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IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS IRAQ AT IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS Iraq at a crossroads ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 5 Karim Hauser Daesh, a long decade of Sunni Arab alienation in Iraq and the Middle East ........................................................ 9 Myriam Benraad Iraq after ISIS: Shia militancy and Iranian influence ................................................................................................................... 17 Hayder al-Khoei The Kurdish question and the fight against Islamic State ........................................................................................................ 25 Wladimir van Wilgenburg Iranian policy towards post-Saddam Iraq ................................................................................................................................................... 35 Mohammad Ali Shabani Daesh in Syria: major potential for expansion ...................................................................................................................................... 43 Fabrice Balanche Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq ................................................................................................................................................................ 51 Nur Cetinoglu Harunoglu Bombing from behind? An assessment of US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL .............................................................................. 61 Jean-Loup Samaan The EU’s diverging strategy for a changing Iraq ................................................................................................................................ 69 Oz Hassan The humanitarian disaster in Iraq: beyond the atrocities of Daesh ............................................................................... 77 Pedro Rojo IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS Beware; for I am fearless, and therefore powerful. —Mary Shelley, Frankenstein ack in December 2014, Casa Árabe and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung held the seminar Iraq at a crossroads, with the participation of a heterogeneous group of Middle East Banalysts and observers. A year before we had organized, with the participation of FRIDE, another important seminar on the state of affairs in Syria. It is clear that both countries have had their fates sealed by the dismemberment of state institutions and the power vacuum spurred by autocratic rule and badly planned foreign interventions. A pause is needed to reflect upon the major mistakes of the 2003 US-led invasion and its aftermath: the marginalization of Sunni Arabs, the failure to “win hearts and minds” (George W. Bush dixit) and the collapse of Iraq as a nation-state however artificial its colonial origins and binding might have been. Enter the rise of violent jihadism, Al-Qaida and its newest brethren Islamic State (Daesh, ISIL, ISIS or simply IS): a non-state actor which wraps Iraq and Syria in its utopian political project, a pseudo-caliphate that embraces Iraq and the Levant with savage and post-modern methods and an ability to attract, absorb and transform new members. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014 and the self-proclamation of the IS caliphate, the situation has become more alarming than ever. The forces that are playing and redrawing the lines in the sand will remain in Iraq and Syria for years to come, if not decades. The international order inherited from the First World War is all but history. Neighbors such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are – and should be – extremely wary of IS expansion. Lebanon is also in the eye of the storm. The profusion of non-state actors is mind-boggling, just like their complex relations with Gulf countries, Russia, the US and Iran, to name Karim Hauser the most important. Actors such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi), sponsored by Baghdad and Tehran, or the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam), funded by Saudi Arabia, offer a case in point. The balance of power on the ground is in constant turmoil. Fresh IS recruits come from as far as Australia or France but also from closer grounds like Tunisia and Yemen. Affiliates which now pledge allegiance to the Daesh flag have mushroomed in the area and beyond: Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Afghanistan. On the other side, the Kurds seem to be constantly “skipping the rope”, negotiating their positions in Syria, Iraq and in a more traumatic manner, with Turkey. The assertive role of Iran in this real “game of thrones” is to be reckoned with, whilst the US and other Western actors appear more like disoriented gamblers betting in a frenzied horserace. Sectarianism, another subject explored in-depth by Casa Árabe and published in its bi-annual journal Awraq (No. 8, 2nd semester, 2013), has exponentially grown from theological differences and geopolitical struggle to situations of fully-fledged religious war. The takfiris, the so-called Muslims who follow a Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam deeply impregnated in IS, easily accuse other Muslims (and other “people of the Book”) of apostasy and obliterate lives accordingly. In addition, the role of media networks and the propaganda machine that has been perfected by IS fans the flames by showing off its bloody exploits like trophies. Islamic State has found a fertile ground to expand its ideology in underdeveloped areas such as Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor in Syria, but also in Iraqi provinces such as Mosul or al-Anbar. Its draconian but pragmatic approach to achieve law and order seems to be successful in some areas, in comparison to Baghdad’s previous dismal governance. For instance, reports from Mosul indicate an improvement in services under IS rule: electricity supply, food markets, distribution of oil derivatives have been re-established. It’s a strategy of gaining legitimacy that is fear-induced but result-oriented. At the same time, Shia militancy and its armed offshoots, which pre-dated the 2003 US- led invasion, have multiplied over the last decade and flexed their muscles. Hezbollah in Lebanon is a major player; in Iraq, the above-mentioned Popular Mobilization Forces, the League of the Righteous (Asaeb Ahlil Haq) or even the now co-opted Badr Brigade, which hardly receive any media attention, may be useful examples of this changing balance of power. On June 13, 2014, Ayatollah al-Sistani issued a historic fatwa calling Iraqi citizens to defend Iraq from IS. The “fatwalization” of public space is a well-established reality on both sides, further complicated by the fact that Sunnis lack a proper hierarchy in the issuing of religious edicts. With plentiful of military and financial resources to fuel these centrifugal forces – in sharp contrast with the austerity imposed on a large part of the world economy – dangerous fragmentation is more ominous than the Iraqi 2006-07 conflagration initiated with the bombing of al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The humanitarian cost is stranger to no one, both the result of decades of war and sanctions in Iraq and the fresher hemorrhage in Syria. Deep mental health problems in the region, affecting both victims and victimizers, remain understudied but should also be highlighted. 6 Iraq at a crossroads In this shifting context, publishing this collection of articles became a question of urgency. Some chapters tackle the Iraqi conundrum by delving deep into current affairs, while others take a few steps back to bring in some historical perspective. In our view, they complement one another to give us a better insight, although the final picture might still come across as blurry, due to the evolving nature of the conflict. With its blunt protagonist role, it is not hard to understand why most of these articles gravitate around Islamic State, despite the fact that finding reliable sources to explain what goes on inside Daesh is a very difficult task. Its brutal leader and self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, remains shrouded in darkness like a villain from Star Wars, except that instead of special effects we are fed harrowing images of real inhumane actions widely distributed on the Internet. Terror 2.0. The Pandora Box has been opened. What is certain is that domestic, regional and international dynamics have all contributed to bringing about such a disastrous outcome. Another conclusion is that regional states, encouraged by international patrons, implemented dysfunctional development models, forced identity politics on their diverse populations, promoted corruption and endemic repression and ended up creating marginalized minorities and disenfranchised peoples that have given rise to powerful non-state actors. These mutating organizations have jumped at the opportunity that others neglected. Fighting ISIS will require time, resources, boots on the ground, creative options and narratives to lure would-be recruits, and probably the ironic twist of fate of encouraging continuity in Damascus. Mostly, it will require addressing the root causes behind the emergence of this phenomenon, rather than solely focusing on the symptoms. The chapters in this volume follow this order: the internal (Sunni, Shia, Kurds) followed by the regional (Iran, Syria, Turkey) and international (US, EU) dimensions and a final reflection on the humanitarian aspects. We have deliberately left the authors use the different terminologies to refer to this terror organization, as we believe the least of problems in dealing with
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