Albert Camus and the Political Philosophy of the Absurd

ABSTRACT Title of Document: ALBERT CAMUS AND THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSURD Matthew Hamilton Bowker, Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Directed By: Professor C. Fred Alford, Department of Government and Politics Compared to the unmistakable impact of absurd theatre, literature, and art on contemporary European and American cultures, the philosophy, morality, and politics of the absurd have remained relatively obscure. Few interpretations of Albert Camus’ philosophical contribution have successfully defined the meaning of absurdity, its components and dynamics, or its moral and political consequences. This dissertation attempts to clarify these areas of absurd thought by applying the logic of ambivalence to Camus’ philosophy of the absurd, revealing its compelling diagnosis of extremism and indifference, its experiential grounding for post-traditional values, and its unique appeal for moral and political maturity. After reviewing the recent history of the concept of absurdity in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Nagel, and elsewhere (Chapter 2), I offer detailed analyses of Camus’ absurd and the contributions of his scholarly critics (Chapter 3). I introduce the concept of ambivalence in the work of Eugen Bleuler, Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Otto Kernberg, and relevant sociological and political researchers (Chapter 4) to argue that the absurd is best understood not in skeptical or existential terms, but as an ambivalent ‘position’ with respect to countervailing desires, primarily a desire for unity and a kind of principium individuationis (Chapter 5). These ambivalent desires are implicated in the moral and political tensions between self and others, absolutes and limits, creation and destruction, even good and evil. Applying this interpretation to Camus’ The Stranger and its main character, Meursault (Chapter 6), and to The Myth of Sisyphus, The Rebel, The Plague, and other works (Chapters 7 and 8), I argue that the destructive ideologies Camus decried may be understood as defenses against the ambivalence of the absurd, while an absurd morality demands mature and creative resolutions of contradiction, resistance against defensive reactions, and deliberate moral and emotional identifications with others and enemies. Analyses of two controversial cases, Camus’ defense of Kaliayev and the ‘fastidious’ Russian assassins of 1905 and Camus’ unpopular stance on the Algerian War (1954-1962), are offered as miniature case-studies to ground conclusions about the meaning of absurd morality and politics (Chapter 9). ALBERT CAMUS AND THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSURD By Matthew Hamilton Bowker Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2008 Advisory Committee: Professor C. Fred Alford, Chair Professor Joseph Brami Professor Stephen Elkin Professor James Glass Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu © Copyright by Matthew Hamilton Bowker 2008 Preface This dissertation has its origins in two fairly humble and not-so-scholarly sources: the indefinable pleasure I have always taken in absurd things, absurd ideas, and absurd experiences, and the mundane intuition that a great many moral challenges have to do with learning how to live with (or in, or through) contradiction. While I am tempted to speculate that absurdities offer a strange and frightening pleasure because they afford us brief opportunities to satisfy otherwise forbidden desires for senselessness, selflessness, even craziness, contending with contradiction is likely a bit more complicated. If the difference between success and failure in managing contradiction has anything to do with balancing strength and gentleness, with being able to forgive and forget when necessary, too much of any of these things, too much absurd glee or too much fear of absurdity, too much comfort with contradiction or too much discomfort with it, can lead to hypocrisy, rigidity, a divided self, or worse. At least on my reading, questions of how to balance senselessness with good sense, strength with gentleness, and contradiction with coherence are the central questions of the philosophy of the absurd. They are also the implicit questions asked by most theorists of ambivalence. In this work, then, I use ambivalence to interpret the philosophy of the absurd in the hope that doing so will reveal something not only about the harrowing and thrilling experience of absurdity, but about the challenges, dangers, and moral and political consequences of living with contradiction. It is not unreasonable to wonder if resurrecting the poor philosophy of the absurd after all these years is really warranted, especially when there are so many newer theories and so many other serious problems one could choose to write about. ii Perhaps the best justification for doing so is that at a time when so much postmodern thought and critique seems undercut by its own hermeneutical stance, “lost in texts,” as a teacher of mine put it, the absurd is something we can feel and, I dare say, something that feels real . Attempting to ground absurd moral and political reflection not in narratives, discourses, or intertextual spaces, but in the complex but powerful emotions of absurdity, is part of this dissertation’s attempt to explore a neglected path in absurd philosophy and its application to moral and political theory, a path that leads directly to the question of how we ought to face the conflictual, contradictory, and absurd challenges of our time. The reader will be very happy to know that it is not my intention to use the philosophy of the absurd to fashion a new theory of ambivalence. Although I think Albert Camus may be considered a theorist of ambivalence of sorts, I do not suggest that ‘absurd drives’ replace Eros and Thanatos , nor do I propose that an ‘Absurd Personality Disorder’ be added to the DSM. Instead, this work argues that we may use ambivalence and its related constructs as analogies to give richer content and consequence to the philosophy of the absurd. That marks the first disclaimer: that as a work of political theory and not of psychoanalysis or psychology, ambivalence plays a secondary and supporting role. The second disclaimer is that while I have come to believe in the expressive, heuristic, and philosophic potential of the absurd, I have sought to adopt neither a pro- nor anti-Camus stance. The voluminous and often cantankerous critical literature on Camus compels me to claim (or at least to pretend) neutrality. iii Beloved by artists, university students, and humanists of all kinds because of his (deceptive) simplicity and his willingness to be a sensitive moralist in a cynical age, Camus is mocked by both serious philosophers and political realists on largely the same grounds. His critics have a point: there are moments of naïve and ‘bad’ philosophizing, idiosyncrasy, and unreasonableness in Camus’ expository works. But his defenders have a point as well: there is something noble and admirable about Camus’ serious contemplation of moral dilemmas, his honest indignation at suffering and cruelty, and his unflagging commitment to humanity. It is unfortunate and ironic that the contemporary champion of la mesure (measure) has been treated so extremely by both his adherents and his detractors. I feel obliged to try a more balanced approach. I hope that this work will be read as constructive criticism of Camus’ philosophy of the absurd, not only because it proceeds without assuming either a disparaging or a valorizing tone, but, more importantly, because it analyzes, criticizes, and interprets Camus’ thought in the hope of constructing a refined model of the dynamics of the absurd. iv Dedication For Julie, who makes even the absurdities of life blissful v Acknowledgements I am indebted to all of the members of my advisory committee for their thoughtful attention, their time, and their efforts throughout this process. I am particularly grateful for the instruction, support, and friendship of my advisor, Fred Alford, for nearly eight years of graduate school, or, as I like to think of it, about one quarter of my life so far. Jim Glass gave me numerous opportunities to learn and to lead, and not always in ways that I expected. Assisting his film courses taught me as much as it taught the enrolled students, and profoundly changed me as a student and a teacher. Vladimir Tismaneanu has served on every committee I have ever asked to assemble and has always offered brilliant and incisive criticism, in spite of the fact that I have never done anything to deserve his great kindness. Steve Elkin has graciously read and insightfully commented on this work and is someone from whom I should have learned much more in my time at Maryland. And Joseph Brami has been a genuinely kind and thoughtful advisor even in this late phase of my graduate studies; I would have liked to have made his acquaintance sooner as well. I am also thankful for having had the opportunity to work with Dorith Grant-Wisdom, who advised me about the prospectus for this dissertation. In our time together at College Park Scholars, I learned a lot about what it means to be a teacher and I feel even more fortunate to have become her friend. My wife, Julie, to whom this work is dedicated, has made this dissertation, my other work, and my life possible in an exact sense and in more ways than can be enumerated. I could write another dissertation about how wonderful Julie is, how deeply I love her, and how lucky I feel to have met her at one of those mixers for vi graduate students where, apparently, nobody ever meets anybody . But if I did, she would have to suffer me through another writing process and I would just end up dedicating that work to her as well. Through what can only be described as his radical combination of strength, intelligence, and kindness, my father, Robert, shaped my heart.

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