ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES CONTROVERSIES IN PEACE ETHICS AND SECURITY POLICY

ISSUE 01/2018 Strategic Foresight: a Broader Vision, Fewer Crises?

SPECIAL Between Technology and Man – on the Bundeswehr of Tomorrow STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: SPECIAL: BETWEEN TECH- A BROADER VISION, NOLOGY AND MAN - ON FEWER CRISES? THE BUNDESWEHR OF TOMORROW

Editorial Beyond Reading Tea Leaves Veronika Bock Page 03 Foresight as an Instrument of ­Modern Crisis Prevention Foresight and Modern Future Interview mit Norbert Reez Page 48 ­Research: Possibilities and Practice Edgar Göll Page 04 The Citizen in Uniform, Now and in the Future – a Personal Perspective Crisis Prevention in a Time of Vizeadmiral Joachim Rühle Page 50 Radical Change Markus Vogt Page 10 “Human existence shall not be changed without reflection” Transformative Scenario Planning – Interview with Dirk Fischer Page 53 Working together to Change the Future Imprint/Full Issues Page 55 Adam Kahane Page 18

Available Future? Peace Ethics Reflections from the Perspective of Just Peace and Prudence Franz-Josef Overbeck Page 25

Increasing Complexity and ­Uncertainty: Future Challenges to NATO and the West Admiral Manfred Nielson Page 30

Crisis Early Warning and Foresight in Peace and Security ­Policy: Earlier, More Resolute, More Substantial Action! Winfried Nachtwei Page 36

The New Unpredictability – Why Germany Needs a Security Strategy James D. Bindenagel Page 44

2 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 EDITORIAL

Our current e-journal edition of Ethics and goals of peace ethics, or does it only serve par- Armed Forces examines the question: “Strategic ticular interests which are likely to make crises foresight: Does a broader vision mean fewer cri- worse? ses?” Find out what the sinking of the Titanic has Why choose this question? Firstly, because to do with foresight; why in the sense of the vir- interdependent developments like globaliza- tue prudentia – prudence – we should not lose tion and climate change mean there is a con- sight of the past; how working with scenarios stantly growing need for a systematic way of can promote social reconciliation processes; dealing with uncertainty. Secondly, because and what obstacles lie in the way of “future it is hoped that strategic foresight will provide work” in day-to-day politics. new approaches to complement classical cri- Moreover, the normative aspect – the act of sis prevention – a goal recently set down in the imagining desirable futures and the power of vi- 2016 White Paper and in the German federal sions to promote peace – is not excluded from government’s guidelines on “Preventing Crises, foresight processes. “Dreams are very, very Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace,” published important to me. If you want to change some- in 2017. thing, you need a dream, a vision. A belief that it The question at the core of foresight process- is possible to make this vision a reality” (trans- es is: What is in store for us? What do we need to lated from German).1 prepare ourselves for? The question may be as Practicing foresight means expanding one’s old as humanity itself, but the conditions under view of the world. This requires openness and which it is asked are becoming ever more chal- flexibility toward all kinds of future scenarios, lenging. Social scientists and crisis researchers including contrary viewpoints. It requires a have coined a term for this: “dynaxity” (dynamic close consideration of what we think of as giv- complexity). Digitalization and autonomization en, and what we believe can be changed. In this processes, new capabilities (e.g. fully autono- respect, it always draws our attention back to mous weapons or human enhancement), and ourselves. new forms of conflicts (cyber war, hybrid wars, I hope you will enjoy reading this examina- etc.) are also changing the coordinates of se- tion of “possible futures”. curity policy. Old certainties suddenly vanish; crisis phenomena such as the rise of populism 1 Dr. Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of the Interna- tional Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), and nationalism seem to catch us completely which was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize on unprepared. October 6, 2017. Zeitmagazin, January 25, 2017, p. 25. Being able to know is evidently becoming continuously more difficult. And because that is the case, there is a growing desire not only to observe change, but to apprehend possible futures in different ways. In the sense of think- ing ahead to prepare for eventualities. In the sense of identifying and examining options for action. And in the sense of reflecting on one’s own point of view. Dr. Veronika Bock The authors of this issue offer an interdisci- Direktorin des zebis plinary investigation of the question “Strategic Foresight: Does a broader vision mean fewer crises?” – from the perspective of futures re- search, theology and ethics, (security) policy and the military. They explain key concepts, give an overview of foresight practice in Germa- ny, and critically examine its capabilities and limitations. Can foresight be made to serve the

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 3 FORESIGHT AND

MODERN FUTURE Author: Edgar Göll

RESEARCH: We know from the first great civilizations that peo- ple thought about the future even thousands of POSSIBILITIES AND years ago. Mostly they were concerned with pre- dicting the weather for crop cultivation, or with their PRACTICE health and destiny, or with threats and auspicious moments for waging war. History tells us that be- fore he embarked on his relentless conquest of the east, Alexander the Great consulted the Oracle of Delphi to find out his chances of success.

Thinking about the future in the modern era

Societies have changed vastly since then. Econo- mies and systems of production, lifestyles, cultures, and systems of belief, technologies, the military, sciences, media, and politics have seen great trans- formation, mainly in their forms. So when people to- day think about future developments, even in their everyday lives, it rarely boils down to a yes or no Abstract question, contrary to what oracles in former times, or the table talk and tabloid media of today, might Although the need to reduce uncertainty is a constant in human suggest. The realms of possibility for human behav- ­history, current challenges such as climate change, globalization, ior are in principle very extensive. Contemporary and digital transformation – as well as the vast array of options sociology therefore talks about the “multi-option society” (Peter Gross). On top of this, changes are in modern societies – have altered the debate about the future. In accelerating at an increasing rate, with their diverse recent years, a stronger scientific basis has been observed in business consequences and challenges for modern people, and politics, accompanied by an expansion of related capacities and institutions, and societies. Such challenges – here expertise. Edgar Göll cites the example of the “weak signals” concept, listed only in note form – include climate change or which may enable us to anticipate relevant changes and potential climate disaster, technological change and specifi- security risks. Despite professionalization, all manner of methods cally digital transformation, individualization, com- and increasingly powerful computers, it is still not possible to make mercialization, the concentration of capital, and definite predictions about the future. But given the unsustainability urbanization. In addition to this increased complex- of Western lifestyles, we have a greater-than-ever need for serious ity, we have to contend with conditions of globaliza- futurology to warn of critical developments, encourage reflection on tion, under which the spatial dimension, and hence our own role, and identify possible solutions. In this way, we can take the human sphere of perception and more or less a carefully considered, evidence-based approach to shaping the future. conscious sphere of impact, expands still further. Göll sees this increase in “self-reflection” as being one of the greatest Everyday uncertainties for people today are differ- ent than those of millennia ago. They appear less advantages of such an approach – and at the same time an important existential, but they are potent and they preoccupy condition for it. To search out the new and unexpected, he argues, we us more or less consciously. need to take complexity into account and increase “individual and Humans have the capacity to distinguish past, organizational awareness of new information and opinions.” In the present and future. In addition, human activity is field of security policy, this openness implies an inclusion of breaks, a priori and for the most part geared to the future. contradictions, and the perspective of the other. If this succeeds, And in so far as human beings are a kind of “think- foresight could help to expand options for action, and support the ing animal,” their behavior is only partially guided maintenance or establishment of violence-free and peaceful conditions. by instincts and simple routines. All of this means

4 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 that both the individual and collective behavior of and unintended consequences of new technolo- humans is extremely contingent. It is ultimately in- gies and their applications. Military research has fluenced by countless factors, their interaction, and also been a major influence on modern futures how they are perceived. Human behavior, there- studies. Most active in this field were US think tanks fore, is barely possible to predict, or only under – particularly the RAND Corporation, which rose to particular circumstances. For this reason, modern, prominence with its linking of three new scientific science-based futures research and foresight1 do theoretical approaches: cybernetics, game theo- not aim to make predictions. The goal is rather to ry, and rational choice theory. The new approach develop the best possible and sufficient basis for to futures research, however, only developed “in discussing future realms of possibility. The former around 1960, after European and US knowledge director of the Institute for Future Studies and Tech- stores came together to form conceptualizations nology Assessment (Institut für Zukunftsstudien und of futures research, which then in turn made an Technologiebewertung, IZT) neatly sums it up: “You impact in the United States” (translated from Ger- cannot predict the future, but you can develop sci- man).3 Since then, various approaches have been entific knowledge about the future, and use that for a better understanding of (possible, probable, desir- Modern, science-based futures research and able) futures. And in a participative, democratic pro- ­foresight do not aim to make predictions. The goal cess, you can work to prevent disasters and achieve the best” (translated from German).2 is rather to develop the best possible and sufficient basis for discussing future realms of possibility The need to think about the future developed for dealing with that sphere which is not yet realized, but which is at least partially beginning From the two phenomena described above (the to emerge in the form of futures. “Futures” is in the range of options and the challenges), a kind of plural, since as long as no single “future option” “objective need” for futures research and knowl- has become established, the future holds manifold edge about the future can be derived. Thinking possibilities. about – or better: forethought for – tomorrow and In the meantime, international working and re- what it may bring is therefore by no means trivial. search networks have formed, which are devoted In so far as humans need to modify their environ- to more or less systematically investigating future ments and do so more or less consciously and developments. They utilize concepts and meth- creatively, they and their historically differentiat- ods from various scientific disciplines. For the most ed institutions and professions need to “under- part, their goals and methods are pragmatic, for stand” the past and future and make these “un- example in fields such as market research, urban derstandable” for themselves. Even more than planning, organizational development, technology that, however, they need to dedicate themselves design, and the military. In the course of “reflexive to the future, because it is “there” that the emer- modernization” (“reflexive Moderne,” Ulrich Beck), gent human living environments will be found, these activities are being further professionalized and because uncertainties and corresponding – and, in some cases, scientifically grounded with possibly dangerous and, in part, potentially even corresponding institutions, expert networks and in life-threatening or existentially threatening – new the higher education sector. challenges, hazards and risks may be associated One particular, demanding way of dealing with with those environments. futures is scientifically grounded futures research. Over the course of history, forms of dealing In the course of general cultural and scientific de- with the future and associated uncertainty have velopment over recent decades, research fields changed immensely. From the middle of the twen- such as technology assessment and technology tieth century, an increasing scientification of think- foresight, meteorology and climate research, mil- ing about the future can be observed. This was itary strategy development, risk research, urban initially influenced by the technological sciences, planning and so on have emerged. Their work has where research was conducted into the intended been increasingly supported and expanded by rap-

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 5 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

idly growing computer capacities (e.g. modelling, The great overall breadth of methodical ap- visualization, big data). proaches is remarkable. They originate in various Furthermore, in the course of recent decades, scientific disciplines, particularly the social scienc- mainly in Western countries like Germany, ever es. They encompass trend and megatrend studies, more capacity for and forms of futures research scenarios of very different kinds, Delphi surveys, competences have been created, both in the busi- various types of modelling, and the use of biblio- ness field and also in government, i.e. in the polit- metrics and big data, as well as road-mapping, oth- ical and administrative field. These include study er quantitative methods, and qualitative approach- commissions in the German Bundestag and Land es. For the development of the discipline and parliaments; the Office of Technology Assessment self-professionalization, an important handbook at the German Bundestag (Büro für Technikfolgen- was written by a working group in the Netz­werk abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag, TAB); Zukunftsforschung.7 It is designed as an attempt teams in policy departments of governments and to formulate initial proposals and suggestions for ministries; government commissions; projects on standards and quality criteria in futures studies, behalf of ministries; teams, commissions, depart- to offer practical guidance for work on futures. In ments in parties, and foundations; and interna- ­theoretical terms, modern futures research relates tional bodies (e.g. United Nations (UN), Sustainable to various social theories and social analyses, as Development Solutions Network (SDSN), World well as theories of change. This can be seen particu- Bank, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change larly in the university working contexts. (IPCC), Club of Rome, NATO). Thus the German Fed- For the systematic identification and prioritiza- eral Ministry of Defense (Bundesverteidigungsmin- tion of social trends, as well as their driving factors, isterium, BMVg), German Federal Foreign Office the STEEP method is often used. The method in- (Auswärtiges Amt, AA), and German Federal Ministry vestigates various key aspects of change processes. for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Usually these are the following five areas: Social, Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz Technological, Economic (macro), Environmental, und nukleare Sicherheit, BMU) have created futures Political. Depending on the problem at hand, oc- research capacities; other ministries are consider- casionally the aspects of Values (STEEPV) and the ing doing so.4 This is often a case of evaluating and Military (STEEPM) are included. Each of these areas using the expertise obtained from futures research- is examined as systematically as possible to find in- ers in sufficient depth. fluential, potent trends, as well as the driving forces and actors. Then, in addition, the mutual effects Scientifically grounded futures and interactions are estimated, and conclusions research worked out for one’s own decisions and actions. Despite these positive developments, even Finally, a self-professionalization of scientific futures modern, scientifically grounded futures research research has taken place. In 2007, futures research- can only shine a more or less plausible, intelligent ers from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland set spotlight on future developments. Predictions are up a futures research network association called (probably) in principle impossible. Netz­werk Zukunftsforschung.5 Various international expert networks in the futures research field have Inertias and challenges existed for decades now. And in 2010, the Institut Futur at Freie Universität Berlin launched an inter- The need for scientifically grounded futures and transdisciplinary master’s degree programme. research and a carefully considered, evi- This is the first and so far only academic futures dence-based approach to shaping the future is studies course in Germany, while various other today greater than ever. Here we can mention a countries outside Europe already offer courses in doyen of German futures research, Ossip K. Flech- futures studies. The methods and principles of re- theim.8 In a historical phase, when the limits of searching, constructing, and reflecting on imagined Western patterns of development were beginning futures in society, politics, and business are taught to become more obvious and apparent, Flecht­ at the Institut Futur.6 heim assigned a big task – perhaps too big – to

6 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 futures research: “In a way similar to that in which normal growth trends (particularly gross domestic medicine is concerned with human ailment and product and population growth) could cause soci- healing on an individual level, futurology should eties to collapse, mainly because raw materials are diagnose, prognose, and ‘treat’ humanity collec- available only in limited quantities. These assess- tively” (translated from German).9 ments led to numerous changes and innovations From the middle of the twentieth century on- wards, people and institutions have grown accus- For thinking, reflection, and tomed to a way of life (the “American way of life”) which now turns out to be highly problematic. This forethought, habit is an extremely potent is because it systematically, though unintentional- gravitational force ly, undermines the conditions for human life and human civilization, and is on the verge of destroy- in political, economic, and social fields. Thus the ing them, as countless studies and reports show. worst consequences predicted in the report have Spread by Western media and advertising, this nor- not yet occurred, or their force has been reduced. mality of undesirable developments is also seen as In some cases, rethinking and alternative action a goal in most other regions of the world. Yet a gen- took place. eralization and spread of the Western lifestyle is not possible, simply for reasons of resource limitations. Methodology with the example So the United Nations model of sustainable devel- of “weak signals” opment was created, and recently its sustainability goals were drawn up (United Nations: Sustainable In the field of security research, for example, Development Goals, 2030 Agenda). modern futures research can draw on extensive It would be fatal – and this poses a major chal- experience and social-science approaches. Risk lenge for futures research – not to question the research, early warning systems, and technology permanently created “comfort zones” in our cul- assessment are just some examples that can be ture, and not to discuss “inconvenient truths” (to cited. The canon of frequently used methods in borrow the title of Al Gore’s famous documentary futures research also includes cross-impact analy- about global warming). The creation of always ses, Delphi surveys, scenario techniques, and trend “new” products and media content results in a analyses. To these, the “weak signals” approach “racing standstill” (“rasender Stillstand,” Paul Virilio) can be added,10 which was developed by Igor in which warnings are not heard. We ignore and Ansoff in a management context in the 1970s and suppress the possibility that threatening develop- has been used for some time in futures research. It ments and the associated vague anxiety and feel- aims to help businesses anticipate changes well in ings of insecurity might have something to do with advance, and react accordingly. Ansoff used a five- the negative effects of our own consumerist and step scale to categorize the transition from weak to exploitative lifestyle. For thinking, reflection, and strong signals and the appropriate reactions. The forethought, habit is an extremely potent gravita- concept attracted interest in security research, too, tional force. It is a normal and permanent state that since timely detection and evaluation of new or fu- is hard to change. More than it has done to date, ture emerging dangers could minimize or prevent futures research should here act as a “second-order security risks. observer” (“Beobachter zweiter Ordnung,” Niklas Of central importance here is the question of Luhmann), strengthen societal reflection and whether particular events and signals are actually self-reflection, and productively “irritate” to help weak signals, in the sense that they will develop into overcome dangerous thinking habits and destruc- relevant trends and influential factors. Experience tive behaviors. shows that weak signals develop along idealized An important and well-known example of the stages, each of which has specific phenomena and “warning function” of foresighted scientific find- features:11 ings was the 1972 Club of Rome report, The Lim- 1. Weak signal: No-one knows its to Growth. Using new computer models with 2. Strong signal: Can be spotted in research different variables, it was judged that maintaining groups, think tanks etc.

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 7 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

3. Trend: Appears in general contexts/can be to see what is new. He therefore particularly sug- recognized by several persons gests looking in those places where normally one 4. Megatrend: Significant and recognizable might not look, although the innovative and new entity comprising phenomenon often come from the fringe areas and opposition- 5. Driving force: Affects whole societies al milieus of a society or of the world society. This Accordingly, by means of expert dialogs and is a challenge in principle and in general. It always various process steps and tools (e.g. horizon arises and has to be dealt with in futures research scanning, monitoring, technological and social and foresight work. forecasting), an attempt can be made to assess whether particular signals have the potential and Benefits of futures research and a high probability of developing in line with these foresight – and requirements five steps. Another conceptual and methodological chal- It is sensible and useful to apply and consult fore- lenge consists in overcoming structural barriers to sight and futures research in almost all areas of the gaining of insights by individuals and groups. society. Usually, futures are thought about in sim- Ansoff describes internal structures as possible ple forms, in entrenched ways. That is to say, such filters, through which information has to pass in thinking is neither sufficiently systematic nor suf- order to be perceived, and hence be taken into ficiently complex, and does not consider or use account in decision-making: the surveillance fil- the experience and expertise of modern futures ter, the mentality filter, and the power filter. The research. At a theoretical and conceptual level, futures In order to be able to see what is new research offers expansions in three dimensions. a habitual and comfortable thinking In terms of content, it can add additional per- spectives and aspects (“what”). In societal terms, structure has to be broken up additional groups and organizations can be reco­ gnized as relevant (“who”). In the time dimension, surveillance filter describes the characteristics foresight and futures research can set new em- of actors and institutions in the search for (new) phases and take additional, more extensive peri- information. In this filter, structural and method- ods of time into account (“when”). ological criteria determine whether weak signals Somewhat more specifically, futures research are (or can be) perceived at all. Creativity plays a and foresight can contribute in various ways to special role here, as it is crucial for the signal filter- better decisions and strategies. One of the main ing process. The mentality filter is characterized ways is by supporting the creation of transparen- by mental criteria. Recognizing new information cy and orientative knowledge for decisions, e.g. requires that one’s view of possible change pro- by making trends and diverse development pos- cesses is not blocked and remains open to new sibilities visible. Traditional thinking patterns can relevant facts. As the final characteristic, the pow- be expanded and usefully complemented. Hence er filter refers to the evaluation and use of infor- an important expansion of options for action can mation previously identified as possible weak take place, and new solutions can be found. Fore- signals, which is in no way automatic. sight and futures studies strengthen integrated It is only at the level of a decision that the infor- thinking and the competent handling of com- mation results in a reaction, which of course can plexity (on account of the multidisciplinary ap- also take the form of doing nothing. Ansoff de- proaches alone). Finally, futures research makes scribed these three filters as a structural challenge it easier to be aware of and explain implicit – and in the detection and evaluation of weak signals. possibly obsolete – assumptions. The UNESCO Consequently, in addition to the detection itself, Foresight Unit also emphasizes this aspect, with these three filters constitute the second difficulty its new concept of “anticipatory assumptions” in the process of utilizing possible weak signals. In (Riel Miller). other words, a habitual and comfortable thinking structure has to be broken up in order to be able

8 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 If one treats people like they are, one makes consequential events (“game changers”) which up- them worse. set well-ordered ideas about the future, but at the If one treats people like they could be, one makes same time may reveal potential weaknesses. them better. (Translated from German.) In short: futures research and foresight can (Johann Wolfgang Goethe) help to expand the powers of imagination, make Nevertheless, to carry out futures research and opportunities and risks more assessable, reveal foresight is a demanding task. It requires an atti- alternatives, and hence expand the realms of pos- tude of openness, and an increase in individual sibility and the capacity for action. They increase and organizational awareness of new information the self-reflection of those involved, and thus and opinions. Our approach when seeking to iden- increase the chances of success with regard to tity future developments and events should follow strategies and tactics for maintaining or creating the lateral thinking principle: we can expect to suc- violence-free and peaceful conditions. ceed only if we overcome all too narrow patterns of perception or even taboos. Ways and mech- 1 The terms “futures research” and “foresight” are used interchangeably here. However, futures research (or anisms of outside-of-the-box thinking are of key futures studies) has a more academic orientation, whereas importance for detecting the new and unexpected. foresight is application-oriented. Therefore, they should be included appropriately 2 Kreibich, Rolf (2007): “Wissenschaftsverständnis, Methodik und Zukunft der Zukunftsforschung.” in the working process of futures research, and also Unpublished manuscript. Salzburg, , p. 22. in security research. 3 Seefried, Elke (2015): Zukünfte. Aufstieg und Krise der Particularly in the key field of defense and secu- Zukunftsforschung 1945–1980. Berlin/Boston, p. 70. 4 In this context, the concept of “anticipatory government” rity, our own flexibility should be increased in this should also be mentioned, which is applied in parts of the respect, both for persons and institutions. This is US administration: Fuerth, Leon/Faber, Evan (2012): Anticipatory Governance. Practical Upgrades. a reference both to the awareness and openness Project on Forward Engagement, Washington DC. already mentioned, and to elements such as the https://forwardengagement.org/anticipatorygovernance/ division of labor, communication processes etc. [accessed June 5, 2018]. 5 See: https://www.netzwerk-zukunftsforschung.eu/ Selectively distorted perception, rigid and nar- 6 See: http://http://www.ewi-psy.fu-berlin.de/v/ row-minded stereotypes, bogeymen, and dehu- masterzukunftsforschung/zukunftsforschung/index.html manization of the enemy can all produce immense 7 Gerhold, Lars et al. (eds.) (2014): Standards und Gütekriterien der Zukunftsforschung. Ein Handbuch für negative consequences; they can lead to self-fulfill- Wissenschaft und Praxis. Wiesbaden. ing prophecies and escalation, spirals of violence 8 Flechtheim, Ossip K. (1973): “Futurologie in der zweiten and arms races. By contrast, an integrated under- Phase?” In: Pforte, Dietger, Schwencke, Olaf (eds.): Ansichten einer künftigen Futurologie. Zukunftsforschung in standing of current situations, contingencies, and der zweiten Phase. Munich, pp. 17–25. potentials is required, i.e. also the deep-seated 9 Ibid., p. 17. causes of conflicts, opposing narratives, sensitivi- 10 Ansoff, Igor (1975): “Managing strategic surprise by response to weak signals.” In: California Management ties and fears, or expressed generally: to research Review 18 (2), pp. 21–33. http://journals.sagepub.com/ and understand the other’s perspective. The same doi/10.2307/41164635 [accessed June 5, 2018]. ultimately applies not only to the intended but 11 Holopainen, Mari & Toivonen, Marja (2012): “Weak signals: Ansoff today.”. In: Futures 44,pp. 198–205, p. 201. also the unintended effects of one’s own actions. Comfort zones created by an esprit de corps or male-bond cultures close off the possibility of The Author seeing beyond one’s own horizons, including the Dr. Edgar Göll is a social scientist. In 1995, he joined foreign and strange, and utilizing provocations the Institute for Future Studies and Technology Assess- for one’s own development – in terms of content, ment (IZT) in Berlin, where he is currently co-head of methods and strategies. Hence problems, uncer- research for the Future Studies and Participation cluster. tainties, contradictions, protests, conflicts, and His work focuses on sustainable development, transfor- tensions in the foresight process should be taken mation processes, and governance. Göll is also a member seriously and taken into consideration so that the of the board at Netzwerk Zukunftsforschung e.V., and a respective decision-makers and actors can pre- lecturer on the futures studies master’s degree programme pare themselves at an early stage. One possibility at Institut Futur, Freie Universität Berlin. here is to use wild cards, i.e. unexpected but highly

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 9 CRISIS PREVENTION IN A TIME OF Author: Markus Vogt We are living in a time when familiar patterns RADICAL CHANGE of order and power structures are becoming fragile, yet no replacement has been found: “Liberal Western society is breaking down, but no alternative exists yet” (translated from German).1 Many people are experiencing these times of accelerated change in the po- litical and economic sphere, and in society in general, as a crisis. Others see more of an op- portunity to shake off traditional limitations, and explore something new. At any rate, such a world of transitions is marked by a wide variety of surprises, tensions, and multipolar conflicts. The “intensification of the frequen- cy of changes” (translated from German)2 suggests that this is an epochal change. As such, it also requires new ethical, political, and military orientations. In a complex world, the possibilities and reference points of certainty change: the only thing that is certain seems to be that the fu- ture will be different from what was expect- Abstract ed. Predictions and the promise of control come to nothing. We need to rethink our Many signs indicate that we are witnessing an epochal trans­ concepts of planning and crisis prevention. Conventional strategies of risk avoidance be- formation. Radical changes in our lives are happening more often, come ambivalent, as they sometimes result while familiar patterns of order and power structures are becoming in necessary adjustments being delayed. Re- noticeably less important. But whatever will follow is not yet in sight. silience – in the sense of robustness, adapt- The only certainty is that in the near future, we will face various ability, and anti-fragility as familiar certain- security risks, for which our conventional risk avoidance strategies ties fall away – becomes a key value.3 are ineffective or even counter-productive. In this wide field, the following article at- Markus Vogt cites the specific examples of climate change, the tempts to outline the challenges for crisis superimposition of various types of conflict, and finally “the fact that prevention from the perspective of Christian morality itself is becoming uncertain.” He puts forward the concept of social ethics. On this basis, the model of risk “resilience” when dealing with uncertainty. This concept, now becom- maturity is proposed. It is based on “sys- ing more established, requires a shifting of focus away from external tematic ignorance” when acting in complex factors to an inward consideration of one’s own potentials for robust system contexts, and it aims for a robust and crisis management strategies. Especially in times of increasing uncer- peace-promoting way of dealing with sur- prises, crises, and collapse phenomena. tainty, the author argues, resilience becomes a new guiding principle. The philosophical and theological tradition of “learned ignorance” (docta ignorantia, Nicholas of Cusa) can be useful here, and enhances Climate change as a current foresight practices. It can help to systematize our own security risk ignorance, awaken curiosity and the willingness to learn, and offer In Earth system research, analyses of accel- guidance for action under uncertain conditions. Ultimately, it allows erated change are empirically underpinned the establishment of “risk maturity,” i.e. the ability to take justified by a wide range of indicators. There is plenty and responsible decisions in complex and uncertain situations. of data to indicate that environmental and

10 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 climate change is already close to “tipping globally coordinated climate policy. If it fails points” in many regions. This means that to do so, climate change will draw ever-deep- threshold values for critical parameters are er lines of division and conflict in internation- close to being exceeded, and if they are, a al relations, triggering numerous conflicts change in the system dynamics will result. In between and within countries over the dis- their “big report” to mark the 50th anniver- tribution of resources, especially water and sary of the Club of Rome (1968–2018), Ernst land, over the management of migration, Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Anders Wijkman and or over compensation payments between their co-authors compile many such global the countries mainly responsible for climate trends which create instability and are unsus- change and those countries most affected tainable. The Italian chemist and ecologist by its destructive effects,” (WBGU 2008:1). Ugo Bardi sums up the analysis of change in his 2017 report, also addressed to the Club of Global climate and environ­mental Rome, titled “The Seneca Effect.”4 He refers to an observation made by the Stoic philos- change not only constitutes an opher Seneca, according to which system- ic orders generally take a very long time to ecological risk, but also – to a arise, but collapse very quickly. He analyses ­significant extent – a security risk the collapse of empires, financial systems, food production structures and the possible In conflicts over distribution, conflicts of in- end of the planetary ecosystem in its current terest and conflicts of domination usually form, before considering strategies to pre- overlap; the former concern the question of vent or manage systemic problems of this how resources are distributed, the latter the kind. We are currently in a phase of transi- question of who decides on the distribution.6 tion, he argues, in which collapse phenom- WBGU does not assume a direct correla- ena are accumulating and the survival of in- tion between climate change and an increase stitutions depends largely on their ability to in violence. Instead, the Advisory Council di- react to these phenomena in a flexible and agnoses an indirect correlation via an am- anti-fragile way. plification of mechanisms that lead to inse- Against this backdrop, global climate and curity and armed conflicts: “Climate change environmental change not only constitutes could thus lead to the further proliferation an ecological risk, but also – to a signifi- of weak and fragile statehood and increase cant extent – a security risk. Ten years ago, the probability of violent conflicts occur- the German Advisory Council on Global ring,” (WBGU 2008:2). As a push-factor for Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bun- the increase in migration within developing desregierung Globale Umweltveränderun- regions, and between North and South in the gen, WBGU) comprehensively analysed this context of the North–South conflict, climate situation.5 In the absence of comprehensive change is increasingly overstretching nation- counter-strategies (and there have been al and international governance structures none so far), climate change will exceed (cf. WBGU 2008:14). There is a great danger many societies’ adaptive capacities within of escalating conflicts. A warning example of the next few decades: “This could result in this is Syria. Before the escalation of political destabilization and violence, jeopardizing conflicts, there was a massive drought. First national and international security to a new of all, this triggered distress and migration degree. However, climate change could also at regional level, which overstrained govern- unite the international community, provided ance structures and ultimately, together with that it recognizes climate change as a threat other factors, led to the destabilization of to humankind and soon sets the course for the entire region. Syria is also an example of the avoidance of dangerous anthropogenic the complexity of conflicts: what started out climate change by adopting a dynamic and as a conflict of interest (the question of the

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 11 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

distribution of resources) became a conflict paid transfer of resources from the global of domination (over the question of who will South to the rich nations of the North, one control Syria and in what way), with a high can certainly talk of a new phase of coloni- readiness to escalate among all actors in- alism. According to studies by the UN, the volved. lifestyle of the “externalization societies” of As long as knowledge was considered to the North, mediated via climate change, is be a key resource, there was a decrease in today already curtailing existential human violent conflicts (since knowledge can hard- rights for several hundred million people ly be acquired by military force). But today, (e.g. the right to food, safety, water etc.).7 a struggle for increasingly scarce resources Climate change is mostly anthropogenic, i.e. is emerging. Their sustainable management, caused by humans. Since its victims in the however, can only be achieved through col- global South are not identical with those in laboration. In many areas, humankind has the global North who are mainly responsible come to share a common destiny, where for it, it is interpreted as a conflict of justice. the ability to survive depends on adopting It is not accepted as fate. cooperative strategies. “All our main prob- On the other hand, identity conflicts are lems are global in nature: the nuclear threat, coming to the fore, with an intensity that global warming, global inequality and the would not have been expected even just a rise of disruptive technologies such as artifi- few years ago. Globalization and migration cial intelligence and biotech. To successful- bring cultural and religious pluralization – ly master these challenges, we need glob- including within many societies. As a result, al cooperation,” (translated from German; different cultures and religions meet in a con- Harari 2018:14). Particularly when it comes fined space, with their specific conceptions to ecological resources, there are certainly of humanity, interpretations of the world, encouraging experiences from history with ideas of morality, and legal systems. People regard to the cooperative management of experience these as alternatives, comparing common use. Rivers, lakes, and coastlines their advantages and disadvantages, be- show that this has often worked relatively tween which they can or must choose. Trans- well across national and ethnic boundaries. cultural encounters result in whole cultural Yet the complexity of present-day conflicts systems competing at national and interna- means there is a challenging need for a new tional level. Their representatives constantly quality of international, intercultural, and in- battle for recognition. Because of this, many tergenerational cooperativeness on the part people feel alienated and overwhelmed. At of many actors who are involved, affected, the same time, such conflicts are always also and capable of acting in very different ways. a construct, since cultures are never closed Expressed positively, and relating to the con- systems. Their dynamism is always a result of cept of foresight: the sustained process of diverse internal tensions as well as encoun- stabilization of habitats and management of ters with other patterns of interpretation. In collective goods would be a key dimension of overburdened situations, however, this inter- crisis prevention. nal heterogeneity is often forgotten. At the present time, the link between lib- The superimposition of eralism and capitalism in particular is per- ­conflicts of recognition and ceived by many as an aggressive threat to conflicts over resources their cultural identity, or is portrayed as such in discourses of discrimination. As a coun- Conflicts in the current phase of global ter-reaction, closed systems of reference change have a dual nature: firstly, they are and the rhetoric of populist discrimination hard conflicts of interest and power with re- seem attractive. The associated conflicts of gard to access to ecological and technical identity and recognition are not less virulent resources. Given the massive, largely under- than the experience of exclusion and misery.

12 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 The reason why identity conflicts are so po- plural society. In addition to the mentioned litically and ethically explosive is that unlike phenomena of radical change, as well as conflicts of interest, they generally cannot be global resource and identity conflicts, there solved by compromises, and are often linked is a third fundamental uncertainty that needs to strong emotions that are scarcely amena- to be overcome: the fact that morality itself is ble to reason.8 becoming uncertain – in respect of its foun- On a geostrategic level, Samuel Hunting- dations, and its individual and societal valid- ton predicted and stimulated interest in ity in a plural society marked by breaks with the changed constellation of global conflict traditions. situations with his theory of a “clash of civ- ilizations”9 – so-called “fault-line wars” be- Climate change could also unite tween cultures. Conflicts between Western and Islamic countries or groups appear to the international community, confirm Huntington’s thesis in the most dra- matic way: the conflicts triggered by the 9/11 provided that it recognizes climate attacks are not primarily focused on materi- change as a threat to humankind al interests. Instead, they are a symbolically charged conflict in which cultural systems If morality today is to acquire a general are held to be irreconcilably opposed. One validity in everyday life, it has to prove itself highly problematic aspect of Huntington’s under conditions of contingency, where justi- theory, however, is the construct of cultural fications are plural and hence always disput- blocks, which he describes in rather gener- able. Moreover, it should critically reflect on alized terms. In the Middle East, for exam- and fend off patterns of unresolved complex- ple, the highly complex differentiation be- ity in politics and society, which often lead to tween the different Islamic movements and false solutions, kneejerk reactions and frag- groups is key if we want to understand these mented perspectives. At the same time, mo- conflicts and identify possibilities for viable rality should not allow itself to be paralyzed solutions. Another problematic point is that by the high degree of ignorance about com- interpreting and enacting cultural conflicts plex interactions. It should instead develop a can become a self-fulfilling prophecy: such way of engaging with risks which is capable activities may in themselves create and re- both of restraint and caution, as well as inno- inforce the very feeling of being threatened vation and decisive action. which they seek to counteract. The super- In the ethical debate, the experience of imposition of resource conflicts and identity uncertainty is relevant in several respects: conflicts appears to be highly explosive in it relates to the consequences of action in political terms. complex contexts, and the justification and responsibility for particular decisions. In plu- A productive engagement ral societies, it is often impossible to find a with uncertainty in morality consensus regarding the justification, validi- ty, and scope of moral postulates. This can In a complex world, there are no simple solu- generate considerable uncertainty on the tions. The current world situation under- part of the individual. A carefully considered standably produces feelings of being over- admission of ignorance and doubt with re- whelmed and of anxiety. Today, therefore, gard to the traceability of actions, motives a critical task for politics, ethics, theology, and consequences of actions is a strong and and culture is to face down the temptation reasonable basis for establishing freedom. of easy, but false solutions with their black/ To reserve judgment and allow different white, good/evil and friend/enemy dichot- opinions in situations of uncertainty follows omies. This can also be described as a task from a logical system for dealing with igno- of building trust in the project of an open, rance that is constitutive for the rationality

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 13 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

of ethical decisions. Many individual and so- entation from consequence optimization to cietal decision-making conflicts have such a resilience seriously: the current world situ- high and specific degree of complexity that ation is so confused that any action guided the type of rationality that consists of calcu- directly by benefit calculations could prove lating expected consequences doesn’t seem to be very ill-considered. We need robust alli- to guarantee adequate decisions. Hence, ances and approaches to stabilization policy utilitarian models of ethics also have a lim- at various levels (cultural, economic, polit- ical, military etc.) The multidimensionality Preventive security policy needs new of conflicts and the complex interactions be- tween them requires a corresponding multi- forms of intercultural, interreligious, dimensionality in prospective security policy. The paradigm of the “just peace”11 may offer ecological and social competence important guidance here. In the conflict situ- ations of the present – charged with identity ited reach, i.e. models based on calculating conflicts, frequently asymmetric and highly the consequences of actions in relation to complex – this paradigm is a necessary ac- individual or collective benefits. Because the companiment to military strategies through comparability of benefits in complex situa- civil society. Given the complexity of current tions is limited, their usability as an ethical global conflicts, preventive security poli- guiding category is constrained, too. cy needs new forms of intercultural, inter­ Instead of a rationality type based on the religious, ecological and social competence. predictability of consequences, we need one that calculates with open variables and can “Learned ignorance” respond to surprises – a type of rationality that pays attention to non-linear interac- The uncertainty triggered by accelerated tions and takes secondary effects, cross-sec- change and the high complexity of conflicts tional relationships and cultural contexts leads to calls for more knowledge about the into account. We need a rationality type future. Today, this is no longer seen as a pro- that not only sets goals but also optimizes phetic gift based on divine revelation. It has decision-making and communication pro- long been established as an interdisciplinary cesses – one that expects the unexpected research field. Thus there are a large number and shapes systems so that they can absorb of institutions and practices, with scientific unforeseen events elastically through “buff- methods which promise “to turn the uncer- er zones”. “Resilience” is currently becoming tainty of possible events and developments established as a key interdisciplinary con- into predictabilities: demographic trends, cept that transforms traditional concepts climate change, the energy supply, assessing of progress, risk and security, and shifts the technological and geopolitical consequenc- focus onto the question of robust crisis man- es, not least the economics of the stock ex- agement strategies. What makes the concept change,” (translated from German).12 At the attractive is that it asks about immanent same time, however, there remains a con- problem-solving potentials, rather than ex- siderable degree of uncertainty to take into ternal aids and certainties. It often seems consideration: “We only have the future in its that the challenges of change are necessary social and societal constructs. Even the divi- to activate these potentials.10 “The most natory knowledge of the ancient world, with important ability for the future is to adapt its oracles, never claimed to ‘really see’ a fu- ourselves permanently to changes. Whoever­ ture reality, but it did state and judge what can do that is well prepared,” (translated was visible, identifiable and plausible for from German; Harari 2018:14). a perspectivization of power and morality. In geostrategic terms, too, there are con- Knowledge about the future is orientational siderable consequences if we take the reori- knowledge. That remains true today for any

14 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 kind of ‘political counselling,’” (translated Thus the decision-making maxim in dubio from German; ibid.) Prediction quality results pro reo ([when] in doubt, for the accused) from the ability to understand the underly- arose in the moral theology of the Baroque ing structure of current change at any given period, and today is legally acknowledged to time, and the logic of the forces at work in be self-evident. The admission – hard-won at it. But there always remain many open ques- the time – that it is unjust to condemn some- tions. Instead of knowledge about the future one unless their guilt can be proven, creates or predictions, today we often hear the term trust in the legal system. “scenarios” in the sense of if-then correla- Trust in legal and political processes of tions. conflict settlement is an essential form of Wisdom consists mainly in the ability to complexity reduction in situations where distinguish between what one knows and differences of opinion and ignorance pre- what one does not know. Scientific and eth- vail. But trust also has a personal dimension: ical progress, too, often results not from ad- it draws its certainty not from objectively ditional knowledge, but in the first instance from the realization that there is something Knowledge of one’s own ignorance one does not know and cannot know. This is a crucial virtue when it comes to acting is particularly important for theology, for example. As “learned ignorance” (docta ig- under uncertain conditions norantia, Nicholas of Cusa), theology is de- signed to remain open to the non-knowable, knowing something, but from interpersonal the non-calculable, and the mysterious. In relations. Acting in uncertainty requires com- the plea for “conscious ignorance,” links can pensation for the limits of individual knowl- also be drawn with secular traditions, e.g. edge through the communicative ability to the Socratic “I know that I know nothing.” network with other knowledge holders and For the philosopher, this is considered to be perspectives critically and on a basis of trust. the starting point of wisdom. Hence foresight Trust in no way precludes the ability for crit- should be interpreted not only as looking icism. Here, there is a fundamental link with ahead, but also as being cautious and taking belief as a form of knowledge. According to care in uncertain situations. the biblical understanding, belief is not an In very different ways, the difference be- uncertain assumption. It is at its core a re- tween repressed or unreflected ignorance lationship of trust (Hebrew aman = belief, (which limits the validity of the respective trust). theory) and conscious ignorance (which is included in the form of variables, or factors Risk maturity in the face of kept open) is constitutive both for philo- systematic ignorance sophical and theological traditions and for modern complexity theories. Conscious ig- Wolfgang Kersting uses the term “risk matu- norance is the basis for curiosity and a will- rity” (Risikomündigkeit) to describe a respon- ingness to learn. Knowledge of one’s own sible approach to uncertainty. “Thinking in ignorance is a crucial virtue when it comes terms of probabilities, weighing up multiple to acting under uncertain conditions. A key possibilities, forms part of the cognitive infra- conclusion, particularly for ethics, is to ac- structure of the modern era, for the modern knowledge that there is no getting round era is the age of only relative, certainty-free the fact that different perspectives exist, and rationality. [...] Hence in technical and moral hence that the right to plurality must also be respects we should become risk-mature and acknowledged. From this follows the idea develop a system of managing uncertainties” of tolerance as the peace principle in plural (translated from German).13 Risk maturity is societies, and the legal principle of reserv- the ability to take justified and responsible ing judgment when charges are unproven. decisions even in situations characterized by

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 15 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

high complexity and uncertainty. Uncertainty critical threshold of risks and increase flexi- here refers to the consequences of actions, ble problem-solving potentials. to the different standards of judgment on the (2) A key element of risk maturity is a part of those affected, and to the limits of mor- clear hierarchy of problems and dangers al rationality, for which there is no ultimate in assessing complex situations, as well as justification and no complete coherence un- the weighting of risks that are not directly der conditions of modernity. comparable. Systemic risks are particularly In methodological terms, one can identify problematic – such as those that are typical three main criteria that need to be taken into of climate change, or in the field of financial account for risk-mature crisis prevention: markets, which are mainly determined by (1) When assessing the evils in an actual systemic ­interaction processes. Risk analy- decision-making situation, in order to avoid ses have traditionally limited the assessment of undesired effects to numerical probabili- Risk maturity requires democratic ties, which are generally based on relative frequencies and the respectively assigned ­processes that include the different com­ damage potentials. A key feature of the petences as well as the citizens main present-day conflicts, however, is that the probability of occurrence and extent of concerned in a representative way damage are not sufficiently known, while the public’s assessment of risk deviates signifi- a distorted and one-sided consideration, cantly from that of the experts, or the experts we should always systematically include the themselves cannot agree. Additional assess- consequences of failing to act in our concept ment criteria (alongside the probability of of responsibility. Owing to the abundance of occurrence and extent of damage) include uncertainty in complex systems, the maxim ubiquity (geographic extent), persistence (ex- “if in doubt, priority for the worst-case sce- tent in time), and reversibility (particularly nario” postulated by Hans Jonas (Heuristics in the case of delayed effects). Risk maturity of Fear)14, if consistently applied, would lead requires systemic thinking and, derived from to the paralysis of our ability to act. Strict this, a hierarchy of problems and action op- avoidance of any risk results in a resigned tions. These criteria also apply to military loss of innovation. It could therefore ulti- action in complex conflict situations, for ex- mately turn out to be a strategy that blocks ample in Afghanistan. potential for action and thus creates more (3) “Yet precisely because the perception risks than it avoids. From a military ethics of risk is not shaped by the grammar of ab- point of view, too, the risk of not acting al- solute rationality, but is instead embedded ways has to be systematically taken into ac- in a plural perceptual behavior which bal- count. Risk maturity therefore aims not to ances different value perspectives, it should absolutely minimize all risk, but to avoid a remain embedded in participatory deci- sion-making models of risk management” The Author (translated from German; Kersting 2005:318). Prof. Dr. Markus Vogt, born in 1962 in Freiburg, studied To the extent that many situations involving theology and philosophy in Munich, Jerusalem, and Lu- complex interrelationships are particularly cerne. Since 2007, he has held the chair of Christian social context-sensitive, the judgment of those who ethics at LMU Munich. His research focuses on anthropo- are directly acting and affected acquires an logical and socio-philosophical bases of ethics in modern essential importance over that of external society; human–environment relationships; sustainability experts. Risk maturity requires democratic and bioeconomics; business ethics and welfare state theory; processes that include the different compe- and political ethics and peace ethics. tences as well as the citizens concerned in a representative way. In view of the current transition from a hegemonial world to an ex-

16 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 tremely confusing, multipolar world that is ForChange: http://www.forchange.de [accessed marked by heterogeneous identity conflicts June 5, 2018]; see e.g. a study on resilience and risk by M. Vogt. and conflicts of interest, communicative 11 Die deutschen Bischöfe [DBK] (2000): Gerechter strategies are centrally important – particu- Friede. Published by Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (Die deutschen Bischöfe 66), larly also for military ethics. Anyone who not Bonn. only wants to win the war, but also peace, 12 Cf. Mosse Lectures 2016: https://www.hsozkult. needs cultural competence and a willingness de/event/id/termine-30701 (accessed June 5, 2018). 13 Kersting, Wolfgang (2005): Kritik der Gleichheit – to engage in dialogue beyond technical su- Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral. periority in order to achieve reconciliation Weilerswist, p. 317; on risk maturity see the whole and the consent and participation of the section on pp. 317–320. 14 Jonas, Hans (1984): Das Prinzip Verantwortung – population in the construction of new pow- Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation. er structures. Such an expansion of military 2nd ed. Frankfurt, pp. 63f.; cf. also p. 385 (on the strategies in the sense of just peace is today a anthropological fallacy of utopia) and pp. 390–392 (on the relationship between fear, hope and necessary element of crisis prevention. responsibility). [Translated version: The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 1 Harari, Yuval Noah (2018): “Zucker ist heute Age. Chicago.] gefährlicher als Schießpulver.” Interview on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference 2018. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 15, 2018, p. 14 (henceforth quoted in abbreviated form as “Harari 2018”; the same applies to the other quotations). 2 Osterhammel, Jürgen (2009): Die Verwandlung der Welt – Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Munich, p. 51. 3 Cf. Taleb, Nassim (2013): Antifragilität – Anleitung für eine Welt, die wir nicht verstehen. 3rd ed. Munich; Vogt, Markus/Schneider, Martin (eds.) (2016): “Theologische und ethische Dimension der Resilienz.” Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift [MThZ] vol. 67, 3/2016; Karidi, Maria/Schneider, Martin/Gutwald, Rebecca (eds.) (2017): Resilienz. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven zu Wandel und Transformation. Wies- baden. 4 For the two reports, cf. Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich / Wijkman, Andreas (2018): Come on! Captalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet – A Report to the Club of Rome. New York; Bardi, Ugo (2017): The Seneca Effect­ – Why Growth Is Slow but Collapse Is Rapid. Cham. 5 WBGU (2008): Climate Change as a Security Risk. Berlin. 6 Cf. Imbusch, Peter/Zoll, Ralf (eds.) (2006): Friedens- und Konfliktforschung – Eine Einführung. 4th ed. Wiesbaden, pp. 67–81. On the analysis of climate conflicts, cf. Vogt, Markus: “Klimaschutz im Gestrüpp der Interessen – Philosophische und theologische Perspektiven.” In: Felix Ekardt (ed.): Klimagerechtigkeit – Ethische, rechtliche, ökonomische und transdisziplinäre Zugänge. Marburg 2012, pp. 54–78. 7 UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] (2007): Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change – Human solidarity in a divided world. New York. 8 Cf. on this point Vogt, Markus (2017): “Politische Emotionen als moraltheoretische Herausforderung.” In: Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift [MThZ] vol. 68, 4/2017, pp. 306–323. 9 Huntington, Samuel (1996): The Clash of Civiliza- tions and the Remaking of World Order. New York. 10 On the concept of resilience, cf. endnote 3 as well as the website of the Bavarian research consortium

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 17 TRANSFORMATIVE

SCENARIO PLANNING Author: Adam Kahane WORKING TOGETHER TO CHANGE THE FUTURE South Africa at a crossroads

In February 1990, South African president F. W. de Klerk unexpectedly announced that he would release Nelson Mandela from 27 years in prison, legalize Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) and the other opposition par- ties, and begin talks on a political transition. This had launched an unprecedented and unpredictable process of national transforma- tion. Although South Africans knew that things could not remain as they had been, they dis- Abstract agreed vehemently and sometimes violently over what the future should look like. Nobody knew whether or how this transformation “What might happen?” Anyone who seeks a systematic answer to could happen peacefully. this question will usually want to consider events and developments Professors Pieter le Roux and Vincent Maphai, that are regarded as plausible. This is the method that Adam from the ANC-aligned University of the Western Kahane followed, when as head of Shell’s scenarios department in Cape, thought that it could be useful to bring the early 1990s, he was asked to oversee the Mont Fleur Scenario together a diverse group of emerging national Exercise in South Africa. leaders to discuss alternative models for the At the time, the apartheid system had come to an end, and the coun- transformation. They had the idea that the try’s future was uncertain: between peaceful reform and a civil war, scenario planning methodology that had been anything seemed possible. Instigated by the left-wing opposition, the pioneered by the multinational oil company project was originally intended to highlight alternative development Royal Dutch Shell could be an effective way to do this. At the time, I was working in Shell’s possibilities, but it turned out to be highly integrative. Over the course scenario planning department at the compa- of several months, representatives of all groups in society – including ny’s head office in London. Le Roux asked me those who had fought violently against the apartheid regime – were to lead the meetings of his group, and I agreed able to jointly outline four scenarios for the country’s future. enthusiastically. These four alternative blueprints for the future became important My job at Shell was as the head of the team points of reference in political discussions, and influenced the posi- that produced scenarios about possible fu- tions of key actors. For example, the surprisingly strict budgetary tures for the global political, economic, social, policy of the subsequent ANC government under Nelson Mandela and environmental context of the company. can be traced back to these preceding thought experiments. Shell executives used our scenarios, together The Mont Fleur project is an excellent example of the method’s with ones about what could happen in energy potential for bringing people together to forge a better future. In the markets, to understand what was going on in second part of his essay, the author sets out the conditions under their unpredictable business environment and which scenario development can initiate change and reconciliation so to develop more robust corporate strategies and plans. The company had used this meth- processes, and resolve frozen conflicts. These include: a represent- odology since 1972 and continued to develop ative team of high-profile and influential stakeholders, a rigorous it. It helped Shell to anticipate and adapt to, for process, and a stable framework (“strong container”). instance, the first and the second oil crisis, the According to Kahane, the all-important transformation essen- fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Islamic tially takes place at the personal level. Because everyone involved radicalism.1 ­changes – in terms of their views and intentions as well as their In 1980, Anglo American, the largest mining relationships with each other and their actions – it becomes possible company in South Africa, produced two sce- for the situation as a whole to change. narios of possible futures for the country as

18 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 an input to the company’s strategizing: a “High other and explained themselves and argued Road” of negotiation leading to a political set- and made jokes. They agreed on many things. tlement and a “Low Road” of confrontation The scenario method asks people to talk not leading to a civil war and a wasteland.2 Six years about what they predict will happen or what later, Anglo American made these scenarios they believe should happen but only about public. They were presented to hundreds of au- what they think could happen. At Mont Fleur, diences around the country, including de Klerk this subtle shift in orientation opened up dra- and his cabinet, and Mandela, at that time matically new conversations. The team initially still in prison. These scenarios played an im- came up with 30 stories of possible futures for portant role in opening up the thinking of the South Africa. They enjoyed thinking up stories white population to the need for the country (some of which they concluded were plausible) to change. Then in 1990, de Klerk, influenced that were antithetical to their organizations’ of- in part by this work, made his unexpected an- ficial narratives, and also stories (some of which nouncement. they concluded were implausible) that were in line with these narratives. Trevor Manuel, the The Mont Fleur Scenario head of the ANC’s Department of Economic Pol- ­Exercise icy, suggested a story of Chilean-type “Growth through Repression”. Mosebyane Malatsi, head Le Roux and Maphai’s initial idea was to pro- of economics of the radical Pan-Africanist Con- duce a set of scenarios that would offer an gress (PAC) – one of their slogans was “One Set- opposition answer to the establishment sce- tler [white person], One Bullet” – told a wishful narios prepared at Anglo American and to a story about the Chinese People’s Liberation subsequent scenario project at Old Mutual, Army coming to the rescue of the opposition’s the country’s largest financial services group. armed forces and helping them to defeat the When le Roux asked my advice about how to South African government; but as soon as he put together a team to construct these scenar- told it, he realized that it could not happen, so ios, I suggested that he include some people this scenario was never mentioned again. who could prod the team to look at the situ- Howard Gabriels, an employee of the Fried­ ation from challenging alternative perspec- rich Ebert Stiftung (the primary funder of the tives. What le Roux and his coorganizers at the project) and a former official of the socialist Na- university did then was to include current and tional Union of Mineworkers, later reflected on potential leaders from across the whole of the the openness of this first round of storytelling: emerging South African social-political-eco- nomic system. Their key inventive insight was Some of the participants had that such a diverse and prominent team would be able to understand the whole of the com- sacrificed a lot in long-running battles plex South African situation and also would over the future of the country be credible in presenting their conclusions to the whole of the country. So they recruited 22 “The first frightening thing was to look into insightful and influential people: politicians, the future without blinkers on. At the time there businesspeople, trade unionists, academics, was a euphoria about the future of the country, and community activists; black and white; yet a lot of those stories were like ‘Tomorrow from the left and right; from the opposition morning you will open the newspaper and read and the establishment. Some of the partici- that Nelson Mandela was assassinated’ and pants had sacrificed a lot – in prison or exile what happens after that. […] You are looking or underground – in long-running battles over into the future and you begin to argue the cap- the future of the country; many of them didn’t italist case and the free market case and the know or agree with or trust many of the others. social democracy case. Suddenly the capital- Nevertheless, the members talked together ist starts arguing the communist case. And all fluidly and creatively, asked questions of each those given paradigms begin to fall away.”3

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 19 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

Johann Liebenberg was a white Afrikaner Africa if the South African political leaders executive of the Chamber of Mines. Mining was made the wrong decisions. The fourth scenario the country’s most important industry, its oper- was a vision of a better future for the country ations intertwined with the apartheid system of if all three of these errors were avoided. When economic and social control. So in this opposi- they started their work together, this politically tion-dominated team, Liebenberg represented heterogeneous team had not intended to agree the arch-establishment. Gabriels later recalled on a shared vision. But both the content of the with amazement: “Flight of the Flamingos” scenario and the fact He was the enemy, and here I was, sitting with that this team had agreed on it served as a this guy in the room […]. I think that Mont Fleur hopeful message to a country that was uncer- allowed him to see the world from my point of tain and divided about its future. view and allowed me to see the world from his.4 The team wrote a 16-page summary of their work that was published as an insert in the The first three scenarios were pro- country’s most important weekly newspaper. Lindy Wilson, a respected filmmaker, prepared phetic warnings. The fourth scenario a 30-minute video about this work. The team used these materials to present their findings to was a vision of a better future more than 100 political, business, and nongov- ernmental organizations around the country. In one small group discussion, Liebenberg was recording on a flip chart while Malatsi of The impact of Mont Fleur the PAC was speaking. He was calmly sum- marizing what Malatsi was saying: “Let me see Of the four scenarios, the one that had the big- if I’ve got this right: ‘The illegitimate, racist re- gest impact was “Icarus.” Economist Nick Segal gime in Pretoria ... ’” Liebenberg was able to summarized the warning about the dangers of hear and articulate the provocative perspective macroeconomic populism as follows: of his sworn enemy. “A popularly elected government goes on a social spending spree accompanied by price A message of hope and exchange controls and other measures in order to ensure success. For a while this yields In the following six months, the team and I re- positive results, but before long budgetary and turned to Mont Fleur for two more weekend balance of payment constraints start biting, workshops. They eventually agreed on four sto- and inflation, currency depreciation and oth- ries about what could happen in the country – er adverse factors emerge. The ensuing crisis stories they thought could stimulate useful de- eventually results in a return to authoritarian- bate about what needed to be done. “Ostrich” ism, with the intended beneficiaries of the pro- was a story of the white minority government gramme landing up worse off than before.”6 that stuck its head in the sand and refused to This scenario directly challenged the eco- negotiate with its opponents. “Lame Duck” nomic orthodoxy of the ANC, which in the ear- was a story of a negotiated settlement that ly 1990s was under strong pressure from its constrained the new democratic government constituents to be ready, once in government, and left it unable to deal with the country’s to borrow and spend money in order to re- challenges. “Icarus” was a story of an uncon- dress apartheid inequities. When members of strained democratic government that ignored the scenario team presented their work to the fiscal limits and crashed the economy. “Flight party’s National Executive Committee, it was of the Flamingos” was a story of a society that Joe Slovo (chairperson of the South African put the building blocks in place to develop Communist Party), citing the failure of socialist gradually and together.5 programs in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, The first three scenarios were prophetic who argued that “Icarus” needed to be taken warnings about what could happen in South seriously.

20 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 When le Roux and Malatsi presented “Icarus” amount in all that going back to Mont Fleur. I to the National Executive Committee of the could close my eyes now and give you those Pan-Africanist Congress – which up to that scenarios just like this.”11 The economic disci- point had refused to abandon its armed strug- pline of the new government enabled the an- gle and participate in the upcoming elections – nual real rate of growth of the South African Malatsi said: “This is a scenario of the calamity economy to jump from 1 percent over 1984- that will befall South Africa if our opponents, 1994 to 3 percent over 1994-2004. the ANC, come to power. And if they don’t do The Mont Fleur team’s messages about the it, we will push them into it.” With this sharply country’s future were simple and compelling. self-critical statement, he was arguing that his Although some commentators thought that party’s declared economic policy would harm the analysis was superficial and many on the the country and also its own popularity. left thought that the conclusion about fiscal One of the committee members then asked conservatism was incorrect, the team succeed- Malatsi why the team had not included a sce- ed in placing a crucial hypothesis and propos- nario of a successful revolution. He replied: “I al about post-apartheid economic strategy on have tried my best, comrades, but given the re- the national agenda. This proposal won the alities in the world today, I cannot see how we day, in part because it seemed to make sense can tell a convincing story of how a successful in the context of the prevailing global econom- revolution could take place within the next ten ic consensus and in part because Manuel and years.” Later, le Roux recalled that none of the Mboweni exercised so much influence on the members of the committee could do so, “and economic decision making of the new govern- I think this […] was crucial to the subsequent ment for so long. shifts in their position. It is not only the scenar- Mont Fleur not only contributed to but also ios one accepts but also those that one rejects exemplified the process through which South that have an impact.”7 This conversation about the scenarios was It is not only the scenarios followed by a fullday strategic debate in the committee. Later the PAC gave up their arms, one accepts but also those that one joined the electoral contest, and changed their economic policy. Malatsi said that many of rejects that have an impact these changes were “directly or indirectly influ- enced by Mont Fleur.”8 Africans brought about their national transfor- These and many other debates – some aris- mation. The essence of the process – a group ing directly out of Mont Fleur, some not – al- of leaders from across a system talking through tered the political consensus in the opposition what was happening, could happen, and need- and in the country. (President de Klerk defend- ed to happen in their system, and then acting ed his policies by saying “I am not an ostrich.”9) on what they learned – was employed in the When the ANC government came to power hundreds of negotiating forums (most of them in 1994, one of the most significant surprises not using the scenario methodology as such) about the policies it implemented was its con- on every transitional issue from educational sistently strict fiscal discipline.10 In 1999, when reform to urban planning to the new constitu- Mboweni became the country’s first black Re- tion. serve Bank governor (a position he held for ten Neither the Mont Fleur project in particular years), he reassured local and international nor the South African transition in general was bankers by saying: “We are not Icarus; there is perfect or complete. Many issues and actors no need to fear that we will fly too close to the were left out, many ideas and actions were bit- sun.” In 2000, Manuel, by then the country’s first terly contested, and many new dynamics and black minister of finance (a position he held for difficulties arose later on. But Mont Fleur con- 13 years), said: “It’s not a straight line from Mont tributed to creating peaceful forward move- Fleur to our current policy […], but there’s a fair ment in a society that was violently stuck.

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 21 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

When to use transformative to be able to approach this work head-on. They scenario planning agree neither on what the solution is nor even on what the problem is. At best, they agree that The South African context that gave birth to the they face a situation they all find problematic, Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise turns out to have although in different respects and for different been a particular example of a general type of reasons.13 Any attempt to implement a solution situation. Transformative scenario planning directly would therefore only increase resist- can be useful to people who find themselves in ance and rigidity. So the transformation must a situation that has the following three charac- be approached indirectly, through first build- teristics. ing shared understandings, relationships, and First, these people see the situation they are intentions. in as unacceptable, unstable, or unsustainable. The actors who came together in Mont Fleur In any event, these people cannot or are not all agreed that apartheid was irretrievably problematic and needed to be dismantled, The South African context that gave but they came in with deep differences in their diagnoses and prescriptions. The scenario pro- birth to the Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise cess enabled them to create common ground. turns out to have been a particular example of a general type of situation How transformative scenario planning works

willing to carry on as before, or to adapt to or I have learned how to do transformative sce- flee from what is happening. They think that nario planning through 20 years of trial and er- they have no choice but to try to transform ror. During this time, I have been able to discern their situation. The participants in the Mont what works and what doesn’t and why, and to Fleur project, for example, viewed apartheid piece together a simple five-step process: as unacceptable, unstable, and unsustainable, 1. Convene a team from across the whole and saw the just-opened political negotiations system as offering them an opportunity to contribute 2. Observe what is happening to changing it. 3. Construct stories about what could hap- Second, these people cannot transform their pen situation on their own or by working only with 4. Discover what can and must be done their friends and colleagues. The larger so- 5. Act to transform the system cial-political-economic system within which Transformative scenario planning is simple, they and their situation are embedded is too but it is not easy or straightforward or guaran- complex to be grasped or shifted by any one teed. The process is emergent; it almost never person or organization or sector, even one with unfolds according to plan; and context-specific lots of ideas and resources and authority.12 design and redesign are always required. The South Africans who wanted to transform the five steps therefore constitute not so much a apartheid situation had been trying for dec- recipe to follow as a set of guideposts to keep ades to force this transformation, through mass in view. protests, international sanctions, and armed In a transformative scenario planning pro- resistance. But these efforts had not succeed- cess, actors transform their problematic situa- ed. Mont Fleur and the other multistakeholder tion through transforming themselves, in four processes of the early 1990s (which the previ- ways. ous forceful efforts had precipitated) provided First, they transform their understandings. South Africans with a new way to work with Their scenario stories articulate their collective other actors from across the system. synthesis of what is happening and could hap- Third, the actors who need to work together pen in and around the system of which they are to make the transformation are too polarized part. They see their situation – and, critically

22 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 important, their own roles in their situation – can relax and pay attention to their work with- with fresh eyes. out interruption or distraction. Second, the actors transform their relation- The third component is a rigorous process. ships. Through working together in the scenar- In a transformative scenario planning process, io team, they enlarge their empathy for and the actors construct a set of relevant, challeng- trust in other actors on the team and across ing, plausible, and clear stories about what the system, and their ability and willingness to could happen – not about what will happen or work together. This is often the most important about what should happen – and then act on and enduring output of such projects. what they have learned from this construction. Third, the actors transform their intentions. The uniqueness of the scenario process is that Their transformed understandings and rela- it is pragmatic and inspirational, rational and tionships shift how they see what they can and intuitive, connected to and challenging of dom- must do to deal with what is happening in their inant understanding, and immersed in and dis- system. connected from the complexity and conflict of Fourth, the actors’ transformations of their the situation. Furthermore, the future is a more understandings, relationships, and intentions neutral space about which all actors are more enable them to transform their actions and equally ignorant. thereby to transform their situation. Transformative scenario planning can gener- A new way to work with ate transformations only if three components the future are in place. It is a composite social technolo- gy that brings together three already existing The transformative scenario planning process technologies into a new way of working that that was invented at Mont Fleur originated in can generate new results.14 the adaptive scenario planning process that The first component is a whole-system team had been invented at Shell two decades ear- of insightful, influential, and interested actors. lier – but it turns this process on its head. In These actors constitute a strategic microcosm an adaptive scenario planning process, the of the system as a whole: they are not from only leaders of an organization construct and em- one part or camp or faction of the system, and ploy stories about what could happen in the they are not only observers of the system. They world outside their organization. The aim is to all want to address a particular problematic sit- formulate strategies and plans to enable their uation and know that they cannot do so alone. organization to fit into and survive and thrive The second component is a strong container in a range of possible futures that they think within which these actors can transform their they cannot predict and cannot or should not understandings, relationships, and intentions.15 or need not influence. The boundaries of this container are set so that But this is useful only up to a point. Some- the team feels enough protection and safety, as times people need an approach not simply for well as enough pressure and friction, to be able to do their challenging work. Building such a Sometimes people need an approach container requires paying attention to multi- ple dimensions of the space within which the not simply for anticipating and team does their work: the political positioning adapting to the future but also for of the exercise, so that the actors feel able to meet their counterparts from other parts of the influencing or transforming it system without being seen as having betrayed their own part; the psychosocial conditions of anticipating and adapting to the future but also the work, so that the actors feel able to become for influencing or transforming it. For example, aware of and challenge (and have challenged) an adaptive approach to living in a crime-rid- their own thoughts and actions; and the physi- den community could involve employing locks cal locations of the meetings, so that the actors or alarms or guards, whereas a transformative

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 23 approach could involve working with others to within the project or well beyond its end. A reduce the levels of criminality. Both approach- transformative scenario planning project can es are rational, feasible, and legitimate, but get a process of systemic transformation start- they are different and require different kinds of ed, but the process may take generations to be alliances and actions. completed. The key difference between adaptive and transformative scenario planning is, then, one This article is an abridged version of the first of purpose. Adaptive scenario planning uses two chapters from Adam Kahane’s book “Trans- stories about possible futures to study what formative Scenario Planning: Working Together could happen, whereas transformative scenar- to Change the Future” (San Francisco: Berrett-­ Koehler, 2012). Transformative scenario planning 1 See, for example, Van der Heijden, Kees (1996): addresses problematic situations slowly Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. Chichester, West Sussex; Wilkinson, Angela/Kupers, Roland (2014): and from the inside out The Essence of Scenarios: The Evolution of the Gentle Art in Shell 1965-2010. Amsterdam. (Additional references in the original version.) io planning also uses stories about possible 2 Clem Sunter (1987): The World and South Africa in the futures to influence what could happen. To 1990s. Cape Town. achieve these two different purposes, adap- 3 Unpublished project document, 2000. 4 Unpublished project document, 2000. tive scenario planning focuses on producing 5 See le Roux, Pieter et al. (1992): “The Mont Fleur new systemic understandings, whereas trans- Scenarios.” In: Deeper News 7, no. 1; Segal, Nick (2007): Breaking the Mould: The Role of Scenarios in Shaping South formative scenario planning also focuses on Africa’s Future. Ed. Betty Sue Flowers. Stellenbosch; producing new cross-system relationships and Gillespie, Glennifer (2004): “The Footprints of Mont new system-transforming intentions. And to Fleur: The Mont Fleur Scenario Project, South Africa, 1991–1992.” In: Käufer, Katrin, et al. (2004): Learning produce these two different sets of outputs, Histories: Democratic Dialogue Regional Project. New York adaptive scenario planning requires a rigorous [= Working Paper 3]. See: https://reospartners.com/ process, whereas transformative scenario plan- publications/the-footprints-of-mont-fleur-a-learning- history [accessed June 5, 2018]. ning also requires a whole-system team and a 6 Segal, Nick (2007), p. 49. strong container. 7 Personal communication with Pieter le Roux. Transformative scenario planning addresses 8 Gillespie (2004), p. 41 9 Personal communication with Pieter le Roux. problematic situations slowly and from the in- 10 Veteran journalist Allister Sparks referred to this side out. Over the course of the five steps, the fundamental change in ANC economic policy as “The actors gradually transform their understand- Great U-Turn.” Sparks, Allister (2003): Beyound the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa. Johannesburg, p. 170. ings, relationships, and intentions, and thereby 11 Unpublished project document, 2000. their actions. Meanwhile, the transformation 12 I am referring here to the consequences of social, ripples out from the individual leaders to the dynamic, and generative complexity respectively. See Kahane, Adam (2009): Power and Love: A Theory and scenario team, the organizations and sectors Practice of Social Change. San Francisco, p. 5; Senge, Peter, they lead, and the larger social system, either and Scharmer, Otto (2001): “Community Action Research: Learning as a Community of Practitioners, Consultants and Researchers.” In: Reason, Peter/ The Author Bradbury, Hilary (2001): Handbook of Action Research: Adam Kahane is a Director of Reos Partners, an Participative Inquiry and Practice. Thousand Oaks, California, p. 23. international social enterprise that helps people move 13 I learned this crucial distinction between problems forward together on their most important and intracta- and problematic situations from Kees van der Heijden. ble issues. He is the author of Solving Tough Problems, 14 Brian Arthur says that new technologies arise from new and unexpected combinations of existing ones. See Power and Love, Transformative Scenario Planning, and Arthur, W. Brian (2009): The Nature of Technology: What Collaborating with the Enemy. Adam was head of social, It Is and How It Evolves. New York. political, economic, and technological scenarios for Royal 15 This container principle is explained in Stookey, Crane Wood (2012): Keep Your People in the Boat: Dutch Shell and held strategy and research positions with Workforce Engagement Lessons from the Sea. Halifax, Nova the Universities of Oxford, Toronto, British Columbia, Scotia. California, and the Western Cape.

24 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 AVAILABLE FUTURE? PEACE ETHICS REFLECTIONS Author: Franz-Josef Overbeck FROM THE PERSPECTIVE “While mapping the future is a risky under- OF JUST PEACE AND PRUDENCE taking, perhaps the only thing riskier is doing nothing.”¹

However old the human desire to know the future may be, our ability to know is limited, and the outcome is uncertain. Nev- ertheless, human existence will mainly be determined by our actions because the fu- ture is not merely fate; it is also shaped by human decisions. In order to consciously shape the future, humans require a concept which can guide their actions and which they accept to do so. We have introduced the concept of “just peace” as a vision for the future into the po- Abstract litical opinion-forming and decision-mak- ing process. With regard to the future of hu- In his essay, Bishop Franz-Josef Overbeck examines the extent to mankind, this concept is based on a simple which the methods of strategic foresight can be made to serve a insight: “A world in which most people are worthwhile vision of the future, namely a “just peace”. He starts out deprived of that which makes for a digni- by presenting the essential elements of modern foresight tools, which fied life is not sustainable. It is still full of are a “systematic way of dealing with uncertainty”: the determination violence even if there is no war. Conditions of driving forces, the revealing of latent structures and entrenched of on­going grave injustice are in themselves attitudes, the illustration of various possible developments, taking violent” (translated from German).2 Jus- breaks and discontinuities into consideration, and the identification tice or justness – understood to mean the of scope for action and influence. Nevertheless, the author argues, realization of conditions under which hu- strategic foresight is ethically neutral, since it can serve any goal. mans can lead dignified lives – constitutes a This “shortcoming” of foresight raises a fundamental problem: is it worthwhile vision of the future: “the goal of just peace enables forward-looking politics” at all compatible with the concept of just peace, which is committed (translated from German).3 To move clos- to non-violence and the prevention of violence, and which calls for a er to this goal, however, requires a kind of comprehensive political crisis management system that is guided by politics that continually reflects on its moral these criteria? responsibility. Bishop Overbeck finds the solution in the concept of prudence Although the future remains uncertain, (prudentia) from the Aristotelian and Christian ethics of virtue. To humans have acquired a scientific set of act prudently in this sense is to consider aspects which also feature tools designed to minimize this uncertain- in foresight processes – such as thinking in terms of various options, ty, or at least make it more bearable. Differ- and including principles of all different kinds, including contrary ent varieties of futures research, futurology ones. But in its orientation to “what is useful [...] in the long term” and foresight attempt to anticipate future and to the standard of the good, prudentia at the same time implies events, so that action can be taken when something more than this: it is prudentia which enables an ethi- they occur – or better still, before they oc- cally desirable application of foresight tools and measures derived cur. This raises the question of to what ex- tent and under what conditions foresight from them. In the context of successful crisis prevention, the author can serve the goal of just peace. First of all, translates this into three concrete demands: that we should consider therefore, we will take a closer look at the the history of conflicts, focus on the people concerned – especially their available tools, before moving on to discuss religious background – and show tolerance and respect toward their the conditions. traditions.

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 25 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

Foresight as a human need probabilities of occurrence with mathemati- cal precision. Instead, the idea is to prepare Particularly in times of an increasing per- for possible future events. ception of uncertainty, people have an in- “Government foresight means systematic herent need to look into the future. Already approaches by state actors to continuous- in ancient times, they consulted oracles or ly analyze possible future developments seers before crucial decisions were taken, in a methodologically sound way, so as to so that their actions could be guided by be better prepared for them and – as far as those prophesies. Even today, many peo- possible – shape them” (translated from ple perceive the present to be uncertain, German).5 Transferred to the strategic policy and considering ever faster changes in the context, this is primarily a matter of policy political, economic, scientific and cultural guidance beyond the short term, i.e. iden- sphere, they have wellfounded reason to do tifying key factors that are already apparent and relevant for forward-looking govern- There is a growing need ment action to shape the future. The goal is to “think for the future” – to identify new for a systematic way of dealing scope for action, increase the available op- tions, and prepare for discontinuities and with uncertainty surprise events (known as “wild cards”). Foresight is mainly concerned with “mak- so. This affects not only individuals, but also ing the invisible visible” by analyzing latent entire societies, and especially the political structures, assumptions and attitudes. Con- leadership of states. Their decision-makers ventional risk analysis often considers only in particular struggle to gain the earliest “established” risks, which can be relatively possible notion or knowledge of what lies well assessed. Former U.S. Secretary of De- ahead or might lie ahead, so that they can fense Donald Rumsfeld coined the phrase possibly still influence the course of events. “known unknowns” for this kind of risk. The Given the growing complexity of deci- counterpart to this is “unknown unknowns”, sion-making situations along with highly i.e. new kinds of threats that cannot be cap- interdependent environmental and eco- tured using the tools of traditional risk anal- nomic trends such as globalization and cli- ysis.6 In this respect , foresight is mainly the mate change, there is a growing need for a “management of uncertainty”. systematic way of dealing with uncertainty. Our description of the foresight meth- Therefore, “foresighted and interministeri- od leaves the moral question as yet unan- al political action [is becoming] ever more swered, however. It has to be ascertained important, but also ever more challenging” that foresight as an instrument is in itself (translated from German).4 Global digital ethically neutral. “Thinking for the future” to transformation and autonomization pro- deal with future events is initially independ- cesses as well as new forms of conflicts are ent of the attitudes and objectives of the ac- also considerably changing the coordinates tors involved. Its various methods can serve of security policy – keywords here are cy- purposes which should not be pursued from ber war, fully autonomous weapons, hybrid an ethical point of view. Thus, in itself, it is wars and transnational terrorism. In com- not sufficient to serve the goal of just peace parison to the pre-modern era, when con- which requires, as mentioned earlier, a kind siderations of different futures were mostly of politics that continually reflects on its spiritual in nature, the methods of futures moral responsibility. In addition, a concept research have become increasingly scientif- from virtue ethics that is traditional but by ic over recent decades. Now it is no longer no means outdated is required. a question of having relevant events pre- dicted by a magical authority, or calculating

26 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 The virtue of prudentia Aristotle distinguishes between a type of prudence or practical wisdom oriented to Prudentia personified is a woman with two virtue (phrónēsis), and an adroitness that re- faces: one looks forward, to see how the jects it (craftiness, panourgía): It is impossi- goals of a virtuous lifestyle can be achieved. ble to be prudent without being virtuous at But to do this she also has to look back into the same time. A person who acts prudently the past, to previous experiences, to devel- is guided by the standard of the good. The op an understanding of new contexts for ac- future to which prudent action is geared, is tion. Medieval allegories express this in their also a future that is qualified as good in eth- depiction of Prudentia. With an attentive ical respects.15 gaze, she looks into the world in front of her, When making balanced judgments about while at the same time holding a mirror up what to do in complex situations, someone to her face, in which she looks into the past.7 who decides on their own on the choice of Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, at- appropriate means may not take important tributed a leading role to prudence in the aspects into account. Therefore, according evaluation of actions. “A prudent man is one to Thomas Aquinas, discussion among sev- who sees as it were from afar, for his sight eral people deserves preference.16 The pru- is keen, and he foresees the event of uncer- dent person, however, will not merely follow tainties.”8 The prudent man evaluates future the experts’ advice. They will make their de- actions from the perspective of knowledge cision independently. Knowing about oth- that goes beyond the immediate situation; er perspectives in the discussion includes it is a question of what is useful to him and the possibility of going beyond one’s own others in the long term. Firstly, he is familiar with the conditions that determine the cur- The future to which prudent rent situation. But the prudent man is also capable of distancing himself from what the action is geared, is also a future that is specific circumstances appear to demand.9 qualified as good in ethical respects Prudent actions, in their chronological structure, are characterized mainly by their point of view. In this respect, discussion al- “foresighted concern about a desirable fu- ways serves the exchange of ideas and the ture” (translated from German).10 The scope communication of values and visions, too. for possible action is partially influenced by Therefore, a person who acts prudently will the past. An essential element of prudence be guided by social, political and ethical is “[...] to obtain knowledge of the future goals. from knowledge of the present or past”.11 At Aspects of the classical concept of pru- the same time, the future always appears to dentia as a virtue can be found in foresight us in an intertwining of available and una- processes: the perspective of knowledge vailable aspects. What will be, is available going beyond the specific situation; fore- only up to a point to the acting person.12 sighted concern for a desirable future that Consequently, prudent actors too should is guided by a specific practical interest; an engage with uncertainty.13 In their consider- awareness of the available and unavailable ations, they should anticipate future dan- aspects of the future; an attitude of open- gers, possible side-effects and long-term ness and flexibility toward different future consequences, and examine measures that scenarios; and, due to the complexity of re- could contribute to successful practice.14 ality and contexts for action, a consultation Considering uncertainty is something model that includes all kinds of views, even wholly different than wanting to “force the contrary ones. future to happen.” Therefore, the attitude Yet for all its intelligence, creativity and of the prudent person is characterized by logical rigor, foresight per se does not pos- openness and flexibility. sess any prudence in the sense of the vir-

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 27 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

tue prudentia. It is only through this virtue, At the same time, this idea implies that however, that an ethically imposed appli- political priorities should be determined by cation of the foresight instrument becomes peace ethics. If it is possible to make pur- possible. At the same time, prudence is not poseful contributions to reducing violence, a marginal extension of thinking ahead. then this insight is also accompanied by an Rather, through its relationship to what is ethical obligation to follow it. After all, us- morally advisable, and also through its pur- ing violence in any form – even those forms posefully farsighted view of impacts and that are based on serious reasons – not only side-effects, it is a fundamental requirement entails grave consequences, harming and for successful action toward the prospect of destroying lives. There is also the constant just peace. danger that the use of force will spiral out of control, and its intrinsic dynamics will undermine the achievement of the desired Prudence, foresight and 17 conflict prevention goal. Strategic foresight enhances present-day The 2016 White Paper on security policy and crisis early warning with new methods and the future of the German armed forces, and approaches: by analyzing alternative pos- the German federal government’s guide- sible developments and options for action, lines, published in 2017, on “Preventing by pointing out and questioning mental Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace” models and assumptions, by enhancing the (Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, visibility and verbal expression of interests, goals, desires and priorities, and by promot- Preventive politics embodies the ing communication and collective learning. However, for successful crisis prevention it idea that an attitude of renunciation is important, after the early warning, to act of violence can be translated prudently in the ethical sense. Firstly, this requires engagement with the history of into political structures conflicts, as the often interest-driven defini- tions of contemporary problems do not get Frieden fördern), set out a framework for in- to the root of the conflicts. Secondly, to act ternational crisis management. Its goal is to prudently in conflict prevention means de- prevent crises by means of systematic fore- voting attention to the people concerned: to sight. This premise of preventing violence is their educational opportunities and to the the fundamental idea of just peace. question of how they approach morality In the concept of just peace, the spirit of – and hence also their religion. One of the non-violence makes itself felt in a very fun- major challenges in many current conflicts damental way in the manner in which the consists in a disturbance of the so-called political situation is perceived, the extent to post-secular society. The importance of reli- which it is accepted, and in the places where gion and hence also the ethical significance changes are called for. This orientation leads of the unconditionality of the awareness of to a new emphasis on those questions that God and the resulting ethical obligations are associated with the prevention of vio- have become completely unimaginable for lence. Preventive politics embodies the idea many people. Thirdly, for the sake of pru- that an attitude of renunciation of violence dence, a true pluralism of thought would can be translated into political structures need to be established, and it would need to – in other words, that it seems possible in sufficiently reflect on and respect regional principle to change political structures and traditions, customs and contexts. All of this mechanisms in such a way that they lead to would be a prudent form of prevention re- a greater capability for peace in the interna- sponsibility which governments would have tional system. to take and which would correspond to the

28 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 prevailing spirit of non-violence within the concept of just peace. Foresight reflects the situation of our times, in which many conceptions of the good compete with each other. Conse- quently, knowledge about possible scenar- ios does not put an end to questions about the normative criteria, or the striving for a future that is qualified as good in the ethical sense. According to our beliefs, the concept of just peace is one such normative criteri- on. To move closer to it requires, in addition to modern methods of futures research, the traditional virtue of ethical prudence.

1 https://www.wired.com/2013/01/al-gore-futurist (accessed May 29, 2018). 2 Die deutschen Bischöfe (2000): Gerechter Friede, No. 59. 3 Ibid., No. 60. 4 Stiftung neue Verantwortung (2013): “Policy Brief: Denken auf Vorrat – Strategische Vorausschau macht Deutschland fit für die Zukunft”. www.stiftung-nv.de/ sites/default/files/pb_government_foresight_.pdf (accessed May 16, 2018). 5 Ibid. 6 Roth, Florian and Herzog, Michel (2016): “Strategische Krisenfrüherkennung – Instrumente, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen”. In: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 9, pp. 201-211, p. 204. 7 Cf. Fidora, Alexander et al. (2013): “Einleitung”. In: by the same author et al. (eds.): Phronêsis – Prudentia – Klugheit. Das Wissen des Klugen in Mittelalter, Renaissance und Neuzeit. Porto, pp. 7-11, p. 7. 8 Summa theologiae [Abbr. as S. th.] II-II, q. 47, a.1, c. [Translation taken from http://www.newadvent.org/ summa/3047.htm; accessed May 18, 2018.] Here Thomas is quoting Isidore of Seville, cf. Etymol., Lib. X, ad litt. P (PL 82, 388). 9 Cf. Mertens, Karl (2005): “Die Zeitstruktur kluger Handlungen”. In: Kersting, Wolfgang (ed.): Klugheit. Weilerswist, pp. 215-236, p. 215. 10 Ibid. 11 S.th. II-II, q. 47, a.1 , c. 12 Cf. Mertens (2005), p. 219. 13 Cf. Mertens (2005), p. 220. 14 Quoted after Mertens (2005), p. 223. The Author 15 Cf. ibid.; cf. also Koch, Bernhard (2017): “Klugheit”. Dr. Franz-Josef Overbeck studied theology and philos- In: Ebeling, Klaus/Gillner, Matthias (eds.): Ethik-Kom- ophy at Münster and Rome. He was ordained a priest in pass. 77 Leitbegriffe. Mit einem Vorwort von Hans Joas. Freiburg im Breisgau, pp. 94-5. 1989. Following his consecration as a bishop in 2007, he was 16 S. th. I-II, q. 14, a. 1.3, c. an auxiliary bishop in the Diocese of Münster. In 2009, he 17 Cf. on the preceding two paragraphs Hoppe, Thomas was appointed Bishop of Essen. Since 2011, he has also held (2001): “Motiv Menschenrechte? Die Idee vom gerechten Frieden als Grundlage der Außen- und Sicherheitspoli- the post of Catholic military bishop for the German armed tik”. In: Zentralkomitee der deutschen Katholiken (ed.): forces. In 2014, he became chairman of the commission for Sein ist die Zeit. 94. Deutscher Katholikentag Hamburg 2000 societal and social issues of the Episcopal Conference of – Dokumentation.­ Kevelaer. Germany (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, DBK); that same year, Pope Francis appointed him to the Pontifical Council for Culture. In March 2018, he was elected Vice-President of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE).

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 29 INCREASING

COMPLEXITY AND Author: Manfred Nielson

UNCERTAINTY: NATO is facing an unprecedented diverse range of security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. FUTURE CHALLENGES The emergence or resurgence of state actors as potential peer competitors, coupled with the increasing threat of terrorism have generated a TO NATO renewed emphasis on deterrence and defense. Persistent transnational challenges such as or- AND THE WEST ganized crime, climate change, or economic instability further deepen the uncertainty and complexity of our security environment. Living in a globalized society, we cannot ignore the developments in areas beyond our borders. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – located in Norfolk, Virginia – seeks to provide NATO with relevant, resourced, mili- tary capacities in the right posture, to address current, but with even more emphasis, future challenges and to keep NATO relevant now and in the foreseeable future. At the same time, this underscores the need for stability projection. Abstract At the 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO decided to adapt its posture in a 360-degree approach. To stay relevant as a military alliance for the foreseeable future, Heads of state and government reconfirmed it is essential to adapt. As the international security architecture that the three core tasks – collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security – continues to change, it affects NATO too, the world’s largest mili- remain valid. In order to maintain its effective- tary alliance. Plus there is the development and spread of much-dis- ness, NATO has therefore embarked upon a cussed disruptive technologies, many of which are available not only journey of adaptation. ACT being in one of the to state actors, as well as the increasing pluralization of societies. driving seats. Citing these and several other future trends, Admiral Manfred This adaptation is framed by three major Nielson, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and questions: the highest-ranking admiral in the German armed forces, de- Do we fully understand the context and de- scribes the conceptual considerations of the NATO Strategic Future velopments in our security environment? Analysis (SFA) 2017. The alliance’s military plans are based on this Do we have the right capabilities to counter document. It discusses future security policy challenges and opportu- evolving threats? nities, and also clearly identifies likely ethical problems. Following And, are we adapting at the speed of change on from this, the next step is to draw up various scenarios from the and in a comprehensive approach (e.g. govern- future trends, and work out their implications for military policy. ments, civil sector, military, economy, cultural, non-governmental organizations)? SFA 2017 incorporates the futures research of all 29 member All this requires an Alliance that is strategi- countries. This lends it particular weight, especially since the cally aware and flexible and agile enough to national security doctrines of the individual member countries are simultaneously decide, operate, and adapt. If in turn derived from it. It was also produced in close consultation executed poorly, NATO may in the future find with the European Union. Despite receiving little public attention, itself dominant in a conventional sense and ef- SFA 2017 is the central document setting out the future of security fectively irrelevant at the same time. policy in the global West. In his essay, Admiral Nielson accurately Of course, NATO has adapted before, but summarizes its essence. currently, the new security environment shows

30 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 that we do not have plenty of time to get it right. “Shaping the Future of Geopolitics,” released We need to be in place, resilient, and persistent. in November 2017, and the SFA reciprocally To get the adaptation of the Alliance right, we informed each other in their production phase. need to speed up our processes and our adapt- As 22 nations are members in both organiza- ability, increase our situational awareness, and tions, a certain overlap and shared assessment plan for challenges of the future, not the past should not surprise us, but be valued as criteria ones. Decisions taken today must take the ef- for combined strength, shared resilience, and fects over the mid and long term into account. common ground for future cooperation. And we have to be ambitious and innovative. In addition, to enable a shared point of view Maybe we will even have to redefine innovation of 29 allies, SFA 2017 also offers different opin- in the military realm. ions in some particular issues, where general All this requires a better understanding of agreement could not be achieved. This under- what surrounds us today and in the future. This lines the ambition to maintain maximum ob- is not about predicting the future, but about jectivity. identifying general trends. ACT released its first edition of the Strategic Foresight Analysis NATO’s Strategic Foresight (SFA) in 2013. But in fact its origins go back to 2009, when ACT was commanded by today’s Analysis is closely shared and coordinated US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis. Back with the European Union then, he initiated the “Multiple Futures Project” as a solid foundation for much of our strategic The SFA forms the intellectual foundation planning. This key document already recog- for the “Framework for Future Alliance Opera- nized many of the future trends, threats, and tions” (FFAO) which was released by both Al- requirements that have been driving the adap- lied Command Operations (Belgium) and ACT tation of NATO’s military posture since Wales earlier this year. This document goes one step and Warsaw. further by taking a number of instability situa- The aim of the revised SFA 2017 is still to tions from the SFA and defining their military provide a shared understanding of the strate- implications for the years to come. It identifies gic future security environment. It describes characteristics and abilities of future Alliance the most significant political, social, techno- capabilities to meet the potential challenges logical, economic, and environmental trends and opportunities of the future security envi- in the coming years, and resulting security im- ronment. plications for the Alliance and for its member What do we believe are the most significant nations. Supported by professional military evolutions in trends since the SFA 2013 report, judgement, the SFA helps to both understand and what might be their key implications for today and to visualize the future, in order to en- the Alliance? able NATO to adapt. Besides that, all nations develop their own The shift of powers as a foresight documents. The combination of all challenge to the West these different perspectives, however, is what gives the SFA its unique added value. Not only The geostrategic power transition that has does it establish a shared view by 29 Allied na- been taking place over the past years in the tions, but it is the result of a collaborative effort Asia-Pacific region is now reaching a decisive drawing extensively on their expertise, and in- turn. It clearly illustrates the resurgence of pow- tegrating inputs from partner nations, other in- er politics in the region. China is leveraging its ternational organizations, think tanks, industry, economic power to increase defense spending, and academia. as the foundation of a growing global power In particular, it is closely shared and coordi- strategy. The neighboring India is following the nated with the European Union. The European same path. It could reach a comparable status Strategy and Policy Analysis System’s (ESPAS) in the medium term. At the same time, Russia

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is resurfacing with the intent to be recognized In addition, the trend that governments will as a major power again. It is challenging the continue to lose their driving role in the devel- established order in the former Soviet space opment of cutting-edge technologies, leading by taking advantage of the lack of unity and re- to an overdependence on the commercial sec- solve of Western nations. tor, including in sovereignty areas such as de- Finally, a wide variety of emerging non-state fense and security, is likely to continue. actors – ranging from terrorist groups to glob- For NATO, the consequence of this easier ac- ally operating companies – with significant cess to disruptive technologies poses a threat resources and ambitions are increasingly influ- through their exploitation by our potential ad- encing societies, national governments, and in- versaries. This even includes individual actors. ternational institutions. This trend, combined Therefore, the Alliance will have to keep up with a growing lack of trust in governments and with the tempo of these evolutions and adapt institutions, raises a number of consequences at the speed of relevance. A paradigm shift in for the Alliance. our acquisition processes will be needed to al- First, the increased likelihood of power com- low quicker integration of innovative solutions petition is putting the international rule-based into our range of capabilities. order to the test and is directly challenging the Start-ups spend their own money on research cohesion of the Alliance. and development. If the market embraces their Second, the growing complexity of this envi- product, they make a fortune, if not, they move ronment and a wide variety of actors requires on and develop something else innovative. NATO to develop a global strategic awareness, However, if we compare this model to our gov- beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. ernmental procurement processes, we must recognize we usually spend public resources NATO has to develop a global for concept development and experimentation. Instead of stopping a defense project due to a strategic awareness change in parameters, we feel bound by the mil- lions we have already spent and stick to the de- Third, in this unprecedented range and mul- cision taken 15 years before in many cases. titude of global developments NATO will need This does not correspond to the innovative to reinforce its cooperation with existing part- velocity of the world we are supposed to oper- ners, other international organizations, or rel- ate at all. Our business model differs in many evant non-state actors; and establish an effec- regards; we often tend to focus more on pro- tive dialogue with the rising powers to develop cesses than on outcome. confidence and security building measures. The United States released their Third Offset Strategy in 2014, aiming to ensure the US keeps The exponentially growing the global technological edge in the defense innovation rate of technologies sector and focuses on the most advanced tech- will change our societies nologies. Many technologies originally devel- oped for other purposes were identified as rele- Emerging technologies are undoubtedly the vant for the military today and in the future. The fastest-growing and -evolving trend. The literal- purpose of the Third Offset Strategy is to deter ly disruptive nature of some technologies has other major global powers from contesting the already started to transform our daily lives and US militarily and to take advantage of the most the societies we live in. The surge in comput- advanced technologies. ing power, together with artificial intelligence For NATO, this makes it imperative to in- (AI) and autonomous systems, will continue to crease funding for the most advanced defense accelerate the pace of technological progress. technologies. The US invited the Europeans The development of global networks eases the to participate in some of their capability pro- access to new technologies and information, as grams. One focus for NATO and the US alike is well as their dissemination down to individuals. to enhance any man–machine interface.

32 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 Machines increasingly outpace humans in aware of the concerns, worries, and fears of our processing data. We need to identify ways and citizens? means to utilize this capability to our benefit. Whatever turns the discussion will take we Furthermore, the disproportionate tempos in must always keep our Western societies in technological developments amongst Alliance mind; we cannot wish away these emerging nations could lead to compatibility issues with- technologies – if we do not embrace them, oth- in NATO. ers will, and we need to be prepared to deter Divergent ethical and legal interpretations and to defend against the threat imposed by and acceptance of the evolutions in technolo- them. Our potential adversaries are increas- gies will create different levels of adoption and ingly using global networks to disseminate a reluctance to partner with nations that em- false or misleading information to influence ploy them in operations. The technological edge and the newest We cannot wish away emerging techno- gadgets, which are driving change in how we interact socially, how we shop, how we plan, logies – if we do not embrace them, others how we conduct our businesses, no longer will. We need to be prepared to deter and to reside in the military community. The informa- tion environment is developing into a new bat- defend against the threat imposed by them tlefield with data as a main strategic resource. This will require adaptive mindsets, technolog- public opinion and decision-making. It can be ical awareness, appropriate policies, and legal assumed that they will neither have the legal frameworks to facilitate the adoption of new constraints nor the ethical debates that are re- technologies, as well as to ensure the highest quired on our side. level of interoperability for capabilities that will NATO will not only need to develop capaci- be increasingly connected. ties to detect changes in the information envi- We need to be aware of the impact on ronment to become more strategically aware our most valuable capital and bring about a and to take an agile approach to strategic com- change of attitude in order to remain relevant. munications. Equally important is that NATO In the international community, the discussion and its nations will need to increase resilience on how legal norms like “law in armed conflict,” against false information disseminated by op- “human rights,” and “protection of civilians in ponents who do not feel bound by the same set armed conflict” are effected are ongoing. There of norms, rules, and legal frameworks. is growing consensus on the need to apply in- What does this mean in the realm of deter- ternational norms to the field of AI and auton- rence? omous systems. As we stand right at the begin- ning of the political process, NATO could take Changing societies could a leading role in shaping the discussions and impact the Alliance driving them forward. In fact, the complexity becomes really chal- Increased urbanization will lead to more re- lenging if we have a closer look at the legal source competition and even to scarcity. framework and the closely linked ethical as- Ownership and control of critical infrastruc- pects. How do we foresee the decision cycles ture could become contested. It will create for the deployment of unmanned and semi-au- additional vulnerabilities for the distribution of tonomous systems? AI will inevitably lead to available resources. In addition, ageing popu- autonomous self-learning platforms and they lations will continue to challenge medical and are a technological reality already even though social welfare policies, potentially limiting the not fully operational so far. necessary budgets for defense and security. Have we considered the necessary legal Furthermore, the polarization of societies is adaptation to that? Are we up to speed in the increasing, preliminarily affecting Western na- ethical discussion process? Are we sufficiently tions fuelled by endless opportunities of indi-

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vidualized lifestyle and amplified recognition of Third, natural disasters will increase re- minorities. quirements for humanitarian support. The All these factors will increase instability and lack of military assets required for this support the risk of large-scale migration, civil unrest, must also be taken into account in operation- potentially even civil war. Consequently NATO al plans. must be prepared to operate in heavily con- centrated urban environments. Therefore, the Strategic shocks of a yet related measures regarding the protection of unseen magnitude civilians are integrated into the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations. All those briefly presented trends could equal- Among allied nations, the understanding of ly lead to crises. However, the greatest danger civil preparedness and interdependence be- is the confluence of these trends, and of many tween services will be an essential factor to im- others described in the SFA, building up to prove their sustainment and to build resilience. trigger strategic shocks of a yet unseen mag- nitude. Threats and strategic Are we prepared to be resilient and to absorb opportunities raised by environ­ such shocks today? Are we really considering mental and climate change the possible effects of those shocks and are we willing to plan for them or do we still prefer Climate change impacts nearly all domains to ignore those scenarios because we fear de- and comprises technical, legal, and political bates about their consequences and the meas- challenges. Increased frequency and severity ures we would have to take to be resilient? of natural disasters will continue to shape the The understanding that the allied nations security environment. The scientific under- have of civil preparedness and interdepend- standing of climate change is growing and will ence between public services will be an essen- have to be taken into account in the Alliance’s tial factor to improve their sustainment and long-term planning and risk assessments. The to build resilience. Building resilience already following implications must be addressed: demands persistent interconnectedness be- First, the easier accessibility of the Arctic re- tween the civil, private, and military sectors gion will cut distances between Europe and in peacetime. Waiting for emerging crises to Asia by a third. It will also allow increased mil- address the needs and required processes will itary use of the far North and Arctic regions lead to failure and existential threats for our by friend or foe. This will impact both the Alli- nations. ance’s threat assessment of these regions, and It is important to have a common under- also offer greater opportunities for our strategic standing of the future trends and their security lines of communication. and stability implications. In order to cope with this challenge, the SFA makes a valuable con- Building resilience already demands per- tribution with its shared perspective of the 29 sistent interconnectedness between the civil, member states, which lays the foundation for the discussion of future trends, threats, and private, and military sectors in peacetime challenges and fosters cohesion of the Alliance. It will enable us to better coordinate our na- Second, there is a need to develop resil- tional defense plans to face the future and to ience against deficiencies in primary resourc- grasp new opportunities. es and infrastructures while planning for mili- The SFA is also the primary document to in- tary operations. Extreme weather conditions, form national security reviews and defense and water and food security issues and other cli- security strategies. It will help allied nations mate and environmental stressors must be and partners to include future perspectives in included in allies’ situational awareness and today’s decisions and enables the Alliance to planning processes. permanently adapt.

34 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 But in fact, we at ACT strive at more than only Such a change in policy and mindset does to influence. Our purpose is the implemen- not come from the organization itself. It builds tation of the outcomes of Warsaw on a larger on the people within, their curiosity about scale and to bring coherence. adapting at the speed of relevancy. NATO and It is about better use of what already exists, its allied nations need to embrace the uncer- leveraging it through existing structures and tainty, need to learn from the rapidly chang- using it on a persistent, day-to-day basis, but without taking ownership or duplicating the Waiting for emerging crises to work. It could apply to everything we do: Com- address the needs and required processes mand and Control, Capabilities, Training and will lead to failure and existential Exercises, Logistics and Partnerships. And speed in this process will make the difference threats for our nations between being one step behind and one step ahead of any potential opponent. ing world around us, and need to enhance Practically speaking, our ambition is to our interaction in order to gain a common, connect and to federate what exists in NATO, whole-of-government increased situational in nations, and in other organizations for awareness and higher levels of resilience. the benefit of all. And in doing this to also Improving today, shaping tomorrow, bridg- strengthen national responsibilities in service ing the two is what drives Allied Command of the Alliance. Transformation. That’s why ACT’s Persistent Federated Ap- proach is not just focused on Command and Control, but also on capabilities, logistics, the way we train and exercise, and on our ­approach to partnerships. Partnerships that are not limited to partner nations but incor­ porate international organizations, non-gov- ernmental organizations, industry, and aca- demia, etc.

A Persistent Federation to achieve higher levels of resilience It is about constantly improving the way NATO The Author and nations collaborate and cooperate, whilst Admiral Manfred Nielson assumed duties as Depu­ nations retain full sovereignty and control over ty­ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in their systems. This would require, among oth- Norfolk, Virginia in 2016. He has commanded units er things, the adaptation of policies and per- at all levels and held various leading positions in the missions. Key however is a change in working German Federal Ministry of Defense. Following his ethos and practices. promotion to Rear Admiral (lower half), he served as A federated approach would provide insights Commandant of the Naval Academy in Flensburg from into a specific situation through its architec- 2003 to 2005 where he served as Commander Combined ture, encompassing NATO nations, partners, Task Force 150 during Operation Enduring Freedom. the private sector, academia, and all sources Promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral in 2010, he was of publicly available information. It would facil- appointed Commander in Chief of the German Fleet in itate enhanced strategic awareness to provide Glücksburg. From 2012 to 2015 he served as Chief of Staff Joint Support Service of early warning and the assessment of a deterio- the Bundeswehr. He was promoted to the rank of Admiral with the assumption of rating situation. NATO task at ACT.

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 35 CRISIS EARLY WARNING AND FORESIGHT IN PEACE AND SECURITY POLICY: EARLIER, Author: Winfried Nachtwei MORE RESOLUTE, MORE I have been active in peace and security policy for more than 35 years. In all that time, (civilian) SUBSTANTIAL ACTION! crisis prevention has been a central theme for me, and crisis early warning (CEW) has been a key element of that. From the early 1980s on- wards, one major factor that led me into poli- tics was a future scenario that had enormous damage potential, was impossible to rule out, and even seemed to be becoming more likely: Abstract the failure of the nuclear deterrent in Europe, and a devastating nuclear “homeland defense” in Germany. Several times, European civiliza- It is not long since Joachim Gauck, the then President of Germany, tion only just narrowly avoided this scenario. called for “earlier, more resolute, and more substantial” action in We were all extremely lucky! the Federal Republic’s foreign and security policy. Since the 2014 Munich Security Conference, this remark has become an axiom for Germany’s new security policy. Winfried Nachtwei has an intimate Surprising major crises knowledge of politics in Berlin. In his essay, he investigates what this Since then, peace and security policy has had call means for (civilian) crisis prevention and the early recognition to contend with big surprises and unexpected of crises. He begins by briefly listing surprises in world history over major crises: the extraordinary series of events the last thirty years. Not infrequently, these have also triggered secu- that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall; the peaceful rity policy crises. The author then outlines the need for a crisis early revolutions in Eastern Europe and the break-up warning system, to contain the potential for surprises in a world of the Soviet Union; the return of war to Europe shaped by increasing uncertainty. The German federal government, in the Balkans; the genocide in Rwanda; the Al too, has recognized the strategic foresight method. One of its goals is Qaeda terror attacks in New York and Washing- ton; the borderless war against terror and the to develop and link competences in this field. Based on extensive re- international/German deployment in Afghani- search in the individual institutions, Nachtwei provides a snapshot of stan; German overseas deployments, mostly in the status of foresight and crisis early warning in the individual min- regions that had never seemed likely; the rap- istries (development, defense and the German Federal Foreign Office). idly clouding-over Arab Spring and the extreme He also looks at how they are linked together (the German Federal consequences of the war in Syria, leading to the Academy for Security Policy BAKS, is mentioned in particular). Both terror of the Islamic State (IS); the “discovery” of in terms of expertise and in the degree of networking, the author sub-Saharan Africa by European and German points out that Germany has a fair amount of catching up to do. security policy; the refugee crisis around the In the second part of his essay, Nachtwei looks at the stumbling Mediterranean; the frosting of relations between blocks to crisis prevention. These often lie between an early, pre- Russia and the West since the annexation of cise analysis and security policy-makers in executive matters and Crimea and the war in East Ukraine, as well as legislature. As a member of the German Bundestag for many years, the associated return of Alliance defense; Brex- Nachtwei offers insights – some of them quite alarming – from his it; Trump’s electoral victory in the United States and the global rise of national populism; the rev- extensive experience in security policy. The personal tone of this olution in social and public communication. section and the glimpse behind the scenes of the Berlin Republic are of In 2001, it was possible to prevent the next im- great value to the interested reader. pending Balkans war in Macedonia, thanks to a The article ends with a plea for strategic foresight, and with last-minute recognition of the crisis, concerted recommendations – highly worthy of consideration – for a more solid international prevention efforts, and political implementation of its methods. This would make international crisis pressure on the parties involved in the conflict. prevention and peacebuilding generally more effective, and the world, But this seems to have been something of a pos- perhaps, a little more peaceful. itive exception to the negative rule.

36 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 New impetus for crisis Building Peace” (translated from German). For prevention the first time, both government documents prominently discuss crisis early warning and Given the increasing frequency of major crises foresight, and in more specific terms than ever and growing uncertainty, it is only natural that before. political crisis prevention and foresight in Ger- The White Paper emphasizes that Germany’s many has gained (a new kind of) impetus since fourth strategic priority is the “early recogni- 2014. tion, prevention, and resolution of crises and From 2000 to 2004, the German federal gov- conflicts.”1 This requires a “forward-looking, ernment’s overall concept and action plan for comprehensive, and sustained approach.” “Civilian Crisis Protection, Conflict Resolution Early recognition of crises should “combine and Post-Conflict Peace Building” provided national and international, state and non-state the conceptual basis for the new policy field expertise to create a clear overall picture.” An of crisis prevention. Following the disaster of inter-ministerial approach to developing strat- the Balkan conflicts, new instruments and ap- egies will be promoted by “expanding and proaches were added to the infrastructure of interlinking authority in the areas of strategic civilian crisis prevention. These include the foresight, control, and evaluation.”2 Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF), The prevention of the impending war in the Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst, ZFD), the German Foundation for Peace Re- Macedonia in 2001 seems to have been something search (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, DSF), and the “zivik” program for civil conflict of a positive exception to the negative rule resolution. Moreover, there was a general in- crease in conflict sensitivity in development The guidelines reaffirm the “primacy of poli- cooperation. tics and the priority of prevention” (translated But while the crisis early warning action from German). “Early recognition of crises is an plan did identify a warning/prevention gap, essential basis for early and decisive action to it did not discuss it further. Strategic foresight prevent crises. It allows avoidable surprises to was not even mentioned at the time. Partly be reduced, and policies to be better prepared because of the growing challenges of over- for possible escalations. This requires capaci- seas deployments, crisis prevention came to ties for the targeted surveillance of countries be overshadowed in the following years as and regions. The German federal government attention was focused on post-conflict reha- will refine its tools of analysis, so that it can bilitation. It was not until early 2014, with the keep sight of political, economic, and struc- debate over Germany’s international respon- tural trends that favor the development or sibility, the proliferating conflict environment, intensification of crises. At the same time, it is and the Federal Foreign Office’s “Review2014” important to stay realistic: even with very good process, that the political emphasis shifted early warning mechanisms, crises cannot al- back onto crisis prevention – and now, for the ways be predicted in detail” (translated from first time, onto strategic foresight. Crisis pre- German).3 vention and crisis management became one In its guidelines, the German federal govern- of three priorities in German foreign policy. ment makes a commitment to Following consultative processes, for the first • “refine and more closely interlink its instru- time in July 2016 the German federal cabinet ments for the early recognition of crises”; approved the “White Paper on German Secu- • “apply strategic foresight methods and seek rity Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr close international cooperation in the early (German armed forces).” This was followed in recognition of crises and fragility analysis”; June 2017 by government policy guidelines • “promote joint situation assessments of titled “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, potential crises” (translated from German).4

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Fundamentals of foresight and Status of foresight and ­ crisis early warning systems crisis early warning in German ­government ministries Strategic foresight is increasingly develop- ing into an instrument for the systematic For a long time, the embassies dotted preparation of political decisions.5 Expec- throughout the world, their respective coun- tations occasionally surface to the effect try sections in the German Federal Foreign that strategic foresight can provide reliable Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) and the German predictions about future trends, crises, and Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnach- violent conflicts. It can identify preventative richtendienst, BND) were the main sensors in “adjusting screws,” so to speak, which would the Federal Republic of Germany’s crisis ear- allow conflicts to be reliably prevented. But ly warning system. But the early recognition such expectations are unrealistic. Social and capability of the overseas representations political processes are fundamentally differ- depended to a considerable degree on their ent than the cause-effect relationships of the respective staffing and the crisis sensitivity of physical world: they cannot be exactly pre- their management. dicted and can be influenced only to a lim- Some ministries only recently gained early ited extent. warning tools: the Federal Ministry for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development (Bun- Social and political processes cannot be exactly desministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusamme- ­predicted and can be influenced only to a narbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) in 2005, the Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministeri- limited extent. But at the same time, crisis and um der Verteidigung, BMVg) in 2012, and the conflict escalations are not natural disasters Federal Foreign Office in 2015. Development ministry: A majority of the fo- But at the same time, crisis and conflict cus countries for German development coop- escalations are not natural disasters; they eration are considered to be fragile. Conflicts, are human-made. And in some types of cri- fragility, and violence are obstacles to devel- sis and conflict, escalations can be predicted opment. As a result of the 2005 BMZ strategy with reasonable plausibility: e.g. humanitar- for peace building, and as part of the devel- ian crises or mass violence including geno- opment cooperation crisis early warning sys- cide. Many cases are known in which there tem, the German Institute for Global and Area were early and credible warnings as well as Studies (GIGA) analyzes the crisis and conflict realistic options for action, but these were potential of more than 90 countries every year not followed up with appropriate political or on behalf of the development ministry, based military prevention. Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo on 36 indicators (structural conflict factors, in 1998, northern Afghanistan in 2006, and processes that intensify conflicts, strategies the 2014 ISAF pull-out are such cases, and I for conflict management and the use of force, have personal political experience of them. definition of the conflict phase). Supple- The examples show that the systematic mentary “politico-economic brief analyses” view ahead can and should be significant- (politökonomische Kurzanalysen, PÖK) by ex- ly better: in short-term CEW and in strate- ternal experts analyze societal actors and insti- gic foresight; to sharpen our focus so that tutions, providing regional desks with a basis we are better able to deal with the general for preparing country strategies and the work ­acceleration and fundamental uncertainty; of country teams. Finally, “Peace and Conflict in policy-making processes for short-term Assessments” (PCA) ensure a peace building crisis prevention measures and for strategic orientation for development projects. planning. Defense ministry: Division SE I 3 in the strat- egy and deployment department, and division Pol II 1 in the policy department at BMVg, as

38 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 well as the department of futures research at Safety produce short studies on relevant secu- the Bundeswehr planning office deal with early rity policy topics. recognition and foresight in various scopes: SE I The department of futures research at the 3 with a time horizon of up to 18 months, Pol II 1 Bundeswehr planning office has been in exist- up to 5/10 years, and futures research until 2040. ence for 11 years. The fact that the Bundeswehr As of 2012, in the context of the Bunde- have the longest tradition in this field is simply swehr’s departmentally coordinated task pro- due to the extremely long planning cycle in the file for countries under observation, informa- military. It is all about long-term considera- tion from the media, military intelligence, and tions, so that signals can be better understood. other departments at first converges on SE I Strategic foresight in the Bundeswehr forces 3. In the process of assessment and consoli- begins broadly, but is application-oriented on dation, the relevant data is separated from the whole. In February 2017, the head of the the irrelevant. In addition to the risk situation (focus on military force, violent conflicts), as- Foresight experts point out that pects affecting Germany are considered too there is extensive foresight potential (e.g. potential risk to German citizens, facilities and interests, multilateral interests, regional in Germany, but it is hardly used aspects). Via “potential analyses,” the risks of role changes (from a partner to an enemy) are planning department at BMVg – Lieutenant also taken into account. Furthermore, inter- General (Generalleutnant) Erhard Bühler – for departmental and inter-sectoral expert talks the first time presented a long-term perspec- on crisis regions (e.g. Iraq) are held. These tive to 2040, titled “Strategic Foresight for the talks include non-governmental organizations German Armed Forces” (Strategische Voraus­ (NGOs). The findings from SE I 3 periodically schau für die Bundes­wehr). This describes pos- flow into the situation early warning system. sible developments as well as capabilities that Division Pol II 1 aims to foster the strategic will be needed in the future. capacity of the German federal government. Methods of futures research in the defense It looks at likely crisis areas of the future. The ministry are similar to those of CEW (e.g. Del- approach used now ranges from quantitative, phi method, scenario technique, road map- IT-assisted methods to qualitative analyses. A ping, future workshops). The department has “strategy and foresight” network was set up, an interdisciplinary orientation, with experts in which the following organizations, among in seven core areas, each with attached net- others, participate in regular thematic meet- works. Regular exchanges of views are es- ings: the new METIS institute at the university sential for a constant change of perspective. of the federal armed forces in Munich (Univer- These take place at conferences and in vari- sität der Bundeswehr München), the Bunde- ous networks with people from different spe- swehr planning office, the Bundeswehr Com- cialist fields, cultures and regions of the world. mand and Staff College (Führungsakademie Federal Foreign Office: Department “S” has der Bundeswehr), the university of the federal been growing since 2015. It deals with crisis armed forces in Hamburg (Universität der Bun- prevention, stabilization, post-conflict reha- deswehr Hamburg), various foundations (in- bilitation and humanitarian aid. Within the de- cluding the German Institute for International partment, two divisions are explicitly tasked and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und with taking a systematic look into the future: Politik, SWP), Bertelsmann Foundation, Kon- S06 with strategic foresight, and S04 with cri- rad Adenauer Foundation), the Federation sis early warning. of German Industries (Bundesverband der S04 has been developing a CEW toolkit since Deutschen Industrie, BDI), the German Trade 2016. This computer-assisted analytical system Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerk­ draws on 41 databases so far (e.g. World Bank, schaftsbund, DGB).6 In addition, the METIS in- SIPRI, weather services, media). It should be stitute and the Hamburg Institute for Maritime completed by the end of the year. Political, eco-

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nomic and social indicators include, for exam- departments in a cycle of 12 to 18 months. They ple, the status and protection of human rights, are intended to record the conflict structure of political and social participation, poverty rates, a country, identify escalation factors, take resil- migration pressure, price trends and economic ience factors into account too, and support pol- data, and social inequality including ethnic, re- icy-making. They are also made available to the ligious, and gender-specific indicators. German federal government in the “crisis pre- Findings are delivered to department “S” it- paredness information system” (Krisenvorsorge- self as well as to other recipients in the Federal informationssystem). Furthermore, the BND is- Foreign Office. An early warning working group sues twice-monthly “intelligence and warning” meets every four years. It represents all the key reports. These provide a basis for short-term foreign policy and security policy departments. early warning, but they are secret. German Federal Academy for Security Usually, the growing demands of day-to-day Policy (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspoli- work are so absorbing that little or no time is left for tik, BAKS): Since 2014, BAKS has served as a a systematic look into the future training and networking platform for strategic foresight. Whereas an estimated 200 different S06 delivers analyses of conflicts and actors, organizational units are engaged in futures alternative future scenarios and options for research, BAKS is tasked with promoting the action on an as-needed basis e.g. to country whole-of-government approach in this field. sections but also to embassies. Time horizons Heads of section from all departments partic- extend to several years. ipate in its methods seminars. Every year, the A so-called “Focal Point” for the responsibil- “Strategic Foresight in Practice” (Strategische ity to protect was set up in the Federal Foreign Vorausschau in der Praxis) network stages a Office in 2012, and subsequently assigned to conference and workshop day at BAKS, in part- department “S”. The German early warning nership with various ministries. This event is system for impending mass crimes is based on attended by dozens of foresight experts from available CEW tools such as reports by missions nearly all German federal ministries and sub- abroad, the UN and its special envoys, and CEW ordinate authorities, who meet to exchange reports from the BND and the new S04 division. experiences and research results. The Crisis Response Center (Krisenreak- When it comes to foresight, the ministries tionszentrum, KRZ) monitors and responds to are for the most part still set up in very differ- crises worldwide, to protect German citizens ent ways. Some still lack a dedicated organiza- in danger. Its task is not to prevent or provide tional unit, while at others this is already in the early warnings of political crises, but rather to development stages. Often only two or three make the best possible provisions in the event employees are available for the task. The fu- of a crisis by issuing travel warnings and plan- tures research department at the Bundeswehr ning protective measures and evacuation oper- planning office is unique in having a staff of ten. ations (crisis prevention and response in rela- A fundamental change in thinking can be tion to individuals). The various departmental observed on the part of the Bundeswehr when capabilities are assigned to the KRZ, includ- it comes to strategic foresight: previously, anal- ing the Technical Relief Service (Technisches yses and responses were geared to what was Hilfswerk, THW) and BKA negotiating group. presumed to be likely. But it is said to be better The KRZ is regarded as a good example of a first to look at the possibilities, then the risk po- clear understanding of existing capacities and tential, and only then the probability. capabilities. Crisis support teams assist contin- Foresight experts point out that there is ex- gency planning irrespective of location. tensive foresight potential in Germany, but it is German Federal Intelligence Service (BND): hardly used. One such example is the foresight Country-based CEW analyses are a key instru- enhancement work carried out over the last 25 ment of intelligence foresight. The BND produc- years by the Office of Technology Assessment es these analyses with assistance from other at the German Bundestag (Büro für Technikfol-

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genabschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag, and since 2009 in its environs. Over this time, TAB). Or in the German Federal Ministry of Ed- I have encountered many factors, constraints, ucation and Research (Bundesministerium für interests and mentalities that get in the way of Bildung und Forschung, BMBF), where it is re- or even block political attention and farsighted- ported that very many detailed foresight stud- ness, crisis sensitivity, strategic thinking – and ies on a wide range of policy areas are available hence the earlier action we are hoping to see. and accessible on the Internet. The familiar “Cassandra syndrome” de- On the level of crisis early warning, regular scribes a situation where truthful warnings communication takes place in the early warn- from competent persons acting in the common ing working group (Arbeitsgruppe (AG) Früh­ good are regularly ignored by incompetent de- erkennung) between the AA, BMVg, BMZ, German cision makers fixated on short-term advantage. Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministe- Yet this is an over-simplistic caricature. The re- rium des Inneren, BMI) and BKA at the levels of ality is rather more complicated. section head (quarterly) and department head • The double resource problem: foresight, stra- (every six months). The “Preventing Crises, Re- tegic thinking and early warning do not come solving Conflicts, Building Peace” guidelines for free; they require sufficient personnel, announce for the future an “inter-ministerial time, space, and money. Usually, in the min- crisis early warning meeting – horizon scanning” istries, the growing demands of day-to-day (“Ressortrunde Krisenfrüherkennung – Horizon work are so absorbing that little or no time Scanning”). This would convene as needed or is left for a systematic look into the future. at least every six months, to promote joint situa- When there is a permanent sense of urgency, tion assessments of potential crises. a sense for what is important can be lost. Recent years have brought a sharp increase • “Early action” requires options for action and in networking as well as dialog and education always implies the use of resources. These formats beyond ministerial boundaries, and are usually scarce, and less available in cases with the involvement of think tanks, founda- where there is no acute pressure to act. tions, associations etc. As a result, hitherto • Strategy weakness: For many years, primar- different understandings of foresight and ear- ily at the German Chancellery and Foreign ly warning may be brought into line with each Office, I experienced a downright defensive other, or at least made compatible. BAKS offers attitude to strategy developments. Some a central platform for this. justified the need for “driving by sight” by However, institutional locations for an in- referring to the runaway pace of change in ter-ministerial, integrated CEW and strategic international politics and the cost of devel- foresight system are evidently not yet in sight. oping an inter-ministerial strategy. This, they One can only suppose that this gap probably argued, was out of all proportion to the value makes it more difficult to take the desired “ear- of such a strategy in providing guidance. For lier, more resolute, more substantial” political other top politicians, strategy development action, especially with regard to operational evidently appeared to be an unacceptable and short-term crisis prevention. limitation on the freedom to act of “men who make history”. By contrast, the security policy The crux of it all: from the community has been calling for strategy de- analysis to the decision makers velopment, as a top priority, for many years. • Reachability of decision makers: political ac- The critical points are to be found in the trans- tors and decision makers generally have to fer from theory into the political practice of pol- deal with all kinds of topics, requirements, icy planners and decision makers in the execu- deadlines and interests on a daily basis. tive and legislature – in the gap between “early • Given this competition for attention, getting warning” and “early action.” through to them is always difficult – especially I have focused on international crisis man- for issues where there is no acute pressure to agement since 1994 in the German Bundestag act, but which might entail a slew of other tasks.

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• To reach decision makers, CEW is all the and those around them say that the decisive more dependent on the credibility of sourc- criterion determining some positions and ac- es (for example the International Crisis tions is that the boss is presented in a favora- Group), the relationships between analysts ble light. Prevented crises and conflicts are and decision makers, and on an orientation invisible successes, generally attracting little to the needs of decision makers. Warnings attention or merit. In terms of party tactics, a commitment to early warning and foresight is Where thinking for the not likely to bring much advantage. • Where hectic day-to-day politics prevail, as future is required, a two-person in sections of the German Bundestag, ear- ly warning, foresight and strategic thinking department is not much use have a particularly difficult time. So having the space and time for foresight and early should be as clear and specific as possible. warning is all the more important. In the Recommendations should not be seen as previous legislative period, the “civilian cri- completely unrealistic, as this would mean sis prevention” (Zivile Krisenprävention) sub- they could be dismissed. committee would spend the final half-hour • Individual and collective perceptual filters in of its meetings on less well-known conflict the form of suppression, refusing to believe, regions, as a way of drawing the German wishful thinking and denial of reality. During federal government’s attention to blind the German deployment in Afghanistan, I spots in CEW. Many country sections were found that perceptual filters of this kind were extremely grateful for this. particularly widespread. It was a sobering ex- perience: warnings rejected for years on end, Switching on the fog lamps spin doctoring, losing touch with reality, first development illusions, then illusions about It would be irresponsible to continue driving only withdrawal, and a rejection of impact analy- by sight into the thickening fog of the future. An ses that continues to this day. This was due intelligent autopilot is not available. But whatever to a combination of political interests (prior- guidance exists should be used in the best way itizing loyalty to the alliance and domestic possible and developed further. In this respect, opportunity), the lack of a “no-blame culture” Germany is a long way behind other countries. and defensive attitudes toward unpleasant • More common language, better dialog and a truths, but also excessive demands resulting foresight network of educational institutions from a highly complex conflict situation. in Germany are required. • In circles that disapprove of the military, there • The organizational units for foresight and CEW are patterns of perception which primarily fo- must be given the staffing and funding they cus on potential threats emanating from the need to work more effectively. They should be West. In these patterns, threats from other ac- more than just a token. Where thinking for the tors play almost no part – and hence neither future is required, a two-person department is does the challenge of averting dangers. not much use. • Across parties and actors, there is a pattern • Bodies that establish and foster links between of perception that sees only the faults of the the ministries should be supported. Common other, but not one’s own faults. Yet meaning- platforms for particular processes would be ful foresight and early warning absolutely useful. It is recommended that different per- depend on having a self-critical perspective. spectives should be brought in, e.g. compar- • Decision makers should be concerned with ing trend analyses across policy areas from the people, the issue at hand, and the common perspectives of different ministries. good. In reality, party and group interests, as • The German federal government’s guidelines well as personal career and power interests, on crisis prevention and peace building state are often involved too. Individual ministers more clearly than ever before: “The preven-

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tion of war and violence in international rela- prevention and peace building more effective. tions, the prevention of genocide and serious This appeals to and is in line with the beliefs of human rights violations [...] are fundamental most citizens, but that is not enough. principles of German governance” (translated • It also needs to be more politically worthwhile. from German).7 This categorical declaration The key here is that the policy area of crisis of the responsibility to protect should also prevention and peace building, which has tra- be reflected in its operationalization, starting ditionally been largely invisible, should finally with an effective early warning mechanism. It be made professionally more visible. Good is doubtful that the design of the existing Ger- news from this field should not continue to be man “Focal Point” for the responsibility to pro- knocked down by the bad news that suppos- tect is sufficient. edly has a higher news value. • I am aware that a large number of government reports appear periodically, and that they of- 1 German federal government (2016): White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. ten receive only minimal attention in the Bun- Berlin, p. 50. destag, as a formality. Nevertheless, an annual 2 Ibid., p. 57. foresight report following the Finnish exam- 3 German federal government (2017): Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern. Leitlinien der 8 ple that had to be debated in by the Bundes­ Bundesregierung. Berlin, p. 111. tag would be an important step – as a bridge 4 Ibid., p. 150. from the important foresight community to 5 To deepen the topic, I recommend two articles from the daily press: Münkler, Herfried (2018): “Regieren wird sehr the political sphere and the public. viel schwieriger werden.” In: Frankfurter Allgemeine • However, any such reporting would have to Zeitung, January 12, 2018; Seliger, Marco (2018): “Vorher wissen, wo es knallt.” In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, be accompanied by a certain degree of cul- February 15, 2018. tural change: it has to be possible to openly 6 One particularly innovative project affiliated to this mention unpleasant events. In the case of the network that I learned about at a presentation is “CEW through literature” (KFE durch Literatur). Inspired by annual report by the parliamentary commis- Nigerian Nobel Prize in Literature winner Wole Soyinka, sioner for the armed forces (Wehrbeauftragter the project is producing a “mapping of emotions.” des Deutschen Bundestages), this has been ac- 7 German federal government (2017): Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern. Leitlinien der cepted practice for years. Bundesregierung. Berlin, p. 47. • Foresight and crisis early warning, especially 8 See http://vnk.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/ by state institutions for hazard prevention, are hallituksen-tulevaisuusselonteon-1-osa-jaettu-­ ­­ ymmarrys-tyon-murroksesta [accessed June 5, 2018]. naturally focused on risk and threat factors, 9 National Intelligence Council: “Global Trends – Paradox and worst-case scenarios. This is as necessary of Progress.” https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/ as it is potentially dangerous. Especially as it GT-Full-Report.pdf [accessed May 25, 2018]. looks today, the future might frighten people. The “Paradox of Progress” study by the U.S. National Intelligence Council9 illustrates this with its five global megatrends: the moun- The Author tains of problems keep growing, the paths to Winfried Nachtwei was born in 1946. After completing conquering them are hardly visible. Reactions military service and studying, he worked as a teacher in such as anxiety about the future, suppression Dülmen from 1977 to 1994. From 1994 until 2009, he was and flight are only natural. a Member of the German Bundes­tag; from 2002 he was • So as not to inadvertently stir up a sense of security and defense spokesman for the Green party. He hopelessness about the future, and not only is co-chair of the advisory panel for civil crisis prevention to prevent crises but also build peace and give at the German Foreign Office, a member of the advisory justified encouragement, foresight and CEW panel for Innere Führung (leadership development and also need a systematic view of opportunities civic education) at the German Federal Ministry of Defense and of constructive approaches, processes, (BMVg), a director of the United Nations Association of and actors. “Seek the peace” applies here too. Germany, a member of the “Just Peace” working group at the German Commission • Early warning and foresight should make Justitia et Pax, and a member of the advisory board of Katholische Friedensstiftung. In German contributions to international crisis 2015, he headed the “G36 im Einsatz” commission. www.nachtwei.de

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 43 THE NEW

UNPREDICTABILITY Author: James D. Bindenagel WHY GERMANY NEEDS The national interest or raison d’état of the Fed- A SECURITY STRATEGY eral Republic of Germany derives from the duty to respect and protect human dignity which is set down in Article 1 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG). At the present time, the global and security policy context in which this principle applies is once again going through an upheaval. With rapidly advancing technological progress, the history of warfare is once more on the threshold of a new chapter: between Rus- sian aggression, Chinese nationalism, and con- tinuing unrest in the Middle East, the conditions and demands of modern warfare are currently experiencing fundamental change. Weapons systems are spreading rapidly, non-state actors are increasingly in possession of highly ad- vanced weapons such as anti-tank missiles and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, and the diffusion of information technologies is chang- ing public transparency as well as the conduct of military operations. Thus, with the digital revo- Abstract lution and robot technology powering technical innovations in weapons development and high- Technological advances will have a considerable influence on ly advanced weapons and information systems future warfare. According to James D. Bindenagel, meanwhile, spreading massively on a global scale, methods and principles of military engagement are un- contrary to many hopes, it is already becoming clear that the use of dergoing a fundamental upheaval. robots and artificial intelligence will by no means reduce the risk New technological trends of course bring a of escalation in armed conflicts. On the modern battlefield, military whole array of new challenges. This is particu- conflicts will still be characterized by the tendency toward extremes larly true of drones, which have been the focus (von Clausewitz). As a result, modern warfare with its high-tech of many debates on the future of military inter- tools threatens to become “even bloodier, more ethically problematic, ventions. The advantages of unmanned combat and generally more unpredictable.” On top of this comes the steadily equipment are undeniable – such as compara- increasing com­plexity of international relations in the 21st century. tively low costs, the reduced risk to troops, and In particular, there is an ever-widening gap between traditional inter- the possibility for targeted and therefore often national humanitarian law and the possible applications of modern highly efficient intervention. It is not for nothing war technologies. Closing this gap now is essential to minimize legal that the new generation of military robot tech- ­challenges and ethical grey areas, and at the same time enable an nology is seen by many as a natural develop- effective response to security threats. ment of all previous military technologies. Hence there is an urgent need for a long-term, coherent security strategy – which has been lacking for many years in Germany. Part- Between technical ly also in view of the new isolationism of the Trump administration, problems, legal challenges, the author sees Germany as the “political and geographic heart of and ethical grey areas Europe.” As such, the country has a duty to lead the EU with a strate- Nevertheless, unmanned combat systems – and gy of this kind, based on the broadest possible consensus. This would particularly what is called “targeted killing” – are give national and international prominence to the raison d’état of the perhaps some of the most problematic aspects Federal Republic of Germany: to respect and protect human dignity. of modern military conflict. The new technolo-

44 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 gies entail a large number of problems: strategic ders? How can legal responsibility for drones dangers of alienating local civilian populations and partially autonomous weapons systems be and allied governments; troops’ lack of trust in regulated? When and to what extent could “tar- unmanned aerial support, as recently investigat- geted killing” be justified, considering that it cur- ed in depth by Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia rently exists outside of any legal norm? And who Macdonald; the fact that the physical distance is involved in the decision-making process re- from the battlefield increases the odds for- er garding the deployment, legitimacy, and scope rors in judgement; and collateral damage due of transnational drone strikes? These and many to the lack of an overview of the situation on other questions lead to considerable uncertain- the ground.1 While these and similar challenges ty regarding the immediate future and carry are mainly of practical, technical, and strategic extensive implications for global security policy concern, perhaps the most important challenge and military intervention. with regard to unmanned combat equipment and new weapons systems lies elsewhere: in the Foreign policy strategy in the question of the attribution of responsibility, their complexity of the 21st century status under international law, and the basic le- gal frameworks for the use of new, highly tech- In sum, therefore, the development of new nologized combat systems. weapons, combined with changed threat sce- Thus, for example, the edited volume Drones narios, is a huge contributing factor in making and the Future of Armed Conflict by David Cor- the international security environment even tright, Rachel Fairhurst, and Kristen Wall,2 or more complex. Charting a course in global se- Avery Plaw’s comprehensive analysis The Drone curity becomes even more unpredictable. For Debate,3 provide a detailed overview of the com- Germany, this means one thing above all: as plex legal, strategic, and ethical issues posed by the new technologies. Together with other The emerging depersonalization of developments such as partially autonomous weapons systems, the emerging depersonali- military intervention creates considerable zation of military intervention caused by drones and robot technology creates considerable legal legal uncertainties and ethical dilemma uncertainties and ethical dilemma. In particular, questions of responsibility, legislative compe- the geopolitical situation becomes more un- tences, and the applicability of current legisla- predictable, including as a result of changing tion regulating military deployments become technological conditions, current German for- increasingly diffuse. eign policy looks increasingly inadequate. It In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Paul Scharre is largely characterized by a case-by-case ap- argues that drones and robot deployments will proach, and often seems to be shaped more decisively shape the future, despite their con- by improvisation than by coherent strategic siderable limitations, and that the development thinking. The future of warfare brings entirely of better drones will solve most of the problems new challenges – and Germany, too, will have they cause.4 Yet progress on a technological lev- no choice but to prepare for them. In order to el will not solve the massive legal and ethical effectively address the growing complexity of issues. Indeed, the urgency of the many new security policy issues, a long-term, overarch- questions raised in strategic, legal, and human- ing security strategy is now urgently needed. itarian respects, as well as in respect of interna- The struggle against ISIS clearly illustrates tional law, tends to increase still further as new the relevance of this issue. Aside from the weapons systems become more sophisticated: development of new weapons systems and What implications result from the dissolution of drone technology, it challenges conventional war zone boundaries due to the geographical security strategies in a completely different displacement of attacks, and the fact that they way. With ISIS being a non-state actor, nation- are carried out across multiple national bor- al borders lose all significance. As a result,

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 45 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT: A BROADER VISION, FEWER CRISES?

legal frameworks designed for the legitimi- Overcoming security zation of counter-attacks and the right to de- policy deficiencies for a fense intended for nation states, such as en- long-term strategy visioned by the UN convention, are no longer fully applicable. Faced with a threat situation All of these aspects should be integrated into a that has fundamentally changed, state actors long-term, overarching security policy approach. respond by changing their tactics and devel- Of course the various challenges of one kind or oping new military instruments. But in so do- another which result from technological advanc- ing, they encounter many kinds of legal and es and new, highly technologized warfare will strategic uncertainties. Thus the fight against hardly decrease in the medium to long term. The international terrorism makes it all the more future of military conflicts looks different than clear that existing legal frameworks and prin- the past, and we will have to adapt to the chang- ciples of international military intervention es. In order to deal with increasing uncertainty in are no longer sufficient to maintain modern security policy and unforeseen developments, security requirements. including those resulting from new weapons and technologies, Germany needs to take a strategic look into the future. Since the German Federal Germany needs to overcome Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) security policy incoherencies between ruling of July 12, 1994, the Federal Republic of Germany is able to send troops outside of NATO political elites and the broad public territory, provided there is a mandate from the German Bundestag. In the present-day context The changing character of international of a changed technological situation and a new conflicts, which goes hand in hand with the security environment, it is now up to the Bundes­ use of new technologies, means there is an tag to define political principles with regard to urgent need for a corresponding national and future German military engagement, in accord- international debate. A new, more stable legal ance with Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law. framework is necessary to counter a combi- To manage new challenges, a long-term stra- nation of challenges at the crossroads of ag- tegic approach is necessary. But before this gression through non-state actors on the one goal can be achieved, massive gaps in German hand and the use of new, in part highly am- strategic culture need to be closed. Therefore, bivalent technologies on the other hand. To the Federal Republic will have to pursue a dual arrive at such a framework, firstly the issue of strategy: firstly, Germany needs to overcome proliferation and the creation of internation- security policy incoherencies between politi- al treaties to limit the development of weap- cal elites and the broad public in order to es- ons systems such as cluster bombs should be tablish a workable consensus across society. discussed in depth. The new weapons pose While leading politicians emphasize Germany’s ethical and humanitarian dilemmas that need international responsibility, for example, nearly to be taken seriously. At the present time, it is seventy per cent of Germans do not know why impossible to predict the full extent of pos- the Federal Republic is involved in the mission sible consequences that the new weapons in Mali.5 Secondly, a comprehensive exchange technologies might entail. For these reasons, of expertise needs to take place at a national there is an urgent need to modify internation- level. To achieve this aim, it would be neces- al humanitarian law with a view to the future sary to bundle academic insights from foreign of global warfare. On the other hand, as part of policy and security analysts with the resources a forward-looking security policy debate, the of the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany changing threats need to be recognized, and (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), the German Federal new military instruments and technologies for Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, combating these threats need to be taken into BND) and other relevant institutions and inter- account. link these with ministries as well as the German

46 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt, BKAmt). Such grey areas. Above all, new technologies will be a format would then enable strategies for the another uncertainty factor when it comes to as- future to be developed to address numerous sessing international threats and formulating issues – from Chinese and Russian aggression, national security strategies. At the present time, structural change in Africa, and nuclear prolifer- it is impossible to predict the full consequences ation, to Iran and the MENA region. At the same time, a long-term security policy of this kind Technological progress will not transform should be closely oriented towards Europe- an security initiatives. It could, for example, be modern warfare into a clean, unproblematic, linked to the European Defence Fund or Perma- and low-risk engineering exercise nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

No overall European of these technological developments. Hence it is security strategy without a all the more important to keep their future stra- German strategy tegic implications in sight. To respond to these changing circumstances and deal effectively with In the era of Trump’s isolationist policies and the resulting challenges, Germany and Europe increasing indifference toward Europe on the urgently need an overarching, coherent, and part of its traditionally most important ally, the forward-looking security strategy based on Arti- EU can only develop a coherent security and de- cle 1 of the Basic Law which will enable flexible fense policy if Germany – the political and geo­ responses to complex and ever-evolving threats. graphic heart of Europe – first produces a clear strategy in this regard. Without a clear German 1 Schneider, Jacquelyn/Macdonald, Julia (2017): “Why Troops Don’t Trust Drones. The ‘Warm Fuzzy’ direction in security policy, PESCO is doomed Problem”. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ to fail. The European Defence Fund would only united-states/2017-12-20/why-troops-dont-trust-drones be usable to finance marginal capacities. French [accessed June 5, 2018]. 2 Cortright, David/Fairhurst, Rachel/Wall, Kristen intervention forces would be likely to continue (eds.) (2015): Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict. to act autonomously in the future, without inte- Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications. Chicago. gration into ­European structures. Europe would 3 Plaw, Avery (2016): The Drone Debate. A Primer on the U.S. Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside of Conventional become even more unsteady. Battlefields. Lanham, Boulder, New York. Germany must now adopt a clear position 4 Scharre, Paul/Schneider, Jacquelyn/Macdonald, Julia (2018): “Why Drones are Still the Future of War. Troops within European structures, assume responsibil- will Learn to Trust Them.” https://www.foreignaffairs. ity, and take a leading role by the side of its Eu- com/articles/united-states/2018-02-15/why-drones-are- ropean partners. To succeed here, the country still-future-war [accessed June 5, 2018]. 5 Körber Stiftung (2017): “The Berlin Pulse. German requires a courageous strategic vision of main- Foreign Policy in Perspective.” https://www.koerber-­ taining democracy, peace, and prosperity in Eu- stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/ rope. Germany now needs a national security redaktion/berliner-forum-aussenpolitik/pdf/2017/ The-Berlin-Pulse.pdf [accessed June 5, 2018]. strategy that can build on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. To this end, national interests and potential threats as well as means The Author and instruments of protection have to be iden- James D. Bindenagel looks back on 30 years of expe- tified. The German federal government’s 2016 rience in the diplomatic service of the United States of White Paper took the first steps in this direction. America. From 1996 to 1997 he was U.S. Ambassador to Technological progress will not transform Germany. An authoritative diplomat, he has negotiated modern warfare into a clean, unproblematic, and the compensations for forced workers during the Nazi low-risk engineering exercise. In all likelihood, it Regime, the Washington Principles on Nazi Confiscat- will tend to make war even bloodier, more ethi- ed Art and the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, cally problematic, and generally more unpredict- in order to prevent “conflict diamonds.” James D. Binde- able. The use of robots and artificial intelligence nagel was deputy head of an American think tank and in particular will create more ethical and legal vice president of the DePaul University in Chicago.

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 47 BEYOND READING

TEA LEAVES of passengers on board, for example. From the FORESIGHT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF designers’ and engineers’ point of view, based on their calculations, it was totally inconceiv- MODERN CRISIS PREVENTION able that the ship could sink. In the context of strategic foresight, this phenomenon is called cognitive dissonance or distorted perception. Foresight processes allow the systematic iden- tification of groupthink – which was the case here – as well as wrong assumptions, perceptual filters and thought-traps.

What does that mean for security policy in the 21st century? To what extent can strategic foresight help us prepare better for crises and disasters? Dr. Reez, you are the foresight officer at the Today, of course, it is no longer sufficient to German Federal Academy for Security Policy. “drive by sight.” As a result of political and social What in your view are the characteristic fea- challenges that never existed before, such as the tures of strategic foresight? pervasive digitalization of our lives (ubiquitous As the name suggests, strategic foresight is about computing), early warning and foresight require vision, watchfulness, and thinking ahead. “Cau- other methods. It is definitely not enough any- tion” is a word that also belongs to this semantic more to send a sailor up to the lookout with a field. The best way to illustrate the character- set of binoculars – so to speak – to keep watch istic features of strategic foresight – and hence for icebergs. To put it in clear terms, we need its benefits – is with a story. I am sure you know practical quantitative and qualitative methods the famous scene in the movie TITANIC, when and techniques of strategic foresight. A new kind the camera pans from the sailors’ lookout – the of “crow’s nest” for states is needed. Interesting- “crow’s nest” as it is called – across the starry Arc- ly, back in the 1980s, the renowned systems re- tic night sky, to show us giant icebergs looming searcher Niklas Luhmann once referred to him- behind wisps of fog. The story of the Titanic – the self as an “observer in the crow’s nest”. This is biggest shipping disaster in recent history – has very accurate and highly topical: today we need many lessons to teach us about foresight. First- a systematically developed early warning sys- ly, you can only see about one-seventh of the tem, a “new type of crow’s nest”, that facilitates iceberg – the rest is not visible since it is below and sustainably supports anticipatory govern- the water line. The question is: How big is the ance. This is because today we have to deal with iceberg? In a figurative sense, this is exactly the different, complex problems (known as “wicked question at the core of foresight processes: What problems”). To stay with the iceberg metaphor: is in store for us? What does the uncertain future the iceberg is constantly turning – so quickly that look like, that we can see only in outline (so- we cannot measure its proportions at any given called “weak signals”)? What should we prepare time. ourselves for? Could you explain that in more detail? What And what other lessons can the Titanic case exactly is the difficulty for crisis prevention to- teach us? day? The second reason why the tragedy of the Titan- Social scientists and crisis researchers use the ic is instructive is because it has been shown that term “dynaxity” (dynamic complexity) and talk fatal false assumptions caused the disaster. The about a VUCA world (volatile, uncertain, com- ship’s engineers were completely convinced that plex, ambiguous). This underlines the point that the luxury liner was “unsinkable.” That is why not crisis preparedness and crisis prevention are no enough lifeboats were provided for the number longer only a matter of classical cause-effect re-

48 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 lationships. What we see instead are surprising best sense), day-to-day operations in organiza- and unforeseen domino and cascade eff ects tions and institutions degenerate into piecemeal as a result of state interventions, for example in dealing and muddling through. measures to prevent global warming, interna- tional migration or urbanization. In other words, So, in your view, what specifi cally should be to cope with new pressures, states have to de- done? velop their “sensors” and tools. I believe that I think an action program divided into fi ve main foresight capacity building is now an imperative task areas would be useful and possible: capac- for state institutions, because strategic foresight ity building at the level of the German federal off ers precisely such a toolkit. It goes beyond government, transfer of practical expertise to and complements classical planning, taking current leaders, creating additional higher edu- potential problem situations and possible cation study opportunities, expanding network solutions into account at an early stage. Eckard activities and educational work, and quality as- Minx rightly talks about “Denken auf Vorrat” (i.e. surance in practice. In this context, it would be thinking ahead and making provisions for a wide important to cultivate practical foresight work range of possible future scenarios). In the world while maintaining standards and quality criteria, of strategic foresight thinking, surprising events and prevent one-sided methodological devel- and disruptive trends are called “wild cards” opment toward quantitative methods – which or “black swans.” Conceivable scenarios of this are referred to as “AI oracles.” kind should serve as a stimulus and a challenge: we should systematically analyze these possibil- A foresight-based national early recognition ities and their social consequences in advance, and early warning system, such as you de- so that timely provisions can be made. With re- scribe, will not be set up overnight... gard to responsible security precautions by the Strategic foresight does indeed require a certain state, developing an integrated strategic fore- strategic culture. But skepticism toward these sight system is now a condicio sine qua non. tools should decrease as the willingness even to engage with such decision-preparation pro- There is nothing wrong with thinking ahead cesses increases. This could happen quickly if and making provisions. But how would you re- there is a growing conviction that it makes sense spond to those who say that strategic foresight in principle to establish a new crow’s nest func- is much like reading tea leaves, and has little tion in the government departments – in other practical relevance? words, that it is the expression of political pru- Foresight processes are structured commu- dence in the 21st century to use the instruments nication processes, whether they are future of strategic foresight. workshops, scenario analyses, Delphi meet- ings, SWOT analyses or roadmaps. Ultimately Dr. Reez, thank you very much for the interview! the question is always: What specifi cally should be done, what action should be taken? In this respect, foresight has little in common with Norbert Reez is domestic policy advisor and foresight reading tea leaves, fortune telling or having your officer at the German Federal Academy for Security head in the clouds. Unfortunately this prejudice Policy (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, BAKS) is very hard to eliminate. So too, by the way, is in Berlin. Previously he worked in law enforcement the much quoted and popular bon mot: “Peo- with the German Federal Police and as department head ple who have visions should go see a doctor.” at the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Visioning is actually a widely acknowledged, se- Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz rious method of normative futures research. The und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) in Bonn. At the same goal is to develop positive visions of the future time, he was project manager in the LÜKEX national that can provide orientation and guide action crisis management exercise series. Norbert Reez holds for problem-solving and the realignment of or- a doctorate in law and a degree in criminology. He studied in Saarbrücken, Mainz, ganizations. Without such visionary ideas (in the Speyer, Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg and Dijon (France).

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 49 THE CITIZEN IN

UNIFORM, NOW AND By “thinking for the future” in this way, we aim to anticipate better, recognize earlier, IN THE FUTURE and interpret in more detail. We want to be sufficiently prepared, for both crises and un- A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE expected events, which certainly may change the fundamental situation. In this context, the term “black swans” is used – referring not only to the extraordi- nary and significant zoological beings, but by extension to extremely rare and at the same time rarely extreme events. These are events that people do not want to imagine happening, but which do occur nonetheless. Ultimately, distorted perceptions, selective attention, and suppression of undesired sce- Author: Joachim Rühle narios are not what we need when it comes to preparing the armed forces appropriately for different futures – and not just in terms “The most curious thing about the future is that of hardware. then our own time will be described as the good old times.” Technological megatrends Ernest Hemingway Autonomization, digital transformation, and It is hard to say, today, whether future gen- hybridization will continue to bring signifi- erations will look back romantically on the cant changes in the years ahead, not only for current situation our world is in, and call it the German armed forces. As a result, these the “good old times.” But one thing is cer- armed forces will themselves have to change tain: in the here and now, we have a duty to significantly. think about our future. This is not a question At this point, let us just mention some of gazing into a crystal ball, or reading tea keywords: virtually limitless networking, big leaves, or indeed making expectant visits to data, human enhancement, progressive op- an oracle – even if military commanders of timization of the individual, #HomoDigitalis, yore set great store by their predictions. grey areas between the virtual and the real Modern, resilient armed forces depend on world, the (apparent) perfection of informa- long-term, forward-thinking security planning. tion, cognition, and communication technol- But this is not to claim that strategic fore- ogy. These current trends are accompanied sight in the German armed forces is able to and consequently accelerated by demo- predict what will happen 15 or 20 years from graphic change that offers little scope for now. Rather, it is a case of systematically interpretation. A change in recruitment prac- recording a wide variety of possible future tice is therefore absolutely necessary. scenarios, as well as pointing out the conse- In addition to the planning implications for quences with regard to our range of actions the armed forces that this kaleidoscope pre- and capabilities. sents, it is important not to lose sight of one The goal of strategic foresight, therefore, crucial aspect: the future place of the citizen is to identify plausible developments and to in uniform. consider them on equal terms, side by side. In future, the German armed forces will It is not to attempt to specify probabilities of continue to offer policy-makers an appropri- occurrence, as ultimately this only opens the ate range of options for military action: glob- door to pointless speculation, devoid of all ally, in NATO, in the EU, under the umbrella substance. of the United Nations, and in coalitions. They

50 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 will do this with significant troop strength the armed forces. This role is set to increase and a broad capability profile, while playing even further. Command systems will be bet- a part in the country’s overall security pre- ter and faster at handling the sometimes cautions, as well as in prevention, protection, diffuse flow of information, and they will re- deterrence, and international crisis manage- duce the complexity of its presentation. ment. But we should be careful: command sys- But rapid rates of change, the speed and tems and digital situation maps show only complexity of operations, the mere existence a pseudo-reality. For the foreseeable future, of the “irrational,” and potential enemies who total information and total control will re- obey different rules are placing greater de- main purely in the realm of wishful think- mands on people than ever before: on their ing. They cannot relieve the military leader ability to anticipate, on their conscience as a moral authority, on their personal persua- We are faced with technological siveness, and on their ability to make sound judgments and decisions “in the fog of the developments that not only open up oppor­ unknown,” as well as based on their feel for the situation – which algorithms and formal tunities, but also create temptations logic lack even a rudimentary capacity to provide. of her or his responsibility, since leading by mission means taking on precisely this Leading by mission responsibility. There are two basic ways (Führen mit Auftrag) that this can be done. One is to decide everything yourself. The second is to dele- We are faced with technological develop- gate, but without giving up overall respon- ments that not only open up opportunities, sibility. This is exactly what mission-related but also create temptations. For precisely tactics require. this reason, it is vital to draw clear bounda- Whenever personal responsibility be- ries to protect the essential core of our prov- comes diffuse, clear rules have to be put in en concept of Innere Führung (leadership place. Our proven understanding of leader- development and civic education). ship is based on the indivisible responsibil- One thing is certain: Innere Führung and ity of the military leader, and on the recog- Führen mit Auftrag are two sides of the same nition of his or her conscience as a moral coin. authority. Despite all technological capabil- Judging the effects of one’s own actions ities, this responsibility may never be given always requires thinking beyond one’s im- up. Difficulties always arise when decisions mediate area of responsibility. are taken across command levels on the The key elements of mission-type tactics basis of supposedly better situational over- (Auftragstaktik) are the freedom to act and views. Interfering with the freedom to act to delegate as well as to accept that respon- of those who are led destroys mutual trust. sibility, a reasonable tolerance of errors, Therefore, command systems must never and the overwhelming importance of the be an end in themselves, and “leapfrogging” commander’s intent for intellectual interac- orders across command levels should be tion between superiors and those they lead. the exception. Our armed forces owe their existence to Only the soldiers on the ground have a this leadership principle, despite – or per- feel for the situation and can choose a suit- haps because of – a sometimes difficult en- able method of implementation within a vironment. It has proven particularly effec- defined scope of action. For this reason, we tive in overseas deployments and missions. have a continuing need for well-educated, Command technology and information creative, decisive, and ethically confident technology rightly play a prominent role in women and men. Anyone who thinks mili-

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 51 tary decisions can be automated and made of leadership. The necessary preconditions without risks is mistaken. for this are similarly uniform values, clearly Mathematical algorithms and the systems defined and internalized tolerances, and a based on them cannot reproduce ethics, clearly stated claim to leadership, education, and training. These will continue to be the Agreement in terms of concepts and fundamental pillars of the citizen in uniform in the future as well. actions is an essential requirement for a Not only do our soldiers have a right to ­expect this, but so do our society and parlia- uniform understanding of leadership ment, in whose name and on whose behalf they act. Our self-determination based on our morality, and a gut feeling which is not al- common values, must remain a constant in ways merely rational. Yet extreme situations whatever futures we imagine. in ever more complex deployment scenarios demand that tactical decisions taken under time pressure and pressure to act stand up to moral and ethical scrutiny. This is ex- tremely challenging – and it is something that only humans can do.

Drawing boundaries

Autonomous systems must therefore never be given complete freedom of action. Tensions arise here that need to be resolved. It is im- portant not to close ourselves off from tech- nological and social developments – but at the same time we should define our own clear rules. In terms of their values, standards, cultures, and origins, future generations of soldiers are becoming more diverse. As a result, it will be- come ever harder to reach agreement in terms of concepts and actions. Yet this is an essen- tial requirement for a uniform understanding The Author Vice Admiral Joachim Rühle became Vice Chief of Defense of the German armed forces in 2017. Follow- ing assignments on various sea-going units, in 2005 he became commander of Task Group SEF (Standard­ Einsatzausbildungsverband Flotte/Fleet Standard Operational Training Force), and in 2010 Director of the Knowledge Management Directorate at the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples. From 2012 to 2014, he was Director-General for Planning at the German Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg), during which time he also served as acting head of the Directorate-General­ for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service ­Support. From 2014 to 2017, he held the post of Director-General for Personnel.

52 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 Dr. Dr. Fischer, strategic foresight focusses on plausible future developments and sce- “HUMAN EXISTENCE narios. What does this mean for military medicine, and what particular challenge SHALL NOT BE comes to your mind? In military medicine, I consider the question CHANGED WITHOUT of human enhancement as crucial. As in civil life we get more and more confronted with different forms of optimization and enhance- REFLECTION” ment of the human being in the military. A well-known example might be the call for neuroenhancement, which is today a phar- macological improvement of psychological skills and vigilance in particular. Beside this, there is a number of non-pharmacological techniques to be found which allow to im- prove the soldiers’ capacities in nearly every human sphere. Think of exoskeletons, deep brain stimulation or brain-machine-inter- originally does not have as a member of the faces. To develop future scenarios with re- species homo sapiens. gard to human optimization and human en- hancement is an important task for military What might be the consequence of human medical ethics. enhancement as you defined before? Apart from the discussion on human en- Do you see a difference between optimiza- hancement in the transhumanism debate, tion and enhancement? which I do not like to comment on right In my opinion it is very important to differen- here, human enhancement as an invasive tiate techniques helping to support natural- technique will lead to a challenge not only ly given skills from those which implement a for the individual human being, but also for new trait. The latter might be characterized society in general. Though the development as an invasive technique. Based on this idea of enhancement techniques seems to be I propose the following definition: human important from the point of view of military enhancement means the invention and ap- necessity, a fundamental change of human plication of invasive technical methods and existence has to be a line which shall not tools to surpass qualitatively any natural giv- be crossed without further reflection. Think en limit of human beings who thereby enter of the consequences the development of a a new stage of existence. After having taking posthuman super-soldier might have on the up a method or tool of human enhancement law of armed conflict as we know it today being human means something different and its underlying human ethos. Though I than before. am not capable to line out the characteris- tics of the development of enhancing tech- Does this mean that applying those meth- niques to come, I am deeply convinced that ods challenges our self-understanding as this topic will preoccupy us tremendously in human beings? the future, and therefore should be part of It certainly does. What is brought to our strategic foresight. mind here in a very impressive way is noth- ing less than the question of what it means Is this topic already part of the military to be a human being. Natural given limits medical ethical debate? in this context do not refer to quantitative, Over the last few years the question of hu- but qualitative traits, that is to say skills man man enhancement has become more and

ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 53 more important. An enormous amount of research is done all over the world to profit from this development, particularly in mili- tary scenarios. The role military medical per- sonnel have to face in this context still needs to be defined. As they are obliged to serve humanity, they will raise their voice in any case where a human being is at stake. Along with other institutions, at the Teaching and Research Unit for Military Medical Ethics at the Military Medical Academy in Munich we stress the need for further reflection on human enhancement and improve the re- search on this topic.

Dr. Dr. Fischer, thank you very much for the interview!

Dr. Dr. Rupert Dirk Fischer studied medicine, ­philosophy and catholic theology and gained a doctoral degree in medicine and catholic theology. He serves as spiritual director at the Herzogliche Georgianum in Munich, medical ethics consultant in the medical service of the Bundeswehr as well as head of the Teaching and Research Unit for Military Medical Ethics at the Bundeswehr Medical Academy in Munich.

54 ETHICS AND ARMED FORCES 01/18 PREVIEW / FULL ISSUES

The forthcoming issue Full issues of „Ethics and Armed Forces“ „Ethics and Armed Forces“ will examine the question: Are we on the way to a European se- 2017 Terror – The Fear Profiteers curity policy and an “army of Europeans?” Date 2016 Global Warriors? Soldiers and the Val- of publication: December 1, 2018 ue of Innere Führung 2015/2 Hybrid Warfare – Enemies at a Loss? 2015/1 Saving the Enemy? Military Medical Personnel Under Fire 2014/2 Cyberwar: the digital front – An Attack on Freedom and Democracy? 2014/1 Anonymous Killing by New Technolo- gies? The Soldier Between Conscience and Machine IMPRINT The e-journal “Ethics and Armed Forces” (ISSN Service provider as the legal entity 2199-4137) is a free-of-charge, non-commer- of Zentrum für ethische Bildung in cial, digital publication containing journalistic den Streitkräften – zebis: and editorial content. Katholische Soldatenseelsorge (KS) It is produced by Legal form Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den Public law institution Streitkräften – zebis Herrengraben 4 Supervision 20459 Hamburg Catholic military bishop for the German Germany armed forces (Bundeswehr) Director of zebis: Dr. Veronika Bock Am Weidendamm 2 10117 Berlin Germany Editorial Team Jan Peter Gülden Authorized board of directors Rüdiger Frank of KS: Leitender Militärdekan Person responsible for content Msgr. Wolfgang Schilk pursuant to section 55 (2) of the Am Weidendamm 2 German Interstate Broadcasting 10117 Berlin Agreement (Rundfunkstaats­ vertrag, RStV): Diplom-Kaufmann Wolfgang Wurmb Dr. Veronika Bock Am Weidendamm 2 Herrengraben 4 10117 Berlin 20459 Hamburg Contakt KS: Contact: Phone: +49(0)30 - 20 617 - 500 Phone: +49 (0)40 67 08 59-51 Fax: +49(0)30 - 20 617 - 599 Fax: +49 (0)40 67 08 59-30 [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Date of publication: June 15,2018

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