Miners, Farmers, and the Non-Union Spirit of the Gilded Age, 1886-1896

University of Kentucky UKnowledge

Theses and Dissertations--History History

2016

Run of the Mine: Miners, Farmers, and the Non-Union Spirit of the Gilded Age, 1886-1896

Dana M. Caldemeyer University of Kentucky, [email protected] Digital Object Identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.075

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Recommended Citation Caldemeyer, Dana M., "Run of the Mine: Miners, Farmers, and the Non-Union Spirit of the Gilded Age, 1886-1896" (2016). Theses and Dissertations--History. 34. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/34

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The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.

Dana M. Caldemeyer, Student

Dr. Tracy Campbell, Major Professor

Dr. Scott K. Taylor, Director of Graduate Studies

RUN OF THE MINE: MINERS, FARMERS, AND THE NON-UNION SPIRIT OF THE GILDED AGE, 1886- 1896

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By Dana M. Caldemeyer

Lexington, KY

Director: Dr. Tracy Campbell, Professor of History

Lexington, KY

2016

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

RUN OF THE MINE: MINERS, FARMERS, AND THE NON-UNION SPIRIT OF THE GILDED AGE, 1886-1896

“Run of the Mine” examines why workers refused to join unions in the late nineteenth century. Through a focus on the men and women involved in the southern Midwest coal industry who quit or did not join unions, this dissertation analyzes the economic, geographic, and racial factors that contributed to workers’ attitudes toward national unions like the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). It argues that the fluidity between rural industries that allowed residents to work in multiple occupations throughout the year dramatically shaped worker expectations for their unions. This occupational fluidity that allowed miners to farm and farmers to mine coincided with farmer and worker stockholding, futures market speculations, cooperative endeavors, and strikebreaking efforts that complicated workplace relationships and muddled local union goals. Taken together, these factors caused workers to craft their own concepts of unionism that did not always fit with national union agendas. Workers’ disinterest in formal unions, then, did not come from an apathy toward unionism, but from a belief that unions did not offer the surest means to attain their economic, political, and social needs.

KEYWORDS: Non-unionism, capitalism, rural labor, agriculture, dual occupations

Dana M. Caldemeyer

April 8, 2016 Date

RUN OF THE MINE: MINERS, FARMERS, AND THE NON-UNION SPIRIT OF THE GILDED AGE, 1886-1896

Dana M. Caldemeyer

Dr. Tracy A. Campbell Director of Dissertation

Dr. Scott K. Taylor Director of Graduate Studies

April 8, 2016 Date

“Organization is simply a means to an end and not the end itself….”

--“Old Residenter,” Indiana coal miner United Mine Worker’s Journal, May 26, 1892

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing labor history pertaining to the late nineteenth century, more often than

not, is depressing. Even when the “good guys” were truly good, they seldom won. It

makes writing about workers difficult. Without a strong support network, this process

would have been more painful than any grad student could stand. But this

acknowledgement section is proof that there are people willing to go out of their way to

make research easier, writing tolerable, and life so much brighter. I have been blessed with a fantastic family, amazing friends, and astute colleagues who all made this project stronger than I could have ever hoped or imagined. Such teamwork may not have always worked well for labor organizing in the 1880s and 1890s, but it has definitely benefitted me.

Those who have known or worked with Ronald Formisano will agree that I could not have found a more knowledgeable, challenging, or helpful mentor. I know he had countless better things to do with his retirement than correct awkward chapter drafts, but he carefully read each one anyway; some of them several times over. I am so grateful he took the time and effort to train me.

My first-rate dissertation committee gave fantastic feedback and constant encouragement throughout this process. Mark Summers graciously answered my questions about trade networks, railroads, and politics long after he had likely lost interest. And even after that, he read this entire dissertation, saving me from a host of

embarrassing errors. Phil Harling, Amy Taylor, and Michael Kazin carefully read this

draft and gave terrific insight on developing this project. Jeremy Crampton and Ernest

Yanarella likewise offered excellent critiques. But none of this would have been possible

iii

without Tracy Campbell. A skilled dissertation director, he waded through atrocious

drafts and pushed me to work through organizational issues, research problems, and

arguments. This hunk of research would not be passable without him.

I have had the benefit of a host of helpful readers through the course of this

project. It was truly an honor to have Bruce Laurie read and offer his valuable insight on

this dissertation. His knowledge of labor organizing in the late nineteenth century is unmatched and I am grateful he took the time to share his expertise with me. Edward

Blum, Matthew Hild, and Chad Montrie all offered great conversation, new perspectives, and fantastic advice that made arguments clearer and chapters stronger. Eric Arnesen,

Andrew Arnold, Cindy Hahamovitch, Jennifer Luff, Scott Nelson, and the rest of the

participants in the D.C. Working Class History Seminar provided excellent feedback on

Chapter Three that helped immensely with the overall structure of my dissertation. J.

Burton Kirkwood offered the interest and encouragement that motivated me to turn an undergraduate paper into a doctoral dissertation.

I’m not sure where I would be without the support of the University of Kentucky

History Department faculty and staff. Bruce Holle’s wisdom and advice were invaluable throughout my time at UK and I consider myself fortunate to have such a great friend and mentor. James Albisetti, Ronald Eller, Joanne Melish, Francis Musoni, Eric Myrup,

Gerald Smith, and Scott Taylor offered much appreciated encouragement, interest in my

research, and made POT 17 a more welcome place. Tina Hagee, a stellar administrator,

receives far too little credit for the work she does. Not only did she help with the mounds

of paperwork required to navigate the University bureaucracy, but she went out of her

way to make sure that the process was as painless as possible and that my research was

funded.

My research would not have been possible without research award money or the

army of librarians and archivists at the University of Kentucky and elsewhere. The

National Society of Colonial Dames of America granted me extensive research funds

through their Regional History Award that funded my early research trips. UK’s Lance

Banning Memorial award, travel support from the UK History Department and Graduate

School, as well as generous support from the William T. Bryan Chair all eased research

and travel expenses at different points of this project. The William T. Bryan Dissertation

Fellowship likewise made it possible for me to focus on writing and last minute research

crucial to strengthening this project.

UK’s Interlibrary Loan and Circulation departments endured my unending requests for more microfilm and books and Judy Fugate was always happy to order more.

John Hoffmann at the University of Illinois and the staff at the Indiana State Archives,

University of Iowa, University of Missouri, as well as the Illinois state archives at the

University of Illinois-Normal repository and at the state capital happily accommodated my constant requests to see anything they had on coal mining and farming. Glenna

Schroeder-Lein and Debbie Hamm at the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library made my time in Springfield a joy as they pulled collection after collection for me, helped me track down new ones, and patiently listened as I told them more than they ever wanted to know about the Illinois coal industry. Lin Fredericksen and the rest of the staff at the Kansas

State Historical Archives were likewise eager to help. Always friendly, always with a

great sense of humor, the team at the KSHS knew what I needed before I even knew I

needed it, not just in their repositories, but in collections outside the state.

I would have been lost without the fantastic staff at the Kentucky Historical

Society. I hardly know where to begin thanking Tony Curtis, Amanda Higgins, Matt

Hulbert, Patrick Lewis, Whitney Smith, David Turpie, and the rest of the gang at the

KHS. Their partnership with the University of Kentucky enabled me to spend a year and

a half learning the ins and outs of the academic press and, of course, provided ample time

and sources for my dissertation. They bit their tongues when I rambled about wheat and

coal prices, celebrated un-birthdays, and encouraged me to “just turn it in” each time I

wanted to pick at a chapter a little more.

Every grad student needs an ally in the department that understands the trials and

frustrations of research, TA-ing woes, and funding nightmares simply because they are in

the trenches with you. I’m unsure how I managed such great fortune, but somehow I

came out with several allies. They heard more bad jokes and puns about the nineteenth

century than anyone should endure and our discussions of carpenters, TVs, and

millionaires, “Office Hours,” and other shenanigans always brightened my day. Ed

Mason and Billy Mattingly, my “pre-modern brain trust” answered countless questions

about language dialects, Greek and Roman culture, and, even more importantly, were

never without a good story to liven up a day at the office. My soul sister, Ashely Sorrell,

has been with me through thick and thin. She patiently listened to my rants, helped me sort out countless problems in research, teaching, and life, and gave skillful critiques of drafts. From confronting insect invasions to wrangling cattle on a research trip gone

vi awry, she was always ready to take on whatever lay ahead. It’s surely an understatement to say that she kept me much more sane than I otherwise would have been.

Stephen Pickering and Robert Murray would no doubt sigh heavily and roll their eyes if I said how much I looked up to them at UK. Instead, I’ll say they were great pals who gave excellent advice on writing and how to be a less terrible historian. Amanda

Higgins, James Savage, Brandon Wilson, and Jacob Glover all helped in different ways with great feedback and friendship.

Finally, and probably most importantly, I am so grateful for my friends and family that encouraged me throughout this process. Amanda Hall, Natalie Rexing,

Brittany and Travis Scraper and Dustin Hagman knew me long before this ordeal began and have been great friends every step of the way. My grandparents, David and Helen

Caldemeyer, taught me early on that formal education is one of many ways to gain knowledge, that knowledge is no substitute for wisdom, and that family is most important of all. Their lives and love shaped every word of this dissertation.

My parents offered crucial support in a host of ways. Joan Caldemeyer could always be counted on to help fix a spreadsheet, to read through a draft to make sure it didn’t sound too “complicated,” and caught more run-on sentences than I would like to admit. Chuck Caldemeyer introduced me to history and showed me that passion is worthless if it isn’t harnessed to hard work and patience. But that only scratches the surface. Really, I don’t have words to describe all the ways he encouraged and helped me. So, Dad, here’s a completed dissertation instead. I couldn’t have done it without you.

I would be absolutely lost without “the siblings.” My three sisters and two brothers-in-law were the most wonderful distractions. I all but forgot about my

vii dissertation each time I went home and our times together were always the highlight of my visits. Scott Jones and Nathan Forshey were great sports who kindly tolerated my long-winded answers when they asked how the research was going. My sisters accompanied me on research trips and even humored me enough to read a chapter or two.

Few people may ever understand “the Caldemeyer girls’” conversations, jokes, or downright weirdness, but I don’t think the four of us would have it any other way. I wouldn’t trade Deanne, Jill, or even Beth for the world.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements …………………………..………………………………………… iii

Table of Contents ……………………………,…………..………………………………ix

List of Figures ……………………………………………..…..…………………………xi

Chapter One Introduction: Shadows of Canaan………….……………...………………………...... 1 Blind Spots…………………………………………………………………….……..19 Examining the Non-Union Spirit………………………...…………………………..29 Chapter Two Imposters: Markets, Deception, and the 1888 Union Merger……...…..………………...35 Deceptive Markets………………………………………………………………...…40 Inhuman……………………………………………………...………………………52 Unpaid………………………………………………………………………………..64 Hypocrites……………………………………………………………………………73 Chapter Three Undermined: Winter Diggers, Union Strikebreakers………………… ………………....86 Assorted Incomes…………………………………………….………………………90 Turns…………………………………………………………………………………97 Enterprise………………………………………………………………………..….102 Concessions…………………………………………………………………………113 Chapter Four Backsliders: Union Betrayal and the Aborted 1891 Strike...... 124 Misled………………………………………………………………………………128 Backsliding…………………………………………………………………………135 Indiana………………………………………………………………………………139 Misplaced Faith……………………………………………………………………..145 Chapter Five Outsiders: Race and the Exclusive Politics of an Inclusive Union, 1892-1894…...... ….166 Separated……………………………………………………………………………172 Unskilled…………………………………………………………………………....184 “Coal Butchers”…………………………………………………………………….197 Chapter Six Waiting for “Moses”: Renegade Leaders and Absent Victories, 1894-1896……..……212 The Suspension……………………………………………………………………..215 Unrest………….……………………………………………………………………232 Cast Out…………………………………………………………………………….237 Chapter Seven Epilogue: Common Legacies……………………………………………………...……259

Appendices Lexicon of Mining Terms, Union Dues Charts……….………………………265 List of Abbreviations….………………...……………………………………271 Bibliography...... 273 Vita...... 296

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 World’s Columbian Exposition: Mining Building....…………….………….2 Figure 1.2, The Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace………………………….………………..5 Figure 1.3, Southern Midwest Coal Producing Counties, 1890-1893……….………….7

Chapter 1: Introduction

Shadows of Canaan

Over three hundred and fifty thousand guests roamed the lavish Columbian

Exposition buildings in a city that stood in the middle of wilderness. Not twenty years after its infamous fire, Chicago rose from the ashes become a bustling metropolis, “the

City of Aladdin’s palaces,” a beacon of modernity in the heart of a “primeval” muddy prairie. It seemed illogical that untamed countryside could sustain a city of such stylish vibrancy, but this was part of the “magic” Chicago offered, and in 1893, it enchanted the entire world. 1

Jack was one of the thousands captivated by the 1893 World’s Fair.2 For the first time in Fair history, planners dedicated an entire building to the source of the “White

City’s”—and the world’s—rapid industrial growth. The building itself was a symbol of modernity, “mark[ing] an era in roof construction,” with its steel cantilever trusses holding a glass ceiling over the building’s central hall exhibits. Intricate relief carvings of men with picks and drills adorned the building’s outer walls that dwarfed Jack as he approached. Craning his neck to take in the enormity of the mammoth building, he saw two female figures carved out of the rock above the ninety-foot tall central archway. Each woman held out mine lanterns as if to illuminate the single word etched in stone between them: “MINING.”3

1 Trumbull White and William Igleheart, The World’s Columbian Exposition, Chicago, 1893 (Philadelphia: International Publishing Company, 1893), 13. 2 “Jack,” letter to the editor, “A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893. 3Frederick Skiff, “Mines,” in White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 240. 1

The building celebrated all facets of the wealth nature offered the modern world.

Gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, salt, metals, and ores, all prized for their monetary value, pulled in thousands of patrons excited to see the precious materials literally piled in displays that took up

Figure 1.1 “World's Columbian Exposition: Mining Building, Chicago, United States, 1893,” S03i2231l01, Goodyear Collection, Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn, New York.

two floors and a basement level. Jack, however, came to see the other material prominently displayed in the mines building not for its high monetary value, but for its abundance that made it exceptionally cheap. To Jack’s delight, in order to see the Statue of Liberty carved out of salt guests also viewed an eleven-ton pillar of Great Britain coal.

A thirty-foot tall, twenty-three-foot-wide archway of coal served as the entrance to

Kentucky’s Mammoth Cave replica while Cape Colony presented samples of its coal

deposits with the 40,000 diamonds its attendants cut and polished as patrons watched.

Amid the statues of silver and pyramids of gold stood dozens of coal columns, samples,

and seams shipped from all over the world. Everywhere the guests looked to see the

splendor of the new age they saw coal as well.4

Dusty, dirty, and remarkably brittle compared to the other items displayed in the

Mines Building, coal nevertheless was the crucial material needed to fuel the Gilded Age.

Chicago could not become the nation’s “Second City” without the coal-powered railroads

that connected its factories and companies to the rural periphery and the eastern urban

centers. It fueled the engines that carried both exhibits and patrons across oceans and

prairies to the Exposition’s fairgrounds. Perhaps most importantly, it made the coke used

in the steel mills to forge the metal that undergirded nearly every aspect of the modern

age. Cheap coal made cheap steel that allowed the railroads to stretch farther and more

affordably than it had on iron rails. It made steel-infused farm equipment cheaper,

allowing farmers who could afford the investment an opportunity to cultivate and harvest

larger crop yields. It connected local markets to larger, more competitive ones via

railways and steamship lines that stretched across the nation and world.5

4 White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 239-262; R.A.F. Penrose, Jr., “Notes on the State Exhibits in the Mines and Mining Building at the World’s Exposition, Chicago,” The Journal of Geology, 1:5 (Jul.-Aug., 1893) 457-470; “Montana’s Silver Statue,” NYT, May 31,1893; “Infanta at the Fair,” EC, June 8, 1893; “The Spell Broken,” DISJ, August 25, 1893;.Benjamin Cummings Turman, History of the World’s Fair: Being a Complete Description of the World’s Columbian Exposition from its Inception (Chicago: Mammoth Publishing Company 1893) p. 345-347; John J. Flinn, Official Guide to the World’s Columbian Exposition in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, May 1 to October 26, 1893 by Authority of the United States of America (Chicago: The Columbian Guide Company, 1893) 117, 256; Tim O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893. 5 On the importance of coal in the late nineteenth century see Sean P. Adams, “Promotion, Competition, Captivity: The Political Economy of Coal,” Journal of Policy History, 18:1 (2006): p. 74:95. 3

Such developments rapidly changed how materials were produced and consumed.

By 1893, many expected that it would not be long before all farm equipment would be

made of steel and mining could be done with efficient “labor saving machinery.” Indeed,

although machine miners only comprised fourteen percent of the Illinois mining force,

they produced twenty-five percent of the state’s total coal output. Still, farms, mines, and

railroads often lagged in the mechanization of the era compared to other industries, with

nothing replacing the usefulness of a hickory plow on the Kansas plains or the skilled

blow of a human hand hammering a damp and jagged rock face. The labor did not

change, but the scale and availability of it did. Established coal operations expanded or

opened new mines in developing regions. Meanwhile, formerly secluded mines became

connected through railway lines so that by 1893, mines from Pennsylvania to Illinois

competed to sell their coal in Chicago. The days of isolated local markets were fading

and in its wake arose a new age of limitless capabilities that came from mining cheaper

coal at a faster rate. 6

Like much of Gilded Age society, the Fair celebrated this surplus of goods and how easily they were accessed. It created a world of wealth concentrated in centers that displayed their opulence prominently for all to see, not just at the Columbian Exposition, but in cities throughout the world. Ornamental coal, like hundreds of other raw materials

6 The amount of production in machine mines compared to the non-machine mines was not wholly due to the speed of mining technology. Rather, machine mines were only profitable in mines where coal extraction required the least amount of effort, causing even hand mines in machine mining districts to produce more coal than mines with harder rock or thinner coal veins. The Brown Coal Mining Machine,” EMJ, September 17, 1892; “A New Invention,” NLT, July 20, 1878; Andrew Roy, “Ohio Institute of Mining Engineers,” CTJ, June 17, 1891; “Steel Head Frame at Collieries,” CTJ, December 16, 1891; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1893: Twelfth Annual Report, A Supplemental Report of the State Bureau of Labor Statistics Containing the Tenth Annual Reports of the State Inspectors of Mines (Springfield, IL: H.W. Rokker,1894), XXI-XXX1, 155-6; Frederick Skiff in Trumbull and Igleheart, 261; Keith Dix, What’s a Coal Miner to Do?: The Mechanization of Coal Mining (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 6.

arranged and presented as art at the Fair and elsewhere became a way to demonstrate

wealth and modernity, to boast of abundance so great it could be displayed rather than

consumed. “Sioux City [Iowa] will have a corn palace at the World’s fair; Yankton, Dak.,

a cement palace; Hutchinson [Kansas] a salt palace, and Newton [Kansas] when she gets

her four sorghum mills to running will doubtless

Figure 1.2 The Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace. “Opened by ‘Our Carter,’” CDT, September 15, 1891.

build one of molasses candy,” the Topeka State Journal quipped, prompting newspapers

throughout eastern Kansas to joke that their cities would build a palace of coal.7

Such a claim was only partially in jest. Amid much fanfare, President Benjamin

Harrison attended the first opening of a two-story coal palace in Ottumwa, Iowa. The 325 by 215-foot wooden building was gilded with polished Iowa coal with the inside full of

7 “The Only Corn Palace,” Sioux Valley [Correctionville, IA] News, September 4, 1890; “Sioux City,” TSJ, April 1, 1890 (quote); “Leavenworth a Coal Palace,” The Leavenworth [Kansas] Times, April 3, 1890; “Osage City a Coal Palace,” OFCP, April 10, 1890; “A Coal Palace,” reprinted from the Pittsburg [Kansas] Smelter in The Leavenworth [Kansas]Times, April 18, 1890; “The Flax Palace,” The Des Moines Register, September 1, 1891. 5 displays exhibiting the region’s farm surplus and manufactured products. Streator,

Illinois, East St. Louis, and Brazil, Indiana, erected their own palaces celebrating the abundant “black diamonds” that came from their soil.8

These displays of opulence highlighted two very different worlds centered on the wealth generated by surplus. One world, witnessed by Jack in Chicago, gained its wealth by not only being proximate to raw materials, but also by the means to use them for profit. The other world was also witnessed by Jack, in the Illinois mines he where worked just outside the city. There, rural “producers,” or those who provided the materials consumed elsewhere, lived and labored in a world surrounded by the surplus and wealth urban centers prized. In the southern Midwest coalfields of western Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern Missouri, and eastern Kansas, this surplus created a veritable “Canaan,” full not only of the “cheap coal” the Fair celebrated, but seas of inexpensive grain.

But Canaan’s prosperity did not extend to all who lived within its borders. To those who produced this abundant wealth, “cheap coal” and “cheap grain” had an entirely different meaning. As organizers planned the Mining Building’s marvelous displays of coal that would not be burned, a miner three hundred miles from the fairgrounds worked to loosen a five-ton block of coal from the southeastern Kansas soil to be placed on exhibit. Due to his mine’s conditions and the size of the piece, no machine could be used

8 Although Harrison and other guests toured it in 1890, the Ottumwa Palace was not officially completed until September 1891. “The President’s Trip,” The Humboldt [Iowa] Republican, October 9, 1890; “A Coal Palace,” OCFP, January 2, 1890; “Ottumwa’s Coal Palace,” The [Hawarden, IA] Independent, February 6, 1890; “We see it announced,” The [Humeston, IA] New Era, February 12, 1890; “Iowa’s Coal Palace,” Davenport [Iowa] Daily Republican, September 17, 1890; “Ottumwa Coal Palace,” Logansport Pharos- Tribune, August 11, 1891; “Ottumwa’s Pride To Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 1891; “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “A Coal Palace,” UMWJ, June 23, 1892; “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Welcome,” UMWJ, June 30, 1892; “No Coal Palace for Them,” Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] Dispatch, June 17, 1890. 6 to mine the coal so the miner extracted it by hand. Such a technique had remained unchanged for decades, but the wages the miner received had declined. The miner had agreed to extract the block in exchange for eleven dollars, which he would split with his assistant, and a keg of beer to be given to the extra men needed to hoist the massive block to the surface intact. But after the miner spent days carefully extracting the piece,

Figure 1.1 Southern Midwest Coal Producing Counties 1890-1893 Map adapted from nationatlas.gov/mapmaker. Accessed January 11, 2014.

he received only five dollars for his toil. Keeping his word when his employer did not, the miner split the five dollars with his assistant and purchased the promised beer out of his own earnings.9

Jack’s and the Kansas miner’s experiences demonstrated two ways in which these two worlds of wealth met. To a coal miner like Jack, the Mines Building was a source of

9 L.A. Quellmalz to Lorenzo D. Lewelling, July 29, 1893, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS. 7

both pride and vexation, symbolizing the astonishing wealth he produced but could not

obtain. “It is a pity that every miner could not have been able to visit the mines building in the World’s fair,” the frustrated miner wrote to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. He wanted all miners to see that their products were needed and their labors unappreciated. It did not seem fair, one Illinois mine laborer’s wife agreed. The nation depended upon the miners’ labors

“and yet,” she grumbled, “the miner today is thought very little above the brute.” 10

The Kansas miner’s story seemed to confirm the validity of the wife’s claim, yet

his experience demonstrated a second way these worlds of wealth met. The need to

maintain this abundance caused companies to over-invest in raw material production,

lowering material prices, making it impossible to pay their workers like the Kansas miner

the wages they were promised. Indeed, after spending over $30,000 to construct its palace

of coal, the owners of the Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace were forced to sell “Ottumwa’s

Pride” at public auction for $3,000 barely one year after its official opening.11 Coal was

at the heart of progress, but, as the Mines Building demonstrated, it was pumped out of nearly every corner of the earth, shipped further, and in greater volumes than the burgeoning industrial societies could consume. Coal was everywhere and, like the miner, it was undervalued.12

10 “A Mine Workers’ Wife” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892. 11 “Ottumwa’s Pride to Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 189; “Coal Palace,” The Des Moines Register, December 2, 1891. 12 Edward Atkinson, a businessman and industrialist commissioned by President Grover Cleveland to investigate the state of financial centers in Europe reported that the global trade values of coal in relation to Germany had fallen from 27.46 Marks per kilo in 1873 to 11.88 Marks in 1886. In comparison, wheat fell from 25.94 Marks to 15.06 Marks in that same period. Edward Atkinson, “Report Made by Edward Atkinson… Upon the Present Status of Bimetalism in Europe, October 1887,” 50th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 34 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887) p. 229, 244, 275; Tim O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893; “Jack,” letter to the editor, 8

Rural producers like Jack, the Kansas miner, and the miner’s wife were well aware of these forces that continually increased coal and crop production while the products’ monetary value continued to decline, despite their necessity in the industrial age. It was why Jack wanted every miner in the world to visit the Fair to see not only the world’s dependence on the producer’s toil, but “the power he holds if he only would use it.” 13 But most miners did not use the power Jack described. In fact, as Jack wandered the exhibits of the 1893 World’s Fair, the “mine workers’ union,” officially known as the

United Mine Workers of America (UMW) was barely three years old and nearly dead.

Farmers’ Alliances and other rural producer organizations were husks of the once vibrant organizations that seemed to hold such promise in the mid-1880s throughout the South and Midwest. Workers simply were not interested in organization, Illinois mine worker organizer Pat Donnelly observed. “There is no reason in God’s World why Illinois mine workers should have less than 10,000 members in a union,” he wrote of the 30,000 miners who labored in his home state in 1893.14 But instead of 10,000 members, Illinois had less than 3,000.15

What caused this lack of interest in organization? This is the question this dissertation seeks to answer. Farmers and miners throughout the southern Midwest coalfields of western Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern

Missouri, and eastern Kansas were all exploited. Miners were seldom paid regularly or in cash, were forced to shop at company-owned stores, and compelled to rent company homes or purchase their own. Farmers, facing high taxes, high mortgages, and low crop

“A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893 “A Mine Worker’s Wife” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892. 13 “Jack,” letter to the editor, “A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893. 14 P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “What of Illinois?” UMWJ, January 5, 1893. 15 John McBride, letter to the editor, “Objectors,” UMWJ, March 9, 1893. 9 profits did not fare any better. As the nation faced the greatest economic depression in its history, miners and farmers alike were debt-ridden and hard-pressed to make ends meet.

But instead of organizing into an “Industrial Crusade” that Donnelly and dozens of other farm and labor leaders advocated, the nation’s potential “producer army” remained overwhelmingly uninterested in the cause.16

Historians have long acknowledged this inability to unite, but disagree over how tight bonds were between farmers and laborers, as well as the reasons for their organizational failures in the late nineteenth century. Lawrence Goodwyn claimed that organized labor was too weak and undeveloped to create a movement culture that would allow workers to ally with Populist farmers. Robert McMath and others disagreed, noting the vibrancy of organized labor and its involvement in similar farmer-labor coalitions in the years leading up to the Populist push. Such a legacy prompted Matthew

Hild to argue that farmers and laborers did form a strong alliance, but that this alliance could not overcome the other factors that inhibited movement, namely the pervasive racism that undermined Populist strength.17

16 P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “What of Illinois?” UMWJ, January 5, 1893; “Spartan,” letter to the editor, “The Bevier, Mo., Strike Broken,” NLT, June 28, 1879; William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Why Not Live in Harmony,” NLT, July 2, 1887; “Harmonious Development of the Industries,” NE, April 6, 1888; “Down with the Twine Trust,” NE, May 11, 1889; J. Brad Beverly, “Mighty Army of Producers,” reprinted in JKL, January 30, 1890; “Come and Join Us,” editorial from the Bevier [Missouri] Appeal, reprinted in JKL, January 30, 1890; Merlinda Sisins, letter to the editor, “The Bugle-Call to Arms,” JKL, February 12, 1891; G. P. Benezet, letter to the editor, “United We Stand, Divided We Fall,” JKL, July 13, 1893. 17Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Robert C. McMath, Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance (New York: Norton, 1977); Bruce Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989); Leon Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Matthew Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor and Populists: Farmer-Labor Insurgency in the Late- Nineteenth-Century South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007); Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 10

Such sentiments not only undermined the strength of farmer-labor alliances, but,

as many historians of farmer and labor movements have claimed, also weakened

individual farm and labor organizations. Gwendolyn Mink and others have observed that

the growing diversity among workers made it increasingly difficult for wage earners to

unite as a solid oppositional force. Similar sentiments fractured farmers’ organizations

and caused black farmers to form their own independent Colored Alliance when the

Farmers’ Alliances forbid black membership.18

These issues were compounded by additional factors that sapped union strength.

The well-documented competition between labor leaders regarding whether trades, industrial, or labor unions would best care for workers’ needs further divided an already comparatively small rank and file. Robert Weir and others likewise noted that divisions within single organizations further crippled their effectiveness.19 Meanwhile, the also

18 Skill divisions frequently fell along ethnic lines, causing white native-born workers to hold skilled jobs and leaving less skilled positions for black workers and new immigrants. Unions that organized only skilled workers, then, remained overwhelmingly white. Gwendolyn Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development: Union, Party, and State, 1875-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Michael Kazin, Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); James Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago’s Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1892 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987); Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Mildred Allen Beik, The Miners of Windber: The Struggles of New Immigrants for Unionization, 1890s-1910 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); Daniel Letwin, Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878-1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); William P. Jones, The Tribe of Black Ulysses: African American Lumber Workers in the Jim Crow South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005); Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists; Gerteis, Class and the Color Line: Interracial Class Coalition in the Knights of Labor and the Populist Movement (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Omar H. Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South, 1886-1900 (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2010); Claire Goldstene, Struggle for America’s Promise: Equal Opportunity and the Dawn of Corporate Capital (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2014), 49, 203-4. 19 Robert Weir, Knights Unhorsed: Internal Conflict in a Gilded Age Social Movement (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000); Craig Phelan, Grand Master Workman: Terence Powderly and the Knights of Labor (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000); Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also Norman J. Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States, 1860-1895 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1929) 364-370. 11

well-documented employer and government hostility toward labor and agricultural organizations crushed both union and cooperative alike.20

Historians such as Bruce Laurie, Richard Oestreicher, and others have argued that

these factors inhibited more than organizational effectiveness. The limitations created

through workers’ ethnic divides, simplification of trades, organizational infighting, and

employer or government hostility also affected what members and union leaders believed

they could achieve. Organizations adopted a method of what Laurie called “prudential

unionism,” that made goals more conservative than they had been in the past. Likewise,

Oestreicher found that those who joined organizations expecting major gains became

disillusioned when the orders fell short of their expectations. This awareness of obstacles

preventing union success created what sociologist Kim Voss called a “cognitive

encumbrance” that caused workers to lose faith in labor organizing and abandon their

orders.21

Recent scholars, however, tend to see this period as one not necessarily of union

decline, but of business and labor organizations learning how to function in a new

industrial age. Although they acknowledged the limitations unions faced, the instability

of a new industrialized market system dependent upon trade networks and transport upset

old ways, creating a kind of instability in market negotiations that gave workers such as

20 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise; Tracy Campbell, Politics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1993); Laurie, Artisans into Workers; William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Kim Voss, Making of American Exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Charles Postel, Populist Vision. 21 Laurie, Artisans into Workers; Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation: Working People and Class Consciousness in Detroit, 1875-1900 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement, p. ix, 31, 135; Voss, Making of American Exceptionalism, p. 228; Susan E. Hirsch, After the Strike: A Century of Labor Struggle at Pullman (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); James Green, Death in the Haymarket: A Story of Chicago, the First Labor Movement and the Bombing that Divided Gilded Age America (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006). See also William Fromm, Divided We Stand: Working-Class Stratification in America (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 12

miners, considerable bargaining power. Richard White, Andrew Arnold, and others have

demonstrated that workers, far from powerless, inserted themselves into the ongoing

power struggle between coal operators and railroaders for control of the coal industry. In

the process, they helped shape business negotiations and labor relationships that laid the foundation for modern day business and labor dealings.22

Taken together, the studies of union decline as well as unions’ place in a changing market structure demonstrate both the weaknesses and strengths of organized labor in the

Gilded Age. Still, the overwhelming focus on organized workers has greatly narrowed our understanding of what working class life looked like in industrializing America, implying that only organized workers embodied the spirit of working class reform. Non-

organized workers, then, become an anomaly. If organization was the only way to protest

low wages and poor working conditions, most Gilded Age workers would seem to have

accepted defeat, became complacent in poverty, and did not try to improve their

conditions. These conclusions trickle into the work of contemporary journalists, activists,

and scholars who observe that despite living in a “Second Gilded Age,” union numbers

remain low. Workers, they claim, “vote against their interests” in elections, seemingly

tricked, either by their employers or political party platforms, into supporting candidates

22 Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York, W.W. Norton, 2011); Andrew B. Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age: Railroads, Miners, and Disorder in Pennsylvania Coal Country (New York: New York University Press, 2014); Sean Patrick Adams, Home Fires: How Americans Kept Warm in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Christopher F. Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); David A. Wolff, Industrializing the Rockies: Growth, Competition, and Turmoil in the Coalfields of Colorado and Wyoming, 1868-1914 (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2003); Adams, “Promotion, Competition, Captivity.” These assessments pull from older studies such as Robert Weibe, Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977).

who care little for the working class.23 Such assessments imply that workers, both in the

first Gilded Age and today, are easily misled, apathetic to the problems they face, and are

not capable of discerning what is best for them or their families.24

But Jack’s experience at the World’s Fair indicates otherwise. Far from unaware

of the global forces on Gilded Age industry and economics, this coal miner from Illinois

understood quite readily that the coal he mined sat beside coal from all over the world.25

All of it, from the Pennsylvania samples to those from New South Wales were shipped

easily to Chicago, a city far removed from oceanic ports. More importantly, Jack knew

that although to most patrons the samples presented all looked to same, very important

differences affected their worth. Some industries found Pennsylvania anthracite more

useful than the softer bituminous coal mined nearly everywhere else in the United States.

Even among bituminous coals, the materials fused in with the coal, how fast it burned,

and the amount of smoke it produced when burning created a graduated scale of qualities

that affected the value. 26 These factors were complicated by other logistical concerns

such as the amount of labor needed to mine the coal and the cost of shipping it to market,

creating a “scale” that dictated how much coal miners earned for mining in a particular

23 Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Linda Tirado, “Opinion: Why the Poor Vote ‘Against Their Own Interests,’” MSNBC, September 24, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/opinion-why-the-poor-vote-against-their-own- interests, accessed December 3, 2015; MacGillis, “Who Turned My Blue State Red?,” NYT, November 22, 2015. 24 For a deeper examination of working-class voting trends, see Richard Oestreicher, “Urban Working- Class Political Behavior and Theories of American Electoral Politics, 1870-1940,” Journal of American History 74:4 (March, 1888): 1257-1940. 25 For a detailed examination of global coal trade expansion in the late nineteenth century, see “‘Bound Out for Callao!’ The Pacific Coal Trade 1876 to 1896: Selling Coal or Selling Lives? Part 1,” The Great Circle, 28:2 (2006): p. 26-45 and “‘Bound Out for Callao!’ The Pacific Coal Trade 1876 to 1896: Selling Coal or Selling Lives? Part 2,” The Great Circle, 29:1 (2007): p. 3-21. 26 J. F. Limerick letter to G. C. Boradhead, February 15, 1890, Box “3271-3299 Miscellaneous Manuscripts,” File 3276, SHSM, Columbia; For a detailed discussion on the science behind determining coal quality in the nineteenth century, see Peter Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p.43-46. 14

region. Such distinctions had always existed within the coal industry, but Jack and miners

throughout the nation understood that the market that placed their coal side by side and in

competition with other regions also pitted miners in a competition with each other. Those

who mined coal for the lowest prices would produce the cheapest coal, allowing their

mines to sell more. Mines that sold the most could afford to stay open full time year-

round, ensuring miners steady work, even if it was for a depreciated wage.

But not all miners were affected by the national market in the same way. As

Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky were pulled into competition with Pennsylvania,

Ohio, and West Virginia, other mining regions, such as the railroad-owned mines in

Missouri and Kansas were only indirectly affected by market competition. Their concerns, which were distinct from those competing for national markets, caused an east- west divide to become more pronounced in unionizing efforts. As organizers focused on creating a national pay scale in the competitive districts, miners west of the Mississippi did not see how such efforts met their immediate needs. Miners in Indiana’s “block” coal

field voiced similar cries of neglect. As a type of coal more valuable than typical

bituminous coal mined elsewhere in the southern Midwest, block coal miners’ wages and

concerns differed from those in the rest of the competitive district. Despite its differences,

however, the block field was classified as part of the Indiana bituminous district and, like

Missouri and Kansas, was often forced to accept UMW wage terms that applied more to

bituminous mines in the competitive fields than to those west of the Mississippi or the

mines of Clay County, Indiana. As a result, in different ways, the national coal market

dictated nearly every aspect of the mining industry even if a region’s coal did not enter

the competitive market.

Labor organizers claimed that this connection between regions and miners

demanded that all mine workers from West Virginia to Kansas work together. If miners

could organize into a national “union,” they could regulate wages and working

conditions. But such a term can be misleading. Although late-nineteenth century workers

used the term “union” freely, their understanding of unionism differed greatly from the

unionism that grew in the twentieth century. Like many fraternal organizations of the

period, groups like the Knights of Labor and Patrons of Husbandry fused moral

understandings with their understandings of how society should function, allowing these

orders to be as much fraternal and social clubs as they were laborer organizations. In

addition to committing to overarching goals like abolishing the wage system and

establishing cooperatives, Knights were to abstain from alcohol and quoted Biblical scripture in meetings. In the workplace, they observed “honest principles” of not stealing or undercutting fellow workers and working together for the collective good. Such moral components carried over into other farmer and laborer organizations as well.

Organizations like the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers, the National

Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers or the Farmers’ Alliances all professed moral and at times even religious conviction to their tenets. Consequently, a moral obligation undergirded union affiliation so that to organizers and dedicated organized rank and file workers a true “union man” was not only a member of a labor organization, but also one who lived and labored with moral conviction. Conversely, when organizers or rank and file members identified someone as “non-union,” their claim implied that the worker rejected union membership and its principles. To go against the union, then, was to act immorally. 27

27 McMath, Populist Vanguard; Bruce Palmer, “Man Over Money”: The Southern Populist Critique of 16

But in the late nineteenth century, national unions tended to be more abstract and

feeble than the ideologies they claimed to embody. Often, national labor organizations

were barely functioning orders with more ambition than strength. Leadership, though

claiming authority over the rank and file masses were seldom more than figureheads who

preached the ideologies of labor unionism with few practical means to implement.28

As national labor leaders waged a war with labor ideology, many workers, both outside and in organization ranks, held a more complicated yet pragmatic view of unionism. Although the coal market operated on a national scale, wages and working conditions were still dramatically influenced by regional issues such as unique mining conditions in each mine, or a mine’s specific cost to ship its coal to market.

Consequently, local organizers, pit committees, checkweighmen, and other local leaders who represented the miners’ interest in the workplace influenced miners’ decisions more than the national organizations. These pit committees and checkweighmen were not always union leaders, but simply experienced miners well-known and respected in the mining community. As a result, union involvement was already a secondary factor in negotiations between miners and boss. Most miners saw organization as one of many ways to take care of themselves and their families. Whereas labor leaders stressed the

American Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Gutman, “Protestantism in the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age” in Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America (New York: Vintage Books, 1977) 79-118; Robert Weir, Beyond Labor’s Veil: The Culture of the Knights of Labor (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Joe Creech, Righteous Indignation: Religion and the Populist Revolution (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York: Knopf, 2006); Dennis Sven Nordin, Rich Harvest: A History of the Grange, 1867-1900 (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2007); Edward J. Blum, “‘By the Sweat of their Brow’: The Knights of Labor, the Book of Genesis, and the Christian Spirit of the Gilded Age,” Labor 11:2 (Spring 2014): 29-34; For additional nineteenth century connections between labor, faith, and economics, see William Mirola, Redeeming Time: Protestantism and Chicago’s Eight-Hour Movement, 1866-1912 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015) esp. p. ix-x. 28 For a more detailed treatment of union growth development in the late nineteenth century, see Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age. 17

importance of year-round union membership and dedication to protect miners from wage

decline or lax enforcement of labor legislation, many workers saw membership as a tool to secure immediate goals. For miners, this caused union numbers to increase in April and May when yearly wage contracts were signed and strikes were most likely to occur.

These part-time members as well as those who refused to join the union entirely rejected the notion that the only “good men” were those who resided in union ranks. They were quick to point out that, despite leaders’ claims, union membership did not denote

“honest” labor. Rather, plenty of union members disregarded the “honest principles” they professed or rejected leader orders. Likewise, “good men” upheld “honest labor principles” without ever joining union ranks. Such instances prompted many local organizers to insist that hundreds of workers had the “spirit of unionism” even if they did not carry its card. 29

Perhaps not surprisingly, the distinction between union and non-union grew

increasingly muddled as market competition intensified in the final decades of the

nineteenth century. One mine labor organizer noted that the miners were like unsorted or

“mine run” coal, a pressurized mix of slate, clay, and silt, fused with the coal as it was pulled from the earth. They were “run of the mine” men, the organizer explained, because like the coal they extracted, their identities were muddled and blurred together, leading them to seemingly contradictory actions.30 They advocated dependence as they clamored

for freedom, professed notions of honor and dignity while describing themselves as

29 “Wigs, The Kid,” letter to the editor, “Mining Notes,” UMWJ, January 4, 1894; M. Commesky, letter to the editor, “From Indiana,” UMWJ, April 23, 1891; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “From the Districts,” UMJW, September 24, 1891; “Dhroleen,” letter to the editor, “Indian Territory,” UMWJ, October 20, 1892; George Gorham Groat, An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America (New York: MacMillan Company, 1916), 455-458. 30 Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton, Ind.,” United Mine Workers’ Journal, May 28, 1891. 18

unhuman, claimed to be moral when breaking strikes, and expressed an unyielding hope for their futures even as they proclaimed their despair.

Blind Spots

Historians have long noted the radicalism inherent in late nineteenth an early

twentieth century organizations.31 Such a focus on the most radical adherents to unions,

however, may make analyses of labor organizations cleaner and much less messy, but it

ultimately misconstrues nature of late nineteenth century working class life, creating

substantial blind spots in studies of late nineteenth century organizing. First, this attention

to worker radicalism, particularly through union or political mobilization, reflects a

tendency to select and extract aspects of working class life without considering the

variegated nature of workers’ identities. Laborers who do not fit the worker radicalism

mold, such as those who rejected labor organizations or who openly opposed labor

legislation are frequently overlooked. Only the workers most dedicated to labor

organizing are examined. By allowing only the most dedicated and radical voices to

speak for the entire working class, our understanding of labor becomes skewed and,

given the faith in organizing espoused by these workers, organizational failure becomes

more difficult to explain. Emphasis on the radical minority makes it seem larger and

more vibrant so that membership surges appear higher and membership decline to appear

more dramatic than it actually was.

31 For examples, see John Laslett, Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881-1924 (New York: Basic, 1970); David Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor: Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Howard Kimeldorf, Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers, and the Making of the Union Movement (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999). See also James Green, The Devil is Here in These Hills: West Virginia’s Coal Miners and Their Battle for Freedom (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2015). 19

This exclusive focus on labor organization members leads to a second blind spot

in studies of labor organizing. While examining membership numbers or dues rates to

monitor how membership grew or shrank in a given period can be useful, it can also

make the organization appear more steadfast than it truly was. High membership or high

dues are frequently taken to indicate a kind of worker “solidarity” that presumably came

from common experiences binding workers together while low numbers or low dues

payments indicate “fragmentation” or growing differences between workers that

eventually dissolves worker bonds and the organization that supports them.32 In a general

sense, this assessment is correct, but it also overstates the commitment and cohesion of

union members whose “membership” was always tentative and conditional. Such

analyses leave little room for rank and file members who were dissatisfied with

organizational leadership, disobeyed organizational orders, or behaved contrary to its

advocated principles. Without examining the fragmentation that was endemic among the

rank and file, the organization appears more solid and united than it truly was, creating a

larger disparity between organized and non-organized workers.

Finally, focusing only on organized members often causes scholars to examine

one specific organization or industry rather than placing the organization in a broader

context both within the labor movement as well as society. As Matthew Hild has shown,

this exclusive focus on one industry or organization has caused historians to create a false

dichotomy between farmer and labor organizing and political efforts.33 Connections

32 Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation; Richard Oestreicher, “A Note on Knights of Labor Membership Statistics,” Labor History 25:1 (1984): 102-108. 33 Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor and Populists. Such a centralized focus, for example, prompted Lawrence Goodwyn to conclude that the labor movement was too weak to form a farmer-laborer alliance. Although Bruce Laurie, Leon Fink, and others refuted this claim and proved that organized labor was strong enough to have its own “movement culture,” the connections between farmers and laborers remain 20

between occupations or organizations forged outside the meeting hall are therefore

hidden, skewing our understanding of how rank and file workers interacted with each

other and the organizations that claimed to represent their interests. For the thousands of

farmers who worked in the mines during the winter months, these intersections were a

critical part of life, even though they seldom called themselves “miners” and rarely joined

the miners’ organizations year-round.

“Run of the Mine” seeks to restore the messiness and confusion within late nineteenth century organizing efforts by examining all aspects associated with it instead of focusing on organizations or their most devoted members. In particular, this dissertation considers the hundreds of thousands of workers who remained outside organizational ranks and those within the ranks that questioned organizational tactics, leadership, and decisions. Looking beyond those who carried union cards reveals that a wider range of working class mobilization existed and that was part of a more complex working class life and culture than historians usually describe. It pulls together workers in seemingly disparate industries, such as farming and mining and includes groups like strikebreakers, stockholders, mine managers, and small business owners whose worlds overlapped in complicated ways.

This wider scope also pulls in actions of rural workers’ wives who were seldom union members themselves, regardless of their husbands’ union affiliations. Because women like miners’ wives could not work in the mines, they could not join industrial unions like those in the mining industry. Until unions formed auxiliaries in the twentieth

largely unexplored. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise; Laurie, Artisans into Workers; Fink, Workingman’s Democracy. 21 century, these women had no official relationship with their husbands’ unions.34 As such, historians have been slow to recognize women’s contributions to the development or failure of male-dominated unions in the late-nineteenth century. Like traditional labor studies, examinations of workers’ wives tend to imply that wives’ union activism began only with official organizational affiliation in the twentieth century, overlooking wives’ constant but informal involvement decades earlier.

The few scholars that have considered nineteenth century workers’ wives largely depict them as followers rather than forceful decision-makers. They highlight supportive actions such as taunting strikebreakers and seldom offer examples of independent or sustained involvement in the late-nineteenth century labor movement. Consequently, even in this literature, wives only rallied during periods of strife and were uninvolved in union decisions.35

As historians of farmers’ movements have observed, however, distinctions between “public” and “domestic” spheres were not as clear as this scholarship implies.

34 Elizabeth Jameson, “Imperfect Unions: Class and Gender in Cripple Creek,” in Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker edited by Milton Cantor and Bruce Laurie (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977): 166- 202; Susan Levine, “Workers Wives: Gender, Class and Consumerism in the 1920s United States,” Gender and History 3 (Spring 1991): 45-64; Melinda Chateauvert, Marching Together: Women of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Caroline Waldron Merithew, “‘We Were Not Ladies’: Gender, Class, and a Women’s Auxiliary’s Battle for Mining Unionism,” Journal of Women’s History, 16:2 (Summer 2006): 63-94. 35Rosemary Jones, for example, noted that miner wives in South Wales facilitated unionism by ostracizing miners who broke a strike or refused to join a union. Herbert Gutman likewise observed that wives and daughters of striking coal miners in Illinois staged demonstrations against strikebreakers, with their actions bordering on riot. Elizabeth Jameson and R. Alton Lee found that rural wives in Colorado and Kansas participated in similar acts, joined boycotts, and in some cases, eventually formed women’s union auxiliaries. Rosemary Jones, “Sociability, Solidarity, and Social Exclusion: Women’s Activism in the South Wales Coalfield, ca. 1830-1939,” in Mining Women and the Development of a Global Industry, 1670 to 2005, edited by Jaclyn J. Gier and Laurie Mercier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 96-118; Susan Levine, Labor’s True Woman: Carpet Weavers, Industrialization, and Labor Reform in the Gilded Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), 108-9 and 115; Herbert Gutman, “Labor in the Land of Lincoln,” in Power and Culture: Essays on the American Working Class, edited by Ira Berlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 170-171; Jameson, “Imperfect Unions”; R. Alton Lee, Farmers vs. Wage Earners: Organized Labor in Kansas, 1860-1960 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 15, 285; Gutman, Work, Culture and Society. 22

Rural wives were intimately involved in family financial affairs, often helping earn income and save money. For farm wives, this allowed them to join and participate in organizations like the Grange and Farmers’ Alliances.36 These women gave lectures at

Grange and Alliance meetings, voted on organizational matters, and as Julie Roy Jeffery observed, regularly voiced their opinions in newspapers like the Progressive Farmer.37

Such interest in activities typically associated with the “male sphere” also carried over into national politics. Although most women could not vote in the late-nineteenth century, wives and daughters took an active interest in political affairs, campaigning for their candidates of choice, debating political questions in local newspapers, and even wrote to political figureheads to help shape campaign agendas.38 Elsa Berkley Brown

36 Nancy Grey Osterud, Bonds of Community: The Lives of Farm Women in Nineteenth-Century New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Donald Marti, Women of the Grange: Mutuality and Sisterhood in Rural America, 1866-1920 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 7-11, 26; Oliver Hudson Kelley, Origin and Progress of The Order of the Patrons of Husbandry in the United States; A History from 1866 to 1873 (Philadelphia: J.A. Wagenseller, 1875) 14-16, 213-217, 347-348, 425; John Mack Faragher, “History from the Inside-Out: Writing the History of Women in Rural America,” American Quarterly, 33:5 (Winter, 1981) 537-557; Julie Roy Jeffery, “Women in the Southern Farmers’ Alliance: A Reconsideration of the Role and Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth-Century South,” Feminist Studies, 3 (Fall, 1975) , 79; Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community and the Foundations of Agribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life after Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 205-207, 233, and Marilyn P. Watkins, Rural Democracy, Family Farmers and Politics in Western Washington, 1890-1925 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). For a counterargument to this point, see Deborah Fink, Agrarian Women: Wives and Mothers in Rural Nebraska, 1880-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). 37 Jeffery, “Women in the Southern Farmers’ Alliance.” For a detailed discussion of women contributing to family incomes and the debate over the amount of authority this gave them, see Gita Sen, “The Sexual Division of Labor and the Working-Class Family: Towards a Conceptual Synthesis of Class Relations and the Subordination of Women,” Review of Radical Political Economics 12:2 (July 1980): 76-86. 38 “M.L.N.” to William Jennings Bryan, November 7, 1896, WJBC, Folder 1896, Box 10, Nov 7 N-Pa, LC; Mary Elizabeth Hodgson to William Jennings Bryan, November 6, 1896, WJBC, Box 8, Folder 1896 Nov 6 He-Ho, LC; Mary Sobieski to William Jennings Bryan, October 24, 1896, WJBC, Folder 1896, Box 4, October 12-25, LC; Corinne Brosseau to William Jennings Bryan, November 6, 1896, WJBC, Box 7, Folder 1896, November 6 A-B, LC; Bertha Lambert to William Jennings Bryan, November 7, 1896, WJBC, Box 10, Folder 1896 Nov 7, Ki-LL, LC; Ethel Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, November 8, 1896, WJBC, Box 11, Folder 1896 Nov 8 So-Y, Z, LC; Belle M. Kern to William Jennings Bryan, November 12, 1896, WJBC, Box 14, Folder 1896, November 12-13, LC.; Merlinda Sisins, letter to the editor, “A New Party,” JKL, August 7, 1890. 23

likewise found that newly enfranchised black working class families decided together

which way to cast the husband’s vote in elections. 39

These instances indicate that women retained a degree of influence in both

politics and labor despite not officially having a right to vote or a job title separate from

their husbands. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, rural wage earner wives like miners’ wives

also participated in union decisions even though they were officially barred from

membership. Although they never entered the coal mine, wives were intimately aware of

the workplace issues and wage problems that affected the mining industry. To them,

mining, like farming, was a lifestyle that pulled in all members of the family. Miners’ and

farmers’ wives, were responsible for helping family finances, allowing them to call

themselves “miners” without touching a pick. As a result, wives in both industries took

an interest in labor organizing and helped their husbands decide whether or not to join.

Those who cast their lot with the labor organization readily wrote to organizational

newspapers like the National Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers Journal, participating in debates. Moreover, their forcefully expressed opinions about organizational affairs were entertained as valid and valued proposals from members of these organizations, allowing women to shape union actions and agendas without ever entering the meeting hall. In light of this, the bold women typically cast as anomalies in the male political world such as Annie Diggs, Mary Lease, or Mary Harris “Mother”

Jones are more typical than previously understood. Consequently, no study of labor

39 Elsa Barkley Brown, “To Catch the Vision of Freedom: Reconstructing Southern Women’s Political History, 1865-1880” in African-American Women and the Vote, 1837-1965, Ann D. Cordon and Bettye Collier-Thomas, eds. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997) ebook, 66-99.

organizing is complete without careful consideration of wives’ contribution to

organizational decisions.

Because the trade newspapers typically gave equal voice to women and people of

color, they became a forum that allowed a freer discussion of thoughts and opinions than

likely would have been tolerated in other arenas where physical differences were more

apparent. Although women, immigrant, and black writers frequently identified

themselves as such in their letters, these differences mattered less when their letters

appeared in the newspaper.40 Instead, most tended to treat the letters as though all the

writers were white and male unless discussing issues of race and immigration. This

essentially allowed conversations to flow across divisions of race and gender as

participants discussed the most pressing problems of the mining industry and the miners’

organizations. Due to the anonymity associated with late-nineteenth century letter writers,

it is not always possible to discern whether writers were male or female, black or white.

When possible, I distinguish between men and women writers simply because men

typically had the firsthand experience in describing workplace conditions or events that

transpired during a union meeting whereas wives’ reports could only be hearsay.

Similarly, because black, immigrant, and native-born white miners’ experiences and grievances with their employers and union leaders were similar, I do not identify miner ethnicity in most chapters. This is because regardless of their ethnicity, the letter writers’ complaints come from their experiences as miners first and foremost and they speak on behalf of the entire industry, regardless of ethnic background. The exception to this is when miners clearly speak on behalf of one particular ethnicity or voice concerns and

40 For a detailed discussion of newspapers and the “public sphere” see John Brooke, Columbia Rising: Civil Life on the Upper Hudson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) p. 103-107. 25

experiences clearly related to their identities as black or immigrant miners. In these cases

where ethnic background is relevant, I identify a miner’s race or ethnicity.

Such inclusion in a union forum make newspapers a valuable source in

understanding non-unionism in the late nineteenth century. Like many other industries,

coal miners’ and their labor organizations relied on newspapers to report information

quickly and reliably to a population of workers spread across the rural countryside. State

organizers and leaders frequently maintained official columns in the National Labor

Tribune and United Mine Workers’ Journal that reported organizing success and failure,

meeting minutes, and topics up for debate at national meetings. For miners wishing to

locate better paying work, letters to the editors of labor newspapers like the National

Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers’ Journal provided a way for miners to report wages and working conditions in their mines, whether the boss was fair, or whether the mine was on strike. Such information proved valuable to miners who traveled from mine

to mine searching for work, but also allowed miners to voice their grievances and use the

newspaper columns to carry on nationwide discussions of how to remedy their common

problems.

Such a forum for airing grievances, however, was not limited to miners frustrated

with wages or working conditions. They also used the newspapers to discuss problems

within their own labor organizations. Workers upset with officers or wished to see change

in union structure frequently wrote to these same newspapers to discuss how to resolve

organizational problems as well as those of the workplace. This trend, which had existed

since the 1870s as miners’ organizations formed and faltered, continued when the United

Mine Workers established its Journal in 1891. By then, miners had developed a

longstanding mistrust for labor leadership that grew particularly strong as UMW officers

also served as the editors of the organization’s official organ. To remedy this, UMW

officers and Journal editors insisted on a strict promise to publish all letters submitted to the newspaper, regardless of how critical they were of the miners’ organization.41 Such an effort, designed to build the miners’ trust for the organization, made the Journal a unique place for members and non-members to voice their frustrations against the UMW, its leaders, and its policies. Consequently, the letters printed in the pages of these labor papers are integral to understanding how and why rank-and-file support for workers’ organizations like the UMW broke down in the Gilded Age.

This study focuses on the coal industry in the rural southern Midwest states of

Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas for several reasons. Contrary to popular conceptions of industry, most of the Gilded Age industrial workforce lived and worked in regions that were more rural than urban. Mining, railroad work, sawmills, turpentine making, and much of the metalmaking industries all took place in rural regions, meaning that most Gilded Age industrial workers resided and worked in small towns scattered throughout the countryside.42 Secondly, although the southern Midwest was deeply tied

both to the national competitive coal market and the railroad industry, few histories

consider the region’s mining history. In this region, mining often took place beside—or

under—farm fields, allowing labor organizing to coincide with the farm organization

efforts that swept portions of the southern Midwest in the 1890s. Third, as Gilded Age

41 “A Compliment,” UMWJ, July 2, 1891; “Outlook,” letter to the editor, “Right of Criticism,” UMWJ, June 11, 1891; Editorial, “We were pleased,” UMWJ, August 13, 1891; Editorial, “We hope Mr. Kennedy,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; “Editor’s Note,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891.”Kep Off the Grass,” letter to the editor, “Keep off the Grass,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 42 Department of the Interior, Census Division, Abstract of the Eleventh Census: 1890, 2nd ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), 265. 27

prices declined, coal was often at the head of this decline, forcing prices in other

industries down as well. While this was ideal for industrialists desiring cheap steel and

consumers who wanted more affordable products, it also continually pulled down miners’

wages. By 1896, coal miners made roughly sixty-eight percent of what the average

manufactory worker earned.43 If any industry had the grievances to bind a workforce

together in a solid labor organization, coal would be among the likeliest of candidates. In

addition, although it was extremely dangerous work and often demanded precision and

care, coal mining was largely semi-skilled labor learned on the job without prior

experience. Coal mining therefore better reflects the 1880s and 1890s workforce that

grew increasingly unskilled rather than the skilled workers frequently examined in labor

studies. The fact that coal mining was unskilled/semi-skilled labor also eliminated some

of the unionbusting tactics employers used. Anyone who wanted to mine coal could do so

without any prior training or experience, learning the trade as they performed it.

Employers or “operators” paid the same wage regardless of skill or ethnicity so that all

workers shared the same experiences, dangers, and earnings with no stratification as

appeared in many other industries to thwart worker organizations.44

All of these factors should have helped create a strong miners’ union, and in some

respects, historians have claimed that it did. When the Knights of Labor mining trade

assembly merged with the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers to

form United Mine Workers (UMW) formed in January 1890, the new miners’

43 George A. Fitch to Willard C. Flagg, March 5, 1878, Flagg Family Collection, Box 1, Folder 6, UILSP, Champaign; Andrew B. Arnold, “Mother Jones and the Panics of 1873 and 1893,” Pennsylvania Legacies 11:1 (May 2011): 18-23; Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888- 1896 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 240; Paul Douglas, Real Wages in the United States: 1890-1926 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930) p. 223, 350, 353; Albert Rees, Real Wages in Manufacturing: 1890-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) p. 74. 44 Employers did, however, exercise favoritism or segregation in the mines that at times exploited racial differences in an effort to dissolve unions, as discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 5. 28

organization claimed to have over 34,000 in its ranks. Historians of the organization cite

this number and frequently jump forward to the late 1890s when the UMW made its first

major gains as a labor organization under the direction of UMW President and former

Illinois miner John Mitchell. Those that do consider the period focus more on union

leadership learning the importance of “disciplining union members.”45 Such claims

imply that the UMW was numerically strong, but that the rank and file simply lacked the

discipline to obey leadership. But the trouble the UMW faced extended beyond leaders’

inability to control their ranks and miners’ actions in the late nineteenth century were

caused by far more than a lack of discipline. Rather, most of the nation’s miners

remained outside the organization and still more abandoned the union when membership

proved unbeneficial. By 1892, the UMW was in a steep decline that only continued

despite organizer efforts to revive the order.

Examining the Non-Union Spirit

This dissertation also examines why a strong coalition of mine workers never

formed in the nineteenth century. Pulling primarily from mine workers’ and wives’ own

letters, it explores the lives and decisions rural workers made, giving careful attention to

the factors that influenced whether a mining family supported the miners’ unions. As a

result, this dissertation puts forward four main arguments. First and foremost, it argues

45The official account of the UMW’s first one hundred years written by Maier B. Fox, for example, summarizes the miners’ unionizing efforts from the 1860s to 1898 in the first fifty-five pages of the five- hundred and forty-page text. Maier B. Fox, United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America, 1890- 1990 (Washington D.C.: United Mine Workers of America, 1990); Craig Phelan, Divided Loyalties: The Public and Private Life of Labor Leader John Mitchell (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1994); John Laslett, “British Immigrant Colliers, and the Origins and early Development of the UMWA, 1870-1912,” in John Laslett, ed., The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity? (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 40 (quote). See also Green, The Devil is Here in These Hills. 29 that distinctions between farmer, business owner, investor, wage earner, and wife were not as separate as scholars have implied. Rather, these identities overlapped considerably in the late nineteenth century in ways that directly impacted family life, incomes, and behavior. Second, it demonstrates that workers were well aware of the economic forces that dictated work conditions and wages as well as what successful collective action could potentially achieve. Third, it maintains that worker rejection of formal unions did not denote a dislike for union principle. Instead, workers and wives formed their own objectives and concepts of unionism that did not always fit with union agendas or allowed them to affiliate with two seemingly different unions simultaneously.

Consequently, the divisions emphasized between organizations like the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor were more important to union leadership than to the rank and file. Finally, this dissertation argues that workers failed to join unions not because they were apathetic about their conditions or disillusioned with unionism, but because they believed that the labor organizations did not adequately address their most pressing needs and desires.

To present these key points, I examine five events that did not happen. A national union that never united, union miners who failed to strike, a planned strike that never occurred, a union that failed to accept all who carried membership cards, and a putative victory that looked more like defeat are the focal points of the five chapters that comprise this work. Each non-event highlights a distinct aspect that contributed to worker rejection of labor organizations or decisions to disobey union leader orders. The next chapter offers a brief overview of late nineteenth century business and producer responses to it. It shows that producer concerns that figures with authority were deceiving average people and

30 taking advantage of them ultimately generated mistrust for labor leadership. Although leaders in the Knights of Labor and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers insisted that these problems would fade when the two organizations merged into a single national miners’ union, these concerns of fraud and deception ultimately caused workers to reject the new order so that despite much fanfare and promise of cooperation, the united miners’ union did not form.

The third chapter looks more closely at the rural workers’ world. Although they criticized the hypocrisy and greed of businessmen, investors, politicians, and ministers who took advantage of workers, many of these workers committed the very acts they condemned. This chapter examines the overlap between farmers, miners, and investing, demonstrating that miners not only understood business concepts of profit, but that looking out for one’s own interest was infectious. Workers, like businessmen, often set aside union principles when it was more advantageous to break a strike or work for less pay than the union demanded. While union leaders were supposed to push for higher wages for workers, such pushes did not always occur. This chapter ends with an examination of an instance where after encouraging miners to strike for higher wages, labor leaders backed away from their claims and told miners to accept a wage reduction.

As non-union miners went on strike for an “honest wage,” organized miners, under leader orders broke the strike. As a result, lines between “union” and “non-union” became blurred.

Chapter Four continues with this theme of worker dissatisfaction with a close examination of the effects of a strike that never occurred. Despite constant campaigning and advertising for a nationwide strike for the eight-hour workday set to begin on May 1,

1891, union officers called off the strike at the last minute, claiming that the newly formed United Mine Workers (UMW) was too weak to achieve its goal. The following months marked the beginning of steep membership decline that came not from miners’ disillusion with unionism in general, but a firm belief that UMW leaders had “backslid” from the principles they were supposed to uphold. As a result, miners throughout the nation not only left the UMW, but formed new miners’ organizations that rivaled the national order. Although labor leaders insisted that those who turned their backs to the

UMW were the true “backsliders,” the workers’ actions indicated that their faith in unionism did not waver even if their faith in labor organizers did.

While Chapter Four examines those who turned their back to major labor organizations, Chapter Five focuses on the workers who claimed national unions like the

UMW turned their backs to them. Although organizations like the Knights of Labor and

United Mine Workers claimed to accept workers of all races, religions, and ethnic backgrounds, such inclusion never truly occurred. This chapter therefore explores those who were on the fringes of labor organizing, who did not completely fit with the white male miner profile. Black, non-native-English-speaking miners, farmers who worked in the mines, and miners’ wives who did not work in the mines were associated with the miners’ unions in ways different from the white males who dominated the order. This chapter examines the grievances unique to these outlier groups, giving careful attention to how factors of ethnicity affected worker expectations for the unions that claimed to represent their interests. Careful examination of labor legislation pursued by groups like the UMW indicate that despite their claims for inclusion, native-English-speaking white- dominated labor organizations were uninterested in promoting racial and ethnic equality

32 in the workplace or society. This disregard for racial and ethnic concerns pushed many black and non-English-speaking miners away from the order and at times caused them to form their own rival unions. Such instances show that white women and white farmers were more accepted by the miners’ orders than the non-white and non-native-English- speaking miners of the trade.

The sixth chapter turns away from the workplace and looks at workers’ understanding of union leaders’ responsibilities and dedication to the workers’ interests.

It focuses specifically on the outcome of the 1894 bituminous miners’ strike when over

100,000 bituminous coal miners set down their tools in hopes of earning a higher wage.

With UMW membership only measuring 13,000 at the time of the strike, union officials and miners alike marveled at the turnout that almost entirely shut down bituminous coal production. The massive numbers caused both miner and organizer to believe that victory was certain, but as farmers and other workers entered the mines to fill the national coal demand, UMW leaders ended the strike and settled for a wage less than what the miners desired. Miners questioned leader dedication to the workers’ cause. Although leaders insisted that the small wage increase the workers secured was still a victory, the miners disagreed. This chapter, then, examines the outcome of a strike victory that appeared on paper, but not in the mines. As charges of UMW leader corruption surfaced, organized miners overthrew their leadership in an effort to “purify” their decaying union. Their efforts coincided with other organizations’ efforts to revive their own orders, which ultimately led to the Knights of Labor ending its alliance with the UMW, and prompted union miners, along with workers in other industries, to form a new organization that would rival the Knights. While leaders of these fracturing orders fought over the

33 remaining scraps of their failing unions, thousands of workers questioned why they should join an organization more interested in fighting other labor organizations than improving workers’ lives. As a result, as union leaders “sold out” the miners’ interests, workers turned in their union cards, believing they had a better chance of taking care of their families without it.

In the end worker rejection of unions or union leadership is neither a sign of unwillingness to care for “their interests” nor unique to the Gilded Age. Rather, the “non- union spirit” that ran rampant in southern Midwest mines reflected a disconnection between labor organizations and the rank and file they represented that can be found in all industries an in all time periods, including the present day. What follows is a story of those, like Jack, who worked in and was worked by the worlds of wealth that fueled the

Gilded Age. But it is also a story of hope and despair, of community and division, and of union and non-union that are mixed and fused together in ways that cannot be separated.

Chapter Two

Imposters: Markets, Deception, and the 1888 Union Merger

Edgar Simpson had just sat down to supper when the alarm whistle pierced the

quiet Kansas countryside. The thirty-two-year-old iron smelter froze. Having worked as a coal and metal miner in Colorado and Kansas before joining the smelting trade, he knew the alarm signaled an accident at one of the mines. Within minutes, a young boy, running over a mile and a quarter through sleet and freezing rain, had burst into Simpson’s home and exclaimed “that mine number 2 had blown up and everybody in it.” Upon hearing the news, Simpson ran to join the rescue effort. Without breathing a word, he “got up and got my pit coat and… struck out for number 2.” 1

It was already dusk when Simpson reached Frontenac Mine No. 2 a half an hour

after the explosion, but as he peered through the sleet and rain, he stood in awe of the

chaos. The November 1888 explosion tore through the earth, creating rifts in the soil. It

blew out the fan house, moving it two feet from its foundation. It shattered the hoist and

shot out blazing timbers, which lay smoldering around the shaft. Haggard wives stood

planted with their children by the shaft despite the winter storm, screaming for someone

to enter the mine while local men and miners from nearby towns worked frantically to

clear airways and rig a new hoist. 2

Everyone knew the mine’s breathable air was running out, but it still took

Simpson and the other rescuers hours to reach the bottom of the shaft. Enduring the

1 Edgar Simpson testimony, The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, as the Administratrix of Alexis Siplet, deceased, Case No. 10702, Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, 1896, KSHS, p. 122 (quote), 152. 2 Simpson testimony, Cherokee and Pittsburg vs. Siplet, 123-127; “Mine Explosion,” FSDM, November 10, 1888; “Scores Dead,” TSJ, November 10, 1888; “A Mine of Death,” NLT, November 17, 1888. 35

searing heat, smoke, and mine gas, the party worked until three in the morning, moving

methodically down the mine track replacing timbers, clearing air passages, and searching rooms for survivors.3 Amid the debris, Simpson discovered the charred body of John

Baptiste Labecq, burned beyond recognition.4 The thirty-one-year-old miner’s hair was

“singed to a crisp; the flesh singed to a crisp.” But to Simpson, the most memorable

damage was caused by Labecq’s poorly-fit clothing. His shirt, Simpson explained, “was

too short for him and it left a band of flesh exposed between it and his pants.” While

Labecq’s ill-fitting clothing always made labor in the mines more difficult, it had especially distressing effects in the explosion. In the blast that melted dinner pails and soldering, Labecq’s unprotected skin burned instantly. Not realizing this, Simpson tried to move the miner by grabbing what he mistook as Labecq’s leather belt “and the flesh came off in my hands.”5

The circumstances that created Labecq’s “belt” demonstrated how national

markets, company authority, and unsafe working conditions had an impact on every

aspect of a miner’s life. Rural mines like Frontenac No. 2 were often spread apart for

miles, making it difficult for mine inspectors to check mines or enforce mining laws. 6

Mine owners took advantage of the lax law enforcement and decreased production costs

by ignoring safety protocol like wetting dry mines to prevent coal dust from hanging in

3 Simpson testimony, 126-130, 158; “Mine Explosion,” FSDM, November 10, 1888; “Forty Bodies,” TSJ, November 12, 1888. 4 It is unclear whether Labecq was still alive when Simpson found him. Simpson testimony, 132; “The Dead,” TSJ, November 13, 1888; “The Mine Horror,” Pittsburg [Kansas] Headlight, November 15, 1888; Nikki Patrick, “Today Is Anniversary of Mine Disaster,” Morning Sun [Pittsburg, Kansas], November 9, 2008. 5 Simpson testimony, 134. 6 Technically, the mine was operated by the Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal Company which was a subsidiary of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (hereafter ATSF). Keith L. Bryant, History of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974) p. 223. 36

the air. 7 To lower wages they hired inexperienced miners, such as Jimmy Wilson. The

seventeen-year-old farmer’s son was hired as a mule driver, but when the company

ordered the mine to increase production, the mine boss put Wilson to work digging coal.8

During the evening blast to loosen the coal, Wilson packed his “shot” improperly. His

blast backfired, ignited the coal dust in the dry mine, and shot fire down the corridors. It

incinerated Labecq’s flesh that was exposed because the company store he was

compelled to shop at did not sell properly-fitting clothing he could afford. Lacodia

Labecq later identified her husband’s charred body by this peculiar burn, but she, like

many wives, could not afford a proper burial.9 Instead, John Labecq and many of the

other fifty-six men and boys killed in the explosion were buried in an unmarked mass

grave.10

The company, then, dictated not only how Labecq worked but also how he lived

and died. In their efforts to increase profits, companies discounted miners’ safety and

lives, turning them into replaceable parts. Employers used company stores, debt, and a

host of other techniques, forcing miners to risk their lives for company gain.

Many of those who labored in the mines saw this treatment as part of a larger

problem that plagued the nation. They were members of an enormous body of

“producers” who toiled to provide the wealth that went to someone else. As coal and crop

7 Richard Wilson testimony, Cherokee and Pittsburg v. Siplet, 50-53. 8 Jimmy’s father, Richard, had quit work in the mines just days before the explosion to harvest his fields. Jimmy was supposed to quit as well, but at the request of the mine boss continued working for the winter season. Wilson testimony, Cherokee and Pittsburg v. Siplet, p.52; “The Mine Horror,” Pittsburg [Kansas] Headlight, November 15, 1888; “Forty Bodies,” TSJ, November 12, 1888; Patrick, “Today Is Anniversary of Mine Disaster,” Morning Sun [Pittsburg, Kansas], November 9, 2008; Mt. Carmel Coal Company Records, M-465, Box 1, KSHS. 9 “Mass Meeting,” Pittsburg [Kansas] Headlight, November 15, 1888. 10 Two mass graves held the bodies of those killed in the 1888 explosion, one for Catholic miners and one for Protestant and non-religious miners. Both were unmarked. The Eagle Scouts later placed headstones that listed the names of all miners known to occupy each grave. Nikki Patrick, “Today Is Anniversary of Mine Disaster,” Morning Sun [Pittsburg, Kansas], November 9, 2008. 37

prices fell, miner and farmer earnings decreased drastically. Meantime, they watched

their employers, bankers, merchants, and stockholders grow wealthier. Thousands of

farmers and laborers throughout the southern Midwest understood that they were little

more than “slaves.” In their employers’ eyes, they became “brutes,” “things,” and “mice”

whose lives were expendable.11

But, like Labecq’s belt, the way things seemed was not as they actually were.

Edgar Simpson understood this when he grabbed for a leather belt and instead felt the

miner’s flesh tear away from his body. The miner’s bare skin showed the company’s

disregard for his life and demonstrated on a fundamental level how grotesque and

disturbing this relationship between employer and employee was. Employers and much

of Gilded Age upper and middle class society may have regarded the poorer classes as

immoral and untrustworthy beings, but producers saw themselves as honorable and

upright. Men and women such as those who spent the long, wintry night at the Frontenac

shaft stood in stark contrast to their employers. Instead of working for profit, men like

Simpson walked away from their supper and spent days rescuing his neighbors while

miners from other towns sacrificed their own pay and risked their lives for men they had

never met.

The producers of Frontenac believed they were the ones who lived upright lives in

a selfish world. They were the ones with hearts, souls, and morals whereas their

employers and the rest of society were the true heartless beings who gambled, lied, and

stole simply to earn more money faster. Such a revelation prompted the Christian

Advocate to call for missionaries to “Christianize the upper masses” rather than focus

11 On the expendability of miners and how miners reacted to it, see Michael K. Rosenow, Death and Dying in the Working Class, 1865-1920 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 68-97. 38

solely on converting the lower classes to Christianity. “If religion is a good thing to make

a servant submissive, why is it not a good thing to make an employer human?” the editors

asked. “If the Christian religion will… prevent miners from deeds of violence, why will it

not also cause mine owners to treat their men as men?”12

Historians have been careful to highlight the common religious and moral rhetoric

that mobilized producers and earned sympathy and support from middle class

constituents.13 Less is known about how average farmers and workers understood and

applied these thoughts to their daily lives. For thousands of rural producers like Labecq

or those who viewed and buried his body, the moral injustice they witnessed was far from

rhetorical. To them, the exploitive relationship between those who produced the nation’s

wealth and those who benefited from it was morally wrong and unconstitutional. They

couched their grievances in moral and political terms that continually reaffirmed their

identities as moral citizens and human beings entitled to kindness and fair treatment

rather than disposable tools that had no souls to save.

These beliefs resonated among laborers in multiple occupations who were not

only frustrated with poor treatment, but understood that these conditions would continue

as long as market competition increased. Still, even though organizers emphasized these points in their speeches, their words were not enough to convince producers to unite and confront their common foes. Instead, many producers applied their misgivings for leadership to labor leaders as well, questioning whether they truly cared about the workers as they claimed. Even as the Frontenac miners buried their dead, two

12 “Christianizing the Upper Masses,” Christian Advocate, reprinted in NLT, November 20, 1886. 13 McMath, Populist Vanguard; Kenneth Fones-Wolf, Trade Union Gospel: Christianity and Labor in Industrial Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Kazin, Populist Persuasion; Creech, Righteous Indignation; Mirola, Redeeming Time. 39

organizations vied to be the sole defender of the miners’ interests: the Knights of Labor

and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers (NFM). As leaders fought to

kill their opposing order, miners found good evidence that worker concerns were

secondary to union survival and demanded that the war between unions stop.

Yet, when leaders of the two orders finally decided to put aside differences and

merge into a single union as their rank and file demanded, thousands of union miners

refused to join. The two unions’ failure to merge was the first in a series of un-makings of

a national movement in the coal industry. This false start came not from workers’ apathy

toward unionism, but from their belief that labor leadership was another facet of Gilded

Age fraud, akin to deceitful businessmen, corrupt politicians, selfish employers, and

money-loving ministers who acknowledged the nation’s producers only enough to exploit

them.

Deceptive Markets

To many rural producers, deceit ran rampant through Gilded Age business and

was epitomized by men like Charles J. Devlin. Born around 1853 to Irish immigrants in

northern Illinois, Devlin grew up in poverty. His mother, Bridget, worked as a washerwoman and raised her son and his eleven-year-old sister alone. Devlin was arrested for larceny as a teenager and spent the early years of adulthood in the Illinois

State Penitentiary. Upon his release, he began working as a clerk for a coal company.14

He climbed the ladder to manager and in 1884, with the financial support of his father-in-

14 Devlin’s term in prison, originally only three years, was elongated due to his escape and recapture. “Charles J. Devlin,” Illinois Department of Corrections, ―Alton State Penitentiary and Joliet/Stateville Correctional Center – Index to Registers of Prisoners, Record Series 423.201, Illinois State Archives, Springfield, IL; “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910; “United States Census, 1870," Family Search, “Charles Devlin,” https://goo.gl/1xaccE (accessed October 23, 2014). 40

law, Devlin founded the Spring Valley Coal Company, the start to a vast and wealthy

coal-powered empire.15 By 1896, Devlin lived in Topeka, Kansas, but his authority in the

coal industry spanned from Illinois to New Mexico and included the Frontenac mine that

exploded in 1888. His influence reached into board rooms in St. Louis and Chicago, New

York City and Boston. The twenty-six companies he owned or managed in the mining,

railroad, real estate, and banking industries made him a millionaire, but his methods of

earning his fortune were not always transparent. 16 Rather, Devlin’s life reflected a

broader trend within Gilded Age business where false fronts, false markets, and false

products generated millions of real dollars.

Devlin’s rise from criminal to coal baron was not due solely to hard work, owning

major corporations, or even savvy investing. Rather, it came from the railroads, eastern

businessmen, and government financers who needed a manager to look after their

companies and investments in rural and western lands. In addition to his father-in-law’s

funds, Devlin received subsidies from local businessmen and railroad operators seeking

to develop Spring Valley. Journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd claimed that several local

railroads worked with Devlin’s Spring Valley Coal Company to control the city’s

development and ensure their businesses received the greatest profits. This growth, Lloyd

asserted, only came with hushed agreements for “special freight rates needed to enable

the ‘enterprise’ to steal the business of its competitors.”17 More importantly, although he

15 John H. M. Laslett, Colliers Across the Sea: A Comparative Study of Class Formation in Scotland and the American Midwest, 1830-1924 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 128; “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910. 16Charles J. Devlin to W. K. Gillett, September 33, 1894, RR 132:3 File #1005 Charles J. Devlin Coal Properties in Southern Kansas, ATSF; Charles J. Devlin to Joseph P. Whitehead, October 20, 1894, RR 132:3 File #1005 Charles J. Devlin Coal Properties in Southern Kansas, ATSF; “Reports from Leading Coal Markets of the West,” BD, April 8, 1905. 17 Henry Demarest Lloyd, A Strike of Millionaires Against Miners or The Story of Spring Valley: An Open Letter to the Millionaires, Second edition (Chicago: Belford-Clarke Co. Publishers, 1890), 13-14. 41

was one of its founders, Devlin was not the primary shareholder of the Spring Valley

Coal Company. He managed the mines, but Devlin answered to eastern stockholders such

as Democratic Pennsylvania Congressman William L. Scott, who was more than an

investor and politician. His interests tied him to multiple regions and industries, making

him a shipping magnate, New York Stock Exchange operator, railroader, bank president,

and racehorse breeder. To miners, however, he was a “coal king” with mines in

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Illinois, including the Spring Valley Coal Company. 18

Devlin served as Scott’s manager and continued this relationship with other investors

when he moved west and started a new coal company affiliated with the Atchison,

Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad (ATSF). There he amassed a fortune while managing the

Devlin Coal Company along with several other coal companies affiliated with the ATSF

railroad.19

Devlin’s relationship with his employers reflects a critical trend often neglected in

histories of Gilded Age politics and investment. Historians investigating these areas often

focus on the changes taking place at the state and national level. Railroad expansion not

only transformed product shipment and markets, but also opened new doors for investing,

connecting railroaders, mine owners, stockholders, bankers, merchants, and government

officials in complex webs that spanned across multiple states. As Richard White noted in

18 P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “The Work in Illinois,” NLT, September 7, 1889; “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “To Organized Labor and the Public in General,” NLT, September 14, 1889; Charles J. Devlin to Joseph P. Whitehead, October 20, 1894, ATSF, RR 132:3 File 1005, KSHS; Lloyd, A Strike of Millionaires; “The Philadelphia Record…,” NLT, September 26, 1891; “Mr. Scott’s Big Farm,” NYT, October 20, 1889; “William L. Scott Dead,” NYT, September 21, 1891. 19 “Devlin’s New Move,” OCFP, September 17, 1896; “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910. For a deeper examination of railroad involvement in the development and function of the coal industry see Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, especially p. 37-43; 92-102, 185-220. 42 many instances, this web was often controlled by the same individuals under a host of complex business and investment fronts that failed more often than they flourished.20

Less is known about how these failing fronts operated on the ground level.

Managers like Devlin were integral to Gilded Age investment, handling businesses and

accounts in the rural countryside for employers that lived in urban centers hundreds of

miles away. In cases like the mines Devlin managed for Scott and the ATSF, individual

mines or mining companies were small parts of a larger whole that often teetered on the

edge of bankruptcy.21 Devlin’s multiple companies were little more than shoddy entities that moved property between each other to avoid expenses and bankruptcies.22

Consequently, when the Frontenac miners’ families settled with the Cherokee and

Pittsburg Coal Company eight years after the 1888 explosion, Devlin overdrew the coal company’s account. Within days, ATSF board members and accountants shuffled funds to float the Cherokee and Pittsburg $40,000, most of which originated from the ATSF’s

“surplus cash.”23 When a similar need for cash occurred in 1905, however, the ATSF did

20 Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Gilded Age: or, The Hazard of New Functions (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 68-70, 80-81; William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) p. 47, 97; White, Railroaded, p.17-36; Mark Whalgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), p.190-5; Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age. See also Michael W. Nagle, Justus S. Stearns: Michigan Pine King and Kentucky Coal Baron, 1845-1933 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015). 21 “The Santa Fe’s Troubles,” CT, December 21, 1888; “Santa Claus,” letter to the editor, “Mining Notes,” UMWJ, January 11, 1894; Bryant, History of the Atchison; White, Railroaded; Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, 213, 225-7. 22 For example, E.P. Ripley encouraged ATSF chairman of the board Aldace Walker to split “the Cerrillos R.R. from the mining property and amalgamating the former with the A.T. & S.F. Ry,” while creating “a new company to take over title to the mining property and all rights pertaining thereto.” In this particular plan, the mining property was transferred from one Devlin-managed company to another. “Devlin’s New Move,” OCFP, September 17, 1896; E.P. Ripley memo to Aldace Walker, November 2, 1896, ATSF, RR 122:1, File 664, KSHS; E.P. Ripley to Victor Morawetz, September 18, 1896, ATSF, RR 132:3 File 1005, KSHS; Unsigned memo to E.P. Ripley, December 7, 1896, ATSF, RR 122:1 File 664,KSHS; E. P. Ripley to Aldace Walker, March 30, 1897, ATSF, RR 132:3 File 1005, KSHS; The Cerrillos Coal and Iron Company, Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company, and Cerrillos Coal Mining Company Records, ATSF, RR 122:1 Files 662-664, KSHS. 23 E. Wilder to Aldace F. Walker, November 4, 1896, Aldace Walker to E. Wilder, November 11, 1896, E. Wilder telegram to Aldace Walker, November 12, 1896, and E. Wilder to Aldace Walker, February 20, 43 not come to Devlin’s aid. As the manager, Devlin was responsible for several indebted companies, nearly four million dollars of missing government and corporate money, and at least four bank closings in three states. After filing for bankruptcy, Devlin was placed under investigation and died of a stroke before his case was settled.24

Although historians have observed how major corporations overextended themselves and often failed, Devlin’s experience showed that this happened to companies more often than was publicly known. Despite his close relationship with the railroad, the

ATSF was not implicated and seldom even mentioned in the news stories regarding the scandal. Even by 1907, two years after Devlin’s failure and death, the investigation had not untangled the web of Devlin’s business connections and a 1910 article in FUEL remembered Devlin as a coal magnate who singlehandedly developed the western coalfields. 25 In reality, he was a railroad employee whose coal interests depended on the

1897, all found in ATSF, Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal Company General, RR 516:10 File 514, KSHS; ATSF, Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal Company General, RR 516:10 File 514 KSHS. Despite the ATSF’s effort to settle with the families, few of the Frontenac victims’ families, including Lacodia Labecq, received the amount paid. Although Labecq joined the court case and paid sixty-five dollars in court fees to the miners’ attorney John F. McDonald, she was initially only offered fifty dollars to settle her case. Although she rejected the offer, McDonald settled the case and disappeared with the money. James M. Devore, to the FSDM, “An Answer to Limb,” FSDM, January 26, 1897; James M. Devore, written statement to the FSDM, “Hill and M’Donald,” January 27, 1897; Richard Wilson to Lacodia Labeack, “Hill and M’Donald,” FSDM, January 27, 1897; J. D. Hill, written statement to FSDM “Hill and M’Donald,” January, 27, 1897 (quote); “Where is Judge M’Donald?” FSDM, January 9, 1897. 24 Company records are unclear regarding why investors abandoned Devlin in 1905. “Another Devlin Bank Wreck,” NYT, June 21, 1905; “Topeka Bank Closed; Made Loans to Devlin,” NYT, July 4, 1905; “Two More Banks Shut on Account of Devlin,” NYT, July 6, 1905; “To Act with Cy and Hurley,” FSM, July 15, 1905; “Charles J. Devlin Dead” NYT, November 2, 1905, “Illinois,” EMJ, July 14, 1906; “Thomas v. Woods,” in American Bankruptcy Reports… in the United States of the Federal Courts, State Courts and Referees in Bankruptcy, vol. 23, ed. John T. Cook (Albany, NY: Matthew Bender, 1910), 132-33. 25 In fact, reports of an 1889 meeting between operators and the miners’ unions listed Devlin as an independent operator who grew irate at the meeting and withdrew from the conference. Although W. L. Scott also angrily walked out, no mention was made that Devlin was in Scott’s employ at the time. “The Strike Still On,” CT, August 17, 1889; Lewis Wabel, “Charles J. Devlin: Coal Mines & Railroads, His Empire,” (n.p.: n.p, 1991); “Pioneers in the Western Coal Industry: Charles Devlin," Fuel, April 12, 1910. The ATSF was not alone in these multiple holdings, records from the Union Pacific Mining Company also maintained different companies to manage their holdings in different states and, like Devlin, were deeply connected to railroads. Industrialist Levi O. Leonard oversaw companies in southern Iowa and eastern Kentucky. Levi O. Leonard Railroad Collection, MsC 159, Box 25, Folder “Northwestern Coal Co,” Box 44

ATSF. His companies, moreover, appear as isolated entities when they were actually

small parts of vast corporate holdings that spanned the nation.

This national expansion was critical to the coal industry. Unlike other industries

where a handful of corporations dominated the trade, no single corporation had a hold on

the market. Most nineteenth century coal mines in the southern Midwest were hand

mines, or mines that required little industrial equipment and low upfront cost. As long as

a landowner had a means to reach the coal and hoist it out, his coal was as good and as

cheaply produced as the largest mine enterprises. This meant that small-scale coal mines

with ten to thirty miners continually cropped up along the countryside.26 And as railroads

stretched into the countryside, these mines began shipping their coal to urban markets, for

the first time causing Indiana and Illinois mines to compete with those in Ohio and

western Pennsylvania. The sheer number of mine owners and operators made it

impossible for the nation’s coal operators to organize like other industries that would

control prices or keep unions out. Even if some of the biggest coal kings like William

Scott attempted to set a high coal price, other companies underbid them, rendering any

operator organization powerless to raising profits.27

Still, if they could not corner the coal market, large operators could undersell it.

By underpricing coal, companies landed more contracts with urban coal dealers and

consumers so that the increased volume of their coal sold absorbed the cut in profit. 28

31, Folder “Union Pacific Mining Co., Pittsburgh, PA,” and Box 36, Folder “East Kentucky Coal, Lumber, and Railroad Co.” University of Iowa Special Collections, Iowa City, Iowa. 26 Missouri BLS, Sixth Annual Report of the State Mine Inspector of the State of Missouri, (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printing Company, 1892), 11. 27 Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, 239-40. 28 Due to the complexities associated with production and shipping costs, as well as consumption markets, it is impossible to realistically compare company profits from state to state. Railroad mines, for example, were not run for a profit, but simply to produce coal as cheaply as possible for company consumption. However, the Missouri BLS estimated that the average price per ton for its mines in 1891 was $1.33 1/3 per 45

Mine owners with vast holdings like William Scott who owned dozens of mines could

shut down a mine or region, relying on other holdings for revenue until mining became

more profitable. In doing so, they could drive out single-mine owners who could not

afford to run their mines with such low profit margins. The result, however, created a

competitive and overstocked national coal market as companies battled for the lowest

prices that would steal coal contracts from competitors.29

Although farm labor is seldom classified with industrial operations, farmers faced

a similar problem. Like coal, the crops they produced were sold in nationwide markets

that were flooded by the 1880s. Enormous farms consisting of hundreds of thousands of

acres, such as the bonanza farms in the Dakotas, turned farming into a corporatized

industry. These farms, often owned by landowners who lived in the east, were divided

and sub-divided into tracts worked by hundreds of farm laborers who earned daily wages

and were managed by foremen. Similar to miners in company towns, these workers lived

in company-owned boarding houses and some shopped at company stores. The scale of

production enabled bonanza wheat farms to sell their grain at a substantially lower price

than smaller farmers, affecting grain prices throughout the nation. The Missouri Bureau

of Agriculture found that these farms were one of the primary factors in declining grain

prices. Wheat, which averaged $1.14 in Chicago in 1882 fell to $.85 in 1889. Corn and

oat prices during the same period were cut in half.30 But production only increased. By

ton of coal. This price fell to $1.26.8 per ton the next year. Miners working at a “fair” price at this time would have earned roughly $.70 per ton for screened coal, depending on working conditions. Missouri BLS, SMI, Sixth Annual Report, 11; “Live and Let Live,” letter to the editor, UMWJ, October 12, 1893; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1891, 1. 29 “A Victim,” letter to the editor, “More About Alum Cave,” NLT, October 5, 1889; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “The Vice President,” UMWJ, December 10, 1891. 30“San Francisco Coal Supply,” CTJ, January 5, 1887; “Coal and the Inter-State Act,” CTJ, January 26.1887; “San Francisco Trade Report,” CTJ, April 6, 1887; USDA, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 46

1892, the US Secretary of Agriculture reported that wheat production in the Dakotas alone surpassed the entire national output just fifty years earlier. 31

Unlike other industries that produced finished products whose surpluses could be shipped to other regions or countries, farmers’ and coal operators’ products were produced in nearly every industrializing country more cheaply than ever before.32 David

A. Wells, an economist and free-trade advocate, claimed this fact combined with the rapidly expanding railroads in North America, Australia, Argentina, Russia, and India created an intensifying global market with prices and sales that hinged on a region’s ability to ship their products by land or sea affordably. 33 According to historian Chester

McArthur Destler, this dynamic “served to stimulate economic expansion until world markets were glutted with both agricultural and industrial products.”34

Few industries were more competitive than the global wheat market. By the1880s, the United States exported roughly one third of its wheat crop each year, primarily to

European countries. Market competition intensified as wheat farmers in India, Argentina,

1893 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894) 481; Chester McArthur Destler, “Agricultural Readjustment and Agrarian Unrest in Illinois, 1880-1896,” Agricultural History 21:2 (April 1947): 106-7. 31 One particular bonanza sub-farm in Casselton, North Dakota, employed over 400 farm laborers to harvest the wheat crop. They were paid a daily wage and lived in company-owned boarding houses on the premises, making crop production more efficient. The sheer volume of production enabled bonanza farmers to survive on a smaller profit margin than the average farmer with less than 200 acres, driving wheat prices lower than what the average farmer required to survive. Missouri SBA, Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Missouri State Board of Agriculture for the Year 1894 (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printing Company, 1895), 62; G. Chitty Baker, ed., Journal of the Department of Agriculture of Western Australia, Volume IX January-June, 1904 (Perth, Australia: William Alfred Watson, Government Printer, 1904), 190;United States Department of Agriculture, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1892 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893) 416-417; See also “The Riddle of the Sphinx,” Chapter 3 in N. B. Ashby, The Riddle of the Sphinx (Chicago: Mercantile Publishing and Advertising Co., 1892), esp. 49-50. 32 For a more in-depth treatment of export industries, over production, and underconsumption, see James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1873-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 51, 86-89, 158-9; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 17-18; Palmer, “Man Over Money,” 117-8; David Ames Wells, Recent Economic Changes and Their Effects on the Production and Distribution of Wealth and the Well-Being of Society (New York: Appleton and Company, 1898), 71-7. 33 Wells, Recent Economic Changes, 35-44. 34 Destler, “Agricultural Readjustment,”107. 47

and Egypt dramatically increased their production in the 1880s and sold their crops at

lower prices than US farmers could afford. Between 1868 and 1887, India increased its

wheat production from 558,852 bushels to 41,558,765 bushels. This escalation was

mirrored in wheat-producing nations throughout the world, all competing to sell their

grain to Europe. In an 1887 study of global wheat cultivation, the statistician to the U.S.

Department of Agriculture reasoned that European immigration to South America would

only intensify the “wheat culture” in Argentina and Chile. Such a “stimulation of the

industry” would dramatically increase competition. Wheat prices, which were governed

by the global market, would steadily decline.35

But such a decline was not as visible at the New York Produce Exchange,

Chicago Board of Trade, and the dozens of other trading centers throughout the United

States and Europe. Despite the growing agricultural crisis in the fields, traders a world away bought and sold wheat and other crops before they were ever harvested. The new

kind of trading, known as “futures” markets was a kind of market speculation and trade

that gambled on the expected value of future crops without any products physically

changing hands. 36 Like coal companies that formed contracts with businesses promising

to supply coal, dealers in agricultural products like wheat, cotton, hemp, and livestock

35 Missouri SBA, Twenty-Seventh Annual Report, 63; U.S. Department of State, Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries During the Years 1890-1891 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892) 79, 176; “The World’s Wheat Surplus,” in Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, 1887 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), 570-3, quote 73; “Wheat,” in Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1890 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 298-300. 36 Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 231-234; Jonathan Ira Levy, “Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905,” American Historical Review 111, no. 2 (April 2006): 307-355. 48

arranged contracts settling prices for goods yet to be produced.37 This allowed merchants

who purchased crops from farmers or farmers’ agents to sell their future products while

prices were high rather than for the market price when the crops were ripe. Doing so

involved investing with money borrowed from banks with interest.38 If the merchant sold

at the right time, his profit absorbed the interest and his investment proved worthwhile. If

he sold at the wrong time his gains would be substantially less, even leaving him in

debt.39

The risks involved with futures investing and the uncertainties that came from

selling products not yet grown, however, gave many farmers and merchants pause. By the

late 1880s, futures trading had become a major form of trade, but to many, the entire

system seemed dishonest and immoral. “This gambling—I call it gambling—the most

shrewd, subtle system that ever emanated from the brain of man and the most hard to get

at the bottom of. They will bamboozle you out of your senses,” former grain dealer

William Howard argued to a congressional committee investigating futures trading. A

farm agent for Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Minnesota farmers, Howard argued that

futures trading involved more than merchants hedging their purchases. It only protected

merchants when the price of crops went down and therefore encouraged merchants to

manipulate crop prices in order to increase investment returns. “How is it? How is it that

the hog product of the United States has not paid the cost for the last ten years and yet

these [merchants] have grown to be millionaires. How did they do it?” In the constant

37 Historian William Cronon compared the elements of futures trading to the banking system, claiming that it benefited all parties because it eliminated the risk in grain pricing. Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 120- 132. 38 “Statement of Mr. Melvin J. Forbes, Representing the Duluth Board of Trade,” in HCA, Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products: Hearings on H.R. 392, 2699, and 3870, 52nd Cong., 3rd sess, 1892, p. 143. 39 “Statement of Mr. Melvin J. Forbes, Representing the Duluth Board of Trade,” HCA, Fictitious Dealings, 138. 49

fluctuation of prices, Howard claimed, futures stock opened the door for corruption and

wild speculations disproportionate to crop supply. “I say it is the greatest evil that ever

struck the United States of America,” he insisted. “I tried it far enough to see that an

honest man could not make a living at it and I got out.”40

The notion of evil lurking within the burgeoning economic system indicated a

growing conflict within society between capitalist profit and morality. Because of the

potential for high returns, futures markets reached as far as the global wheat and cotton

trade, from England to India to Chile to Kansas. But farmers like C. Wood Davis of

Kansas believed it injured farmers’ profits and gave businessmen more control over crop

prices than the farmers. To Wood, the physical supply of wheat did not matter as much as

the amount traders anticipated on the exchange floor when they traded “enormous

quantities of fiat or fictitious products.” Everything emanating from the futures sale

seemed fabricated by businessmen who turned a profit without physically owning

anything.41 Historian Ann Fabian contends these claims of dishonesty and immorality

came out of citizens trying to reconcile not only how hard work was not rewarded, but

also how previously unacceptable practices such as gambling became the norm. Farmers

saw those who won in the futures markets as “modern incarnations of the scheming

gamblers who brought nothing to market but tricks and ruses and crept away with profits

40 “Statement of William P. Howard, of St. Louis,” HCA, Fictitious Dealings, 146-147. At the 1894 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, General Master Workman James Sovereign suggested that the Knights’ preamble be changed to address this issue, so that “the buying and selling of options, the gambling in farm produce or other necessaries of life be made a felony by law, with adequate punishment for such offense.” J. R. Sovereign Address, “Sovereign’s Report,” The Daily [New Orleans] Picayune, November 16, 1894. 41 “Statement of C. Wood Davis,” HCA, Fictitious Dealings, 6-7. Predictably, stock traders and businessmen disagreed with the farmers’ claim that futures stock affected crop prices and maintained that supply and demand alone dictated farmer profits. For an example of this argument, see Charles W. Ide, James O. Bloss, William Ray, Henry Hentz, and Seigf. Gruner, “Protest of the New York Cotton Exchange Against the Following Bills: H. R. 2699, S. 685, and S. 1268,” HCA, Fictitious Dealings, 128-130. 50

to which they had no right.”42 Such an understanding prompted farmer A. M. Burdick to

declare that “[t]hese men who ‘operate’ on the boards of trade (more appropriately called

gambling hells) have no more right to the consideration of honest men than the devil has

to a seat in heaven.”43

More and more, it seemed, the new industrial age found ways to replace old ways with new versions that seemed less honest. Like “fictitious” wheat sales, the invention of a “false butter,” made mostly from tallow and lard leftover from the meatpacking process, incensed dairy farmers and alarmed consumers who feared that the new oleomargarine was less wholesome than traditional butter.44 Each of these cases, from

enormous but financially weak corporations quietly branching into multiple industries to

stock trading, to industrialized butter seemed to go against natural and moral ways. They

hurt producers while reaching for profits and fabricated cheaper products that kept the

prices of genuine products lower.

Citizens looked to the government to regulate these practices, to check the

expansion and corruption that seemed to stretch everywhere. Yet, state and federal

governments often overlooked even blatant corruption. Railroads and coal mines

continued to generate profits through loopholes that exempted them from government

42 Ann Fabian, Card Sharps and Bucket Shops: Gambling in Late Nineteenth Century America (New York, Routledge, 1999), 154. 43 A. M. Burdick to M. C. Hatch, Fictitious Dealings,306. 44 “Imitation Dairy Products,” 49th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record vol. 17 pt. 5 at 4966 (1886); HCA, The Oleomargarine Bill: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture, H.R. 3717, 56th Cong. 2nd sess, Report 2043 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901); “The Fraud Upon the Dairymen,” Lawrence [Kansas] Daily Journal, May 14, 1886; “National Grange,” Bloomington [Illinois] Pantagraph,, November 23, 1887; “Country Butter,” letter to the editor, “Don’t like Oleo,” NLT, February 13, 1892; Ruth Dupré, “‘If It’s Yellow, It Must Be Butter’: Margarine Regulation in North America Since 1886,” The Journal of Economic History 59:2 (June, 1999): 353-371; Richard A. Ball and J. Robert Lilly, “The Menace of Margarine: The Rise and Fall of a Social Problem,” Social Problems 29:5 (June 1982): 488-498; Christopher Burns, “Bogus Butter: An Analysis of the 1886 Debates on Oleomargarine Legislation” MA thesis, (University of Vermont, 2009). 51 oversight. Railroad mines, for example, were not held to the pay laws other mines were supposed to follow, allowing mines like Frontenac No. 2 to pay their miners whenever they saw fit.45 After years of trying to discern between “gambling,” and futures markets, the U.S. government declared futures trading legal. They believed that banning them from the United States would not stop the global futures trade and that the profit from futures aided the nation’s growth as powerfully as the thousands invested in railroads.46

Although the Supreme Court ruled that marketing margarine as the equivalent of butter was “fraudulent” in 1886, the Oleomargarine Act passed that same year declared it was an honest product as long as it was not colored yellow.47 To the average rural producer,

these changes were part of a dizzying world of dishonesty where invisible empires rose

out of nothing, profits came from pushing prices lower, and success seemed to defy

morality and logic. The government’s willingness to allow these practices seemed to

indicate that business mattered most and the producers were worth little at all.

Inhuman

The business practices inherent in the new market system stood at odds with how many rural producers believed the nation should function. Thousands in the southern

45 Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “What Unity Has Done,” NLT, September 9, 1887; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “A Voice from Kansas,” JKL, February 5, 1891; “The Centralia Miners,” JKL, February 2, 1892; “Joe,” letter to the editor, “Danville, Ill.,” UMWJ, August 24, 1893. 46 Some state legislatures banned futures markets in response to a push from the National Farmers’ Alliance. The primary factor that set futures apart from gambling lay in the futures contract holder’s right to demand delivery of the product, which meant tangible goods could be delivered if desired. Jonathan Levy discusses the legal battles regarding the conceptualization of the early stock market in more detail in Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 241-247. See also Cedric B. Cowing, Populists, Plungers, and Progressives: A Social History of Stock and Commodity Speculation, 1890-1936 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965),3-24, esp. 15. 47 Despite the anti-margarine advocates’ frustration with the government over margarine regulation, the passage of the Oleomargarine Act was among the first laws to regulate manufactured foodstuffs and one of most stringent regulations in the world placed on food products in the late nineteenth century. Only Canada had harsher regulations against it, outlawing the product entirely. Dupré, “If It’s Yellow, It Must Be Butter”; Ball and Lilly, “The Menace of Margarine,” quote, 489. 52

Midwest remained rooted in a worldview that fused together “Jefferson and Jesus.”

Moral acts such as respecting one’s neighbor, not stealing, not lying, working hard, and

pursuing honesty over corruption, they believed, were the keys to a successful life.48 Yet,

the new fast-paced market system offered a new alternative for success. Instead of

rewarding labor, the national market rewarded greed, corruption, and gambling while

slighting those who toiled. Efforts to gain higher profits forced debts onto producing

classes, created high interest rates on mortgages, contributed to falling earnings in mining

and agriculture, and cut corners in workplace safety while demanding more work for less

pay. 49

Falling crop prices, combined with shipping costs, taxes, interest, and mortgage

all chipped away at a farmer’s earnings so that, as one Kansas farmer put it, “farming

don’t pay.” 50 Each year farmers throughout the South and Midwest were deeper in debt

to banks and local merchants who allowed farmers credit until their crops were harvested.

Because bankers “prefer the interest to the property,” they seldom foreclosed on indebted

farms. Still, thousands of farmers searched for ways to avoid “subsist[ing] as a slave.”51

The Kansas and Iowa statistics bureaus acknowledged that land tenancy increased not because of foreclosures, but because it was more lucrative for farmers to sell their farms

48 Kazin, A Godly Hero, xiv; Mark Noll, America’s God: From Jonathan Edward to Abraham Lincoln (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 9-11; Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New York, 1989); Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy; Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 19, 62-64; Liston Pope, Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), 86. 49 Chad Montrie, Making a Living: Work and Environment in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008) p. 91-112. 50 KBLI, Ninth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industry of Kansas, 1893 (Topeka, KS: Press of the Hamilton Printing Company: Edwin H. Snow, State Printer, 1894), 12-14. 51 Iowa BLS, “Voice of the Farmers,” Fourth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the State of Iowa 1890-91 (Des Moines, G.H. Ragsdale, State Printer, 1891), 67. 53

than to farm land they owned. 52 Farmers like Frontenac’s Richard Wilson and his son

Jimmy looked to the mines as a way to supplement their incomes. Others, along with thousands of unneeded farm hands, entirely abandoned their farms for the mines, iron works, railroads, and factories.53

The presence of Jimmy Wilson in Frontenac No. 2, then, was not an anomaly, but

part of a broader trend taking place in rural America as farm profits declined. Far from

remaining committed to a single occupation, rural farmers and laborers flowed from one

occupation to another, searching for better pay. For Jimmy Wilson’s seventeen years of

life before dying in the 1888 explosion, this involved balancing farm and mine work. For

Edgar Simpson who helped search for Wilson’s body, it meant going from the mines to

the iron works, but still keeping his “pit coat” close by.54 In 1888, neither Wilson nor

Simpson were technically miners, but both were connected to the mines in ways that

allowed them to understand on a personal and powerful level how the market system not

only took producers’ livelihoods, but also their lives.

Few industries showed the growing disregard for workers’ well-being more than the coal industry. Like other rural industries, miners’ wages were low, but fighting for higher pay involved challenging more than the mine employer. In an industry governed by market competition, pushing for higher wages meant potentially losing coal contracts that provided steady work to neighboring mines that produced coal more cheaply. One

52 KBLI, Ninth Annual Report, 1893, 12-14, 340; For a detailed discussion on merchant monopoly and debt peonage, see Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 1977 original), especially 131-7, 147, 149-151. 53 In addition to working in the mines, farmers also worked for sawmills, railroads, and even traveled periodically to nearby cities to work in factories. KBLI, Ninth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industry of Kansas, 1893, 63, 144, 358. 54 Simpson testimony, 152; For a deeper examination of moving between regions and occupations in the late nineteenth century, see Frank Tobias Higbie, Indispensable Outcasts: Hobo Workers and Community in the American Midwest, 1880-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003). 54

Indiana miner claimed that these conditions prevented miners from dealing with their

employers “between man and man” and forced them to accept any terms their employees

offered. Missouri miner “A K. of L.” agreed, claiming that “[t]he operators here hardly

realized that the miners were human beings. The company has ruled with an iron rod so

long that they thought when a man went to work for them he had no voice in

anything….” Instead of being equals in society, they asserted, miners were less than men

and cowered to their boss’s demands. 55

This juxtaposition of man and “thing” intensified as industrialization transformed the way Americans worked. In the legend of John Henry, a “steel drivin’ man” for the

Chesapeake and Ohio railroad in the 1870s out-drilled the latest steam-powered drill.

With a hammer in each hand, Henry drilled fourteen feet while the drill only drove nine.56 In swinging two hammers simultaneously, Henry’s skill made him faster and

more efficient than a machine, but it also invited a comparison between the two.57 He

labored fast, methodologically, and efficient. Henry worked like a machine. For an

instant, he became something other than human. Still, in most versions of the legend,

Henry’s humanity is emphasized. In some ballads, he says, “You know that I’m a man.”

55 “T.F.B.,” letter to the editor, “Southern Indiana,” NLT, December 24, 1887. “A K. of L.,” letter to the editor, “Mattoon Getting There,” NLT, February 2, 1887.Patricia Cooper found that cigar workers expressed a similar desire to be on equal footing with their employers. In the case of the cigar industry, workers did this by dressing their best on payday. Patricia A. Cooper, Once a Cigar Maker: Men, Women, and Work Culture in American Cigar Factories, 1900-1919 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 124. 56 Scott Reynolds Nelson, Steel Drivin’ Man: John Henry, the Untold Story of an American Legend (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 57Nelson, Steel Drivin’ Man, 75. Edward Baptist made a similar observation regarding double-handed skill in the cotton fields with pickers who fluidly and furiously picked cotton with both hands. Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 137-9. 55

In others, Henry’s hammers crash to the ground as he falls dead after defeating his steam- powered foe.58 Working like a machine drove Henry to his death.

By the late nineteenth century machines had simplified dozens of industries, but were less useful in workplaces with unreliable working conditions like mines. 59 On level,

dry ground, wide openings, and with the right type of rock or large seams of coal,

machines could fly at unprecedented rates. The holes that machines made were jagged

and kicked up clouds of rock and coal dust as they drilled, but in ideal conditions, they

moved as fast as human hands. On uneven and flooded spaces, hard rock, small coal

seams, and narrow passages, however, human labor remained most efficient. Human-

made holes were smooth, their blows comparatively dustless, and when they mined coal,

men could discern between rock types to extract the coal cleanly.60 Unlike other industries, then, the distinct uses between man and machine made the two labor forms complements to each other instead of competitors. Both were tools used to complete the same task, used based on which was more efficient in specific conditions. Yet, in sharing

58 See Federal Writers Program of the Works Progress Administration in the State of West Virginia, West Virginia: A Guide to the Mountain State, (n.p.: Conservation Commission of West Virginia, 1941), 137-9 (quote); For a more detailed discussion on John Henry folklore and black masculinity, see John C. Inscoe, “Race and Remembrance in West Virginia: John Henry for a Post-Modern Age,” Journal of Appalachian Studies 10, ½ (Spring/Fall 2004): 85-94. 59 The classic work on industrialization undermining skilled labor positions is Laurie, Artisans into Workers. For specifics on the slow mechanization of the coal industry, see Keith Dix, Work Relations in the Coal Industry: The Hand-Loading Era, 1880-1930 (Morgantown, WV: Institute for Labor Studies, Division of Social and Economic Development, Center for Extension and Continuing Education, West Virginia University, 1977), 21-22. 60 Machines had been used in southern Midwest mines for years, but were never widely used in the 1880s and by 1893, fourteen percent of Illinois miners worked in machine mines. However, workers frequently traveled from mine to mine, causing a much higher percentage of rural laborers to work alongside mining machinery than represented in the BLS reports. Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1893, xix, xxxi; “Two Old Miners,” letter to the editor, “Two Old Miners,” UMWJ, October 21, 1897. See also Nelson, Steel Drivin’ Man, 75, 90-91; David Brody, “Market Unionism in America: The Case of Coal,” in In Labor’s Cause: Main Themes on the History of the American Worker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 131-132; Clay McShane and Joel Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). 56

this job with and in comparing his work to the latest steam-powered contraption, man

became interchangeable with machine.61

The limitations of mining technology prevented machines from making hand

labor obsolete.62 For miners then, their conflict with mechanization was less a fight for their jobs than a fight against being compared to a machine. Northern Illinois miner “Pro

Bono Publico” claimed that the hand miners were “driven from pillar to post to get a living” due to the competition with machine mines. Because miners were paid according to the amount of coal they produced rather than earn a flat daily wage, machine miners could produce more coal than hand miners, increasing their tonnage. But machines did not work in northern Illinois, Pro Bono Publico explained, “while in southern Illinois the

conditions are reversed.” The mines in the southernmost part of the state were ideal for

machines, allowing them to turn out more coal faster and cheaper so that they could sell

their coal in the Chicago market for lower prices than the northern hand mines. “We are

asked to come down [in wages] and compete with machinery that is producing coal in an

8 foot vein, while we have the human machine and 2 ½ to 3 feet, except in one or two

places,” the miner continued. “Now it is unjust and unreasonable to ask the miners of

northern Illinois to compete. They cannot do it.”63

61 “Harmony,” letter to the editor, “From Indian Territory,” NLT, May 7, 1887; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, March 3, 1888; William Houston, letter to the editor, “Letter from William Houston,” NLT, November 9, 1889; “R,” letter to the editor, “Honor vs. Dishonor,” NLT, December 21, 1893. 62 Dix, Work Relations in the Coal Industry, 31. 63“Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Differs with Dan,” NLT, June 29, 1889; William Houston, letter to the editor, “Letter from William Houston,” NLT, November 9, 1889. Although no formal scale for machine mining wages was adopted until the mid-1890s, machine miners often earned less than hand miners because the labor was less demanding and the volume of coal each miner produced was higher. By the late-1890s, many machine mines were paid by the distance they drilled rather than the tonnage they produced. J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “J. H. Kennedy,” UMWJ, September 8, 1898. See also, Adams, “Promotion, Competition, Captivity,” p. 86; Jon Amsden and Stephen Brier, “Coal Miners on Strike: The Transformation of Strike Demands and the Formation of a National Union,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2:4, (Spring, 1977): p. 583-616. 57

Pro Bono Publico worked like a machine for a machine miner’s wages even

though he worked by hand in his mine, but the devaluation of workers did not end with

wage decline or competition with machines. Illinois miner “Jim” echoed hundreds of

miners’ complaints when he claimed that his mine implemented a “damnable system” of

overcharging for mining supplies and issuing fees.64 Most mines required miners to

perform extra jobs such as laying railroad track, pumping water out of mines, or propping

up the roof. Commonly known as “dead work,” these tasks took a miner’s time and

energy but did not add to his coal production or pay. 65 In one Kentucky mine, dead work

included prying up rail tracks from old parts of the mine and re-laying them in a new

room. Otherwise, the miners had to push their loaded coal cars across the mine floor from

their rooms to the roadway. “[A] man should have iron track,” miner “Justice” grumbled,

but the company would not furnish it. “Illiterate” and “A Would-Be Knight” described

similar conditions. Their mines saved on mule purchases by having the miners “tram their

own coal instead of mules pulling it.” Still, Illiterate commented bitterly, “even if they

had long ears, [the miners] could not favorably compare with mules,” because unlike

miners, mules “kick when overloaded.”66 Miner “Jumbo,” complained that his mine

cared more for its mules than its miners. When the safety catch broke on one of its two

cages the company did not fix it, even though the malfunction would kill its riders if the

64 “Jim,” letter to the editor, “From Illinois,” NLT, March 30, 1889; “G.P.,” letter to the editor, “White Slavery,” NLT, February 25, 1888; Editorial, “The Girard, Ill., Gazette,” NLT, June 22, 1889; John Kane, letter to the editor, “Letter from Organizer Kane,” NLT, April 4, 1891; “Lincoln,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” NLT, March 24, 1892. 65 “Bitten,” letter to the editor, “Has Been There,” NLT, June 9, 1888; “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, Mary 18, 1889; “C.,” letter to the editor, “Against Summer Strikes,” NLT, February 22, 1890; J. H. Kennedy, UMW District Eleven Report, “In Indiana,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891; Dix, Work Relations in the Coal Industry, 16; Price V. Fishback, Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners 1890-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 72. 66 “Justice,” letter to the editor, “Red Ash, Kentucky,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; “A Would-Be Knight,” letter to the editor, “Alabama News,” UMWJ, November 12, 1896 (“tram” quote); “Illiterate,” letter to the editor, “Still Another,” UMWJ, July 6, 1893. For a similar comment, see “Captain,” letter to the editor, “Captain,” UMWJ, October 4, 1894. 58

cage fell. “The north cage is the best,” the miner noted, “and they use it for hoisting and

lowering the mules, and the men have to go on the broken cage.”67The decision to protect

mules over miners reflected how the competitive market shifted the ways companies

valued their workers. A miner could be replaced at no cost whereas a replacing a dead

mule required additional funds.

In other cases, mines disregarded safety protocol because upkeep was too

expensive. Ignoring regulations like timber spacing, gas monitoring, “sprinkling” dry

mines to keep coal dust down, and proper powder storage saved the company money, but

increased the risk of accidents. Having clear airways was not only essential to proper

mine ventilation, but also offered the surest means of escape in the event of an accident.

Still, mines often neglected their upkeep. One western Kentucky miner reported that the

only way to escape his mine in the event of an accident was for all the miners to climb “a

very narrow winding stairway up which you must crawl on your hands and knees for over

200 feet in the dark with water pouring down like rain upon you.” The distance made it

unlikely that all men would escape, yet in order to have a new airway, the miners had to

dig it for free. 68

Such a precaution would have been valuable to the miners in the Diamond Mine

in Braidwood, Illinois. After an accident flooded the mine, the company refused to dig a

new shaft to drain the water and aid in the rescue. Rescuers instead waded through the

water, taking days longer to search for miners. They pulled out twenty-eight bodies, most

67Mia Bay found similar comparisons among black slaves and workers who claimed they were treated as mules. “Jumbo,” letter to the editor, “From Grape Creek,” NLT, August 3, 1889; E. A. Sparls, letter to the editor, “Elliott, Mo.,” UMWJ, January 4, 1894; “A Thinker,” letter to the editor, “The Man and the Brute,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; Mia Bay, Chapter 4 “Us Is Human Flesh,” in The White Image in the Black Mind: African-American Ideas about White People, 1830-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117- 149. “Jumbo,” letter to the editor, “From Grape Creek,” NLT, August 3, 1889. 68 “New Kentucky, No. 2,” “Mine Postals,” UMWJ, October 12, 1893. 59 either drowned or suffocated, but the last six recovered, according to miner Adam

Stewart, “neither drowned nor choked.” Rather, “they starved to death.” Believing the miners remaining in the mine had suffered the same fate, the company declared the missing miners dead, abandoned the search, and closed up the mine. For Stewart, who lost two sons in the mine, this was unthinkable. “I believe it is possible that there may be live men in the mine yet,” he wrote, noting that miners in other disasters found their way out of mines weeks after rescuers abandoned the search. The grieving father claimed the action was a “disgrace to humanity,” and asserted that “[n]o country that claims to be civilized would have done the same as was done at the Diamond mine.” But many mines did. Unless a mine was in good enough condition to resume production, companies saw little point in repairing the mine or locating miners that were likely dead. It was more economical to entomb the miners and sink a new shaft elsewhere.69

The sheer number of mine injuries and deaths each year was staggering.

Accidents were so common that state mine inspectors measured mine safety according to the number of deaths in relation the amount of coal produced. Missouri mine inspector C.

C. Woodson reported that there was “one fatal accident for every 222,347 tons mined” in his state in 1889, or twelve deaths and twenty-two injuries. Missouri mines fared better than Kentucky mines that claimed one life for every 156,134 tons that same year, but

69In the case of the Diamond mine disaster, many miners agreed with the company to abandon the search because they believed the mine was too unstable. Had the company agreed to dig a rescue shaft, however, the miners likely would have continued their search. Adam Stewart, letter to the editor, “A Sorrowing Father’s Opinion,” NLT, March 22, 1884; Special Report to the Governor of an Investigation by Commissioner of Labor Statistics and Inspection of the Coal Mine Explosion at Rich Hill, Mo. March 29, 1888, Missouri BLS, Tenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Missouri…, 1888 (Jefferson City: Tribune Printing Company, 1889), p. 9, 16; Illinois BLS, Fifth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, 1888 (Springfield: Springfield Printing Co. 1888), p. 350. 60 ranked worse than Illinois, which lost one miner for every 263,590 tons.70 The actual number of dead was substituted for a ratio that correlated deaths with mine productivity, giving government officials a baseline to determine the number of deaths acceptable for the tons produced. In the process, miners became collateral in the drive to fuel the Gilded

Age.

Mine inspectors, then, also played a role in the devaluation of miners. Missouri mine engineer William Porter argued that at least two mine inspectors were needed to visit “the most important mining operations scattered over so large a territory as in this

State.” Even in his plan, smaller mines, such as the hundreds of Missouri mines that employed less than ten workers, would not be inspected at all.71 In some cases, inspectors used this to their advantage, accepting bribes from mines to not inspect their facilities carefully or avoid them entirely. Indiana miner George Johnson claimed that the conditions in his mine were so poor that miners in the best spots worked in water a foot deep.72 “I heard a miner that was emptying the water out of his big gum boots ask the boss if the inspector ever came around. The boss said yes. Well, how does he get around?

we asked. Says the boss: ‘We haul him around.’”73 The statement implied that the

70 These numbers did not account for the thousands of miners who were injured but not killed in the mines each year, including those injured too severely to return to work. The Illinois BLS report for 1891 claimed that the state averaged 35,314 tons of coal for every man injured. Three hundred and sixty-seven men were injured in 1891 Illinois coal mines alone. State inspectors reported their stats in different ways. Some counted the year beginning in January, while others began in June. Some used the “short ton” as the measurement while others used the “long ton,” making it impossible to accurately compare mine deaths and injuries. C. C. Woodson, Missouri Mine Inspector Report to Lee Meriwether, Missouri BLS, Report of the State Mine Inspector of the State of Missouri for the Year Ending November 5, 1890 (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printing Company, 1890), 9; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1891, 31; Edward Wheeler Parker, US Production of Coal in 1894 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895). 71 Missouri BLS, Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1888, 50. See also Rosenow, Death and Dying in the Working Class. 72 In many cases, mining required a miner to sit or lay on the floor of the mine. Consequently, water even a few inches deep not only made work miserable, but also increased the miner’s chance of drowning and illness. 73 George Johnson, letter to the editor, “Expects,” UMWJ, October 10, 1893. 61

inspector followed the will of the company, and cared less for the well-being of the miners. A miner in Weir City, Kansas, confirmed this when he reported that the mine inspector never inspected the inside of the mine. Instead, he “only inspected the mine from the tipple of the shaft.”74 Throughout the nation, miners made similar complaints

that state mine inspectors failed to do inspections, were too unfamiliar with the mining

process to do inspections adequately, or gave their mines safety approvals despite

eminent and visible dangers.75 “I am under the impression that the mine inspector laws are lived up to on one side, but not the other,” Illinois miner William Gardner claimed.

“The salary side is lived up to, but the duty side is deficient.” His words came in response to the latest death in a local mine. “He was a Polander that was killed, but a

Polander is not supposed to be human, so I did not hear of any investigation [into] how the accident occurred.” Gardner’s bitter words, which indicated the inequalities that ran through the mines and government, also revealed the inspectors’ power of discretion.

Some accidents were more worthy of investigation than others. Some deaths were not worth reporting at all. As such, even the callous ratios of deaths to coal produced may be substantially higher than what the officials claimed.76

74 V.N. H., LA 626, letter to the editor, “Weir City, Kansas,” JUL, January 28, 1888. 75 Mine inspectors were appointed by the state. In most states, they were required to take an exam on mining laws, safety, and techniques, but passing the exam was not always necessary. In many cases, the mine inspector had never entered a mine in his life before accepting the position. In the wake of an 1888 Missouri explosion, the mine inspector relied on input from several coal operators when conducting his investigation including Robert Craig, the superintendent for the ATSF’s Frontenac, Kansas, mine that exploded just a few months later. “T. B. T.,” letter to the editor, “Not Well Received,” NLT, May 7, 1887; G. A. Dinsmoor, Jos. McKernan, Frank Kenoyer, demands to Missouri Governor Albert Morehouse reprinted in “An Investigation Demanded,” NLT, April 14, 1888; “Mass Meeting,” Pittsburg [Kansas] Headlight, November 15, 1888; “A. Miner” letter to the editor, “A Missouri Inspector,” NLT, August 25, 1888; P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “Illinois Mine Inspectors,” NLT, October 5, 1889; Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “As to Mine Inspectors,” NLT, December 21, 1889; “Illinois: Examination for Mine Inspectors at Springfield,” The Colliery Engineer 8:4 (November 1887), 79. 76 William Gardner, letter to the editor, “Letter from Illinois,” NLT, November 9, 1893. 62

The hardship that miners suffered, from the indifference to their labor to the disregard for their deaths all indicated to the miners that their employers and those appointed by the government to look after them, viewed the mine workers as less than human. Indiana miner “Cambrian” claimed miners were defenseless “prey to every vicious human being.”77 Miner “Justice” agreed, writing that miners struggled between being “men or mice.”78 The phrase, which referenced the century old poem “To a

Mouse,” was familiar to thousands of Scottish miners throughout the southern Midwest.

Written by Robert Burns, it told the story of a farmer’s drive to clear his field that ultimately destroyed the home of a timid field mouse. Dozens of miners referenced the poem, identifying with the mouse whose possessions were overturned by a more powerful being with the ability to quash its life.79 Such a fragile existence was particularly clear to mine workers. Mice often ran rampant in the mines, but seldom served a purpose except to monitor the amount of breathable air.80A mouse’s only value was that it was worthless, its very breath was an expendable tool for the mines.81 To the miners, this was a poem about their own poverty and powerlessness. They became timid

77“Cambrian,” letter to the editor, “President McBride at Dugger—A Strong Appeal to Miners,” NLT, August 3, 1889. 78 “Justice,” letter to the editor, “Red Ash, Kentucky,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891. 79For example, Indiana miner “Old Pilgrim” encouraged miners to no longer sit in “significant silence” but “men and not mice” and fight for better working conditions. “Old Pilgrim,” letter to the editor, “Wants Discussion,” NLT, March 22, 1890; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Rendville,” UMWJ, July 7, 1892; J. A. Crawford, letter to the editor, “The Organized Miners,” UMWJ, February 6, 1896; J. P. Reese, letter to the editor, “Journal Agent Reece,” UMWJ, November 17, 1898. 80 Small animals such as birds and mice were often carried with the miners to discern when odorless gas levels were too high because they would succumb to the poison before the miners. Mines and Quarries Reports of J. B. Atkinson, H. M. Inspector of Mines for the East Scotland District (No. 1) For the Year 1900 (London: Darling & Son, 1901), 13; J. P. Reese, letter to the editor, “Journal Agent,” UMWJ, October 27, 1898; “Discussion Upon Dr. J. Haldane’s Paper on ‘The Causes of Death in Colliery Explosions,” Transactions of the Federated Institution of Mining Engineers Vol. 13 (1896-97): 284-287. 81 In some cases this comparison extended to the mine structure itself. An 1835 Scottish magazine compared the nursery rhyme “Hickory Dickory Dock” to the life of “a small coal man” who continually climbed up and down the shaft of his mine or “mouse hole.” “Nursery Rhymes,” Blackwoods’ Edinburgh Magazine Vol. 37 No. 233 (March 1835): 475. 63

“mice” who labored hard in harsh conditions, entering the mine each day wondering if

they would emerge unharmed.

Unpaid

Company and governmental effort to protect earnings at employee expense

extended beyond the mine and into nearly every aspect of miners’ and their families’ lives. Although some historians have claimed that miners had the power to move to the best paying mine thus avoiding exploitation, the complexity of the payment system made this exceedingly difficult.82 A simple “cent per ton” wage could not be compared

between mines without accounting for the amount of dead work, supply costs, and

weighing method.83 While miners settled on a payment rate for winter and summer

mining each year, the cent per ton agreement was subject to the deductions as well as

dead work that chipped away at a miner’s earnings. In addition to these factors, the

companies frequently switched between a variety of weighing techniques, further eroding

miners’ paychecks while maintaining that they paid a high cent per ton wage.

Because there was no uniform weighing method, it was simple for companies to

lower wages even if the cents paid per ton remained the same. When the coal was

extracted, the “slack” or clay, stone, and silt mixed in with the coal needed to be filtered

out before the coal was sold. To do this, the coal was placed over large “screens” with

“bars” spaced apart to allow the slack to fall through. Coal chunks remained above,

82 The primary work that favors this view is Price V. Fishback’s Soft Coal, Hard Choices, which argues that most miners raised their wages by relocating to mines that paid the best. In doing so, he claimed, they forced other mines to pay their employees equally high wages or risk losing their best workers. 83 Even the “ton” was not standardized between mines. Most mines measured on the “short ton,” or 2,000 lbs. but others used the “long ton,” which was 2,240lbs. These inconsistencies make it impossible to provide any meaningful comparison of miners’ real wages. J.M. Carson, letter to the editor, “Vice President Carson,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, p.114. 64

eventually tumbling into a new car separate from the slack. “Run of the mine” coal,

which was weighed before it was filtered, was heavier due to the slack, making it worth

less than “screened coal,” which was filtered before it was weighed. In some cases, mine

run coal earned fewer cents per ton than the screened wage, in other instances, operators

paid screen wages for run of the mine coal, but deducted a percentage of the overall

weight to account for the slack, and at times deducting as much as fifty percent of the

weight. 84

Screened coal was more common in late nineteenth century mines, but even the screening process was uneven. Mines often changed the “bars” on the screen to increase the amount of slack that fell through the gaps. In changing the bars’ shape or spacing or using corroded bars and broken screens, companies could increase the amount of slack.

“I have been told that on one certain occasion,” Illinois organizer William Scaife quipped, that the spaces between bars in one Illinois mine were so large, “the operator’s pug dog went down the screen and fell through into the nut car.”85

In doing this, the company not only increased the amount of slack or, in Scaife’s

case, small dogs, filtered away but also caused smaller pieces of coal called “nut coal” to

fall through the screen and into a separate car designated for nut coal. This coal was not

credited to the miner’s coal weight, meaning he dug it for free even though the company

84“Semi-Monthly,” letter to the editor, “Clinton, Ind.,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Davis Answers,” UMWJ, December 15, 1892. In other mines, such as the machine mines located in southern Illinois’s Egypt, companies rejected the wage per ton system altogether and implemented a “box system” where miners were paid according to the number of “boxes” they loaded with coal. “The boxes are claimed to hold a ton, and they do beyond a doubt,” Illinois union leader J. M. Carson wrote, “more often they hold from about 2500 to 3000 pounds, still called a ton, and the cry is put more coal on your box or bring your tools out.” J. M. Carson, letter to the editor, “Vice President Carson,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, Ninth Annual Report… 1891 (Springfield: H. W. Rokker, 1891), 25-6; “1892-1893 Daily Production at Echols, Ky,” McHenry Coal Company Records, MSS 29 Box 1, Folder 1, WKU, Bowling Green, Kentucky; Missouri Bureau of the Mines, Sixth Annual Report, 1892, 159. 85 William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Ex-President Scaife,” UMWJ, December 16, 1897. 65

sold this coal. 86 Kentucky miner “Snake Eye Saul” claimed that at his mine, the

company charged the miners fifty cents a load to burn nut coal in their homes. “We

consider this very unjust as we get [paid] nothing for mining and sending out nut coal,”

he complained, asserting the action was nothing better than theft.87

But company theft from miners was not limited to large screens and nut cars.

Companies frequently “lost” cars of coal prior to weighing. When this happened, the

miner’s tag was separated from his coal car so that he received no pay for the load when

it was filtered and sold. Illinois miner “K. of L.” reported that at his mine often lost up to

five tons of coal, “and [the pay discrepancy] don’t get rectified for weeks and months

after, and some never get it.” 88 Such operators who dared to “steal” weight from the

miners were especially deplorable, Indiana miner and organizer Aaron Litten wrote. “I

believe there should be a special place prepared in hell for such men as this operator.”89

As deplorable as the acts were, however, the behavior K of L and Litten described

was commonplace in the southern Midwest coalfields. In most instances, it was not only

part of a larger system of withholding payment in part to offset expenses, but also a

means of keeping workers dependent upon their employers that many rural industries

practiced. The heavy investing and high debt inherent in railroad speculation and other

86 One Kentucky miner estimated that at least twenty percent of the coal he mined fell into the nut car. Jas. A. Connery, letter to the editor, “Spottsville, Ky.,” NLT, March 28, 1891; Dan McLaughlan, letter to the editor, “Indian Territory,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891; “What Is It About?,” NLT, August 15, 1891; J. C. Heenan, letter to the editor, “Keep Away,” NLT, July 30, 1887. For a description of the various sorting processes according to types of coal see, Selwyn Taylor, “General Mining Methods of the Pittsburg Coal Region,” Colliery Engineer 8:4 (November 1887), 86; Frederick E. Saward, The Coal Trade: A Compendium of Valuable Information Relative to Coal Production, Prices, Transportation, Etc., at Home and Abroad… (s. l.: s. n., 1891), 106. 87 “Snake Eye Saul,” letter to the editor, “Trouble,” UMWJ, August 10, 1893. 88 Miners of the Mine Creek Coal Shaft, Linn County, Kansas, letter to Governor Lorenzo Lewelling,, May 11, 1894, LDLP, Correspondence, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS; “K. of L.,” letter to the editor, “Mattoon Complaints,” NLT, February 5, 1887; G. W. Weippiert, “Life in a Coal Mine,” NLT, January 26, 1893. 89 “K of L,” letter to the editor, “Streator,” NLT, October 13, 1888; Aaron Litten, letter to the editor, “Notes from an Organizer,” NLT, August 17, 1889. 66 forms of big business meant that these corporations rarely had money on hand to pay all of their employees. Some mines, such as the C. C. Company Mine No. 4 in Danville,

Illinois, solved this problem by dividing its workforce into quarters and paying each group on a different day of the week. According to miner “Joe,” this achieved “entire satisfaction with the miners,” but few mines implemented the tactic. In fact, when No. 4 received new managers, the payment system quickly ended. The inexperienced new manager ordered the miners to widen the entry by two feet, which “became a drag” on coal production and upset the mine’s small but carefully balanced budget. Short on cash,

No. 4 changed its pay schedule so that it could use the miners’ pay to cover expenses for an extra week. Within weeks, the company was so far behind it stopped paying the miners regularly altogether. When the miners demanded their pay, the manager offered them the choice between weekly pay at 43 ½ cents per ton or monthly at 48 cents.90

For companies with small budgets or large railroad mines like the ATSF that often flirted with bankruptcy, avoiding laborers’ payroll was crucial to keeping the company afloat. Even when miners were paid, companies seldom paid miners their full amount due. An 1891 Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics study, for example, reported that even the largest coal corporations withheld five to twenty days’ worth of wages in each pay.91 Many companies paid their employees as little cash as possible in part to maintain their limited cash supply, but also to keep the workers tied to the company. In addition to mines, railroads, sawmills and even larger plantation or bonanza-style farms

90 “Joe,” letter to the editor, “Ran Short,” UMWJ, July 13, 1893. 91 “K. of L.,” letter to the editor, “Mattoon Complaints,” NLT, February 5, 1887; Missouri BLS, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Missouri Being for the Year Ending November 5, 1891 (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printing Company, State Printers and Binders, 1891), 9; Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 115; Eileen Boris, “‘A Man’s Dwelling House is His Castle’: Tenement House Cigarmaking and the Judicial Imperative,” in Work Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor, ed. Ava Baron (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 128. 67 not only paid irregularly, but often avoided paying their workers in cash. Many employers paid in “checks” that could not be cashed immediately. In an extensive study on rural wage payment, Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether found that the checks frequently required workers to wait anywhere from one to ten years before redeeming the check for its full cash amount.92

According to Meriwether, the check system frequently worked in conjunction with commissary stores that the company owned. Known by the miners as the “truck” or

“pluck-me” store because they “plucked” wages from the miners, these stores frequently charged high prices for goods that could be purchased without cash. For thousands of miners facing unreliable and irregular payment periods, these stores were often the only place that extended credit. Similarly, although the checks were seldom good anywhere else, workers waiting for their checks to mature could spend the full amount in the pluck- me before the cash-in date. Any amount not spent when the check had matured could be redeemed for cash, but the checks often could only be cashed at a bank, which was often several miles from the coal camp. In other cases, company issued vouchers known as

“coupons” or “scrip” used in place of legal tender.93

92 Lee Meriwether report to Governor David R. Francis, Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Missouri Being for the Year Ending November 5, 1889 (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printers and State Binders, 1889) 48, 51; “K. of L.,” letter to the editor, “Mattoon Complaints,” NLT, February 5, 1887. 93 “Johnny Bull,” letter to the editor, “Ha! Ha!” UMWJ, November 17, 1892; Henry Carter Mulberry letter to Lorenzo Lewelling, February 13, 1894, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS. Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields: The Southern West Virginia Miners, 1880-1922. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981, 32; Ronald Eller, Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers: Industrialization of the Appalachian South, 1880-1930 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 188. Not all historians agree on the degree of exploitation that occurred in the company stores. Crandall Shifflett argued in Coal Towns that company stores gave mining families ready access to goods previously unavailable in remote locations and acted as a central point for socializing, both of which, he claimed, improved the overall quality of life in mining towns. Although Price Fishback acknowledged that some companies compelled their miners to shop at their stores at higher prices, his Soft Coal, Hard Choices argued that more miners shopped at the company store out of choice rather than force. Moreover, he contended, the debt a miner incurred seldom amounted to more than the miner would earn in his next paycheck. Fishback 68

Whether the company used checks or scrip, the outcome was the same. If the

worker wished to cash a check prematurely or if he wished to exchange his scrip for cash,

he typically received only seventy-five to eighty cents for each dollar earned.94

Meriwether argued the companies implemented this delayed payment system to force miners to remain in debt so that they had to shop at the company store. The tactic worked. Less than two years after Meriwether’s initial report, the Missouri BLS reported that the majority of miners in the state received all of their wages in food and merchandise purchased on credit prior to pay day. 95 One Louisiana sugar plantation

laborer claimed that such a system was designed to “make you a slave” over twenty years

after the Civil War.96

The incentives for shopping in the company store often compelled mining

families to accept the system rather than challenge its procedures. “J. D.” claimed that

his Iowa mine did not pay their miners in scrip and did not force them to purchase their

items at the commissary through debt. Rather, the company used the prospect of punishment to guarantee patronage, telling the miners, “The more you spend in our store

the harder you may work; the more you spend in our store the better place [in the mine]

we will give you.” Conversely, those who did not shop at the store found that their wages

were less. “I notice when I do not buy there that some thing is the matter with my coal,”

stressed that the miner’s ability to pay off his debt was paramount in issuing credit as the company held a greater risk at losing money in the transaction if it allowed a high debt peonage. Price V. Fishback, Soft Coal Hard Choices.; Crandall Shifflett Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1991). 94 In some cases, the company used both systems so that when a miner went to cash his check, he was given scrip and the option to exchange the scrip for cash at a deduction.; “Illiterate,” letter to the editor, “Still Another,” UMWJ, July 6, 1893; 95 Missouri BLS, Thirteenth Annual Report, 9 96 Harold Woodman, New South, New Law: The Legal Foundations of Credit and Labor Relations in the Postbellum Agricultural South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Forbath, “Ambiguities of Free Labor,” 796-7; Terrebonne, LA., Sept. 5, 1887,” JUL, September 26, 1887 quoted in Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015),2-3. 69

one miner reported to Meriwether. “It has more sulphur in it or more slack, or I get a

room where it is harder to mine coal. My wages invariably decrease, and I have found the

only way to get a better room and fairer wages is to deal at the company store.”97

Combined with low wages, irregular pay periods, and withheld wages, the

presence of a pluck-me meant that many miners were tethered to the company until their debt was paid.98 Although not all miners were compelled to shop at the store, those that

were had no control over the store’s selection of brands that they could purchase. They

also had no means to fight how much they cost. One Missouri wife claimed that she had

no wash tub and that her husband was shoeless because the commissary had neither items

in stock. Because no other stores accepted the company’s tender, she “was compelled to

wait two months until the Holladay store had obtained its new supply.”99 These

conditions enraged miners who claimed the pluck-me stores were unconstitutional. “It is

a system that plucks me of my civil rights,” Missouri miner S. C. Pierce complained to

Meriwether. It took “one of the dearest privileges of my life, that of having the dollar that

I have earned by the sweat of my brow, to go with it to the place I like, to trade it for food to put on the table and for clothes to put on my children’s backs.”100

It was not fair, Iowa miner J. D. railed. “They rob us while producing their

wealth. They rob our wives while they are compelled to trade in their store. Is this all?

97 “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “The Old Story,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891; Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report, 1889, 15. 98It is like the old Mexican peon system,” one miner complained to the Kansas Bureau of Industrial Statistics, “[companies] get the miner here and get him in debt to them, and they own him. If he has a family, he can’t get enough ahead to get away.” KBLI, First Annual Report, 138; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “A Voice from Ayrshire,” UMWJ, November 5, 1891; “Mining Contract with the Pittsburg & Cherokee Coal & Mining Co. at Frontenac, Kansas,” August 22, 1893, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS; J.H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, February 4, 1897; William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Scaife,” UMWJ, November 3, 1898. 99 Meriwether report, in Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report, 56. 100 S. C. Pearce to Lee Meriwether in Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report,1889, 22-23. 70

No. They rob our children of the intellect that God has given them.” 101 Even in his frustration, J. D. knew that legislation overlooked this kind of “robbery.” Since most

“anti-truck” laws focused on either abolishing scrip or compulsion to shop at the commissary, the miners had no way to fight the stores.102 Worse, as Meriwether

discovered, operators regularly defied standing laws with impunity. “The law requires

corporations to redeem all checks or tokens of indebtedness issued to their employees

within thirty days after the date of delivery,” Meriwether explained. “This law is laid

down so plainly and explicitly that I hesitated to believe any company in Missouri made a

practice to issue checks to their employees and refuse to redeem such checks in cash until

the expiration of ten years.”103 Yet not one, but several companies in Missouri and elsewhere violated this law and others regarding pay, weighing techniques, and mine safety.104 “We seemingly have no means of protection,” J.D. concluded.105 Miners and

101 “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “The Old Story,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891. 102 In most states that passed anti-company store legislation in the late 1880s and early 1890s in the southern Midwest state legislatures frequently either deemed the laws unconstitutional or “impossible to enforce.” Kansas designed an 1887 act “to secure to laborers in and about coal mines and manufactories the payment of regular intervals, and in lawful money of the United States.” According to an 1893 assessment of contemporary labor law, the Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industry found that many states ruled the laws unconstitutional due to a perceived violation of the coal mine operators’ freedom of contract, or “the right of every man to freely enter into such engagements as his business sense approves.” Section 2441-2, General Statutes of Kansas, 1889, volume 1 (Topeka, KS: George W. Crane & Co., 1889), 724; “House Bill No. 28,” and “Senate Bill No. 40” Journal of the House of Representatives of the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois (Springfield, IL: H.W. Rokker, State Printer and Binder, 1891), 661-2, 995, 1076; The Truck Store,” UMWJ, May 28, 1891; Will Hall, letter to the editor, “Streator, Ill.,” UMWJ, April 7, 1892; KBLI, Ninth Annual Report, 1893, 800-05; For a more detailed treatment of the courts attitudes pertaining to paternalism in the workplace, see William E. Forbath, “The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,” Wisconsin Law Review 4 (July, 1985);796-7; Aviam Soifer, “The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921,” Law and History Review 5:1 (Spring, 1987): 249-279. 103 “Jim,” letter to the editor, “From Illinois,” NLT, March 30, 1889; Lee Meriwether report to Governor David R. Francis, in Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report, 1889; Meriwether quoted in “The Company Store in Missouri,” NLT, November 2, 1889. 104 See Meriwether’s report containing correspondence with all labor commissioners in mining states, Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report, 1889, 18-29; Robert Linn, letter to the editor, “From Kansas,” NLT, May 12, 1883; “Miner,” letter to the editor, “Has Indiana an Inspector of Mines?,” NLT, December 14, 1889. 105 “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “The Old Story,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891. 71

farmers desperate for work had no choice but to accept the terms offered or try to find

work elsewhere.

These experiences of powerlessness, surrender, dependence, and submission, from the mine to kitchen table, stood in contrast to producers’ understanding of what it meant to be men and free citizens. Elongated periods between pay and increasing debt made it difficult for mining families to move away. Consequently, what began as wage decline spread to nearly every aspect of life, eroding producers’ abilities to make their own decisions. Miner “Veritas,” claimed that tolerating wage deductions or agreeing to shop at the company store “only drives away those of sterling moral worth, and invites a population low in morals, low in self-respect, and depraved in every God-given

attribute.” Such an undercutting of virtue, he argued, was inevitable “when manhood is

surrendered” to the will of the company.106 Similarly, knowing that the latest failed

agreement between miners and operators in 1889 would trigger another reduction, Illinois

miner “Pro Bono Publico” warned National Labor Tribune readers that the situation

would only worsen. “If we are to do the behests of the operators and submit to their will

without question,” he cautioned, “then we lose our manhood and our freedom.”107

From the workplace into the home, it seemed that those who looked for work in the mines sacrificed their manhood and freedom. In these regions, “free labor” had turned in the eyes of many into “wage slavery,” with no hope of improvement.108 “Men who

106 “Veritas” to the editor, “Company Stores,” NLT, June 2, 1888. 107 “Gomer,” letter to the editor, “Our Illinois Letter,” NLT, August 4, 1877;“Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Organization,” NLT, March 2, 1889; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “President Penna’s Pertinent Comments,” NLT, June 9, 1889; KBLI, First Annual Report, 78; W. H. Blake to Lee Meriwether, Eleventh Annual Report, 24; Cooper, Once a Cigar Maker, 124-5, 322. 108Patrick McAdams, letter to the editor, “From Indiana,” NLT, October 3, 1885; T. J. Roberts, letter to the editor, “That Grape Creek Visit,” NLT, February 19, 1887; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Answers Questions of his Own Asking,” NLT, February 26, 1887; “Braceville Miner,” letter to the editor, “Against the Contract,” NLT, March 16, 1889. 72

want to be men cannot get along here,” miner “G. F.” complained, noting that low wages

and pluck-me made conditions in his current mine worse than what he had left behind in

England. The irony was not lost on him. “This is called the land of the free, but if this is

freedom, where does slavery exist?”109 His castigation was both moral and political. A nation that prided itself in offering freedom and opportunity allowed the market system to cripple producer life and liberty, turning a blind eye to suffering and starvation for want of cheaper coal and grain prices. There was simply no hope to get out of debt, Illinois miner “D. B. T.” explained after his mine underwent a twenty-five percent wage

reduction. But the reduction was not the only problem. After employer fees and wage

garnishments, D. B. T. and his fellow miners were paid only twenty-five cents for each

dollar they earned. “I think this will show slavery and serfdom, and that we are all, black

and white, in bondage under the present system.”110

Hypocrites

For thousands of rural workers, the system that allowed businessmen to grow

wealthy while treating others as less than human seemed blatantly immoral. Observing

the greed within the coal industry, “A Well Wisher,” called attention to the irony of

businessmen “claiming to be civilized, and some of them Christianized” while treating

their laborers harshly. They forced their employees “to work down in the dark and dangerous mines more than eight hours per day, while they themselves are enjoying all

109 “G. P.,” letter to the editor, “White Slavery,” NLT, February 25, 1888. 110 “D. B. T.,” letter to the editor, “Illinois,” NLT, March 25, 1876. 73 the sunlight and the pure fresh air and riding about to all the places of amusement… and then claim to be human.”111

A Well Wisher’s claim reflected how thousands of rural producers regarded the business practices inherent in the new nationally and globally competitive market system.

The businessmen who engaged in it and the government officials who condoned it, both behaved in ways contrary to the values they professed. In treating their employees as less than human, employers acted as soulless heathens, even as they professed Christian values. Likewise, the government officials and ministers charged to look after all people but cared little for workers were equally as hypocritical. Yet workers, like miner “Fair

Play,” condemned this treatment, asserting,“[w]e are not slaves but human beings and demand to be treated as such.”112 Often, they used their own Christian convictions, understandings of citizenship, and moral right not only to show themselves as moral citizens, but to shame those who treated the poor unjustly.

Most late nineteenth century workers seldom attended church or affiliated with a specific denomination, but still upheld general Christian beliefs.113This religious thought

111 “A Well Wisher,” letter to the editor, “Letter from New Castle,” NLT, April 25, 1891; For similar arguments of neglect, see Samuel G. Clevinger vs. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., District Court of Iowa and Woodbury County, March 1888 in Charles Almon Dewey Papers, MsC 103, Box 4, Folder 23, University of Iowa Special Collections, Iowa City, Iowa. 112 “Fair Play,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Logan,” NLT, July 25, 1891. 113 This could be, as some historians have suggested, that workers viewed churches as a means to control the working class. Robert Weir and others have suggested that this caused workers to turn to unions for spiritual guidance so that local unions resembled “workingman’s churches” that incorporated Christian symbols and words in their rituals, insignia, constitutions, and speeches without adhering to a specific Christian doctrine. Likewise, historians of Populism have observed that Farmers’ Alliance meetings often sounded more like revivals than meetings to discuss political reform. These convictions ran throughout labor organization declarations, often embracing what Herbert Gutman identified as a kind of “social Christianity” unaligned with any specific Christian doctrine to justify their criticism for “parasites” that robbed producer classes and their desires for labor reform. Weir, Beyond Labor’s Veil, esp. 68-92, quote page 69; David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872 (New York: Knopf, 1967), 200-4; Gutman, “Protestantism in the American Labor Movement,” quote 105; Fones- Wolf, Trade Union Gospel; Mirola, Redeeming Time; Jarod Roll, Spirit of Rebellion: Labor and Religion in the New Cotton South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010); Clark D. Halker, For Democracy, Workers, and God: Labor Song-Poems and Labor Protest, 1865-95 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 74

was more than rhetoric. It offered a way for rural producers to present their hardships as

clear moral, economic, and political wrongs against them and their families. Although

reformers played into such religious sentiments, these understandings transcended union rhetoric and came out of genuine spiritual conviction often independent of the religious values middle class society professed. 114 Rural producers asserted their own Christian

values not only to push for reforms, but to challenge their place in society, asserting that they were humans with Christian souls that deserved respect.

The hypocrisy they witnessed within society was the precise reason many rural producers did not affiliate with traditional churches despite their religious convictions. “I used to be a very good church member, and I admire the teachings of Christ very much yet,” Illinois organizer William Scaife wrote, but he would not attend or give it money any longer. During strikes, ministers favored operators who gave more money to the church than workers. “[The ministers] profess to be followers of ‘the meek and lowly’

Jesus, but it is only a profession with them,” he insisted. In Scaife’s mind, this made ministers part of the “moneyocracy” that hurt the poor. “Better to be without a church than hire a man or men to stab you in the back when you are engaged in a conflict with the oppressors of this earth.” 115 This was not Christianity, the Des Moines, Iowa,

Farmers’ Tribune argued. Rather it was “churchianity” where the “greed for power and popularity welcomes to its folds the very men whom Christ drove from the temple.” 116To

1991), esp. 142; Blum, “‘By the Sweat of their Brow,”; Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion,50; 169; 260; Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero; Robert McMath, Populist Vanguard, 75-6; Creech, Righteous Indignation; Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009). 114 Pope, Millhands and Preachers; Gutman, “Protestantism in the American Labor Movement,” 107. 115 William Scaife, letter to the editor, “His Opinion of Some Preachers,” NLT, October 22, 1892. 116 “Practical Christianity,” reprinted from the [Des Moines, Iowa] Farmer’s Tribune, NLT, January 9, 1892. See also, J. B. Silcox, “The Social Problem,” JKL, November 23, 1893; Editorial reprinted from Cleveland Citizen, UMWJ, June 22, 1893. 75

Scaife, the “so-called Christian ministers who in time of conflict go out of the way to abuse the weaker party in the fight,” were worse than strikebreakers. “Doubly so,” he argued, “because they are all educated men, and ought not to allow their sense of right to be overcome by their desire for gold, and that is what most of them do.” Scaife believed these actions made them “the worst characters in the sight of God,” and as worthy of damnation as the operators who sat in their congregations. 117

Indiana miner wife Laurene Gardner agreed. Although she and her husband were faithful church members, her ailing husband’s request for spiritual guidance shortly before his death was met with indifference from their minister. “One poor perfunctory visit was all the minister could find time to give.” Instead, her husband’s coworkers came to his aid. They performed his last rites, arranged the funeral, and held the ceremony over his grave. This was why workers did not attend church, Gardner explained. “When the church does the work then the common people will again hear them gladly. If they leave the work among the working classes to the trade unions then the church people should not wonder that workingmen prefer their trade unions to the church.”118

Unions, not churches, were the organizations that truly followed the “principles” all should follow, “A Laborer” wrote. “Honest labor,” as thousands of workers called it, involved working hard, helping those in need, not stealing, and not showing favoritism. 119 “[T]here is Christianity in these principles,” he argued, yet the wealthy did

117 William Scaife, letter to the editor, “His Opinion of Some Preachers,” NLT, October 22, 1892. 118 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Pathos,” UMWJ, July 27, 1893; Rosenow, Death and Dying in the Working Class, 92. 119 For examples of workers and organizers using this term , or variations of it, as a shorthand for the set of values to live and work by, see P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “Secretary Donnelly’s Reply,” NLT, April 2, 1887; “Federation,” letter to the editor, “Response to a Denial,” NLT, January 7, 1888; Aaron Litten, letter to the editor, “Indiana Mine Reports,” NLT, March 16, 1889; Henry Evans, letter to the editor, “Plenty of Miners in This Country,” NLT, February 1, 1890; “Trades Unionism,” UMWJ, May 28, 1891; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Work Very Dull,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891. 76 not follow this. “The rich are crushing the poor; many of them make a profession of

Christianity one day out of seven; while man and his wife and family living near the place of worship are debarred from attending for the want of wearing apparel and that they may not be made light of by others who are rich in the world’s goods.”120

Yet workers’ agreement that their treatment was immoral was not enough to bind them to unions. Both the Knights and the National Federation of Miners and Mine

Laborers (NFM) attempted to tap into these understandings in an effort to win the allegiance of the nation’s mine workers. Despite their efforts, neither organization swayed a majority of the nation’s coal miners into their ranks. Even those who joined one or both organizations did not always follow their leaders’ orders. Just as Christian convictions did not correlate with worker church attendance, so their desire to reform the system that injured them did not always lead to union faithfulness.

Part of the lack of faith in labor organizing came from the enormity of the system that hurt rural producers. Worker mistreatment stretched across the nation and connected disparate industries together in complex ways. For the coal industry, resolving miners’ grievances required a powerful national union capable of addressing questions of crop prices and farm debts so that the farmers and their farm hands could return to the fields. It meant engaging the steel and railroad industries that not only demanded cheaper coal, but were also crucial to coal mining and transport. It required government support to pass new safety laws and enforce those already in place. Most importantly, it meant finding a way to fight the entire coal market that forced companies to constantly undercut prices by cutting costs in their mines.

120 “A Laborer,” letter to the editor, “From the Bend,” UMWJ, June 22, 1893. 77

Although workers understood the enormity of this undertaking, both the Knights

and the NFM confronted these issues differently. The Knights’ cooperation and education

plans were long-term endeavors that many producers believed were essential to restoring

economic independence.121 More importantly, its structure of “mixed locals” allowed

farmers, miners, and other trades to all attend the same union meetings, fortifying

connections across trade lines. The NFM, which was founded in 1885, was more adept at

looking after specific trade concerns. Its dedication to the mining industry allowed it to

focus on regulating companies’ cutthroat competition by negotiating a nationwide pay

scale with coal operators each year from 1886 forward. Often, leadership in the two

orders stood at odds with each other. Many of the founding members of the NFM began

as Knights and, like hundreds of workers in other industries, left the order to organize

along trade lines.122

Thousands of miners, however, believed the two organizations complementary.

Many held membership in both unions. G. W. Dinsmoor noted that his Missouri mine maintained memberships in both orders without conflict, declaring “[t]his method is far the best I have ever seen tried yet.”123 Thomas Faulds of Indiana similarly asserted, “I

think if the different labor organizations would work in meeting directions each in their

121 For a recent discussion of the Knights of Labor’s goals and efforts, see Goldstene, Struggle for America’s Promise, p. 45-67. 122 For additional information on the growth of trade and industrial unions and the beginning of the Knights of Labor’s fight with the American Federation of Labor, see Sanders, Roots of Reform, p. 42, 53; Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement, Vol 2: From the Founding of the A. F. L. to the Emergence of American Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1955, 1995), p.165-6; T. J. Roberts, letter to the editor, “The Grape Creek Miners,” NLT, January 22, 1887; NFM official report, “Coal Miners’ Matters,” NLT, January 29, 1887; Frank Julian Warne, The Coal-Mine Workers: A Study in Labor Organization (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1905), p.57. 123 G. W. Dinsmoor, letter to the editor, “Moberly Miners Vindicated,” NLT, February 4, 1888; William Hall, letter to the editor, “A Peculiar Situation,” NLT, March 19, 1887; Chris Campbell, letter to the editor, “The Long Lockout,” NLT, March 26, 1887; Frank Campbell to Terence Powderly, January 9, 1884, Reel 6, Series A, Part 1D, Correspondence of Local Assemblies, 1881-1915, Numbers 6514-6974, JHP. 78

own sphere, perhaps what could not be achieved in one might in the other.”124 In his

mind, cross-union cooperation was not only possible, but ideal.

By 1886, neither group was strong enough to secure the changes they promised.

The Federation established a national pay scale but could not enforce it in all states.

Companies in weakly unionized areas took advantage of the agreement and undersold

mines that honored the scale, intensifying competition rather than diminishing it.125

Similarly, the Knights’ rapid growth in the mid-1880s did not translate into successful

mining reform. The mixed occupational leadership within assemblies made it difficult for

the union to address problems specific to the mining industry. In many cases, Knight

decisions regarding the coal industry were not made by miners, but by workers in other

industries whose unfamiliarity with the coal industry was a liability.126 Because of this,

the Knights formed National Trades Assembly 135 (NTA 135) in 1886. Like the

Federation, NTA 135 was specifically for miners, essentially a trade union under the

Knights’ umbrella. This structure allowed miners to remain as Knights while providing

leaders over the miners who were well acquainted with the mining trade.127

In many ways, NTA 135’s formation upset an already shaky balance between the

two orders. Federation leaders viewed it as an open attack on their trade union structure

and saw it as the Knights working to undermine Federation authority in mining reform.

NTA 135 officers were outraged at the Federation leadership’s unwillingness to

124 Thomas Faulds, letter to the editor, “Oil on the Troubled Waters,” NLT, February 2, 1887; James Morrison to Terence Powderly, December 10, 1883, Reel 6, JHP. 125Minutes of the Joint Convention of Operators and Miners, February 23 and 24,1886, Reel 1, JMP; “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Organization,” NLT, March 2, 1889; George Harrison, letter to the editor, “Which Is Best?” NLT, January 1, 1887. 126 Daniel McLaughlin to Terence Powderly, June 9, 1882, Reel 4, JHP. 127 “Let it Be Stopped,” official NTA 135, Knights of Labor report, NLT, August 27, 1887; “Absolute Surrender,” Dixon [Illinois] Evening Telegraph, January 12, 1888; Record of Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor of America, Tenth Session, 1886, 42, 265-268; Ware, Labor Movement, 213-14. 79

cooperate, particularly at its resolution that forbid any NFM officer from holding an

office in any other labor organization. 128

The following two years were plagued with bitter disputes between organization

leaderships. Although the Knights of Labor declined in the urban centers that once

formed the union’s stronghold, rural workers often remained in the order.129 NTA 135

fell into the internal disputes within the Knights, which hampered its effectiveness, but

even in late 1888 the order remained as strong as its rival organization.130 Unable to win

all miners’ support, the NFM could not enforce pay scales or safety laws. The two orders’

leadership therefore remained locked in a battle to destroy their rival in the name of protecting miners.

The miners disagreed. They saw little benefit in the ongoing division between

Federation and NTA 135 leadership. Many questioned whether the leaders’ actions, like

those of ministers, government officials, and employers, were guided more by personal

ambition than by care for the rank and file. Illinois NFM organizer P. H. Donnelly

claimed that in founding NTA 135, the Knights strayed from their original goals of

eradicating the wage labor system and building up the workers. “The heart of the great

body of the K. of L. is right,” Donnelly asserted. Yet, to many miners, the organization’s

latest efforts seemed focused more on quashing its competition than aiding miners. “We

128 W. T. Lewis, letter to the editor, “Which is Waging War?” NLT, February 5, 1887. 129 For theories on the Knights of Labor’s decline, see Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation, Voss, The Making of American Exceptionalism; Richard Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics: Class Conflict and the Origins of Modern Liberalism in Chicago, 1864-97 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Robert Weir, Knights Unhorsed: Internal Conflict in a Gilded Age Social Movement (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000). 130 For a detailed account of Knights divisions as the organization fell into decline, see Weir, Knights Unhorsed. For accounts of how this applied specifically to NTA 135, the most vivid depiction is a note from Powderly to Hayes in March 1888 which contained a sketch of Powderly being violently blown to pieces with “135” at the center of the explosion. Terence Powderly to John Hayes, March 1, 1888, Reel 1, JHP. See also, T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “T. T. O’Malley Explains,” NLT, June 4, 1887; W. T. Lewis, open letter to Terence Powderly, “Lewis to Powderly,” NLT, January 12, 1889; “W. T. Lewis Vindicated,” editorial reprinted from the Ohio State Journal, NLT, March 30, 1889. 80 feel that there can be no peace or comfort until that rule or ruin policy is abandoned and the order of the K. of L. brought back to first principles again,” he continued. If the organization truly cared about the miners, he insisted, it would “do away with the so- called National District Trades assemblies of different callings.” T. J. Roberts argued that NTA 135’s formation brought unnecessary strife to the miners who were already struggling in their workplaces. “I myself respect the K. of L. as much as any man living, having been connected with it for a number of years, but I don’t like to hear men trying to break down the best trades union my craft has ever had, simply to further the ends of a few men who really have not the interest of my craft at heart.” Roberts did not love the

Knights of Labor any less, he insisted, rather, “I love the Federation more.”131

Despite the dual loyalty, there was no denying that the union divide came at the miners’ expense. “[W]e are the ones who have to suffer,” miner and organizer John

Duddey explained. Because of the division, the miners were “taxed and levied on by both organizations.” Indiana organizer Samuel Anderson described similar conditions, noting that miners in his district paid dues to both organizations but could barely earn a living. If the miners of both organizations could cooperate with each other, surely their organizations could as well.132 In December 1888, union leaders heeded the miners’ demands. Meeting in Columbus, Ohio, leaders in both organizations agreed to sever ties

131 Several local assemblies, especially those in the Pennsylvania anthracite region, protested the decision to put all miners’ assemblies under NTA 135 jurisdiction and instead petitioned the General Assembly to remain in their District Assemblies. P.H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “Secretary Donnelly’s Reply,” NLT, April 2, 1887; “K. of L,” letter to the editor, “Mattoon Complaints,” NLT, February 5, 1887; John Smith, letter to the editor, “Mr. Bailey’s Visit to Grape Creek,” NLT, February 5, 1887; T.J. Roberts, letter to the editor, “That Grape Creek Visit,” NLT, February 19, 1887; Chris Campbell, letter to the editor, “The Long Lockout,” NLT, March 26, 1887; Peter McCall, William Hawthorne, and Thomas Brady, Committee of the Spring Valley, Illinois, IMPA NFM Lodge, Official Report, “Scolding the Officers,” NLT, August 13, 1887; Proceedings, 1886, 42-4; Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor of America, Eleventh Regular Session, 1887, p. 1699-1701. 132 John Duddey, letter to the editor, “Wants the Obstacles Removed,” NLT, May 21, 1887; Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “Queries as to Unity,” NLT, December 10, 1887; Edward Wilton, letter to the editor, “Edward Wilton Gives His Opinion,” NLT, January 14, 1888. 81 to their old orders, killing both NTA 135 and the NFM while dissolving the autonomous state unions within the NFM. In its place, they established the National Progressive

Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU).133

This was what the miners had demanded for years, but rather than join the unified order, hundreds of NTA 135 members refused to abandon the Knights. The NPU was little more than a renaming of the Federation, they complained. There was no structure that resembled what the Knights offered. Miners who had enjoyed the benefits of both orders saw no reason to desert NTA 135, even if its leadership did. Kansas organizer

Robert Linn wrote he was not pleased with NTA 135’s structure and function, but he could not justify leaving the order. “I am, and have been for the past ten years, a Knight of Labor,” he declared. “I never have had a thought or expressed a wish to abandon N. T.

A. 135 or the Order of the Knights of Labor.” His words reflected thousands of southern

Midwest miners’ sentiments regarding the amalgamation debate. As a result, many opted to retain their dual memberships in both orders while some refused to join the NPU altogether.134

Instead of unity, the NPU’s formation drew an even larger divide between organizations and therefore increased frustration from the rank and file.135 Indiana miner

133 “The Miners’ Convention, Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] Post, December 8, 1888. 134Union miners in Spring Valley, Illinois, for example, kept their minutes for their Knights of Labor local assembly and their NPU lodge in the same bound volumes. Spring Valley, Illinois, Lodge 26 “Miners and Mine Laborers Protective Association” of the NPU, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, IRAD, Normal, Illinois; “Coal Miners Matters,” NLT, January 5, 1889; Robert Linn, letter to the editor, “A Letter from Brother Robert Linn” JUL, January 24, 1889; IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, July 27, 1889; Ware, The Labor Movement, 215-221; Andrew Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, from the Development of the Mines to the Close of the Anthracite Strike of 1902, Including a Brief Sketch of Early British Miners (Columbus, Ohio: Press of J. L. Trauger Print Company, 1906), 250; Aaron Littin, letter to the editor, “Indiana Mine Reports,” NLT, March 16, 1889. 135 Within weeks, the NPU convinced thousands of western Pennsylvania miners to abandon NTA 135 for the new union by launching an attack against W. L. Scott, forcing him to improve conditions in his mines. The event marked the beginning of a slow increase in NPU support. By February 1889, the Miners and Mine Laborers Amalgamated Association, a union mostly comprised of Ohio miners also joined the new 82

“Coffee,” one of the thousands who refused to abandon NTA 135 and instead retained a

membership in both orders, claimed that the division between the organizations created a

cloud “as dark as a coal operator’s conscience” that hovered over the miners. Coffee’s

description equated the union fighting with operators’ callous actions in the mines that

endangered miners’ lives. “Now I would like for some one of either side to show me

where there is anything gained by being continually at ‘outs,’” he demanded.136 Dual

member Aaron Littin agreed, charging “This [fighting] originated and is advocated

principally by disappointed office seekers.” Such men, like employers, government

officials, and ministers only looked to the miners as a means for personal gain. “A man

that will join an organization to get an office is not worthy of recognition by any honest

laboring man,” he insisted, “and when [honest men] find one of that caliber [they should]

at once brand him as an imposter, and when they succeed in getting the heads of all such

demagogues chopped off then they will find peace and success will crown their every

effort.”137

Coffee and Littin’s descriptions of organization leadership as selfish impostors

tapped into the already present suspicions rural producers had against national leaders

who claimed to help rank and file, but did not act so. They were worthy of as much

mistrust as employers who did not treat their employees fairly, government officials who

did not uphold the law, and ministers who did not behave as Christians. In short, the

order. The NPU’s inability to honor its promises, however, prompted hundreds to abandon the order, causing the Indianapolis News to predict that the Knights would outlast the NPU. “Deserted the Knights,” The [Huntington, Indiana] Daily Democrat, December 21, 1888; “Miners Leaving the Knights of labor,” CT, December 21, 1888; “Telegraphic brevities,” The Ottawa [Kansas] Daily Republic, February 2, 1889;” Amalgamation of Interests,” Indianapolis News, December 14, 1889. 136 “Coffee,” letter to the editor, “Slow Work at Ayrshire,” NLT, April 6, 1889. 137 Aaron Littin, letter to the editor, “Indiana Mine Reports,” NLT, March 16, 1889; “Tramp,” letter to the editor, “A Tramp’s Wanderings,” NLT, March 16, 1889; “Address of President McBride,” NLT, January 19, 1889; NPU Indiana District Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, August 24, 1889. 83 unions became another foe to many miners. “A man can be a hypocrite in a labor movement just as easily as in church,” Indiana miner “X” wrote.138 His statement made the parallels between faith and union abundantly clear. Neither the church nor the union was wrong, but dishonest leaders in both could injure miners more than they helped. Just as miners’ belief in Christian values prevented them from attending church, so their belief in honest labor principles prevented them from fully supporting union leaders’ decisions.

The NPU’s inability to unite the miners or earn their trust was part of a larger culture of suspicion and fraud in the Gilded Age. Corporations’ reach into multiple industries, government ties, and backroom deals that pulled up profits while driving down prices contributed to a sense that corruption lurked everywhere from business, to churches, to their own trade organizations.

Although union leadership also claimed that producers were exploited, rhetoric alone did not sway miners to the union cause. When unions focused more on defeating each other than promoting safety and fair treatment, miners believed their claims were less than genuine. In these cases, even the thousands that joined the labor movement stopped short of supporting leadership objectives. Consequently, although thousands of organized miners called for a peaceful merger between the unions, they refused to obey a new organization that demanded they abandon their labor union ties. The officers who orchestrated the failed merger, they believed, acted out of their own self-preserving interests and seemed equally as fraudulent as their employers, government officials, or the ministers who often claimed to have the miners’ best interests at heart.

138 “X.,” letter to the editor, “Greedy for Work,” NLT, February 14, 1895. 84

Still, miners and farmers found it difficult to hold fast to their sense of moral right

in a competitive market. A network larger than local community bonds had changed the rural producers’ world. As earnings continued to decline, the competition between mines

and farms, union and non-union seeped into the ground itself. Producers’ need to provide

for their families facilitated a new kind of competition on the local level, turning

neighbor against neighbor and complicating the divisions between miner, farmer, and

businessman more than ever before.

Chapter Three

Undermined: Winter Diggers, Union Strikebreakers

One hundred feet below the frozen Illinois topsoil, a handful of farmers turned up

the earth not by the plow, but by the pick. Rather than work their fields, they spent

February 1888 in the Enterprise Mine, digging coal destined for the Chicago market.

Their mine was located in the southernmost region of the state, commonly known as

“Egypt,” whose coal industry was among the fastest growing in the southern Midwest.

Nearly four thousand Egypt miners turned out over 2,600,000 tons of coal in 1888 alone,

almost one-quarter of the state’s total output.1 Miners came from all over the nation and world to dig Egypt coal, but in February 1888, only farmers went down to work in the

Enterprise Mine.

No one but farmers dared descend the Enterprise shaft because it was one of

several Egypt mines on strike. The miners were already working below scale rates when

Egypt coal operators ordered another wage reduction that would bring their wages nearly

twenty-five percent lower than competing mines. “[T]he men thought it unjust,” miner

Robert Smith explained, because it not only cut wages deeper than market competition

required but it also would trigger wage reductions in mines throughout Illinois, Indiana,

Ohio, and Pennsylvania as they lowered costs to compete with Egypt for the Chicago

market. “We therefore resolved to resist the cut, and not give the operators surrounding

1 The 1888 coal output was an increase by over 400,000 tons, 50,000 tons more growth than any other region in the state. Illinois BLS, Fifth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, 1888, (Springfield, IL: Springfield Printing Co., 1888), p. 332, 358. 86

us the excuse to cut their miners, as it seems southern Illinois is always below our fellow

craftsmen.”2

But not all Egypt residents shared this conviction. Smith’s emphasis on the

miners’ desire to not go further “below” their craftsmen stood at odds with the local

farmers who broke the strike. Run as a joint stock company, anyone who wished to

purchase stock in the Enterprise Mine could do so at twenty cents a share. Several local

farmers had seized the investment opportunity and purchased as many shares as they

could afford in hopes of generating extra income for minimal effort.3 The February strike

jeopardized their investment. Unwilling to let the mine shut down and risk losing their

money, the farmers entered the mines to dig the coal themselves. As the miners remained above ground fighting a reduction that would lower wages throughout the region, the farmers protected their financial assets by literally going under the miners to mine the coal. The farmers’ ideological actions mirrored their physical labor. By going into the mines, the farmers went “below” their neighbors, undercutting the wage scale, taking their jobs, and challenging the cooperation that bound community members together.

The Egypt farmers who became miners because they owned a stake in the mines

reflected how the competitive market fundamentally altered daily life in the Gilded Age.

As farm profits decreased, farmers and farmhands alike looked to mines and other rural

industries to cover expenses. Some, like the Egypt farmers, approached these industries

as small scale investors. Others entered the mines as hired hands employed by the miners

themselves. Such occupational confusion allowed workers to be owner, employer, and

employee simultaneously and stretched into multiple industries, allowing rural laborers

2Robert Smith, letter to the editor, “Gross Injustice,” NLT, February 25, 1888. 3 Robert Smith, letter to the editor, “St. Johns and Duquoin Strike,” NLT, March 3, 1888. 87 like farmers, miners, and railroad workers to work in a host of industries from farms to mines to lumber camps. By cobbling together various incomes, rural men and women etched out a living. Rural folk had used these connections between industries for decades, but as the agricultural crisis intensified, coal profits declined, and the number of industrial laborers looking for work swelled, the overlap between industries became more hazard than help. As budgets tightened, rural workers like the Egypt farmers and countless others moved to protect their own interests. They “cheated” their coworkers by accepting favoritism in the mines, discarded mine rules to earn extra pay, and broke strikes to preserve investments or simply to earn a wage. Laborers who once worked together now competed, turning communities against each other as they turned out more coal.

In many ways, historians have noted this change, demonstrating how the economic forces that pushed thousands of producers into poverty also pressed them against each other, even as they held fast to the community bonds and cooperation that undergirded rural society. Throughout the nation, ordinary farmers and laborers worked to reconcile ideas of republican equality and reciprocity with their need to earn a profit or a living wage.4 But these shifts did more than drive wedges in local communities. They reconfigured relationships between owner, laborer, and neighbor tangling them in new

4 The classic example of this line of scholarship is Lawrence Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise. Goodwyn contended that traditional values such as cooperation and faith in democracy clashed with the market system and prompted farmers to try to remake the nation according to their own vision of a fair democracy. See also Eller, Miners, Millhands and Mountaineers; Altina Waller, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Jane Adams, Transformation of Rural Life: Southern Illinois 1890-1990 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor; Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy; Gutman, “Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1915-1919,” in Work Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 3-78; Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth. For a recent work that addresses how local ties and multiple rural occupations affected unionization, see Lou Martin, Smokestacks in the Hills: Rural Industrial Workers in West Virginia (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015). 88 ways within the national market system. The term “neighbor” took on new meaning as states grew connected through trade, competing against each other for the first time.

Consequently, the “honest principles” that miners prized such as honoring contractual agreements, not undercutting wages, rejecting favoritism in the mines, and not “stealing” another worker’s livelihood grew harder to maintain as coal and crop prices fell. Local and individual need tugged against the grain of national competition and growing national unions, blurring rural producers’ understandings of how to live a moral life.

Time and again, self-preservation proved more important than “honest work,” compelling them to compromise their moral principles and undermine their community networks to survive.5

In such cases, union miners did not always act according to the values they professed. Thousands of union miners broke each others’ strikes and filled each other’s coal contracts. They insisted their actions were justifiable due to their economic need, but condemned miners in other regions performing these same acts, calling them dishonest and immoral “blacklegs.”6 In the process, honest labor in the mines and community was often determined more by occupational background and geographic lines than by any clear definition of moral behavior. In 1889, this led hundreds of Illinois union coal miners to not strike for higher wages and better conditions as labor organizations typically did.

Instead, they followed their union leaders’ orders and broke a strike waged by their non- union coworkers. The circumstances that prompted farmers not to farm and union miners not to strike indicated the complicated ways the market system turned rural workers against each other and prompted them to put personal need before public good. Their

5 IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, February 25, 1888. 6 “J. D. C.,” letter to the editor, “DuQuoin, IL,” JUL, May 28, 1888; “C.,” letter to the editor, “Against Summer Strikes,” NLT, February 22, 1890. 89

justification of their decisions to abandon their neighbors and principles, however,

signaled to many miners not only the futility of local strikes in a national market, but also

the moral bankruptcy that seemed to run through in the miners’ unions and Gilded Age

business alike.

Assorted Incomes

Peter Shirkey was already an experienced coal miner when he arrived in the US

from the British Isles at age fifteen in 1850 and on his arrival, he quickly set out for the

coalfields traveling from mine to mine for higher wages. In 1870, he worked in a mine

outside Wadsworth, Ohio, boarding with miner Henry Mendinhall’s family and several

other miners before heading west. He later settled in southern Indiana where he married

Lydia Minnis in 1891.7 By then, however, Shirkey was more than a migrant coal miner.

Even though he still identified himself as a miner on the 1900 Census schedule, Shirkey

also owned his own farm, mortgage free. He and his wife shared their home with

seventeen year-old Isum Stout who worked with Shirkey in the field and the mines.8

Shirkey’s life demonstrated how multiple incomes and cooperation jointly shaped

rural life in the Gilded Age. As Rob Weise has shown, average farmers and laborers

regularly made small-scale investments to earn extra cash. They borrowed money to

7 “United States Census, 1870,” Family Search (https://familysearch.org/pal:MM9.1.1/M6L3-BTH: accessed December 18, 2013) Peter Shirkey in household of Henry Mendinhall, Ohio, United States; citing p.10, family 74, NARA microfilm publication M593, FHL microfilm 00552740; "United States General Index to Pension Files, 1861-1934," Family Search, “Lydia J Minnis” in entry for Thomas M Minnis, 1888, https://goo.gl/Q9NCrN (accessed 6 February 2015), citing Indiana, United States, NARA microfilm publication T288 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.); FHL microfilm 541,086; “Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959,” Family Search Peter Shirkey and Liddy Minnis, February 12, 1891, https://goo.gl/XstgGN (accessed July 11, 2014); “United States Census, 1900,” Family Search, “Peter Sherkie,” https://goo.gl/SQIozc (accessed December 18, 2013). 8 In the case of Stout, who is listed as both Shirkey’s servant and a coal miner on the 1900 census schedule, it is likely that Shirkey hired Stout to work both the mine and the farm. “United States Census, 1910,” Family Search, “Peter Shirkey,” https://goo.gl/krENMA (accessed December 18, 2013). 90 purchase more land in efforts to increase crop yields, bought and sold items on credit, and sold their lumber for cash.9 Johnathan Levy found this same trend among farmers who participated in futures market speculation and pursued western farm mortgages, believing such investments would generate larger income or at least protect their economic stability. It kept Shirkey traveling from mine to mine in search of better pay, ultimately enabling him to purchase a farm. Census schedules from 1880 and 1900 show that

Shirkey was not alone in this endeavor. Hundreds of southern Midwest miners owned or rented houses surrounded by farms, rented a parcel of farmland, or, like Shirkey, owned their own farm while listing their occupation as a coal miner on the Census.10

But not all workers experienced Shirkey’s success and instead used multiple incomes simply to make ends meet. Peter Shirkey’s neighbors, Daniel and Martha

Hornback understood this point well. Although they were the same age as the Shirkeys and farmed in the same community, the Hornbacks did not own their land. Instead, they shared their rented farm with their disabled son and sixteen-year-old grandson, Shirley,

who worked in a local coal mine.11 Unlike Shirkey, who saved funds and used his dual

9 Robert S. Weise, Grasping at Independence: Debt, Male Authority, and Mineral Rights in Appalachia 1850-1915 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2001); Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 185; 196-99. See also Stephan Thernstrom’s Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). 10 Edward Davis and Pete Buss, for example, were black coal miners who both rented houses outside of Earlington, Kentucky, surrounded by farms owned or rented by white families. "United States Census, 1900," index and images, Family Search, “Edward Davis,” https://goo.gl/hgiw0p (accessed October 5, 2013); "United States Census, 1900," Family Search, “Pete Buss,” https://goo.gl/EJbi9t (accessed October 5, 2013); For an Iowa example, see “United States Census, 1900," Family Search “Willie Phyllips and John Phyllips,” https://goo.gl/PFT1eS (accessed October 5, 2013); For an Illinois example see "United States Census, 1900," Family Search “Martin Allman,” https://goo.gl/XtpV6Q (accessed October 5, 2013); Illinois BLS, Third Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, 1884 (Springfield, IL: H.W. Rokker, 1884) 431-434; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “Mining Notes,” UMWJ, January 4, 1894; Editorial, UMWJ, November 3, 1898; Cornelius Saurs, letter to the editor, “A Peoria,” UMWJ, December 22, 1898; Missouri BLS, 1889, p. 309. 11 “United States Census, 1900,” Family Search “Daniel Hornback,” https://goo.gl/AfW7Zf (accessed December 18, 2013); “United States Census, 1880,” Family Search, “Daniel Hornback,” https://goo.gl/UAGD2w (accessed December 18, 2013). 91

occupation to maintain a steady income, the Hornbacks faced a steady decline in farm

profits combined with the added expense of caring for a disabled relative. For the

Hornbacks, mining was a way to make ends meet. By 1910, the Shirkeys and Stout still

lived on their farm while the Hornbacks had relocated. Shirley Hornback continued to

work as a coal miner, but lived in a rented home with his wife Lillie and a widowed

Daniel. In the following years, the Hornbacks regularly uprooted and roamed throughout

the southern Midwest coalfields looking for work.12

Cobbling together multiple occupations, then, was away for the Hornbacks to

balance their budget and for Shirkey to get ahead. Their efforts were part of larger

cooperative networks engrained in rural society that allowed multiple hands and multiple

revenues to contribute to a single family’s income. 13 For decades, farmers like the

Hornbacks took advantage of the seasonal rhythms inherent in both farming and mining

industries. During the winter months, when farms lay dormant, more mines were open. In

Illinois alone, the number of miners working in the mines increased from 16,771 in the

1887 summer to over 23,648 the following winter.14 Farmers often took advantage of this

seasonal work, laboring in the mines before returning to the farm in the spring. “We farm

in summer and dig coal in winter,” one Kansas farmer and small mine operator explained

to the Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics. In the summer months, his mine

12 "United States Census, 1910," Family Search, “Shirly Hornback,” https://goo.gl/sE3yM3 (accessed December 18, 2013); "Illinois Deaths and Stillbirths, 1916-1947," Family Search “Shirlie Hornback,” https://goo.gl/cx0s33 (accessed December 18, 2013). 13 For southern Midwest examples see John Campbell’s entries for September 5 and 7, 1896 in Diary Book 1 of the John S. Campbell Papers, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library; “A Word to Our Farmers,” The Hickman [Kentucky] Courier, March 5, 1880; Nathan F. Gilbert Diary, June 5, 1896, N.F. Gilbert Papers, Indiana State Historical Society. Osterud, Bonds of Community,166; Hal Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 9-10; Marti, Women of the Grange; Jeffery, “Women in the Southern Farmers’ Alliance;” Higbee, Indispensable Outcasts. For additional examples, see Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 205- 207, 233. 14 Illinois BLS, Fifth Biennial Report,1888, 357. 92

that he shared with other local farmers closed and only resumed after harvest when coal

demand increased.15 Likewise, miners often found work as farmhands in the summer

months when mines shut down or worked only part time. 16 Large and small mines

throughout the southern Midwest followed this pattern. Those that did not shut down

used smaller workforces in the summer and dramatically increased their number of

employees in the winter months.

These trends rippled through families, connecting sons to the same rhythms their

fathers followed. Like farmers who used their sons in the fields, miners used their sons to

help load coal in the mines, in some cases sending them to school at night so that they

could work in the mines year-round.17 Companies granted father-son mining teams extra

cars to transport coal, increasing the overall amount credited to the miner while allowing

the son to learn the mining trade. Men without sons, like Shirkey, hired “contract miners”

to help. Such hired loaders were often young men like Isum Stout or farmers like Shirley

Hornback who needed the additional income while tending the farm. As with sons,

companies granted miners with loaders extra cars but because they were the miners’

employees, loaders did not receive their pay from the company. When a loader placed

coal on a coal car, the company counted it as coal belonging to the miner. On payday, the

miner then paid his loader a flat daily wage out of his own earnings.18

15 Kansas BLS, Third Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor, 1888 (Topeka: Kansas Publishing House: Clifford C. Baker, State Printer, 1888), p. 264. 16 Montrie, Making a Living, 71-90; Missouri BLS, 1889, 341-2. 17 Kansas BLS, Third Annual Report, 1888. p. 187. 18“Coal at Rich Hill, Mo.,” CTJ, April 27, 1887; “Kansas Coal News,” CTJ, December 7, 1887; “1896- 1905 Production Accounts,” McHenry Coal Company Records MSS 29, Box 1, Folder 1.3, WKU, Bowling Green, Kentucky; Missouri BLS, Fifteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Inspection of the State of Missouri Being for the Year Ending November 5, 1893 (Jefferson City: Tribune Printing Company, 1893), 114. 93

In many cases, this shared labor made the difference between rural workers

earning a living wage and going into debt. For farmers, it provided an income that

supplemented crop profits. It dramatically increased a miner’s coal output, well-worth the

money spent to hire a hand. In an 1893 study of coal mining families, the Missouri BLS

found that miners’ yearly wages ranged from $200 to $560. Those who worked alone

typically earned a little over $200 each year and never earned more than $300. Miners

with a loader reported earning $400 to $560 each year.19

But family income streams depended on more than fathers and sons. Tight budgets demanded that even women contribute to this work. “I never will marry a farmer,” Gussie Reuter declared to her cousin. Growing up on an Illinois farm, she knew that farm labor, even when shared, was grueling. “I will marry but not a farmer, don’t care who he is.”20 Reuter’s disdain for farm life came from knowing that farmers’ wives worked hard at long hours. Like other rural wives, they cooked and cleaned, raised gardens and livestock, made and sold whiskey, and took in sewing and laundry for extra money. 21 Their actions granted many rural women a degree of authority over household

finances. In her diary, Nannie Stillwell Jackson differentiated the livestock she raised and

the money she earned from her husband’s income and grew frustrated when he spent her

money unwisely. 22 Historian Sally Zanjani found that wives of Western prospectors were

19 Missouri BLS, Fifteenth Annual Report, 1893, 306-312. See also Iowa BLS, Fourth Biennial Report, 1890-1891, 176-177. 20 Despite her claim, Reuter married John Knottrerus, a local farmer, in 1900. Augusta Reuter to William Rider, October 19, 1896, WERP, Box 14, Folder 5, UMKC Special Collections, Kansas City, Missouri; “United States Census, 1910,” Family Search, “John Knotterus,” https://goo.gl/m0K762 (accessed July 9, 2014). 21 For examples, see Osterud, Bonds, 2; Marti, Women of the Grange, 7-11, 26; Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion; Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 337-8; Margery Jones, letter to the editor, “Margery’s Notions,” UMWJ, August 27, 1891. 22 Margaret J. Bolsterli, ed. Vinegar Pie and Chicken Bread: A Woman's Diary of Life in the Rural South, 1890-1891 (Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press, 1982), 38, 42, 44, 54-5. 94

far from passive helpmeets. Instead, women like Ellie Nay labored passionately in the

prospecting field. They “saw themselves as full partners” in their husband’s, father’s,

and brother’s prospecting enterprises and “demanded the financial rewards due them as

such.”23 In the process, wives included themselves as crucial components in balancing

family budgets, not only helping to decide how money would be spent, but also in

discerning the proper time to strike.

Southern Midwest wives also fit this description. Although Henry Mendinhall

owned the house that boarded young bachelor Peter Shirkey in 1870, Barbra Mendinhall

cared for him. In paying board, Shirkey and the other miners hired her to cook their meals

and wash their clothes. Other wives used these same roles differently. Unlike

Mendinhall’s housemates who were boarders, the Shirkeys declared that their housemate

was an employee. The room and meals Isum Stout received were a portion of his

payment, making Lydia and Peter Shirkey joint employers. 24 In other cases, wives were

even more enterprising. Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether noted that farmer

wives with cash purchased mine scrip and company checks from local miners’ wives for

roughly eighty percent of their value. These arrangements enabled mining families to

have cash without forfeiting wages to the company, freeing them to shop for cheaper

goods elsewhere or even move away if desired. Meanwhile, farm wives saved the scrip

and checks for purchases when company store goods were cheap, maximizing the return

on their investment.25 Such actions as employees, employers, and investors made

23 Sally Zanjani, A Mine of Her Own: Women Prospectors in the American West, 1850-1950 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 165-6. 24 For additional examples see Clinton S. Campbell’s account for farmhand John Hiatt, July 1885- September, Clinton S. Campbell Papers, Box 2, Account Book 2, 1880-1900, ALPL. 25 Missouri BLS, Eleventh Annual Report, 1889, 51. 95

southern Midwest wives crucial not only in sustaining family finances, but also placed

them in the center of rural market networks.

These trends coincided with larger community bonds that allowed neighbors to

aid each other in times of need. David and Lizzie McMaster of Carbondale, Kansas,

described to the Holt family how their community combined their resources to survive

after a particularly bad year when crops and cattle failed. In addition to aid from the

Grange, residents purchased groceries and provided housing for neighbors who fared

especially poorly. 26 In other instances, such as an 1893 strike in Kansas, rural farmers

gave striking miners wheat when local stores refused to sell to them.27 “Tommy the

Tramp” and union organizer Tim O’Malley, two wanderers famous in the Midwest

mining industry, frequently described miner and farmer wives who opened their homes

and cupboards to road-weary workers or fellow miners who shared their dinner pails with

those who had none.28

The multiple incomes and occupations provided by rural men and women in

industrializing rural society, then, were built upon longstanding cooperative networks that

relied upon friends and family aiding each other. A miner hiring a neighboring farmer to

load coal in the winter helped both men increase their incomes just as a farm wife

purchasing mine scrip from a neighboring miner wife granted both women better options

26 David and Lizzie McMaster to the Holt Family, April 15, 1875, Martin S. and Frank W. Holt Collection, Box 2 ½ Personal and Family Correspondence, 1860-1866-79, ALPL. 27 “The War in Kansas,” Topeka Daily Capital, July 27, 1893. 28T.T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “’O’Malley’s Meanderings,” NLT, February 8, 1890; Tim T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim on Tramp,” UMWJ, August 24, 1893; “Tim T. O’Malley,” letter to the editor, “Tim at the Fair,” September 21, 1893; “Tommy the Tramp,” letter to the editor, “Tommy, the Tramp,” UMWJ, November 2, 1893; Tim T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim on Tramp,” UMWJ, November 16, 1893; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “From Ayrshire,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Very Irritating,” UMWJ, February 25, 1892; W.R. Riley, letter to the editor, “Jellico Region,” UMWJ, July 7, 1892;; J.A. Crawford and W. J. Guymon, UMW Illinois Special Convention Proceedings, “Official Report,” August 30, 1894; J.H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana Special Convention Proceedings, “Official Report,” UMWJ, November 26, 1896; William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Scaife,” UMWJ, November 3, 1898. 96

for purchasing their families’ necessities. Such traditions opened the door for neighbors

to join each other in forming cooperatives with the expectation and understanding that all

would benefit from jointly owning and investing in a store or mine.29 Industrialization did

not separate farmers from laborers at all, but instead drew them together as they cobbled

their incomes side by side.

Turns

If common experiences and community ties could pull workers in various

occupations together, it could also push them apart. For many, the wedge between miners

and farmers who worked in the mines began with “the turn.” In the mines, the turn

referred to the length of the miners’ wait for a car to transport their coal to be weighed. In

most mines, the number of available cars was limited or the weighing process was

backlogged so that miners might only receive four cars a day, which limited the amount

of coal he produced. When mines became overcrowded, such as when companies

recruited miners from elsewhere or when farmers entered the mines, the number of

miners “claiming a turn” increased. This elongated each miner’s wait, making the turn

“slow,” and decreased each miner’s total output.30 Because a miner’s wage depended on

the amount of coal he produced, even miners working at high paying mines found it

difficult to make ends meet. Iowa miner “Rambler” complained that miners came from

all over the country to take advantage of the high wages paid at his mine, but in the

process overcrowded the mine and slowed the turn. “[T]he shafts here would need to run

29 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 34-49; Postel, Populist Vision, 114-124; Gourevitch, From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth; Goldstene, Struggle for America’s Promise, 50. 30James Cantwell, letter to the editor, “Carbon Doings,” NLT, January 12, 1884; “Squib,” letter to the editor, “From Iowa,” NLT, April 9, 1887; Abe Thinkenbinder, letter to the editor, “Hanna City, Ill.,” UMWJ, December 21, 1893. 97 night and day to hoist all the coal the men here could send out, and still they come,” he continued bitterly. Despite the company’s high wages per ton of coal, the slow turn meant that the average miner in Rambler’s mine still only received a $1.50 for a day’s labor.31

But crowded mines did not solely come from traveling workers. Mines also became overcrowded as farm profits decreased and farmers grew more dependent on the mines to sustain their families. Farmers like Shirley Hornback who began working in the mines as miners’ employees working for a flat daily wage soon learned they could earn more by mining and loading their own coal during the winter months or abandoning their farms entirely. 32 Their decisions to work as miners further glutted the labor market,

slowing the turn so that all miners earned less. “The farmers have crowded us out,”

Indiana miner John Neal complained. The “coal butchers from the farm,” needed only a

supplemental income rather than a living wage. They accepted increased dead work and

lower wages to gain a spot in the mine, forcing “practical miners,” or those who mined as

31 “Mendota, Mo.,” NLT, January 22, 1887; “Avondale,” letter to the editor, “Avondale’s Answer,” NLT, April 14, 1888; “Rambler,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Iowa,” NLT, December 3, 1887. 32 The Kansas Bureau of Labor Statistics confirmed this trend, finding that many farmers were leaving their land for steadier-paying jobs while the Coal Trade Journal observed that many farmers were selling their farms to coal companies because the coal was more valuable than the crops they produced; Editorial, Sterling Standard, December 2, 1886; “Coal at Rich Hill, MO.,” CTJ, April 27, 1887; “Silver City News,” Malvern Leader, February 6, 1890; “Bald Head,” letter to the editor, “How,” UMWJ, January 26, 1893; Kate Sanborn, Adopting an Abandoned Farm (New York: Appleton and Company, 1891) 1-5; KBLI Ninth Annual Report 1893; John McBride “Coal Miners,” in The Labor Movement: the Problem of To-Day ed. George E. McNeill (Boston: A.M. Bridgman & Company; New York: The M.W. Hazen Company, 1887), 242; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, March 26, 1887; James Boston, Jr., letter to the editor, “Organization in Southern Illinois,” NLT, November 26, 1887; G.W. Dinsmoor, letter to the editor, “Moberly Miners Vindicated,” NLT, February 4, 1888; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, April 28, 1888; “Fair Play,” letter to the editor, “Jug-Handled Arbitration,” NLT, June 30, 1888; ; “Jim,” letter to the editor, “From Illinois,” NLT, March 30, 1889; Editorial, “Harmonious Development of the Industries,” NE, April 6, 1889; T.D. Hinckley, “A Talk to Dakota Farmers,” NE, August 24, 1889; Richard Wilson testimony, The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, ; F.G. Blood, “Corrected and Explained,” NE, January 4, 1890. Shifflett Coal Towns, 16, 23; Richard Callahan, Work and Faith in the Kentucky Coal Fields: Subject to Dust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 66; Montrie, Making a Living, 71-90. 98

their primary occupation, to accept the same terms.33 Miner “Bald Head” replied to

Neal’s grievance, claiming that the practical miners had no one but themselves to blame.

In their quest to increase their pay, the “practical miners that are so selfish” had trained

the farmers how to mine. “They go to work and give the Hay John [farmer] fifty or

seventy-five cents per day, and about three or four weeks afterward they get to ask the

boss for a room to themselves, and the boss gives them one,” he explained bitterly.

“That’s the way winter diggers have got such a foothold,” he continued. “You don’t

count the risk you are taking when you hire such men as they.” 34 But little could be

done. The need that drove farmers to the mine was the same that prompted miners to hire

farmers to help load coal.

As the turn slowed, mining and farming families turned their own value systems

to accommodate their need, twisting and molding them into new notions of honor and

respectability previously deemed undignified. In the coal mines, labor deemed

“dishonest” came in several forms. Some miners took advantage of the mines’ constant accessibility, which allowed them to loosen or load coal on Sundays or late nights when the mines were closed. Because the cars used to load the coal were almost always in short

supply, loading cars when the mine was closed enabled a worker to load his coal without

33 John Neal, letter to the editor, “Clay City,” UMWJ, January 5, 1893; “coal butchers,” J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, October 20, 1892; “W. H.” letter to the editor, “Rubens, Kan.,” JUL, January 7, 1888; “A Pumpkin-Roller,” letter to the editor, “From West Virginia,” NLT, March 1, 1890; Robert Smith, letter to the editor, “St. Johns and Duquoin Strike,” NLT, March 3, 1888; “Tramp,” letter to the editor, “A Tramp’s Wanderings,” NLT, March 16, 1889; “C,” letter to the editor, “Kentucky Farmers Adopt Our Preamble,” JUL, July 11, 1889. 34 The Coal Trade Journal asserted that farmers hurt coal companies as well when they hired men to mine coal on their farms and then shipped the product into cities. Their actions upset the already precarious price scale and forced other mines to reduce prices to compete. “Kansas Coal News,” CTJ, March 16, 1887; “O.P.W.” letter to the editor, “Audobon, Iowa,” JUL, October 22, 1887; “St. Louis, MO., Trade Report,” CTJ, December 7, 1887; “Kansas Coal News,” CTJ, December 7, 1887; P.H. Donnelly, NPU Southern Illinois District Report, “P.H. Donnelly’s Report,” NLT, March 16, 1889; “Bald Head,” letter to the editor, “How,” UMWJ, January 26, 1893; “A Former Employe of the Forsythe Company,” letter to the editor, “The Forsythe Case,” UMWJ, October 19, 1893; “Successful Americans,” CTJ, September 1, 1897. 99 waiting for a car. In the process, it took cars away from “honest” miners working during operating hours. Miner “Working Slack” noted that fathers claimed turns for their sons, but the sons did not fill them. Instead, fathers loaded extra coal on their sons’ cars while the son earned daily wages as mule drivers.35 Other miners complained of coworkers accepting wage reductions, extra dead work, or large spaces between screen bars in order to gain a better spot in the mine or secure steady work. In doing so, miners allowed employers to charge less for their coal, sell more coal, and keep the mines open longer.

Such an arrangement was so effective that an Indiana state investigator found that miners working at 75 cents per ton earned more in wages than those who earned one dollar per ton due to the amount of coal the company sold.36 Still, the dead work and large screens combined with miners accepting wage reductions ultimately forced other miners and mine operators to accept the same terms or else face shutdowns in their own mines.37

Illinois miner, “K. R.” insisted no honest man of union principle would engage in such

“cut-throat” actions, yet desperation drove many to accept the terms. “[T]he result,” he claimed, “is that good men are made the target of by the operators,” forced to accept lower wages that would only increase the wage decline or lose their jobs entirely.38

35 In other cases, miners reported that fathers took children as young as three and four into the mines to claim turns on their behalf. “Working Slack,” letter to the editor, “Not So,” UMWJ, January 18, 1894; “Fair Play,” letter to the editor, “Fair Play Reports Clay City News,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891; “Miners and Schools,” NLT, may 21, 1892. 36 Upon learning this, miner and organizer T. J. Lewellyn sarcastically remarked, “In order to be in line, I suggest that our next year’s scale be fixed at 25 cents [per ton], so that we can get rich.” T. J. Lewellyn, letter to the editor, “The Miner’s Wealth,” NLT, July 27, 1889. 37 “D.N. P.” to the editor, “The Free Turn Curse,” NLT, January 22, 1887; “K of L,” letter to the editor, “From Streator,” NLT, February 19, 1887; “Amaranth,” letter to the editor, “Says He Is a Falsifier,” NLT, May 21, 1887; Peter McDonald, letter to the editor, “Death in the Mine,” NLT, September 15, 1888; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Dan’s Advice,” NLT, April 20, 1889; “Knownothing,” letter to the editor, “Ayrshire Affairs,” UMWJ, December 7, 1893; John McBride “Coal Miners,” 242-3; “The Warner,” letter to the editor, “Mining Notes,” UMWJ, October 12, 1893. 38 “K.R.,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Illinois,” NLT, November 8, 1879; “Lincoln,” letter to the editor, “Becoming Uneasy,” NLT, August 13, 1887;.Editorial, Sterling[Illinois] Standard, December 2, 1886; “Coal at Rich Hill, MO.,” CTJ, April 27, 1887; “Kansas Coal News,” CTJ, March 16, 1887; “O.P.W.” 100

Few components of the mining industry revealed this moral compromise more

than the “free click.” Much like the pluck-me, the free click or “free turn” was a system companies enforced in mines throughout the nation. Most mines required “entries,” or long corridors that extended from the shaft to the “face” of the mine. The majority of miners worked in “rooms” situated along these corridors, but a handful of miners were needed to “drive entry,” or dig the coal from the face to extend the corridor for more rooms. 39 The faster the “entry men” cleared, the faster production increased. Companies therefore lost money when entry men waited for cars to transport their coal. To solve this, many operators implemented the “free click” which permitted entry men to skip the line and take an empty car whenever they needed it instead of having to wait with the room men.

The practice was needed to keep the mine functioning, but it had the added benefit of dramatically increasing the entry men’s pay at the expense of the room men who continued to wait for access to coal cars. In most instances, companies used entry driving positions to reward miners for good behavior, such as taking on extra dead work, shopping at the company store, or accepting a wage reduction without complaint. Such favoritism used the miners’ economic need to keep the workforce divided.40 Although

letter to the editor, “Audobon, Iowa,” JUL, October 22, 1887; “St. Louis, MO., Trade Report,” CTJ, December 7, 1887; “Kansas Coal News,” CTJ, December 7, 1887; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, January 14, 1888; Robert Smith, letter to the editor, “St. Johns and Duquoin Strike,” NLT, March 3, 1888; “A Tramp,” letter to the editor, “A Tramp’s Wanderings,” NLT, March 16, 1889; P.H. Donnelly, NPU Southern Illinois District Report, “P.H. Donnelly’s Report,” NLT, March 16, 1889. 39 “Mines, Miners and Wages,” CTJ, April 6, 1887; “Penrod,” letter to the editor, “The New Kentucky Mines,” NLT, February 5, 1887; “Squib,” letter to the editor, “From Iowa,” NLT, April 9, 1887; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “The Indiana Miners,” NLT, July 23, 1887. See also Dix, Work Relations in the Coal Industry, 5-6. 40 In other industries such as steelwork and meatpacking, employers further divided the ranks along ethnic lines. In most late nineteenth century mines, however, workers of all ethnicities shared equally in the dead work and all worked for the same low pay even if their housing was segregated. In most cases, the workers’ own economic need, racial prejudices, and language barriers proved enough to prevent organization across ethnic lines. Ronald L. Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class and Community Conflict 1780- 101

some miners and companies managed to create a system that allowed all miners a turn at

the entry to keep wages even, this grew more difficult to uphold as wages declined. “We

had a mass meeting and a resolution was passed for the entry men to get six cars ahead

and then to stop until the room men can catch up to them,” Kentucky miner “Penrod”

reported. “This worked all right until they had to stop [after their six cars] and then they

kicked against it and now it is the same old tune—free click.”41 Mine workers may have

remained opposed the idea of favoritism in the mines, but such an opportunity to earn

more proved too valuable for workers who benefited from the system.

Enterprise

The moral turns that working families faced demonstrated how economic

circumstances transformed social and cultural norms, undermining resident’s values even

as they tried to hold onto them. But not all dishonest labor came by force. Hoping to grow wealthy, some producers invested in businesses like cooperative stores or coal mines while others took advantage of workplace favoritism and strikes to gain higher wages. Hundreds of producers, like the employers and merchants with whom they dealt, adopted cut-throat practices not to scrape by, but to improve their economic position.

Hundreds of farmers operated what many knew as a “one-horse rig,” or a small mine on their land that used a single horse to hoist the coal out of their pit. Their wives, children, and hired hands often aided in the labor, allowing them to produce a meager amount of coal cheaply. Because these mines were informal arrangements rather than an

1980 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 39; Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1981 (New York: International Publishers, 1981), 83; Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement, (New York: Atheneum, 1969, 1931 original)232-3. See also Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle; David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 41“Penrod,” letter to the editor, “The New Kentucky Mines,” NLT, February 5, 1887; “D.N. P.” to the editor, “The Free Turn Curse,” NLT, January 22, 1887. 102

actual mining company, one-horse rigs did not always pay their miners a per-ton wage,

but instead gave their miners a percentage of the profit earned on the coal, further

reducing production costs compared to miners paid by the ton. One-horse rigs often

operated only in winter months and seldom produced enough to compete for coal

contracts. Still, their production supplied local markets so that, collectively, these low- cost enterprises cut into demand enough to force larger companies to lower their own production costs. More importantly to miners, when miners struck against coal companies one-horse rigs often remained in operation, benefiting from the high coal demand. 42

Landowners with private mines were not the only small-scale operations to turn

their back to honest principles and break strikes. Small mine owners, like the farmers

who owned stock in Egypt’s Enterprise Mine also discarded their neighbors’ and

employees’ interests when their investments were at risk. Scholars, however, seldom

consider these connections between cooperative investment and strikebreaking and

instead highlight differences between the two. Early examinations of worker cooperatives

and strikebreaking often depicted such participants as ill-equipped to participate in the

modern market. Cooperative participants were bent on reviving bygone market systems

while strikebreakers were little more than tools to serve company agendas.43 Even the

42 Kansas BLS, Tenth Annual Report, 1888, p. 264; Jas. J. Flynn, letter to the editor, “A Misfortune,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; “Burn American Coal—II,” CTJ, April 18, 1894; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, February 28, 1895; J. W. Reynolds, letter to the editor, “President Reynolds,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; J. M. Carson, letter to the editor, “Vice President Carson,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, March 28, 1895; Julius Fromm, letter to the editor, “Iowa News,” UMWJ, April 25, 1895; “Dan McLaughlin,” NLT, August 8, 1895. 43 For examples of this line see Ware, The Labor Movement, 321-2; Robert Wiebe, Search for Order, 1877- 1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 75. On trends in strikebreaking historiography, see Jarrod Roll, “Sympathy for the Devil: Missouri’s Notorious Strikebreaking Metal Miners, 1896-1910,” Labor History 11, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 13-15. See also Robert P. Weiss, “Private Detective agencies and Labour 103 most sympathetic depictions of cooperatives have maintained this clear division between producer and capital. Lawrence Goodwyn agreed with previous assertions that farmer cooperatives grew out of traditional community values, but asserted that these groups

“challenged the existing structures of … the nation’s financial system,” envisioning a system wholly different from the culture big businesses offered.44

Recent examinations of cooperatives and strikebreaking have done more to emphasize producers’ business-minded pragmatism, but in many ways distinctions between union and non-union remain. Historian Charles Postel saw cooperative efforts as evidence of business-minded farmers and farm laborers capable and willing to participate in the modern market, yet cast their efforts as an alternative vision to mainstream market ventures.45 Scholars of strikebreaking have maintained a similar dichotomy. They have highlighted social, economic, and cultural reasons for strikebreaking, but in most instances, these examinations cast strikebreakers as the antithesis of union workers.46

Discipline in the United States, 1855-1946,” Historical Journal 29, no. 1 (March 1986): 96; Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 385; Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, 20, 25, 130. 44Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, Chapters 1-5 passim, especially 80-81, quote xxi; Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901, Essays and Documents (New York, Octagon Books, 1963), 10, 199-205. For a more recent treatment of this cooperative commonwealth vision, see Gourevitch, From Slavery to Cooperative Commonwealth. 45 Postel, Populist Vision, 104-108. 46 Theresa Ann Case provides a detailed outline of strikebreaking historiography in “Losing the Middle Ground: Strikebreakers and Labor Protest on the Southwestern Railroads,” in Rethinking U.S. Labor History: Essays on the Working-Class Experience, 1756-2009, ed. Donna T. Haverty-Stacke and Daniel J. Walkowitz (New York: Continuum, 2010), 54-81. See also William M. Tuttle, Jr., “Some Strikebreakers’ Observations of Industrial Warfare,” Labor History 7, no 2 (Spring 1966):193-197; Warren C. Whatley, “African-American Strikebreaking from the Civil War to the New Deal,” Social Science History 20, no. 4.(Winter, 1993): 525-558; Robert Michael Smith, From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003); Eric Arnesen, “Specter of the Black Strikebreaker: Race, Employment, and Labor Activism in the Industrial Era,” Labor History 44, no. 3 (2003): 319-335; Eric Arnesen, “The Quicksands of Economic Insecurity: African Americans, Strikebreaking, and Labor Activism in the Industrial Era,” in Arnesen, The Black Worker: Race, Labor, and Civil Rights Since Emancipation (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 2007); Stephen H. Norwood, Strikebreaking & Intimidation: Mercenaries and Masculinity in Twentieth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 7-12. 104

Although Jarod Roll has recently noted the difference between non-union and anti-union

strikebreaking, the distinction between union and non-union, striker and strikebreaker,

remains.47 In fact, cooperatives and strikebreaking are seldom examined in tandem, so

that those who established cooperatives appear to have little in common with those who

broke strikes.

In practice, however, union-associated entities like cooperatives and actions like strikebreaking overlapped. For thousands of workers in the southern Midwest and elsewhere, the nation’s leading capitalists were not the only investors privy to risk management tactics like joint-stock ownership or cooperative investment. Instead, they involved average workers looking to earn extra income for their families. Such opportunities had more in common with strikebreaking than historians have typically understood. Cooperative mines could seldom price their coal competitively without cutting into shareholder profits. When prices fell, they were frequently the first mines to sit idle and the last to resume work. For the duration of its closure, investors gained nothing. Larger businesses absorbed the loss, but small investors, like farmers and miners, lost their wages in addition to their investment. As was the case with the

Enterprise mine in Egypt, the prospect of losing such an investment was enough for stockholding farmers to become strikebreakers.48

47 For an example of non-union vs. anti-union strikebreaking, see Roll, “Sympathy for the Devil.” 48 For a more detailed discussion of the rate of cooperative failures, particularly within the Populist movement, see Stanley B. Parsons, Karen Toombs Parsons, Walter Killilae and Beverly Borgers, “The Role of Cooperatives in the Development of the Movement Culture of Populism,” Journal of American History 69:4 (March, 1983): 866-885. “Capital and Labor Co-Operating,” Pittsburgh Manufacturer, reprinted in CTJ, July 30, 1884; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, October 29, 1887; “The Co-operative Coal Shaft,” BDP, March 17, 1887; “Mines, Miners and Wages,” CTJ, April 27, 1887; “The K. of L. Co-Operative Coal Mining Company,” NLT, November 5, 1887; “The Coal Enterprise,” The [Humeston, Iowa] New Era, April 25, 1888; M. Commesky, letter to the editor, “President Commesky’s Notes,” UMWJ, November 19, 1891; “I. N. C.,” letter to the editor, “A First Attempt,” UMWJ, August 24, 1893; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 24, 1893; 105

The farmers’ willingness to strikebreak demonstrated the surest way for an

individual or cooperative to survive in the competitive market. The comparatively few

cooperative mines that succeeded often did so by implementing the same cut-throat tactics as other firms. A Knights of Labor cooperative in Avery, Iowa, not only cut coal prices but offered a free car of nut coal for each ten cars of coal purchased. The tactic stole contracts from their biggest competitor, the Avery Coal Company, allowing the cooperative to dominate the local coal market.49 Regardless of the Knights’ ideals of fair

labor, the cooperative’s survival depended on its ability to competitively market its

product.50

Consequently, although they were founded on the premise of allowing average

workers ownership, cooperatives and joint-stock initiatives often helped the owners at their employees’ expense. The Knights of Labor executive board, for example, owned the

Mutual Mine near Cannelburg, Indiana. It had operated as a cooperative since 1884, but only a few of its owners worked in the mine. Instead, most were Knights from Ohio, including the mine superintendent and NTA 135 Master Workman, William T. Lewis.

But by 1892, the Knights could not afford to run the mine and leased it to the Watkins,

Lunch and Company, a coal company based in Peoria, Illinois. Technically, the mine remained a cooperative. Its owners continued to receive a twelve cent per ton royalty on all coal mined, but like hundreds of other mine owners, the Knights were absentee proprietors who left most decisions to local managers. In these instances, already low profits fell further for cooperative owners who split their dividends with third party

“A Miner’s Widow,” letter to the editor, “Funny Reading in Their Pay Envelopes,” JKL, March 8, 1894; “An Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “McHenry, Ky.,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 49 “Queer Business Methods,” CTJ, March 2, 1887. 50 “Bad State of Affairs at Spring Valley, Ills.,” Alton[Illinois] Telegraph, September 5, 1889; House Committee on Agriculture, Fictitious Dealings, 6; Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 199, 249-255. 106 companies while those working in the mines received little or no benefit from the cooperative at all. 51

Similarly, joint-stock companies like the Enterprise mine in Egypt were forced to comply with the wage reductions or shut down entirely.52 Indiana miner and union organizer J. C. Heenan’s joint-stock mine in southern Illinois faced a similar problem.

Unable to compete while paying the union-sanctioned scale, Heenan and his business partners cut their miners’ wages to price their coal under the largest Egypt mines. While mining coal and organizing local unions in the Indiana coalfields, Heenan simultaneously drove down wages under union scale rates as a mine owner in a neighboring state.53

Such instances blurred divisions between owner and employee as well as union and non-union. Heenan was all four at once. While he pushed for higher wages, market

competition made it impossible for him to pay what he and other miners deemed fair. The

need to recuperate his investment led Heenan to undermine the very policies he

advocated.54 In Petersburg, Illinois, mine stockholders gave themselves first access to mine cars so that their employees “only get what cars they can’t fill and that is few.”

Stockholders ran a company store and forced their miners to shop there. When the miners

51 In most cases, Knights cooperatives still enforced “honest labor principles” which regulated mines more carefully than others. Although cooperative miners sometimes still waived benefits to keep the mine open in the face of stringent competition, most miners held the view that a mine owned and operated by miners was more fair than a non-miner owner. “I. N. C.,” letter to the editor, “Historical,” UMWJ, September 21, 1893; W. T. Wright, letter to the editor, “Iowa State Assembly,” JUL, June 16, 1888; Knights of Labor General Executive Board Minutes, April 12, 1888, ‘Mutual Mining Company—Report of Mr. Bailey,” Reel 13, JHP; Knights of Labor General Executive Board Minutes, June 12, 1888, Afternoon Session, “Mutual Mining Co,” Reel 13, JHP; Terence Powderly, Terence V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor, 1859- 1889 (Columbus, OH: Excelsior Publishing House, 1889), 460-464; Ware, Labor Movement in the United States, 320-33; Sanders, Roots of Reform, 38. 52 Robert Smith, letter to the editor, “Gross Injustice,” NLT, February 25, 1888. 53 “Deist” to the editor, UMWJ, May 26, 1898; J. C. Heenan and William Sheffler to the editor, UMWJ, September 1, 1898. 54 In another instance, the Vice President of the Illinois District of the UMW also served as the president of a Bloomington, Illinois, mine that refused to pay what miners in the district deemed was a fair wage. Alfred Klang, letter to the editor, “Bloomington, Ill.,” UMWJ, June 7, 1894. 107

complained, the stockholding miners fired their employees and continued mining coal on

their own.55

Companies with more capital frequently used similar incentives to their

advantage, offering miners mine stock to soothe wage grievances. In doing so, companies

decreased the likelihood of miners striking for higher wages because it sliced into their

gains as shareholders. In at least one case, these tactics were so injurious to miners that

one committee of Illinois miners wrote to the National Labor Tribune to end the practice.

“[W]e earnestly implore of you fellow men not to increase the force of the shyster

stockholders whose acts always tend to keep the iron heel of oppression down heavily on

us.” Claiming their actions were “a dodge from men’s duty,” the committee wanted these

stockholding miners to “be branded as traitors to their fellow men and the people’s

cause.”56

The committee’s distinction between duty to the community’s well-being and

personal investment opportunities tied into a larger moral conflict that ran throughout

nineteenth century society. According to historian Ann Fabian, as the market economy

shifted to one fueled by immediate profits and enormous gains, it changed the entire

nation’s attitude toward investment, risk, and gambling, not just those of big investors.57

Farmers may have decried the speculators that seemed to manipulate crop prices in New

York and Chicago, but by the late 1880s futures trading was as accessible to ordinary people hoping to turn a dime into a dollar as it was big investors. Unofficial trading venues commonly known as “bucket shops” brought the exciting new world of futures

55 “Mine Postals,” NLT, May 21, 1887; “Mine Postals,” NLT, June 4, 1887. 56 “Your Committee,” IMPA Circular, “Miners’ District Circular,” NLT, October 8, 1887. Despite this stance, however, cooperative mines, such as one that opened in Grape Creek, Illinois in 1887 offered high wages for miners who purchased stock in the company. “Notes of the Week,” CTJ, November 2, 1887. 57 Fabian, Card Sharps and Bucket Shops, 153-202; Levy, “Contemplating Delivery.” 108

speculation and stock trading into rural communities throughout the nation.58 Because

they were unincorporated venues, they were classified as illegal gambling dens in most

states by the mid-1890s.59 Regardless of their legality, however, bucket shops functioned

on the same principles as future traders in urban market exchanges. They “gambled” on

future prices by selling “fictitious” or “fiat” products without actually owning or

exchanging any merchandise. 60 Such cases blurred the lines between reputable business

owner, successful businessman, and gambler. The hope for easy profit drove big

businessmen and ordinary people alike into the world of shareholding and futures

investing.

Few aspects captured this conflation of business, gambling, and dishonesty better

than the term “blackleg.” Labor historians often dismiss it as a taunt during strikes and

seldom consider its meaning. As such, they often imply that “blackleg” and

“strikebreaker” were interchangeable terms.61 But in the late nineteenth century,

“blackleg” had multiple meanings that most miners and farmers understood well. To farmers and ranchers, it was a name for the gangrene that killed crops and cattle, literally eating away the investments they worked so hard to raise. Throughout the nineteenth

century the same term described gamblers and degenerates, not unlike bucket shop

patrons, who gambled illegally with the futures market. By the end of the century, it

58 David Hochfelder, “‘Where the Common People Could Speculate’: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular Participation in Financial Markets, 1880-1920,” Journal of American History 93:2 (Sep., 2006): 336; Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 222 and 242. See also Cowing, Populists, Plungers, and Progressives. 59 For a full discussion on Supreme Court debates regarding futures trade, trader intent, and the illegality of bucket shops vs. the legality of futures trading, see Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 242-245. 60 House Committee on Agriculture, Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products. 61 Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 17; Andrew Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age; Herbert Gutman, Power and Culture, 154-5, 169, 170, 179, 192; Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America,43. 109 applied to any dishonest “cheat” or “swindler” who unfairly took another person’s rightful gain.62

All of these meanings likely ran through rural workers’ minds when they heard and used the word “blackleg.” Those who used it meant it as an insult that not only described a dishonorable action, but dishonorable intent. Far from simply describing a person who broke a strike, a blackleg took what did not belong to him or her without caring who they injured. Blacklegs were malicious beings whose behaviors seemed to spread like disease, ravaging the earnings of honest laborers, creating a moral, mental, and physical threat. In the mining industry, “blackleg labor” implied any kind of dishonest mining practice that injured one’s coworkers for the sake of personal profit.

While this often applied to strikebreaking, it also included men who labored below scale rates, accepted free clicks, stole another man’s coal, loosened coal on a Sunday, and engaged in any practice that miners deemed dishonest.63

To many miners, blacklegging of any sort was a cardinal sin. Indiana miner Lige

Jones claimed that miners who accepted free clicks were “brutal and savage and heathenish and hell-like…. monsters who were too greedy to give their fellow-man a

62 Technically, “blackleg” referred specifically to the disease that killed cattle, but some farmers applied the term to their crops as well. In the mid-nineteenth century, the term could also be applied to procurers of pimps as evidenced in John Randolph’s attack on Henry Clay referencing “Bilfil and Black George.” Links between “blackleg” and non-union miners appeared in England as early as 1879 as evidenced by a British poem in which the speaker proudly writes “‘A blackleg!’—well, I know it—And a blackleg still I’ll be: Tyrant man or tyrant Union,--Neither makes a slave of me.” “Non-unionist Miner loquitur,” Punch, or the London Charivari, April 26, 1879; James Maitland, The American Slang Dictionary (Chicago: R. J. Kittredge & Company, 1891), sv. “blackleg;” Oxford English Dictionary, sv. “blackleg,”;“W.R.C.,” letter to the editor, “The Evils and Poor Accommodations of Our County Fairs,” IF, September 20, 1890; “Col. Hering’s Gambling Policy,” CT, January 27, 1893; Fabian, Card Sharps and Bucket Shops, 29, 37, 80; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 17. 63 Not all miners agreed that breaking a strike was a form of blackleg labor. Men hired by the company during the strike to make repairs, lay track, or pump water were, to some miners, not blacklegs because they did not mine coal during the strike and their actions did not affect coal prices. George H. Christman and Elijah Chadwick, letter to the editor, “Card from Men Slandered,” NLT June 1, 1889; “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “The Sparland Miners,” NLT, June 1, 1889. 110 chance to live.”64 Miner “D. N. P.” likewise asserted that free clickers had lost their souls

“– soulless communists I call them,” he declared. “I happened to be in church and heard them giving their experience at a love-feast, and rise on their feet and thank God that they could ‘read their title clear to mansions in the skies.’” To D. N. P. and hundreds of others, such miners were hypocrites. Their good fortune did not come from God’s blessing, but from accepting what was not theirs. D. N. P. insisted, “I would ask your readers how these men can sit on their seats, in the sight of Almighty God and the men they are sitting and working beside, whom they know that they have taken, as it were, the bread out of their wives and children’s mouths to satisfy self.” 65

But the distinction between dishonest and upright was not always as clear as D. N.

P. envisioned. 66 Thousands of miners acknowledged that they labored unscrupulously, but insisted that they were not blacklegs. Rather, they claimed they were forced to accept dishonest labor in order to protect their own interests. Consequently, although the

National Labor Tribune charged such miners were “a little too enterprising,” and looked after themselves while betraying other workers, the promise of living comfortably tempted union miners just as it did non-union. 67 Although both Knights and miners’ unions condemned the free click, union miners continued to participate in the system.

The reward it offered was too great for them to reject the system on principle alone. “I am sorry to say the majority of the entry men are Knights of Labor,” western Kentucky miner

“Penrod” claimed of his local mine. Such men, he insisted, were Knights “in name only,

64 Margery Jones, letter to the editor, “Lige’s Conversion,” UMWJ, May 28, 1891. 65“D.N.P.” letter to the editor, “The ‘Free Turn’ Curse,” NLT, January 22, 1887; “K of L,” letter to the editor, “From Streator,” NLT, February 19, 1887; IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, November 26, 1887; James Boston, Jr., letter to the editor, “Mr. Dupont’s Mine,” NLT, January 7, 1888; “A Miner’s Wife,” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife’s Letter,” NLT, February 18, 1888. 66 Margery Jones, letter to the editor, “Margery’s Letter,” UMWJ, June 25, 1891. 67 “Crows and Hawks,” NLT, February 8, 1890; “J. D. C.,” letter to the editor, “DuQuoin, IL,” JUL, May 28, 1888; “C.,” letter to the editor, “Against Summer Strikes,” NLT, February 22, 1890. 111

not principle, if I am not mistaken, or they would not accept of a free click if they want to

act right towards their fellow man, as they get all [the work] they can do and the

roommen in some parts of the mine not making a livelihood.” But Penrod’s coworkers

were not the only organized men who disregarded honest principles. Indiana miner

“T.B.T.” noted that his local’s president “and most of the committee” regularly took free

clicks, causing him to conclude that “we ought not ask others to join [the Miners’

Federation] if we violate the rules ourselves.”68

William Houston of Indiana noted that the Knights at one local mine accepted a

10 cent per ton reduction that would force all mines in the region to “go down” in wages.

“There is only one name for this and that is blacklegging,” he argued. But the effects of

blacklegging did more than allow blacklegs an advantage to earn more at their neighbors’

expense. Like a contagion, it spread as miners injured by those they condemned as

blacklegs had no choice but to labor dishonestly themselves. Illinois miners faced a

similar situation when operators initiated an immediate 10 cent per ton reduction in

wages that would increase to 20 cents if the miners resisted, National Progressive Union

organizer Patrick H. Donnelly advised the miners to “keep cool” and accept the terms.

“All who can get work at something else should do it,” he asserted, continuing that “those

who can’t get work should adapt themselves to the conditions and make themselves as

useful to the cause as possible.”69 Such orders were a far cry from the rallies that

typically associated unionism with solidarity and strength. Rather, Donnelly’s words

68 Not all agreed with T.B.T.’s claim. Hiram T. James responded to T.B.T.’s letter in the National Labor Tribune asserting T.B.T., or “treason breathing traitor,” lied to destroy the Federation. Hiram T. James, letter to the editor, “T.B.T.,” NLT, June 4, 1887. “Penrod,” letter to the editor, “The New Kentucky Mines,” NLT, February 5, 1887; “T.B.T.” letter to the editor, “Not Well Received,” NLT, May 7, 1887; “K. of L.” letter to the editor, “Streator,” NLT, October 13, 1888. 69 “Illinois Miners,” NPU Illinois District Official Report, NLT, June 1, 1889; P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “An Appeal from Organizer Donnelly,” NLT, June 22, 1889. 112 reflected a language of compromise that came from the realization that market prices for coal had dropped too low for unions to enforce the agreements made with employers.

Yet, in the process, miners continued to undermine their neighbors, allowing wages to fall ever lower70 “We are getting more demoralized every week in Clay City,” Houston concluded in his letter, acknowledging the guilt many union miners felt when they accepted their wage reduction. The mining Knights were over 1200 strong, he observed, but they could not honor their own principles.71

Concessions

Miners’ belief in honest principles, then, did not forestall their hardships. When

Iowa miners in NTA 135 fell on hard times, they had little choice but to undercut their neighbors. Rather than face scorn in their own communities, several miners traveled to

Grape Creek, Illinois, a Miners’ Federation (NFM) stronghold in the midst of an ongoing strike. Carrying union cards, the Iowa Knights insisted they were honorable men forced to break the strike and meant no harm. “My God, what way would they help us?” Illinois

Federation officers asked “My neighbor to starve my family and then ask that I consider him a good and true neighbor!”72

The officers’ description of the strikebreaking union miners as “neighbors” reflected the difficult position southern Midwest miners occupied in the Gilded Age.

Although the Iowa mines were over one hundred miles removed from Grape Creek, rail lines placed miners, and their coal, side by side. Regardless of distance, they were neighbors. At the same time, the word pulled on miners’ sense of working-class

70 William Scaife, NPU Illinois District Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, December 7, 1889. 71 William Houston, letter to the editor, “Miners Reminded of their Duties,” NLT, May 12, 1888. 72NFM Official Report, “Coal Miners Matters,” NLT, April 2, 1887; IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, March 5, 1888; “Bitten,” letter to the editor, “Has Been There,” NLT, June 9, 1888. 113

community. More than ever before, miners across the nation were connected and their

actions had an impact on each other. Such an image called for miners to “love thy

neighbour as thyself,” and look after each other’s needs rather than tear them down.73

Still, a miner’s duties to his neighbors remained secondary to his personal duties.

Miners may have been connected through national markets and even common labor

principles, but responsibilities to hearth and one’s union brothers remained paramount.

Regional boundaries and union divides therefore became means for otherwise “honest”

men to justify non-unionlike behavior. Notions of honor that caused a miner to think

twice before blacklegging at home held less sway when he did not personally know the

miners he injured. Thus the Iowa Knights were not alone in their behavior. Missouri

miners broke Kansas strikes, Indiana miners broke strikes in southern Illinois, and

western Kentucky miners broke strikes in southern Indiana. 74

But in the growing competitive market, miners no longer needed to travel to a

nearby mine to break the strike. Because the goal of the strike was to dry up the coal

supply, miners who accepted the low-paying coal contracts belonging to striking mines

technically blacklegged by ensuring the supply of cheap coal remained unchanged.75

Business boomed in Danville, Illinois, when nearby Springfield miners went on strike.

But, as one Danville miner noted, it would not be long before Springfield’s strike would

end with a defeat that forced Danville to take a reduction. Danville would go on strike,

73 Quote from Matthew 19:19 (King James Version); “Starvation in Indiana,” NLT, June 22, 1889; Robert Cochrane, letter to the editor, “Meyersdale Region,” UMWJ, October 8, 1891. 74 David Ross, letter to editor, “Controversy about Mining Rates,” NLT, June 6, 1889; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene Gardner,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891; W. D. Ryan, UMW Illinois District Twelve Report, “W. D. Ryan,” UMWJ, August 5, 1897; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “J. H. Kennedy,” UMWJ, September 2, 1897. 75 While this did put pressure on local operators’ profits, larger coal corporations with multiple mines often could often wait out a local mine strike without experiencing much profit decline. In other cases, operators purchased coal from neighboring mines to fill their contracts. 114

the miner continued, and while it was out, Springfield would fill its contracts until the

Danville strike failed. Both towns technically broke each other’s strikes and claimed its

competition was blacklegging, but neither viewed its own strikebreaking actions as

blacklegging. Rather, it justified its willingness to fill strikers’ contracts by claiming that

it was only taking back what the “blacklegs” had taken from it in its last strike. “That is

the way Springfield and Danville men have been fighting for twenty years,” he

concluded. 76

This dynamic grew more complicated as the national market web expanded,

pulling more mines into the same competitive network. Springfield and Danville not only

competed against each other, but the entire field reaching from Pennsylvania to southern

Illinois. By 1889, miners in Ohio could fill Illinois contracts or Pennsylvania miners

could compete against Indiana without leaving their home state.77 Although the National

Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU) had formed less than five months

earlier, the organization failed to unite the miners and could not stop the steady fall of

wages across the coalfields. Pennsylvania and Ohio mines reduced their wages by five

cents per ton, forcing Indiana and Illinois mines to lower their wages to compete for the

Chicago market. In Indiana, bituminous wages fell from 75 to 55 cents per ton and block

coal from 90 to 70.78 Even more harsh, mine owner William L. Scott, “coal king of

Pennsylvania,” instructed his mine manager Charles J. Devlin to reduce the Spring

76 “Mine Postals,” NLT, October 29, 1887. 77 “S.,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Missouri,” NLT, August 10, 1893; Adams, “Promotion, Competition, Captivity,” p.76. 78 “Starvation in Indiana,” NLT, June 22, 1889. 115

Valley, Illinois, miners’ wages from 90 cents per ton to 72 ½ cents per ton, double the

dead work, and crowd the mines by adding a third miner to each two-man room. 79

In the course of negotiating, most Indiana miners managed to settle for a five cent

per ton reduction comparable to a reduction Pennsylvania and Ohio miners accepted.80

Some Illinois operators offered similar terms as long as the miners agreed to sign an iron-

clad agreement rejecting the union.81 Progressive Union leader Dan McLaughlin advised

the miners to accept all terms except the iron-clad agreement. The operators had

stockpiled coal and would not need to reopen their mines for at least six months, “so that

when the markets require our labor we would, through hunger and other causes, be ready

to accept their terms.” Accepting the reduction immediately, he and other union leaders

insisted, “is the very best we can and should do.”82

The miners disagreed. Calling a mass meeting in English, Polish, and German,

miners discussed the terms, deciding that they were dishonest and unjust. Although the

majority was not affiliated with NTA 135 or the Progressive Union, they voted to go on

strike. 83 Furious at McLaughlin and the other leaders’ willingness to abandon the

principles they professed, the non-union strikers of northern Illinois and the Indiana block

79 At the time, Devlin owned one-seventh of the company’s stock. William Scaife, Illinois District NPU Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, December 7, 1889; “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “To Organized Labor and the Public,” NLT, September 14, 1889 (quote); “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, May 18, 1889; “Bad State of Affairs at Spring Valley, Ills.,” Alton Telegraph, September 5, 1889. 80 “Illinois and Indiana Mining,” NLT, June 1, 1889; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Another Letter from ‘Dan,’ NLT, August 3, 1889. 81 John Rowe, letter to the editor, “Adverse to ‘Old Dan,’ NLT, June 15, 1889. 82 Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Dan’s Advice,” NLT, April 20, 1889; John McBride, official circular from National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers, “From President McBride,” NLT, April 13, 1889. 83 William Monaghan, letter to the editor, “Response from Wm. Monaghan,” NLT, July 6, 1889. 116

field insisted that they would fight for honest principles and fair pay even when the

unions would not. 84

As the miners walked out, however, their actions were met with disdain from

union leaders. If the miners wished for higher wages, McLaughlin contended, they

needed to be thoroughly organized across state lines. Southern and central Illinois needed

to honor the pay scale or their cheap coal would flood the Chicago market. The only way

a strike could be successful was if all underpaid miners in all states struck

simultaneously. In light of this, McLaughlin condemned the northern Illinois strike, calling the striking miners “knaves” for believing that a regional strike would solve a national problem. They were willing to ruin the progress the national organization had made for the sake of a local pay increase, “though some of them [claim] to be followers of the meek and lowly Savior,” he continued. Such a claim indicated that the non-union strike for higher wages was not only ill-conceived, but morally wrong and dishonorable.

“They will have plenty of time to do penance in sackcloth and ashes for the ruin they have brought on our people.” The strikers meant well, McLaughlin insisted, “but they have listened to the wily tongue of the deceiver and not to their friends….” With that,

McLaughlin and other NPU and NTA 135 leaders ordered all organized men to sign the

84 Official Missouri NPU order, “Another Rough Out Proposed,” NLT, May 18, 1889 (quote); Spring Valley, Illinois, Lodge 26 “Miners and Mine Laborers Protective Association” of the NPU, Special Meeting Minutes, May 22, 1889, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, page 42, ILSU IRAD repository; NPU Twelfth District Meeting Minutes, May 1889, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, page 37- 40, ILSU IRAD repository; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “Let Us Be Fair,” NLT, June 8, 1889. 117

contract and return to the mines.85 In the following days, several union miners

complied.86

The balance of the strikers grew more outraged. They believed that McLaughlin’s

orders, which encouraged union men to blackleg and break an overwhelmingly non-union strike, were “a cowardly stab at manhood’s rights.”87 Such a phrase implied that

McLaughlin’s actions to preserve the union over miners’ wages made him no better than

employers who treated their workers poorly. “Old Dan [McLaughlin]” had no right to

order the miners living “under enforced slavery” to further “sign away their manhood,”

miner and local organizer T. J. Lewellyn observed.88 Such an accusation indicated that

organizers like McLaughlin were as guilty of making miners less than human as the

employers who refused to treat them fairly. “As to Dan meeting tyranny and oppression,”

Pro Bono Publico asserted, “it is an easy matter to meet in the way he has advised for

eight years. We have been advised to accept reduction after reduction until the thing has

grown monotonous and irksome.”89 Unlike McLaughlin, the miners could no longer afford to wait for the day when all miners could strike together. Union officers like

McLaughlin, it seemed, were so far removed from the miners’ daily struggle that they

had lost sight of honest principles. Instead, they grew complicit to the cut throat practices

85Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Whither Are We Drifting To?” NLT, June 8, 1889; P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “The Big Strike in Illinois,” NLT, July 6, 1889. 86 It is unclear how many miners initially responded to the call to return, but some reports indicate that roughly ten percent of the striking miners in northern Illinois followed the orders. Others resumed work when companies began to import strikebreakers from Pennsylvania. William Monaghan, letter to the editor, “Response from Wm. Monaghan,” NLT, July 6, 1889; William Scaife, Illinois National Progressive Union Official Report, NLT, December 7, 1889; “Where Did They Gain?” [Chicago] Tribune Supplement Page, November 15, 1889. 87 William Monaghan, letter to the editor, “Response from Wm. Monaghan,” NLT, July 6, 1889. 88 T. J. Lewellyn, letter to the editor, “The Miner’s Wealth,” NLT, July 27, 1889; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “The Illinois Controversy Ended,” NLT, August 24, 1889; Daniel McNulty, letter to the editor, “A Defense of ‘Old Dan,’” NLT, June 22, 1889. 89 “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Pro Bono to ‘Dan,’” NLT, July 20, 1889. 118

that drove wages down. “Keep quiet, ‘Dan,’” Pro Bono Publico ordered. “Don’t censure

any man or men for doing something you never dared do.”90

To them, McLaughlin and those who followed his orders and accepted the

depreciated terms were bowing to company demands. Missouri miner George

Palfreyman, like many northern Illinois miners at the time, insisted that such miners were

not humans but “things in the shape of men.”91 Illinois organizer William Scaife agreed,

writing that the “hordes” of union men who broke the strike were worse than mice who

timidly accepted company terms. Rather, they were “rats” that “did not possess a spark of

manhood.”92 Accepting the terms did more than make it impossible for northern Illinois

miners to live, northern Illinois striking miner John Rowe argued indignantly. In addition,

it “would cut the throats of our fellow miners in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, who

have got settled on reasonable terms, and we propose to hunger awhile rather than do

this, even though Dan McL. calls us knaves.”93At a special convention governed by

Illinois NPU officers, the miners agreed. They not only decided to continue the strike, but

officially censured McLaughlin “for branding us as knaves and deceivers of the men of

this district, who are actuated by motives as pure and honest as those of any man….”94

But honesty meant little when coal flooded the market. As miners and officers

fought over who had the purest motives, the families of strikers suffered. Neither the

NPU nor NTA 135 could support the hundreds of striking families. By August, the

Bloomington [Illinois] Daily Pantagraph reported that at least two infants had already

90 “Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “Differs with ‘Dan,’” NLT, June 29, 1889. 91 “W. G.,” for example, called them “things meaner than the ground you walk on.” George Palfreyman, letter to the editor, “From Missouri,” NLT, July 20, 1889; “W.G.,” letter to the editor, “‘Old Miner’ Again,’ NLT, November 2, 1889. 92 William Scaife, NPU Illinois District Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, December 7, 1889. 93 John Rowe, letter to the editor, “Adverse to ‘Old Dan,’ NLT, June 15, 1889. 94 Robert M. Reed and William Scaife, Official Proceedings of Special Convention of northern Illinois miners, “Proceedings of Special Convention,” NLT, July 6, 1889. 119

died from starvation, with more expected if the strike continued without relief.95

Consequently, as union miners broke the strike in the northern Illinois mines, hundreds of

desperate strikers traveled to the non-union mines in Egypt to find work. Both groups

mined coal below the scale and both sent their coal to the Chicago market. Although both

claimed to be “brave fellows” fighting for what was right for them and their families,

both were also deemed “blacklegs” by other miners who claimed their willingness to

mine coal rendered the strike ineffective.96

By December, most northern Illinois mines had resumed work. The Illinois strike

officially ended when Spring Valley miners signed a new contract accepting a 7 ½ cent

per ton reduction and increased dead work, but allowing two men to a room. Dead work

taken into consideration, the entire reduction averaged 10 cents per ton rather than the

original 20-25 cents. Within days, the last Indiana mines on strike conceded as well.97

Although the miners secured better terms, northern Illinois and Indiana miners condemned the unions for betraying their cause.98 Dishonesty and selfishness, they

recognized, existed on both sides of the union line. Acknowledging the dissatisfaction,

William Scaife attempted to mollify the embittered workers. The terms were unfair, he

conceded, but the miners’ struggle was no longer a fight between right and wrong.

Instead, it was an ongoing choice between “the least of two evils.”99

95 “Almost Beyond Belief,” The Bloomington [Illinois] Daily Pantagraph, August 3, 1889; “Starvation in Indiana,” NLT, June 22, 1889; “Many Miners Destitute,” CT, June 25, 1889; “Horrors of the Strike,” CT, June 26, 1889. 96 “Relief Badly Needed,” Alton [Illinois] Evening Telegraph, June 25, 1889; C. H. Davis, letter to the editor, “Reply to John Rowe,” NLT, June 29, 1889. 97 William Scaife, Illinois National Progressive Union Official Report, NLT, December 7, 1889; “Where Did They Gain?” [Chicago] Tribune Supplement Page, November 15, 1889; “Collapse of the Block-Coal Miners’ Strike,” Decatur [Illinois] Daily Republican, November 22, 1889. 98 “Anthracite,” letter to the editor, “Not Satisfied,” NLT, November 23, 1889. 99 William Scaife, Illinois National Progressive Union Official Report, NLT, December 7, 1889; Spring Valley, Illinois, Lodge 26 “Miners and Mine Laborers Protective Association” of the NPU, Meeting 120

The national market twisted and stretched understandings of honor and morality,

complicating workplace conflicts in ways that turned workers and unions against each

other. Efforts to generate larger personal profit were never limited to the big businessmen and bankers that rural producers so readily condemned. Though on a smaller scale, producers engaged in similar acts not only upsetting local relationships as small mine owners extracted their profits by decreasing their neighbors’ incomes, but making it impossible to overcome local interests to create an effective national union.

Consequently, as wages declined, union affiliation did not denote honest behavior any more than miners’ and farmers’ rejection of union organizations indicated a lack of

“honest” labor principles.

For farmers, miners, and owners, from cooperatives and joint stock ventures to

blacklegging, the concessions that national market competition demanded remained the

same. To fight debt and exploitation producers had to compromise their sense of what

was moral and fair. Miners and farmers gambled, cheated and stole. They cried

“blackleg” when dishonest labor threatened their own livelihoods, but accepted terms

that they knew would “cut the throats” of their fellow miners, breaking their strikes,

filling their contracts, taking their coal cars, and ignoring their scales. It was the lesser

evil than subjecting their families to hardship when increased income was within

reach.100

But it was still an evil. Miners throughout the southern Midwest looked in disgust

at the 1889 strike failure, observing the markets, declining wages, union officers,

Minutes, December 21 and November 12, 1889, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, page 48-50 [meetings out of sequence in minutes book, December 21 meeting appears first]. 100 John Rowe, letter to the editor, “Adverse to ‘Old Dan,’ NLT, June 15, 1889. 121

blacklegs, and the families who survived the summer on little more than bread and water.

To them, it was a fresh reminder of the immorality inherent not only in their employers’

business practices, but the practices of their own neighbors. “In the past we have sown to

the lust of flesh and we are reaping a harvest of evils,” miner “Pumpkin Smasher,” said of

the 1880s conflicts. In training the farmers that overcrowded the mines, in flooding the

market with coal, and in accepting more reductions, he observed, the miners contributed

to the dire circumstances they faced. “[O]ur craftsmen have become so greedy of pelf that

they sell their souls to get a dime more,” he continued. Such a phrase was a reminder of

the cost dishonest labor demanded. If operators were “soulless” for demanding higher

profits at workers’ expense, workers forfeited their own souls when they injured their

own neighbors.101

Few miners, least of all those defeated in 1889, believed the Progressive Union or

NTA 135 could end this moral erosion. But the experiences in the late 1880s convinced

the miners that they needed a way to live according to the honest principles they claimed,

to love their neighbors without starving their families. To many, national unity between

the vying unions seemed the only viable option. Union officers “have shown their

inability to look after the interests of their craftsmen,” Indiana organizer William

Houston acknowledged; yet he remained convinced that unionization was “the only rock and foundation to build upon for the salvation of all.”102 As the strikers returned to work

in December 1889, miners throughout the nation expressed this same hope, willing the

national miners’ union to be born again just one month later. But even as they formed the

new order, the problems of the 1880s remained. Competition and wage decline

101 “Pumpkin Smasher,” letter to the editor, “Pumpkin Smasher,” UMWJ, February 8, 1894. 102 William Houston, letter to the editor, “Miners Reminded of their Duties,” NLT, May 12, 1888. 122 intensified, more farmers entered the mines, and miners remained skeptical of union leadership. Cutthroat competition was steadfast, informing the actions of operator and miner alike and undermining the trust miners had for each other and their organization.

123

Chapter Four

Backsliders: Union Betrayal and the Aborted 1891 Strike

“I dislike to speak against those who claim to be engaged in the service of labor reform, but he who wears your colors and professes to fight on your side, and then turns his sword against you in the thickest of the fight, is the most cowardly and miserable of all traitors….”1

—Thomas Faulds

“Everyone was struck dumb when they heard the telegram read,” nineteen year- old block coal miner John Mooney reported to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. The stillness lingered in the crowded meeting hall as Indiana block coal miners considered

United Mine Workers of America (UMW) National Secretary Patrick McBryde’s refusal to support their proposed November 1891 strike. According to McBryde, the miners were selfish fools for considering the endeavor. Even though the operators refused to pay the agreed winter wage, the UMW would offer no assistance in enforcing the scale, nor would the miners have the union’s support if they struck.2

The silence quickly turned to rage. “Do our national officers know what they are doing? Are they aware of what they are doing? If not they will have to define their

1 Thomas Faulds, letter to the editor, “Doesn’t Think a Union Practicable,” NLT, April 9, 1887. 2 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; “Strike Among Miners,” Indianapolis [Indiana] News, November 5, 1891; Joe Dunkerly and T. F. Bolser on behalf of the Clinton, Indiana, miner delegation,“Commesky Exonerated,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 report, UMWJ, November 12, 1891; Patrick McBryde, letter to the editor, “Response from McBryde,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891; “The Indiana Miners,” JKL, December 17, 1891; "United States Census, 1900," Family Search (https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.1.1/MMBJ-Z3L : accessed March 12, 2015), John Mooney in household of Nellie Ackelmire, Brazil Township Brazil city Ward 2, Clay, Indiana, United States; citing sheet 11B, family 246, NARA microfilm publication T623, FHL microfilm 1240363. 124

position and explain their reason for such conduct,” Mooney demanded. His anger came

not only from the telegram’s harsh words, but from what Mooney and thousands of other

miners saw as the officers’ continued retreat from the principles they were supposed to

defend. Six months earlier, national officers canceled the UMW’s first nationwide strike

days before it was to begin. Although officers had once promised certain victory, they

ordered the miners to accept the best terms employers offered.3

Mooney’s anger toward the national office, then, was part of a broader pattern of what many miners saw as the officers’ indifference and betrayal of the very principles that they were elected to uphold. Like their accusations of government officials who failed to live up to their political beliefs, many rank and filers asserted that union officers had turned away from union principles and pulled the UMW astray with them.

But frustrations with leadership did more than demonstrate rank and file mistrust of union leaders. It also reflected the formidable difficulties that grew from forging a national organization that could regulate a national but decentralized industry. Interstate competition between coal mines demanded a strong and centralized national union to negotiate and regulate the wage scale, but doing so often came at the expense of local concerns. More than ever before, the new union structure forced UMW leaders to look after national interests and larger mining regions like the western Pennsylvania field over the issues of smaller mining regions and areas like Mooney’s block field. Consequently, what appeared to Mooney to be an abandonment of union principle was really evidence of an overtaxed union spread too thinly to look after all regions simultaneously.

3 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 125

Still, in 1891, Mooney and thousands of other miners wondered why they should

wait for officers’ blessings to earn a living wage. “We have blacklegged long enough,”

Mooney grumbled. By following union orders, they had worked below the pay scale,

which drove down wages in neighboring mines and made union miners indistinguishable

from the “blacklegs” who broke strikes, the most hated workers in the industry. The

national officers had endorsed the “blacklegging” Mooney described, content with letting

Indiana workers fall in to deeper poverty. But neither Mooney nor the rest of the Indiana

miners and even the district officers agreed with this approach. Recognizing this, Indiana-

Kentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy ordered the entire state to strike, despite

the national leaders’ orders. Mooney and thousands of Indiana miners cheered. True

union miners fought for fair treatment in the mines, Mooney argued, “and if the national

officers do not help us let them keep hands off and we will fight our own battles.”4

The Indiana rejection of the UMW national officers in November 1891 was not an

isolated event. By the early 1890s, laborers across the nation were dissatisfied with union

leadership, causing membership to wane.5 Although historians have cast this decline as a

kind of disillusion that eroded union “solidarity” when the successes that once appeared

guaranteed no longer seemed attainable, Mooney’s assertions show that workers did not

always join or abandon unions based solely on union potential for success.6 Instead,

many like Mooney, remained in the union long after major organizing failures even

though they disagreed with union leaders and their actions.

4 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 5 E. W. Lightner, “K of L Methods Criticised,” NLT, December 12, 1889. 6 Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation; Voss, Making of American Exceptionalism, 228; For debates regarding rank and file support for leaders in other organizations, see Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 395; Leon Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy, 35; and Richard Oestreicher, “Terence Powderly, The Knights of Labor, and Artisinal Republicanism,” in Labor Leaders in America, ed. Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 54. See also, Green, The Devil is Here in These Hills. 126

In many respects, the UMW’s experiences in the early 1890s are crucial because

of what did not occur rather than what did. The UMW’s 1891 national strike that did not happen demonstrated that membership numbers did not indicate union strength. Although the union claimed to be 70,000 members strong the February before the cancelled strike,

only a fraction were willing to strike just a few months later.7 Second, the UMW’s

decision to cancel the strike did not come from antagonistic employers, but from the tens

of thousands of miners who would not honor the strike, indicating that the young union’s biggest threat came from within the order. Yet, even when leaders canceled the strike and confessed the UMW’s frailty, miners did not immediately abandon the union as studies of organizing suggested they should have. Moreover, when miners decided to leave the union, many still believed in unionism even if they did not have its membership. They did not abandon the UMW because of any disillusion with organized labor but because they believed the UMW leaders had turned away from the organization’s original goals.

In the months following the May 1891 strike cancellation, miners and officers

struggled to save the union, wrestling with dissatisfied miners and defiant local unions. In

officers’ eyes, miners who “kicked” or fought against the union by not paying dues,

rebuking leaders, and disregarding union orders were “Judases” who “backslid” away

from the honest principles they had once held. Conversely, miners like John Mooney who

had insisted that the miners could “fight our own battles,” believed that the true

backsliders were the officers who forced miners to blackleg, leading the union away from

its founding principles. Miners “kicked” to regain control of the union supposed to look

after their interests. When their efforts to reclaim the UMW seemed fruitless, miners

7 Report of Robert Watchorn, Proceedings of the United Mine Workers 1891 National Convention, “United Mine Workers,” NLT, February, 14, 1891. 127 throughout the nation questioned whether the UMW’s centralized structure and national scope ever would be able to look after all miners’ interests. Thousands formed their own local unions that rivaled the UMW. The Indiana miners’ actions in the months after the

1891 strike cancellation, then, were part of an ongoing struggle between national officers and coal miners both inside and outside the UMW.

Close examination of the Indiana miners’ grievances with national and state

UMW officers provides a useful means to understand when and why droves of rank and file miners abandoned the UMW in nearly every mining region of the nation. These early

UMW failures and mining families’ responses to them indicate that union decline in the late nineteenth century was not necessarily due to company hostility or worker disillusion with unions’ ability to improve workplace conditions. It did not denote a waning faith in unionism at all, but was a conscious effort to recommit the union to its own principles and create a union that fit with their needs and visions for their futures.

Misled

Over seventy thousand coal miners were supposed to strike on May 1, 1891.

Instead, less than ten thousand struck, and most of that number went out by accident.

Planned by the UMW national officers to initiate the eight-hour workday throughout the coal industry, the strike would be the first time all miners walked out in unison. For over a year, officers and organizers trumpeted the strike, promising that it would begin an aggressive campaign for fair treatment in the mines, increasing wages and improving work conditions. Despite months of campaigning and assurances of certain victory, however, UMW leaders called off the strike less than three days before it was to begin.

As the officers explained in a circular sent to all locals, union membership was too low

128

and too many miners had declared they would not honor the strike. Considering these

factors, it was “impossible to unite the country in one solid phalanx for any given object

of reform.” 8

Although it was abandoned, the UMW’s effort to initiate a nationwide reform no isolated event in late nineteenth century labor organizing. It was part of a great push for political and economic reform. Throughout the nation, groups pushed for moral, civic, and economic reforms ranging from temperance to tax reform. Farmers in the South and

Midwest, long frustrated with the economic conditions that slighted “producers,” gradually built a movement that, by 1890, became a powerful force in several states.

Legislation such as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and countless state and federal laws regulating workplace conditions and railroad practices, and stronger laws against “pluck-

me” stores seemed to indicate that the government was on the producers’ side. As

Southern farmers worked to fight jute prices, the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association

(FMBA) along with Midwestern Granges mobilized wheat farmers to stand against the

“twine trust” that charged exorbitant prices for the string used to bind wheat.9 After years

of organizing, groups like the Knights of Labor and Farmers’ Alliances forged farmer-

laborer alliances to challenge railroads and monopolies. 10 By early 1891, farmers and

laborers planned to meet in Cincinnati that May to form a third political party that would

8 UMW National Executive Board, Official Circular to the miners of the UMW, “Peace is Declared,” UMWJ, April 30, 1891. 9 “Down with the Twine Trust,” NE, May 11, 1889; “An experiment has been made,” NE, May 18, 1889; N.B. Ashby, “Alliance Matters in Iowa,” NE, April 27, 1889; “The Situation,” NE, May 11, 1889; N.B. Ashby, “Organization in Iowa,” NE, June 29, 1889; House Committee on Agriculture, Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products, 8. 10 “All Are In the Same Boat,” JKL, May 21, 1891; Sanders, Roots of Reform; Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists. 129

reform the nation. 11 Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) made headway

securing the eight-hour workday, helping the carpenters gain it in 1890 and planned to

extend the push into other industries. 12

The UMW added to this excitement when it formed in January 1890. After years

of fighting, the miners’ unions finally united, creating one of the largest unions in the

nation. Learning from failures, the new union’s structure dissolved neither the

Progressive Union nor Knights Trade Assembly 135. The UMW promised to smooth past

differences between the two orders by creating a flexible framework that allowed Knights

to remain over their local assemblies while the former Progressive Union miners

followed the AFL. Both groups answered to the UMW’s national executive board

members who were required to hold membership in both orders. This board made all

decisions for the UMW, including which strikes the union would support and how much

aid the strikers would receive. The officers and many of the rank and file believed the

centralized power of the union would give it the strength to confront the competitive coal

market, adding mine reform to the growing list of producer-led transformations at the end

of the century. The UMW’s decision to join the AFL’s fight for the eight-hour workday

only seemed to further confirm this promise that change would come soon.

“I never so much regretted that the best half of my life is past as I do now, when I

see what grand possibilities lie in the years to come,” Laurene Gardner wrote excitedly.13

11 Jonathan Garlock, Guide to the Local Assemblies of the Knights of Labor (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); J. D. Thompson to the editor, Indiana Farmer (hereafter IF), April 27, 1889; W.C. Latta to the editor, IF, December 28, 1889; Milton Trussler, Report on the 19th Session of the Indiana State Grange, IF, January 11, 1890; Jonathan Shields to the editor, IF, May 17, 1890; Eben Howells to the editor, UMWJ, April 16, 1891; H. G. Strietelmeier to the editor, UMWJ, October 1, 1891; “A New Party is Forming,” NYT, December 5, 1890; “Alliance Movement,” UMWJ, April 16, 1891. 12 Tenth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1890, Report of Proceedings, 14; Eleventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1891, Report of Proceedings, 12; Proceedings of the United Mine Workers of America 1891 Convention, “United Mine Workers,” UMWJ, February 14, 1891. 130

The forty-two-year-old miner wife expressed the sentiments thousands of producers in

the southern Midwest held. Although she had never been a union member herself, she

followed both labor and political issues closely. Her interest began at age thirteen with

the American Miners’ Association in the 1860s and continued when she married a coal

miner and settled in southern Indiana. As she raised her three sons and two daughters, she

watched miners’ unions come and go, reading union proceedings “while rocking the

cradle” of her children.14 She raised them “to take no mean place in the grand march of

liberty to the worker.” 15This was her duty, and Gardner did it well. Her sons, she

bragged, “have never been called blacklegs yet.”16

For Gardner, a white woman who was both a part of and apart from political and labor movements all her life, the mobilization of the UMW and the Populists gave her hope for the future. But the enthusiasm Gardner expressed and successes she witnessed were short-lived. As promising as 1890 appeared, the years that followed demonstrated that the excitement was premature. State after state became enmeshed in battles over the constitutionality and enforcement of their new workplace and pluck-me laws. Meanwhile,

Populists failed to establish their third party at a convention in Cincinnati. Despite the

13 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Notes,” UMWJ, March 31, 1892. 14 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “From Ayrshire,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891. 15 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene Gardner,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891. 16 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “From Ayrshire,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891. Gardner’s vision of her role in raising her children to protect the union is similar to what Linda Kerber found among mothers in the Early Republic. Historians of rural organizations such as the Patrons of Husbandry have found that such concepts persisted well into the late nineteenth century. Linda Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Rebecca Edwards, Gender in American Party Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Thomas A. Woods, Knights of the Plow: Oliver H. Kelley and the Origins of the Grange in Republican Ideology (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1991), 167-9; Marti, Women of the Grange. 131

silver purchase act, economic conditions continued to worsen for producers across the

nation. 17

In the midst of this, the UMW called off its nationwide strike. The cancellation

and its aftermath, known by the miners as “the first of May,” stood in sharp contrast to

what organizers had proclaimed only one week earlier. The miners, then, saw the aborted

strike as more than evidence of the UMW’s inability to look after miners’ concerns. To

them, it was proof that the officers had misled the rank and file by pushing a movement

that failed while lying about union strength. In joining the union, miners had risked their

jobs and sacrificed their pay for what the New York Times dubbed a “May Day fizzle,” a

movement that failed before it began. 18

Those who were ready to strike expressed more outrage at the officers’ misleading actions than the union’s abandonment of the eight-hour movement. Miners in

Flagler, Iowa, expressed “great dissatisfaction” at the strike’s cancellation. “[W]e are

open to confess the calling it off is something we don’t really understand,” they wrote,

noting that the miners had voted in favor of the strike at the last convention. In the minds of the Flagler miners, only a mass vote of delegates could countermand the strike call.

“Thus the Executive Board would have no right to declare the demand off without very grave reasons,” the miners reasoned.19

The problem was that UMW officers had explicitly announced that a May 1

victory was certain. The miners had not been alerted to any “grave” situations that caused

the cancellation. Consequently, the abrupt change indicated that either the leaders were

17Sanders, Roots of Reform, 135; Goodwyn Democratic Promise, 245-248. 18 “The Demands of Labor,” NYT, May 1, 1891; “A Sort of May-Day Fizzle,” NYT, May 2, 1891; Will Scaife, “The Situation in Illinois,” Trade and Mining Journal, reprinted in UMWJ, June 4, 1891. 19 “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891. 132

too cowardly to fight or were lying about their strength. “I believe there has been too darned much blowing and bluff indulged by the delegates to conventions which have been held during the past eighteen months,” Indiana miner “M. F.” complained.20 The optimism from successfully forming the UMW gave delegates an inflated hope in the new union’s abilities. Officers, M.F. and other miners reasoned, should have been more straightforward on the limits of the union’s success prior to their eleventh hour strike cancellation, but instead the United Mine Workers’ Journal had proclaimed certain victory until the strike was canceled. “Are they all imbeciles, or are they all traitors?”

M.F. asked of the UMW’s national officers.21 For many miners, the answer to this

question did not matter. The Flagler, Iowa, miners reasoned that the “Executive Board

certainly should have known, if they did not know, the strength of this order previous to

the last moment.”22 That the officers refused to acknowledge the true state of affairs, or at

least hid them from the rank and file, seemed disingenuous and preyed on the hopes of

miners who paid into a cause that never came to fruition.

Miners throughout the nation demanded to know why the Journal’s early issues

trumpeted the eight-hour rallying cry if their defeat was so imminent. For many, the

answer was that UMW officers used the official organ as a propaganda tool to boost

worker faith in the movement without building strength. Indiana miner F. J. Llewellyn

called such efforts “thunder” that, sounded threatening but never generated a true storm.

Instead, it produced “a Don Quixotic effort” that only hurt the miners. “Truly a glory

shared in by none except the authors and creators of the great U Mean Wind paper

20 “M. F.,” letter to the editor, “Not a Kicker,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891. 21 “M. F.,” letter to the editor, “Not a Kicker,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891. 22 “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891. 133

organization. What magnificent victories we have won—on paper! What grand things we

shall do—in the future! But in the living present, what?”23

Leader William Scaife acknowledged similar feelings among union miners

throughout his home state of Illinois, especially the northern field. Even after their 1889

strike defeat, they believed the UMW would redeem the miners from the years of wage

decline. Yet, instead of going forward with the national strike, the leaders pulled back,

leaving the northern Illinois miners in what Scaife called “hopeless confusion,” and

causing them to wonder if anything the union leaders said was true. The result, Scaife

claimed, was enough to “disgust the members and make them swear they will never

belong to a national union.”24 UMW Vice President Phil Penna’s tours of the northern

Illinois coalfields in July 1891 confirmed Scaife’s assessment. By then, the thirty-four

year old was no novice to organizing. Born in England, Penna arrived in the United

States in the early 1880s and settled in Linton, Indiana, where he began mining coal. 25

His fiery speeches and short temper for non-union miners soon made “Little Phil” famous

in the Indiana miners’ unions and propelled him to national leadership when the UMW

formed in 1890.26 Penna had given thousands of speeches and organized hundreds of

locals by the time he combed through the Illinois coalfields in the 1891 summer. Yet as

he traveled from town to town Little Phil discovered that even he could not fully

23 F. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Lightening without the Thunder,” NLT, May 23, 1891; “Miner,” letter to the editor, “Mike’s Caustic Criticism,” NLT, May 23, 1891; “Miner,” letter to the editor, “From Indiana,” NLT, July 18, 1891; “Shakey,” letter to the editor, “Shakey Criticises,” NLT, June 27, 1891; “Samuel Simon,” letter to the editor, “The Old and the New,” NLT, July 25, 1891. 24 “Situation in Illinois” reprinted from the [Joliet, Illinois] Trade and Mining Journal, UMWJ, June 4, 1891. 25 “United States Census, 1900," Family Search, “Philip H. Penna,” https://goo.gl/oN10SI (accessed February 18, 2012). 26 Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “From Indiana,” NLT, January 1, 1887; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Little Phil’s Trip,” UMWJ, August 20, 1891; John Gallagher, letter to the editor, “Clay County Miners,” UMWJ, September 24, 1891; “No Kicker,” letter to the editor, “No Kicker,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892. 134 persuade the miners to return to their union. Rather, he found that “miners have disbanded their locals in some instances, while nowhere could I find a place thoroughly organized.” Instead of pride in unionism, he found “deep seated discontent,” with the

UMW’s actions.27

Backsliding

Leaders like Penna regarded the angry miners with contempt. If it were not for such “ilk[,] there would be no need of an organization at all,” the organizer wrote, indicating that the miners’ worst enemies were not their employers, but their coworkers who claimed to support the union and then turned away. 28 According to Indiana-

Kentucky District President Michael Commesky, these “chronic kickers” no longer believed in the principles the UMW advocated. Instead, they opted to “sit like a gnat on a log” in union meetings and “preach[ed] their scabism to whoever will listen to them” when union victory came slowly. Their hostility toward the order, he argued, had hardened their hearts to organized labor’s call. “[W]hen men make up their minds not to be converted they will always be sinners,” he wrote, reminding readers that even the strongest union men could fall away. 29

The comments touched a common theme among UMW loyalists. Miner wife

Girsy McNab claimed that such actions were both the source and the effect of the May first cancellation. Although she insisted it was not her habit “tae tell a fa’ing man o’ his backslidings,” she noted that many of the union miners in her region abandoned the union

27 Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 28 Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Penna’s Jottings,” UMWJ, August 27, 1891. 29 M. Commesky, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven report, “District 11,” UMWJ, September 3, 1891. Ohio organizer Richard Davis made a similar observation in his region. “I do not pray for death to remove these kind of people, but if some other agent would come along and get them, I, as well as others, would be very thankful,” he wrote. R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Rendville,” UMWJ, July 7, 1892. 135

after the failure. “And noo when the’re in trouble they are wishing they hadna discarded

their union.” 30 Sinthy Snodgrass agreed. Like McNab, Snodgrass was frustrated by union

miner complaints about the UMW rather than building it up. “Har is de pint dat gages me

all de time,” she wrote, “why dese bery men dat cus de organazation if dey get in trouble

wid de bos dey run to de union and get dem ter strike to gane der pint an sum ob dem on

metin nite wont go to de metin, but gow rund to de pluck-me an talk to de stoer clerks

and try to git a sof snap jus because dey get der poak and beans fer de skinup stoer.” This

was no way to build a union, Snodgrass argued, instead, “we nede more good strong

onions dat will bring the tears ob repentence to de eys ob some ob de rank and file.”31 To

McNab and Snodgrass, this was an ongoing trend. Miners constantly joined and left the

union only to join again when the miners grew desperate.

Such descriptions, which echoed complaints many churchgoers made of

“backsliders” who fell away from Christian teachings, tapped into a larger discussion of

honest and moral living in the nineteenth century. Although most often understood within

religious faith, the term “backslider” was frequently applied to people aside from those

who stopped attending church. Local newspapers used the term to describe presumably

upstanding citizens who had acted in ways deemed unethical. 32

A political backslider was someone who turned away from his political

convictions. Methodist Reverend James Miller stressed to his Decatur, Illinois,

congregation those practicing politics should uphold honesty above all. “If you have the

honest spirit you will have the right spirit, and you will go through the campaign with

30 Girsy McNab, letter to the editor, “Girsy Has Views,” UMWJ, July 2, 1891. 31 Sinthy Snodgrass, letter to the editor, “Our Colored Sister,” UMWJ July 2, 1891. 32 “The Landlord of Nevada Gulch,” Wyandotte [Kansas City] Gazette, January 8, 1875; “Pig-Eyed Pete, the Reformer,” CDT, January 11, 1891; “Pertinent Thoughts,” Logansport [Indiana] Pharos-Tribune, January 24, 1892 136

clean hands and come out with a record of which no man need be ashamed.” But if one

did not, he claimed “you will be certain to backslide and will have to be converted again

next winter.”33 The Ottawa [Kansas] Daily Republican rejoiced in 1893 when a group of local residents “returned to their first love,” by rejoining the Republican Party, declaring

“that Cleveland and Hoke Smith are frauds” and that “the populists are blind.” 34 Daily

Inter Ocean correspondent “A. R. H.” made a similar claim of Illinois Ex-Governor John

Palmer in 1888. Citing the Republican-turned-Democrat’s long career, the writer compared Palmer’s speeches from 1868 to his stance in the 1880s. While Palmer had

once referred to Southern rebels as untrustworthy “sinners,” twenty years later, A. R. H.

asserted the governor was a “backslider” himself as he moved to reconcile political

differences and looked at Democrats with sympathy. 35

Whether they were churchgoers, union members, citizens, or politicians, the

“backslider” simply was not committed to the values he or she once professed. Using the

term was a way for ministers, politicians, and union leaders to vividly describe their

efforts as well as those they wished to convert. It reaffirmed that their cause was a

morally right but challenging endeavor and not only called attention to difficult tasks of

persuasion where leaders tried to overcome evil, but also implied that their struggles

continued even when their conversion efforts succeeded.

More importantly, the term shamed the people it described. Backsliders had once

believed in the leaders’ message, but had fallen away. In this sense, the term “backslider”

became a double insult. It acknowledged that those carrying the term did not behave in

33 “The Decatur Pulpits,” DDR, April 16, 1888; Editorial, “The Congregationalists,” Algona [Iowa] Republican, February 25, 1891; Editorial, “In no part” The Daily Inter Ocean, January 26, 1881; “Hayes and Garfield,” CDT, March 1, 1881; “Read Up, Brother Andrews,” DDR, May 6, 1875. 34 “Righter,” Ottawa [Kansas] Daily Republican, August 16, 1893. 35 “A. R. H.,” “Palmer As a Backslider,” DIO, August 3, 1888. 137

moral and respectable ways. This fact was made worse because the backsliders knew

better. They sinned not out of ignorance, but simply because they did not care to act

morally. In short, while those who had never been converted were simply immoral, a

backslider was an immoral traitor.36

Officers were not the only union affiliates that cried traitor in the months

following the May cancellation. Thousands of miners, who joined the UMW to create a

nationwide front against falling wages and poor work conditions, grew frustrated when

the new union fell short in reaching its goals as well as generating national unity.

Officers, they believed, had not only become less committed to regulating the national

market, but even their limited efforts favored some groups of miners over others.

Miners throughout the southern Midwest saw the first of May as proof of more

than officer dishonesty, but outright favoritism of some regions and miners over others.

In looking over the union’s history in his mining region, Indiana miner William Blakley

claimed that officers habitually neglected Indiana miners’ interests. When the UMW

neglected to set a price for mine-run coal in Indiana that was comparable to the eastern coalfields, he was furious. “Why were the same provisions in regard to the mine run price, not made for Indiana as was made for Pennsylvania and Ohio?” The officers

“ignored” the Indiana miners’ concerns “when every other distrist’s [sic] wishes and well-being were looked after.”37 Miner “A Beginner” from southern Illinois asserted that

no UMW officer bothered to visit his mining region since they organized, causing the

36 Thomas Faulds, letter to the editor, “Doesn’t Think a Union Practicable,” NLT, April 9, 1887; T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892. 37 William Blakley, letter to the editor, “A Linton, Ind., Correspondent,” UMWJ, February 17, 1898; John Donnelly, letter to the editor, “An Illinois Criticism,” NLT, May 30, 1891. 138

miners to wonder if they even had officers any longer.38 It was a valid question for the

southern Illinois miners to ask. Although they were technically members of the Miners’

Federation when it merged into the Progressive Union in 1888, no organizer notified

them of the merger by telegram, letter, or visit until nearly five months later.39 According

to William Scaife, such tendencies caused thousands of southern Midwest miners to

believe “that our organization is an eastern one.”40

The miners found proof for their suspicions in the Executive Board’s own circular that detailed the May 1 decision.41 Although the UMW had over twenty districts, only

five district presidents attended the first day’s meeting to discuss the strike cancellation,

and four of those were from the Pennsylvania districts. Indiana and Illinois district

presidents were summoned for the second day’s meeting, but only the Illinois president

arrived in time. After two days’ debate, the six district presidents and the Executive

Board decided to cancel the strike and send the UMW’s May 1 strike fund to aid an

ongoing strike in the Pennsylvania coke mines.42 The balance of the nation’s miners

would have to wait until the UMW was strong enough to fight on a larger scale.

Indiana

Southern Midwest miners were no strangers to weak unions, but by 1891 they

were tired of their unions backing away from the fight, especially when the union

38 “A Beginner,” letter to the editor, “Murphysboro, Ill.,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894. 39 Southern Illinois was a weak spot in the Federation ranks, largely due to its ongoing war NTA 135 leadership. Although both orders had locals throughout the state Federation officers concentrated their organizing efforts in the northern portion of the state while NTA 135 developed the southern portion of the field, Locals that existed outside each organization’s primary territories were often neglected. P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “Organizer Donnelly’s Report,” NLT, April 20, 1889. 40 William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Letter from Illinois,” NLT, February 28, 1891. 41 “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891; P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “From the Districts,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 42 UMW National Executive Board, Official Circular to the miners of the UMW, “Peace is Declared,” UMWJ, April 30, 1891. 139 supported strikes in the east. This sentiment was particularly strong in the Indiana field.

The block coal miners, who suffered through the 1889 strike with little support from the

Progressive Union or NTA 135, expressed no interest in joining the UMW when it formed one month after their 1889 strike failed. Even the bituminous miners who joined when the new union formed were less than satisfied long before the 1891 summer. Their anger with the national officers began a year earlier when the officers failed to secure their desired wage scale with operators in May 1890. Although the Indiana bituminous miners were among the most thoroughly organized in the nation and were ready to strike, the national officers ordered them to accept the terms, which required miners throughout the state to take a reduction. 43

The miners’ frustration was offset with the promise of the May 1891 strike.

National officers assured the miners in Indiana and elsewhere that the strike would not only initiate the eight-hour workday, but also fair wages. Consequently, when they learned the strike was canceled, Indiana miners were furious. But the reason for their anger was not only due to the UMW national leaders’ reluctance to fight. The short notice of the May 1 strike cancellation prevented Indiana UMW officers from receiving the news in time. Unaware of the telegram, thousands of Indiana union and non-union miners walked out of the mines believing that their neighboring states had done the same. UMW

Indiana-Kentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy was as shocked as the miners when he heard news of the cancellation “and I may say right here that the officers, as well as the organized miners of this state, were in favor of the move for eight hours and I fear the change of policy will be a great drawback in perfecting the organization of District

43“The Columbus Result,” NLT, April 26, 1890 (quotes); See also, Robert Watchorn, Official UMW Report, “Coal Miner Matters,” NLT, April 26, 1890; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 Report, “Miners of Indiana,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 140

11.”44 Kennedy’s assessment proved true. A week later, most mines remained at a

standstill not because miners were striking for the eight-hour day, but because operators

wished to impose another wage reduction upon the miners’ return.45

“The miners of this portion of Indiana were prepared for an honorable defeat, but

not a dishonorable retreat, and we have been both and not a blow struck!” F. J. Llewellyn

exclaimed. 46 The miners, he insisted, were accustomed to fighting losing battles for a just

cause, but to be abandoned by the union hours before their strike was nothing short of

betrayal. The UMW had left the Indiana miners at the operators’ mercy as other states’

coal filled their contracts.47

Despite the miners’ defeat and anger at what they saw as the UMW officers’

abandonment of the cause, a close examination of the dues union miners’ paid indicates

that few Indiana union miners abandoned the UMW in the months after the strike failure.

Although officers often claimed that dues payments were members’ responsibility for a

wider cause, miners did not always agree. Rather, they often looked at their dues

payments as a way to show support or disdain for union decisions. In some cases, failure to pay dues indicated that a local union or assembly had dissolved and that miners no longer wished to be members. More often, miners remained in the union, but refused to give money to an organization that did not act in their interest. Organizer Tim O’Malley observed that two Knights of Labor miners’ assemblies refused to pay dues to NTA 135

44 J.H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Report, “Indiana Miners,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891. 45 J.H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Report, “Situation in Indiana,” UMWJ, May 14, 1891. While the wage reduction was likely in part due to spite, May 1 was also the day operators and miners instituted a new contract for the following year. Reductions, lockouts, and strikes were therefore extremely common in all mining districts during the first week of May. 46 F. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Lightning without the Thunder,” NLT, May 23, 1891. 47 “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891; “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “The Old Story,” UMWJ, May 21, 1891; “Spring Valley Miners,” UMWJ, July 2, 1891; M. J. Goings and Eben. Howells, Official UMW Illinois District 12 Circular, “An Appeal,’ UMWJ, July 2, 1891; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 Report, “Old Time Troubles,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891. 141

in 1887 but continued to support the Knights’ General Assembly. 48 In instances such as

this, decisions to not support specific union levels or branches spoke volumes to

organizations that continually operated on small budgets, making dissatisfaction

abundantly clear to union officials. 49

Officers experienced this sentiment in the weeks following the first of May as

they traveled the coalfields to assuage miners’ frustration with the cancellation. “The

month just gone has been one of disappointment and trouble,” Ohio organizer W. C.

Pearce reported in June 1891. “In almost every mining locality in Ohio there has been

more or less kicking and fault-finding regarding the settlement of the 1st of May…. Every

day letters are received stating men will not pay their dues until some of the [national]

officers come and explain the present conditions.”50 Ohio organizer and national

executive board member Richard L. Davis confessed that only two-thirds of his district’s union men paid their dues. “The others refuse and some of them say that no matter [what] they will not pay another cent to anything. They say they have paid and paid and have never reaped any benefit and it is impossible for any one to try to show them any good that has been done.…” 51 UMW Vice President Phil Penna found similar conditions

when he toured the southern Midwest that summer. After a trip through the northern

Illinois coalfields, local unions and assemblies unabashedly told the national officer that

48 T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “The K. of L. and Trades Unions,” NLT, May 28, 1887; Oscar Anderson to John Hayes, June 17, 1892, Reel 11, JHP. 49“E. P.,” letter to the editor, “Rambler Criticized,” NLT, February 4, 1888; Thomas Faulds, letter to the editor, “The Value of Organization,” May 19, 1888; FAMI Official Report, “Indiana Miners,” NLT, September 7, 1889. 50 W. C. Pearce, letter to the editor, “Fault-Finders in Ohio,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891. 51 R.L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Work Very Dull,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891. James H. Eskew made a similar statement regarding miners in Ayrshire, Indiana, that winter. James H. Eskew, letter to the editor, “Ayrshire Somewhat,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891. 142

they “will oppose sending another cent to the national while the present executive board

have control”52

Penna’s statement, combined with other national organizers’ comments pertaining

to national dues payments, indicates an important trend in union dues payments. Because

unions sent their dues to the various organization levels separately, miners and locals

were able to discern when each level received its payment and what amount each level

would receive, regardless of organizational bylaws. No detailed national dues receipts

exist from the southern Midwest during the UMW’s early years. However, Indiana-

Kentucky District Secretary Kennedy’s meticulous weekly reports, which included the

amounts the state received from each local, offer a window into miner dedication to the

UMW. As officers and organizers reported locals collapsing and union miners

withholding their national dues, a close examination shows that the state-level finances

fared somewhat differently than the national. 53

Prior to the strike, Kennedy’s dues totals often ranged from $20 to $90 each week,

with the highest amounts collected between March 28 and April 30, corresponding with

anticipation for the May strike (Appendix Chart 1). This pattern changed in the weeks

following May 1. The first three weeks following the strike cancellation state dues

declined slightly compared to weeks prior, hovering at roughly $40 each week, within the

range typical for his reports prior to the strike. But by June 4, Kennedy reported only

52 Historian Andrew Arnold found that hundreds of Pennsylvania union miners similarly refused to pay dues to UMW or NTA 135 but continued to pay into the Knights’ General Assembly, causing Arnold to conclude that while regional Knights “were slipping back into its old role as a leadership organization,” the UMW “was simply slipping away.” Arnold, Fueling, 157; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 53 The analysis of the Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven dues is only possible because Secretary Kennedy took pains to report every cent he received each week. No other organizer reported dues as consistently during this period. 143

$8.20 for the previous week. In fact, the secretary’s receipts for the entire month of June only totaled $70.50, a far cry from the dues received just weeks earlier.54

Although the decline in the Indiana-Kentucky district’s dues corresponded with officer reports throughout the nation that miners had lost faith in the union, the decrease was more likely due to the ongoing strike. Miners seldom paid dues while on strike, but

resumed when the strike ended. Kennedy’s reports confirm this trend: miners resumed

paying union dues after their summer strikes ended in failure. In fact, Kennedy’s receipts

for July 1891 actually showed an increase in union dues that surpassed those collected

even in the weeks leading up to May 1. If union decline was primarily due to any sort of

disillusion with union strength or ability, Kennedy’s dues should have plummeted and

not recovered after most Indiana miners’ strikes had failed. Miners who believed in the

union continued to pay their state dues even as they cursed their national officers. Their

belief in unionism was not rattled; their faith in the officers was. 55

54 Kennedy’s receipts show that newly organized locals, small locals, or those that sent sporadic union payments were the most likely to dissolve in the 1891 summer. Local Assembly 2998 of Spotsville, Kentucky, was only organized for a few months when the May 1 failure occurred. The assembly paid $8.20 according to Kennedy’s April 4 report, but did not send in anything more until a final payment reported August 13, amounting to $7.50. Similarly, Local Assembly 456 of Carbon, Indiana, was a small order located in the heart of the non-union block coal field. Although the local managed to regularly send in its meager dues in the 1890 summer months, the union stopped its payments immediately following the May 1, 1891 strike. These dues comparisons are taken from a compilation of Kennedy’s weekly reports on UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven’s status and finances printed in each issue of the UMW’s official organ. For 1890 and early 1891, the reports are found on the UMW page of the National Labor Tribune. After April 1891, they were printed in the United Mine Workers’ Journal, most frequently under the headings “District Eleven” or “Indiana Miners.” 55 William Bauchop Wilson, letter to the editor, “Wilson in Indiana,” UMWJ, September 24, 1891; John Gallagher, letter to the editor, “Clay County Miners,” UMWJ, September 24, 1891. Local Assembly 3688 in McHenry, Kentucky, continued to give its roughly eight dollars each month even after the May 1 cancellation. Similarly, Local Union 31 at Linton, Indiana, which sporadically paid eight dollars in dues prior to the May 1 cancellation began sending in its dues once a month starting in June 1891. In the months that followed, its dues payments increased from eight dollars to twelve by September. 144

Misplaced Faith

Few miners captured this sentiment more than those in the Indiana block mines.

They had no interest in joining the UMW when it formed and were not members during the May 1 strike cancellation. But lack of membership did not mean the miners rejected union sentiment. Instead, the non-union block men joined the thousands of Indiana bituminous miners in what they thought was a nationwide strike. Moreover, when the strike failed, the miners did not abandon the UMW. Even though, as block district organizer Samuel Anderson explained, they had “not much faith” in the new union, over one hundred and fifty miners in Knightsville alone decided to “give it a fair trial” and become UMW members for the first time. 56

The Clay County miners’ willingness to join the UMW after a substantial defeat

demonstrated that union strength or the miners’ lack of faith in it was not enough to

dissuade workers from joining a union. But this did not mean that the new members

trusted the union or its officers. Their skepticism came from their longstanding

frustrations with larger unions overlooking block district concerns. “Nearly half the

miners of this state are in this county,” Anderson complained, but their coal was of a

different quality, mined, and, was priced differently from the coal in the national

bituminous market. As a result, block miners paid the same dues as bituminous miners

but often found that block coal concerns were rarely addressed in the state or national

union agendas.57

56 William Houston, letter to the editor, “Clay County’s Hard Lines,” NLT, January 11, 1890; Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891. 57Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891; “Indiana Miners Give In,” NLT, January 2, 1892. 145

Block miners grew particularly frustrated with the national defense fund. All

union miners were expected to contribute to the fund to be used as aid for striking or

locked out miners. Unlike past funds, which were controlled by local and state unions,

the National Executive Board held sole discretion over how the defense fund was spent.

The centralization of the funds, much like the centralization of union authority, was

supposed to increase union efficiency. Yet in 1891, it seemed that the UMW gave little

aid to the southern Midwest. “[O]ur most intelligent members began to ask, ‘What are

[the national officers] doing with the defense fund?’” When Anderson and the other

leaders replied that they did not know, “[a] quiet smile could be seen on some faces and

that was the last of them.” The miners understood that they would never see the money

again. 58

Despite Anderson’s effort to revive faith in the union, the miners wanted nothing of it. “[W]e called two delegate meetings and one mass meeting to discuss the propriety of thorough organization,” he recalled. “These were failures.” Consequently, as Phil

Penna and the other national officers decried the union miners’ who “kicked” against the

UMW and “backslid” away from it, Anderson, like other local organizers, insisted that it was not the miners who backslid. Instead, Anderson wanted the nation’s miners to understand that the Clay County men were neither “dupes” fooled by their employers nor

“sinners” who had backslid from the union. “There are as intelligent and good union men here as there are anywhere,” he insisted. The union, not the miners had turned away from honest principles. “I believe that when we started to organize we made a grand mistake, for if, instead of sending away our money for taxes without receiving one particle of benefit in return, we had put every cent of money we subscribed into a [home] fund to

58 Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891. 146

thoroughly organize Clay county, we then ourselves could have removed the many local

hardships we have to labor under and could have joined issues with [the bituminous

miners] on a sound basis.” 59

Anderson’s anger was echoed throughout the state when the UMW issued its fall

1891 orders for the Indiana miners to reduce wages. Rather than earning 75 cents per ton

as expected during winter months, block miner John Mooney and his coworkers—at

UMW orders—now earned only 45 ½ cents. The officers’ decision, Mooney asserted, “is

as dishonest and false as the system that it is based on. It is impossible to establish a

common measure of prices that will do justice to the coal miner.” But there was nothing

the miners could do. “We cannot fight the men, the operators and the organization.” 60

Frustration turned to hostility when roughly ten thousand miners in western

Pennsylvania went on strike for higher wages that fall. The UMW did not order this

strike, but because the national officers wished to maintain a unified front, they ordered

all miners to lend their support to the Pennsylvania miners.61 The Indiana miners were

outraged, Mooney explained, because the same officers “gave their aid and sanction to

the Pittsburg [Pennsylvania] miners to demand 13 cents per ton above scale rates, and

they condemn the miners of Indiana when we are justified in forcing the operators of this

state to pay scale rates.” 62 In short, the national officers had ordered Indiana miners not

only to work at a reduction, but to send financial aid to miners striking for wages nearly

twenty-five cents higher than what Indiana miners earned.63 Within days, Indiana miners

59Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” NLT, August 8, 1891. 60 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Scale for IN,” UMWJ, September 3, 1891. 61 UMW national officers did not announce that they did not order the Pennsylvania strike until after it was defeated. Patrick McBryde, letter to the editor, “Secretary McBryde,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 62 John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891. 63 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 report, UMWJ, November 12, 1891; “Ten Thousand Miners Quit Work,” NYT, October 2, 1891. 147

and officers planned a strike of their own. Their appeal reached the Executive Board just

as the Pennsylvania strike ended in defeat. Facing an exhausted national treasury,

National Secretary Patrick McBryde sent the infamous telegram that stunned the Indiana

miners. His orders for them to accept the reduced wage were countermanded by Indiana-

Kentucky District Secretary John Kennedy, who commanded all Indiana miners to

strike. 64

It was not in Kennedy’s character to disregard orders. Born around 1847 in

Scotland, Kennedy moved with his parents to Indiana and began mining at age nine.65

When he turned seventeen, he enlisted in the US Army, serving the final months of the

Civil War. After briefly returning to the mines at war’s end, he reenlisted and served for

another twelve years, learning how to read and write during his term. After working for

several years in the Texas coal mines, he returned to Indiana, settling in Terre Haute.

Upon his return, Kennedy began organizing under the Knights of Labor in the 1880s,

becoming Secretary-Treasurer of the Indiana District of NTA 135. When the Progressive

Union formed in 1888, Kennedy was among the handful of officers that left the Knights

to join the new order, where he later assumed the Secretary-Treasurer position for the

Indiana NPU.

Kennedy did not gain these positions through his personality. Unlike most

organizers known for their gregarious behavior and charisma, Kennedy was painfully

64 “Strike Among Miners,” Indianapolis [Indiana] News, November 5, 1891; Joe Dunkerly and T. F. Bolser on behalf of the Clinton, Indiana, miner delegation,“Commesky Exonerated,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Greatest Strike,” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District 11 report, UMWJ, November 12, 1891; Patrick McBryde, letter to the editor, “Response from McBryde,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891; “The Indiana Miners,” JKL, December 17, 1891. 65 "United States Census, 1900," Family Search (https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.1.1/M99X-1H3: accessed March 12, 2015), John H Kennedy, Harrison Township Terre Haute city Ward 7, Vigo, Indiana, United States; citing sheet 5A, family 124, NARA microfilm publication T623, FHL microfilm 1240409. 148

shy, detested public speaking, and often avoided large union meetings. Described as

“taciturn” and “morose,” the slight man rarely socialized, even during union conventions

where he knew the other more boisterous organizers well. Still, none could deny that

Kennedy was “amongst the most persistent [UMW] organizers that we have ever had.”

Rather than relying on oratory or grace, Kennedy organized locals by writing letters to

anyone interested in unionizing, opting to meet with interested parties only when

absolutely essential. Even then, Indiana organizer John Kane later wrote, “When a visit is

deemed necessary by him, he makes it, and many a time he has [arrived] and gone before

anybody knows it.”66

Despite this, both miners and union officials respected Kennedy. Forceful with a tireless work ethic and meticulous attention to detail, he applied his military discipline to unionizing. Kennedy faithfully reported district news and receipts of dues to the labor papers each week, far more frequently than any other UMW officer in the nation. His

efforts and dedication earned him the admiration of union miners throughout the state.

During a period when miners were constantly dissatisfied with union leaders, Kennedy

held the Indiana District Secretary-Treasurer position for over ten years.

No miner or UMW officer doubted Kennedy’s loyalty to the union. Yet, in

November 1891, Kennedy condemned the organization and its national officers and ordered the Indiana miners to strike. “We are sorry we have to act in opposition to the wishes of our national officers,” he wrote in his weekly report announcing the strike, “but we have been sidetracked so often that patience ceased to be a virtue.” Kennedy’s

66 “Biographies of the National Executive Board,” UMWJ, March 10, 1898. 149

carefully selected words resonated throughout the state, where miners committed to the

UMW’s principles believed that the officers no longer did the same.67

Often, the UMW’s ability to distribute strike aid confirmed these suspicions.

Although locals had limited aid during the Indiana strike, several mines earned the pay

increase. As directed by state officers, they forwarded their pay increases to the state

treasury to be sent to aid the remaining striking miners. However, because the remote

Indiana mines were so spread out, the miners’ aid took days to reach the state officers and

days longer to distribute the funds. In the meantime, striking miners wrote letters to the

United Mine Workers’ Journal complaining that they received no aid. Seven weeks into

the Indiana strike, for example, “Summit Miner” asked the Journal, “What has become of

those men that received the advance six weeks ago and were going to donate us 5 cents

per ton for all coal mined and day men in proportion. If we are defeated and have to

blackleg are we worse than they?”68

For the miners who had dutifully sent their pay advance forward to the officers, letters like Summit Miner’s came as a shock. By the time they read the letters, which took roughly a week to appear in the Journal columns and equally as long for print versions to reach the rural mines, their aid had long been sent. Consequently, although Kennedy accounted for the donations, it appeared the funds were entirely mismanaged.69 To the

67 J. H. Kennedy, Official Indiana District Eleven report, “Miners of Indiana.” UMWJ, November 12, 1891; For additional examples of miners feeling “sidetracked” see “C.C.” letter to the editor, “Words of Advice to Miners,” NLT, January 14, 1888; “M.F.,” letter to the editor, “Not a Kicker,” UMWJ, May 7, 1891; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891; “Justice,” letter to the editor, “Red Ash, Kentucky,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; “Farmers’ Alliance,” letter to the editor, “A Farmer’s Letter,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891; J.H. Kennedy, Official Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892. 68 “Summit Miner,” letter to the editor, “A Summit Miner,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891; P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “Penna’s Letter,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891. 69 Kennedy’s receipts appeared alongside Summit Miner’s request for aid and James H. Eskew’s letter from Ayrshire, Indiana, claiming the miners sent their aid that week. Miners in both striking mines and in those 150

strikers, it seemed that the miners who won the pay advance had abandoned them. To the

donating miners, it appeared as though the officers misplaced or stole the money.70 “If

this aid did not reach the men needing aid, what became of it?” miner wife Laurene

Gardner asked in response to a claim by UMW Vice President Phil Penna that her mining

town did not pay the aid they were required to send. “[W]e disclaim owing the striking

miners or anybody else anything more than the assistance due one brother from another.

In all my knowledge of Ayrshire we have never asked or received either assistance or

encouragement from anyone,” she argued. “Yet if our striking brothers need more help

we stand ready to give it.”71 Union miners, in her mind, were bound by the principles

they shared, not by officer commands.

Gardner’s statement indicated disconnect that ran through much of the labor

movement and nineteenth century society. On one hand, people like Gardner understood

and appreciated the need for centralized governing authorities over both union and

governmental affairs. Their national structure was essential in an age where businesses and people continually crossed state and national borders. For those affiliated with the

People’s Party, government regulation of railroads and coal mines was essential to establishing regulated rates that, they believed, would benefit both worker and consumer.

At the same time, this uniformity also cost residents and local unions the autonomy they enjoyed. It placed their money and futures in the hands of individuals that often lived

paying aid, however, did not see this Journal issue until nearly two weeks after it was published. J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “Kennedy’s Record,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891; James H. Eskew, letter to the editor, “Ayrshire Somewhat,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene,” UMWJ, January 7, 1892. 70 “Mike,” letter to the editor, “Mike Responds in a Few Neat Words,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891. 71 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “The Drink Habit,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891. Both Mike’s and Gardner’s responses were to Penna’s accusing letter, which stated the “men of Ayrshire owe to the miners on strike the amount per ton which you received in advance,” that appeared under the title “Penna’s Letter,” in the Journal’s December 17, 1891 issue. 151 hundreds of miles removed from the mines and fields. Centralized boards’ actions seemed especially distant for rural residents who often remained outside the reach of timely and reliable communication. In instances like the missing telegram in May 1891 or the delayed reports of aid the following fall, the communication gap had a detrimental impact on workers’ lives and their faith in governing structures. Even those who climbed through union ranks such as Kennedy earned their livings through clerical work and politics rather than sweat and muscle like those they represented.72 In many cases, they were likened to dishonest businessmen and corrupt politicians, consequently placing these leaders in a centralized structure that gave them increased control over union finances and affairs prompted miners to mistrust their leadership even more. In the heat of Indiana’s missing aid ordeal, Kennedy reported that he encountered miners who praised the UMW yet “in the same breath” claimed “that dishonesty has been practiced by the state officers in distributing the funds.”73

Surveying the damage of the 1891 strike cancellation and subsequent failed local strikes, Indiana-Kentucky District President Michael Commesky noted that miners throughout his district, as well as neighboring districts all viewed the UMW officers with contempt. “At this date I cannot say what effect the strike will have on the organization, but we hope for the best.” Despite his attempt at optimism, however, Commesky had his doubts. Instead of closing his letter with his characteristic call for organization or the frequently used “yours for the cause,” the union leader ended with “yours for the

72 Postel, Populist Vision, 142. 73 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “Kennedy’s Report,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891. 152

present,” hinting that the future of the organization or at least his future in it was

uncertain. 74

Kennedy’s dues receipts indicate that Commesky had cause for concern. The

union miners faithfully paid dues through the 1891 fall (Appendix Chart 2). In fact, by

November 1891, the same month the miners struck against UMW orders, Kennedy’s

receipts totaled $283.00, a larger amount than had ever been collected prior to the May

cancellation. The UMW’s condemnation of the Indiana strike, insulting the miners, and

the Indiana miners’ subsequent failure, however, proved detrimental to the Indiana

UMW. The number of locals paying dues fell drastically so that most of the $85 in dues

Kennedy reported in early 1892 came from five locals.75

The decline, however, was not limited to Indiana. Hostilities and misgivings the

Indiana miners expressed toward the UMW structure in the labor newspaper pages met

miners’ unease throughout the country. 76 Throughout the nation, miners and organizers

claimed their experiences with UMW leadership decisions were similar to those of the

Indiana miners. 77 The Bloomington, Illinois, Daily Pantagraph reported that faith in the

UMW was so low that only fifteen members attended the Illinois District’s 1892 convention, and that most of the northern Illinois mines had “withdrawn from the

74 M. Commesky to the editor, “Strike Ended,” UMWJ, December 31, 1891. 75 For example, Local Assembly 430 of Washington, Indiana, for example, regularly gave fifteen dollars each month before May 1 and after an initial break in dues contributions due to their summer strike, gave twenty dollars a month until November1891. That month, Local 430 sent in no dues. By early 1892, the assembly only paid twenty dollars every two months before stopping their dues entirely in the summer of 1892. 76 P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “A Review,” UMWJ, January 14, 1892 77 “Farmers’ Alliance,” letter to the editor, “A Farmer’s Letter,” UMWJ, December 17, 1891; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “A Frank Letter,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891; M. J. Goings, letter to the editor, “From Illinois,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; “Faithful,” letter to the editor, “Gardner, Illinois,” UMWJ, December 10, 1891. 153

union.”78 “Napoleon” of Iowa observed that if Ohio and Indiana, the “great union states”

of the nation, could not function, there was little hope for other regions to avoid such

“tomfoolery.”79 The Indiana miners’ winter strike became symptomatic of larger

problems and misgivings already spreading throughout the UMW rank and file regardless

of region.

The officers’ perceived inability to look after the miners’ interest informed many

mining families’ decisions to reject the UMW or refuse to pay their dues. Even the most

dedicated unionists charged that the officers failed in this respect. Although Laurene

Gardner professed she was a faithful UMW supporter, she was among the first to take up

her pen and question the officers’ decisions. She had “faith in at least their good

intentions,” she wrote, “but we know how disastrously they turn out sometimes.”80 For

her hometown of Ayrshire, the turnout was especially disastrous. In the wake of the fall

1891 defeat, mines like Ayrshire that won the pay advance were forced to either resume

work at the reduced wages or risk the mine shutting down entirely. Ayrshire shut down.81

Partially locked out and partially on strike against a reduction even lower than what they

had originally fought, the Ayrshire miners who had donated all of their pay to the striking

miners just weeks earlier looked to the UMW for aid. Their strike, however, was not

78 “The Audience Was Absent,” The [Bloomington, Illinois] Daily Pantagraph, January 13, 1892. The UMW officers never documented the number in attendance at the convention, but during the convention the Journal acknowledged that Illinois membership was “in anything but a gratifying condition.” Editorial, “The annual convention,” UMWJ, January 14, 1892; Official Report of the UWM Illinois District Twelve State Convention, “Official Report,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892. 79 “Napoleon,” letter to the editor, “Napoleon,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892. 80 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene,” UMWJ, January 7, 1892. 81 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, UMWJ, December 31, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Welcome Laurene,” UMWJ, January 28, 1892. 154

sanctioned by the National Executive Board and therefore was not entitled to a share of

the UMW strike fund. 82

Furious with the UMW officers for demanding Ayrshire pay to the union in return

for nothing, Laurene Gardner chastised the UMW’s leadership and practices. “I offer no apology for any suggestions or remarks I may make in these lines,” the miner’s wife began. With that, she demanded an account of the National Executive Board and Indiana state board’s spending. “Commencing with Ayrshire, how much money has been paid into the treasury and what has become of it? I mean since the United Mine Workers was organized here,” she demanded. To Gardner and many others, it seemed “that part of the business is but poorly managed.” The UMW’s rejection of the miners’ need and the inability of miners elsewhere to send adequate aid made this abundantly clear. National officers simply were not capable of handling the miners’ funds responsibly. As a result,

Gardner joined the chorus of miners throughout the southern Midwest who adamantly opposed the “national defense fund.” UMW locals should control their own funds, she argued, “instead of sending it out like bread upon the water without even the assurance that it will return again after many days.”83

Gardner’s assertions were repeated in mining regions throughout the state in the weeks following the strike. Indiana miner John A. Templeton reported that the once solid

82 The UMW National Executive Board did not approve the strike until the last week of March. J. H. Kennedy, UMW, Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official report, “District 11,” UMWJ, March 31, 1892; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, April 7, 1892. 83 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene,” UMWJ, January 7, 1892; “Cambrian, letter to the editor, “President McBride at Dugger,” NLT, August 3, 1889; Sinthy Snodgrass, letter to the editor, “Our Colored Sister,” UMWJ, July 2, 1891.Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “In the Block Coal Region,” UMWJ, August 8, 1891; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 13, 1891; P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “Little Phil’s Trip,” UMWJ, August 20, 1891; “Napoleon,” letter to the editor, “Napoleon,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892; “Mike,” letter to the editor, “We’ll Be There,” UMWJ, February 4, 1892; “Argus,” letter to the editor, “A Plea Made,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892; John E. Griffiths, letter to the editor, “Good for Dugger,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892. 155 unions in his region had fractured over the officers’ actions in the late 1891 strike. Like

Gardner, however, they were reluctant to turn their backs on unionism. The winter strike failure had “given the organization a blow from which it will not get over for some time,”

Templeton acknowledged, but miners were more ambivalent about union structures than opposed to them. According to Templeton, “the men are badly split up at Dugger

[Indiana], some of them wanting to hold on to the U. M. W. of A. and another lot wanting a local organization and some want no organization at all.”84

Within weeks, Dugger miners’ membership in the “home organization” known by locals as the “Nickel Knights” grew. According to miner “Dogtown,” the Nickel Knights

originally formed as the Independent Order of Home Mine Laborers in Washington,

Indiana, where miners were upset with the high dues paid to state and national officers

without receiving any benefit.85 Their nickname, he claimed, came from the five cents the members paid in dues each meeting night, which were kept at home for expenses and local cases of sickness or strike. 86 The miners in the home organization did not seek to organize other locals under their name, but mines like Dugger applied the structure to

84 John A. Templeton, letter to the editor, “Linton Locality,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892. 85 It is unclear when the order actually formed. Phil Penna’s May 1891 report mentions the “Nickle Knights” as already established in the Dugger area. However, the Independent Order of Home Mine Laborers did not file its Articles of Association with Indiana until February 4, 1892. More importantly local miners did not see the organization as a threat to UMW membership until early 1892. P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton,” UMWJ, May 28, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Pensive Laurene,” UMWJ, February 18, 1892; “Dogtown,” letter to the editor, “Dogtown, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 10, 1892; “Friend,” letter to the editor, “A Defense,” UMWJ, March 9, 1893; “Articles of Association” in Annual Reports of the Officers of State of the State of Indiana, (Indianapolis: Wm. B. Burford, Contractor for State Printing and Binding, 1893), p. 97. 86 It is likely that sickness also encouraged Washington and Dugger miners to establish their “home organizations.” Both regions suffered from a ravaging outbreak of “la grippe,” devastating families and often leaving them without sustainable income. Based on miners’ letters, the UMW was unprepared to support all ailing miners’ families. Consequently, many of the arguments pertaining to the home organization centered on the miners wanting to keep their “sick fund” locally. John A. Templeton, letter to the editor, “Linton Locality,” UMWJ, January 21, 1892; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Letter,” UMWJ, February 11, 1892. 156

their own mines so that “any organization outside the United Mine Workers has been

termed nickel knights.”87

Dugger UMW leader John E. Griffiths claimed he knew nothing of the order, but

admitted that many local miners were dissatisfied with the UMW ever since the strike.88

Ironically, the locals had sided with the national officers in opposing the strike, arguing

that the state officers’ strike order “was premature and ignore[ed] the fundamental

principles of our organization.” With their argument dismissed at the state convention,

Dugger miners honored the state officers’ strike call. Within weeks, however, “a number

of men got dissatisfied with the amount of aid received from defense fund and openly

declared they would pay nothing into the organization… and that feeling grew during the

strike until it looked as if organization was a thing of the past.” Dugger miners “got luke

warm” and pulled away from the UMW, unwilling to be part of a body whose parts did

not cooperate. 89

UMW miners viewed the Nickel Knights with contempt. Phil Penna described

them as “Nauseating Knaves.” They were not men, he insisted, but “specimens of which

we have everywhere,” who had no sense to stay in the union and or uphold its

principles. 90 The Nickel Knights were “Judases who have sold their manhood” to the

87 “Dogtown,” letter to the editor, “Dogtown, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 10, 1892. 88 Dugger and most of the surrounding mines were operated by local companies but owned by the Pennsylvania Company. “Agreement, Pennsylvania Company, Operating Indianapolis and Vincennes Railroad, and Dugger and Neal Coal Company,” in S. H. Church, Corporate History of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh…., Series B, Vol II (Baltimore: The Friednwald Company, 1900), p. 690-91 89 John E. Griffiths, letter to the editor, “Good for Dugger,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892; T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Indiana Items,” NLT, February 20, 1892. UMW Vice President Phil Penna encountered similar sentiments in northern Illinois, claiming that Oglesby miners in particular “had about decided that national union is no good and opinion divided as to whether their interests could be best promoted by being a part of the state organization or keeping aloof from all.” P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “Little Phil’s Trip,” UMWJ, August 20, 1891. 90 P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton,” UMWJ, May 28, 1891. 157

company, T. J. Llewelyn argued.91 According to miner wife Sinthy Snodgrass and many others, most were “pumpkin rollers,” or farmers who mined for supplemental incomes and cared little about the trouble they caused.92 John Kennedy agreed, stressing that he

hoped the Nickel Knights would “abandon their evil ways and return to their proper place

in the United Mine Worker’s [sic] of America.”93 Nickel Knights, they believed, were the

backsliders at the heart of the UMW’s impotency.

But not all held the UMW in such high regard. Laurene Gardner first encountered

the Nickel Knights when her family was forced to abandon their home in Ayrshire and

search for work in the mines surrounding Dugger and Linton. Her experiences during the

Ayrshire strike, like those who joined the Nickel Knights, caused her to question the

UMW leaders’ abilities. Although Gardner remained committed to the UMW and

vehemently criticized the Nickel Knights, she did not defend the UMW’s actions of the

past year. She did not claim those who joined the local organization were backsliders

who abandoned their beliefs or dismiss the Nickel Knights’ grievances against the UMW

as unjust. Instead, she criticized their methods. “It is a poor way to correct any evil in the

organization to pull out,” she wrote. In condemning the Nickel Knights this way, Gardner

indicated that the true evil was not the rebellious miners, but the organization itself. The

Nickel Knights’ fault, in Gardner’s eyes, then, rested not with any kind of abandonment

91 T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892. 92 Sinthy Snodgrass, letter to the editor, “Sinthy Snodgrass,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892. For additional examples, see T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “District 11” UMWJ, June 30, 1892. It is unlikely, however, that the miners were farmers. Since most farmers returned to the farms in March and union membership continued to grow in the summer months, these allegations were likely an insult attacking the Nickle Knight miners’ skill in mining and value to the company rather than an accurate description of their occupations. 93 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892. 158

of principles, but with their unwillingness to run the perceived evil out of the miners’

national organization. 94

Such assertions that evil lurked within the UMW resonated throughout the

southern Midwest. Indiana block miner and mine operator “Old Timer,” claimed that the

block miners backslid from their principles not when they decided to leave the UMW, but

when they first decided to join it. Their decision to reject the UMW and form their own

local, then, was a return to the principles they once abandoned. “[W]e wandered off to

follow strange gods; were led into the wilderness and there left to perish; but thank God,

we are coming to our senses again and I expect soon to see our craft in this district

organized into a solid block coal union,” he declared.95

Miners like Old Timer defended their rights and principles by leaving the UMW

rather than joining it. Thousands of miners like Old Timer and the Nickel Knights

believed that local unions had a better chance of favorable work terms than the union that

struggled to control the national market. “Home organizations” like the Nickel Knights

settled all disputes with the companies directly rather than waiting for UMW officials to

mitigate differences. This proved beneficial for several reasons. First, it allowed workers

to settle disputes and return to work quickly. In addition, operators, seeking to keep a

94 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Pensive Laurene,” UMWJ, February 18, 1892. 95 The pseudonym “Old Timer” belonged to Edward Wilton, an experienced miner who was heavily involved in organizing Pennsylvania in the 1880s before moving to the Indiana block region. He purchased stock in a local mine and eventually became superintendent. Regardless of his position as partial owner, he remained staunchly in favor of organizing all his life, though critical of the UMW. While it is possible that his position as operator influenced his preference for local unions over national, his experiences as an organizer navigating the original “inter-state” scale agreements in the 1880s likely did more to convince him that no union would work until thoroughly organized. “Old Timer,” letter to the editor, “From the Block Coal District,” NLT, June 22, 1893 (quote); IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, January 1, 1887; “Old Timer No. 2,” letter to the editor, “Old Timer,” NLT, April 26, 1894. 159

national union out of their mines, often granted local organization miners’ requests more

than those of the UMW miners.96

These factors, combined with the miners’ growing frustration and mistrust of

UMW leaders, caused state and local organizations that rivaled the UMW to spring up

across the nation. Northern Illinois organizer Will Hall described a mass meeting in

Streator where miners resolved that a national union was not reliable. With that, they

decided “to form a local union, attached to nothing or nobody….”97 Pennsylvania miner

M. J. O’Neil claimed that miners in his district also no longer trusted the UMW. “I am not in any organization at present, neither are the miners of this run,” he confessed, adding that the miners, “one and all have become disgusted even at the word organization.”98 Within months, miners in O’Neil’s district planned to establish a new

regional union comprised of the mines along the Monongahela, Ohio, and Kanawha

rivers.99 UMW miners in Ohio debated seceding from the UMW, leading the movement

to return to state-based organizations.100 These sentiments reached to the southern

Midwest where Iowa miners did form a new state organization that fall.101 Within

months, Missouri and Kansas union miners considered organizing two “national” unions,

one representing the mines east of the Mississippi River and the other with jurisdiction

96“Economy,” letter to the editor, “Very Regrettable,” UMWJ, February 25, 1892; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Letter,” UMWJ, March 10, 1892; “Dogtown,” letter to the editor, “Dogtown, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 10, 1892. 97 Will Hall, letter to the editor, “Streator, Ill.,” UMWJ, April 7, 1892; M. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “Unimpeachable,” UMWJ, January 5, 1893. 98 M. J. O’Neil, letter to the editor, “Letter from Banksville,” NLT, March 19, 1892. 99 “Mind Your Own Business,” letter to the editor, “From the Monongahela River,” NLT, June 15, 1893; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “On Miners’ Organization,” NLT, July 27, 1893; “Albion,” letter to the editor, “Old Time Reminiscences,” NLT, August 3, 1893; John A. Cairns, letter to the editor, “Letter from Secretary Cairns,” NLT, August 10, 1893. 100 P. McBryde, “A Suggestion,” UMWJ, July 6, 1893; Dan Lennon, letter to the editor, “What Form of Organization is Best,” UMWJ, July 13, 1893; M. Commesky, letter to the editor, “Commesky’s Comments,” UMWJ, July 20, 1893;“Tramp,” letter to the editor, “Tramp’s Ideas,” UMWJ, July 27, 1893. 101 Editorial, “A delegate meeting…,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893. 160

over the west.102 Although they had pushed for a unified national order for years, by

1893, its structure and scope no longer seemed ideal.

Far from being committed to the national and centralized structure, miners looked

at the UMW’s shortcomings and suspected that, somehow, miners’ organization had gone

astray. “[I]t is the most trying time I have seen in my life,” western Kentucky miner

“Blackbird” confessed. Most of the miners in his district had abandoned the UMW while

those that remained had no money in the union’s treasury and made little effort to

connect to the national officers. Operators took advantage of the union’s weakness and

abolished all mine rules that kept miners safe.103 Blackbird, who had always tried to labor

honestly, was exasperated. “I have done and am doing my best to lead a christian life and

to stand by our organization and lead others to it, but they will not.” The miners

recognized they needed to restore their union, but refused to revive their UMW locals,

much to Blackbird’s dismay. Instead, they organized on their own. “It troubles me to see

men go astray like this,” Blackbird continued. In his mind, neither UMW miners nor their

officers had remained faithful to the UMW. “I sometimes feel like exclaiming my God!

where are we drifting to?”104

Blackbird’s question was an old one that touched the heart of many Americans’ deepest concerns. From the time the nation began to industrialize, many citizens

expressed anxieties over the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few and

102 “Tramp,” letter to the editor, “Tramp’s Ideas,” UMWJ, July 27, 1893. 103 “Rules” pertained to mining practices designed to keep the mines safe. A specific time for “shooting” coal, for example, helped reduce explosions. “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Very Mean,” UMWJ, August 3, 1893. 104 “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Very Mean,” UMWJ, August 3, 1893 (quote); “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Notes from Western Kentucky,” UMWJ, June 8, 1893. 161

the greed, corruption, and moral decay that seemed to follow in its wake.105 “Whither are

we drifting?” became as much a warning as it was a question, in reaction to the rapid

changes in economics, society and culture. In 1882, Freeman Otis Willey took up the

concerns of Midwestern producers, asking “whither are we drifting as a nation,” the

Michigan lecturer offered a close analysis of the currency system. The current system, he

claimed, only intensified the wealth gap. He closed his examination remarking that “if the

present monetary system is allowed to continue, the child is born who will live to see the

masses of the American people bankrupt and the principal wealth of the nation in the

hands of ten per cent of its population.”106 Ten years later, miner wife Margery Jones

echoed Willey’s claims. Pointing out workers’ patriotism in a country that favored

wealthy classes over poor, she urged readers to “inquire a little more into the question,

‘Whither are we drifting, as a nation,’ and not only as a nation, but as a world….” How

could other nations emulate the United States “if in a land like this, blessed as it is with a

keen, discreet and enterprising population, the perversity, avarice greed and selfishness of

man is to succeed in subverting liberty and independence except to those who by the

most diabolical schemes have possessed themselves of nations wealth and opportunities,”

she asked.107

105For additional examples see “An Anson Whig,” letter to the editor, Weekly Standard [Raleigh, North Carolina], August 1, 1855; “Where Are We Drifting?” Glasgow [Missouri] Weekly Times, August 3, 1854; William F. Packer, Inaugural Address, reprinted in “Political,” Democrat and Sentinel [Ebensburg, Pennsylvania], January 27, 1858; F. P. Blair, Jr. Speech to Republican ratification meeting St. Louis, Missouri May 22, 1860, reprinted in “Political,” NYT, May 26, 1860. 106 Freeman Otis Willey, Whither are We Drifting as a Nation, (St. Louis: Geo. C. Hackstaff, 1882), p.541. 107 Dan McLaughlin made a similar claim, asserting that corruption was growing worse. Beginning with legislation that failed due to an unsympathetic state legislature, he told stories of unfair treatment and poverty that workers endured. He ended with a discussion of the 1889 northern Illinois strike where even the unions did not stand united. To McLaughlin, this was proof that the nation’s drifting toward selfish interests had reached into the labor movement, corrupting leadership and dividing workers. Margery Jones, letter to the editor, “Margery’s Letter,” UMWJ, July 16, 1891; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Where Are We Drifting To?” NLT, June 8, 1889. 162

Such fears of going astray indicated the concerns and discord that ran through

nearly all reform movements of the period.108 As the UMW attempted to recover from its

1891 failure, NTA 135 delegates to the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor

were shocked to hear General Master Workman Terence Powderly condemn the mine

workers’ union. The UMW had drifted away from the Knights’ driving principles,

Powderly insisted. According to him, the UMW favored the AFL at the expense of the

Knights, that the miners had stopped paying dues to the Knights, and that their

willingness to set a wage scale rather than abolish the wage system contradicted the

ideals the Knights professed. With that, Powderly ordered an investigation into the UMW

with the added suggestion that NTA 135 withdraw from the UMW and restore the

miners’ union to its original goals.109

Such expressions of division and corruption indicated that a common vision was not enough to create a united movement in labor organizing or beyond. Just as union miners divided over whether local, state, or national unions could best protect their interests, so Populist proponents split over whether a third party was the best way to initiate their desired changes. Like thousands of the nation’s miners and the new union,

108 For an additional discussion over organizing failures and the direction of the labor movement see “Report of Committee on Eight Hours,” Eleventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1891, Report of Proceedings, 46. 109 An extensive examination in the following year uncovered that most of the charges, propagated by Knights Secretary-Treasurer John Hayes, were unfounded and part of an attempt to increase Knights numbers and authority by dismantling the UMW, making the Knights the premiere miners’ organization. Terence Powderly, “Report of the General Master Workman,” Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1892, p. 8; “K. of L. Propositions,” Twelfth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1892, Report of Proceedings, 17; John McBride to Terence Powderly, January 11, 1893, reprinted in UMWJ, April 13, 1893; Terence Powderly to John McBride, February 9, 1893, reprinted in UMWJ, April 13, 1893; John McBride, Official Address to the 1893 National Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “McBride’s Address,” UMWJ, April 13, 1894;William B. Wilson, Address to the New Orleans General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1894. See also, Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, 159-160. 163

they remained outside the organization even as they sympathized with its stance.110

President and Master Workman John Rae described this in his final convention report.

Noting the numerous local strikes called against national leaders’ orders and the dozens of anti-UMW locals, he asserted, “it is plain that while our miners cry for national organization, they continue to practice local methods.” For Rae, who tried to uphold the union’s national scope while appeasing local interests, this duality cost him supporters on both sides of the UMW divide.

Just as local miners criticized Rae for not fully supporting them, miners who supported a strong centralized union condemned Rae for tolerating miners who disregarded national union orders. The 1892 UMW convention sided with national leaders’ in their decisions to not support the winter strikes in Pittsburgh and Indiana and insisted “stricter methods must be adopted” in enforcing national authority over the mining districts. 111 Rae’s unwillingness to be forceful, Tim O’Malley and others

believed, created “the criminal blunders of last year.” Rae may have tried his best to keep

the peace in the UMW, but “in their hearts [the miners] despise him, and admire the man

who has convictions and the courage to express them, even if it does not suit them at the

time.”112 Recognizing Rae’s difficult position, Illinois leader William Scaife expressed

sympathy for the leader that, he noted, simply could not act without the full support of a

unified rank and file body. “These have been troublesome times,” he wrote as he

surveyed the events of the past year, “and it has been another case of damn you if you do

110 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 245-249. 111 “United Mine Workers,” NLT, February 20, 1892. 112 T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “The Miners’ Unions of America,” English Labor Tribune, reprinted in NLT, April 2, 1892. 164 and damn you if you don’t. With Brother Rae, no matter what he done, he was certain to be damned.”113

As Rae’s predicament demonstrated, defending rights, even for unions, proved a difficult task. Establishing a centralized national organization that looked after specific regional concerns demanded more manpower and better communication than the young

UMW could provide. It involved bringing together disparate groups across a vast region, and in most cases, it demanded sacrificing the needs of some for the good of the whole.

For miners who looked to the UMW for salvation from workplace ills, Rae’s damnation did not come from the strike cancellation, but from his overstatement of union strength and his inability to tend to all miners’ concerns. These actions, combined with those of the other officers, tainted miners’ trust for the entire order.

Far from a solidified force, union miners’ criticisms against leaders over strike funds and union dues were part of a rank and file battle with officers and each other over how the UMW would look after miner interests. For others, this task required forming new unions while still others believed that the surest way a miner could look after his interests was to stay out of unions entirely until one was strong enough to uphold its principles. Although officers dismissed these varying views as an abandonment of union principles, mining families disagreed. Their dedication to unionism never waned, but they believed UMW officers’ devotion had.

113 William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Letter from Scaife,” UMWJ, January 7, 1892. 165

Chapter Five

Outsiders: Race and the Exclusive Politics of an Inclusive Union, 1892-1894

Less than fifty miles of rugged countryside separated miner “Willing Hands” and

Laurene Gardner’s Indiana coal towns. In many respects, their backgrounds were very similar. Both were deeply connected to the coal industry, originally from the Upper South and moved north for better mining jobs. Gardner and Willing Hands were both ardent

Populists and, although neither quite fit with the UMW, they were two of the union’s strongest advocates during a period of widespread rank and file discontent with UMW

action and policy.

But in 1892, when both participated in a debate featured in the United Mine

Workers’ Journal, two very important differences drove a wedge between their otherwise

common ground. One was a coal miner by trade, one was not. One claimed to be an

accepted part of the UMW, one did not. The alignment of these sentiments, however, did

not follow the clean division one would expect. Instead, they reflected how lines in late

nineteenth century unionism contorted in ways that simultaneously included and

excluded the same individual in a host of ways. Gardner, a white woman, was neither a

coal miner nor union member, but she and her “fellow craftsmen” considered her a part

of the UMW. Willing Hands, a black union miner, wrote repeatedly that he was not a part

of the UMW’s main body.

Coming of age in the Southern coal mines, Willing Hands believed that race and

class issues were deeply entwined. Fears of corporate and political corruption, increasing

wealth gaps, and poverty were interwoven with lynching, convict labor, and Jim Crow.

166

He watched in horror as racial hostilities intensified throughout the nation, including the

coal mines. Like thousands of producers, Willing Hands insisted that slavery still existed,

but the enslavement he witnessed involved more than poor treatment and low wages. It

involved literal chains, forced labor, segregation in mines and coal cars all fortified by the growing power of “the lynching club of the South.”1 Consequently, when miners began

discussing the best course for the UMW’s reviving its dwindling membership, Willing

Hands vehemently argued that the UMW had neglected black miners when it needed to

defend them. “You can never get your union strong as long as you ignore the Afro-

American as a coal producer against you,” he challenged.2 Arguing that the UMW only

stood to gain by speaking out against convict labor and other Jim Crow-related systems

practiced in and around the mines, Willing Hands expected the UMW to be an

organization that would fight for racial equality in addition to economic. When it fell

short, he and thousands of black miners like him, asserted that the UMW offered them little more than membership.

But not all agreed with his forceful stance. “I notice our friend ‘Willing Hands’ seems much troubled about the interests of his race,” Gardner noted in her weekly letter to the Journal.3 A white miner’s wife born on the Illinois-Kentucky boarder in 1850,

Gardner believed that the economic inequality all miners faced should be the UMW’s

main focus, not questions of racism. Her effort to promote unity over racial equality

echoed white conversations taking place throughout the nation. As citizens voiced

concern over the nation’s fragility and expressed fears of another civil war, miners,

wives, and officers expressed similar alarm with the UMW. In 1892, no national miners’

1 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 2, 1892. 2 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 24, 1892. 3 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Island City, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 5, 1892. 167

union had existed effectively for longer than five years. Each one proved a failure due to

internal divisions that made the union too weak to withstand the pressure brought by a

competitive market and employers hostile to unionism. Gardner, like many white men in

the mines, was determined to make sure that the fragile unity formed by the young UMW

held. “[N]o side issue, race, creed, sectionalism or anything else should divert attention

from the common doom of slavery that is hanging over us all,” she later declared.4 If the

miners could pull together and secure better conditions, justice and equality for black

miners would follow, she and other whites believed, but the key was to stand united on

their common ground. Consequently, much like the Northern and Southern reconciliation

that came at the expense of African Americans, the UMW, in a similar quest for unity,

eclipsed these questions as well.5 “We have seen the results of divided action in the last

year’s record of troubles,” she wrote. “Not until the order will move as one harmonious

whole will victory crown our efforts.”6

The discussion involving a black miner and a white miner’s wife in the pages of

the United Mine Workers’ Journal highlighted several crucial aspects of the UMW’s

function in the late nineteenth century. Neither looked like the typical white male coal miner, yet miners and officers alike encouraged Willing Hands and Gardner to write their

4 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene,” UMWJ, August 16, 1894. 5 For the standard narrative of reconciliation after the Civil War, see David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001). For similar examinations of this narrative through particular social movements like labor and religion, see Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865- 1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) and Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana, 2005); Nina Silber, The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Cecilia Elizabeth O’Leary, To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 6 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, ‘Pensive Laurene,” UMWJ, February 18, 1892. 168

opinions to the Journal.7 During a period when black voices were systematically, legally,

and violently silenced and when women had limited voice in the public arena, Willing

Hands and Gardner were welcome to participate in a white male-dominated forum of a

white male-dominated organization.

This kind of partial inclusion is seldom reflected in the scholarship of Gilded Age organizing or society. Scholars studying the period have carefully observed the politics of ethnicity inherent within unions, political organizations, and greater society. They have described how unions and political parties included and excluded groups of workers or potential constituents based on immediate need. In particular, they have shown that skill- based hierarchies in workplaces often corresponded with ethnic and gender backgrounds that gave preference to English-speaking white men. In most cases, it resulted in outright exclusion of black and immigrant workers not only from skilled positions, but also from unions that, by the 1890s, focused on recruiting skilled laborers into their ranks.8

But Willing Hands and Gardner do not fit within these patterns of exclusion any

better than they fit within the union they defended. Like thousands of other rural

producers in the Gilded Age, they sat on the fringes of the order and society at large,

neither fully included nor excluded. Social structures functioned differently in rural

regions where working class women and men often worked and socialized together,

creating organizations more receptive to women than those in urban settings. Similarly,

unlike skilled jobs where employers created stratified hierarchies, the drive to lower costs

7 J. H. Kennedy, Indiana UMW District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, January 19, 1893; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Linton News,” UMWJ, November 17, 1892; “Argus,” letter to the editor, “A Plea Made,” UMWJ, March 3, 1892. 8 Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development; Kazin, Barons of Labor; Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle; Lankton, Cradle to Grave; Letwin, Challenge of Interracial Unionism; Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists; Gerteis, Class and the Color Line; Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth; Goldststene, The Struggle for America’s Promise, 49, 203-4. 169 of coal production made it more advantageous to force all miners regardless of color, language, or experience to compete against each other for jobs. Any miner, regardless of ethnicity, who accepted a pay reduction automatically forced all other miners in his mine to accept the same. Consequently, any union that wished to regulate wage rates needed to include all miners without regard to ethnicity as well. Whereas other industries and unions could exclude unwanted minorities based on skill, organized workers in semi- skilled industries often sought to include minorities rather than push them away.

Yet, as in the case of Willing Hands and Gardner, inclusion often only reached so far. When literal skill met the politics of late-nineteenth century society, they became both a part of and apart from the whole. Laurene Gardner had never mined coal in her life and therefore was banned from full membership and attending union meetings, which were limited to members. She lacked experience in mining, but her skill in raising a family on a miner’s meager wages and raising children to follow the union were commendable qualities to a union facing a dwindling budget and a wayward rank and file.9 Although it did not formally include her, she included herself in the UMW when she spoke of the miners and the union officers, using phrases such as “we need” and “our officers.” More importantly, no one challenged Gardner’s claim. While they at times took issue with her opinions on union policy and politics, they argued with her views rather than dismissed them even as they forbade her from entering the meeting hall.

While Gardner’s inclusive wording indicated that she was of the UMW even if she was not in it, the language Willing Hands used demonstrated that although he was in the order, he was not of it. In 1892, he was a member of the Knights of Labor and UMW yet in his letters, which were often directed toward white UMW miners, referred to the

9 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, October 22, 1891. 170

UMW as “your union” and used the word “you” to describe the miners. His use of “we” never referred to a collective body of miners or organized producers as Gardner used the word. Rather, “we” described black miners whose interests and experiences, Willing

Hands believed, differed from those shared by white miners and their wives. The UMW may have accepted any creed or color, but Willing Hands remained ostracized from the miners’ organization. He was a member and heavily involved with the UMW, but, in his mind, the UMW was a white union.

In many respects, Willing Hands’s assessment was correct. White English- speaking union “miners,” including wives like Gardner, included many ethnicities in their ranks and expected them to be faithful to the order and its principles. But they stopped short of welcoming these minorities in their workplaces or addressing their grievances, despite leaders’ efforts to promote racial harmony. Although the UMW put forward ethnically inclusive platforms, the labor legislation it actively pursued often favored white English-speaking miners’ interests over others. Their decisions to support or reject proposed labor legislation such as laws pertaining to convict labor, competency tests for mining or mine inspecting, or ending the use of screens to filter the coal often placed the rank and file at odds with union leaders who could not understand why miners would oppose any legislation that would promote equal and fair treatment in the mines.

Desperate to protect their jobs, lives, and wages from those they perceived as particularly immoral, careless, and unskilled, experienced white English-speaking miners moved to regulate who could enter the mines. Despite their claims of wanting to protect the mining craft and their lives, the UMW’s efforts ran along ethnic lines rather than those of skill,

171

tearing through the organization’s already riddled ranks and pushing away its minority

members.

Separated

Women like Gardner had a hard time understanding why miners like Willing

Hands insisted on pushing for racial equality when the union so desperately needed unity

within its ranks. 10 Because it accepted all miners, white English speaking miners

believed the union treated all colors and nationalities equally. To them, black miners like

Willing Hands who complained about race were no better than the miners who grumbled

that the union did nothing for them. “There are some slobs in it who have only sense

enough to be always howling about all cost and no profit, who if the mote could only fall

from their eyes would realize the benefits to be derived from organization,” wife Mary

Jane Beanblossom wrote. During a period when dissatisfied miners abandoned the UMW

in droves, the remaining union miners and wives grew more determined that personal

interests, including those of race, be secondary to the union’s survival, which, they

believed, was crucial to bringing the changes that all miners needed.11

Black miners and wives, however, disagreed. Although black and non-English speaking miners shared the same problems as all miners regarding wages and working conditions, many faced these problems on a level worse than white miners experienced in addition to other problems that the UMW often failed to acknowledge or address. Phrases white miners commonly used like “white slavery” or urging the union to defend the rights

10 “A Constant Reader,” letter to the editor, “A Woman’s Reply,” NLT, April 5, 1884; Rachel G. Foster, “Woman’s Column,” NLT, December 24, 1887; Margery Jones, letter to the editor, “Margery’s Letter,” UMWJ, July 16, 1891; Girsy McNab, letter to the editor, “Some Good Advice,” UMWJ, July 16, 1891 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Pensive Laurene,” UMWJ, February 18, 1892. 11 Mary Jane Beanblossom, letter to the editor, “From Ashboro,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Island City, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 5, 1892; M. Commesky, letter to the editor, “Mission Over,” UMWJ, June 30, 1892. 172

that belonged to them “as free white men,” made it clear to African American members

that UMW priorities favored white concerns over black.12 In other instances, as white

Indiana miner “Freedom” proudly wrote that he was “not ashamed our institutions,” and

applauded a local vigilante association known as the White Caps that “serves to keep the

niggers in of nights….”13 Such a statement indicated that while white miners joined a

union that was inclusive to black workers, those who populated its local unions and

assemblies seldom practiced this inclusion on a daily basis.

These practices were continued in the workplace. Many operators took advantage of already present racist and nativist sentiment in the mines and used black or non-

English speaking workers as a means to lower wages, often refusing to hire them unless

they worked under scale or as strikebreakers. In addition to the desperation that came from often being the last hired and first fired, these groups also found it more difficult to

confront their bosses regarding wages and working conditions. They not only faced the

unequal relationship between mine owner and employee that tended to dehumanize all

workers, but also confronted language barriers and social expectations that made

challenging one’s white employer especially difficult and dangerous. French miners at

Frontenac, Kansas, found it difficult to communicate problems with working conditions

to their employer and often resolved to simply continue working in the poor conditions.14

12 “One of the Men,” letter to the editor, “Trouble at Cedar Mines,” NLT, June 15, 1889 (“free white men”); For discussions of “white slavery” used in place of the more common phrase “wage slavery” see “Justice vs. Right,” letter to the editor, “White Slavery in Kentucky,” NLT, June 28, 1884; “G. P., W. F. 8889,” letter to the editor, “White Slavery,” NLT, February 25, 1888; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “White Slavery,” JUL, June 23, 1888; Merlinda Sisins, letter to the editor, “Let Us Rejoice,” JKL, January 2, 1890; George R. Sims, “Shop Early,” JKL, August 20, 1891; “Practical Christianity,” reprinted from the [Des Moines, IA] Farmers’ Tribune, NLT, January 9, 1892; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “In Kansas,” UMWJ, March 24, 1892; Official Manifesto of the Delegates at Joliet to the Friends of Organized Labor, “Manifesto,” NLT, September 14, 1889. 13 “Freedom,” letter to the editor, “Is Immigration Hurtful to the Country,” UMWJ, December 29, 1892. 14 Charles Fisher Testimony, Siplet v. Cherokee and Pittsburg Coal Company. 173

Polish miners in northern Illinois worked for such low wages that when the company store burned down, their wives climbed into the smoldering timbers to salvage the charred food.15 A black miner who confronted his white employer over hazardous work conditions, unfair weights, or lost cars not only upset the workplace hierarchy but also challenged contemporary racial norms. Kentucky miner W. J. Smith reported that few men dared dispute their working conditions in their Madisonville mine. “The men lost cars all the time and one colored man claiming a car talked plain about it and the weighmaster shot him.”16

Events such as this made it clear to African American miners throughout the late nineteenth century that they had no real option other than accepting the terms presented.

Black miners’ decisions to fight wage reductions, push for fair weights, and, as in the case of Madisonville, object to operators stealing cars, not only made them especially susceptible to losing their jobs, but also increased the risk of losing their lives. “This is why they won’t have organization in Hopkins county,” Smith concluded in his report of the Madisonville shooting. There was no point in joining a union that did not offer protection to its members. 17

Black mine organizer and union officer Richard L. Davis faced a similar situation in his Ohio district. There a group of black miners carefully considered accepting an operator’s offer to put a majority of black miners in the No. 3 mine. “Some claimed that they thought they ought to have a majority in one mine, at least, that the whites had the majority in every mine in the valley,” Davis reported. A black majority mine would not only offer more jobs to black miners, but also allow black miners to be elected to places

15 “Tramp,” letter to the editor, “A Tramp’s Wanderings,” NLT, March 16, 1889. 16 W. J. Smith to the editor, UMWJ, September 14, 1899. 17 Ibid. 174 of prestige. Checkweighmen, for example, were usually elected by the workers in a mine to make sure the coal was weighed fairly. Black miners seldom received the position in mines where whites were in the majority. “I can remember the time when this mine was altogether colored, all the other mines for the whites,” Davis wrote. “Now then, for No. 3,

1 the colored man’s mine at that time, all the other mines in the valley had the 1 /8 inch screen, the screen at mine No. 3 was 1 ½ inches; at all the other mines the men were paid for dead work at mine No. 3 they were not paid for this class of work. Thus you can see the difference between the white man’s mine and the colored man’s mines…. Well then, as we are now mixed up all through, when one makes a demand we all make it, there is no color line; is it not better or do you class yourselves inferior beings?”18

Despite Davis’s efforts to push for integration to further dissolve the color line in the mines, racial divisions remained steadfast. Miner F. H. Jackson responded to Davis the following week, explaining the black miners’ frustration. “The white miners of Mine

No. 3 refused to work some three weeks ago because they thought they had to work under a negro boss, which was very wrong to them. It caused my race in this valley to feel very angry over this action of my white friends.” Learning of the dissatisfaction, the mine boss promised he would “fill Mine No. 3 with negroes and give them eight and nine months work, and it would be best for them.” Although Jackson insisted that the tactic was a ploy to divide the miners and their union by race, he also acknowledged that the offer was a tempting one for black miners who seemed to get no protection from the

UMW regarding steady work or promotions in the workplace.19

18 R.L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Davis,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892. 19 F. H. Jackson, letter to the editor, “More Good Words,” UMWJ, August 11, 1892. 175

When offered the opportunity of steady work at high wages at what the agent

promised was a new mine, Madisonville, Kentucky, miner Wylie Johnson eagerly

accepted the terms. He was one of thirty western Kentucky black miners, ages fourteen to

forty-three who answered the call. But instead of being taken to a new mine as promised, the miners were sent just north of the Ohio River, to Evansville, Indiana, where the mines were on strike. Local residents ambushed the party as they traveled from the train station to the mine on the city outskirts, injuring several miners before they made it to the safety of the mine. 20

Terrified, Johnson told his story to the local labor-sympathizing newspaper. “I

had a good job and left it to come here. We did not know there was a strike and were told

we would be well cared for,” he claimed. “We want to go back home,” the twenty-six-

year-old miner pleaded. “Won’t you send us back home?” The UMW denied that its

miners were involved in the ambush, claiming instead that they were men who had

learned the mining trade as “convicts” in the South, but there was no doubt in Johnson’s

mind who gunned him down. “The union men ought not to have attacked us,” he insisted.

But instead of condemning the UMW, Johnson appealed to it, asking for help. “We want

the union to send us back home.”21

Johnson and the other miners returned to Madisonville the next day. Their

experiences were not unique. Hundreds of black miners, both men and women, were

imported to striking mines each year, both voluntarily and by force. Some knowingly

20 “Men in Ambush Shoot Down Imported Miners,” EC, June 21, 1899. 21"United States Census, 1900," Family Search (https://familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:M94N-PSS : accessed July 3, 2015), Wiley Johnson, Magisterial District 2, Earlington (excl. Earlington city) Barnsley village, Hopkins, Kentucky, United States; citing sheet 15A, family 297, NARA microfilm publication T623 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.); FHL microfilm 1,240,528.Wylie Johnson statement, “Imported Miners Assert…,” EC, June 21, 1899; “Evansville Riot,” UMWJ, June 29, 1899. 176 came to break strikes while others, like Johnson, came unaware of the strike but did not have the funds to return home. 22

Situations like this became a root of hostility between white and black miners.

Many white English-speaking union miners and organizers condemned minority miners, charging that these groups were particularly less honest than others in the trade. “The colored men often kick because white men do not treat them right, and say we don’t give them a chance,” former Illinois union leader Dan McLaughlin wrote from his new home in Indian Territory. “Just as long as the colored man allows himself to be shipped around the country in gangs for the purpose of driving white men away from their homes and lowering wages, just so long will the prejudice and hard feeling exist. Let him be white or

black, we have no use for the man who insists on going down into the ditch and dragging

us with him.”23

McLaughlin’s statement revealed a disjunction that ran throughout workers’ ranks. 24 The old union leader spoke of strikebreaking in general, condemning all who broke strikes and worked below scale rates. In his mind, the problem plaguing black miners and the UMW was not one of race, but of ethics. White miners’ anger against black miners, he insisted, was not due to their skin, but to black miners’ willingness to

22 An 1898 song, likely a minstrel, sung to the tune of “On the Banks of the Wabash,” celebrated the fear a trainload of black miners from Alabama experienced when imported to striking Virden, Illinois. They came under the impression that the Illinois miners were all fighting in the Spanish-American War, but when they arrived, the moonlit “banks of the railroad” were lined with striking union miners ready to ambush the train. “On the Banks of the Railroad,” UMWJ, October 13, 1898; Louis Ludlow, “To Import Workmen Against the Law,” EC, June 22, 1899; “Sympathizer,” letter to the editor, “Outrageous Situation,” NLT, December 8, 1888; “A. Miner,” letter to the editor, “A Missouri Inspector,” NLT, August 8, 1888; “Women Take a Hand,” UMWJ, June 4, 1891; “Negroes,” UMWJ, July 27, 1893; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “Indiana News,” UMWJ, July 23, 1896; J.H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “Sued for Damages,” UMWJ, August 31, 1899. 23 Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Indian Territory,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 24 Herbert Hill, “Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers of America,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2;2 (Winter 1988): p. 132-200; Nell Irvin Painter, “The New Labor History and the Historical Moment,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 2:3 (Spring 1989): p. 367-370. 177

drive down wages.25 Yet, McLaughlin’s claim also revealed the racist sentiment rampant

in union ranks. Not all black miners broke strikes, and many of the black union miners

that complained to McLaughlin about fair treatment in the UMW were likely as willing to break strikes as their white coworkers. Still, McLaughlin’s unapologetic words indicated that he and other white UMW members would discriminate against all black miners as

long as some black miners broke strikes. Even though white union and non-union miners frequently broke strikes and compromised their labor principles to provide for their families, the strikebreaker, in many white miners’ minds, was black.26

To black miners, such treatment was far from equitable. All miners were accepted

in the union, and, by 1891, the UMW had added a provision to the constitution that “no

person be hindered from securing work on account of race, color or nationality.”27 Still, thousands of unionized white English-speaking miners refused to work with black men in the mines. Progressive Union organizer John Young reported that although black and

Italian miners in Braidwood, Illinois, were interested in the union, they still refused to join. “They say that they would be in the union if they get the same show as other men, and there is a great deal of truth in it,” he wrote, acknowledging that black and non-

English speaking miners’ interests were frequently neglected even when they joined the

25 For additional examinations of whites’ “blindspot” regarding union members of color see David Roediger, Seizing Freedom: Slave Emancipation and Freedom for All (London: Verso, 2014), 119-20; David Roediger, “Accounting for the Wages of Whiteness: US. Marxism and the Critical History of Race,” in The Wages of Whiteness and Racist Symbolic Capital, eds. Wulf Hund, David Roediger, and Jeremy Krikler (Berlin: LIT, 2011), 9-36. 26 Arnesen, “Specter of the Black Strikebreaker,”; Mark Noon, “‘It Ain’t Your Color, it’s Your Scabbing’: Literary Depictions of African American Strikebreakers.” African American Review 38, no. 3, (Fall 2004): 433; Whatley, “African-American Strikebreaking,” 529; John H. Keiser, “Black Strikebreakers and Racism in Illinois, 1865-1900,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 65:3, (1972): 315; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Indian Territory,” UMWJ, July 23, 1891. 27 Official Proceedings of the UMW Columbus Convention, “The United Mine Workers,” NLT, February 21, 1891. 178

order.28 Recognizing a similar situation, Kentucky miner and organizer W. H. Foster

reported that the union was “going down,” in his region because “the white man is doing

all he can to down the Negro and the Negro is doing all he can to down the white

man….”29 Willing Hands insisted white miners should not be surprised at the black

miners willingness to tear at the miners’ union. His own assembly in Bevier, Kentucky,

dissolved over the very issues Foster described, yet he offered no apology for the black

miners’ unwillingness to work with the white miners. “[W]hen everything is smooth you

object to our color, which is unconstitutional and contrary to the will of our National,

state and general officials.” Given this inconsistency, Willing Hands argued that white

miners should not be surprised that when white miners went on strike “out of revenge we,

the bulk of the Afro-Americans go to work for spite,” he wrote.30

Perhaps not surprisingly, in the midst of the widespread frustration with UMW

authority when locals throughout the nation broke away from the UMW and formed

“home organizations,” thousands of black union miners did the same. Fed up with UMW

officers who did little to end the racial discrimination in the mines that hired white miners

over black and learning that the region’s five hundred white miners in Leavenworth,

Kansas, were planning to strike, black miners of Leavenworth broke from their white

brethren and formed an “anti-strike organization.” In doing so, the miners curried special

favor with their employers, securing the fair treatment and steady work that the UMW

did not provide.31

28 John Young, letter to the editor, “Braidwood Notes,” NLT, February 2, 1889. 29 W. H. Foster, letter to the editor, “Wanted!” UMWJ, June 8, 1893. Capitalization in original. 30 For additional scholarship regarding black miners strikebreaking for spite or asserting masculinity see Norwood, Strikebreaking and Intimidation; “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 24, 1892. 31 F. B. McGregor, letter to the editor, “President M’Gregor,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894. 179

The African American miners of Leavenworth demonstrated a crucial component

encouraging anti-UMW organizing. To UMW Missouri-Kansas District President F. B.

McGregor, the black miners were “led by the nose,” away from proper organization and

morality. 32 They turned their back on honest labor principles out of selfishness and greed.

But to the miners who joined the anti-strike order, it was a way to secure what the national union neglected. In organizing, the miners demonstrated their understanding that collective action brought desired results. Their faith in unionization never wavered, but their trust in the UMW did. As such, their anti-UMW order became a means to not only secure higher wages in their workplace, but to also strike at the order that had betrayed them. 33

Illinois miner Pro Bono Publico recognized this problem in his own district and

bamed the problem on both races. Black union miners were upset with white members

because they were not treated equally in the order. Meanwhile, white miners resisted

opening their locals to black miners based on their presumed dishonesty either through

working for lower wages, breaking strikes, or laboring as convicts. Like many organizers,

he pushed miners to put aside racial differences. Urging his readers to “treat every man

as white,” he ordered them to cooperate with each other regardless of whether a coworker

may have broken a strike or might have once been a convict. “[I]t is a business matter,”

not one of racial sentiment or morality. “Christianity or morality don’t dig coal,” he

argued, reminding miners that “the coal produced by the immoral man is just worth as

much money in the market as that produced by the moral man or church member.” For

32 F. B. McGregor, letter to the editor, “President M’Gregor,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894. 33 Charles Postel made a similar observation of black Populists. Their dedication to the cause did not come from any sort of blind hope that the Populists would fight for racial equality, but from a pragmatic understanding that its platform nonetheless granted more freedom than any alternative. Charles Postel, Populist Vision; Gerteis, Class and the Color Line. 180

that reason, he continued, “it won’t do for us to hold aloof from another man because his

life has not been all that could be desired previously.” Rather, “the only way to make

those men better and at the same time make yourselves better is to get into the union with

them” and urge upon them to do better in the future than they have in the past.”34

But, as Willing Hands and other black organizers found, even when they were

willing to work in the same local, white miners seldom wished to follow black leaders.

Richard Davis endured countless threats from both white and black miners for his firm

stance for white and black miners to unionize and cooperate across the color line.35

Miner T. H. Rollins demanded to know why black miners “are never elected to any

position that there is any honor or pay in?” To Rollins, the practice of accepting black

miners but denying them leadership smacked of hypocrisy. “I feel that we have as much

at stake as our white brothers,” he wrote, echoing white union miners’ claims that all

miners had an interest in improving the mining trade. But while white miners used this as

an argument for black miners to cast aside concerns for racial equality within the union,

Rollins used it as a way to push for black rights within the order. “I know that I speak the

sentiments of my colored brothers at large,” he wrote. Black union miners were as willing

and competent as whites to help guide the union, but were seldom given the chance.36

To black miners, exclusion from the UMW did not come from any concerted

effort to push them out of the organization, but from rank and file resistance to UMW

laws. “Now what is needed most is principle and discipline,” Willing Hands wrote of

white miners ignoring the inclusion laws of the UMW and Knights of Labor, “brothers,

34“Pro Bono Publico,” letter to the editor, “National Organization,” NLT, January 18, 1890. 35 R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Very Plain Talk,” UMWJ, August 11, 1892. 36 T. H. Rollins, letter to the editor, “The News,” UMWJ, March 11, 1897; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “A Frank Letter,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891. 181

buy and read a few Afro-American papers, to see just what the negro has to fight….” His

words referenced the trouble “that not only the Afro-American gets in the South, but all over the land, both North and South.” 37 In the following weeks, he called readers’

attention to a lynching in Ohio, a race riot in Nashville, and reminded them that such

happenings were connected to the events at Coal Creek, Tennessee, a year earlier when

black convict laborers were forced to take the place of striking miners. “I appeal to you to

do something against such outrages,” he wrote, arguing like T. H. Rollins that such

actions affected white miners as well as black.38 Using “supposed Afro-American criminals” as laborers, lynching, and other forms of violence, the “lynching club of the

South” kept African Americans pressed down while forcing all miners to “work for a song.” It was in the white miners’ best interest to join the anti-lynching cause, he argued.

“Laborers you will suffer the same fate that we Afro-Americans are if you don’t become more solid, for it is you next that the despots will mob.”39 Like T. H. Rollins and

thousands of other black farmers and laborers throughout the late nineteenth and early

twentieth century, Willing Hands firmly believed that their labor organizations were ideal

vehicles to lobby for racial change.40

But support was not always easy to cultivate. White miners readily supported

laws forbidding convict labor, but seldom for the reasons black miners listed. Rather, it

was because, as miner wife Girsy McNab wrote, it was another means for the mine

37 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, April 14, 1892. 38 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 5, 1892. 39 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 2, 1892. 40 Eric Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press); Charles Postel, Populist Vision; Eric Arnesen, Brotherhoods of Color: Black Railroad Workers and the Struggle for Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Jarod Roll, Spirit of Rebellion: Labor and Religion in the New Cotton South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010). 182

operators and government to work together “that guid American citizens may starve.”41

Laws that dealt with broader aspects of racism that had indirect implications on mines,

however, received substantially less support. Segregation, black miners’ inability to

safely express workplace grievances, and lynching all affected black miners and

organization, but few could convince white miners or the UMW to push for new laws.

White miner “Mike,” for example, replied to Willing Hands’s plea for UMW action

regarding the Nashville riot with a joke. Known for his sarcasm, Mike quipped that the

black prisoners’ deaths were “too bad.” Instead, “they should have been taken to the

World’s Fair and exhibited to Sunday school scholars as models of innocence.”42 Mike’s

response, however, appeared in the same Journal issue that contained black mine

organizer Richard Davis’s report of a trip through West Virginia. Traveling with two

white men to organize the region, Davis faced hostility at nearly every coal town they

visited. Denied access to the boarding house, he was expected to sleep in a run-down

cabin far from town. He was forbidden from eating indoors, from eating with his fellow

travelers. In each case, his companions spoke to their hosts and usually secured Davis

better accommodations, or at least access to a bed and dining room table. Still, Davis

could not help but wonder what would have happened if he had made the trip alone. He

presumed he probably would have been arrested, “for I felt like cursing and I would have

used cuss words had I been by myself.”43

41 Girsy McNab, letter to the editor, “Outrageous Law!,” UMWJ, July 30, 1891; “Voice of the Press,” UMWJ, July 30, 1891; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892; “Beginner,” letter to the editor, “Beginner,” UMWJ, September 1, 1892; W. F. Miller, letter to the editor, “Clinton News,” UMWJ, September 15, 1893; 42 “Mike,” letter to the editor, “Mike,” UMWJ, June 9, 1892. 43 R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Rather Tough R. L.,” UMWJ, June 9, 1892; Gutman, "The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America: The Career and Letters of Richard L. Davis and Something of Their Meaning, 1890-1900,” in Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 121-208. 183

Outraged at the irony, Willing Hands once again urged readers to pay attention to the violence blacks faced, “for it will not be long until a Virginia mob will have an Afro-

American labor organizer hung…” With that, he condemned Mike’s words, asserting that the violence African Americans endured was no joking matter. “Further,” he continued,

“it is not possible for you to wish the organization success as long as Afro-Americans are left at the mercy of others, as I fear that you would have done R. L. Davis should you have been in company with him.” 44 Davis cautioned that this ongoing racism against black miners would only hurt the UMW. Black miners would continue to reject the order and worsen white miners’ conditions in the process, he argued, “for take the negro out of the organization and you have a vast army against you, one that is strong enough to be felt and feared.”45 UMW membership was simply not enough to be included in the order.

Even within union ranks, as many black miners understood it, the line between white and black, “you” and “us” remained.

Unskilled

Distinctions between “them” and “us” extended to miners who did not fully assimilate into American culture. In most cases, these were newly-arrived immigrants who spoke very little English. Like miners from the British Isles, these immigrants often arrived with prior experience in the mines and traveled to mines in regions where they already had friends or family waiting. While stereotypes of strikebreaking and immorality applied to these groups, most miners placed more emphasis on non-assimilated immigrants’ lack of knowledge, both of American customs as well as of the mining industry. In her account of the economic downturn, for example, Laurene Gardner

44 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil Notes,” UMWJ, June 16, 1892. 45 R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “A Frank Letter,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891. 184

described a “flood” of “imported laborers” that were different from the immigrants that

came before. Like black miners and convict laborers “imported” into mining camps to

lower wages and break strikes, new immigrant miners were “imported” into the nation for

the same reason. “Our fast growing millionaires cast about for cheaper labor more

amenable to their wishes and found it in the hordes of vagrants and paupers the old

countries were glad to be rid of.”46

The desperate population of beggars Gardner described became a menace in many miners’ minds for several reasons. First, they feared that their communities would become overrun with men and women who did not adhere to local customs and disregarded local law.47 In addition, the new arrivals’ presumed willingness to work for

low wages would only worsen the condition of miners throughout the nation. Indiana-

Kentucky District Secretary John Kennedy described a new group of immigrant miners

arriving at a small Indiana mine whose operator deemed the miners qualified to mine coal

because “they could live and work on a piece of bread half the size of his hand and a

glass of water for twenty-four hours.”48 Though hyperbolic, such a claim was horrific to

miners who understood that such a denial of basic necessities resulted in a wage

reduction that would cascade into their own homes. These notions were made worse by

the belief that the “pauper laborers” arriving were “unintelligent” and “unskilled.”49 Not only did these new miners not speak English or understand American customs, but,

46 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892. 47 “The Miners and their Cause,” NLT, June 29, 1889. 48 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 6, 1891; Kansas BLS, 1891 Report, p. 124-133. 49 Miners routinely used these phrases when discussing immigration. Sullivan and Clay County [Indiana] Citizens, Official Preamble and Resolutions, “Indignation,” UMWJ, November 19, 1891; Mary Jane Beanblossom, letter to the editor, “From Ashboro,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; “Freedom,” letter to the editor, “Is Immigration Hurtful to the Country?” UMWJ, December 29, 1892; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891. 185

according to most assimilated miners, they did not know how to mine coal.

Consequently, many assimilated miners maintained that the new miners would degrade

the mining trade by lowering wages, making a mockery of the skill required to perform

the job safely, and placing all miners in grave danger underground.

For thousands of miners and other citizens, trouble began with the new arrivals’

inability to speak English. “It is quite a common thing to lay the blame on a number of

those who work in the mines who do not understand the English language,” one

Braidwood, Illinois, miner explained of the declining wages and failed unions. Although

many non-English speaking immigrants honored strikes while English-speaking miners

broke them, he acknowledged, the stereotype remained. 50 John Kennedy agreed with the

Braidwood miner’s assertion and conceded that “those non-English-speaking people were not all to blame” in the recent strikes. Still, “it was through them and on account of them that the strife and bloodshed was brought about.” Even if they did not break strikes, they were responsible for lowering wages, he insisted. All the “ignorant Poles,” were good for,

Kennedy asserted, was driving down wages and pushing honest laborers out of work.

Kennedy was not alone in such beliefs. Southern Illinois miner and organizer J. C.

Heenan noted that operators used the non-English speakers’ “ignorance” as a way to keep the union out of the mines. By shuffling non-English speakers from one local mine to another, operators kept non-English speakers “constantly among strangers,” never assimilating, never getting to know English-speaking coworkers. Such a tactic not only added to the desperation of non-assimilated miners who never knew where they would

50 Miner “Ike” made a similar observation, claiming that immigrants were unrefined and uneducated because European governments prevented it, but that there were hordes of native-born miners equally uneducated who lacked the excuse the European miners had. “Ike,” letter to the editor, “Miners’ and Other Workmen’s Delinquencies,” UMWJ, November 2, 1893; “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “Report from Braidwood,” UMWJ, June 18, 1891. 186

work next, but also “destroy[ed] all confidence that might otherwise be established

between them and the English-speaking miners.”51

These claims, which often associated lack of English skills with ignorance and

indifference to unionism had a bigger impact on miners than lowering wages and

crippling unions. In many cases, English-speaking miners and society at large carried

these assumptions of ignorance into how they understood skill. Charles Fisher, for

example, learned how to mine coal in France but was working in the No. 2 mine in

Frontenac, Kansas, when it exploded in 1888. He was in the mine when he heard the blast

and nearly died trying to navigate the toxic tunnels to fresh air. With over seventeen

years’ experience mining coal, the thirty-three-year-old knew proper mining practices, how to ventilate a mine, and on the day of the explosion could tell simply by the sound that a “blown out shot” was the source of the mayhem that followed.52

But when Fisher was called as an expert witness in a trial to determine who was at

fault for the 1888 explosion, he did not know how to explain this. He sat on the witness

stand confused at the court proceedings—each time the plaintiff asked him a question, the

defense objected before Fisher could answer. By the time the plaintiff asked him to tell

the jury whether or not the company supplied “brattices” to direct the mine’s airflow and

after the defense’s objection was overruled, Fisher neither knew whether he was allowed

51 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 6, 1891; J. C. Heenan, Southern Illinois District Thirteen NPU Official Report,” NLT, June 16, 1889; “Screenings,” CTJ, July 29, 1891; “Screenings,” CTJ, September 16, 1891; “Good Will,” letter to the editor, “‘Good Will Proud,” UMWJ, February 4, 1892; “Johnny Bull,” letter to the editor, “Ha! Ha!” UMWJ, November 17, 1892; W. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “Springfield, Ill.,” UMWJ, December 21, 1893; “Strike News of the Past Week,” CTJ, May 16, 1894; Arthur Connery, letter to the editor, “The News,” UMWJ, February 24, 1898; “Broadax,” letter to the editor, “Broadax,” UMWJ, August 25, 1898; Frank Julian Warne, The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers: A Study in Immigration (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1904), esp. 80. 52 Charles Fisher testimony, The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, as the Administratrix of Alexis Siplet, deceased, Case No. 10702, Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, 1896, KSHS, p.195-96, 209-210. 187

to answer the question nor what the plaintiff meant by his question. As the jury awaited

his answer, Fisher voiced his exasperation to the Court. “You must explain this to me,”

the miner demanded. “I can’t understand very well the English language; I want you to

explain so I understand.”53

The problem was not that Fisher could not speak English. He could. Prior to the

explosion, French miners not fluent in English went to him for assistance when dealing

with mine management. Fisher spoke on their behalf, requesting new rooms for some

men or, on the morning of the 1888 explosion, demanding better ventilation in the rooms.

More likely his fluency in English and knowledge of the common complaints in the mine

explain his inclusion as an expert witness for the plaintiff in the trial.

Fisher’s confusion came from the words the lawyers used to describe the mining

practices that were seldom used in the mines. Most miners familiar with the term

“brattice” knew it as a wooden frame placed in a mine doorway that, by itself, had little

to do with controlling air flow in the mines. The heavy canvas cloth coated with tar

which hung from the brattice controlled the flow. Only miners of British descent called to

testify during the trial voluntarily called the curtain and frame together “bratticing.” The

other miners, including Fisher, simply knew it as a “curtain” or “canvas” and never used

the word “brattice.” This was especially important, since the Cherokee and Pittsburg

Company often provided the wood for the frame, but did not provide sufficient curtains to hang from them. The plaintiff’s question, as Fisher understood it, made no sense. 54

53 Fisher testimony, p. 196-97. 54 Fisher testimony, 196-8; Richard Wilson testimony, The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, p. 67, 75, 76, 90; Vincent Gladis testimony The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, p.47; Robert Craig testimony, The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company v. Amelia Siplet, p. 321. 188

The misunderstanding, which came from the attorney’s unfamiliarity with mining

terms and practices, however, reflected poorly on Fisher and drastically altered his

treatment during his testimony. The miner’s outburst where he admitted not

understanding the question caused the plaintiff to rephrase the original question and ask

whether the company provided “curtains,” but it also had a second outcome. Although

defense attorneys had frequently objected to the questions asked of Fisher and the other

witnesses as a tactic to muddle testimonies, the grounds for objections to Fisher changed

after his outburst. In the other testimonies and before Fisher’s outburst, the defense’s

objections were that questions were “too suggestive” to the witness or “irrelevant” to the

case. The objections, like those for other witnesses, were quickly overruled and the trial

continued. But after the outburst, the objections grew more frequent and often charged

that, “the witness has not shown himself competent to express an opinion with reference

there to.” 55 Much to Fisher’s frustration as he tried to recount his experience during the explosion, the defense argued he was incompetent to do so. “I can tell it if you let me,” the miner insisted as he grew more restless on the witness stand, but it was no use.56

Unlike the objections to other witness testimonies, several objections against Fisher

attacking his competency were sustained. 57 Nearly two decades of working in the mines

was not enough to be recognized as a mining expert by the Kansas courts. Credibility

hinged on more than one’s ability to mine coal; it also demanded impeccable proficiency

in the English language.

Despite his actual skill, Fisher’s lack of English fluency placed him on the fringes

of the workplace and society. Throughout the coalfields, immigrants like Fisher were cast

55 Fisher testimony, 198, 204. 56 Fisher testimony, 200-201. 57 Fisher testimony, 198, 201, 202, 204. 189 as “ignorant,” and “unskilled” despite their experience in the coal industry. To be sure,

European mines and mining methods were not drastically different from procedures in the United States. As in the southern Midwest, European mining techniques often varied from mine to mine based on coal quality and surrounding rock composition. However,

English-speaking American miners frequently assumed that non-English speakers, particularly those from eastern European countries were unskilled in the more “modern” mining techniques, namely blasting the coal with explosives. In reality, mines in Eastern

Europe were as likely to use explosives to blast the coal as mines in Britain, and any immigrant miners had more experience in mining coal than a local farmer, but the stereotype of the unskilled “Hun” remained steadfast.58 Miners who wished to keep the new immigrants out of the mines therefore not only did so because they believed non-

English speakers lowered wages and took jobs, but because they believed that the new arrivals were unskilled at mining and endangered the lives of all who worked in the mine with them.

In a report circulated throughout southern Midwest mining districts as well as labor newspapers, Ohio Chief Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine claimed that “Slavonic and Latin races,” possessed “intense greed” that “create a constant menace to the lives and health of themselves and their fellow workmen. These people are entirely ignorant of the science of mining and as a result are continually working in peril.” Not only did they not know how to mine, he continued, but they could not be taught. “Their lack of

58Aleksi︠ e︡ ĭ Petrovich Keppen, The Industries of Russia: Mining and Metallurgy with a Set of Mining Maps, trans. John Martin Crawford (St. Petersburg, Russia: Mining Department Ministry of Crown Domains, 1893), 53-70, esp. 68; Board of Trade, Journal of Tariff and Trade Notices and Miscellaneous Commercial Information, Volume XIII, July-December 1892 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1893), 144-148; “Items of Interest,” CTJ, February 4, 1885; George J. Lamb, “Coal Mining in France, 1873-1895,” Journal of Economic History 37:1 (March, 1977): 255; Warne, The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers. 190

knowledge of our language precludes their being warned in time of danger or of being

instructed as to the mode of applying the remedy, until many times it is too late.”59

English-speaking miners did not have to look far for evidence. Haseltine found

that although the total number of immigrants laboring in Ohio mines was less than 9

1 percent, 11 /3 percent of Ohio mine fatalities for 1891 were “among this class of

people.”60 The mines that hired the majority of non-English speaking immigrants to drive

down their prices also tended to cut more expenses in keeping mines safe. Mines that

hired an overwhelming number of non-English speaking miners were also the most

unsafe and the most likely to experience an accident. Just seventeen months before the

infamous 1892 Homestead strike, Andrew Carnegie’s business partner and Homestead

manager Henry Clay Frick faced a different kind of labor crisis when one of his coal

mines exploded. The Mammoth mine disaster, which killed nearly one hundred and

twenty men and boys, became one of the largest ever recorded. Miners and wives

throughout the nation expressed alarm at the explosion, offering their sympathy to those

affected in the disaster. Miners knew that the same disregard for safety took place in their

own mines and looked at the disaster as a rallying cry to change procedures in extraction,

not only by making sure that explosives were handled with greater care, but to also make

sure that inexperienced miners did not handle them and that mine inspectors knew

enough about explosives to check the mines properly. In the midst of this debate was a

careful mention of who died. Over one hundred of the dead were immigrants from

eastern Europe, adding to the evidence that new immigrant arrivals had no business

59 Ohio BLS, Chief Mine Inspector Report for the Year 1891, Issue 17, p. 7; “The Miners and their Cause,” NLT, June 29, 1889; Missouri BLS, Fifteenth Annual Report, 1893, 47-48; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal, 1893,119; Iowa BLS, Fifth Biennial Report, 1892-93,13-29. 60 Robert M. Haseltine, Seventeenth Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines of Ohio for the Year 1891 (Columbus, OH: Westbote Co., State Printers, 1892), p.7. 191

working in the coal mines. Consequently, even as they offered sympathy and even

monetary assistance to the non-English speaking miners’ families injured or killed in the

Mammoth explosion, English-speaking miners also moved to take them from the mines

entirely. 61

Dozens of miners cited the Mammoth mine disaster as evidence for tighter

regulations against unskilled miners and mine inspectors. “[I]t only seems to be a matter

of time when more of our craft will share the same fate,” organizer W. H. Turner of Iowa

asserted, insisting that more precautions against mine gasses needed to be implemented.

“It is not likely to be detected until too late, unless some competent person is keeping a

vigilant watch for its presence,” he insisted.62 Turner did not speak alone. In the wake of the disaster, miners clamored for tighter laws such the Gallagher Bill that restricted who could work in the Pennsylvania anthracite mines.63 “If other states will follow this

example,” the National Labor Tribune wrote, “the miners will be similarly protected; if

not they will be subjected to the competition of not only the Huns and Italians who have

drifted there under ordinary circumstances, but will have also those that Pennsylvania

will refuse to take.”64 But the bill did not work as planned. Although the legislation was

designed to keep inexperienced miners out of the mine and mine inspector’s office,

anthracite miner “A Delving Serf” insisted that it was ineffective because it “has not

stopped one Polander or Hungarian from filling the place of a miner.” Irate, the miner

continued to say that he witnessed miners receive mining certification “who could not tell

61 Peter Wise, address to Members of the Knights of Labor and Workingmen of the Coke Region, printed in “Scores of Miners Dead,” DIO, January 28, 1891. 62 W. H. Turner, letter to the editor, “Organizer Turner’s Report,” NLT, February 7, 1891; “The Mammoth Colliery Disaster,” The Colliery Engineer, 11:7(February, 1891): 157. 63 The Gallagher Bill required that all miners take a competency exam to determine whether they were skilled enough to enter the mines. “Why the Number of English Speaking Miners Is Decreasing,” The Colliery Engineer, 11:7(February, 1891):157. 64 “The Miners and Their Cause,” NLT, June 29, 1889. 192

in English where they were born, what their names were, or how old they were.” Worse,

Delving Serf insisted, one local operator had three of his Polish employees go before the

board in hopes they would be appointed to the mining board, “and lo and behold, Mr.

Polander was appointed, when to my certain knowledge miners of at least twenty-one

years’ experience who were passed by.”65

Delving Serf’s statement, which contrasted “Mr. Polander” with experienced

“miners” indicated that, in his mind, one could not be Polish and an experienced miner.

Such a belief came out of more than simple expectations of white, English-speaking

entitlement, but a fundamental understanding that those who could not speak English

were incapable of being honest skilled workers. Rather, many saw them as tools that

furthered company’s power over the mines. The Gallagher Bill, Delving Serf argued, not

only failed to keep immigrants out of the mines, but also gave operators a valuable

loophole in the event of a mine disaster. “[I]f any anthracite miner gets killed the

employers can say ‘Well, he had a certificate of competency; surely he knew what he was

doing. What had he a certificate for but as a practical miner? We are not liable.’” 66

Such a fear prompted thousands of English-speaking miners and wives to stop pushing for legislation to keep new immigrants out of the mines and instead favor laws

that would prohibit immigration entirely. The “intelligent foreign born miner” should not

be offended at UMW efforts to stop immigration, Laurene Gardner observed. If “he is

ready and willing to avail himself” to assimilate, unionize, and mine with care, he was

welcome to stay. But those who did not were “one evil that organization was meant to

65 “A Delving Serf,” letter to the editor, “A Bill that Does No Good,” NLT, February 14, 1891. 66 Ibid. 193

check,” she insisted. 67 Citizens in Hymera, Indiana agreed. A mass meeting at the

Hymera Baptist Church demanded on behalf of the miners that all immigration be

immediately prohibited, “except for persons who can read and write the English language

and who bring with them the means to make a home in this country.”68 Although

thousands of farmers and laborers in the United States were already impoverished to the

point of desperation and had no “means to make a home” without living on a tenant farm

or a company house, non-English speaking immigrants seemed far more dangerous than

any other group.69

English speakers may have accepted non-English speakers into their ranks, but such actions left no doubt where their true sentiments lay. For thousands of non-native

English speakers, such hostility gave them little reason to support an organization

devoted primarily to native-born and English-speaking interests. Swedish miners in

Oswalt, Iowa, for example, took pride in the fact that they kept their entirely Swedish-

speaking Knights of Labor assembly strong when the English-speaking miners’ assembly

faded. Such enthusiasm was in part due to Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes’s

attention to the local, promising them assistance in whatever way he could.70 Still, by

summer 1892, miner Oscar Anderson voiced uncertainties about NTA 135 and the UMW

to Hayes. As one of the two organizations that comprised the UMW, NTA 135 was

supposed to have a say in UMW affairs, but it held little influence. “[I]n fact,” he wrote

to Hayes, “135 is dead as far as Iowa is concerned.” To the Swedish miners of Oswalt,

67 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892 68 Sullivan and Clay County [Indiana] Citizens, Official Preamble and Resolutions, “Indignation,” UMWJ, November 19, 1891. 69These sentiments fit well within the rising nativist sentiment that swept the nation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants; Michael Kazin, Barons of Labor. 70 John Hayes to Charles Holm, February 18, 1892, Reel 11, JHP; Gust. Granguist to John Hayes, September 7, 1891, Reel 11, JHP. 194

this was a problem. “[T]he Mine Workers organization is so much mixed up in the

Federation of Labor that our members positively refuse to pay them any Tax.”71 Like

thousands of English-speaking miners who refused to pay dues to organizations that did not respect their wishes, Anderson and the Swedish union miners of Oswalt wanted

nothing to do with a labor organization voicing increasing hostility to immigrant labor.72

The Knights General Assembly, Anderson believed, was far more accommodating to

their interests. With that, he requested that Hayes transfer the Swedish local’s charter

from NTA 135 to the General Assembly, and to send all Knight material to the local in

the Swedish language. Anderson’s request, which would pull the assembly out of the

UMW, revealed that, what many English-speaking organizers would have described as

ignorant and anti-union actions were actually an effort to unionize according to the

organization that best addressed their interests. Irate at being called an “ignoramous” for

opposing officer decisions, French miner Louis Goaziou sarcastically played into this

stereotype. “What little English I can speak and understand I have learned in or around

the mines, and the little I can read and write I have learned at home in the evening, so you

can easily see that having such an ignoramus as myself for teacher it’s no wonder that my

education is very imperfect.” Perhaps he was incapable of understanding how the union

functioned, he continued, but many miners “not as ignorant as myself” nonetheless

agreed with his assessment. Several miners rushed to Goaziou’s defense, but the miner’s

71 Emphasis in original. Oscar Anderson to John Hayes, June 17, 1892, Reel 11 JHP, underlines in original. 72 The miners’ frustration with the UMW and AFL was likely not wholly due to ethnicity. The Swedish local of Oswalt joined the ranks of hundreds of locals frustrated with the UMW officers’ actions in the May 1891 strike. Gust Dahlstrom wrote to Hayes that they were ordered to strike by the UMW and succeeded in gaining the eight-hour workday after a two-month strike, but received only one cent in aid from the UMW. Although Anderson did not mention this as a part of the miner’s refusal to pay dues to the UMW the following summer, it is likely that the UMW’s leanings toward AFL strike practices factored into Swedish miners’ decisions to secede from the order as well. Gust Dahlstrom to John Hayes, July 4, 1891, Reel 11, JHP. 195

statement made it plain that his words against the union were dismissed because he was

an immigrant incapable of understanding the union, making his grievances against the

officers less legitimate than those of native-English-speaking whites.73 In his Ohio mine,

“Union” claimed that immigrant miners like Goaziou who complained against the

officers or refused to pay dues until the union acknowledged their grievances were

behaving unreasonably. Although miners of all backgrounds and ethnicities withheld

dues or abandoned the union when it did not suit their interests, non-native-English

speaking miners who did so were seen as particularly hostile to the union. throughout the

nation. “Some of the foreign-speaking people have told us that they are in the majority

and they do not intend to be ruled by the American of English-speaking people,” Union

explained, implying that such demands were illegitimate. When their requests for equal

treatment in the union were denied, immigrant miners abandoned the union. “I feel sorry

that our foreign-speaking brothers are responsible for such a state of affairs. Let us have

unity and we shall prosper; without this we will get farther apart.” The claim blamed the

union’s failure on non-English speaking miners who were refused a full voice in the

miners’ organization. For Union and thousands of other English speaking miners, “unity”

came only when these miners accepted the leadership of white, English-speaking miners

and dutifully paid their dues to the organization that begrudged them. 74

73 Louis Goaziou, letter to the editor, “Straight Out from the Shoulder,” NLT, March 14, 1895; “An Old Miner” from Lasalle, Illinois, was among the first to come to Goaziou’s defense, writing, “The three delegates from here are of the same opinion as Bro. Louis Goaziou, and I am willing to bet a nickel that there are not six men in the Lasalle district who are not of the same opinion as the delegates and L G.” “An Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Mines,” NLT, March 14, 1895. Gouaziou was an anarchist who favored regional associations. Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age, 160, 181. 74 Phil Penna likewise hinted that ethnic differences created union strife when recounting his trip through northern Illinois. Of the estimated 250 working in Ladd, Illinois, one half were from Poland. “Of the remaining one-half there are about thirty in the organization. The other forty would join, but they have not got time, being engaged in cursing the d---d Poles.” Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Little Phil’s Trip,” UMWJ, August 20, 1891; “Union,” letter to the editor, “Bridgeport, Oh.,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895; John 196

“Coal Butchers”

Despite its proclamations of inclusion, the UMW’s actions unapologetically

favored white, English-speaking miners. Even when these groups were officially included

in the order, they were still in many ways ostracized. Yet, as firm as their sentiments

were toward black and immigrant workers in the name of keeping wages fair and mines

safe, white English-speaking miners were far more ambivalent when addressing these same issues among local farmers who also entered the mines. Like black and non-English speaking miners, companies used farmers, most of whom were white and English speaking, as a means to lower wages and decrease production costs. In addition, although they could join the miners’ unions because they worked in the mines, few farmers did.

Still, unlike black and non-English speaking groups imported into the mines, farmers were often well-rooted in the local community. As a result, farmer-miners became a kind

of quiet threat compared to the hysteria that followed other minority mining groups.

White English-speaking miners recognized farmer-miner presence in the mines as a danger, but one secondary to black and non-English speaking miners. Despite constant complaints from mining regions throughout the nation, miners never implemented any major initiative or policy to keep the farmers out of the mines.

But the skilled miners did not treat the farmer-miners with the same hostility as they did black or non-English speakers, even though farmer-miners’ presence in the

mines intensified in mid-1893 when the Panic and depression shattered the already

crippled economy around the southern Midwest mines. As Mary Lease urged Kansas

Young, letter to the editor, “Braidwood Notes,” NLT, February 2, 1889; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892; T. J. Llewelyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January23, 1892; “Johnny Bull,” letter to the editor, “Ha! Ha!” UMWJ, November 17, 1892; Arthur Connery, letter to the editor, “The News,” UMWJ, February 24, 1898. 197

farmers to “raise less corn and more hell,” hundreds followed the first part of her advice

and made up for the difference in the mines. They “crowded out” the practical miners

during the winter months when wages were highest. Their presence in the already full

mines slowed the turn and lowered earnings for everyone. It was unfair, the National

Labor Tribune wrote, the farmer-miners “take from the soil during the season of farming, and when the winter demand set in for fuel they cut a fat streak out of what the regular miners should have.”75 Miner John Neal complained that his mine continued to take on

farmer-miners until the mine was so crowded the miners could not earn a living wage

despite the regular winter pay increase.76 “It will take two of those farmers to put out as

much marketable coal as one practical miner would do, but then it would not do to refuse

those men good places in the mines, because they are useful in time of strikes.”77 Yet as

pressing as the matter had become, miners were ambivalent about how to address the

problem. Even though white English-speaking miners at times walked out when black

men were hired in their mines and often rallied around anti-immigration legislation, they

staged no demonstrations against farmer-miners and agreed upon no policy to rid them

from the mines. Instead, their presence on the fringes of mines and miners’ organizations

created confusion that, in several different ways, served as formidable stumbling blocks

to organizational unity.

75 John Neal, letter to the editor, UMWJ, January 5, 1893; “Crows and Hawks,” NLT, February 8, 1890. 76 “Tramp,” letter to the editor, “A Tramp’s Wanderings,” NLT, March 16, 1889; John Neal, letter to the editor, UMWJ, January 5, 1893; “Bald Head,” letter to the editor, “How,” UMWJ, January 26, 1893; “A Former Employe of the Forsythe Company,” letter to the editor, “The Forsythe Case,” UMWJ, October 19, 1893; “Successful Americans,” CTJ, September 1, 1897; P. H. Donnelly, letter to the editor, “P. H. Donnelly’s Report,” NLT, March 16, 1889; “Our Latest Mails,” NLT, March 26, 1876. 77 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, October 20, 1892; T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892; “Indiana Miners,” FAMI Official Report, NLT, January 14, 1888. 198

Indiana miner and operator “Old Timer” considered farmer-miners a liability on

multiple fronts. Noting that Elijah Bridgewater, an inexperienced local farmer-miner, injured himself in the mine, he reminded his readers not only of the dangers that ran rampant for any miner, but also that the danger increased when working with less skilled men. But Bridgewater’s injury, caused by a slate fall, was likely at least partly the company’s fault. The company seldom supplied enough timbers to prop up the mine and

Bridgewater had good evidence to prove that the company’s neglect caused his injury.

But when the farmer-miner moved to sue the company, his inexperience worked in the company’s favor. Bridgewater “knew but little about mining, and on the trial the lawyers could make him say just what they wanted.” As such, the jury sided against Bridgewater ten to two, ruling that his negligence, not the company’s caused his injury. Not only did

Bridgewater’s presence in the mines place miners in direct danger, but as a witness, he aided the company in escaping responsibility for the fruits of its neglect, allowing unsafe workplace practices to continue.78

In this sense, white assimilated miners’ fears of unskilled miners being used by

the company proved true. But the real danger of the inexperienced miner came not from

the non-English speakers, but from local farmers. Working six months a year in the

mines, farmer-miners simply did not have the skills of “reading” mine faces, cracks, and

other danger signs that might prompt a practical miner to use a different technique to

blast or otherwise loosen his coal.79 Instead, farmer-miners knew just enough to claim to know how to mine, but were often far more likely than other minority groups to become

78 “Old Timer,” letter to the editor, “From the Block Coal District,” NLT, November 9, 1893. 79 Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal & Mining Company vs. Amelia Siplet; KBLI, First Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, 40-70. See also, Carol A. B. Giesen, Coal Miners’ Wives: Portraits of Endurance (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995). 199 mine foremen or mine inspectors. With little experience, they often followed company orders without understanding the consequences in coal mines and as inspectors, seldom recognized company violations. “A Miner” wrote that his Missouri mine should have been shut down because there was no escape shaft. But the mine inspector disregarded the violation. Even though nearly two dozen miners were killed in a mine fire just a few months earlier, he still failed to note the safety violations in the mines. “He is a farmer and does not know anything about a coal mine,” Miner wrote. “He should be removed or thrown in the mine and roasted with the twenty-three men that were burned to death… either would suit the miners so they get rid of him and get a competent inspector to do his duty.”80

Still, as dangerous as it was for the miners, companies saw merit in pushing for inexperienced miners into authority positions. Not only were they more likely to miss safety violations simply through inexperience, but in the event of a mine accident, the company was often absolved of guilt since the mine inspector found no violations. “The operators have the advantage every time,” Old Timer observed, “and unless we become awake to the fact we might as well quit suing coal companies first as last.” The surest way, he believed, was to stop training the farmers. “I have never taught one yet and never will,” he insisted, reminding his readers that “miners must dig the coal and the hay John must grow the corn and raise the pork and beef. Then, and not till then, will we better our condition.” 81

Although hundreds of miners agreed with Old Timer’s sentiment, most recognized that the farmer-miners would not leave the mines. At the same time, miners

80 “A. Miner,” letter to the editor, “A Missouri Inspector,” NLT, August 25, 1888. 81 “Old Timer,” letter to the editor, “From the Block Coal District,” NLT, November 9, 1893. 200

also understood that few farmer-miners were willing to join a trade union for an occupation they performed six months each year. Even when forced to join in strongly unionized areas, they stayed in only for the period that they mined, seldom paid dues, and rarely honored the principles they were supposed to uphold. But if they could not force the farmer-miner to labor honestly, many miners believed that they could force them to pay additional fees. “If we were organized here and charge these winter coal diggers about $20 for the privilege of taking our living from us, we would not be bothered with many of them,” John Neal suggested.82 Although few suggested a fee so high, Neal’s

plan was an old one. One of the first resolutions the UMW passed when it formed was an

“anti-‘corn-husker’ resolution” proposed by an Illinois miner which stated that “men who

only work part of the year in the mines must pay all dues and abide by all conditions of

our organization and should they fall in arrears during the time they are out of the mines

they must pay all arrears before they can be allowed to work.”83

But these precautions did not work to the miners’ advantage. “During the strike of

1889 in the block field our chances of success looked favorable up till the time the

farmers had their crops put away, and then they swarmed down on us and we must either

divide our small resources with them or they would go to work in the mines,” John

Kennedy observed noting that the same conditions applied four years later. “And every

week when the amount was a little smaller than usual they would come to the

commissary, draw their rations and the same day or the next morning go to the boss and

tell him they were ready to go to work although they had worked on their farms and had

82 John Neal, letter to the editor, UMWJ, January 5, 1893; T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Muddy Linton,” UMWJ, February 9, 1893. 83 “Crows and Hawks,” NLT, February 8, 1890. 201

[a] year’s provisions stowed away in their homes.”84As dues paying union members who

worked in the mines, they were entitled to the aid the union provided. Yet, Kennedy and

hundreds of other miners who saw the mines as the farmers’ secondary source of income,

believed that the farmers should allow the aid to be reserved for those truly in need that

had no other income. Not only did the “cornfield-mechanics” take jobs at lower rates,

then T. J. Llewellyn observed, but these “Benedict Arnolds” tore apart the miners’ union,

even if they could be forced to join and pay dues. “[T]hese ‘coal butchers’” would be the

first to sign iron-clad agreements to keep unions out of the mine. “Were it not for the

good men who will suffer through the action of the ‘things’ who are supposed to have

been created upright, but who haven’t backbone enough to make men, I would cheerfully

say that 50c a day is enough for these poor, miserable traitors, who are busily engaged in

tearing down the bulwark between themselves and slavery,” he wrote.85

Statements like Llewellyn’s left little doubt that farmer-miners who worked

against the union were seen as deplorable co-workers, yet his statement indicated that they were also viewed very differently from the black and non-English speaking miners who were accredited with the same behavior. Whereas black and non-English speaking miners were viewed as naturally inclined to dishonest labor and therefore ostracized from within their organization and not entitled to fair treatment, farmer-miners, like white,

English-speaking practical miners, were expected to know better. They were “Benedict

Arnolds,” traitors to their own people. In identifying them as such, Llewellyn included farmer-miners with the interests of the UMW, even as the farmer-miners acted against the order.

84 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, December 8, 1892. 85 T. J. Llewellyn, letter to the editor, “Plain Words,” NLT, January 23, 1892; M. Commesky, letter to the editor, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, December 24, 1891. 202

Such a stance resonated with thousands of white English-speaking miners who,

though seldom understood black or immigrant struggles in the mines, fully understood

farm life. “I have been one of them [a farmer] in times past and was a farm laborer for a

good many years, and I am sure they would be much easier organized than any other

class I know of,” Indiana miner “Salamander” argued.86 “Tow Row” of Ohio agreed,

claiming that the farmer-miners were not only good men, but that their actions should be emulated. “I think it would be better still for all of us to own farms, and work on them, too, when the scale of wages did not suit us.”87 In her reply to Tow Row, Laurene

Gardner expressed her own sympathy for the farmer-miners. “I wish every coal digger

owned… a little patch [of farmland], for that would give me one, two or three, in fact,”

she began, she merely opposed to their willingness to rob miners’ work. Farmer-miners

were not wholly bad, they were industrious and hard-working, “in fact a little too

enterprising,” as one National Labor Tribune editorial professed. Though their actions

were as damaging as other non-union miners, practical miners still counted them as one

of their own, like miners who became operators or foremen, their faults lay in selfishness,

not a predisposition to dishonesty that many associated with black and non-English

speaking miners.88

Willingness to exclude some miners based on presumed skill while tolerate other

miners with decidedly less mining skill came to a head in 1893. For decades, miners had

complained about the unfair advantage coal screens gave to the company. Although many

86 “Salamander,” letter to the editor, “Salamander,” UMWJ, January 12, 1893. 87“Tow Row,” letter to the editor, “Winter Diggers,” UMWJ, January 19,1893. 88 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Moving Smoothly,” UMWJ, January 26, 1893 (quote); “Crows and Hawks,” NLT, February 8, 1890; “A Pumpkin-Roller,” letter to the editor, “From West Virginia,” NLT, March 1, 1890; “Salamander,” letter to the editor, “Salamander,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Petite Linton,” UMWJ, January 12, 1893. 203

states had passed laws standardizing the size of the screens that sorted the coal, they were

seldom specific enough to be enforced effectively. The screens not only needed to be

specific on the length and width, but also in the spacing between the bars that allowed the

coal to pass. The shape of the bar, typically either “flat” or “diamond” also affected how

much coal fell between the bars. Finally, these factors meant little if the screen was not

kept in good repair. The thousands of tons of coal that crossed the screens regularly

corroded them, shrinking bars or breaking them entirely. As a result, more coal fell

between the bars before it could be weighed, making it coal the company could sell

without paying miners for mining it.

Miners and labor organizers alike had long favored the idea of instituting a “run

of mine,” “gross weight,” or “anti-screen” law that would force coal companies to pay

miners before the coal was run over the screen. Such a law made it easier to regulate

scale rates and compensate miners for all coal they mined. By 1893, several states,

including Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, all secured anti-screen legislation in some

capacity and, the UMW expected Ohio to follow that January.89 Quoting Ohio Chief

Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine’s warning of increased dangers created by

inexperienced immigrant miners and citing the latest mine explosion in Colorado that killed twenty-five miners, the United Mine Workers’ Journal presented the anti-screen legislation as a viable means to protect the mines from the “Sicilian or the Bohemian” who “don’t know of the skill, the care, and the intelligence necessary to be a safe and

89 Illinois passed the law but it was declared unconstitutional while the Indiana and Missouri laws remained in the law books but unenforced. “R. L. Davis,” UMWJ, December 15, 1892; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “Davis Answers,” UMWJ, December 15, 1892; Kansas BLS, 1888, p. 2, 186-189, 803; Kansas BLS, 1889 Report, p. 20; “What They Ask,” The [Decatur, Illinois] Herald-Despatch [sic], July 4, 1891; “Stray Scraps,” [Decatur, Illinois] Daily Review, January 28, 1893; “Work in the Mines,” DIO, July 28, 1894; “Another Gross Weight Bill,” DIO, February 3, 1895. 204

complete coal miner.” 90 If mines weighed the coal before it was screened, the UMW and

many miners reasoned, companies would pay all miners equally for the full weight of the

material they mined, including dirt and slack. Skilled miners who produced large

amounts of coal therefore produced a more valuable gross weight than the inexperienced

miners who produced more slack than coal. As a result, companies would seek out the

best and most experienced miners to extract the coal, giving skilled miners the ability to

set their own wages and work with the most careful miners.91

As desirable as the anti-screen bills were to many miners and organizers,

however, hundreds of miners demurred. The number of Ohio union and non-union miners

who rejected them caught organizer Richard Davis by surprise. “I can not for the life of

me see how and where they base their argument,” he wrote. “I believe the miners want it

or they would not have mentioned it.” It simply did not make sense why the miners

would oppose a law that would pay them for all the material they mined rather than the

largest chunks of coal.92

“Willing Hands” readily answered Davis’s question, noting that Indiana had

already passed the law, but could not enforce it unless “it is in the employers [sic] interest

to do so.”93 His words reflected the skepticism that hundreds of miners shared regarding

workplace legislation. “It makes a miner laugh to hear paid lawyers explain what is right

between operators and miners,” miner “Old Timer” wrote of legislation. “Doctors,

lawyers and preachers whenever they make a law to benefit miners always have a

90 “When, in speaking of the Thomas screen bill…,” UMWJ, January 19, 1893; Haseltine, Seventeenth Annual Report, 1891, Issue 17, p. 7. 91 KBLI, Fourth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, 1889 (Topeka: Clifford C. Baker, State Printer, 1889), 17-22; “A Looker On,” letter to the editor, “Holy Moses,” UMWJ, December 29, 1892. 92 R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “The Facile Pen,” UMWJ, December 8, 1892. 93 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Operators,” UMWJ, December 15, 1892. 205

loophole through which an operator can, by greazing himself good, squeeze out of paying

a poor coal digger one cent damages.”94 Legislation to aid miners like abolishing

company stores and establishing weekly pay laws, if they were not ruled unconstitutional,

were seldom enforced in any state, many observed. When they were enforced, companies

used the legislation to protect themselves, such as when mine inspectors’ superficial

inspection and approval of mines’ absolved companies of guilt in mining accidents.

These trends extended into the national forum. Union leaders like Phil Penna

encouraged the miners to support “protection” in 1888, yet by 1892, miners dealing with

wage reductions questioned whether they received any benefit from legislation like the

McKinley Tariff. “I don’t know whether to attribute the above results to the operations of

the McKinley tariff law or not, but it is certainly a protection which we miners of Indiana

could have done without,” miner “Uncle Abe” wrote bitterly. “The Democratic

politicians are just laughing in their sleeves… not that they are glad to see us reduced, but

because it proves as they say the sophistry of those coal operators and with this insure the

State of Indiana on their (the Democratic) side in next November.”95 As the economy

crumbled, hundreds of other miners looked at the McKinley Tariff and the newly

repealed Sherman Silver Purchase Act and agreed, asking how any legislation aided producers. Demonetizing silver “played sad havoc with the business of India,” miner

Ecce Homo observed after the United Sates repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. “I would like to ask Mr. McKinley what caused the panic of ’73, and all the panics since then,” he demanded, insisting that legislation was little more than a “tool” for bankers.

94 “Old Timer,” letter to the editor, “From the Block Coal District,” NLT, November 9, 1893. 95 “Uncle Abe,” letter to the editor, “Straight Talk,” UMWJ, March 31, 1892; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892; C. D. Rolandelly, “A Miner’s Open Letter to the President,” NLT, October 5, 1893. 206

Politicians “claim to be in favor of protecting home industry,” miner “Sorehead” wrote,

“But what are the facts of the case? A few Eastern capitalists seem to get all the

protection.” Meanwhile, silver and coal mines shut down and farmers continued to flood

the mines that remained open, all to the benefit of the “gold gamblers” throughout the

world. 96

If state legislators repealed the laws that aided miners and only enforced the ones

that could benefit companies, and if the national government did the same by repealing

laws like the Sherman Silver Purchase Act that producers wanted while “financial

pirates” exploited the tariff to their advantage, miners saw little reason for the anti-screen

bill to have a different fate.97 “It is a good law for the miners if they only would believe

it,” Willing Hands wrote to Davis, “but, brother R. L. D., you are wrong, there is a large

percent of the men here that don’t want it lived up to….”98

Many miners opposed it because companies would use it to further injure the

miners. Anti-screen bill supporters were correct that the operators would only want

practical miners, “Union Miner” conceded, but this would not benefit the miners. Even

when wage scales were set according to screen size, mines paying wages for mine run

coal deducted as much as fifty percent of the weight for slack.99 No doubt this practice

would continue in some form under the anti-screen law, Union Miner asserted, which

96 “Sorehead,” letter to the editor, “The Present Financial System in Relation to the Labor Problem,” UMWJ, July 13, 1893; “Old Timer,” letter to the editor, “From Block Coal District,” NLT, August 31, 1893; “Mettalist,” letter to the editor, “Talks to ‘Dan,’“ NLT, October 12, 1893; C. D. Rolandelly, “A Miner’s Open Letter to the President,” NLT, October 5, 1893; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “Wise Words from ‘Dan,’” NLT, December 14, 1893; “Ecce Homo,” letter to the editor, “The Last Beast that John Saw,” NLT, January 25, 1894. 97 C. D. Rolandelly, “A Miner’s Open Letter to the President,” NLT, October 5, 1893. 98 “Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Operators,” UMWJ, December 15, 1892. 99“Semi-Monthly,” letter to the editor, “Clinton, Ind.,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893; Illinois BLS, Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1891, 25-6; Missouri Bureau of the Mines, Sixth Annual Report of the State Mine Inspector of the State of Missouri for the Year Ending June 30, 1892 (Jefferson City, MO: Tribune Printing Company, 1892), 159. 207

would mean that all miners would be deducted the same flat rate, regardless of their skill.

“[W]hat are you going to do with the ‘pumpkin rollers’ and the ‘woodchoppers’ that are

already in the organization? They cannot be discharged, because we will not allow it,” he

reasoned. Unlike the UMW’s willingness to overlook mistreatment of black or immigrant

miners, they would not tolerate a unionized farmer-miner to be discharged from the mine.

But farmer-miner coal production was substantially lower than that of practical men,

“and while making the yearly [pay] scale, should it be taken on the anti-screen basis the average would certainly be taken.”100

In short, the anti-screen bill would pay practical miners as though they were as

unskilled as the farmer-miners. “By that the unskilled miner would be benefitted at the expense of the skilled miner,” Union Miner concluded. Kansas miner John M’Laughlin agreed. “I am satisfied that if we insist upon a straight mine run price we will be whipped into accepting a price far below what the practical miner should have for his labor,” he wrote. Accepting the bill would not only do little to help miners in securing fair wages, but it would also make the mines more accessible to less skilled men, degrading the mining craft.101

The anti-screen bill opponents were not far off in their predictions. While most

states simply did not enforce the law, miners gained little in those that did. Farmers

continued to work in the mines while companies paid depreciated wages for run of mine

coal. “Developments have shown that [the anti-screen law] is inductive to poor mining,”

Missouri Labor Commissioner Oscar Kochtitzky observed in 1888. Far from cultivating

100 “Union Miner,” letter to the editor, “The Ohio Screen Bill,” UMWJ, January 12, 1893. 101 “Union Miner,” letter to the editor, “The Ohio Screen Bill,” UMWJ, January 12, 1893; “Bald Head,” letter to the editor, “How,” UMWJ, January 26, 1893; John G. M’Laughlin, letter to Lorenzo Lewelling, June 30, 1893, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS. 208

careful and skillful miners, he found that miners had little incentive to produce quality

coal. Rather, “in order to increase their ‘output,’” miners “resort to the excessive use of

powder and heavy blasting, shooting from the solid, without ‘under,’ or ‘side’ cutting.”

These tactics were the precise actions accredited to immigrant miners and outraged

practical miners when performed by farmers because of the increased likelihood of mine

explosions. But run of mine miners were not paid to be skilled. Whereas experienced

miners once used concentrated blasts to loosen only coal, under gross weight pay, they

overloaded their shots and extended their blasting range to bring down more slack to

increase their weight.102 Rather than protecting the skilled miner, the legislation only

made him less skilled.

Gilded Age efforts to protect the mines and miners manifested in contradictory

ways. Who unions accepted and what legislation they desired did not always align, but

did reflect how late nineteenth century society and skill divisions in a semi-skilled

industry inhibited unity along ethnic and occupational lines. Although the UMW

professed to be an inclusive organization that embraced all miners regardless of ethnicity,

it pushed aside black and non-English speaking miners, dismissing their concerns and berating their abilities. Instead, groups that did not fit with the white, English speaking, experienced miner mold were accepted into the union more out of a desire to make them obey union doctrine rather than genuine interest for their well-being.

102 Most mining laws restricted the use of powder to roughly five pounds per blast. Many miners, however, disregarded this portion of the law and mine inspectors seldom enforced it. Kansas BLS 1889 Report, 17- 22l J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Report, “District Eleven,” December 7, 1893; “Judge J. S. West,” UMWJ, October 4, 1894; Oscar Kochtitzky to Frank H. Betton in KBLI, Fourth Annual Report, 1889, p. 21; William Scaife, letter to the editor, “Scaife,” UMWJ, March 24, 1898. 209

While these various groups could work together for common interests, as when white and black miners fought against convict labor, minority groups were ostracized when their interests did not align with the white, English speaking rank and file.

Questions of racial discrimination in the workplace and community, lynching, or unfair laws were seldom addressed and never given serious consideration by miners’ delegates at national conventions. Such practices alienated black and immigrant workers who looked on the UMW with hostility.

Such a stance allowed the organization to be more accepting of those who were not male or not miners than these minority miners. Whereas skilled black and immigrant miners were pushed away from the order, women like Laurene Gardner and farmer- miners blended in with it. Consequently, official inclusion in union ranks meant little.

While white and English speaking union miners did not want minority groups in the mines, they expected minorities to join and remain faithful to the union. Even as they extended this invitation however, white English speakers neglected legislation that would help black miners and embraced legislation that would keep immigrant miners out of the mines and nation. These positions stood in contrast to the miners’ stances on farmer- miners, who though they were not welcome in the mines, did not suffer from any sort of hostile action from the practical miners. Instead, miners looked on the farmers with sympathy, judging that their placement in the mines was due to the same hardships all white English speakers faced in the midst of an economic depression. The best means to remove the farmer from the mines, many reasoned, was to improve the economy.

Ultimately, these various groups that did not completely fit with the UMW frayed the already unraveling union. Unable to unite for common interests, union legislation to

210

regulate the mines failed, causing many to put their hopes more in national politics than

the union strength. This is what gave Willing Hands and Laurene Gardner the common ground they shared. Despite their disagreement on who belonged to the UMW and what the organization’s priorities should be, both remained confident that it was the best labor organization to achieve their goals. Yet, as the depression continued, even the most steadfast believers began to question the union’s strength. As officers abandoned the organization and the Knights of Labor disintegrated, it seemed that the UMW and what remained of the miners’ unity was not far behind.

211

Chapter Six

Waiting for “Moses”: Renegade Leaders and Absent Victories, 1894-1896

From district to district, miners’ reports of their strike success rolled in. “[W]e are right in line to call for the general suspension” Missouri miner “Sunshine” wrote just a few days after the 1894 strike began, “every man stopped at noon.”1 From Illinois,

“Calamity” boasted “All solid in this county; men all out, will stand by the national officers win or lose; organized to a man—300 to 500 at every meeting.”2 Such a solid standing caught union miners and officials everywhere by surprise. For the first time in their memory, the miners had a widespread and united national movement. Indiana had nearly shut down its entire coal production. Non-union Iowa miners who reluctantly joined the strike were not only still strong six weeks in, but decided to reorganize UMW

Iowa District Thirteen.3 Miners in Ohio were firm and stronger unionized than ever before, “waiting patiently for the final suspension to come to a close at 70 cents, and nothing less,” W. S. Moke reported.4 In nearly every state miners echoed his claim.

“There must be no receding, no backsliding, if it takes all summer and next fall to fight it out,” declared one Pennsylvania miner.5 Wages had fallen too low not to fight; on this point nearly 150,000 bituminous mine workers agreed.

The seven-week bituminous coal strike that began in April 1894 shut down coal production more successfully than most miners thought possible. Years of strike defeats, constant wage reductions, and with the only previous nationwide coal strike canceled

1 “Sunshine,” letter to the editor, “Vandalia, Mo.,” UMWJ, May 3, 1894. 2 “Calamity,” letter to the editor, “Danville, Ill.,” UMWJ, June 7, 1894. 3 Julius Fromm, UMW Iowa District Thirteen Convention Report, “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894. 4 W. S. Moke, letter to the editor, “Barnhill, O.,” UMWJ, June 7, 1894. 5 “Miner,” letter to the editor, “Firm as a Rock,” NLT, May 10, 1894. 212 before it began, miners had little hope that 1894 would bring any real change. UMW membership and coal prices steadily declined as the depression worsened and the warm summer months approached, causing many miners to believe it was unwise to strike. But these same factors also convinced them that they had nothing left to lose. The desperation that came from a prolonged economic depression stirred up unrest from producers in nearly every corner of the country. Coinciding with the growing Populist movement and railroad worker unrest, the union and non-union miners also made a national push on the national stage.

There were only 13,000 miners in the UMW when the miners walked out, yet with the overwhelming support of the non-union miners, the strikers earned a roughly ten cent per ton wage increase despite the ongoing depression. The gain was enough for

UMW officers to call the 1894 strike a victory, not only because they increased miner wages, but because they mobilized the miners as a unified national force. But many miners disagreed. To them, the strike did not mark their first national victory over the competitive coal market, but a defeat that came from within their own organization. The officers’ tactical decision to negotiate with operators while the strike force was at its strongest looked like betrayal to miners who believed that union leaders had “sold out” their best chance to earn a fair wage. Consequently, this defeat that leaders presented as a victory became the latest betrayal in a long history of union deceit. As charges of officer corruption circulated, the effects of such a non-victory cast a shadow over the UMW and its officers that lasted for years.6

6“Vice President Penna Talks,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894. 213

Previous scholars have been correct to observe the power of failed strikes and

employer strength as critical factors in workers’ decisions to abandon their unions.7 In the case of 1894, the settlement crushed the enthusiasm the strike had inspired. Many of those who joined union ranks quickly left as mine operators initiated new wage reductions shortly after the new wage scale was established. Others threw away their union cards to avoid being blacklisted. As both capital and government became more hostile to workers, repression snuffed out any remaining hope for raising wages.

But these blows struck a movement that was already weakened and fragmented.

Many rural producers would have agreed with “Old Miner” of Kansas who insisted that a

“wolf in sheep’s clothing” lurked among them.8 By the time he wrote those words in

1894 no miner was entirely sure who the “wolf” was, but distrusted across the board

government officials, mine operators, and union leaders who claimed to act on behalf of

the miners’ interests. As rural producers across the country moved to clean out

government offices of leaders unsympathetic to the average worker’s plight, so workers

and officials set out to “purify” their own ranks from within. Locals overthrew state

officials and demanded UMW national officials’ resignations. State leaders accused

national UMW leaders for accepting bribes to end the coal and railroad strikes. But such

actions were not restricted to the UMW. In the Knights of Labor General Assembly in

November 1893, Knights overthrew longtime General Master Workman Terence

Powderly. A little over a year later, UMW President John McBride unseated Samuel

Gompers as President of the American Federation of Labor, the UMW miners split from

the Knights of Labor and helped form the Independent Order of the Knights of Labor,

7 Oestreicher, Solidarity and Fragmentation; Voss, The Making of American Exceptionalism; Phelan, Grand Master Workman; Weir, Beyond Labor’s Veil. 8 “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “The Storm Is Over,” NLT, May 10, 1894. 214 and the following June, the Knights of Labor established a new miners’ union that, drawing on the residual anger from the 1894 settlement, siphoned the UMW’s already dwindling ranks.9

Recrimination among the rival organizations mattered little to the rank and file and divisions between the Knights and AFL meant more to organizational leadership than its grassroots. Instead, mine workers asserted that their leaders’ wars came at the detriment of worker interests, reinforcing miners’ beliefs that officers cared little for their interests; and they wondered who, in fact, still labored for honest labor principles and who had “sold out” and used the organization for personal gain.

The 1894 settlement then, proved to be far from the victory UMW leaders claimed. Workers saw it as part of an extensive web of treachery both within the labor movement and in Gilded Age society. It tapped into rural producers’ existing suspicion of leadership and became another symbol for why they doubted anyone who claimed to help the common man. Such confusion and frustration split an already divided rank and file, indicating that the battle workers fought was as much against ‘labor’ as it was against the

‘capital’ that oppressed them.

The Suspension

Wages fell drastically between the time of the canceled 1891 strike and the first nationwide strike in 1894. In 1891, southern Midwest bituminous miners in competitive regions earned an average 70 cents per ton for screened coal. By 1894, they earned 50

9 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June, 27, 1895; Report of the General Executive Board, Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1895, p. 29; Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 257; Sanders, Roots of Reform, 83-5; Weir, Knights Unhorsed, 177. 215

cents per ton for the same labor.10 Nearly every miner understood that the declining price

came not only from miners’ willingness to work for low wages, but too much coal. For

years, many union leaders and miners called attention to the surplus and insisted that the

only way to raise coal prices was to decrease the supply. Some proposed lessening the

supply through a process known as “restriction” where miners limited coal production

either by producing a predetermined tonnage or shortening work hours.11 Still, given

miners’ actions like accepting free clicks, and other means of making extra money, it was

unlikely all miners would honor restriction.12 Worse, the overcrowded mines and slow

turn meant that even if all miners restricted their output or hours, operators could

maintain production rates by adding more men to the mine, further slowing the turn to the

point that it forced miners to work more in order to feed their families.

Others, however, believed that coal exportation was now a viable option. The low

coal prices reached a level for some qualities of US coal to be cheaper than that mined in

the British Isles. To government officials, operators, and miners alike, exporting the US

coal surplus became a viable alternative.13 Some operators considered expanding US coal

exports to British dominions and other regions with poorer coal qualities. At the time,

the total amount of US bituminous coal exported never exceeded 2,400,000 long tons,

worth roughly $6,000,000 in 1893 and $4,900,000 in 1894, indicating over a thirty cent

10 In other places, such as in Bevier, Kentucky, wages remained the same, but the screen size increased. “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Bevier (Ky.) Men,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894; “Proposition,” UMWJ, November 19, 1891; William T. Morris, letter to the editor, “The Old, Old, Story,” UMWJ, August 16, 1894; D. H. Sullivan, letter to the editor, “Denny Sullivan,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895. 11John Rowe, letter to the editor, “From John Rowe,” NLT, July 13, 1889; “Shorter Hours,” letter to the editor, “Shorter Hours the Cure,” NLT, August 10, 1889; “J. D.,” letter to the editor, “A Statement of the Case,” NLT, August 24, 1889; “Bob,” letter to the editor, “‘Bob’s’ Plan of Restriction,” NLT, August 24, 1889. 12 Because miners were paid by the ton rather than by the amount of time spent in the mines, the restriction skilled workers exercised in other industries seldom applied to coal producers. For details on restriction success, see Montgomery, “Workers’ Control of Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century,” in Workers’ Control in America, 9-31. 13 Parker, The Production of Coal in 1894, 27. 216 decline in coal prices, felt in coal mining regions throughout the world. When English miners struck to raise their own wages in early 1894, a handful of US operators took advantage of the scarcity and increased their exports to fill demands formerly supplied by

Britain. The expansion of trade indicated that if US operators could price their coal far enough below Europe, they could claim their own piece of the global coal market.14 Still, as countries negotiated tariffs to protect their own coal industries, the cost to ship and competition with Britain and Germany largely restricted US exports to the Americas where industrial development lagged in comparison to the European and Asian countries where Britain exported its coal surplus.15

For thousands of miners, then, the only way to decrease the US coal surplus was to stop mining entirely. 16 This was the course the UMW decided to take in summer1894.

This was not the first time the miners’ union proposed a national strike. Miners vividly remembered the aborted 1891 strike for the eight-hour day. Delegates at the 1893 convention likewise voted to demand and strike for a five cent per ton wage increase on

14US exports only increased by a small percentage, largely because Germany and other European coal producers were better positioned to benefit from the strike. “Her Waning Glory,” The Hutchison [Kansas] News, February 6, 1894; “Will There Be Another Strike in England?” CTJ, February 14, 1894. 15 Russia, for example, began issuing a duty on all foreign coal in 1884 and gradually raised it as coal prices fell. Its need for coking coal, largely unavailable in its own region, however, made it essential to increase its imports from Britain, Germany, and Austria regardless of the tariff. While the tariff did not stop imports, it was high enough to make it impossible for US operators to compete with Britain for the Russian coal market. Similarly, the coal industry in the Pacific, largely from New South Wales, supplied California’s coal demand more economically than eastern coal operators could. “Why Not Export Coal?” NLT, April 26, 1894; Parker, The Production of Coal in 1894,15, 26-29. Keppen, The Industries of Russia, 58-59; Saward, Compendium of Valuable Information Relative to Coal Production, Prices, Transportation, Etc., at Home and Abroad… 1894 (s.l.: s.n, 1894), 8-10; Richard Rothwell, The Mineral Industry, Its Statistics, Technology and Trade in the United States and Other Countries to the end of 1896, Volume 5 (New York: Scientific Publishing Company, 1897),762-764; “The Coal Trade,” San Francisco [California] Call, January 1, 1891; “Imports and Exports of Coal,” CTJ, January 10, 1894; “Coal is King,” CTJ, January 10, 1894; “The State of Trade,” CTJ, January 24, 1894; “The Tower Bridge,” The [London] Times, January 24, 1894; “Free Coal and Iron Ore,” NYT, January 26, 1894; “Her Waning Glory,” The Hutchison [Kansas] News, February 6, 1894; “Some Figures in the Foreign Trade,” CTJ, February 21, 1894; “Buy American Coal,” CTJ, April 11, 1894; “Buy American Coal—II,” CTJ, April 18, 1894 “Review of the Trade during 1894,” CTJ, December 26, 1894. 16 George A. Denison, “Suspension of Work in the Coal Mines,” in Work and Wages, reprinted in NLT, January 1, 1887. 217

both screened and run of mine coal, an amount that UMW President John McBride

claimed was too low. But low union membership, particularly in West Virginia and

Pennsylvania, combined with the onset of the 1893 Panic, ended miners’ demands before

the UMW could initiate an official campaign. “Had the delegates at our last annual

convention been able to read the future, and thus learn what was ahead of us, there would

have been less disappointment over the failure to advance prices,” McBride said as he

advocated the 1894 strike. 17

Yet, conditions in 1894 had not improved much over 1893. A strike at any time

was a gamble, but a coal strike in a vastly non-union trade during the summer months of

a depression was especially risky. Great Britain’s success with its own coal suspension

left little doubt that coal prices would increase in a coal shortage, but there was no

guarantee operators would be willing to pass this increase on to the miners, especially

since the surplus coal meant operators would make high profits on coal long before their

supply ran low.18 Illinois miner “Irish American” was one of thousands of miners who

acknowledged the ongoing reductions that seemed to happen monthly in the mines. In

some districts it drove weekly wages lower than the cost of a single ton of coal. Still, he

remained opposed to the suspension altogether, noting that the miners were too unorganized and too desperate to feed their families to honor the strike long enough to win. “I wish to say to those who favor national suspension that such a move would only work injuriously toward your organization,” he wrote, “and I think if such a move was

17E. S. C., UMW Convention Summary, “The Coal Miners,” NLT, April 13, 1893; John McBride, Address to the Fifth Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “McBride’s Address,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894. 18 Patrick McBryde, “A Parallel of the Present Proposed Movement of American Miners in the Great British Strike,” UMWJ, April 19, 1894; “Shorter Hours,” letter to the editor, “Shorter Hours the Cure,” NLT, August 10, 1889. 218

inaugurated it would only bring on defeat, and defeat means demoralization, as all those

know who have witnessed failures even in sectional strikes.”19 Thousands of miners

agreed with Irish American’s reservations. “Let me inform you there are miners out in

this Western country not by the hundreds, but by the thousands who have been living on

half rations for months and only half clothed,” one Missouri miner wrote.20 A suspension

at this time, “W. L.” of Foster, Iowa, observed, meant that the miners in his region would

not pay the rent for their company homes. 21 A suspension, then, might make conditions

worse for the miners rather than improve them.

Still, as more mines announced immediate reductions ranging from ten to twenty- five percent, suspending work in all mines throughout the nation seemed the only means of increasing wages.22 “Mr. Editor, how much longer is these hard times going to last in

this country?” the Missouri miner asked in his letter. His questioning reflected the

desperation many miners faced in light of the depression and the indecision they had

toward the suspension. The Missouri miner never claimed to be in favor of the strike,

never insisted that it was the best move for the miners to make. He did not write excitedly about certain victory. Instead, he wrote that he thought there was nothing else left for the miners to do. “I sincerely hope that this general suspension all over the country will prove beneficial to us miners,” he wrote, “for if it doesn’t, I don’t know what is to become of us.”23

19 “Irish American,” letter to the editor, UMWJ, March 15, 1894; “A Miner’s Widow,” letter to the editor, “Funny Reading in their Pay Envelopes,” JKL, March 8, 1894. 20 “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “A few Plain Truths,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 21 W. L., letter to the editor, “A Delegate,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 22 Walter S. Scott, letter to the editor, “Iowa News,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894; T. B. McGregor, letter to the editor, “McGregor’s News,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894. 23 “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “A few Plain Truths,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 219

Such ambivalence stretched throughout the miners’ ranks. In many places, a small

majority favored the decision to join the strike, so that although most miners honored the

strike, not all agreed with it. Delegates to the Iowa state convention voted to join the

strike by a vote of 66 to 58.24 For others, the timing of the strike seemed wrong. Miner

“Blind Robin” suggested that the strike commence a week earlier to prevent operator

stockpiling while others pushed for the miners to quit work on May 1 when their yearly

wage contract expired. Traditionally, striking on May 1 was a way to negotiate a new

wage contract with the company for the upcoming year. If the miners did not agree to the

terms the company offered under the new contract, they would not work until the contract

was resolved. But in 1894, most miners accepted that the low wages came more from the

overstocked coal market than operators’ unwillingness to pay higher wages. The

suspension, therefore, was an effort to deplete the nation’s coal supply and elevate coal

prices high enough to restore miners’ wages to the 1893 scale of 70 cents per ton, not a

negotiating tactic against their employers as a strike was typically used.25 Consequently,

even if an operator was willing to pay the 1893 scale, the miners were forbidden to accept

the offer. The suspension would only end when the UMW Executive Board declared it

over. No local settlements or loading coal for any reason would be tolerated, regardless of

the wage amount. All miners would work for the same price or not at all.26

24 When this vote carried, the delegates re-voted to make the strike decision unanimous. W. L., letter to the editor, “A Delegate,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 2525 The bituminous coal scale was set according to Pennsylvania prices and adjusted accordingly by region, the 1893 scale for southern Midwest states in the Indiana and Illinois competitive regions, would have been around 75 cents per ton. In regions like Lewis Station, Missouri, it would have been around 85 cents per ton. John Mooney, letter to the editor, “Clinton, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; F. W. Koehler, letter to the editor, “A Graphic Account,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894. 26 Proceedings of the 1894 Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “Official Report,” UMWJ, April 19, 1894; John McBride, UMW Official Circular, “Official Bulletin No. 1,” UMWJ, May 3, 1894; John Altgeld, Live Questions (Chicago: George S. Bowen and Son, 1899) p. 762; Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, 249. 220

But not all miners agreed. Indiana delegates to the 1894 UMW Convention

initially voted against the suspension with the intention of finishing out the 1893

contract.27 For the delegates and many of the miners they represented, striking before

May 1 meant breaking their contract and going back on their word. For others, it meant

they would sacrifice extra weeks of pay when the mines were running full time for the

first time in months. Although they remained overwhelmingly non-union, miners in the

Indiana block district favored the suspension but voted 726 to 1349 in favor of not

joining until May 1. Even local union leadership was divided over when to walk out.

Most in favor of carrying out the contract, Indiana Secretary John Kennedy observed,

“favored restricting themselves to two days per week—that being as much or more than

they have worked for the last four months.” Miners in LaSalle, Illinois, likewise decided

to continue working until the contract expired until nearby Spring Valley miners marched

to the LaSalle mines to convince them to stop.28

To many miners’ surprise, the strike began as a success. Although the UMW only

had roughly 13,000 miners in its ranks, mostly concentrated in Ohio, the non-union

miners’ own frustrations allowed them to join the strike, even if they would not join the

union.29 By May 1, roughly 125,000 miners were idle and more followed in the following

days.30 Miners throughout the nation reported marches to neighboring towns to convince

27 When their motion to wait until the contract expired lost, an Indiana delegate suggested the Convention vote again on the suspension issue, on this vote all Indiana delegates voted in favor of the suspension, making the decision unanimous. Proceedings of the 1894 Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “Official Report,” UMWJ, April 19, 1894. 28 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, April 26, 1894; Old Timer No. 2,” letter to the editor, “Indiana in Line,” NLT, April 26, 1894; “Blind Robin,” letter to the editor, “Blind Robin,” UMWJ, April 26, 1894; “C. T.,” letter to the editor, “Pushing on to Victory,” NLT, April 26, 1894 29 Warne, The Coal-mine Workers, p. 213-214; Postel, Populist Vision, 211. 30 Andrew Roy claimed the number of strikers did not reach over 100,000. Frank Julian Warne, however, claimed that although the UMW had only 13,000 fully paid members in the order, 125,000 walked out on 221 more miners to join the strike. Missouri and Iowa almost entirely shut down their industries, Indiana and Illinois shut down by three-fourths, with more expected. Ohio,

Alabama, Indian Territory, and New Mexico slowed their production to a crawl. Such overwhelming support, “Makeshift” of Bevier, Missouri, noted, was “something unusual for Bevier to do.”31 Upon traveling through the partially-unionized Kentucky mines, J.

Carter, like dozens of other union organizers, found the miners’ faith in the UMW revived as the strike continued. “Even the women here are helping us,” he wrote excitedly, “they say they will desert their men if they go back to the old wages.”32 By

May 10, John McBride proudly announced that within five days “there will not be 5,000 bituminous coal miners at work in the whole country.”33After years of defeat, the

overwhelming success of the national suspension inspired new hope among the miners,

causing thousands to believe for the first time that national solidarity was not only

possible, but within reach.

Yet, not all mines were at a standstill. Mines in Earlington, Kentucky ran full

time, mostly with black miners who had no interest in aiding the UMW-led suspension

strike on April 21 and increased to 180,000 by the end of the strike. Maier Fox confirmed Warne’s estimate in his own work. Newspaper and regional officer reports indicate that Warne’s estimations are probably accurate. Official UMW Report, “The Suspension,” NLT, April 26, 1894; William P. Bensinger, William Fredrick, and Martin Robinson, letter to the editor on behalf of Vincennes miners, “Vincennes, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894; “M’Bride is Well Satisfied,” NYT, April 23, 1894; “Strike of Coal Miners Extending,” NYT, April24, 1894; Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, p. 305; Warne, The Coal-mine Workers, p. 213-214; Fox, United We Stand, 45. 31 “Makeshift,” letter to the editor “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ May 3, 1894; John McBride, UMW Official Circular, “Official Bulletin No. 1,” UMWJ, May 3, 1894; “Sunshine,” letter to the editor, “Vandalia, Mo.,” UMWJ, May 3, 1894; “Hopeful,” letter to the editor, “Braidwood, Ill.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; “Sorehead,” letter to the editor, “New Castle, Ill.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Linton, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 10, 894; “Iowa,” letter to the editor, “Foster, IA,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; W. J. Guymon, UMW Illinois District Official Report, “The Situation,” UMWJ, May 31, 1894; “The Miners’ Great Strike,” JKL, May 10, 1894;Executive Committee, report on behalf of the New Mexico miners, “New Mexico,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894. 32 J. Carter, letter to the editor, “Stinson, Ky.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; J. H. Adams, letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 33 John McBride, “Very Latest,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894. 222

and instead filled southern Indiana contracts.34 “If there is any possible way to have those

miners lay down their tools, I would like for some one to suggest the plan, for we have

done all we can do,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote of the working mines.35 In other

regions, farmers abandoned their fields for the mines, unwilling to turn away high-paying

work, even during the normally busy summer farming months. “[The miners] done

everything they could to persuade them to quit work a couple of weeks, and put in their

time cultivating their farms,” John Kennedy wrote, “but as there was nothing human to

them except their shape of course they could not be persuaded to quit work.”36

Such problems were not isolated to Indiana and Kentucky. Virginia, Maryland,

and substantial portions of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Colorado all refused

to join the suspension.37 Missouri miner Philip Veal claimed that most of Kansas ignored the suspension because the state’s organizers, like M. L. Walters, ordered them to remain at work. “The miners in Kansas in most places have seceded from the union under Mr.

Walters, their leader (which Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot must envy),” Veal

wrote.38 According to him, Walters told the miners that “Kansas was not invited to join

the national movement,” and that the suspension would only benefit the eastern mines. 39

34 J.H Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, May, 10, 1894; J. B. Bach and Charles Bell, letter to the editor, “McHenry, Ky.,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894. 35 “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Bevier (Ky.) Men,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894. 36 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, May 24, 1894. 37 John McBride, UMW Official Circular, “Official Bulletin No. 1,” UMWJ, May 3, 1894; Philip Veal, letter to the editor, “Something More,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; James Bagnall, letter to the editor, “A Kansas Letter,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; “Miner,” letter to the editor, “Beacon, Ia.,” UMWJ, May 31, 1894; “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Ky.,” UMWJ, May 24, 1894. 38 Despite Veal’s claim, the Kansas miners did not officially secede from the UMW. Rather, they kept their charters and disregarded the order, prompting Missouri miners to declare them out of their district at the Missouri-Kansas District Convention that summer. Philip Veal, letter to the editor, “Something More,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 39 After traveling throughout Kansas to encourage the miners to quit, Missouri organizer S. T. Ryan claimed that the leaders’ real reason for opposing the suspension was because they were running for public office and a UMW strike would hinder their election chances. S. T. Ryan, letter to the editor, “How,” 223

Even when Missouri miners marched across the state line to encourage the miners to quit, they were met by a crowd of angry miners, wives, and strikebreaker-sympathizers who chased the strikers out of the state.40

Though the number of men who refused to work was higher than expected, they were not enough to shut down national coal production. Pennsylvania and Kansas fields shipped coal to railroad depots across the country while Kentucky and other non- suspended mine regions began sending their coal to fill the Chicago market demand.

Dozens of striking miners and wives in coal towns throughout Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana stopped trains and uncoupled coal cars to sidetrack them, but railroad workers, unsympathetic to the coal suspension, quickly rehooked the cars and continued their trip to Chicago. Nothing, it seemed, would prevent coal from going back into the market, especially as several state governors ordered troops to keep the trains running.41

Meanwhile, dozens of operators throughout the nation, eager to turn a high profit while the majority of the mines remained out, appealed to their employees to return to work, offering the scale price and, at times, even more than the miners asked. By May 5,

UMWJ, May 24, 1894; Philip Veal, letter to the editor, “Something More,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; James Bagnall, letter to the editor, “A Kansas Letter,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 40 “After the Kansas Miners,” Springfield [Missouri] Republican, May 18, 1894; “The Missouri Miners,” The Pittsburg Daily Headlight, May 22, 1894; “The Strikers Back Down,” Independence [Kansas] Daily Reporter, May 26, 1894; 41It is difficult to gauge the number of miners and wives involved in the striker demonstrations or the violence that came out of them. Newspaper accounts and reports to governors describe hostile crowds ranging into the hundreds, but are likely exaggerated. Union officer and miner reports are more conservative in their estimates, which stressed that the demonstrations were almost entirely peaceful. But even in these accounts, crowds ranged from one dozen to over one hundred in some towns. Indiana and Iowa were among the states to issue troops to mining districts where striking miners demonstrated. Notably, Governor John Altgeld of Illinois, refused to order out the militia of his state, regardless of requests from coal operators and sheriffs, a position he tried to uphold in the Pullman strike as well. John G. Williams to Claude Matthews, May 30, 1894, CMP, S931, Folder 1, INSL; “Strike News of the Past Week,” CTJ, June 6, 1894; Shelburn, Indiana, miners committee to Claude Matthews, June 8, 1894, CMP, S931, Folder 1, INSL; John G. Leming to Claude Matthews, June 1, 1894, CMP, S931, Folder 1, INSL; Morgan Ringo to Claude Matthews, June 1, 1894, CMP, S931, Folder 1, INSL; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June 7, 1894; “Junius,” letter to the editor, “Junius,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894; “Prevented by Women,” EC, June 2, 1894. 224

hundreds of miners, having suffered for months, accepted the offer and returned to work

while others remained torn between honoring the strike and accepting the 70 cents per ton

that the miners had already declared as their goal. “I must say that it is useless for Bevier

miners to stay out any longer,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote, asking the UMW

Executive Board what they should do. “[T]he men are getting restless now seeing all

other mines working and we idle. I do not know what they are going to do, they want to

work and are afraid to work, for they don’t want to do anything wrong if they can help

it.” 42

Concerns like Blackbird’s prompted UMW leaders to reconsider their position.

Between the growing number of miners abandoning the strike and the increasingly

violent hostilities between the miners and strikebreakers, it seemed wise to settle quickly

rather than hold out any longer.43 UMW leaders called for a special convention, but warned all miners that the UMW would not be able to reimburse travel expenses. If miners wished to send a delegate, they had to pay for his travel. The expense garnered from the May Special Convention and the difficulty of getting all delegates to Columbus in time made it clear that the miners would not be able to hold another special convention. Consequently, when the delegates failed to settle on a scale, they passed a resolution allowing the Executive Board to settle on the delegates’ behalf. Within a month, McBride and the Board settled with the operators, but not for the 70 cents the miners and delegates expected. Instead, McBride and the national officers ordered the miners back to work for 60 cents per ton.44

42 “Blackbird,” letter to the editor, “Bevier (Ky.) Men,” UMWJ, May 17, 1894. 43 “Secretary McBryde,” UMWJ, June 21, 1891. 44The UMW officers’ actions fit with what Bruce Laurie called “prudential unionism,” or increasing caution in labor goals and agendas in an effort to make gains without risking union strength. In this case, 225

UMW officers claimed to share in the disappointment of not securing the 70 cent

scale, but nonetheless insisted on calling the settlement a victory. “Under all the

circumstances I think you have done remarkably well,” Terence Powderly wrote to

UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde. He, like other officials wanted the miners to

“have the good sense to accept the terms you have won.” 45 But many miners saw little to

celebrate. To those who remained faithful during the suspension, the settlement was no

victory, but, as miner “Incog” wrote, a “great fizzle.”46 Miners who returned to work

early on the 70 cent scale faced reductions to the new settlement rate whereas those who

stood by the strike and refused to work despite the high wage offers were furious that

they sat idle when they could have been earning much more had they abandoned the

strike. “[W]e are beaten, and that badly, by ourselves, after having been idle only two

months, when the country was about paralyzed for the want of coal, trains laid off,

factories closing, mills shutting down, everybody in this great country brought to realize

that they cannot do without the coal miner,” Alfred Broad of Illinois wrote, “Will we ever

be so near victory again?”47

The frustration Broad expressed was but one part of the rank and file outcry that

came from the settlement. Thousands of miners believed the national officers overstepped

Indiana bituminous would work for 60 cents per ton, block 70 cents, Streator, Illinois would work for 70 cents in the winter, Wilmington, Illinois, 77 ½ cents in the winter. John McBride, Official UMW Bulletin No. 7, “Bulletin No. 7,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894; Laurie, Artisans into Workers, 13; Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst’s International Library Co., 1915); Donald Stabile, Activist Unionism: The Institutional Economics of Solomon Barkin (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 136-139. 45 Terence Powderly to Patrick McBryde, June 14, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP; John McBride, P. H. Penna, Patrick McBryde, Cameron Miller, John Fahy, Joseph Dunkerly, and John A. Cairns, Official UMW Circular, “Bulletin No. 7,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894. 46 “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Incog,” UMWJ, July 12, 1894. 47 Alfred Broad, letter to the editor, “Restriction,” UMWJ, September 6, 1894; “F. Y. T.” letter to the editor, “Suspender,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894; Eddie Ocheltree, letter to the editor, “Strong,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894; “P. D. B.,” letter to the editor, “Order and Peace,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894; J. Fromm, letter to the editor, “Iowa Miners,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894. 226

their authority in settling the strike on terms not approved by the miners. “To simply say

that we don’t like the settlement signed by our officials would not give the readers to

understand just how bitter the dose is for us to swallow,” Indiana miner W. J.

Winterbottom wrote. Although the miners in his region returned to work as ordered,

many Indiana miners believed that the officers “abused the power delegated to them at

the Cleveland convention.” As it stood, Winterbottom noted that in his region at least,

“Feeling against our officers who signed the compromise runs high, with no sign of

abatement; nothing short of their resignation and its acceptance will satisfy us.”48 His

assessment reflected the sentiments of thousands of Indiana miners. Within four days of

the settlement announcement, miners in Sullivan County, one of the state’s densest

mining districts, immediately called for a special state convention to discuss the UMW

leaders’ actions.49 Dunkerly “had no right whatever to sign that scale without first

consulting his constituents,” the miners declared in their resolutions. Moreover, they

insisted, all national officers and district presidents “have violated the trust reposed in

them by the miners of the bituminous districts of America” and “crippled our greatest

chances of success in the greatest and only true fight of our lives….” With that, the

48 W. J. Winterbottom, letter to the editor, “How They Feel,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 49 Due to the spread-out nature of the Indiana mines, many mines were too far removed to hear of the settlement in time and therefore did not learn of the special convention until it had already happened. However, the mining region surrounding Terre Haute, Linton, and Dugger, one of the densest mining districts in the state, had enough locals to demand the convention meet immediately. The views reflected in the state convention, then, most closely reflect the sentiments of the miners in this region rather than the entire state. In fact, local union 38 of Ayrshire, Indiana, passed a resolution resolving to return to work and condemning the Terre Haute Convention as the work of “hotheaded, dissatisfied miners” who committed “treason and open rebellion to our organization.” Bart Stinson and George Laughlin, official resolutions passed by L. U. 38 in Ayrshire, Indiana, “Ayrshire, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894. 227

miners asked for the resignations of Dunkerly and the national officers who signed the

scale and announced that they would “continue this fight until we get last year’s price.”50

The Indiana miners succeeded in removing Dunkerly from office, even though the

convention was called so quickly that many miners outside of Sullivan County had not

yet even learned of the settlement, let alone the convention called in response to it.51 Yet,

as they learned of the special convention, more locals endorsed its outcome. “The

removal of President Dunkerly has met with general approval throughout this district,”

W. J. Winterbottom reported, insisting that anyone who condemned the coup was a traitor

to the UMW.52 Winterbottom’s sentiments were confirmed throughout the state in a

second special convention called to allow miners throughout the state participate in the

decisions. Although the miners accepted the new scale under protest, they refused to

reinstate Dunkerly and continued to request the national officers’ resignations. Their

actions demonstrated that while they would tolerate low pay, an untrustworthy officer

was unacceptable.53

The only significant exception to the Indiana miners’ favor of overthrowing

Dunkerly was the Indiana block district where miners endorsed the national officers’

settlement decision and condemned Dunkerly’s removal. By then, the block miners had a

tenuous history with state officers, frequently arguing that the state officers looked after

bituminous interests at the expense of the block. Lamenting that “it was an evil day for

50 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Official Report of the Special Convention of District Eleven, Held in Terre Haute, June 16, “Official Report,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894. 51 When miners in Ayrshire, Indiana, learned of the action, they condemned the Indiana convention, claiming that it was the work of “hotheaded, dissatisfied miners” who committed “treason and open rebellion to our organization.” Bart Stinson and George Laughlin, official resolutions passed by L. U. 38 in Ayrshire, Indiana, “Ayrshire, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894. 52 W. J. Winterbottom, letter to the editor, “How They Feel,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 53 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report of the Second Special Convention of District Eleven, “Official Report,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Incog,” UMWJ, July 12, 1894. 228

the miners of Clay Co. when we allowed our charter to be absorbed by [NTA] 135,” the

block district seceded from Indiana District Eleven. With the national officers’ blessing,

formed its own UMW district, District Eight. “[I]n the name of common sense, why

should we be taxed to pay men that we would not recognize, believing that they [the

Indiana District Eleven officers] not only violated our constitution, but violated every

sense of honor, equity, and justice?” block district President Samuel Adams asked in his

defense of the new district formation.54

The fracture that caused state and local districts’ rebellions indicated the hostilities that ran throughout the nation’s coalfields after the suspension. Illinois miners, like those in other locations, resolved that even though they believed the officers acted within their authority to make the settlement, they would disregard the officers’ settlement and continue the fight for the 1893 scale.55 “John McBride is the greatest

scoundrel on earth, and Penna and Fahy have been consigned to hades long ago,” one

southern Illinois miner wrote on behalf of the non-union men who were UMW members

before the strike.56 They were not alone. Soon after the settlement, miners felt doubly

betrayed by charges that McBride and other officers had “sold out” the miners by

accepting bribes to end the strike. Not only had the officers overstepped their defined

roles, but if the rumors were true, they accepted money from operators while doing so. “If

54 Not all miners in the block district agreed with the decision. Four locals opted to remain in District Eleven. “J. H. Kennedy, Indiana UMW District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 30, 1894; “Clay Co, Ind.,” UMWJ, September 6, 1894; Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “Sam Anderson,” UMWJ, September 13, 1894; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Rather Late,” UMWJ, September 27, 1894; Lee Erwin, letter to the editor, “Another Reply,” UMWJ, September 27, 1894; Sam Anderson, letter to the editor, “Sam Anderson Again,” UMWJ, October 4, 1894; “A. F. C.,” letter to the editor, “A Few Points,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895. 55 J. A. Crawford and W. J. Guymon, UMW Illinois District Twelve Special Convention Official Report,” “Official Report,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; Committee, Official Report of Resolutions, “Mass Meeting,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; “An Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “McHenry, Ky,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; “Keep Off the Grass,” letter to the editor, “Corder, Mo.,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 56 “Miner,” letter to the editor, “An Object Lesson,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895. 229

that be true it is a scathing comment on the miners who put him in office,” miner wife

Laurene Gardner wrote of McBride, noting that this was not the first time he was charged

with dishonesty toward the miners. “As for Phil,” she continued, “I haven’t the slightest

doubt of his sale.” Her claim that Penna did not care for the miners was shared by an

“army of detractors” throughout the coal districts.57 Her assertion was not wrong. A mass

meeting of over 1,000 outraged miners in Ohio resolved to continue the fight for the scale

and requested the resignations of the entire UMW Executive Board that signed the

compromise. 58 In other Ohio regions, miners simply praised their state president, A. A.

Adams for refusing to sign the compromise and continued their fight.59 Missouri miner

“Justice” voiced the complaint of many Missouri miners when he condemned McBride

for the settlement that benefited no miner, least of all those in Missouri. “East of the

Mississippi river are all that were considered when it came to a settlement,” he wrote.

Delegates to the Missouri-Kansas Special Convention echoed his complaint. During the

strike, the UMW did nothing about the Kansas strikers who proved detrimental to the

Missouri suspension effort. The delegates’ frustration at such disregard was enough for

them to declare that no national officers had authority in Missouri-Kansas District

57 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene Gardner,” UMWJ, July 12, 1894. 58Not all Ohio miners agreed. Knights of Labor local assembly 164 rejected Ohio District President A. A. Adams’s call for a special convention, believing his refusal to sign the scale was treason. W. Findley, Thomas Miller, and Thomas Kennedy, Committee, Official Resolutions Passed by Chapman Assembly No. 164 K. of L., “Resolutions,” UMWJ, July 5, 1894; For Ohio resolutions demanding resignation, see Committee, Report of resolutions for miners in Goshen, Pike Run, Dennison, Tuscarawas, Stone Creek, and New Philadelphia, “Hot,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894; Committee, Official Resolutions, “Dissatisfied Ohio Miners,” NLT, June 21, 1894. 59 In the following months, Adams made more formal and public accusations regarding the UMW Executive Board’s actions, prompting Penna to demand a fair trial. “Alpha and Omega,” letter to the editor, “A Few Words,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894; Phil Penna to A. A. Adams, open letter printed in UMWJ, January 17, 1895; “Phil Penna,” letter to the editor, “President Penna,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895. 230

Fourteen any longer. Rather, they ordered “that the legislative power be placed in the

hands of the local unions.” 60

The UMW’s 1894 claimed victory over the coal industry, then, did little more

than divide the organization’s ranks not only against the national officers, but also along

state lines as locals rejected national authority. But local rule did not work in a

decentralized national market. With the national officers unable to establish the scale the

miners wanted and the miners unwilling to accept the scale set, the state conventions’

resolutions to fight for a better price seemed logical, but not practical. Those who

resumed work at the 60 cent scale stood at odds against those who remained out for the

70 cent scale.61 Worse, miners hopeful for a better settlement soon found employers

unwilling to negotiate or hire anyone associated with such an organization. Although the

practice of blacklisting union men had long been implemented in the coalfields, it grew

more widespread as miners looked to return to the mines after the suspension, causing

local unions and assemblies throughout the southern Midwest to shrink as they

surrendered their union cards to return to the shafts.62 Their strike effort was not

successful at securing the miners’ desires or ensuring their dedication to the UMW,

despite officers’ claims of victory. It did, however, powerfully demonstrate the UMW’s

potential strength, which lay not in its membership, but in the organization’s ability to

60 Although the convention was for the entire Missouri-Kansas District, nearly all delegates were from Missouri since most of Kansas had left the UMW. In the course of the convention, delegates also decided they would have no further interaction with the Kansas miners. T. B. McGregor and George H. Chapman, UMW Missouri-Kansas District Fourteen Special Convention Official Report, “Official Report,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894. 61 M. J. O’Neil, letter to the editor, “As to the Pittsburg Scale,” NLT, June 28, 1894; Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, 247, 249. 62 W. J. Reynolds, letter to the editor, “An Iowa Man,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894; “Peace,” letter to the editor, “Lucas, Ia.,” UMWJ, July 19, 1894; T. Howells, letter to the editor, “Braceville, Il.,” UMWJ, August 9, 1894; W. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “The Blacklist,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895 1895 (date listed incorrectly as January 10 on the first page of this issue); “Big Foot,” letter to the editor, “Maynard, O.,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895. 231 mobilize those outside the order.63 Such ability increased operators’ concern for the

UMW even as miners’ faith in it waned.

Unrest

The UMW’s ability to attract non-union miners to the cause tapped into a larger movement taking place among producers. By 1894 the alliance between farmers and laborers to challenge the systems that oppressed them had gathered steam throughout the

South and Midwest.64 The ongoing depression and elected officials’ seeming indifference to solving the problem added to the unrest in the nation’s coal and grain fields. For some, the People’s Party seemed the best option to confront questions regarding railroad power, banking, and finance. Most producers, however, stopped short of fully joining the

People’s Party movement. Like the thousands of miners who joined the UMW strike without joining the union, producers subscribed to the general frustrations voiced by the

People’s Party without committing to the third party. Indeed, as bituminous miners prepared for their first nationwide coal strike, Ohio businessman and currency reformer

Jacob Coxey set out for Washington D.C. voicing the frustrations of hundreds of thousands of farmers and workers who simply could no longer make ends meet. His demands for government assistance in securing higher farm profits and fair paying jobs

63 Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, 243. 64 Historians disagree over how tight the bonds between farmers and laborers were among Populists. Lawrence Goodwyn claimed that organized labor was too weak and undeveloped to create a movement culture that would allow workers to ally with Populist farmers. Robert McMath and others disagreed, noting the vibrancy of organized labor and its involvement in similar farmer-labor coalitions in the years leading up to the Populist push. Such a legacy prompted Matthew Hild to argue that farmers and laborers did form a strong alliance, but that this alliance was not strong enough to overcome the other factors that inhibited movement, namely the pervasive racism that undermined Populist strength. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise; McMath, Populist Vanguard; Laurie, Artisans into Workers; Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy; Sanders, Roots of Reform; Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists; Postel, Populist Vision. 232

resonated with both agriculture and industry.65 Surveying the low number of union

membership in the weeks leading up to the 1894 suspension, one northern Illinois miner

pointed to Coxey as inspiration. “Let us… be like Mr. Coxey,” he wrote, “start out with

the intention to get there, and we will find the people of the whole country will be with

us.”66

The miner’s claim not only described the UMW’s initial success with the 1894

suspension, but also the broader legacy of resistance during the 1894 summer. Just weeks

after the miners’ suspension began and days after Coxey reached Washington, the

American Railway Union (ARU) launched a strike against the Pullman Car Company.

Led by Eugene V. Debs, an already well-known organizer who hailed from the Indiana

coalfields, the ARU enjoyed the support from coal miners in nearly every district of the

southern Midwest. Coxey and other reformers may have wanted to classify these events

as a collective push from the “Army of the Commonweal,” but as the UMW’s

overwhelming body of non-union strikers demonstrated, such a push was far from united.

Still, even though the efforts did not represent a formal collective push under a common

head, they did reveal a broader sense of unrest that came up from the grass roots during

particularly difficult economic hardship.67

This trend became more apparent in the 1894 election when neither farmers nor

laborers united behind the People’s Party campaign. In addition to longstanding party

65 “Coxey’s March,” NLT, April 5, 1894; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Linton, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; “Sorehead,” letter to the editor, “New Castle, Ill.,” UMWJ, May 10, 1894; T. J. Lewellyn, letter to the editor, “Out in Indiana,” NLT, May 24, 1894; “Junius,” letter to the editor, “Junius,” UMWJ, June 14, 1894; Benjamin F. Alexander, Coxey’s Army: Popular Protest in the Gilded Age (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877- 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987). 66 “A Miner,” letter to the editor, “What a Horror!” UMWJ, April 12, 1894; “Addressed by Peffer,” Lawrence [Kansas] Daily Journal, September 19, 1894. 67 Douglas Steeples and David O. Whitten, Democracy in Desperation: The Depression of 1893 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 233

loyalties and beliefs that the ballot box was not the ideal means to change the ongoing

circumstances, even those who supported Populist ideals questioned whether the People’s

Party’s goals were attainable.68 “We will never again see the day when wheat will be

worth $1 a bushel,” Democrat Hermann Lieb stated to the German residents of Decatur,

Illinois. “The reason is that the Argentine republic is now unloading in Liverpool sixty

millions of bushels of wheat against the five millions they used to send.” Nothing the

Populists could do would change how supply and demand functioned in either the wheat

or coal industries, he insisted. Illinois Germans, then, would do better “to vote straight

democratic this time at least.”69 Such claims held sway among thousands of producers

throughout the southern Midwest who were uncertain whether the People’s Party, much

like their unions, was strong enough to bring about the changes it desired. 70 Such

divisions among producers remained steadfast in the 1894 election, with Populists

making small gains in pockets throughout the southern Midwest, but falling short of

forging any sort of farmer-labor coalition strong enough to sweep political offices.71

Farmers and laborers shared common angst and employed common forms of resistance against the forces that oppressed them, but their efforts in the southern Midwest were too decentralized to unite effectively.72

68 “Old Timer No. 2,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Brazil,” NLT, November 22, 1894. 69 “The General Lieb Meeting,” Decatur Herald, November 3, 1894; Daniel Needham, address at the National Farmers’ Congress, “Cause of Low Price of Wheat and of the Depletion of the United States Treasury,” IF, November 3, 1894. 70 “The Coming Election,” Decatur Herald, November 2, 1894; “The Outlook Outside of Cook County,” CDT, November 3, 1894; “Open Defiance to Lewelling,” Leavenworth [Kansas] Times, August 7, 1894. 71 “Governor Altgeld,” UMWJ, November 15, 1894; “Briedenthal Gives Up Kansas,” NYT, November 8, 1894; “A Grand Victory,” OCFP, November 8, 1894; “The Future,” Kinsley [Kansas] Graphic, November 23, 1894. 72 “The Farmers Talk,” Leavenworth [Kansas] Times, August 7, 1894; Jeffrey Ostler, Prairie Populism: The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993). 234

These divisions, dissatisfaction, and unrest reached into other producer organizations. Dozens of locals abandoned the Knights of Labor as leadership seemed unable or unwilling to address rank and file concerns.73 Although the UMW’s dual relationship with the AFL and Knights of Labor had always been difficult to balance, the relationship between the UMW and the Knights’ general leadership continued to decline in the months after the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor.74 An official

Knight investigation uncovered that Knights General Secretary-Treasurer John Hayes had misrepresented NTA 135 numbers and dues payments in his books in an effort to thwart the UMW and bring all UMW miners, including those of the National Progressive Union, under the Knights’ exclusive control. 75

Although McBride and Powderly both vehemently insisted that the UMW was innocent of the charges presented at the 1892 General Assembly and that UMW officers were loyal to the Order, doubts remained. 76 Hayes, McBride declared, “is now and always was an implacable and unscrupulous enemy of the United Mine Workers and their

73 Foner, History of the Labor Movement, Vol. 2, p. 159-60. 74 Because the officers of the UMW held the same respective offices in NTA 135 and in the NPU, its strife lay with the separate pulls of the Knights of Labor and the AFL rather than divisions between NTA 135 and the NPU. “We are like a man with two wives, said wives having legions of relatives. And strange as it may seem this plurality of wives is a barrier against the displeasure of the husband to either of his spouses,” organizer John Kane wrote of the UMW’s difficult position. John Kane, letter to the editor, “Kane’s Trip East,” UMWJ, July 30, 1891. 75 Such actions on the part of Hayes were part of a larger web of fraud. Historian Robert Weir and others have found that Hayes’s duplicity during his tenure as an officer of the Knights reached into dozens of assemblies, involved bribes, hundreds of thousands of dollars of misplaced Knights of Labor stock and properties, and countless schemes to increase Hayes’s power and influence within the order. Terence Powderly, “Report of the General Master Workman,” Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1892, p. 8; John McBride to Terence Powderly, January 11, 1893, reprinted in UMWJ, April 13, 1893; Terence Powderly to John McBride, February 9, 1893, reprinted in UMWJ, April 13, 1893; William B. Wilson, Address to the New Orleans General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1894; Weir, Knights Unhorsed; Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 253-259; Vincent J. Falzone, “Terence V. Powderly: Mayor and Labor Leader, 1849-1893” (PhD diss, University of Maryland, 1970) p. 336. 76 L. V. Deloche, letter to the editor, “Deloche,” UMWJ, December 1, 1892. 235

interests.”77 Powderly reinforced this claim at the 1893 Knights of Labor’s General

Assembly, noting that he “felt mortified to learn that while acting under information

which I had every reason to believe to be genuine I had written that part of my address,

and I regret having done so very much.”78 However, even as he issued his declaration

that there was no doubt of the UMW’s loyalty to the Knights, the Knights made it clear

they were no longer loyal to him. Internal dissention riddled the Knights’ ranks long

before 1893 and when charges of impropriety surfaced indicating that Powderly had used

the Order for personal gain, Powderly’s enemies, including a faction led by Hayes,

unseated Powderly as General Master Workman at the November 1893 General

Assembly, replacing him with James Sovereign of Iowa.79

Such a coup set the tone for 1894, fitting with the national upheaval that caused

Coxey to march, Populists to form a third party, and the miners and railroad workers to shut down the nation through strikes. It made claims of union leader corruption even more credible and provided a pathway for the UMW miners to push for resignations from their own leadership the following summer. That fall, Powderly and his sympathizers attempted to launch their own coup within the Knights in the name of “purifying the

Order.” NTA 135 and other Powderly supporters would overthrow the Sovereign-Hayes

77 McBride had good evidence for his claim. Hayes in particular was instrumental in discouraging NTA 135 miners from joining the National Progressive Union. W. T. Lewis, open letter to Terence Powderly, “Lewis to Powderly,” NLT, January 12, 1889; E. S. C., letter to the editor, “The Mine Workers,” NLT, April 13, 1893; John McBride, Official Address to the 1893 National Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “McBride’s Address,” UMWJ, April 13, 1894; John McBride, Official Address to the 1894 National Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “McBride’s Address,” UMWJ, April 12, 1894 (quote); “U. M. W. of A.,” NLT, April 12, 1894. 78 Terence Powderly to John Devlin, April 4, 1893, reprinted in the “Report of the General Master Workman” Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1893, p. 4. 79 Proceedings, 1893, p. 35-66. For details of the coup and the politics behind it, see Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 253-256; Weir, Knights Unhorsed, 173-4; Falzone, “Terence V. Powderly,” 336-341. 236

faction at the 1894 Knights of Labor General Assembly. For very different reasons, union

leadership was as frustrated and restless as their rank and file.80

Cast Out

The tumult that cast out Powderly and caused miners to call for their officers’

resignations in late 1893 and the summer of 1894, was only the beginning of the upheaval

that ran throughout the mid-1890s. As miners demanded the UMW officers’ resignations

and the UMW officers conspired with Powderly to reinstate his faction in the Knights of

Labor, Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes made his own plans in the name of cleaning house. NTA 135, known to the miners as the “secret branch” of the UMW, was the Knights of Labor’s arm in the UMW for nearly five years by the time of the Knights of Labor’s November 1894 General Assembly in New Orleans. By then, however, the

Knights membership, like many other unions, including the UMW’s in the mid-1890s,

was in a steep decline and the UMW’s increasingly close relationship with the American

Federation of Labor (AFL) made many Knights leaders uneasy. In addition, it was no

secret that the miners’ delegates were part of the group planning to reinstate the Powderly

faction at New Orleans. Powderly claimed he would refuse the General Master Workman

position if it was offered, but remained closely apprised of the Knights’ affairs.81 By

October, the former General Master Workman informed his sympathizers of Hayes’s plan

for the Sovereign-Hayes faction to retain control of the Knights. “Every District and State

Assembly supposed to be friendly to me, or opposed to them, that has elected a

80 Terence Powderly to Patrick McBryde, November 3, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP. 81 “I will lend my humble effort to keep the old ship clear in her course but never again as an officer,” Powderly wrote to Edward Lynch. Terence Powderly to E. J. Lynch, December 7, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP. 237 representative to the New Orleans session is to be disfranchised,” Powderly warned.82

Still, he wanted as many supporters as possible to attend in order to make a unified stand against Hayes, even if they no longer represented their home orders. “John McBryde [sic] should be at New Orleans if he has to walk, even if they [the miners] have thrown him out,” Powderly stressed to UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde.83

No one was surprised, then, when John Hayes renewed his 1892 charges against

NTA 135. In fact, Powderly traveled to New Orleans in anticipation, ready to stop the proceedings with a court order at the first sign of illegal action. But Hayes denied the miners’ delegates as well as those in LA 300 a seat, convincing the other delegates, with the help of Daniel DeLeon and the Knights’ socialist faction, to forbid them from entering the Assembly with a vote of 25 to 37. The decision to bar the miners divided the

Assembly. Knowing this, the expelled delegates hoped that the 25 who claimed the act was unwarranted would convince other delegates to turn against Hayes and reinstate the miners in time to vote for the executive officers. But Hayes had enough support to hold the officer election before the Assembly could move against him. 84 “Come to think of

82 Terence Powderly to Anson Bigelow, Peter Breen, Hugh Cavanaugh, D. F. Lawlor, Robert McConnell, J. J. Riefgraber, A. W. Wright, W. C. W. Wine, F. Vincent, James L. Michels, J. R. Buchanan, D. A. Carey, Bernard Feeney, Wm. Hubbell, L. Hoechatetter, E. L. Jordan, Thomas Lacombe, George J. Kilt, B. J. Lee, Charles R. Martin, F. H. Mauer, Patrick McBryde, Michael O’Keefe, P. H. Quinn, W. Shuntliff, Edward J. Lynch, William E. Taaife, John H. Murray, John P. Eberhardt, James P. Archibald, and Tom O’Reilly, October 28, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP. 83 Terence Powderly to Patrick McBryde, November 3, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP; Wilson, “Address to the New Orleans General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1894.” 84 Hayes would deny DeLeon’s credentials at the Knights’ General Assembly the following year. Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1894, 131; “A Pittsburg Plaint,” PD, November 16, 1894; “The Convention Shuts Out Miners,” DP, November 20, 1894; “Knights of Labor Re- Elect Leaders,” PD November 21, 1894; General Executive Board of the Independent Order of the Knights of Labor, “Address to the Independent Order of Knights of Labor,” Official Circular to all IOKL Locals, in Official Handbook of the Independent Order of the Knights of Labor (1896), n.p; Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 257; Weir, Knights Unhorsed, 177. 238

it,” Powderly later reflected on New Orleans and the election, “hayes [sic], was not the

only rascal, he was simply preeminent in the role that was all.”85

Such a line between honest officials and rascals was not as clearly defined to rank and file miners. In the weeks following the New Orleans Assembly, local assemblies received a barrage of circulars from the Knights and UMW. On behalf of the Knights,

Hayes published the charges against the UMW officers and ordered that NTA 135 be reorganized solely under the Knights. UMW officers refuted the charges and insisted that reorganizing NTA 135 outside the UMW would dissolve the UMW and return to the days of the divided and fighting miners’ unions.86 “Judging from the letters I am receiving

from the local assemblies of the United Mine Workers of this state the men are at a loss

to know what to do,” Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy wrote in his weekly report.

“They claim they are receiving circulars from the general assembly and circulars from the

national office and that they do not understand them,” he continued, noting that he was

equally confused. “I am not furnished with copies of all those circulars, and even if I

were, I do not know that I would be able to advise.”87

Rank and file confusion came from the ongoing debate over which leaders were

worthy of the miners’ trust. Already uneasy by the 1894 settlement, Hayes’s claims of

impropriety within organized labor beginning with his 1893 overthrow of Powderly and

subsequent attack on UMW officers intensified an already ongoing debate regarding

which of labors’ leaders were honest. As UMW delegates voiced their outrage over the

New Orleans Assembly, the AFL faced its own upset. Nominated by Phil Penna, UMW

President John McBride ran against Samuel Gompers for the AFL presidency, defeating

85 Terence Powderly to Tom O’Reilley, December 2, 1894, Reel 59, TVPP. 86 NTA 135 Official Circular, “Official Circular,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895. 87 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” January 3, 1895. 239

him with the help of the AFL’s growing socialist faction. In the AFL, the coup signaled a

push toward political action not possible under Gompers’s direction and was another

indicator of the growing divisions and unrest within organized labor as a whole. To the

miners, however, it furthered the already present claim that McBride’s actions always

benefited his own interests more than those of his rank and file. Hayes’s cries that the

UMW was aligned more closely to the AFL than the Knights found new ground as

McBride handed the UMW Presidency over to Phil Penna in January 1895.88

These misgivings came to a head as the UMW prepared for its own national convention. In addition to holding the annual UMW elections, Knights delegates to the

February 1895 convention would also decide whether to side with the UMW or the

Knights of Labor. Residual anger over the 1894 settlement loomed large as miners prepared for the convention, knowing that the officers who signed the settlement were the same officers embroiled in the ongoing UMW-Knights conflict and the same officers seeking reelection at the 1895 convention. The fact that these same men were involved in so many controversies caused many miners to question if it would not “be best us to have a new set of officers entirely composed of men that have not held any office in the national before?”89 Noting that resentment over the 1894 settlement remained strong in

88 Ironically, Hayes’s partnership with Daniel DeLeon and socialists within the Knights helped bar UMW from the New Orleans General Assembly. Gompers’s rejection of using the AFL to pursue political aims, however, caused AFL members of the Socialist Labor Party to support McBride despite misgivings many had toward Populist supporters. “Gompers Goes Out,” Topeka Daily Capital, December 18, 1894; “President John McBride,” NLT, December 27, 1894; Postel, Populist Vision, 208-9; Pierce, Striking with the Ballot, 147, 178; Phelan, Grand Master Workman, p. 257; Sanders, Roots of Reform, 83-5; Weir, Knights Unhorsed, 177. 89 Sim Cooper, letter to the editor, “Good of the Order,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895 (quote); “Young American,” letter to the editor, “DuQuoin, Perry Co., Ill.,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; David Mason, letter to the editor, “Brother Mason,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; A. A. Adams to Phil Penna, open letter reprinted in “Adams’s Answer,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Phil Penna to A. A. Adams, open letter printed in “Penna to Adams,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; “A Looker On,” letter to the editor, “Discipline,” UMWJ, February 7, 1895; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “What R. L. Thinks,” UMWJ, March 14, 1895; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Courage Brothers,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895. 240

his district, Indiana miner Sim Cooper suggested that Phil Penna decline the nomination

for president. “Now, Mr. Editor, Phil is not the only man by a great deal,” Cooper

continued. “Secretary McBryde is in the same box, and all that signed the compromise

last June, and I think that Pat [McBryde] ought to decline, too, and let us see if the order

can run one year with a new set of officers.”90

Cooper and the other union miners’ demands for new officers did not come from frustration with the 1894 settlement alone, but officers’ seeming preoccupation with affairs that had little to do with the average miner. Many miners believed the “trouble between our delegates to the General Assembly and the general officers of the K. of. L,” had no bearing on local affairs. In fact, few state officials and local correspondents even commented on the events in New Orleans or the fight between UMW and Knight leadership that followed. Instead their debates centered on whether their union dues were too high, if they should establish a defense fund for strikes, what to do about the constant reductions, and how to reach the eastern European miners alienated from the union.91

These were the issues the miners wanted addressed, but found that the officers’

“jealousies,” desires for control, and personal grudges came at the expense of these concerns, just as they had in years past. “It seems to me that when labor officials devote their time fighting each other for supremacy, that the interests of their constituents are

90 Sim Cooper, letter to the editor, “Good of the Order,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895. 91 “A Looker On,” letter to the editor, “Discipline,” UMWJ, February 7, 1895; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, February 7, 1895; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor “A Batch of News,” UMWJ, November 8, 1894; F. P. Harkins, letter to the editor, “That Suggestion,” UMWJ, November 22, 1894; Julius Fromm, letter to the editor, “The Old, Old Story,” UMWJ, June 20, 1895. 241 sadly neglected,” miner “T. T.” wrote. Such a revival of the old ‘rule or ruin’ policy, they believed, would only cause further injury to the already hurting rank and file.92

“The sooner we are rid of such officers the better it will be for the laboring men of this and every other country,” T. T. declared speaking for miners throughout the nation. 93

These concerns came not only from the fighting or seeming dishonesty, but from the

neglect that many miners felt while the officials waged their war against each other.

“Think of it!” T. T. exclaimed. “Ten thousand miners in Ohio on the verge of starvation.

Fifteen thousand in Pennsylvania attempting to avert a reduction in the present rate of

mining. And yet we have some labor leaders who appear anxious to precipitate a war of

extermination between the K. of L. and Federation miners. Shame on such men.”94

T.T.’s claim highlighted how far removed officers were from their rank and file, but he was not the only miner that noticed. Rather, many miners pointed to the officers’ salaries to demonstrate officers’ disconnect from rank and file concerns, placing the salary question as another of the items to be discussed at the 1895 UMW convention.

Although wages continually declined and UMW numbers shrank, officers’ salaries, which came from UMW funds, never decreased.95 Indeed, even the 1894 settlement

92 T. T., letter to the editor, “Advice from Bridgeport,” NLT, January 17, 1895; Philip Veal, letter to the editor, “Adair, Ia.,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895 (“jealousies”); David Mason, letter to the editor, “Brother Mason,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895 (“trouble”); T. T., letter to the editor, “Advice from Bridgeport,” NLT, January 17, 1895; William H. Crawford, letter to the editor, “Free Debate,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Editorial, “Wm. H. Crawford,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Sim Cooper, letter to the editor, “Good of the Order,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Let Us Have a Change All Around,” NLT, February 7, 1895. 93T. T., letter to the editor, “Advice from Bridgeport,” NLT, January 17, 1895. 94 T. T., letter to the editor, “Advice from Bridgeport,” NLT, January 17, 1895. 95 It is nearly impossible to compare state officer salaries to miner earnings. This is in part due to the payment techniques like coal quality and equipment used that affected how much miners earned per ton, but it is also due to the fact that poorly organized states sometimes failed to pay officers the full salary they were to earn. National officers had better success receiving their full pay, but even Knights of Labor Master Workman Terence Powderly complained that the organization owed him back earnings. M. J. Goings, letter to the editor, “From Egypt,” UMWJ, October 12, 1893; UMW District 14 Auditor’s Report, “Official Report,” UMWJ, October 11, 1894; Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States, 375; Vincent J. 242

made by the officers on behalf of the miners did not affect officer salaries, causing one

Illinois miner to quip that union miners were “paying officers a salary to neglect their

duties.”96 When union leader Tim O’Malley defended the officers, claiming that they did not accept their pay during the strike and instead donated “several hundred dollars” to the strike effort, miner Louis Goaziou quickly responded that this was only further damning evidence that the officers earned too much. “What about the miner who don’t earn $1000 in three years and suffered the pangs of hunger to uphold a principle? I know some who fed themselves on boiled bark and leaves sooner than to give up the fight,” the miner continued, adding sarcastically, “But the well fed officer who goes a little into his own pocket, knowing very well that he will get it back, that’s the real hero, and I suppose the hungry miner who foots up all the bills, he is a darn fool.”97 Goaziou was not the only

miner to observe the wealth gap between union officers and their rank and file. By early

1895, one group of Ohio miners found that officers already made five times more than

the average miner in their district and another reduction for the miners was pending. They

believed paying the officers flat salaries would not only bankrupt the miners and their

union, but also make the leaders complacent. “We believe that the nearer the officers can

be kept on an equal footing with those they represent the better it will be for us,” the Ohio

miners declared.98 To them, union affiliation meant little if the unions could not aid the

Falzone, Terence V. Powderly: Middle Class Reformer (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), 171. 96 “Next Week,” letter to the editor, “Chatham, Ill.,” UMWJ, December 13, 1894, 97 Louis Goaziou, letter to the editor, “Straight from the Shoulder,” NLT, March 14, 1895; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim Answers a Paint,” NLT, March 7, 1895. 98 Charles E. Starr, Zoath Hammond, L. M. Redfern, Official Resolutions of LU No. 394, Murray City, Ohio, “Resolutions,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; “Old Timer No. 2,” letter to the editor, “From the Block Coal District,” NLT, March 22, 1894; “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Let Us Have a Change All Around,” NLT, February 7, 1895; “V.,” letter to the editor, “The River Miners,” NLT, February 7, 1895; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Linton Items,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; Samuel Anderson, letter to the editor, “Indiana Mines and Miners,” NLT, February 14, 1895; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Just a 243

miners, but time and again officers seemed unconcerned with the instability of the union

as though they did not realize how close the UMW was to dissolution.

“This neglect or overconfidence in our solidarity of unionism has led us into a

snare,” Ohio official William H. Crawford cautioned while surveying the UMW’s

precarious condition. The union may have successfully called out all the nation’s miners,

but only to its own detriment, especially as officers continued to engage in petty fights.

“Men have lost confidence in their officials and can not trust one another,” he continued,

“This is the gigantic evil in our midst.”99 If the union’s leadership did not heed the miners’ concerns, he and others believed, there would be little need for them or their orders, regardless of whether they won their fights.

This dysfunction coincided with the already growing tension between UMW national officers and miners west of the Mississippi River after the 1894 suspension. Like most other regions, western states faced wage reductions upon resuming work, but their trouble came from two distinct causes. First, the depressed coal prices caused mines to increase production in hopes of selling greater volumes to make up for profit loss. For the first time, Iowa mines mined enough coal to compete with Illinois and Missouri mines for the Chicago and railroad markets at the same time that southern Illinois looked to take a bigger portion of the Chicago market as well.100 Western Pennsylvania miners also

moved to capitalize on the Chicago market and the overwhelmingly non-union region

Few Words,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; Proceedings of the Six Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, “Official Report,” February 21, 1895; “An Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Illinois Mines,” NLT, March 14, 1895; “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Mass Meeting,” UMWJ, December 9, 1897; Ware, Labor Movement in the United States, 371-3. 99 Wm. H. Crawford, letter to the editor, “How Goes It,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895. 100 “Miner,” letter to the editor, “An Object Lesson,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895; “President Penna Talks,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895. 244

caused wage reductions to cascade through competing mines in Ohio, Illinois, and

Indiana, regardless of union affiliation.101

The competition-fueled reductions were compounded with old problems that

intensified with the economic and agricultural crises. Desperate farmers suffering from

lowering grain prices and western silver miners hurt by the silver legislation all sought

relief in the coal mines. While some simply entered the larger shafts as diggers, others

used their land to open their own mines. “Every farmer in Bellville who wishes to, can

have his own coal mine, and it is not uncommon there to see the ‘old man’ and his boys

digging, and the old woman and girls hoisting the coal with an old gin horse, and thus

producing very cheap coal indeed,” Illinois union leader James Flynn observed. Such

enterprises, or cooperatives where miners leased farmland from local farmers to open

their own mines, dug their coal with no overhead and little debt, selling their coal far

below the scale. Although their production was less, there were enough farmers,

cooperatives, and small coal companies to force larger mines to push their wages down to

compete. But by early 1895, the larger corporations operated with higher overhead costs

and larger debts, making it difficult to sustain their corporations on the meager profit

margins that fed cooperative miners’ families.102 Consequently, operators in Iowa

appealed to the UMW to force the smaller and cooperative mines to adhere to the scale

rate.103

101 “Pittsburgh,” CTJ, September 16, 1896; “Wages Question in Pittsburgh, Pa.,” CTJ, September 30, 1896. 102 Jas. J. Flynn, letter to the editor, “A Misfortune,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895; “Burn American Coal— II,” CTJ, April 18, 1894; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, February 28, 1895; J. W. Reynolds, letter to the editor, “President Reynolds,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; J. M. Carson, letter to the editor, “Vice President Carson,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, March 28, 1895; Julius Fromm, letter to the editor, “Iowa News,” UMWJ, April 25, 1895; “Dan McLaughlin,” NLT, August 8, 1895. 103 Official Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers, 1895, “Official Report,” UMWJ, February 21, 1895; “Max,” letter to the editor, “Hiteman, Ia.,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895. 245

But the UMW did little to address the miners’ concerns. Indeed, Missouri mine

worker “Cornfield Sailor” observed that although his state remained loyal to the UMW

throughout the 1894 strike, the organization did little to save them from the constant

injuries sustained from union and non-union miners in neighboring states. Kansas miners

abandoned the UMW and returned to work, injuring the Missouri miners’ strike while the

Oskaloosa settlement that Penna described ultimately caused Missouri miners to accept a

reduction. “The reduction that those places [in Iowa] are getting now is only the

consequence of former reductions at Bevier [Missouri],” Cornfield Sailor explained. In

his mind, the trouble came from the UMW’s inability to regulate the mines west of the

Mississippi. Preoccupied with the larger producers competing in the eastern markets, the

UMW rarely bothered to address the problems in western mines competing for railroad

markets.104

As the February 1895 UMW national convention neared, however, UMW

President Phil Penna looked to Iowa with newfound interest. With rank and file miners

pushing for a formal investigation into his role in the 1894 settlement and the growing threat that the Knights miners would vote to break from the UMW, Penna seized the opportunity to cast the UMW in a positive light. Although he attended the Iowa state convention where miners discussed the problem at length, Penna sent an open letter to

Master Workman James Sovereign blaming him and the Knights of Labor for the wage

decline. According to Penna, miners in Des Moines, who had recently abandoned the

UMW by transferring their NTA 135 charter to the Knights of Labor’s Iowa State

Assembly, were working below UMW scale rates, forcing all miners to accept the same

104 “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor “Cornfield Sailor,” UMWJ, May 16, 1895. 246

reductions.105 Noting that this assembly was under Sovereign’s jurisdiction rather than

the UMW, Penna challenged Sovereign to “exemplify the ability of the Knights of Labor

to care for the miners’ interests” by commanding the Des Moines non-UMW Knight

miners to honor the scale “or admit your inability to do so….”106 Such claims, designed

to highlight the Knights’ weakness also made light of the problems miners faced and the

UMW failed to address, particularly in western states. Consequently, by the time Penna

charged Sovereign with being unable and unfit to care for the Iowa miners, the remaining

UMW miners west of the Mississippi considered seceding from the UMW to form a

western miners’ union.107

Despite Penna and the national officers’ claims that the Knights ultimatum would

split a unified order, many miners understood that what remained of the UMW was

already splintered but those who remained in its ranks desperately willed it to survive.

The 1895 convention at Columbus, Ohio, then, served as a means to patch wounds, even

if it could not heal them entirely. Even miner wife Laurene Gardner, who blatantly

accused Penna of accepting bribes to end the 1894 strike not only encouraged miners to

put aside differences, but endorsed Penna for president.108 The salary question was

quietly laid to rest by reducing the president’s salary by three hundred dollars. Penna won

the presidency, but his reputation remained injured. Although the miners’ committee

105 Due to the complexities of the mining payment system, which varied according to coal quality, equipment used, amount of dead work, screen size, bar spacing on the screen, and the mine’s proximity to the railroad, it is impossible to compare miners’ wages from mine to mine in any meaningful way. 106 P. H. Penna to James Sovereign, printed in UMWJ, January 24, 1895. 107 Philip Veal, letter to the editor, “Adair, Ia.,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; W. L., letter to the editor, “Foster, Ia.,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Joseph Whiteman, letter to the editor, “District Fourteen,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895; C. Triesney, letter to the editor, “Irline, Ia.,” UMWJ, January 3, 1895; E. J. Harris, letter to the editor, “Fulton, Mo.,” UMWJ, November 1, 1894; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Cornfield Sailor,” UMWJ, May 16, 1895; H. Marling, Joseph Perry, John Woodrough, H.W. Walters, Auditing Committee, UMW Missouri-Kansas District Fourteen Official Auditor’s Report from December 31, 1894 to May 7, 1895, “Auditor’s Report,” UMWJ, May 23, 1895; G. H. Hewitt, letter to the editor, “An Interesting Letter,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895. 108 Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Just a Few Words,” UMWJ, February 14, 1895. 247 exonerated Penna and the other officers of the “selling out” charges, even the committee unanimously agreed that the officers had “exceeded their authority” and acknowledged that McBride did have a suspicious amount of money credited to him at the strike settlement.109 At a second meeting, Knight miners voted in favor of seceding from the

Knights to remain loyal to the UMW. Within weeks, the former Knight miners, along with several other trades assemblies, formed the Independent Order of the Knights of

Labor.110 Led by General Master Workman William Beauchop Wilson, a former UMW organizer and delegate at the New Orleans General Assembly, the Independent Order would allow Knight miners to retain their dual membership in NTA 135 and the

UMW.111

The outcome of the 1895 convention, though a testament to many miners’ loyalty to the UMW, did little to assuage the fractures already present within the order. Furious that the officers remained unscathed, Local Union 296 of Ohio submitted resolutions to local presses declaring that they were leaving the UMW and encouraging others to follow suit. The plan reverberated throughout the state, enough for Ohio UMW leader R. L.

Davis to express alarm that the UMW was at a breaking point.112 This sentiment was so strong in Indiana District Eleven that the delegates at the state convention considered a

109 McBride refused to state in the record where the $600 he gave to ARU member Mark Wild came from, but insisted that it was neither paid to him as a bribe nor given to Wild as a bribe to end the railroad strike. McBride explained the details of the exchange to the investigating committee, which unanimously declared “McBride did a very indiscreet thing in having anything to do with that money,” but nonetheless found him innocent of wrongdoing. The scandal, coupled with severe illness, however, crippled McBride’s ability to effectively serve as AFL President, which he lost to Samuel Gompers at the next AFL election. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, 1895, “Official Report,” UMWJ, February 21, 1895; “Wild Bombarding,” Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] Press, February 14, 1895; Goldstene, Struggle for America’s Promise, p. 118. 110 Independent Order of the Knights of Labor Constitution, 1895; “Why the IOK of L?” c.a. 1895. 111Michael J. Bishop, Report of the General Worthy Foreman, Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1895, p.9. 112 R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “What R. L. Thinks,” UMWJ, March 14, 1895. 248 resolution to leave the UMW and use the ten cents paid in national dues to build a local defense fund.113

Davis and the other officers had good reason to worry about their ranks breaking apart. As Wilson and the Independent Order moved to incorporate former Knights into its ranks, their actions were matched by Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes, who

“reorganized” the Knights’ own NTA 135 and called for the former Knight miners’ assemblies to return to the order. Eleven delegates representing ten assemblies from Ohio and Indiana attended founding meeting, held in Evansville, Indiana, in June 1895.114

Although it was dismissed by UMW officers, the split was not taken as lightly as they implied. Officers insisted the new NTA 135 of the Knights of Labor would be short- lived, but the frequency of their comments indicates that the number of assemblies leaving the weakened UMW was cause for concern. The three assemblies that originally seceded from Indiana to form the NTA 135, Knights of Labor, for example, were nearly one-quarter of the total locals still paying dues in District Eleven.115

The Knights’ reach soon stretched into other states, but their decision to leave the

UMW for the Knights did not necessarily reflect a preference for Knights procedure over the UMW. In fact, the fights between Knight and UMW leadership and even the organizational splits were met with little comment or fanfare from the miners. By 1895, neither Knights nor the UMW had proven able to adhere to their principles and in most

113 J. H. Kennedy, Proceedings of the UMW Indiana District Eleven Convention, 1895, “Official Report,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895. 114 By the 1895 convention, the General Executive Board claimed the number of local assemblies attached to NTA 135, Knights of Labor were “nearly one hundred.” J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June, 27, 1895; Charles R. Martin, letter to the editor, “Be Careful!” UMWJ, July 4, 1895; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim’s Reflections,” UMWJ, July 25, 1895; Report of the General Executive Board, Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1895, p. 29. 115 This assessment is based on J. H. Kennedy’s district dues reports from May 1895 to the time of the secession announcement on June 27, 1895. 249

regions, the local assemblies, like local unions, were more concerned with reviving their

dying locals and finding trustworthy leadership than they were with the ongoing fight between organizations.116 The vast number of non-union miners, constant district

competition, and lack of faith in officers had a greater impact on miners than their union

affiliation. Indeed, one Pennsylvania assembly under the Independent Order declared that

the infighting among the officers in the newspapers was tiresome and declared that

instead of attacking each other, they should organize the miners in whatever organization

they wished. 117

But if the rank and file miners were unconcerned with the Knight-UMW split,

their decisions regarding which organization to remain affiliated with after the split

revealed that hostilities from the 1894 suspension remained strong. NTA 135, Knights of

Labor’s selection for master workman, former Ohio state president A. A. Adams, left

little doubt that those who left the UMW to rejoin the Knights did so out of an

unwillingness to sit under the UMW’s present leadership. By the summer of 1895,

Adams was a symbol for organizational purity. He became a hero in 1894 by refusing to

sign the 1894 settlement and openly charged UMW national officers of misconduct. In

subsequent months, he became the driving force behind the allegations that the officers

had “sold out” and was the reason the charges were investigated at the 1895 UMW

convention. 118 Adams, then, was the ideal leader for miners unhappy with UMW officers

116 “Irish Jack and Close Observer,” letter to the editor, “Island, Ky.,” UMWJ, May 2, 1895; A. F. C., letter to the editor, “Block Coal News,” UMWJ, April 18, 1895. 117 “Local Assembly I. O. K. of L. of Barnsboro, PA,” Official Resolutions, “Tired of It,” UMWJ, April 18, 1895. 118 A. A. Adams to Phil Penna, open letter reprinted in “Adams’s Answer,” UMWJ, January 24, 1895; Phil Penna to A. A. Adams, open letter printed in “Penna to Adams,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; Henry Shires, John Spriggs, R. D. Austin, T. R. Jones, M. P. Curran, Committee, Official Resolutions of Miners in Subdistrict 2, District 6, UMW, “Denounced,” UMWJ, March 21, 1895. For specific references to the “sold out” charges, see “Vice President Penna Talks,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894; Eddie Ocheltree, letter to the 250 or their exoneration and the Knights of Labor was the most promising organization to avoid corruption.119

Local assemblies’ decisions to abandon the UMW and Independent Order for the revived NTA 135 Knights of Labor were part of a larger rebellion against the UMW officers. When miners faced a new wage reduction in spring 1895, UMW miners in Ohio and Indiana charged that officers had once again “sold out” the miners and demanded state officers’ resignations.120 Summit, Indiana, miners called for the resignation of the national officers in addition to their state leaders, prompting UMW President Penna to immediately issue a response rejecting their request, claiming the local was three months behind in dues.121 If Penna’s claim was true, the Summit local that lodged the charges, which faithfully paid its state dues, purposefully withheld dues to the national from the time national officers instructed them to accept a reduction. Summit had allies. When

Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy informed local mine leader W. J. Winterbottom that some of the locals in his region of southern Indiana were no longer paying their state

editor, “Strong,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene Gardner,” UMWJ, July 12, 1894; “F. J. H.,” letter to the editor, “Fulton, Mo.,” UMWJ, July26, 1894; “A Would-Be Knight,” letter to the editor, “Alabama News,” UMWJ, November 12, 1896. 119 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, June 27, 1895; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim’s Reflections,” UMWJ, July 25, 1895; “Populist,” letter to the editor, “Steady Work at Montgomery,” UMWJ, September 5, 1895. 120 Geo. Whitehead, letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Views,” NLT, May 30, 1895; “J. B. Donnelly,” letter to the editor, “A La Salle Miner,” UMWJ, August 15, 1895; Alfred Broad, letter to the editor, “A Coal City Man’s Views,” UMWJ, July 18, 1895; D. E. Jones, letter to the editor, “Abuse of the Officers,” UMWJ, July 18, 1895 (“sold out”); J. H. Kennedy, Official Report of UMW Indiana District Eleven Special Convention, August 8, 1895.; J. A. Crawford, letter to the editor, “The Organized Miners,” UMWJ, February 6, 1896; Julius Fromm, letter to the editor, “This Beats All,” UMWJ, February 6, 1896. 121 By order of the Indiana special convention, the Indiana officers’ resignations were only required if the officers, who had encouraged the miners to not strike, called the state out on strike immediately. Summit Miners, Official Resolutions of Summit, Indiana, Local Union 31, “Resolutions,” UMWJ, August 8, 1895; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “President Penna,” UMWJ, August 8, 1895; I. N. Cassady, letter to the editor, “Cassidy Resigns,” UMWJ, August 15, 1895; “Union,” letter to the editor, “Bridgeport, O.,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895; D. C. [name illegible], letter to the editor, “Opposed to a New Organization,” NLT, August 29, 1895; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, August 29, 1895; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, September 5, 1895; Editorial, “For several weeks,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895. 251 dues, Winterbottom did not deny it; instead he remarked that “in all probability they have not paid their national tax either.”122 Other regions experienced similar declines, with officers everywhere giving listings of locals suspended for not paying dues.123 “When the

strike ended the union expired,” Illinois District Secretary W. J. Guymon summarized of

the Illinois districts.124 Miner “Next Week,” agreed, noting that “[t]here are some 32,000 miners in Illinois and not one in ten is organized,” a far cry from how energetic the union had been just a few months earlier. There was no doubt in his mind to the cause as he encouraged the miners to revive their locals. If an officer was guilty “of evil doing” they should “kick him so far that he cannot get back anymore. But stick to the order yourself,” he insisted.125

Next Week’s assertions indicated that the atrophy labor organizations experienced in the mid-1890s did not indicate a lack of faith in unionization as much as it did mistrust for union leadership. “[H]ad we a Debs,” one miner posited, “we might claim nine-tenths of the miners of our country as members….”126 Miners’ cries for “a Moses” who would

“lead us out of this wilderness in which we find ourselves” gave way to new

122 W. J. Wintebottom, letter to the editor, “Washington, Ind.,” UMWJ, October 25, 1894; “Whirlwind,” letter to the editor, “Montgomery, Ind.,” UMWJ, September 27, 1894. 123A Well Wisher,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Ky.,” UMWJ, December 13, 1894; Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “A Batch of News,” UMWJ, November 8, 1894; E. J. Harris, letter to the editor, “Fulton, Mo,” UMWJ, November 1, 1894; “A. F. C.,” letter to the editor, “A Few Points,” UMWJ, January 31, 1895; “Populist,” letter to the editor, “Steady Work at Montgomery,” UMWJ, September 5, 1895; Editorial, “W. J. Guymon,” UMWJ, November 7, 1895; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, November 14, 1895; Patrick McBryde, “Important Notice,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895; Julius Fromm, letter to the editor, “This Beats All,” UMWJ, February 6, 1896; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, March 26, 1896; J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, March 19, 1896; Fox, United We Stand, 49. 124 W. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “The Blacklist,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895 (date listed incorrectly as January 10 on the first page of this issue). 125 “Next Week,” letter to the editor, “Hot Shot,” UMWJ, December 20, 1894; “Miner,” letter to the editor, “Coal City, Ill.,” UMWJ, January 17, 1895. 126 “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Again,” UMWJ, December 5, 1895. 252 organizations comprised of miners frustrated with the UMW.127 Miners in Ohio formed the Massillon Independent Movement, Indiana became a base for the American Industrial

Union in Indiana, which planned to make Eugene Debs their president, while Iowa formed the Iowa Miners’ Protective Association that former Missouri UMW mine worker

“Cornfield Sailor” hoped Missouri would emulate.128

The anger and desperation that drove the miners to refuse to pay dues, reject union leadership, or form opposing orders did more than create unrest within organizational ranks. The most overwhelming and pressing impact that came out of the

1894 suspension, settlement, and seeming officer dishonesty was the dramatic decline in

UMW membership and efficiency. “At our annual convention in 1891 Secretary

Watchorn reported a membership of a fraction over 34,000. Since that time our membership has been on the decline,” Indiana District Eleven Secretary John Kennedy wrote angrily. “We have tried for six years to perfect our organization and we are farther from the goal than we were five years ago.”129 The fracture and decay of the miners’ movement meant that the UMW no longer had any power to influence scale rates or call strikes. Although remaining UMW members continued to push for “restriction” or limiting the amount of coal produced by only working five and a half days a week, leadership cautioned against it, claiming it would only hurt the union more. Only five percent of Illinois miners were organized, Indiana barely had one-quarter in the union,

127 Editorial, “For several weeks,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895 (quote); “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Linton Letter,” UMWJ, November 14, 1895; 128Cornfield Sailor’s non-union status did not necessarily come from a rejection of the UMW, Instead, he became non-union because there was no longer any organization in his region for him to join. D. H. Sullivan, letter to the editor, “Denny Sullivan,” UMWJ, August 22, 1895; Michael Ratchford, letter to the editor, “President Ratchford,” UMWJ, March 13, 1896; G. W. Purcell, letter to the editor, “President Purcell,” UMWJ, August 29, 1895; D. C. [name illegible], letter to the editor, “Opposed to a New Organization,” NLT, August 29, 1895; “Cornfield Sailor,” letter to the editor, “Bevier, Mo.,” UMWJ, November 28, 1895; D. E. Jones, “Abuse of the Officers,” UMWJ, July 18, 1895. 129 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Official Report, UMWJ, December 5, 1895. 253

United Mine Workers’ Journal editor John Kane declared. “Take Pennsylvania and the

same condition of affairs exists, even to a worse degree. Take West Virginia, Tennessee,

Kentucky, Virginia and Missouri, yes, even Ohio, and every other state whose relations

to each other are such that what affects one influences the other, and they are all in a

condition in which the crudest methods of warfare are almost impracticable, not to say

anything about such a nice instrument as restriction,” he continued, claiming it would be

better if the miners waited for the union to become strong again. 130 But Kennedy, as well

as hundreds of the remaining UMW miners, disagreed. “True, if an effort was made in

the direction of restriction and if we failed we would lose some members,” Kennedy

observed. “It is equally true if we remain inactive and do nothing we will lose

members.”131 Miners in Streator, Illinois, agreed, observing that instead of uniting across

district and state lines miners were “making a fight by themselves, the same as in olden

days before we were brought in such close competition with one another by improved

methods of transportation.” Such efforts would only end in failure, they acknowledged,

but they saw no easy fix. While surveying the UMW’s failures since its formation, the

Streator miners claimed that “lack confidence in one another and also our officers,” only

intensified UMW weaknesses, because, they wrote, “instead of building it keeps us

rebuilding.”132

In the meantime, there was little the union could do to aid the miners, but sit in

what Linton, Indiana, miner and former union leader “Incog” called “masterly inactivity,”

130 Editorial, “For several weeks,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895; R. L. Davis, letter to the editor, “R. L. Davis on Restriction,” UMWJ, December 5, 1895; W. J. Guymon, letter to the editor, “What Guymon Says,” UMWJ, December 5, 1895. 131 J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana District Eleven Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, November 28, 1895. 132 Secretary of Progress Assembly No. 963, I. O. K. of L. Official Report of Resolutions, “Local Assembly,” November 19, 1896. 254

doing little more than “hoping for better times.” What was the point of being in the union,

he wondered. “Why just think of it, we are all in the habit of speaking of Earlington

district (Kentucky) as a blackleg hole and yet those men have not come below 62 ½ cents

a ton and are now getting 76 cents, and a man can put out as many tons of coal there as he

can at any mine around Linton.”133 If the miners were going to be masters at inactivity, it

seemed it would be better if they did so outside the union rather than in it.

If the unions were not active, the miners still were. Under the cover of darkness in the late summer of 1896, several masked men burned down the Old Pittsburg Coal

Company’s mine in Hymera, Indiana.134 Prior to the flames, the Hymera miners were

locked in a dispute not with the company, but with the neighboring mines over the size of

the screen used to filter the coal.135 “The lawful screen for this state, or at least the law

recognized, is 1¼ inch diamond bar,” Kennedy explained. “The screen at Hymera was 1

17 56 inches between diamond bars, and they were nearly always in trouble for the last

couple of years with these men because of their unfair screen.”136 The difference between

3 the two, which was 56 of an inch, drove down coal prices in the Sullivan, Indiana, region

enough to help trigger a five cent per ton wage reduction in mines throughout the area.

133 “Incog,” letter to the editor, “Linton News,” UMWJ, November 21, 1895; “Vigo Kicker,” letter to the editor, “Kanawha, Ind.,” UMWJ, November 7, 1895; “Scot,” letter to the editor, “Man’s Inhumanity to man Makes Countless Thousands Mourn,” UMWJ, December 5, 1895; 134 Because mine shafts frequently changed hands, it is unclear if the “Old Pittsburgh Coal Company” was the actual company that owned the shaft at the time of the fire. Kennedy gave this as the company name, but the Labor Commissioner Report the following year listed the company as Butts & Rubly at the time of the fire. “Indiana Labor Commission Report of the Settlement of the Coal Miners’ Strike at Star City and Hymera, Sullivan, Indiana, November 30, 1897,” JMP, Box 37, Folder 4, INSA. 135 At the time, UMW state officers had called a strike for the region, which most miners aside from Hymera honored, even though some of the locals that honored the strike were in “open rebellion” against UMW state officers. “General News,” Indianapolis News, June 8, 1896; “Notes from the Mines,” Indianapolis News, June 10, 1896 (“open rebellion”); “Apply the Torch,” Logansport [Indiana] Pharos- Tribune, July 31, 1896. 136 J.H. Kennedy, UMWA District Eleven Report, UMWJ, August 6, 1896. 255

But even the formerly thoroughly unionized District Eleven no longer had the power to

enforce its regulations.

The other miners in the region walked out on strike when asked to accept the new

reduction that summer, but Hymera accepted the terms. Most who worked there were

also farmers and saw no reason to fight a reduction in their supplemental income. They

continued mining at the newly reduced rate until the fire destroyed everything from the

tipple to the shaft. “So far, nobody seems to have any idea who done it,” Kennedy

asserted, insisting that the “deplorable” arson would do more harm to an already

depressed region. Yet even as he condemned the vigilantes’ actions, Kennedy wanted

some good to come from the event. Namely, he hoped the company would use its

insurance money to purchase a new screen compliant with Indiana regulations. 137

The Old Pittsburg Coal Company, however, did not share Kennedy’s vision. The

company already experienced financial difficulties before the fire and after surveying the

nearly $50,000 in damages, company executives claimed the mine was not worth

rebuilding and made plans to leave the region altogether. In the following weeks, the

Hymera farmer-miners pleaded with the company not only to remain in Hymera, but to rebuild the mine as soon as possible. In exchange, some offered money to help cover the

initial building costs while other farmer-miners promised the company six days of work

without wages. To everyone’s surprise, the company complied, rebuilt the mine, and

announced that anyone seeking a spot in the new shaft would first have to give the

company six days of free labor. “[And] that is not the worst of it,” Kennedy railed, “this

is to be the rule for a year. Fellow miners, any of you that have six days’ labor to pay for

137“Western Coal and Coke Notes,” CTJ, July 1, 1896; “The State of Trade,” and “Notes of the Week,” CTJ, August 5, 1896; J.H. Kennedy, UMWA District Eleven Report, UMWJ, August 6, 1896; “The State of Trade,” CTJ, September 30, 1896. 256 a job at a mine where they are paying less than scale rates… and will promise not to claim any of the rights of citizenship, you might be able to get work at Hymera, Ind.”

Over one hundred men agreed to the company terms.138

The desperation that ran throughout the southern Midwest corn and coalfields by the mid-1890s made situations like that in Hymera far too common. Miners in Spring

Valley, Illinois, were irate when the city inspector found that the company’s scales cheated the miners out of five hundred pounds to each ton. The justice of the peace threw out the case because the city inspector had no jurisdiction over the rural mines. The situation turned into a race riot later that week when a group of black men shot an Italian man while robbing him. In addition to placing a bomb near the mine manager’s home, two separate miner mobs charged to the company houses reserved for African American miners. The black miners had not only accepted the cheated weight, but worked under the scale rate, prompting a mob of “white” miners and a second mob of non-native English speaking “foreigners” led by the region’s Italians to ransack the black miners’ living quarters, shooting and beating men, women, and children. For nearly two days, black miners and their families hid in the woods as the mobs scoured the land with their shotguns, “hunting for negroes.”139

138By April, the mine had resumed full force, yet miners had not been paid for three weeks. Although the company owed them $1,300, it only offered to split $500 between its employees. Within months the company declared bankruptcy, demonstrating how hard-pressed even coal companies were to turn a small profit. “Notes of the Week,” CTJ, August 12, 1896; “Hymera Mines Change Owners,” Indianapolis News, October 14, 1896; J.H. Kennedy, UMWA District Eleven Report, UMWJ, February 18, 1897; “Striking for Arrearages in Pay,” Indianapolis News, April 16, 1897; “Mining Outlook in Sullivan County,” Indianapolis News, May 17, 1897; “Indiana Miners,” Elwood [Indiana] Daily Record, July 7, 1897; “Indiana Labor Commission Report of the Settlement of the Coal Miners’ Strike at Star City and Hymera, Sullivan, Indiana, November 30, 1897,” JMP, Box 37, Folder 4, INSA. 139 “Old Miner,” letter to the editor, “Letter from Lasalle,” NLT, August 8, 1895; “Mobs at the Mines,” NLT, August 8, 1895 (“hunting for negroes”); “Two Mobs in a Riot,” CDT, August 5, 1895; “Rioters to be Tried,” DIO, August 17, 1895. 257

The conditions that caused the Hymera miners to burn down the shaft were the

same that caused Spring Valley miners to divide along racial lines. Such actions exposed

the forces that caused rural workers to attack each other as much as their employers. By

then, the southern Midwest was almost solidly non-union because miners did not believe

that union affiliation could help them. 140 Bituminous miners’ annual income had

declined from $292 in 1894 to $282 just two years later, making their earnings sixty-eight

percent of what factory workers earned in 1896.141 Faced with a crippled economy,

increasing debt and defunct producer organizations, thousands of producers pinned their

hopes for change on the ballot box, but their efforts there were equally frayed. Just as

they remained divided over which organization or leader to follow, neither farmers nor

miners in the South, Midwest, or anywhere could agree on the party or platform that

would improve their conditions while ethnic divisions further prevented rural producers

from voting together. Even with a fusion ticket in 1896, they failed to unite on a national

stage. Instead, miners, like farmers and other rural laborers split their votes between the

parties.142 Their actions in refusing to vote together, embracing vigilantism, accepting

depreciated terms like six days of free labor or five hundred pounds of cheated weight

exemplified the ongoing thought among producers everywhere. They believed they were

better off looking after their own interests than following an organization or party, even

when they accepted worse terms than they desired.

140 By the 1896 national UMW convention, Illinois and Indiana only sent seventeen delegates total. Western Kentucky, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas did not send any. In comparison, Ohio sent thirty-nine, Pennsylvania sent twenty-four, and West Virginia, Tennessee, and southeastern Kentucky sent one delegate each. No other districts were represented. UMW Official Report of the 1896 National Convention, “Official Report,” UMWJ, April 23, 1896. 141 Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, 240; Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 223, 350, 353. 142 Michael Pierce, Striking with the Ballot: Ohio Labor and the Populist Party (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, p. 244-246, 258-261; Matthew Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists. 258

Chapter 7: Epilogue

Common Legacies

There was never much reason to visit the tiny coal mining town just outside

“Egypt” until December 7, 1930. On that day, the number of people in Mt. Olive,

Illinois, swelled by 4,000 as visitors came to pay respects to one of the miners’ greatest champions before she was laid to rest. Mary “Mother” Jones had dedicated sixty years to the miners’ unions, first as a volunteer in the late-nineteenth century, and then as a paid

UMW organizer in 1901. Over the next decades, “the miner’s angel” became famous for her involvement in Colorado and West Virginia strikes, but her heart remained with the

Illinois miners. Consequently, at her request, her body was forever interred with the miners and wives buried at the Union Miners’ Cemetery in Mt. Olive. 1

The union cemetery was first created to hold the bodies of three Mt. Olive miners killed during a UMW strike in Virden, Illinois, in 1898 when strikers and their wives waged a gunfight against mine guards. Six miners and five guards were killed and their bodies were shipped to their hometowns for burial.2 Seen as “murderers” by community leaders, the three miners from Mt. Olive were forbidden from being buried in the regular cemetery. Unlike the miners of Frontenac, Kansas, just ten years earlier, however, the

Virden miners were given a proper burial when the UMW purchased a one-acre tract of land to place their bodies. By the time Jones made her burial request in 1923, the cemetery had become a resting place for dozens of union miners and wives, including

1 “Mother Jones Eulogized,” NYT, December 8, 1930; “Mother Jones Buried,” NYT, December 9, 1930. 2 Five guards also died in the gunfight. Phelan, Divided Loyalties, 43; “Our Illustrations,” UMWJ, November 3, 1898; George Bagwill, letter to the editor, “Bagwill,” UMWJ, November 10, 1898; “Mt. Olive’s Dead,” Decatur [Illinois] Daily Review, October 15, 1898; “Monuments Dedicated,” Decatur [Illinois] Herald, December 2, 1899. 259

“General” Alexander Bradley who marched with Jacob Coxey in 1894 and led the

“soldier-miners” in the1898 march on Virden. 3 Jones wished to be part of this legacy. “I

hope it will be my consolation when I pass away to feel I sleep under the clay with those

brave boys,” she wrote, for in her mind, “[t]hey are responsible for Illinois being the best

organized labor state in America.”4

Jones’s claim was not wrong. By 1930, the UMW claimed over 160,000

members. 5 Although crippled in 1896, changes in both union and the national economy

in the months following greatly improved union strength. Phil Penna stepped down from

the presidency at the end of his 1896 term, becoming superintendent for the coal

company he partially owned.6 With the last of the leadership who signed the 1894

agreement out of the UMW executive offices, hundreds of miners who had demanded

officers’ resignations in 1894 and 1895 considered returning to the union again.

Meanwhile, the improving economic conditions made it possible for miners to demand

higher wages for their work. Working as a volunteer UMW organizer, Mother Jones

joined leaders like Eugene Debs and Samuel Gompers in an aggressive 1897 push to

revive the union and organize the non-union coalfields. During those months, young

northern Illinois miner John Mitchell gained fame for brokering peaceful negotiations

between Illinois miners and operators and bringing “discipline” to a rank and file

accustomed to local strikes. The union’s organizing momentum intensified as Mitchell

3 On Bradley’s involvement in Virden, see “Are Ready for a Fight,” Decatur Herald, October 8, 1898. 4 Mary Harris Jones, “Special Request to the Miners of Mt. Olive, Illinois,” November 12, 1923, Mt. Olive Public Library, Mt. Olive, Illinois; “Conduct Memorial,” Edwardsville Intelligencer, October 12, 1921. 5 William J. Walsh, “The United Mine Workers of America as an Economic and Social Force in the Anthracite Territory,” PhD Dissertation (Washington DC: Catholic University, 1931) p. 193. 6 “Notes of the Week,” CTJ, October 7, 1896; Dan O’Leary, UMW Indiana District Eleven Subdistrict Three Special Convention, “Report,” UMWJ, April 8, 1897; P. H. Penna, letter to the editor, “P.H. Penna,” UMWJ, April 22, 1897; “Indiana Coal Operators’ Association,” BD, July 15, 1905; Warren Van Tine, The Making of the Labor Bureaucrat; Union Leadership in the United States, 1870-1920 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973). 260

unofficially assumed the UMW presidency in 1898, with the UMW making strides in

negotiating wage agreements with operators, most notably in the 1902 anthracite coal

strike. 7 These successes continued into the twentieth century and dramatically increased

under the leadership of former southern Iowa grain dealer and miner, John L. Lewis. 8

By the time Jones died, the UMW was one of the strongest labor organizations in

the United States. Less than six years after the miners laid Jones to rest, 50,000 miners

returned to her grave to once again pay tribute to Jones by erecting a monument in her

honor.9 Despite the UMW’s strength in Illinois and in the nation, Illinois miners were far

from content with their organization. Rather, the organized miners were divided between

two vying unions. The miners who built and dedicated the Jones Monument were

members of the newly-formed Progressive Miners of America (PMA) and its women’s

auxiliary, a rebel union founded in 1932 by southern Illinois union miners dissatisfied

with UMW leadership. They claimed that UMW President Lewis “sold out” their

interests by entering into an agreement with coal operators, including Phil Penna, that

unfairly reduced Midwestern miners’ wages. The PMA and UMW spent the next several

years engaged in violent battles throughout the southern Illinois mine fields, breaking

each other’s strikes and attacking each other through legal battles, in newspapers, and in

sporadic gun battles resulting in casualties.10 By the time the PMA erected the Jones

7 Phelan, Divided Loyalties,36-42 (“discipline” p. 38); Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 118-122 8 Walsh, “The United Mine Workers of America,” p. 193; Alan J. Singer, “‘Something of a Man’: John L. Lewis, the UMWA, and the CIO, 1919-1943,” in The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity? ed. John Laslett (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p.105, 119; Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, John L. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Quadrangle, 1977). 9 “Laud ‘Mother’ Jones as Lemke Hits Lewis,” NYT, October 12, 1936. 10Rank and file frustration with the UMW and Lewis extended beyond Illinois and began long before the PMA’s formation. According to historian Alan Singer, Lewis “ruthlessly suppressed rank and file dissent and dismembered district autonomy,” in an effort to strengthen the UMW and his authority within it. 261 monument, twenty new names were listed on the monument with Jones and the 1898

Virden miners who had given their lives for organized labor. According to the monument’s inscription, these nineteen miners and one miner’s wife gave their lives in the 1930s PMA mine wars, fighting against both the government and the UMW, for “the cause of clean unionism in America.”11

Like Jones herself, the inscription on her grave testified to the complexities of labor organizing and how divided loyalties, internal divisions, and conflicts are typically understood and remembered. Jones’s career as a labor organizer began long before she joined the UMW’s payroll. Like many women involved in the labor movement, she held no membership in these early years and because of this, her efforts prior to working as an official organizer are easily overlooked. Likewise, the monument constructed in her honor was funded and built by union workers who opposed a rival labor organization so bitterly that they were willing to die fighting against it. In memorializing those killed fighting the UMW, Jones’s monument was anti-UMW propaganda designed to remind all who viewed it that organized labor, even in the 1930s, was divided against itself. Even the strongest unions at the height of their strength alienated workers who believed the organization did not have their interests at heart.

But inconvenient truths illustrated by Mother Jones and her grave do not find a place in many narratives of “the labor movement.” By categorizing labor into a neatly separated division of “union” and “non-union,” those with unofficial connections to the

“Illinois Coal War Flares at Hearing,” NYT, August 12, 1933; “Coal Miner Slain in Illinois March,” NYT, October 20, 1933; “88,500 Out in Midwest,” NYT, September 24, 1935; “21 Illinois Miners Held in Bombings,” NYT, December 11, 1936; Sylvia Kopald, Rebellion in Labor Unions (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924) p. 33, 69-70; Singer, “Something of a Man,” p. 108, 110-13, 118-119 (quote p. 110); Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields. 11 Mary Harris “Mother” Jones Monument Plaque, Union Miners’ Cemetery, Mt. Olive, Illinois. 262

labor movement, like women, farmers, or workers in hosts of other occupations that

pulled them in and around the mines, are excluded from historical accounts. In the late-

nineteenth century, these groups played crucial roles in organizing and strike success or

failure. Without holding a union card, women like Mother Jones or miner wife Laurene

Gardner contributed to leadership and organizing decisions that directly shaped the

course of the UMW. Lacking union membership or even the official title of “miner” did

not stop farmers from entering the mines and working for lower wages than the UMW

scale allowed. The tens of thousands of non-union miners who made the 1894 strike an initial success, their reasons for honoring a strike while not joining a union, or their attitudes toward unionism in general are left unconsidered.

In addition, excluding these non-union outliers makes those within union ranks appear much more solidified than they actually were and, at times draws lines that group workers in ways more arbitrary than real. It groups together all union members, whether they were white, black, or a non-English-speaking immigrant as a unified body when they did not always see themselves as a part of the whole. Strikebreaking and working below the union scale may be classified as non-union behavior, but in 1888, union miners broke a non-union strike on union officers’ orders and regularly undermined their own pay scales. Such instances indicate that unionism could exist outside union ranks just as easily as non-unionism resided within.

This simplification of labor organizing’s turbulent past makes it more difficult for modern-day scholars and activists to make sense of the fracture among workers or their unwillingness to organize. If organizations like the UMW are presented as the only alternative for workers to improve their lives and the thousands who stood outside its

263 ranks are overlooked, it makes the modern day divisions among workers and their non- unionism appear more novel than it actually is. Those who stood outside Gilded Age unions or acted against them from within, those who refused to unite for a common

“labor ticket” or support mine legislation like anti-screen laws were not acting ‘against their own interests.’ Rather, workers and their interests were far more diverse than their critics acknowledged.

Worker lives cannot be simplified and sorted into neat categories of “union,”

“non-union,” “Republican,” “Populist,” or “Democrat.” The ideological battles they waged extended far beyond the divisions between the Knights and the AFL. Instead, they were complicated people, with rich lives and hopes that pulled and pushed them in different directions as they did what they thought was best for their lives and families. It allowed them to work multiple occupations as farmers, wage earners, and businesspeople.

It pitted them against labor organizers even while they still professed to uphold “honest principles.” It caused some union miners to strikebreak and others to break away from the main order and form new unions that rivaled larger ones.

Such findings apply as easily to the 1930s coalfields and present day workers as they do the workers of the Gilded Age. They share a common legacy of being “run of the mine” workers, whose interests are mixed and conflicting, but never without reason. It is only when actions are considered in this full, messy, and unfiltered context that worker non-unionism begins to make sense.

264

Appendices

Lexicon of Mining Terms

Anthracite coal: hard coal typically of high quality and mined primarily in the eastern Pennsylvania coal fields

Bars: part of the screens used to sort slack from coal. Bars varied in shape and spacing, both factors determining how much coal fell between the bar gaps and away from the coal that would be weighed to the miner’s credit. Bar shape and spacing was therefore citical to any cents per ton wage agreement.

Bituminous coal: most common type of coal mined in the United States. It is softer and less pure than anthracite

Block coal: coal that broke into large lumps of a higher quality than typical bituminous coal. In the southern Midwest, it was mined almost exclusively in Clay County, Indiana.

“Blown shot”/ “rickety shot”/ “windy shot”: an explosion backfire that came from a miner improperly loading his shot blast out the coal. Instead of firing into the face, it shot into the room, usually with an enormous boom and an intense flame. In most cases, blown shots were harmless, but in poor working conditions, they could cause the entire mine to explode, causing miners to be wary of less experienced men in the mines.

Car: large wheeled cart miners used to transport coal out of the mine.

Checkweighman: Worker appointed to oversee the weighing process to make sure miners were correctly credited for the amount of coal they mined. In some mines, the company appointed and paid the checkweighman but in others, including most union mines, the checkweighman was appointed by the miners and receied his salary out of the miners’ wages.

Dead work: Any labor a miner performed in the mine that did not add to the ton of coal he produced. Placing support beams, laying track, clearing out excess rock, and bailing out water were all kinds of dead work. Because these tasks did not add to his tonnage, the miner was usually not paid for them.

Entry: Long corridors that branched throughout most mines from the mine shaft to the “face” with rooms situated along their sides. Miners who “drove entry” dug the coal from the face of the entry, extending the corridor deeper.

Face: newer portion of the mine where the coal was extracted and entries and rooms were dug deeper.

265

“Free click” / “free turn”: mining system that allowed miners who drove entry access to as many cars as they needed to clear away the coal from the entry face without having to wait for a turn. This allowed the mine to continually expand and increase production, but slowed the turn for room miners who waited for access to a car. Miners who drove entry, then, had the best spots in the mine and often produced more coal than room men.

Lump coal:large chunks of coal miners were paid to extract

Nut coal: smaller pieces of coal that fell through the bars in the screening process that miners seldom received pay for.

“Cents per ton”: the most common method of miners’ payment, referring to the amount of cents the miner received for each ton he mined. This meant that the miner’s wages depended on the weight of his load rather than the effort or the time it took to extract it.

“Pluck-me” store: name for the company-owned store that employers frequentlly compelled their employees to shop at, either through scrip payments or the prospect of losing one’s job if his family did not shop there. Miners frequently complained that the stores unfairly “plucked” the wages from the miners.

Practical Miner: an experienced miner who depended on the mines as his primary income.

Room: section of a mine created by walls and supports designed to keep the roof intact. Rooms were connected by entries and one to four miners were assigned to each room.

“Run of the Mine” coal/”Mine Run” coal: coal weighed before it was screened to filter out the slack. This made the miner’s loads weigh more and decreased the value per ton.

Screen: large mine equipment, usually composed of metal bars and mesh, used to filter mined coal. Coal was dumped over the screens, allowing nut coal and slack to fall away from the lump coal before the coal was weighed.

Screened coal: coal that was screened before it was weighed to filter out the slack. This made the miner’s loads weigh less, but with a higher concentration of coal and increased its value per ton.

Scrip: form of payment rural companies like coal mines, timber camps, and textile mills used in place of cash. It was often only redeemable at the company-owned store, forcing employees to shop there. Scrip was closely tied to wroker debt and exploitation (see Chapter 1).

266

“Slack”: non-coal elements like slate and clay extracted with the coal during the mining process. Slack decreased coal value and most miners received no pay for extracting it.

“Turn”: the wait or the line for an available “car” to load the coal. If the mine had more workers than available cars, the turn ran slow, meaning the miner had longer to wait for his coal to be hoisted and therefore produced less coal.

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268

269

270

Abbreviations Organizations

AMA American Miners’ Association ATSF Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Company BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics FAMI Federated Association of Miners and Mine Laborers of Indiana FLUA Farmers and Laborers Union of America HCA House Committee on Agriculture IFI Illinois Farmers’ Institute IMPA Illinois Miners’ Protective Association IOKL Independent Order of the Knights of Labor NFM National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers NPU National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers NTA 135 Knights of Labor National Trade Assembly No. 135 SBA State Board of Agriculture SMI State Mine Inspector UMW United Mine Workers of America USDA United States Department of Agriculture

Newspapers and Periodicals

BD Black Diamond BP Bloomington [Illinois] Pantagraph CT or CDT Chicago [Daily] Tribune CTJ Coal Trade Journal DISJ Daily Illinois State Journal DIO Daily Inter Ocean [Chicago, Illinois] DP Daily Picayune [New Orleans, Louisiana] EMJ Engineering and Mining Journal EC Evansville [Indiana] Courier FSDM or FSM Fort Scott [Kansas] (Daily) Monitor IF Indiana Farmer JKL Journal of the Knights of Labor JUL Journal of United Labor KF Kansas Farmer NE National Economist NLT National Labor Tribune NYT New York Times OCFP Osage City [Kansas] Free Press TSJ Topeka [Kansas] State Journal UMWJ United Mine Workers’ Journal

271

Collections and Locations

ATSF Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company New York Executive Department Files, KSHS ALPL Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois CMP Claude Matthews Papers, INSL ILHS Illinois Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois ILSL Illinois State Library, Springfield, Illinois IRAD Illinois Regional Archives Depository INHS Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana INSA Indiana State Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana INSL Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana JAMP James Atwell Mount Papers JHP John William Hayes Papers JMP John Mitchell Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. KSHS Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas KBLI Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industry [Industrial Statistics] LC Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. MHJP Mary Harris Jones Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. SHSM State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri TVPP Terence Vincent Powderly Papers UILSP University of Illinois Special Collections, Champaign, Illinois UKSP University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, Kentucky UMKC University of Missouri Special Collections, Kansas City, Missouri WERP William E. Rider Papers, UMKC WJBC William Jennings Bryan Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. WKU Western Kentucky University Special Collections, Bowling Green, Kentucky LDLP Lorenzo D. Lewelling Papers, KSHS

272

Bibliography

Manuscript Collections

Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company Records. Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

Bolsterli, Margaret J., ed. Vinegar Pie and Chicken Bread: A Woman's Diary of Life in the Rural South, 1890-1891. Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press, 1982.

Bryan, William Jennings. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

Campbell, Clinton S. Papers. Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois

Campbell, John. Papers. Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois

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Cerrillos Coal and Iron Company Records. Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company Records. Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

Cerrillos Coal Mining Company Records. Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

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Holt, Martin S. and Frank W. Collection, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois

Independent Order of the Knights of Labor. Constitution, 1895. Microfiche

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Knights of Labor. LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, Illinois Regional Archives Depository, Normal, Illinois

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Lewelling, Lorenzo D. Papers, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka

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Algona Republican, Algona, Iowa Alton Telegraph, Alton, Illinois Alton Evening Telegraph, Alton, Illinois. Black Diamond, New York Blackwoods’ Edinburgh Magazine, Edinburgh, Scotland Bloomington Pantagraph, Bloomington, Illinois Coal Trade Journal, New York Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago Tribune Christian Advocate, New York Cleveland Citizen, Cleveland, Ohio Colliery Engineer, Scranton, Pennsylvania Daily Democrat, Huntington, Indiana

274

Daily Illinois State Journal, Springfield, Illinois Daily Inter Ocean, Chicago Daily Picayune, New Orleans, Louisiana Daily Review, Decatur, Illinois Davenport Daily Republican, Davenport, Iowa Decatur Daily Republican, Decatur, Illinois Decatur Herald, Decatur, Illinois Decatur Daily Review, Decatur, Illinois Democrat and Sentinel, Ebensburg, Pennsylvania Des Moines Register, Des Moines, Iowa Edwardsville Intelligencer, Edwardsville, Illinois Elwood Daily Record, Elwood, Indiana Engineering and Mining Journal, New York Evansville Courier, Evansville, Indiana Farmer’s Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa Fort Scott Daily Monitor, Fort Scott, Kansas Fort Scott Monitor, Fort Scott, Kansas Fuel, Chicago Glasgow Weekly Times, Glasgow, Missouri Herald-Dispatch, Decatur, Illinois Hickman Courier, Hickman, Kentucky Humboldt Republican, Humboldt, Iowa Indianapolis News, Indianapolis Indiana Farmer, Indianapolis Journal of Geology, Chicago Journal of the Knights of Labor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Journal of United Labor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Kinsley Graphic, Kinsley, Kansas Lawrence Daily Journal, Lawrence, Kansas Logansport Pharos-Tribune, Logansport, Indiana Malvern Leader, Malvern, Iowa Morning Sun, Pittsburg, Kansas National Economist, Washington, DC National Labor Tribune Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania New Era, Humeston, Iowa New York Times Ohio State Journal, Columbus, Ohio Osage City Free Press, Osage City, Kansas Ottawa Daily Republic, Ottawa, Kansas, Pittsburg Headlight, Pittsburg, Kansas Pittsburg Smelter, Pittsburg, Kansas Pittsburgh Dispatch, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Pittsburgh Post, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Punch, or the London Charivari, London, England San Francisco Call, San Francisco, California

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Sioux Valley News, Correctionville, Iowa Sterling Standard, Sterling, Illinois Topeka Daily Capital, Topeka, Kansas Topeka State Journal, Topeka, Kansas Trade and Mining Journal, Joliet, Illinois United Mine Workers Journal, Columbus, Ohio and Indianapolis, Indiana Weekly Standard, Raleigh, North Carolina Wyandotte Gazette, Kansas City, Kansas

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Record of the Proceedings of Eighteenth Regular Session of the [Knights of Labor] General Assembly, 1894. Microfilm.

Record of the Proceedings of the Nineteenth Regular Session of the [Knights of Labor] General Assembly, 1895. Microfilm.

Record of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Regular Session of the [Knights of Labor] General Assembly, 1893. Microfilm.

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Vita Dana M. Caldemeyer

Education

Master of Arts, History, May 2010, West Virginia University Bachelor of Arts, History, May 2008, University of Evansville

Awards

William T. Bryan Dissertation Fellowship, University of Kentucky, 2015 American Studies Travel Award to Dartmouth College, University of Kentucky, 2014 Lance Banning Memorial Fellowship, University of Kentucky, 2014 American History Regional Award, National Society of Colonial Dames of America, 2013 Regina Hale Canaga Memorial Scholarship, West Virginia University, 2008

Journal Articles and Book Contributions

“Beyond the ‘Brow’: Pants, Pluck, and Proper Behavior among Nineteenth Century Rural Working-Class Wives” (in progress)

“Yoked to Tradition: Kentucky Women and Their Histories,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society Special Issue, “Building a History of Twentieth-Century Kentucky” 113, no. 2-3 (Summer 2015): 453-475.

“African American Newspapers,” “American Baptist,” “American Mutual Savings Bank,” “Nancy Anderson,” and several other entries in The Kentucky African American Encyclopedia (University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

“Conditional Conservatism: Evansville, Indiana’s Embrace of the Ku Klux Klan, 1919-1924,” Ohio Valley History 11, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 3-24.

Book Reviews

Beverly Bond and Sarah Freeman, eds. Tennessee Women: Their Lives and Times, Volume Two, in Tennessee Valley Quarterly (forthcoming).

Michael W. Nagle, Justus S. Stearns: Michigan Pine King and Kentucky Coal Barron, 1845-1933, in Ohio Valley History (forthcoming). 296

Peter A. Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial America in H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, December, 2015.

Jean-Christian Vinel, The Employee: A Political History in The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 112, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 716-718.

W. William Wimberly, Hanna’s Town: A Little World We Have Lost in Ohio Valley History 11, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 86-87.

Teaching Experience:

University of Kentucky, Teaching Assistant: U.S. History 1877-Present, Fall 2011, Spring 2014

University of Kentucky, Teaching Assistant: The Making of Modern Kentucky, Fall 2013

University of Evansville (Indiana), First Year Seminar, Pop Culture in the Global Market, Spring 2011

IVY Tech Community College, Evansville (Indiana) Campus, U.S. History 1500 1877, Spring, Summer 2011

University of Southern Indiana, U.S. History 1865-Present, Fall 2010-Spring 2011

West Virginia University, Graduate Assistant: Latin America Past and Present, Spring 2009

Editing and Research Experience

Book Review Editor, The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, July 2014- December 2015

Research Assistant for Dr. Ronald P. Formisano, University of Kentucky, Spring 2012-Summer 2013, Spring 2014

Research Assistant and Staff Writer, Kentucky African American Encyclopedia, University of Kentucky, Summer 2013

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Presentations

Roundtable panelist, “Building a History of Twentieth Century Kentucky,” Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Eastern Kentucky University, October 2015.

“Yoked to Tradition: Kentucky Women and their Histories,” Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Eastern Kentucky University, October 2015.

“Undermined: Blacklegging Businessmen and the 1888 Strike,” DC Working Class History Seminar, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., September 2015.

“Coal Miner Wives and the ‘Molly Pitcher Spirit,’ 1890-1900,” North American Labor History Conference, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, October 2014.

“Making the Daily Bread: Coal Miner Wives and the ‘Molly Pitcher Spirit,’ 1890- 1900,” Futures of American Studies Institute, Dartmouth College, June 2014.

“Conditional Conservatism: Evansville, Indiana’s Reluctant Embrace of the Ku Klux Klan, 1919-1922,” Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Eastern Kentucky University, October 2009.

“Holding the Middle Ground: Race, Kidnapping, and the Ambivalent Localism of the Antebellum Ohio River Valley,” Regional Phi Alpha Theta Conference, West Virginia University, March 2009.

“Wages, Race, and Morality: Midwestern Coal Miners and the Struggle for Security,” Regional Phi Alpha Theta Conference, Terre Haute, Indiana, April 2008.

“The 1899 Coal Strike: Coal Miners and Racial Conflict in Evansville, Indiana,” National Phi Alpha Theta Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 2008.

“The 1899 Evansville Coal Strike: The Clash of Race, Miners, Mine Operators and the United Mine Workers,” co-presented with Dr. J. Burton Kirkwood, Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Western Kentucky University, October 2007.

Service

Article Referee, The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 2014-2015

Co-writer for “Legislative Moments” for Kentucky Legislators, Kentucky Legislature in conjunction with the Kentucky Historical Society, 2014-2015

Conference Planner, Bluegrass Symposium, University of Kentucky, February 2013

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Panelist, “What to do with your degree,” Career Services Symposium, University of Evansville, September 2010

Guest Speaker, “Evansville Underground: The Coal Mines Beneath Us,” Reitz Home Museum Historic Preservation Society, Evansville, Indiana, April 2008

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