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Core 1..28 Committee (PRISM::Advent3b2 9.00) House of Commons CANADA Standing Committee on National Defence NDDN Ï NUMBER 042 Ï 1st SESSION Ï 39th PARLIAMENT EVIDENCE Thursday, March 22, 2007 Chair Mr. Rick Casson Also available on the Parliament of Canada Web Site at the following address: http://www.parl.gc.ca 1 Standing Committee on National Defence Thursday, March 22, 2007 Ï (0905) For the benefit of new members on the committee, I want to talk [English] about what constitutes Joint Task Force Afghanistan, the 2,500 CF personnel we have there. Brigadier General A.J. Howard (Director General, Opera- tions, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence): Mr. Mr. Chairman, I won't dwell on this if you want me to continue to Chairman and honourable members, good morning. move along. If there's a reason to stay, I will. I'm here once again to provide you with a short update on I have a quick weather update. As previously mentioned in Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. I will be referring to the previous briefings, this winter has been comparatively harsh in slides that we have on the screen. Afghanistan when compared to an unseasonably mild winter the year before. The chart shows Afghanistan in December, with the very I might just pause to say that I do hope your recent visit to see the high rains in the fall period that I was talking to you about. It has not joint task force in Afghanistan was profitable, and I'm sure you left been common in Afghanistan over the last several years, as there's a with a positive impression of the hard work being undertaken by the very dry desert. It was a welcome relief, but it slowed down some of troops to contribute to a brighter future in Afghanistan. I know they the activities we were trying to accomplish. After Christmas things appreciate your coming. I mean that genuinely. Canadians who come certainly dried out a bit. and look and then communicate back to the country mean a lot to the troops. They said that to the Governor General, who I had the good The Route Summit that we've been busily beavering away on and fortune to accompany two weeks ago into the country. It does mean were having all kinds of difficulties with in the fall has progressed that. So I want to pass that sentiment along, because we do ask the quite nicely. What's left to do? troops, and they roll their eyeballs a bit, but they do appreciate This route is more or less paved and goes through the Zhari- people who come and want to have a look at what they're doing, that Panjwaii region, where Canadians conducted Operations Medusa part for sure. and Baaz Tsuka. We certainly have an obligation to help the local The Chair: General, I'd just like to say that when I got back I put community rebuild after those two operations. The road centres together a PowerPoint presentation. The last two weeks I was home, prominently in this, allowing commerce to move, police to move up I showed it eight times, at legions and to cadets and at seniors homes and down the road, and the locals themselves to move. and schools, and wherever anybody would look at it. The interest was very high. Most of the road is now paved. What's left to do is the bridge over the Arghandab River in that general area. It will connect the southern BGen A. J. Howard: Yes. portions of Panjwaii and will allow folks to get to Kandahar City. [Translation] For this bridge that will span the river, we have pre-negotiated a My presentation will focus mainly on the security issues contract that was signed on February 26. In fact, a Turkish company mentioned over the last several weeks. After my presentation, I will will build it. The bad news in all of this is it's a contract that will be be glad to clarify these issues for you. over 690 days. December 2008 is when we will finally have the bridge completed and finished, for your information, but the rest of [English] the route is more or less done. To confirm with the committee, my mandate this morning is to Let me now provide a short review on the surge in activity over provide an unclassified operational update on Afghanistan, high- the last few months. lighting past joint task force activities over the last several weeks, since you've last been in theatre, and trying my best to clarify any Overall, as you've seen in the press, Helmand province has been questions you may have about my briefing. the most active area for the Taliban in Afghanistan over the winter. This is due in part to the continuous and ongoing aggressive United While there are always three lines of operation for the UN- Kingdom task force operations along the Helmand River valley in sanctioned, NATO-led ISAF mission and all three of those lines are order to secure freedom of movement in and around the Kajaki Dam intertwined, I'm here to focus primarily on the security pillar that so that a major refurbishment of the dam can be accomplished, thus tries to support and enhance the other two that are growing the significantly increasing the amount of electrical power available Afghan capacity to overcome difficulties and rebuild the country. throughout southern Afghanistan. 2 NDDN-42 March 22, 2007 Another complicating factor in Helmand is that over 50% of the [English] Afghan poppy is cultivated in Helmand province. With the NATO forces that have arrived and have been there about a year and a half, there's no doubt that it has put the Taliban back on its heels, and it I'd like to give you the point of view of General Richards—I think has certainly been the most active area over the last few months. it's important to bring this international perspective to you—on the success he feels he achieved during his command. The first thing he Ï (0910) points to is that Afghanistan is now under a single international [Translation] community security focus. It's very important for the Afghan But in the province of Kandahar, the Taliban had a serious setback government to be able to deal with one individual running ISAF, and in the districts of Panjwayi and Zhari due to the continuing ISAP he certainly accomplished that. ISAF was able to spread out operations. The government's position has been strengthened and the throughout the country. Taliban influence in the area has been reduced. In the province of Kandahar, the Taliban kept targeting the The second point he makes is that the insurgents were dealt a national Afghan security forces. Last week, they had two suicide car- significant tactical defeat in the summer by ISAF. He refers here to bombing attacks, and 11 members of the national security forces the coalition's success during Operation Medusa, which was were killed. spearheaded by Afghan and Canadian troops but supported by many key enablers from our partners in the south. Canadians made a [English] real difference there, working with the Afghans, enabled by NATO. The Taliban continue to target local Afghan forces, and that's That's has had quite a ringing effect down, certainly in Kandahar certainly something that we've experienced over the last several province. months. We're certainly taking steps to assist our partners there, the Afghan partners, to diminish some of their vulnerabilities. I'll talk From his point of view, ISAF has the initiative. He explains that about that a bit further in a minute. by saying that insurgents over the last several months have failed to Due to the combined elements of the mountainous terrain and do what they said they would do. They said they would take back extreme weather, Taliban efforts in Oruzgan and Zabol have been Kandahar and the city. They didn't do that. They said they would capable of little more than attempting to restrict ISAF mobility. So if remove the British from Helmand. They did not accomplish that. you ask me for a snapshot of Regional Command South, where we They said they would continue a strong offensive throughout the operate down in the south, all the action really has been in Helmand winter. Again, that was not achieved. province. It's certainly where it has been quite tense over the last several weeks. In three of the five regions, there were over 40% fewer incidents We now turn to the ISAF level. I'll try to start at the very highest in December 2006 than in December 2005. So comparing it to the level and then come right down into the joint task force itself. year before, there were a lot less incidents against Afghan and NATO forces that were initiated by the Taliban. Incidents, as in attacks On February 4, 2007, U.S. General Dan McNeill assumed against ISAF and NATO, have reduced from a peak of 913 in August command of some 31,000 ISAF troops from British General David down to 342 by December 2006. Richards. General Richards, as you'll recall, took over on May 4, 2006, with some 9,000 troops under his command. It's about 31,000 now; he started with 9,000. With an International Security General Richards had a large role to play in the President's Assistance Force, it was simply responsible for Kabul and the advisory group, which was established to help with stronger relative peaceful regions of northern and western Afghanistan.
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