About the CCRP The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) has the mission of improving DoD’s understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. Focusing upon improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control, the CCRP helps DoD take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by emerging technologies. The CCRP pursues a broad program of research and analysis in information superiority, information operations, command and control theory, and associated operational concepts that enable us to leverage shared awareness to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of assigned missions. An important aspect of the CCRP program is its ability to serve as a bridge between the operational, technical, analytical, and educational communities. The CCRP provides leadership for the command and control research community by: • articulating critical research issues; • working to strengthen command and control research infrastructure; • sponsoring a series of workshops and symposia; • serving as a clearing house for command and control related research funding; and • disseminating outreach initiatives that include the CCRP Publication Series. This is a continuation in the series of publications produced by the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT), which was created as a “skunk works” with funding provided by the CCRP under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII). This program has demonstrated the importance of having a research program focused on the national security implications of the Information Age. It develops the theoretical foundations to provide DoD with information superiority and highlights the importance of active outreach and dissemination initiatives designed to acquaint senior military personnel and civilians with these emerging issues. The CCRP Publication Series is a key element of this effort. Check our website for the latest CCRP activities and publications. www.dodccrp.org This publication was originally produced by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1998 for the CCRP. ABOUT THE COVER: The portrait of Clausewitz is owed to the kind permission of Clausewitz.com. The surrounding motif is known as the Mandelbrot set, the computer plot of a fractal basin boundary. It symbol- izes both the underlying complexity and simplicity that characterize nonlinear dynamics. The complexity is represented by the endless repeti- tion of self-similar patterns. Even when magnified 2.7 million times, additional structure continues to appear. The simplicity is demonstrated by the formula that generates the object: Z2 +C. DoD Command and Control Research Program Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) & Chief Information Officer Mr. John G. Grimes Special Assistant to the ASD (NII) & Director RIResearch Dr. David S. Alberts Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the DoD Command and Control Research Program, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviews would be appreciated. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Czerwinski, Thomas J. Coping with the bounds: A Neo-Clausewitzean Primer / Thomas J. Czerwinski. p. cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-57906-009-9 1. Military art and science—Philosophy. 2. Nonlinear theories. 3. Complexity (Philosophy) I.Title. U21.2.C94 1998 355.001—dc21 98-14653 January 1998 CIP August 2003 September 2008 Coping with the Bounds A Neo-Clausewitzean Primer Thomas J. Czerwinski “I am convinced that the nations and people who master the new sciences of complexity will become the economic, cultural, and political superpowers of the next century.” Heinz Pagels Physicist, author of Dreams of Reason, and inspira- tion for the character of the Chaos scientist in the book and film “Jurassic Park.” Died climbing a mountain in 1988. Coping with the Bounds A Neo-Clausewitzean Primer Foreword by James K. Greer, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) ................................................ iii Preface .................................................................................... 1 Part One: Linearity and Nonlinearity 1 Nonlinearity: An Introduction ............................................ 7 2 The Nature of Linear Reductionism .................................. 25 3 Toward a Nonlinear Reductionism ................................... 35 4 The Meshing of “Tools of Analysis” and “Aids to Learning” ......................................................... 51 The Keystone Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War ........................................... 59 Part Two: Aids to Learning 5 Metaphors ........................................................................ 109 6 Van Creveld’s Iron Rules ................................................. 119 7 Perrow’s Quadrants ......................................................... 143 8 Genetic Algorithms, or Artificial Life ............................... 155 9 Pattern Recognition ......................................................... 165 10 Interaction Searches ...................................................... 183 Afterword ........................................................................... 211 About the Author ................................................................ 219 About James K. Greer, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) ......... 221 Catalog of CCRP Publications ........................................... 223 Foreword mericans and the American military in particular like the A scientific method and linearity in war. We are drawn to military theories that play to our strengths. We avidly seek the- ories that tell us if we can overmatch our opponent in manufacturing the tools of war, synchronize combat power to mass overwhelming fire on an enemy, or strike precisely the right target at the right time; we are sure to win. We base our doctrine on Jomini, Mahan and Mitchell because they promise that clear lines of operations, decisive points and overwhelm- ing mass will yield victory. And so while we speak of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu we have yet to truly internalize their concepts. That is because they both speak of uncertainty and a moral component of war; fuzzy concepts that are difficult to translate into the clarity we expect in combat orders, aim points and military decisions. The only problem is… War is chaotic, complex, non-linear and uncertain Always Was; Always Will Be And, since the end of the Cold War we have been frustrated time and time again by the complexity and chaos of operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict; where Irregular Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Operations iii iv Coping with the Bounds have been the main effort the last twenty years. Certainly our application of mass, firepower and speed led to victory in Desert Storm, the quick defeat of Saddam’s regular forces in Iraq in 2003, and the removal of Noriega through a coup de main. Yet in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq linear thinking and Newtonian-based approaches have proven largely unequal to the task. The conclusion that nearly every military thinker and practi- tioner has now reached is that we need a comprehensive approach to warfare; one that combines the approaches to both regular and irregular warfare; that combines the sciences of linearity and non-linearity; and that enables truly successful operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. In the revised edition of Coping with the Bounds Tom Czer- winski provides us the beginnings of a conceptual basis for that comprehensive approach. That conceptual basis will be criti- cal as we develop the doctrines, organizations and technologies that will enable decisive operations anywhere along the spec- trum of conflict. His introduction of a neo-Clausewitzean thought continues the process of leading us away from largely linear and process-oriented thinking and in the direction of balanced thinking that incorporates both linear and non-linear thought. Perhaps more importantly this work serves as a primer for leader development. Junior and senior military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan and civilian leaders throughout the US Gov- ernment have struggled to rationalize what they have been taught with what they have experienced. In simple terms they’ve been taught linear dynamics and have experienced non-linear dynamics. Coping with the Bounds provides those Foreword v leaders a framework for understanding the challenges they face and how solutions might be found. If we are to “win our nation’s wars” against the complex and adaptive enemies we face, and if we are to remain the most powerful and effective armed forces in the world, then we are going to have to take a neo-Clausewitzean approach to war- fare that in many ways departs from the thinking of the 20th Century. Tom Czerwinski and Coping with the Bounds start us along that intellectual journey. James K. Greer Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) Preface his revised edition shifts the emphasis and tightens the Torganization of the original which appeared in 1998. The first edition emphasized the “gee whiz” of applying the emerg- ing sciences of nonlinear dynamics; of chaos and complexity to military affairs. In the intervening