support began to waiver in response to internal domestic political pressure.

While extension of the truce had been considered a realistic option to most players, all expected, or at least prepared for, an end to the truce. In truth, according to Touval (1982), it was also true that none of the actors actually preferred continuation of the conflict. However, extension of the truce, which Bernadotte aimed at as a path to an armistice agreement, could only be agreed upon by the parties if this could lead to a political solution. While both the Arab and Israeli government did not foresee this outlook of a political solution, both recognized that negotiation would be held based on territory held, as opposed to territory allotted under resolution 181 (Dupuy, 1978). Most aggressive in assessing the need for

117 increased territory holdings was Egypt, which strengthened its position in the Negev considerably.

THE FINAL OFFENSIVES

Figure 5 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (Retrieved 11-01-2016)

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The second truce was crumbling over Arab and Israeli unwillingness to extend, and small scale violations of the ceasefire were commonplace throughout the frontline. As Egypt had continued to strengthen its forces in the Sinai, which now totalled over 18.000 soldiers, and had prepared for renewed offensives (Dupuy, 1978). The ten days between the first and the second truce, had shown Arab unwillingness to cooperate on any front. The IDF general staff had recognized this division amongst Arab forces, especially during manoeuvres against the Arab Liberation Army in the Galilee, and now sought to exploit this weakness. Israel also assessed king Abdullah to be content with control over the Western parts of the territories that were allocated to the Arabs under the resolution 181 partition plan. For this reason, the Israeli’s predicted a defensive stance from the Arab Legion, and thus could focus its main attention on offensives against the Egyptians.

In order to relieve the Israeli outposts in the Negev, and assure Israeli control, operation Yoav, also called operation ten plagues, was created (Kurzman, 1970). In preparation for the operation, the IDF had strengthened its forces in the Negev through convoys and airlift assets. The Egyptian positions regularly opened fire on the Israeli convoys, and thereby violated the ceasefire. During the truce both sides improved their positions, preparing for the coming offensive, but no large scale operations were conducted. It did however provide the IDF with the excuse to break the truce, and on October 15, a convoy was send to supply the Jewish Negev communities. As expected, the Egyptians opened fire, and destroyed several vehicles, forcing the convoy to retreat. This delivered Israel the excuse to launch operation Yoav, Egypt had broken the truce and Israel needed to secure its lines of communication with the settlements. The general concept op operation was to take out the Egyptian air force, and then penetrate deep into the desert in order to obstruct the Egyptian supply lines, in preparation for assaults in the Egyptian positions.

The Egyptian resistance was fierce, and the IDF had to adapt their plan accordingly. As the IDF managed to open a corridor to the Negev, this allowed them to effectively threaten the Egyptian forces at Ashdod with encirclement. As a result, the Egyptian command decided to withdraw south (Kurzman, 1970). The corridor also allowed to bring in more units to the Negev, and thus allowed an assault on the town of Beersheba, in turn cutting of the Egyptian forces that were deployed around Hebron. King Abdullah instructed his forces not to relieve or support the Egyptians in their tenuous situation (Dupuy, 1978). The IDF succeeded in forcing the Egyptian army in retreat, and by November 5, controlled the coast to as far south as Gaza.

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In the north, remnants of the Arab Liberation Army had regrouped, and the IDF offensive in the south gave ground for the assumption that hostilities would recommence. As Israel had launched a massive offensive against its biggest opponent, it seemed a safe assumption that Israeli defences in the north would be weakened as units might have been withdrawn to support the southern offensive (Dupuy, 1978). After the defeat earlier, the Arab Liberation Army, under commander Kaukji, had regrouped in Lebanon and Palestinian territory held by Lebanon. His forces, regrouped, only consisted of some 3000 soldiers, out of the earlier 5.000 to 10.000 soldiers. They were supported by a few armoured cars and artillery pieces. As Kaukji realised that the offensive would depend on Syrian support to hold terrain, his main aim was to drive deep into the Galilee, and occupy strategic positions, in order to isolate the elements of the IDF in the region. He launched his offensive on October 22.

The IDF was immediately alerted by the offensive launched by Kaukji. Even though the IDF high command recognized the Arab Liberation Army itself was not a major threat, were Syrian and Lebanese units to join the offensive, this could be a serious risk (Dupuy, 1978). Moving quickly, the IDF put together operation Hiram, based on the same principles as the operation in the south, separating and isolating the enemy units, followed by destruction of the isolated pockets. Operation Hiram commenced on October 28, and first focussed on the enemy pockets in the Galilee, once these had been successfully cleared, the units would move northwards and clear the Huleh valley. On October 31, the operation had turned out to be a success. The Lebanese and the Arab Liberation Army had been defeated and driven out of Palestine, while the Syrians were driven back over the Jordan river, leaving only one outpost west of the river. This initiated a de-facto ceasefire in the region.

Battle for the Negev

The final offensive in the North resulted in an effective end of combat operations for the Lebanese, Syrian and Transjordanian militaries. The United Nations Security Council requested Egypt and Israel to enter negotiations to establish a ceasefire as well (Dupuy, 1978). The Egyptians signalled they would ignore this request and did not want to commit to negotiations with Israel. This allowed the Israelis the final offensive in the south, which started at November 9. The IDF air force effectively attacked the Egyptian air force, which was destroyed on the ground, ensuring Israeli air dominance. Although the ground offensive was aimed at controlling the Negev, IDF units raided Egyptian supply lines and outposts in the Sinai desert, effectively operating in Egyptian territory. At December 29 the UN Security

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Council demanded a cease fire between Egypt and Israel. On December 30, Britain demanded Israel to comply with the ceasefire demand, in order to prevent the mutual defence pact between Britain and Egypt to be invoked. The IDF complied with the ceasefire demand on December 31, which marked the end the first Arab-Israeli war, although it would not result in peace.

RHODES ARMISTICE

Figure 6 Armistice Agreement lines. Source: www.shaularieli.com (Retrieved 13-01-2016)

On January 13, 1949, negotiations on a final armistice between Israel and the four neighbouring states commenced on the Island of Rhodes (Dupuy, 1978). As all actors had their own interests, and the Arabs were still divided, mediator Bunche decided to have bilateral talks. Saudi-Arabia and Iraq did not take part in the Armistice negotiations. The negotiations were partially conducted in secret; as open negotiations could spark political protest from the Arab domestic politics.

The situation between Egypt and Israel was the most urgent, as although operations had ceased, there was still a considerable Egyptian force surrounded in the northern Negev, in the Faluja pocket (Touval, 1982). An Agreement was reached on February 24, in which it was

121 agreed that Israel could claim the Negev, mostly following the borders of the Palestine mandate, and Egypt would gain control over the Gaza Strip, were it still had forces present. The Egyptian forces that were surrounded in the Faluja pocket would be allowed to leave freely.

The negotiation with Lebanon was much more easy, as during the war the conflict was mostly fought on other fronts. An agreement was reached, Syrian forces would withdraw from Lebanon, and the old Palestine-Lebanese border would see a minor adjustment (Touval, 1982). Similarly, an agreement was reached with the Syrians. Although they had been unwilling to relinquish the territory that they had captured, the agreement Israel and Syria concluded on advice of Bunche, included a Syrian withdrawal to the international border, but to add a demilitarized zone to this, in order the deny Israel the ability to take advantage to take over the Syrian positions.

The negotiations with Jordan were mainly conducted in secret in Jordan, directly with King Abdullah (Touval, 1982). The British Government supported the occupation of Palestine by King Abdullah of Transjordan, as they assessed that the only viable alternative would be a tiny, insecure and weak country under leadership of the Al-Husseini clan, which was to be avoided (Cohen, 1986). During November the combat operations against the Arab Legion had been halted, and Transjordan and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. Both actors assessed that further gains against this opponent could only be made a great cost (Dupuy, 1978). On December 1 King Abdullah proclaimed himself king over the territory that is now known as the ‘west bank’, effectively annexing the territory.

Although King Abdullah had already been proclaimed king, his control over the area was not yet secure (Kurzman, 1970; Touval, 1982). The Iraqi forces were eager to release their positions in Judea, especially as the Iraqi population was increasingly disgruntled and civil disorder was increasingly present in Iraq. Sudden Iraqi withdrawal could create a possibility for Israel to renew fighting over the abandoned areas. In fact, as Iraq was unwilling to even negotiate an armistice agreement, a direct assault was also still possible. Israel and Jordan needed to secure agreements on three issues, control over the Negev, control over the West bank, and control over Jerusalem. The agreement was signed at Rhodes on April 3. Israel would recognize Jordanian annexation of the West bank, and Jordan would allow Israel the Negev. The situation in Jerusalem was complex, and thus tensions would remain over this city.

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JEWISH PERSPECTIVE:

End of Mandate – declaration of independence

The declaration of independence was the first step in the formation of statehood for the country of Israel. While some institutions had been created under the Mandate Authority Jewish Agency, a formal political system did not exist. After May 15, Israel was ruled by a Provisional Council of State (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010), Elections would be held in January followed with instalment of the first constituent Government om March 10, 1949. Proclamation of the state and withdrawal of British authority, resulted in Zionist leadership acquiring control over immigration, and by the end of 1948, 100.000 displaced Jews had arrived in Israel.

Altalena affair

The Irgun had been working on collecting weapons and training fighters in Europe. It had procured the Altalena, a ship, in France and intended to use it to transport its equipment and fighters to Israel (Dupuy, 1978). The Israeli provisional government was informed about its operation conducted by the Irgun, and demanded sole authority over the distribution of weapons. The Irgun argued it had paid and organized the shipment, and thus had exclusive rights to its contents. The provisional government disagreed, and argued the Irgun was supposed to be part of the Israeli Defence Force, the IDF, and thus would still profit from the shipment. After arriving in Israel, weapons and fighters were disembarked at Kfar Vitkin, but did not subject to the IDF. The Altalena set sail to Tel Aviv, where more Irgun supporters were supposed to be. The provisional government had instructed the IDF to use force if necessary to obtain the armaments. This resulted in the sinking of the Altalena, and effectively the end of the Irgun. At June 28, all Irgun units took the oath of allegiance, and became part of the IDF (Dupuy, 1978).

Truce – Bernadotte mediations

Planning the end to the truce was a delicate work for the Israeli’s. The truce was badly needed to reorganise and resupply the units. In Europe a lot of military hardware had been secured, either through procurement or donation, and was being organised to be delivered to Palestine. This took time, and a longer truce would assure more time, significantly improving the situation for the Israeli forces. However, as diplomatic pressure was applied by all major actors, even the United States, Israeli diplomats also needed to prevent the truce to morph into

123 a forced peace, as the currently occupied territories would not suffice for a viable state. The truce was followed by ten days of war, in which Israel made major military advances, strengthening its position for future operations.

Truce – Bernadotte assassination

Both the Israeli and Arab leadership might have preferred a truce, but only on irreconcilable terms. Israel needed a political settlement, either by military or by diplomatic means. An unlimited extension of the truce was not considered a viable option, as it would hamper the development of Israel as a state. Militarily, a continued state of war also meant a continued mobilization of the Israeli forces, which would be too costly. The ceasefire agreement was already regularly broken by Egyptian units. Politically and economically the new state would need some form of acceptance by its neighbours. Diplomatically, just 20 countries so far had recognized the Israeli state, and of those only the United States and Russia were major powers (Touval, 1982).

Lehi specifically perceived Bernadotte and his proposals as a threat to Israel (Heller, 1995a). As Lehi had planned to control all of what they considered biblical Israel. Lehi suspected Bernadotte to be a pawn of British imperialism, acting not just against Israel, but against the Soviet Union and all humans in the world. Lehi had threatened to assassinate UN observers before, but had not executed the threats. The second truce came at a point when Israel was making military advances, and this was a clear signal, as interpreted by Lehi, of the weakness of the provisional government. Thus, Heller (1995a) argues, the assassination of Bernadotte served two purposes for Lehi. First it would sabotage his dangerous proposals and functioning as an agent of the imperialist West; second, it would also serve to delegitimize the provisional authority, which Lehi criticized for being a weak subject of Bernadotte. The assassination caused the provisional authorities to outlaw Lehi, and most of its around two hundred members were arrested. Although the Israeli leaders fiercely opposed the Bernadotte proposal, the assassination of the diplomat was condemned as uncalled for, against Israeli interest and in general useless. They also praised Bernadotte for his role in rescuing Jews during World War II.

Rhodes Armistice

The Armistice agreement was of vital interest to Israel. Although the leadership recognized that their position allowed them to make more gains, if the war would continue (Dupuy, 1978).

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The main issue at hand was that further operations against Egypt would have to be conducted in Egypt, and this was already being protested against by both the United States and the United Kingdom. Further gains could be made against the Iraqi forces, this would also involve the Arab Legion, and although the Israeli leadership was confident in the ability to defeat the Arab Legion, the cost to achieve this would be too high. Israel had already suffered over 6.000 deaths on a population of 600.000 people, and sued for peace on acceptable grounds (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The current position allowed the creation of borders for a viable state.

ARAB PERSPECTIVE:

End of Mandate – declaration of independence

On May 15, with the Mandate authorities having formally withdrawn, and the state of Israel proclaimed, the Arab League states invaded. While they had agreed to invade, and had a simple division in sectors, real cooperation was never achieved due to inter-Arab rivalries and mistrusts. The northern sector was to be invaded by Lebanon and Syria, while Egypt would invade the south. The military forces from Transjordan and Iraq were to cross the Jordan river, capture Jerusalem and reach the coast. Egypt would capture the South of Palestine and the Negev.

Bickerton and Klausner (2010) argue that the Arab states fears over future control of the mandate area was the main driving force for the decision to invade. The Egyptian King Farouk was not eager to commit his forces to the war, however, the possibility of a Transjordanian-Iraqi Hashemite controlled Palestine was unacceptable. Not taking part in the war would potentially have resulted in unrest under the Egyptian population and the loss of status amongst Arab leaders, combined with exerted pressure from the Arab League secretary general made Egypt decide to commit its military. The Hashemite kings Abdullah of Transjordan and Faisal II of Iraq might have preferred not to commit their regular forces to the war as well. This would however enable either the Egyptian supported Al-Husseini faction to take control of the territory and proclaim an autonomous pro-Egyptian state. Syria and Lebanon mainly wanted to prevent the central and northern parts of the Mandate area to become controlled by Transjordan.

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Opening – invasion

On May 15, all Arab armies invaded Israel, supported by contingents from Iraq and Saudi- Arabia (O’Ballance, 1957). As combat operations were aided by previous activities employed by irregular forces that operated during the Mandate and the Arab Legion, supporting the British redeployment, successes were achieved. This supported Arab morale, and victory seemed certain. However, the militaries were inexperienced and badly organized, and the logistical challenge could not be met. A truce would allow for regrouping and organising new offensives.

Truce – Bernadotte mediations

From the start of the truce the Arabs had recognised that the most likely result would be a continuation of the war. As the Arab forces had made good progress in the period of fighting, and were mainly held back by logistical challenges, the truce was mainly used to improve positions and get supplies to the frontline. Although Arab cooperation and coordination was called for, it was not achieved (Dupuy, 1978). The Fighting forces of the Arab Higher Committee had been defeated, and although some independent irregular units were still active, they were not able to significantly influence the course of the war.

Truce – Bernadotte assassination

While the Arab states could still not accept, and assured they never would, a Jewish state, also recognized that Israel could not be diplomatically defeated (Touval, 1982). This entailed that either some form of condonance of the Jewish state, or a military solution were the two options open to the Arabs. On November 10, 1948, the Arab League called a conference in Cairo, but again failed at reaching any agreement. Although the Arab leaders agreed on the gravity of the situation, and recognized their inability to coordinate and cooperate as the main issue, they could not resolve this. If anything, over the course of the truce inter-Arab tensions increased.

The Bernadotte plan also seemed to advantage Transjordan, which would be appointed most of the Arab parts of Palestine, a situation unacceptable for Egypt, which had committed a major war effort and controlled large parts of southern Palestine. To this end Egypt installed the All Palestine Government in Gaza, under leadership of the Arab Higher Committee chairman Amin Al-Husseini (Dupuy, 1978). The All Palestine Government was set up by Egypt as an institution to rule all of the former Palestine mandate, and was thus viewed as a

126 threat by King Abdullah, who himself claimed sovereignty over large parts of Palestine. Although this All Palestine Government never was of any effective consequences, it did further damage the Egyptian-Transjordanian relations. No government ever recognized the All Palestine Government as the rightful authority over all of Palestine, except for the six Arab League members, excluding Transjordan. After the war the All Palestine Government administrate Gaza as a nominal independent organ, but be fully subject to the Egyptian leadership.

Rhodes Armistice

The Armistices had been signed by all Arab states, but only Jordan made significant gains from the war, being able to annex Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. This also supported Jordan in abiding by the peace agreement, and Jordan did not immediately press for a new war on Israel (Kurzman, 1970). While all other states stated that a new war on Israel was a possibility, and even the goal of the Arab League, this was considered a long term project. All recognized that Israel had won the war, and should be destroyed at a later date.

4.2.7 EPILOGUE: Stability

The armistice agreements that were signed between Israel and the Arab countries were considered a temporary solution, until a permanent agreement could be reached (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) was responsible for supervising the truce and report on infringements on the agreements. Under UNTSO supervision the Mixed Armistice Commission was created with both Israeli and Arab representatives, intended to resolve all disputes peacefully. Issues that arose were sometimes brought before the United Nations Security Council, although most resolutions were vetoed by either the pro-Israeli United States, or the pro-Arab Soviet Union. An international and regionally agreed upon solution was not found.

JEWISH PERSPECTIVE

State building

A provisional government had ruled Israel during the War of independence (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010), however, during January 1949 elections were held resulting in the instalment of a government in March 1949. The political system of Israel was based on the British

127 system, and the Knesset would form the unicameral legislature. Although the constitutional committees never succeeded in creating constitutional law, the functioning was written down in basic laws. Voting rights were given to all citizens, without racial, sexual or religious exemptions.

The relative peace that was achieved after the first Arab-Israeli war, allowed for the necessity to develop the land to take a higher priority on the public agenda (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). Between 1948 and 1950 the Jewish population of Israel almost doubled from 600.000 to 1.174.000 people, many of whom were still living in temporary shelters. Besides housing infrastructure, the land had to be developed through reforestation and land improvement to provide essential food for the rapidly growing population. For the long term survival economic development was necessary, yet, due to boycotts by Arab countries regional trade remained very minimal. Financial aid and industrial machinery were acquired through many sources, amongst which the United States Government, West Germany and diaspora Jews.

Infiltrations

The truce agreements between Israel and the Arab states resulted in some form of stability, however, elements amongst the Palestinian refugees started infiltrating Israel. These infiltrations were mainly conducted from the Gaza strip, Transjordan and Syria (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). These infiltrations resulted in Palestinian Arabs committing acts of murder, sabotage and bombing. These acts were perceived by the Israeli government as a serious terrorist threat, and while at first a diplomatic solution was sought, pressuring the Arab states in stopping the raids, from 1950 onwards the infiltrations were countered by a strategy of large scale retribution operations crossing the borders of Transjordan, Egypt and Syria. Regular IDF army units could cross the border and attack villages or terrorist bases abroad.

Suez Crisis

Although after the first Arab-Israeli war no permanent peace agreement was negotiated, open war between Israel and one of its neighbours would only occur again until 1956, with the Suez crisis (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The war was essentially one between Great-Britain, France and Egypt, but Israel perceived the war as an opportunity as well. Egypt blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, leading to Southern Israeli harbour, and the Suez Canal to all Israeli traffic. The terrorist threat posed by the Fedayeen, terrorists operating from Egyptian controlled territory and supported by Egyptian government, was perceived to increase and needed to be

128 stopped permanently. British and French support was welcome, as many Arab countries were conducting large scale arms deals, in the case of Egypt with the Soviet Union. The French and British did not achieve all their war goals, and French and British influence in the region diminished. For Israel, the war resulted in control over the entire Sinai desert.

ARAB PERSPECTIVE

At the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, the chance of statehood for Palestinian Arabs had diminished. Egypt controlled Gaza through the All-Palestine government, Transjordan controlled the West-Bank and Israel controlled the rest of the territory. While many of the educated and better equipped Palestinian Arabs successfully build a new life elsewhere in the Arab world, many of the lower class Palestinian Arabs ended up in Refugee camps (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). While Palestinians in Transjordan were offered full citizenship, in most other Arab countries they were offered less favourable terms, and while often where allowed many citizen rights, they were not in general offered citizenship. The Arabs that remained in Israel and acquired full Israeli citizenship.

Infiltrations

The infiltrations and use of violence against Israel by mainly Palestinian refugees was perceived differently by the Arab states (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The Egyptian government supported the Palestinian refugees by organizing the Fedayeen, the fighters, by arming and supplying them. The Transjordanian government had extended citizenship to all Palestinian Arabs living in Transjordan, but was also afraid of instability, and lack of loyalty of the new citizens to their king and country. The Palestinian Arabs perceived the Jordanians as inferior desert nomads. War with Israel was perceived as a danger to Transjordanian stability, and Infiltrations by Palestinian Arabs were discouraged or actively opposed.

4.3 ANALYSIS:

CONTEXT:

Social Cleavage

Social cleavage played a large role in the genesis of the conflict. The conflict in Palestine was essentially a conflict between several groups, divided amongst ethnical and political lines, about the future of government. The Palestinian Arabs were divided in general in three groups, which fully, and sometimes violently, opposed each other. The group that was mainly led by

129 the Al-Husseini clan, envisioned an independent Palestinian state, under leadership of the Al- Husseini clan. In their Palestine, there would be no place for Jews. The Arab factions that supported the Nashashibi, were much more inclined to compromise, and although it would be less influential by May 1948, the Nashashibi clan supported partition and annexation of the Arab parts by Transjordan. The Pan-Arabism factions, aiming for an Arab state covering all Arab lands held less influence. This was significant as the Arab society was very hierarchical, and as Bickerton and Klausner (2010) argue, even feudal in its organisation.

The Jewish community experienced less of a social cleavage, although political opinions differed. Until the 1930’s there was a distinction between the old-Yishuv, those who had lived in Palestine for generations, and the new-Yishuv, those that had immigrated during the recent decades under the influence of Zionism. While Zionism was less popular amongst the old- Yishuv, by the 1930’s the pro-Zionist faction was by far the largest.

The Jewish communities were in general much more westernized than the Arab communities. This increased the Jewish ability to organize and cooperate. Access to financial and judicial means allowed the Jews the purchase of land from the Arabs. Although the Arabs happily sold their land, as they, including the Al-Husseini clan, were profiting from this trade, it did contribute to the creation of a feeling of grievance, which was exploited by the Arab leadership.

Social cleavages are a context factor, and it is difficult to assess its direct or indirect influence. However, the main social cleavages seem to have contributed to escalation of the conflict during the early stages. Political difference existed mainly between the Yishuv and the Palestinian Arabs over the future control over the territory. In social aspects, the Yishuv was in general better educated, organized and financed, allowing them to expand and eventually accept the course of confrontation.

Popular support

Popular support in general is hard to measure, especially retrospectively. It seems that in Palestine of the 1940’s, the British government lacked popular support. Although most actors recognised temporary British authority, excluding the Al-Husseini clan and the Lehi extremists, all aimed at the eventual withdrawal of British forces. It seemed that Britain as central authority had lacked all popular support, which for a large part lay with native actors.

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The Jewish Agency and later the Provisional government seemed to have enjoyed major popular support amongst the Yishuv. To this end they were able to organize and reorganize the armed groups, the procurement of equipment. The legitimacy derived from the popular support allowed the taxation of the Yishuv, increasing revenues which could be used for increasing the warfighting capability. It also allowed for the institution of conscription in early 1948. Although dissidents existed, only Lehi seriously disapproved of the general Jewish leadership, and it was not capable of impairing the general organizational capacity of the Yishuv.

The Palestinian Arab leadership was more divided, and in general popular support seemed to rest much more on personal loyalty and opportunism. This was for instance exemplified when Abd Al-Qadir Al-Husseini got killed during one of the battles of operation Nahshon, and his levies returned to their villages. Although the Al-Husseini seemed to have had commanded most influence and popular support during 1948. As popular support for any central Arab authority seemed to be relatively low, this impaired their mobilisation and warfighting capacity.

As the Yishuv leadership commanded broad popular support, this allowed them to mobilize a large force, and in turn effectively command this force. This gave them an important asset which contributed to escalation of the conflict, as both parties perceived achieving political goals by military means to be a viable option.

Grievances

The main grievance was equal for both the Arab actors and the Yishuv. During World War I, Britain had made political commitments to both the Arab and Jewish leadership. These commitments were interpreted to be irreconcilable by both the Arab and Jewish leadership, although Britain itself committed to a compromise between the two positions. When Britain was perceived as withdrawing from its commitments, according to one or both of the factions, this can directly be linked to escalation of the conflict. Intercommunal grievances increased as the intercommunal violence increased. Although these contributed to escalation, the role seems to have been rather minor, as they were generally within the framework of larger escalations over grievances regarding political commitments.

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Local politics

The role of local politics during the Mandate years and during the 1948 war is difficult to analyse. It is a subject that has been studied less resulting in relative few and inconclusive sources. Contributing to this might have been the size of the Mandate territory, especially as Britain had separated the mandate territories that lay west of the river Jordan from those east of the river Jordan. Local politics would quickly become national politics. Both the Mandate authorities and the Yishuv maintained a strong centralised organization. This was less the case for the Arab communities. During 1948, mainly during the mandate, it seemed that some villages maintained a neutral stance, allowing neither Jewish or Arab groups to use their grounds. This indicates a strong decentralized organization, and this has possibly contributed to local dynamics. The neutral communities were often indeed accepted as neutral by all considered actors. At the same time, some Arab villages started to contribute to the war, seemingly without regard for central leadership, thus escalating the conflict.

National Politics

National politics had a clear influence on escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. During World War II, Yishuv political goals were set by the main actor, the Jewish Agency, which aimed at de-escalation. This policy was seen as disadvantageous by the Irgun and Lehi, who aimed for escalation of the fight against the British authorities. This resulted in the hunting season, which is an example of the main non-state actor attempting to control more militant non-state actors. Likewise, national politics determined Ben-Gurion to take a more militant approach, as he did not want to be perceived as weak when compared to the much more militant Menachem Begin of the Irgun. During the Bernadotte negotiations, Lehi sought to escalate the conflict, with part of its motivation the discrediting of the Provisional government. Although the Lehi was a relative small movement, their actions were very much given in by a distrust of the Jewish Agency. The assassination of Lord Moyne and later Folke Bernadotte caused the mainstream Yishuv to remove Lehi as a legitimate party in national politics, which might have benefitted the provisional government during the truce negotiations later.

Britain was owner of the Mandate, and British domestic politics thus had great influence on the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict in Palestine. All involved had been watching the British post-war elections in order to assess the policy that Britain would adopt regarding the Palestine issue. The prospect of the British elections de-escalated the conflict, as both Arab and Jewish parties assessed that a policy favourable to them would be adopted. Only

132 when the Attlee government had made clear its intentions to not follow the expected policies, the mandate authorities were increasingly perceived as hostile. Domestic British politics also motivated a British withdrawal from Palestine, as the mandate had become too expensive and political solution seemed to be impossible. The referral of the conflict to the United Nations did not cause de-escalation, but resulted in direct insurgency.

Regional Politics

Regional politics played a large role in mainly escalation of the conflict. This is most clearly the case with the invasion of Palestine by the Arab League members, which was as much or even more motivated by regional politics than by anti-Jewish policies or ambitions. Although destruction of Israel was the main aim of the Arab League and the operations executed by its members. Interregional rivalries and competition resulted in increasing unwillingness to cooperate, but also in a large willingness to contribute to the war effort, thus further escalating the conflict.

International Politics

International politics played a large role in both the initial escalation, and the eventual de- escalation of the conflict. This took place mainly in light of two issues. World War II and the German holocaust program had resulted in a high number of Jewish displaced persons, a problem that needed quick resolution. This prompted mainly the Americans seeking access to Palestine for at least a 100.000 displaced Jews. Britain opposed this, as it was balancing both its relation with the Arab countries in the middle east, and the Muslim population in general, as the British empire still held control over large Muslim populations. When the 1948 war threatened to spill over from the Palestine borders, this caused Britain to immediately seek de- escalation of the conflict.

The end of World War II also initiated the increasing east-west tensions of the Cold War framework. This escalated the conflict in two ways. As the Soviet Union assessed that the Palestine issue was a burden to the United Kingdom, escalation would serve the relative strength of the Soviet Union. This would also contribute to preventing western attack on the Soviet Union. This caused the Soviet Union to escalate the conflict by sending weapons and other support. With the socialist Hagana and the Communist Lehi, there was even the possibility of Israel turning Communist, serving the Soviet Union Cold War interests. It would also cause a rift in the Anglo-American alliance, as both countries followed different

133 policies. For the Soviet Union to have this Anglo-American conflict escalate would contribute directly to its policy objectives.

Natural disaster

No natural disaster is known to have occurred during the conflict.

Geography

Geography always plays an important role during any conflict. Warring parties must adapt to the terrain. It is hard to assess whether the terrain contributed to escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. In any case it might have prolonged the conflict, as it offered the armed groups shelter and room for manoeuvre. Mainly in the eastern hilly regions and in the southern Negev the terrain disallowed free movement, and created natural chokepoints which the conflicting parties needed to control.

Increasing the escalation of the conflict was the social segregation. In some cities the Jewish and Arab communities lived together, in most communities this had proven difficult. It resulted in the Jewish communities often creating new settlements in the most desolate places. In time, with proper investment and technologies acquired and procured in Europe, some of these became thriving settlements. The segregation however also resulted in clear targets for attack when hostilities broke out. Both Arab and Jewish armed groups knew which settlement belonged to which population, and thus knew it could attack with less risk of the attack resulting in casualties amongst its own citizens. Attack in this case could also indicate a form of siege warfare, frequently used by the Arab armed groups during 1948.

STATE:

State action – coercive force

Coercive force had been used by the Mandate authorities in their attempt to pacify the Jewish terrorist groups after World War II. While this terror campaign was initiated by the relatively small Jewish factions Irgun and Lehi, the employment coercive force did not create the desired effect. While initially the main Jewish faction was even willing to cooperate with the Mandate authorities, this cooperation ceased as it became clear that the policy solution Britain pursued was not according to the ones committed to earlier. This political rift caused violence to increasingly become part of the proposed solution, and this was strengthened by grievances over violence on both sides increased, this caused further escalation.

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After Britain had referred the issue to the United Nations, and adopted a passive stance in Palestine, aiming at reasonably maintaining order and supporting the withdrawal, the armed groups got increasing freedom of movement, resulting in increasing violence and escalation of the conflict.

State action – policy solution

The Palestine mandate was dominated by two groups, which both had political goals which were, at least after the Biltmore conference, mutually exclusive. Any policy solution proposed or executed by the mandate authority resulted in escalation, as either one or in some cases both Arabs and Jews felt threatened by the proposed policy.

State capacity

Capacity by the mandate forces, at least until 1948, were sufficient. The capacity of the British authority was hardly dependent on local sources, as most of its ability came from the whole of the empire. After World War II Britain faced an economic crisis, and economic policies took preference over some of the security issues. The year 1947 also saw the end of the British Raj, decreasing its imperial capabilities. While Britain certainly had all necessary resources, militarily, economically and socially to maintain the Mandate, it was perceived as too expensive to maintain when assessing the benefits.

Upon proclamation of Israel, on May 14, 1948, the provisional government quickly had at its possession the state apparatuses which had been institutionalized, part in public, part in secret, under the Jewish Agency. This not only allowed mobilization and warfighting, but also increased ability in ‘normal’ administrative duties. This contributed to escalation, as it was crucial in enabling the warfighting ability of the Yishuv.

Weak or strong state

The British empire, though in decline and experiencing economic crisis, was still a major world power. As this did not significantly change during the conflict, it does not seem to have affected escalation or de-escalation. However, closely linked to the ‘state capacity’ argument, the strong state might be perceived as a weak state the moment it decided to disengage, as increasingly social and security tasks were either transferred to local actors, or in some cases simply relinquished. As this was happening the intercommunal violence quickly escalated. So although the capacity of the state never significantly diminished, locally Britain became an

135 increasingly weak state. This resulted in greater freedom of movement for the armed groups. Both Arab and Jewish, would usually start operations in areas as soon as Britain had formally withdrawn.

NON-STATE:

Strategy of armed groups

Throughout the conflict the armed groups have adopted different strategies. The Jewish armed groups have in general made very strategic use of violence. At times, such as when the British elections were to be held, the armed groups de-escalated their use of force, and at other times, such as when the election of the Attlee government did not result in the hoped for policies increasing violence was used as a way to influence policy. The Hagana did for a long time abide by a very restrained stance, and thus contributed to de-escalation. Only when the decision had been taken that partition was necessary and that this policy should be implemented by force, especially after the vote on resolution 181, did they chose an escalatory strategy. Irgun and Lehi had always sought escalation versus Britain, as this was perceived as the only way to motivate them to relinquish the mandate.

As Britain had been withdrawing from its commitment to the 1939 whitepaper, the Arab groups, especially the Jihadists of the Holy War Army had been adopting strategies that were intended to escalate the conflict. These included bombings and assassinations on Jewish targets. In general Arab armed activity during the first phase was limited as the conflict was mainly between Britain and the Yishuv. After adoption of partition the Arabs adopted a strategy of denying logistics to the enemy, and used their vast network of settlements to take control of the roads. This forced the Yishuv in taking action, escalating the conflict further.

Capacity of armed groups

The capacity of the armed groups differed throughout the conflict. During the first phases the capacity of the armed groups was limited. Both in absolute numbers and in relative strength the armed groups had limited capacity. When capacity would increase, this resulted in a direct escalation of the conflict. This occurred when the Arab league delivered weapons to the Holy War Army it increased its capacity to commit operations. The Arab Liberation Army assembled and soon started operating in Palestine as far as its capabilities allowed. This can also be seen when the Hagana received its weapons from Czechoslovakia and launched operation Nahshon. The steady stream of recruits coming from Europe to reinforce the Jewish

136 ranks was also increasing the capabilities of the Jewish armed groups. In general, increased capacity resulted in increased operations, and thus a further escalation.

Factionalisation

Factionalisation occurred both within the Arab and within the Jewish groups. While the Yishuv was represented in the Jewish Agency, an organisation that did not have a specific political colour, not all felt represented. Before the war began, the Irgun split from the Hagana in order to be able to pursue a more militant path. Still later, the Lehi split from the Irgun, again aiming to follow a more radical militant path. These three factions, during the first stage of the war caused escalation. As all factions were still broadly fighting for the same goal, disagreement arose mainly over how to get there, and not where to go. The more militant factions were drawing the Hagana to pursue a more militant policy as well. Thus, it can be argued as having contributed to escalation.

The Arabs groups factionalised from the beginning, forming different competing organisations, often pursuing mutually exclusive goals. Although the organisations did not experience new fractures or organisations splitting from their original parent organisation, existing fractures between existing organisation grew. This resulted in increased competitiveness. It is hard to tell to what extend this contributed to escalation or de-escalation. The Palestinian Arab Holy War Army was defeated early in the war, and all remaining factions were small local volunteer groups, freely attaching and detaching to greater movements. Other active units were the Arab League backed Arab Liberation Army, and the national armies of the Arab League members, sometimes with national volunteer units attached. So it might be argued that the factionalisation amongst Arab armed groups caused de-escalation, as it destroyed their operational effectiveness, this however also partly triggered a foreign intervention, indirectly contributing to further escalation.

Criminalization

Although many criminal acts have occurred over the course of the conflict, it does not seem the armed groups of the Yishuv became primarily criminal groups. While especially after the proclamation of Israel, the Hagana and Irgun seemed to be able to fund their operations through donations and tax revenues, Lehi had traditionally struggled more. Criminal acts versus the general population, such as extortion, are recorded to have been committed by Lehi (Heller, 1995a), although the group maintained its focus on its ideology. Those citizens that

137 did not share the ideology perceived the actions as purely criminal, and Lehi was often referred to as a gang.

The Arab armed groups were much more divided, and criminal gangs have operated especially during the first two phases. This might have contributed to lower popular support amongst Arab citizens in regard to their armed groups. However, this has only sparsely been recorded in academic sources. Most criminal acts where committed towards the Yishuv or the British authorities, in preparation for the withdrawal. These actions included murder and the stealing of weapons from British arms depots and robberies of Jewish communities or targets such as banks. The main motivation for Lehi, after it had become communist during 1944, seems to have remained political.

Although criminal acts contributed to the ability of both the Arabs and the Yishuv to act, either against Britain or against each other, it does not seem to have resulted in the transformation of terrorist and insurgent organisations in criminal gangs.

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4.4 CONCLUSION:

PHASE 1 – NO RESOLUTION

The first phase was mainly marked by escalation. Although Britain and its Palestinian subjects had worked to find a solution, after several whitepapers, commissions, broken promises and new policies, disillusionment hit. A very important issue during this phase is the refusal of Britain to allow Jewish refugees entry into Palestine. Although some were still seeking a political solution, mainly the Jewish militant factions started a campaign of terrorist attacks, aimed at forcing Britain to retreat, handing over the Mandate to the Yishuv. During this phase the main driver for escalation was the grievance over the disillusionment over Government policy. This caused changed strategies within the armed groups, which were still severely limited by their capacity to conduct operations. Finally, increasing tough measures undertaken by the Mandate authorities resulted in increasing resistance, with increasingly less people envisioning a political solution.

PHASE 2 – TERROR IN PALESTINE

Initially the will and capacity of armed groups had lacked. The tough British policies had made it seem unlikely that a satisfactory political solution would be reached. Further terrorist actions resulted in tougher policies, increasing the divide between Britain and the grievances within the Yishuv. The increasingly failing of the political process had resulted in growing support for armed resistance. Armed operations against Britain were increasingly committed. Although these operations were still aimed at improving the diplomatic position in order to achieve the political objectives. The most lethal operation was the bombing of the King David Hotel, and although the Hagana disapproved publicly of the operation, it had given consent to it prior. The operation marked an important change in the relations with the Mandate authorities. Although Jewish Resistance Movement ended during the aftermath of the bombing, the insurgency was in full swing. The British policies in retaliation to the King David Hotel bombing had the effect of further deteriorating the Anglo-Jewish relations. Although it marked the end of most Jewish actions, politically it had achieved a major victory, and contributed to furthering political interest. When Britain opted to refer the issue to the United Nations, this caused an immediate de-escalation in violence against the British authorities. The conflict itself did however not de-escalate, as the chosen policy solution brought in the Arabs, who employed increasingly aggressive measures against the Yishuv.

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PHASE 3 – CIVIL WAR IN PALESTINE

Although formally the Mandate authorities were still responsible for keeping the peace, de- facto the mandate was dismantling. As central authority weakened, armed groups utilized the increased freedom of movement to prepare for and execute attacks. The withdrawal of the Mandate authority can almost be seen as an inversely proportional to the increase in the use of violence. As Britain was withdrawing, large stocks of supplies were left behind, which were often raided by the armed groups in order to increase their capacity to act. Mainly international politics were preventing escalation, as the Palestinian Arabs, the Arab League members and the Yishuv all had interest in Britain abiding by resolution 181, and giving up the mandate. Although a temporary extension of the mandate could have served the Arab interests, it could only do so if this would be done within the 1939 whitepaper framework, which did not happen. Thus all parties, the Yishuv, the Arabs and Britain itself preferred an expedient withdrawal from the mandate.

PHASE 4 – THE JEWISH OFFENSIVES

The conflict escalated further when the capacity of the armed groups, mainly Hagana, but also the Holy War Army, increased. The new capabilities resulted in new an increased operational tempo, escalating the conflict further. Up until that point the conflict had could mainly have been characterized as a rather defensive war, although some attacks on villages had occurred, the strategic positioning of the Arab irregular forces allowed for a protracted siege of Jewish communities. The conflict was thus mainly a deadlock in which the Yishuv was not able to generate enough force to manoeuvre. The arrival of arms shipments from Czechoslovakia and France resulted in increased abilities which were immediately deployed in offensives. The offensives were accompanied by the committal of some atrocities. Although these influenced the development of the conflict, it did not seem to contribute to escalation, which was mainly driven by increased freedom of movement and capabilities.

PHASE 5 – INTERSTATE WAR OF 1948

The interstate war was marked first by an attack by all Arab league members on the newly proclaimed state of Israel. This was a major escalation of the conflict, as the war shifted from being an irregular war between two local communities, to an increasingly regular interstate war. Though initially the fighting resulted in Arab victories, this changed when the fighting was intermitted by two truces. The truces can be perceived as foreign interventions and the

140 result of the international politics factor. The first two truces did however not succeed in creating a lasting peace agreement. A political solution, as demanded by the warring parties, was not agreed upon. A military victory by Israel combined with international pressure did result in armistice agreements to be concluded during 1949. These incorporated a political solution that was assessed as being viable and acceptable to most parties. The local Arab parties that had united under the Al-Husseini banner were defeated and their influence would be limited to Gaza. However, as the military victory had denied Al-Husseini the means to continue the war, the negotiations were concluded without much of their influence, and the Mandate of Palestine was divided between Egypt, Jordan and Israel. The main cause for de- escalation during this phase is the employment of coercive force resulting in a clear military victory, in which both the political goal was achieved and the opponents’ ability to militarily resist was diminished.

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5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This section analyses the escalatory and de-escalatory role of the factors in the four cases, Israel, Lebanon, Namibia, and Sri Lanka, to illustrate the similar and different drivers found in these conflicts. The analysis is structured along the developed framework.

5.1 CONTEXT

Social cleavages

In all four cases, social cleavages can be seen as a highly significant causal mechanism leading to the formation of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the social cleavage between the Tamils and the Sinhalese is the most important. However, the caste system created a hierarchical cleavage within each community, which also contributed to the onset of the conflict. On the other hand, in the case of Namibia social cleavage manifested itself in the form of political and centre-periphery divisions, originating from the South African oppressive apartheid-policies. Ideological division strongly influenced the social cleavage in the case of Israel, as there were two blocks with conflicting ideologies. In the case of Lebanon, ethno-religious sectarian cleavages existed between the numerous Christian and Muslim denominations, which caused inter-sectarian tensions. Additionally, the urban-rural cleavage created tensions within the Lebanese society. It can be observed that social cleavages played a significant role in all four cases facilitating the outbreak of the conflicts. In three cases, Lebanon, Namibia and Sri Lanka, the social cleavage also had an impact the conflict dynamics, in driving at least some of the (de)escalation of the conflicts. In Namibia social cleavages caused an internal power struggle within SWAPO between the younger and older generations. A similar trend occurred at the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, in which a social cleavage existed between the eastern and northern Tamil community. In Lebanon social cleavages escalated the conflict due to communal mobilisation along sectarian lines, which resulted in higher levels of inter- and intra-sectarian violence at several times.

Popular support

In all four cases popular support seems to be related to the conflict dynamics. However, popular support mostly appears to be an indirect influence, since changing levels of popular support did not necessarily lead to changing levels of violence. In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the central government commanded a general low popular support (within a certain community), while the main oppositional actors enjoyed a high level of popular

142 support. In Sri Lanka, the popular support of the non-Tamil population was not necessarily low, but the population voted and supported along party lines, due to the rivalry between the two most important political parties. The idea of a central government was not challenged, but the policy concerning the insurgency was. This resulted in a lack of popular support for the actions of the state, sometimes resulting in anti-government riots. In the case of Lebanon, society was highly divided on the organisation of the state apparatus, but the idea of a central government was supported throughout the conflict. The conflict was more about the division of power within the government. In Israel, the central government lacked legitimacy due to British presence preventing the formation of an Israeli or Arab state. In contrary to the case of Namibia, whereas the central government of South Africa did enjoy popular support from the white voting electorate both in South Africa and Namibia. In the case of Namibia, South Africa´s occupation over Namibia was seen by white ruling minority as historical continuation.

Popular support for non-state actors could be argued to be a contributing factor to both the commencement and continuation of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the state-building project of the LTTE created a high level of popular support because of the provision of security. However, the majority believed their strategies to be too violent. A similar observation can be made in the case of Lebanon, where militias enjoyed popular support due to the protection they offered to their respective communities. Several militias pleaded for the division of Lebanon in different cantons, which was only supported by a small minority of the Lebanese people. In the case of Israel, all non-state actors enjoyed popular support amongst their constituencies. In contrary to Namibia, where the SWAPO did not offer any protection to communities, partly due to its limited military capacity, and mostly enjoyed popular support because of its non-biaze, all including nation-wide independence strife.

The direction of the relation between the two variables works both ways. On the one hand, high levels of violence can lead to lower levels of popular support. On the other hand, high levels of popular support for non-state actors can result in escalation of the conflict, while low levels can de-escalate the conflict.

Grievances

In all the four cases, grievances fuelled the motivation of non-state actors to escalate the conflict. Economic, political and social grievances played a role in the conflicts. Therefore, it had an enormous escalatory impact, mainly in the beginning of the conflict.

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In Namibia grievances can be linked to the apartheid. Oppression of the black population and their poor social and economic conditions caused political grievance. In the case of Israel, the main grievance involved with the escalation of violence was the obstruction by the central authority to comply with prior political commitments on power transfer. In Sri Lanka, the grievances mostly derived from discriminatory policies of the state against the Tamils, which resulted in political, economic and social grievances. For example, the Tamil language was not recognised as an official language. Even though the Tamils were seated in parliament, they had de facto a lack of influence. In the case of Lebanon, political and economic grievances existed amongst the Muslim denominations. The Lebanese confessional system had formalised the division of power, which caused political grievances. The Christian community was granted most political power, which seems to have also resulted in better economic positions, thereby, causing political and economic grievances amongst the Sunni and Shia Muslim community.

It can be observed that within communities, feelings of grievances can prevail. In Lebanon, the Shia Muslim community suffered from a low socio-economic status in comparison to the Sunni Muslim community. This is reflected in Sri Lanka by the caste system, which created differences and grievances within the Tamil community.

In Sri Lanka, Lebanon and Israel, grievances continued to be one of the main drivers of escalation and use of violence for the insurgent(s) throughout the conflict. In contrast to Namibia, where grievance lost its high impact on conflict dynamics, although new grievances arose, for instance, because of poor conditions in refugee camps, which resulted in internal power struggle within SWAPO. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the LTTE was excluded from peace negotiations, which intensified the feelings of exclusion. Additionally, the grievances were so high that decentralisation solutions were not believed to be possible, and they continued devoted to a separate state solution. In the case of Lebanon, the political grievances were deep-rooted and the confessional system hindered political reforms. The Muslim-leftist parties went to great lengths to change the political system. Additionally, the militias were not invited to the negotiation table for a long time, which fuelled their feelings of grievance. Another aspect is the cycle of retaliation, which continued to cause grievances and heighten the level of violence. In Israel, acts of retaliation and inflicted harm caused grievances amongst all actors driving further escalation of the conflict. Interestingly, in all cases acts of retaliation seems to have played a significant role in the escalation of the conflict.

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Local politics

Local politics can be linked to the onset of the conflict in three cases. In the case of Namibia, local politics in the northern region supported the emergence of the SWAPO´s liberation struggle, but it would not impact the conflict dynamics as SWAPO disregarded the local political dimension. Similarly, local politics in Sri Lanka can be regarded as an escalating factor in the beginning, since the rivalry between groups and local leaders resulted in a high level of violence. The LTTE turned out to be the strongest and became the only Tamil militant group for years. Their local political system enhanced public support from the community. Eventually, local political dynamics escalated the conflict again when a new leader started to participate. Likewise, in Lebanon local leaders played a significant role in the onset of the conflict, in terms of communal mobilisation. Lebanese community leaders continued to contribute to the escalation of violence as the conflict progressed by supporting and deploying their respective militia. With the collapse of the central government, communities increasingly relied on the traditional clan structures, in which the local community or clan leader controlled the local police or militia. In all three cases, local politics were highly interrelated with the existence of social cleavages, grievances and the level of popular support. The fourth case, Israel, showed less conclusive results on the specifics of local politics. This might have resulted from the fact that the conflict occurred in a region that is small in many respects, intertwining local and national politics. The Jewish actors maintained a centralised government, while the Arabs were divided more prominently along clan lines. The relevance of either the central government or the clan structures might explain the relative absence of historical accounts on local politics.

National politics

It can be argued that national politics played a role in all conflicts. In all four cases, the nature of the political system functions as a causal mechanism of conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia, the national governments ignored the demands of the non-state parties and continued with their original problematic policies, leading to the outbreak of the conflict. In contrary to Israel and Lebanon, where the non-state actors were not ignored. In some instances, the government even cooperated with the non-state actors. In the Israeli case, for example, during the hunting season, the Hagana militia cooperated with the British in suppressing the other Jewish militias. In the case of Lebanon, the militias functioned as paramilitary wings of political parties. Militias of both the Christian-rightist and the Muslim-

145 leftist parties supported the Lebanese Army at different times in the conflict. The complexity derived from the fact that the militias' leaders could be involved in an armed struggle, while the political leaders were part of the same government. Both political and militias' leaders incited the use of mass violence. In the case of Sri Lanka, it seems that the national politics through national elections de-escalated the conflict due to changing policy in most of the times. Similarly, in Israel, the election of a perceived pro-Zionist government in London during the 1945 elections, influenced de-escalation of the conflict, as political goals could be achieved by cooperation. In contrary to Lebanon and Namibia, where national elections and a change of government mainly escalated the conflict. In Lebanon, political assassinations occurred after a new government had been formed, in order to destabilise the political situation.

Regional politics

All cases had a strong external dimension, in which the regional balance of power played a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict. In the case of Israel, regional politics resulted in a large scale military intervention in the conflict by regional actors. During 1948, the political objectives under consideration by various Arab governments regarding intervention in Palestine, were as much or more dominated by regional political considerations than the destruction of Israel. These regional considerations included maintaining popular support amongst the broader Arab public and increasing political standing, in a bid to become the leader of a Pan-Arab world. Positive considerations were combined with negative regional political considerations, such as preventing other regional actors from expanding territorially, or gaining influence. Regional politics resulting in large scale military interventions is an example of how regional politics can drive escalation. In the same way, foreign invasions of Lebanese territory caused escalation of the conflict. Both Syria and Israel invaded Lebanon multiple times, causing substantial higher levels of violence. Additionally, both states offered financial and material support to the militias, which contributed to prolonging the conflict. Likewise, in the case of Namibia, the Cuban intervention was seen as a major threat by South Africa, leading to its involvement. The South African government also tried to destabilise neighbouring countries, which were supporting and/or hosting SWAPO. Lastly, the support of India for the Tamil militants contributed to escalation of the conflict. Notwithstanding the escalatory role of regional politics, in Namibia, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, a foreign military intervention would eventually lead to de-escalation of the conflict. More specifically, India stopped the military campaign of the Sri Lankan government, which resulted in a three-year

146 ceasefire. However, escalation led to the withdrawal of the Indian forces. In Lebanon, the Lebanese Army supported by Syria, who launched a full-fledged military operation against General Aoun, ended the war.

International politics

International actors proved to be a major factor influencing the conflict dynamics in all four cases. Although, in all cases, international politics contributed to reaching a settlement, international politics often led to or contributed to escalation throughout the conflicts. Escalation was caused by direct military interventions or international pressure on actors to join peace negotiations. In the case of Sri Lanka, the UN tried to pressure the government to find a diplomatic solution towards the end of the conflict, which failed. In the other cases, international negotiations were initiated by the international community. However, the impact of negotiations depended on local receptiveness. For example, in the case of Lebanon, militias who were not invited to the negotiations table, responded to international peace negotiations with fighting. This was not the case in Namibia, where SWAPO was also not included in the leading negotiation. However, they did not even take into account or responded to the international peace negotiations. Eventually, UN recognition for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of Namibian people would consolidate its national position.

In two cases, Israel and Lebanon, escalation occurred as a result of withdrawal of the foreign actor. In the case of Lebanon, the Multinational Forces supported the Lebanese government in the expulsion of the PLO. The withdrawal of the MNF led to severe attacks on several Palestinian refugee camps, as they no longer enjoyed protection from either the PLO or foreign troops. In the case of Israel, the withdrawal of Central British Authority caused escalation, as all parties started fighting to take control. Indirect involvement in the form of diaspora populations supporting specific actors occurred in all four conflicts. This contributed directly and significantly to increasing the strength and capabilities of the supported actors.

Cold War dynamics played a major role in three conflicts. In the case of Namibia, it influenced the conflict dynamics by preventing the peace-building efforts and negotiations. SWAPO was dragged into the fight for communist backed by Angola. In general, it was caught in the middle of U.S. led war against Communism. In Lebanon, the Cold War dynamics became most apparent in the foreign support for militias. The nations offering support were clearly divided along Cold War lines. In the case of Israel, Cold War dynamics are resembled in three different ways. First, British considerations included the strategic need

147 for relations in the region, as being close to strategic supply routes, but also under consideration was the Arab oil, necessary for winning the coming war with the Soviet Union. Secondly, on a political level Soviet opportunism played a role, as British and American policies on the issue of Palestine differed, the Soviets actively pursued a strategy to increase friction on the issue between the two major western allies. Third, as much of the middle east was under British control, creation of the state of Israel, could serve to both impair British relations with the Arab countries. If Israel would successfully claim independence and statehood, this could possibly create a Soviet ally in the Middle-East possessing strategic Mediterranean ports, something the Soviet Union identified as a strategic necessity. In the case of Lebanon, cold war dynamics are mostly resembled in the foreign support militias received. The Christian-rightist camp sided with the West, while the Muslim-leftist camp sided with Soviet-aligned Arab states. In this way, the cold war dynamics accelerated the process of polarisation. In the case of Sri Lanka, other international developments, such as the war on terror, influenced the dynamics of the conflict. The international narrative framed the Tamil Tigers as terrorist, and supported the governmental coercive action against these 'terrorists'. It also declined the financial support of Tamil diaspora, which had a negative impact of the capacity of the LTTE.

In Sri Lanka, Norway led peace negotiations, which seem to have de-escalated the conflict at first. However, they failed to bring all the parties together, which resulted in escalation of the conflict. Likewise, in Namibia peace negotiations were held without SWAPO by the Western Contact Group, which led to escalation of the conflict. In the case of Lebanon, several foreign powers initiated peace negotiations. However, the attempts failed utterly, which resulted in higher levels of violence, and pushed the Lebanese government even more to the sidelines. In the last phase, foreign mediation led by Saudi Arabia led to the Taif agreement, which formally ended the civil war. In Israel, foreign mediation influenced the negotiations in the first phases, in order to gain a position of strength. In the last phase, foreign mediation resulted in three truces. However, the truces were misused to regroup for combat operations.

Natural disaster

Two of the four cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict. Namibia had a serious drought and Sri Lanka was struck by a tsunami. However, the impact of the natural disasters differed. In Namibia, the drought changed the circumstances of the conflict. For instance, the drought forced some tribes to work for the South African Defense Forces. Still,

148 the drought is not considered to be a causal mechanism for escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. In Sri Lanka, it did influence conflict dynamics. The tsunami struck the island in times of relative peace. This united the population for a while, who all worked together in rebuilding the island. However, the rebuilding policy increased political tensions. This resulted in the collapse of the political coalition and increased the social tensions towards the Tamils. Eventually, this contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In Israel and Lebanon no natural disasters occurred during the conflicts.

Geography

In case of Israel, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon geographical settings prolonged the conflict, as the geography caused ethnic concentrations. The Sri Lankas thick jungle and the Lebanese mountainous terrain created an environment for ethnic segregation and bases for long resistance. Similarly, in Israel, segregated villages existed, providing both safe havens and clean targets. The remote and segregated villages provided secure bases for militias to operate from, controlling the village and much of the surrounding land and roads. Concurrently, this segregation also caused insecurity to the civilians, for it provided clean targets. allowing perpetrators to act relentless, as when attacking a village, no account had to be held for the safety of civilians of the own group. Additionally, geographical factors played a decisive role in the type of warfare, as exemplified by the guerrilla warfare in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers controlling the coastlines in the East and the North, which increased their naval capacities. Similar warfare practices can be observed in the mountainous and urban areas of Lebanon.

In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia a regional theatre of war occurred, leaving the rest (most) of the country to continue their more or less normal lives. In contrast, in the case of Namibia geographical setting naturally limited the reach of non-state actors armed operations. Since the operations were in the form of small-scale guerrilla attacks, it seems that geography did not impact the conflict dynamics. These attacks would also have taken place in a different environment, because non-state actor did not have resources for large-scale warfare.

5.2 STATE

State action – coercive force

In all four cases, the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict. In Namibia and Lebanon, the use of coercive force proved to be a major contributing

149 factor to the outbreak of the conflict. In Namibia, the violent breakdown of protests aggravated the population, and started the liberation movement. Similarly, the Lebanese Army was deployed against the Sunni Muslims to bring an end to the protests, which sparked the inter-sectarian fighting. For the remainder of the conflict, the Lebanese government was anxious to use coercive force, as it feared it would fuel sectarian tensions. Eventually, the state lost its coercive force with the disintegration of the Lebanese Army. The role of the state was reduced to the side-lines and the rule of militia triumphed.

Likewise, in the case of Israel, the restrained stance on the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict, as the non-state actors were able to freely combat other non-state actors. In both the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the use of coercive force resulted in a cycle of retaliation. In Sri Lanka, the state's coercive force can be regarded as a response to the violent acts of the Tamil Tigers, although state personal took part in the escalating anti-Tamil riots at the onset of the conflict. In Namibia, coercive force was used to reinforce the apartheid policies, which aggravated the feelings of grievance. In the last phase of the conflict in Lebanon and Sri Lankan, coercive force of the state would result in higher levels of violence on a short term, but de-escalate the conflict on a long term. In the other phases, the use of coercive force by the state resulted in escalation of the conflict. Additionally, it has been observed that the use of coercive force influenced the levels of popular support for the ruling government and militias. Extensive use of coercive force can lead to war weariness, in which the population gets tired from the casualties and costs of war.

State action – policy solution

Policy solutions of the state have similar effects on the four cases. In Lebanon, policy solutions in the form of peace negotiations failed, which led to escalation of the conflict. The warring factions were not able to find common ground due to their diverging objectives, and ordered their militias to continue their attacks. At other times, the negotiations failed because not all factions were invited to the negotiation table. Eventually, peace negotiations initiated by Saudi Arabia would lead to political consensus, ending the conflict. Similarly, in Sri Lanka peace negotiation attempts failed, as the parties failed to make comprises, had ulterior motives, or the LTTE felt excluded, after which the Tamil Tigers returned to their violent strategies.

In Namibia independence negotiations were conducted on the international level without a non-state actor. South Africa made several attempts of self-governance in Namibia, allowing the creation of local parliaments. The SWAPO ignored these peace-making attempts and

150 continued their strive for full independence. Eventually, the involvement of a foreign power and the UN led to de-escalation the conflict in both Lebanon and Namibia. In Israel, independence negotiations determined the strategies, thereby, influencing the dynamics of the conflict. It must be noted that the negotiations were also used as a strategy. The main armed group chose strategies aiming to de-escalate the conflict. While other armed groups, smaller factions, acted as spoilers.

Additionally, in all cases oppressive legislation was adopted to deal with the insurgent movements. In Namibia and Sri Lanka, the anti-terrorism act enlarged the repressive capabilities of the state, but resulted in more grievances among the minority population. In Israel, the same grievances resulted from the non-fraternisation act, forbidding any British citizen to economically or socially interact with a Jewish citizen. In Lebanon, the president ordered the Lebanese Army to search and capture "illegal" Palestinians. However, illegal Palestinians were defined as those who had arrived in Lebanon after 1948, which was estimated to be half of the refugees. This increased the feelings of grievance amongst the Palestinian population.

State capacity

In four cases the state capacity influenced the course of the conflict. The cases offer an insight in the effect of extensive and limited state capacity. In the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the extensive state capacity played an escalatory role in the conflict. This can be observed by the large military campaign that escalated the conflict in Sri Lanka sharply, and eventually ended thus de-escalated it. In Namibia, the SWAPO forces could not compete with the far greater military superiority of the South African Forces. Only at the end, the SWAPO-Cuban-Angola coalition was able to counter these forces.

In contrast to Lebanon, where the limited state capacity contributed to escalation of the conflict. The state lost its mean of coercion after the disintegration of the army, leading to the rule of militia, which escalated the conflict. Additionally, the parallel economy of the militias diminished the financial means of the state, as it could only collect a small percentage of its revenues. However, in the case of Namibia, the diminished state's economic capacity led to de-escalation of the conflict. The state was finally willing, or forced, to negotiate due to the deprived economic situation, high number of casualties, and weakened military capabilities. A related observation can be made in the case of Israel, where the British government withdrew partly due to the no longer economic viable situation. Furthermore, the British state´s capacity

151 did not change throughout the first phases of the conflict. Yet, after the proclamation of Israel, the perception of it being a military weak state contributed other factions to attack, thereby escalating the conflict.

Weak or strong state

In the case of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the unstable political coalition and political polarisation hindered reaching a solution. In both cases a weak state drove the escalation of the conflict, which prolonged the conflict. In Sri Lanka, political polarisation prohibited the government to agree upon solutions, which resulted in the collapse of political coalitions. In Lebanon, the political parties were highly divided on the power sharing agreements, leading to extreme political polarisation, escalating the conflict. Political consensus on political reforms would lead to the end of the conflict.

In the case of Namibia and Israel, the state actor represented a strong actor, enjoying strong public support. Both were colonial powers ruling a native population, but were mainly accountable to their respective voters, causing native popular and political support to be less relevant, or at least national politics to be taken into account. The South African government enjoyed public supported of the white South Africans voters residing in Namibia. Thereby, the popular support enabled the government to take coercive measures and counter international pressure, which escalated the conflict. Similarly, in the case of Israel, the British strong state could rely upon its popular support to counter international pressures. Additionally, South Africa had a strong state apparatus and institutions, which efficiently delivered its oppressive apartheid-policies against the black population group. Determined strong state action led to the escalation of the situation and the emergence of the conflict. Therefore, the Namibian case shows that a strong government, in contrary to the in certain phases weak government of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, can also prolong the conflict.

In all cases the state´s inability to control its security organisations led to escalation of conflict. This can be observed in the Namibian case, when the position of the defence forces became stronger and more independent in conducting operations, escalating conflict dynamics. In contrary to Lebanon, where the dissolving state institutions, including the disintegration of the army, escalated the conflict. Half of the military joined the militias, which would eventually start to rule specific cantons. In Sri Lanka, the government could not control its security personnel and military from taking part in riots. The new proclaimed state of Israel also suffered from uncontrollable militias.

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5.3 NON-STATE

Strategy of armed groups

The strategy of the armed groups in all four conflicts contributed to dynamics of the conflict. The use of different strategies by the armed groups in the different time-frames and conflicts leads to the argument that the strategy chosen by the non-state actor can either escalate or de- escalate the conflict.

Both the conflicts of Namibia and Israel experienced the strategic use of violence in order to achieve strategic rather than tactical goals. In both the case of Israel and Namibia, armed groups used diplomatic efforts to gain recognition of their new states with help of the international community. Namibia was able to acquire recognition for their independence struggle, but human right violations were largely ignored. This relates to the Sri Lankan case, in which the Tamil Tigers tried to change the narrative to gain international support for their cause. The international community recognised the human rights violations of the state, but they did not act thoroughly.

In the case of Lebanon, the non-state actors focused on tactical rather than strategic goals. The militias fought a war of reciprocity and relative victories. Furthermore, the warring factions were highly dependent on the financial and material support from foreign powers, which prolonged the duration of the conflict. It can even be claimed that the end of the Cold War in 1991 contributed to ending the civil war in 1989, since militias were aware that they were no longer assured of support and could not continue fighting without it.

In Namibia, the political struggle was more important than the armed struggle. The latter can be regarded more as a symbolic to the actions taken on the political level of the independence struggle. In contrary to Lebanon and Sri Lanka, where the high levels of violence blurred and at times even replaced the political goal.

In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actor made strategic use of agreed ceasefires to improve its tactical position and regain strength, which resulted in escalation after ceasefires. A similar observation can be made in the Israeli case, where it was the state who misused the ceasefire in the last phase.

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In all cases, terrorist methods, such as suicide bombings and political assassinations, were used to direct attention to their goals. These methods were chosen because of their low cost and high impact. The acts of terrorism led to escalation, as they fuelled the cycle of retaliation.

In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actors adopted an alternative strategy to intimidate their opponents. They organised imposing military parades and exhibition of weaponry. The intention of the parades and exhibitions was also to increase popular support.

Capacity of armed groups

In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the capacity of the armed groups grew over the conflict as they became more professionalised and began to resemble a conventional army, thereby, contributing to the escalation of the conflict. Israeli armed groups had air forces, and the LTTE had a strong naval unit, air force, and specialised fighting units. The militias were highly organised, which increased their capacity. One of the Christian militias in Lebanon even started introducing conscription. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE introduced a similar concept, as every family had to send one child to fight. In the case of Namibia, the militia remained a guerrilla type organisation throughout the conflict.

Namibia’s conflict escalated clearly when the non-state actors’ capacity was increased with the influx of radical young people escaping into exile from Namibia to SWAPO´s camps to Angola, also resulting an internal power struggle. A similar observation can be made in Lebanon, where the PLO recruited heavily in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Militias capitalised on feelings of political, economic, social grievances. In all cases, the financial support of diaspores all over the world contributed significantly to the capacity of the armed groups. In Namibia, militias enjoyed a rather unique position, as they received financial support from the UN, since they were recognised as an official independence movement.

Factionalisation

In four cases, the internal dynamics of the militias influenced the dynamics of the conflict. In three cases, Israel, Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the factionalisation of armed groups played an escalatory role in the conflict, as it increased tensions between groups, which resulted in higher levels of violence. In the case of Israel, the splinter factions separated from the Hagana to follow a more violent path. This did mean that they had to acquire legitimacy. In the case of Lebanon, the levels of violence heightened due to factionalisation, as the militias not only

154 had to fight other sectarian militias, but also militias from their own confessional group. In Sri Lanka, it first escalated the conflict, as it created a battle on a new front. Later, factionalisation contributed to the collapse of the armed group, which contributed to the end of the conflict.

In the case of Namibia, the factionalisation did not seem to have influenced the conflict dynamics, as the armed struggle was centrally coordinated. Factionalisation led to internal power struggles and political division, as observed after the independence in the first voting. However, the internal power struggles did not influence the course of the armed struggle. In contrary to Lebanon, where internal power struggles contributed to higher levels of violence within the communities. This can be related to the significant role of local community leaders in the course of the Lebanese conflict.

Criminalisation

In the case of Lebanon criminalisation played an escalatory role in the conflict, where higher revenues enabled greater capacity and prolonged the costly conflict. It can be argued that some of the militias started resembling criminal organisations, as they were seeking profit rather than reaching a political goal. Criminal acts of armed groups also took place in the case of Sri Lanka and Israel, but only in small-scale. In these three cases where criminal activities existed, they did not change the political objectives (nature, motivation and popular support) of the groups, as their main motivation and goals remained political. In Namibia criminalisation did not play a part during the conflict. SWAPO did not have to resort on criminality to fund its activities because of its massive international financial support.

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6. CONCLUSION

The conclusion will return to the research question posed at the beginning of the research: what causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflicts? The findings will be presented per realm. This research identified several causal mechanisms, which have significantly impacted the dynamics of all four cases. The exploratory nature of the research does not yet allow generalisation of the findings to other conflicts. Therefore, the discussion will refer to the limitations and recommendations for future research in order to improve the analytical framework.

6.1 CONTEXT

Some factors appear to be an important prerequisite for all the four conflicts. For example, social cleavages, which existed in all four cases before the conflict began and contributed to the onset of the conflicts. During these conflicts, the social cleavages remained an underlying, important factor in all cases. The social cleavages created different kinds of grievances that directly motivated actors to start a conflict. In some cases, the grievances were so strong that they continued driving the conflict, for instance, by determining the strategy of the armed groups.

Popular support is another contextual factor that has been a prerequisite for conflict. The lack of popular support for the government or, on the other hand, the growing popular support for an insurgent group, fuelled the conflicts. During the conflicts, this factor also contributed to changing conflict dynamics. Other than social cleavages or geography, popular support is a dynamic factor. Changing popular support changed the conflict dynamics most of the times. A common pattern that has been found in all the four studied cases is about war-weariness. When the level of popular support for the insurgent Low level High level of of popular group or the government is high, the level of violence violence support is likely to grow. A high level of violence leads to war-weariness among the population and eventually

Declining the popular support for the violent approach declines. High level level of of This leads to a declining level of violence, since the popular violence support insurgent group and the government need popular support for their strategy. Additionally, changing popular support influenced the other factors, such as a declining popular support for an insurgent group that caused the factionalisation of the group.

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Politics has a large impact on conflict dynamics on a local, national, regional and international level. Local politics is intertwined with social Conflict dynamics Elections cleavages, popular support and grievances in all four change cases, for instance, social cleavages within a community determine the local parties or the grievances determine the political agenda. National politics are an important factor in explaining conflict New New policy government dynamics. Again a common pattern has been found in three of the cases. Elections lead to a new government with a new policy, which leads to, depending on the nature of the new policy, the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. New elections restart the cycle.

Regional politics appeared in all cases to be directly influencing the conflict, both escalatory and de-escalatory. This is also the case for international politics in three of the cases. All cases have a strong external dimension. In three cases, the conflict escalated when the military involvement of foreign forces declined. Additionally, international support from diaspora strengthened the insurgent groups in all our cases. Foreign mediation failed in all cases, which eventually resulted in escalating the conflict again after a small period of peace.

Two cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict, however, with a different impact. It depends on the circumstances and other factors if and how it influences the conflict dynamics. Geography appears to be a constant factor that determines warfare and strategy. It prolonged the conflict in three cases, since rugged terrain and the adapted strategies made the warfare more complicated. Additionally, ethnic concentrations have strengthened social cleavages.

6.2 STATE

The use of coercive force is strongly intertwined with popular support. War-weariness among the population can contribute to a declining level of popular support, which can result in the need for the state to change their policy. Coercive force influences the conflict, however, it depends on circumstances and other factors, such as the capacity and the strategy of the state, whether it escalates or de-escalates the conflict. Escalation of the conflict happened, for instance, when coercive force contributed to a cycle of retaliation. When the state succeeds to end the conflict using coercive force, it escalates the level of violence for a while, but de-

157 escalates the conflict eventually. This happened in two cases. The restraint stance on the use of coercive force has also contributed to escalation in two cases.

Policy solutions also had a different impact in driving the conflict dynamics. Failed peace negotiations escalated conflict dynamics in all cases. They failed due to a lack of consensus, ulterior motives, or the exclusion of parties. Successful negotiations de-escalated the conflict by ending it in two cases. In four of the cases, the government implemented repressive legislation that resulted in grievances among a part of the population, which resulted in driving the escalation of conflict dynamics.

The state’s capacity determines its ability to use coercive force and the level of successfulness of these military campaigns. In several of our cases the coercive force did only escalate the conflict because a lack of capacity that was not enough to overthrow the other forces. Limited state capacity can also lead to the disability to use coercive force, which gives the opportunity to militias to take over control. In two cases, the military capacity of the state became high in the last phase, which created the ability to overthrow the other party and de-escalated the conflict by ending it. The weak or strong state factor is closely related to the state’s capacity. The collapse of state institutions, such as, the army led to escalation of the conflict in some cases, as it worked in advantage of the opposition. The lack of control over the state’s institutions contributed to escalation, and unstable political coalitions and political polarisation prohibited reaching a solution in two cases. Here a ‘weak state’ drove the escalation of the conflict dynamics. However, in the other two cases, a ‘strong state’, exemplified by a strong state apparatus and institutions, escalated and prolonged the conflict. It depends on the circumstances and the state’s capacity and strategy whether this factor escalates or de-escalates the conflict.

6.3 NON-STATE

There are many similarities between the strategies of the armed groups in all four cases. However, they had different outcomes. In three cases, the armed groups had an international oriented strategy in which they tried to gain international recognition of their cause. In two of these cases, they succeeded in acquiring the international recognition for their independence struggle. In the other case, human rights violations and maltreatment of the minority population by the government were acknowledged, but the independence struggle was not, since the main international narrative framed them as terrorists. Additionally, the armed groups focused on diaspora to get financial and moral support. The international strategy

158 mostly prolonged the conflicts, although international recognition and support drove the escalation of the conflict partly in some phases. Additionally, in three cases the ceasefires were used strategically by the armed group to regain strength and resources. Almost every ceasefire resulted in the escalation of the conflict. In the fourth case, there were no ceasefires. In all cases the armed groups used terrorist measures to get attention for their cause. This fuelled the cycle of retaliation and resulted in escalation of the conflict.

The capacity of the armed groups is different. In three cases, the armed group had started to resemble a conventional army throughout the conflict, while in the other case the armed group remained a guerrilla type of organisation. Although the growing capacities broadened the opportunities of the armed groups, it is not necessarily considered as a driving factor of escalation, since the armed groups also managed to escalate the conflict with little resources. However, the growing capacity did prolong the conflict, as it enabled the armed groups to withstand the government forces.

Factionalisation of armed groups took place in all the four cases, however, they had a different outcome. In two cases, factionalisation led to the escalation of the conflict. In one case, factionalisation contributed to the escalation of the conflict dynamics at first, but later became one of the main factors that contributed to the end of the civil war, thereby, de- escalating the conflict. In the fourth case, factionalisation is not considered to be influencing conflict dynamics. Finally, in all cases the armed groups were taking part in criminal activities to get resources for their armed struggle. Only in one case the goal of some of the armed groups changed from political to criminal nature. This prolonged the conflict, since they benefited from the continuation of the war.

6.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical framework has been created based on the extensive literature review and complemented after the individual case studies, which had revealed two new factors influencing the conflict dynamics. Firstly, in the case of Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, geography has been identified as a factor driving the conflict. Although it is a static factor, it determined other factors, for instance, the strategy of the armed group. Secondly, a distinction is made between international and regional politics. In all cases, it appeared that the regional circumstances and balance of power highly influenced the conflict dynamics. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between regional and international politics. A schematic overview of the new analytical framework is added in section 3.6.2. This analytical framework appeared to

159 be equally applicable to the four studied cases and provided a holistic picture of the drivers of conflict dynamics. However, the direction of the impact and the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Some recommendations for further research and possible changes to the framework in future analysis are listed in the discussion.

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7. DISCUSSION

In this research, an attempt is made to ´dissect´ four different civil wars to understand, ´what makes them tick´. Previous research has been focusing mainly on the origin of conflicts or their resolution. Additionally, scholars have developed frameworks to research conflict dynamics. The sociological-institutional analysis of Pahlavi and Ouellet presents a framework to research the internal factors influencing the dynamics of a conflict. They recommended to adopt a holistic approach, which motivated the broad range of factors used in this analytical framework. The limitation mentioned by Pahlavi and Ouellet was the division of factors between the three dimensions. In this research, the challenge was to link the specific events or mechanisms to the factors of the analytical framework. This calls for further development of the analytical framework. Other insights were derived from the multi-level model of Ramsbotham. He focused on different level-phenomena, for instance, the international, regional and contextual level. The multi-level approach led to the inclusion of external factors in the analytical framework.

The focus of the research was on the individual factors that influenced the conflict dynamics. Nevertheless, the research showed that the factors also interact with each other. It is difficult to assess the direction of interaction and the correlation. For example, popular support can affect strategies of armed groups, and vice versa. Thereby, focusing on the escalation and de- escalation of conflict might lead to an underestimation of the importance of underlying causal mechanisms driving the conflict. Other underlying factors that have impacted the factors identified as influencing the conflict dynamics might be underappreciated in the analytical framework. This is related to the common deduction-induction problem in scientific research. The analytical framework is extensive, identifying three realms and 15 factors. During the research, new factors were identified possibly influencing the conflict. The factors were placed within the existing framework rather than adding a new factor, since their significance might be too small to create a separate factor. However, this might have led to underappreciation of these events.

The analytical framework has only been applied to a limited sample. The four cases that have been researched showed many similarities in their conflict dynamics, despite their differences in timespan, location and circumstances. A more extensive ´N´ is required to test and improve the analytical framework. During the research, several possibilities for improvement have already been found. For instance, the factor state strategy is dived in coercive force and policy

161 solution. It is recommended to combine the two in, for instance, state strategy, since the research has revealed that the state actions are highly intertwined. For example, the implementation of anti-terrorism policy resulted in the use of coercive force. Furthermore, the research found that the peace processes significantly influence the conflict dynamics. It is recommended to add peace process to the contextual factors, since it cannot be linked solely to one of the existing factors. Peace processes have now been placed under state action, policy solution, whereas peace processes can take place without involvement of the state, instead militias might be invited to the negotiation table.

This well-developed analytical framework is of academic relevance, since it contributes to the understudied field of holistic approaches in studying irregular armed conflict. In addition, the findings can also be relevant to practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. The framework points out factors that might contribute to preventing escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflict. In general, future research on irregular armed conflict should attempt to gather more systematic data on armed groups, as research on the dynamics of conflict is seriously hampered by a lack of it.

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8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX A

THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Bernadotte, Folke:

Swedish diplomat and Count, Folke Bernadotte was appointed by the United Nations as a mediator for the Arab-Israeli conflict. His appointment started at May 20, 1948, and lasted until he was assassinated in Jerusalem by Lehi extremists on September 17, 1948 (Touval, 1982).

Resolution 181:

- See UNSCOP.

UNSCOP:

UNSCOP, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was installed when Britain referred the Palestine issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations (Kurzman, 1970). Its task was to retrieve the cause of the conflict and possible solutions. The committee was created on May 15, 1947, and its report was published on September 3, 1947. The Committee proposed termination of the mandate and partition of between two independent states. The proposal was accepted in Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947.

JEWISH ACTORS

Hagana:

Hagana (Cohen, 1986) was a Jewish militia organisation that would later form the main element of the Israeli Defence Force. Its main task in the early years was the protection of the Jewish settlements in Palestine, and it is known for its policy of ‘Havlaga’*, which constituted a defensive posture and did not seek to exert punishment or revenge on Arab citizens. During the 1940’s it would become the largest Jewish militia in Palestine. During the Second World War, the Hagana cooperated with the British both in operations against the Axis as well as in maintaining order in Palestine and refrained from anti-British operations during the war. After World War Two the Hagana reformed and gained a more regular posture.

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*Havlaga:

The policy adopted by major Jewish actors such as the Hagana and the Jewish Agency, calling for a very restrained posture (Kurzman, 1970). As the general believe was that a Jewish home in Palestine would always include the Arab population, and thus a good neighbourhood policy was required. While defence of the settlements was allowed, retaliatory action was not.

Irgun:

The Irgun, also known as ‘Irgun Tsva'i-Leumi’, ‘Etzel’ or ‘Hagana Bet’, is a Jewish armed group that was formed in 1931 of former Hagana members (Bell, 1977). The Irgun supported a more militant and less defensive approach as was practiced under the Havlaga policy. It maintained an active anti-British operation in Palestine during the Second World War. One of its most notorious operations is the bombing of the King David hotel in 1947.

Jewish Agency:

The Jewish Agency (ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 2015; Sherman, 1997) is the main Jewish administrative body, taking care of many governance functions in the Yishuv. The agency cooperated with the British, and had official recognition under the mandate (Council of the League of Nations, 1922). Its main role was governing and supporting the immigration and integration of Jews in Palestine. The Jewish agency had close connections to the Zionist Movement and maintained its function after the creation of the state of Israel.

Jewish Resistance Movement:

Also known as Tenuat Hameri, and is the cooperation between the three Jewish militant organisations Hagana, Irgun and Lehi (Bell, 1977). The cooperation started during October 1945, as British refusal to have Jewish displaced persons enter Palestine caused deteriorating relations with the Yishuv. The cooperation ended after the King David Hotel Bombing in August 1946 had caused severe casualties.

Lehi:

The Lehi or Stern gang (Heller, 1995a) was an extremist Zionist movement that itself can be considered an offshoot from Irgun. Lehi denounced from their creation cooperation with the British, and during the first years of World War II Lehi tried to cooperate with the Axis

173 powers. After 1942, with the death of the group’s leader Avraham Stern, their policy aligned more with the Soviet Union. Lehi never became a large organisation, and never had more than a few hundred members.

Palmach:

The Palmach (Cohen, 1986) was an elite unit within the Hagana, also known as ‘strike force’. While the regular Hagana units were territory bound, the Palmach was a small force that could be used wherever the Hagana leadership desired to put more pressure on the opposing forces. Both within the mandate area and abroad.

World Zionist Organization:

The World Zionist Organization was created at the Zionist Congress, which was held in Basel in August 1897 (Bell, 1977). The organization functioned as a broad platform, and accepted many different political views on what Zionism actually was and how it should be given form.

Yishuv:

Yishuv (Marlowe, 1959, p. 108) is the general used name for the Jewish communities in Palestine. It is a Hebrew word and serves to differentiate the Jews living in Palestine from those that are living abroad, usually referred to as the diaspora. The Yishuv is often divided in a ‘new’ and ‘old’ Yishuv, in which the old Yishuv refers to the Jews that have been living in Palestine for centuries under the ottoman empire, while the new Yishuv constitutes the refugees and others that immigrated to Palestine during the ‘first Alia’ in 1882 and later.

Zionist:

Zionism is the political movement that pursues a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Kurzman, 1970). As a political ideal, Zionism needs to be separated as a term from the Yishuv or world Jewry. Zionism had only had the support from a small fraction of world Jewry, and mainly gained prominence during the 1930’s. Not all Jews in Palestine supported Zionism, and those that did support Zionism often disagreed over the what a Jewish homeland actually entailed and how it was to be achieved.

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THE MAIN ARAB ACTORS

Al-Husseini Clan:

The Al-Husseini clan, also known by different westers spellings such as Al-Husayni, was an influential family in Jerusalem in late Ottoman times (Kupferschmidt, 1987). Influence grew during the first years of the mandate, as the British installed Kamil Al-Husseini as the grand mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Sharia Council. After his passing in 1921, his brother, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, became the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. They would later play a considerable role in Arab Higher Committee and the Holy War Army.

Arab Higher Committee:

The Arab Higher Committee was established in 1936 under the leadership of the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Amin Al-Husseini (Bell, 1977). It was reinstated by the Arab League in 1945 after being banned by the British in 1938. Its role was to act as a governing body for Palestinian Arabs. After World War II, when Amin Al-Husseini returned from Germany, the Arab League reinstated the Arab Higher Committee as a platform for Palestinian Arab governance. Although the committee was active in Palestine during 1947 and 1948, its role in the

Arab League:

The Arab League is an inter-Arabic institution created to promote closer relations and cooperation amongst its members (Khalidi, 1986). It was founded in March 1945 in Egypt and consisted of six member states, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Syria.

Arab legion:

The Arab Legion is the name for the armed forces of Transjordan, which gained full independence as a Kingdom on May 25, 1946 (Bell, 1977). The Arab Legion was first instated under British directive in 1920 as the Emirate of Transjordan was separated from the Palestine mandate. The Arab Legion was actively involved in the Israeli Independence War, and during the war had many British officers in its ranks.

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Arab Liberation Army:

The Arab Liberation Army, also known as Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas or Arab Salvation Army, was set up by the Arab League as an all-volunteer irregular armed force tasked with gaining control of the lands of Palestine (bell, 1977). It operated from Damascus, and operated in close cooperation with the Syrian Army. The Arab League also intended the Arab Liberation Army as a controlled alternative to the Holy War Army.

Holy War Army:

The Holy War Army or Army of the Holy War, was a Palestinian Arab irregular force (Kurzman, 1970). It was involved in the Israeli Independence War from 1947 onwards. It was supported by the Arab Higher Committee. Its commander was Abd al Qadir Al-Husseini, and after his death during the Palestinian civil war, its effective combat capabilities diminished and the Holy War Army ceased to be a significant force.

Supreme Muslim Council:

The Supreme Muslim Council (Kupferschmidt, 1987, Epilogue) was an institution that was initiated by the British in 1921, to aid their interaction with the Arab Muslims in the region. It was tasked with governing Islamic religious activities and institutions, and controlled the Sharia courts.

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