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ATTITUDES OF ISRAELIS TOWARDS AMERICA AND AMERICAN JEWS

by Hanoeh Smith

and

The Smith Research Center

INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION

The two largest Jewish communities in the world are those of and the United States. Together they total more than 9 million of an estimated 13 million Jews in the world, approximately 70 percent of the world Jewish population. Over 3,300,000 live in Israel; the rest of the 9 million in the United States - the country considered by Jews everywhere to be Israel's staunchest ally.

Jews in Israel and the United States feel very close to one another; but because they live far apart and in different milieus, knowledge of each other's goals, opinions, problems and fears is imperfect. For example, American Jews do not fully understand the intensity of Israeli fears about , while Israelis tend to underestimate American Jewish concerns about anti-Semitism and other limitations to full Jewish participation in American life.

One way to bring these two vital Jewish communities closer together is to examine how American Jews and Israelis feel about a variety of common issues, and to pinpoint areas of agreement and disagreement, understanding and misunderstanding, shared values and differences. Polling representative samples of both communities is an invaluable method of acquiring such information, and the findings can be the basis of ongoing programs to promote mutual respect and understanding.

For the first time, under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, two surveys were conducted simultaneously in Israel and the United States which included, along with questions specific to the inhabitants of each of the two countries, a large number of questions that were identical.

The American survey reported under the title, Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis, was conducted by Dr. Steven M. Cohen and included 640 interviews. The details of his survey design are described in the report. The Israeli sample, carried on by Hanoch and Smith of the Smith Research Center in , was a national probability sample totalling 1018 interviews and representing cities, towns, development towns, kibbutzim and moshavim. The poll was conducted by trained enumerators sent to specified addresses, and all persons interviewed were Jews. Examination of the sample data showed it to be highly representative of the Israeli population with respect to age, sex, country of birth and type of settlement, and even political balance. The field interviews were conducted between June J-15, 1983, and all information was transferred to a computer.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Two major sub-analyses were made of all the data, differentiating country of origin and present political preference among parties. -2-

The country of origin classifications represented a cross of two sub-variables — continent of birth and continent of father's birth, and include: (1) born in Africa or Asia; (2) born in Israel of a father born in Africa or Asia; (3) born in Europe or America; (4) born in Israel of a father born in Europe or America; (5) an Israeli whose father was also born in Israel (third generation plus). The first two classifications — Africa/Asia — comprised about 44 percent of the population aged 18 years or older and were mostly Sephardim. The third and fourth categories — Europe/America were mostly Ashkenazim, while the third generation Israelis, about 6 percent of the voting-age population, were mainly Ashkenazi in earlier origins. It should be stressed that this country-of-origin split is one commonly used in Israel, though it is imperfect regarding Sephardi-Ashkenazi classifications, and makes it possible to separate the population according to major origins while noting the shifting generational differences.

The second classification used for analysis was current political preference. No effort was made in this poll to define a specific party of preference; the goal was to distinguish between support for a government coalition party or an opposition party.

The coalition parties, headed by the Likud, include all the religious parties, including Tami, the Tehiya party and remnants of the late 's Telem party. The coalition received 56 percent of all Jewish votes in the June 1981 elections. The opposition, led by the Ma'arach (Labor party), includes 's Citizens' Rights, Shinui, Shelli and other opposition parties.

In this survey, 43 percent supported the coalition, 37 percent supported the opposition and the remaining 20 percent either were undecided, refused to reveal their political preference or did not wish to express a preference. The difference between coalition and opposition, (6 percent), was much lower than in the 1981 elections, and less than the 9 percent difference found in a Smith Center political poll two weeks earlier. (It should be stressed that party preferences in this survey were less rigorously pressed than in regular political surveys. However, as other recent polls have shown, support for the government coalition has been declining and support for the opposition has been rising since Spring 1983.)

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I. VIEWING AMERICA American Support of Israel How similar or different are the views of Israelis and American Jews on subjects related to the American scene? On questions dealing with U.S. support of Israel there is general agreement. When respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that "U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest," the following results were obtained in the two surveys.

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 91 3 6

Israeli Jews 79 13 8

American Jews were practically unanimous in their view that their country's support for Israel is in their country's interest. Interestingly, Israelis also believed this to be so, though a small proportion, (13 percent) did not agree. About 18 percent of third generation Israelis and 16 percent of the Asia/Africa populations, but only 8 percent of the European-origin Israelis, disagreed with th*e proposition. (This European-born Israeli population came closest to attitudes prevailing among American Jews.) Also because Asia/African Jews are more Likud government- oriented than European Jews, opposition supporters tended to agree with the proposition slightly more than did government coalition supporters.

At the same time, it should be stressed that neither Israelis nor American Jews are secure in the belief that the U.S. government will always support Israel, as the responses to the following statements demonstrate:

"I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 55 31 14

Israeli Jews 51 43 6 -4-

"When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's aid in its struggle to survive."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S. Jews 54 24 22 Israeli Jews 42 38 20

American Jews were a little more worried than Israeli Jews about the firmness of U.S. support for Israel. Within the Israeli sample, the Asia/Africa respondents were more concerned, and their responses more closely approximated the view of U.S. Jews than did those of European Jews. Despite this, however, more opposition supporters were worried on this score than were government coalition supporters. Among the politically undecided voters, the highest percentage, 57 percent, were worried.

The difference in views between the communities on the second question is more fundamental. Israeli Jews were fairly evenly divided in their expectation of support from non-Jews for Israel in a crunch, while far fewer American Jews expected non-Jewish support in such a situation. *

Within the Israeli community the key differences were not by political preference, but by country of birth. A clear plurality of foreign-born Israelis agreed with the prevalent U.S. Jewish view, but more Israeli-born Jews, by a small percentage, did not agree. Sabras apparently have a more favorable view of non- Jewish support for Israel than do foreign-born Jews.

The fact that American Jews are less confident of the support of non-Jews and of their government than Israeli Jews will come up again on other issues. -5-

Evaluation of American Groups and Institutions When it comes to assessing key American groups and institutions, assessments of Israelis and American Jews are amazingly similar. For example, both sets of respondents were asked to rank a number of American institutions. "Do you believe each of the several American groups and institutions below is generally friendly, mixed or neutral, generally unfriendly, towards Israel?"

Percent Generally Mixed or Generally No Friendly Neutral Unfriendly Impression

CONGRESS U.S. Jews 44 44 5 7 Israelis 47 26 7 19

PRESIDENT REAGAN

U.S. Jews 33 44 17 6 Israelis 36 36 19 . 9 NEWS MEDIA

U.S. Jews 21 51 24 5 Israelis 12 36 38 14 STATE DEPARTMENT

U.S. Jews 22 37 33 9 Israelis 20 31 25 24

THE MILITARY U.S. Jews 31 36 19 15 - Israelis 26 15 18 31

There was agreement that Congress is the most favorably disposed American institution, that President Reagan and the military are, on balance, slightly favorable, and that the State Department and the news media are, generally unfavorable. Israeli Jews tend to view the U.S. news media more unfavorably, and the State Department less unfavorably, than do American Jews. -6-

Among Israelis, the foreign-born Asian-African group found Congress, President Reagan and the State Department most friendly, though differences among groups are small. There were no large differences in perception among supporters of the different political groupings. Criticism of Israel and Opponents of Israel

On questions regarding public criticism of Israel, certain differences in overall outlook between Americans and Israelis emerge, as well as significantly sharp differences among the Israeli sub-groups. These differences show up clearly in the responses to the two statements recorded below:

,,American Jewish organizations should feel free to publicly criticize the Israeli government and its policies."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 60 27 13

Israeli Jews 45 46 9 Israeli coalition supporters 34 55 11 Israeli opposition supporters 61 31 8 Israeli undecided, other 41 51 8

"American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policy publicly." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 31 57 11

Israeli Jews 51 42 7

Israeli-born Europeans 39 54 7 Israeli-born Asia/Africa 55 36 9 -7-

A very substantial majority of American Jews, 60 percent saw no reason why American Jewish organizations should not publicly criticize the Israeli government. By a similar majority they rejected the notion that American Jews, in general, should not engage in such criticism. Conversely, 27 percent of American Jews did not think American Jewish organizations should criticize Israel in public, and nearly one-third felt that American Jews in general should not do so.

In Israel, differences between coalition and opposition partisans were dramatic. By a margin of 61 percent to 31 percent, opposition supporters believed American Jewish leaders should feel free to criticize Israel in public; while government coalition supporters disagreed by a margin of 55 percent to 34 percent. Thus, the views of the Israeli opposition coincided strongly with those of U.S. Jews favoring free public discussion, while a majority of coalition supporters felt American Jewish organizations should keep disagreement with Israeli policy private.

When the question was framed in the broader term of American Jews generally, rather than Jewish organizations, the overall differences among the respondents remain. In Israel, 58 percent of coalition supporters and 41 percent of opposition supporters agreed that American Jews should not publicly criticize Israel; among American Jews, only 31 percent agreed with that statement. The table above also reveals differences on this subject between Israeli-born children of European parents and Israeli-born children of Asian/African parents. Solid majorities of the Asian/African-born (who also tend to be government supporters) generally agreed that public criticism should be limited, while a majority of the European-origin disagreed.

On other issues, the relevant alignments were quite different as, for example, the responses to statements dealing with American political life:

"Jews should not vote for candidates who are unfriendly to Israel."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S.Jews 73 15 12

Israeli Jews 56 34 9 Israeli-born

Asian-Africans 58 35 7

Israeli-born European 43 45 12 European/American born 59 29 12 -8-

There was general agreement on both sides of the ocean that American Jews should not support candidates not friendly to Israel. But Americans were much more emphatic about this than Israelis.

As the following table indicates, some of the sharpest divisions in Israel surfaced on questions related to the impact of Israeli government policies on American perceptions about Israel. "The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his government have hurt Israel in ״.the U.S

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 50 22 28 Israeli Jews 44 45 11

Asian/African 29 61 10 (all) *

European/ American (all) 56 31 13 Coalition supporters 19 72 Opposition supporters 74 16 10 Undecided, other 41 40 19

In the U.S. survey, half of the American Jews thought that the Israeli government's policies have hurt Israel in the U.S., while over one-quarter were not sure and 21 percent disagreed. In contrast, Israeli Jews were almost equally divided on the issue. The consensus of those of European/American origins (including Israel born) paralleled that of the U.S. Jews. A majority (56 percent) felt the Begin government policies were hurting Israel in America, while 31 percent disagreed. Conversely, the Asian/African population felt, overwhelmingly, ,(61 percent to 29 percent) that the Government's policies were not hurting Israel in America.

Among Government supporters only 19 percent agreed that the government's policies hurt Israel in the U.S. and 72 percent disagreed, while among opposition supporters the views were reversed, 74 percent to 16 percent. (The undecided were neatly and evenly split.) Clearly the results indicate that Israelis perceive the -9- effects of the Government's policy in the U.S. more through the prism of partisan ideology than as a result of dispassionate observation.

II. JEWISH LIFE IN AMERICA The survey revealed a remarkable extent of personal connection between Israeli and American Jews. In the Israeli sample, 29 percent of those interviewed had visited the U.S., including 53 percent of third generation Israelis, 45 percent of Israeli-born respondents of European parents, and 37 percent of the European-born. However, only 11 percent of both Asian/African groups had visited the U.S.

Forty-four percent of Israelis questioned said they had family in the U.S. The highest percentage, quite naturally, was among the European born, with 56 percent reporting family in America. Fifty-four percent of third generation Israelis, 49 percent of the Israel-born of European parents, 35 percent of Asia/Africa-born and 28 percent of the Israel-born of Asian/African parents, reported family in the U.S.

Similarly, 43 percent of the Israeli sample reported having friends in the U.S. — nearly 61 percent of third-generation Israelis, 48 percent of Israel-born Europeans, 44 percent of European-born and 35 percent of both Asian/African groups.

Since such large percentages of Israelis have visited the U.S. or have family and friends there, and since there are no bonds tighter than personal ties, the bonds between Israelis and American Jews are obviously close indeed. The ties of American Jews to Israel are equally close. The Cohen survey indicated that 40 percent of American respondents had visited Israel, 34 percent had relatives in Israel and 35 percent had friends there.

Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Position in America Israeli and American Jews agreed that anti-Semitism was a possibility in the U.S., in the future; they did not, however, see the present situation in the same light as the responses to the following statements demonstrate: "Anti-Semitism in America may in the future become a serious problem for American Jews."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 69 11 20 Israeli Jews 62 22 16 -10-

"Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews." Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S. Jews 37 43 20 Israeli Jews 65 23 12

Strong majorities of both American and Israeli Jews feared that anti- Semitism may, in the future become a serious problem for American Jews, and even more American Jews than Israeli Jews saw such a danger, though these differences were not particularly significant.

Among Israeli Jews the foreign-born were more concerned about this threat than the Israeli born. Among the latter, 55 percent agreed there was such a danger, 27 percent disagreed and the remaining 18 percent were not sure. Among political groupings, 67 percent of the opposition compared to 56 percent of the coalition supporters, agreed there was such a danger.

About the current situation, however, there were much sharper disagreements. By a margin of 65 percent to 23 percent, with only small differences among the continents of origin and political groupings, Israeli Jews indicated that they did not feel anti-Semitism was a serious problem in America at the present time, but American Jews were far more divided on this issue. Only 37 percent agreed that anti-Semitism in the U.S. was not currently a serious problem, while 43 percent disagreed and 20 percent were not sure.

As on the issue of non-Jewish support for Israel in a crunch, American Jews seem far more worried than Israeli Jews about the situation in America.

The same disagreement between Israeli and American Jews is seen in the distribution of responses to another statement.

"Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S. Jews 27 55 18 Israeli Jews 59 21 20 -11-

Again, Israeli Jews with virtually no differences according to political affiliation or origin group, indicated their overwhelming conviction (59 percent to 21 percent) that virtually every position of influence is open to U.S. Jews. Yet a solid majority of American Jews reject this view. Israeli Views of Jewish Life in America As part of the Israel survey, a number of questions were asked of Israeli Jews regarding Jewish life in America that did not appear in Cohen's American survey. One group of questions probed the importance of Israel to U.S. Jewry.

Percent Question Agree Disagree Not Sure 1. The focus uniting U.S. Jews is support for Israel 67 21 12

2. American Jews will always support Israel 66 14 20 3. When Israel's name is smeared, U.S. Jews are also hurt. 71 19 10

By two-thirds majority, Israeli Jews viewed Israel as the unifying focus for U.S. Jews and expressed confidence that American Jews would always support them. Only a relatively small minority in Israel rejected these views, which could be described as highly "Isra-centric." The Israelis also seemed to feel strongly, that the fate of Jews in the U.S. is closely tied to Israel's position in the world as evidenced by the 71 percent who agreed that when Israel is smeared, U.S Jews are also hurt.

Another group of questions probed the Israeli sample's perception of the power of U.S. Jews.

<־ Percent Question Agree Disagree Not Sure The American-Jewish lobby is a very powerful force in influencing American foreign policy. 57 17 24 The Jews of America have control of important branches of the American economy. 73 11 16 -12-

It is clear from the answers to these questions that Israeli Jews have a strong belief in the political and economic power of American Jews — that is not shared by American Jewish perceptions of themselves, but is closer to the way numbers of American non-Jews view Jewish power in America. Though Israeli Jews are aware of how positive American Jews feel about their country and how deeply they identify as Americans, the Israeli sample expressed uncertainty about the Jewish future in the United States.

Percent Subject Agree Disagree Not Sure 1. Most American Jews do not think of their country as the Galut. 70 13 17 2. Most American Jews think of themselves mainly as Americans and not as Jews. 59 21 20 3. For the Jews there, life in the United States is really good. 36 32 32 4. The good life for American Jews cannot last for long. 29 35 36

Overwhelmingly, Israeli Jews agreed that American Jews do not think of their country as the Galut. Israel-born Jews of all origins agreed even more strongly than foreign-born Jews though the difference — 73 percent compared to 67 percent was small. A similar difference separated opposition Jews from coalition supporters. Also by a large majority (59 percent), Israeli Jews said that American Jews thought of themselves primarily as Americans and not as Jews. Still, 21 percent disagreed and 20 percent were not sure. Jews of Asia/Africa origin disagreed slightly more (26 percent) than European groups (18 percent) with the idea that American Jews see themselves primarily as Americans and not Jews. Sixty-two percent of opposition supporters agreed with the statement and 17 percent disagreed, while among coalition supporters 56 percent agreed and 26 percent disagreed.

Notwithstanding their awareness of American Jews' commitment to the U.S., Israelis are divided as about how good it is to be a Jew in America. Only 36 percent agreed that life was very good for American Jews, 32 percent disagreed and 32 percent were not sure — very nearly an even three-way split. The question was designed to see if Israeli Jews viewed life in America as exceptionally good for Jews. And the answer seems to be that, on balance, they were not sure, though there were some group differences among the respondents. -13-

While the Europe/America group was divided three ways on the subject, 43 percent of Asian/African Jews agreed that Jews in America live a very good life and 27 percent disagreed. In contrast, 42 percent of the third-generation Israelis who have visited the U.S. rejected the statement, as against 24 percent of this group who agreed with it. Among government supporters 41 percent agreed and 28 percent disagreed, while opposition supporters split three ways on the issue. There was also uncertainty among the Israeli Jews in the poll as to whether the good life of American Jews would continue very long. Thirty-five percent thought it could not; 29 percent thought it would; and 36 percent were unsure. In this case, it was those of European background and the opposition supporters who were more optimistic. About 25 percent of European-origin Jews and 33 percent of Asian/African Jews said that the good life could not last, as did the 25 percent of the opposition supporters and 35 percent of the coalition supporters.

When the responses to the two questions are combined, it is clear that European-origin and opposition voters are more apt to see Jewish life in America as less good today and the future as a little less bleak than the Israelis of Asian/African origin, while the latter tend to see the present as better but the future more endangered. However, it is important to keep in mind that Israeli Jews overall do not see Jewish life in America as especially good. Judaism and Assimilation

While Israeli Jews see American Jews as viewing themselves primarily as Americans, they are very concerned over the rapid assimilation of American Jews and worry about their continued existence as Jews, as the following table indicates. "American Jews are assimilating fast into American life and there is a danger to their survival as Jews."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure Israeli Jews 74 14 12 Orthodox Jews 79 14 7 Traditional Jews 75 14 11 Secular Jews 72 14 14

An overwhelming 74 percent of Israeli Jews agreed that there is rapid assimilation of American Jews and that it threatens their survival as Jews. There origin or־were no large differences in the responses of the different country-of political groupings, and even by religious affiliation there were only mild differences. Seventy-nine percent of those who defined themselves as Orthodox (a group consisting of less than 15 percent of the population) agreed that rapid -14- assimilation was endangering survival as Jews, as did 75 percent of traditional Jews (mostly oriental or Asian/African constituting about 38 percent of the population) and 72 percent of the remaining secular Jews (predominantly European-origin and constituting 47 percent of the population. With no meaningful differences among Israeli views on the subject, it would be interesting to determine what American Jews themselves think about this issue. As to what to do about the phenomenon, Israelis see no easy answers. For one thing, many find fault with Jewish education in the United States.

"Jewish education in America is weak."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure Israeli Jews 48 20 32 European-born Jews 58 17 25 Israel-born European Jews 39 20 41 Orthodox Jews 57 20 23 Secular Jews 47 18 35 Approximately a third of the respondents had no opinion about the strength of Jewish education in America. But among those who did, the vast majority felt that Jewish education in America lacked strength, European-born Jews expressed the view most strongly, while the Israeli-born of European parents agreed least with this view. Orthodox Jews tended to support this view more than secular ones, but not by a spectacular difference. -15-

Two different questions probed the degree to which religious belief was seen as a factor in checking the loss of Jewish identity in America. "Only strong Orthodox religion can save American Jews from assimilating."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure Israeli Jews 55 30 15 Coalition Supporters 62 26 12 Opposition Supporters 48 34 18 Undecided, other 59 20 21

Orthodox Jews 70 22 8 Traditional Jews 64 25 11 Secular Jews 44 35 21

A clear majority of Israelis (55 percent) felt that only a strong Orthodox religion can save American Jews from assimilation, while only 30 percent disagreed with this view. Not surprisingly, coalition supporters (which includes supporters of the religious parties) strongly supported this view. But perhaps surprisingly a plurality of opposition supporters (48 percent to 34 percent) also agreed. Group differences are found when Orthodox and secular Jews are compared. That 70 percent of Orthodox Jews supported the statement is hardly surprising; but that more secular Israeli Jews (44 percent) agreed than disagreed (35 percent) must give some pause. It would appear that a large percentage of secular Jews in Israel cannot envision Jewish survival in America without some measure of religious affiliation — with the Orthodox leading the way. 16-־

The answers to the second question provide a broader view of this issue.

1,Reform and Conservative Judaism lead to assimilation."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure Israeli Jews 31 47 22 European Jews (all) 20 59 21 Asia/Africa Jews (all) 46 33 21 Coalition Supporters 44 34 22 Opposition Supporters 18 64 18 On this question a sizeable plurality (47 percent to 31 percent), disagreed with the proposition that Reform and Conservative Judaism lead to assimilation. Though responses to the previous question showed that many pinned their hopes on Orthodoxy to preserve Jewish identity, an almost equal number rejected the idea that Reform and Conservative Judaism paved the way to assimiliation. But there was a deep split on this question in Israeli society. Asia/Africa Jews were likely to agree than to disagree with the proposition, and nearly half of them thought Reform and Conservative Judaism do lead to assimilation. But European Jews rejected the proposition by 59 percent to 20 percent. On the political level, a clear plurality of government coalition supporters (44 percent to 34 percent) agreed that Reform and Conservative Judaism lead to assimilation and 22 percent disagreed, while among opposition supporters, 64 percent rejected the proposition and 18 percent accepted it. Thus, while the overall view of Israelis does not support the idea, more coalition supporters agree than disagree. This division will be seen again in the discussion on recognizing Reform and Conservative Judaism in Israel where it will again be observed that an overall majority favors the view while it is narrowly rejected among government supporters. Overall, there is a widespread belief that Orthodox religion is the primary bulwark against assimilation in America; at the same time, many European-origin secular and opposition Jews see a similar role for Reform and Conservative observance in the U.S. and in Israel. The Zionist Answer The underlying Israeli answer to assimilation remains "aliya" or immigration to Israel; but as the responses below indicate, most are not very optimistic that large numbers of Americans will make this move. Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure At present there is no chance for significant aliya from America. 77 10 13 America is the Galut, and Jews from America should come en masse to Israel. 58 30 12 3. Except for intense Zionists, American Jews should be discouraged from immigrating to Israel until the country is better able to absorb them. 23 66 11

On the first statement, there is general agreement throughout Israel, and opposition supporters concur even more than government supporters. But on the second proposition, Israelis are sharply divided. Among Asia/Africa-born Jews 64 percent supported mass immigration from America and 24 percent disagreed, while only 45 percent of Israelis born of European parents agreed and 40 percent disagreed. The differences are likely to reflect the two groups' differing assessments of the situation in America, rather than a different view of Zionism. Indeed, 66 percent did not see Israel's absorption capacity as a barrier to large- scale American immigration, and opposition supporters led government supporters in this view.

When Israelis were asked what kind of teachers and helpers should be sent to the U.S., and how money collected from American Jews should be used, the respondents revealed interesting views. Percent ־ Agree Disagree Not Sure 1. Of moneys collected by UJA and other Jewish organizations in America more than is now the case should go to strengthening Jewish life there and less to Israel. 14 70 16 2. Israel should send more "shlichim" and teachers to America to strengthen Jewish ties and Jewish education than to organize aliya to Israel. 45 45 10 -18-

It would appear that most Israelis are firmly convinced that money collected by UJA and other Jewish organizations is best used in Israel. But on the question of increasing the number of teachers working to strengthen Jewish ties in America, the response was mixed. On the one hand, Israelis want to recruit for immigration; on the other hand, they are eager to help American Jews remain Jews. This dilemma was evident across ethnic, political, and religious lines. Emigration of Russian and Israeli Jews On the issues of Russian immigration to Israel and Israeli immigration from Israel, American and Israeli Jews differ markedly.

By a solid majority (56 percent) Israeli Jews thought Russian Jews did a bad thing by going to America. "Russian Jews who went to America instead of Israel did a bad thing for themselves and their families." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure Israeli Jews 56 25 19 Asia/Africa (all) 65 22 15 European Jews (all) 41 33 26 Asia/Africa Jews supported this view more strongly, (65 percent to 22 percent) than European Jews (41 percent tp 3^ percent with 26 percent not sure), and government supporters excoriated the Russian Jews far more than opposition supporters. In a parallel question, put to both American and Israeli Jews, there was a sharp difference in response. "Israelis who emigrate and settle in other countries are doing something wrong." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure American Jews 16 66 18 Israeli Jews 70 21 9 Foreign-born Israeli Jews (all) 75 15 10 Israeli-born European parents 56 34 10 ־19־

By 66 percent to 16 percent American Jews upheld free emigration as the right of all Jews, Israelis included. Though the question about Russian Jews was not in the American survey, it is reasonable to assume that they would have taken the same position with regard to the Russians. Israeli Jews, on the other hand, felt strongly that Israeli emigrants were indeed, doing something wrong. The term "yored" (emigrant) clearly leaves a bad taste in the Israeli mouth. However, the Israeli-born of European parents, were more divided on this issue than other sub-groups, with a smaller majority (56 percent supporting the view that Israeli emigrants did wrong, 34 percent disagreeing and 10 percent not sure). Does this reflect an acceptance, in certain circles that emigration is acceptable, or at least understandable?

III. ISRAELI POLITICAL LEADERS While Israelis and American Jews perceived the American scene alike on many issues, numbers of American Jews saw that situation as more precarious than the Israelis did. And while opposition and government supporters shared the American Jewish assessment of U.S. politicians and institutions, they did not come to the same conclusions. American Jews felt that Prime Minister Begin's policies were hurting Israel in the U.S. -- a view shared by the opposition but firmly rejected by government supporters in Israel.

In their evaluation of Israeli political leaders, American Jews and Israeli Jews expressed quite different views; the table below indicates the American ratings.

"What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders?"

Percent Very Somewhat Very favor­ Favor­ Unfavor­ Unfavor­ No able able able able Impression Score*

Abba Eban 61 27 3 1 8 84 26 38 7 1 28 56 22 30 2 1 45 49 19 42 13 3 23 45 34 34 20 10 3 38 22 30 20 21 7 11 *The Score represents the difference between a very favorable and somewhat favorable rating minus a somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable rating. -20-

Clearly, was the Israeli leader who received the most favorable rating among American Jewish respondents. An overwhelming 84 percent approved of him and very few had unfavorable impressions. Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Navon also had few detractors, though substantial percentages had no impression of them, followed by Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition. Clearly opposition leaders enjoy a favorable impression among American Jews. Prime Minister Menachem Begin received a less favorable overall score from American Jewish respondents than any of the opposition leaders. Though 34 percent gave him a very favorable rating and another 34 percent a somewhat favorable rating - an overall favorable rating of 68 percent — a sizeable minority (27 percent) gave him a somewhat or very unfavorable rating.

Ariel Sharon attracted the most criticism among American Jews. While 52 percent viewed him positively, 41 percent gave him a negative rating.

On balance, American Jews tended to rate Israeli leaders highly; and to criticize them with great reluctance. The Israeli responses provide a very different picture.

"Which of the following Israeli leaders is acceptable (mekubal) to you and which not?"

״ Percent Very Not so accept- Accept- Accept- Unaccept- No able able able able Impression Score

Yitzhak Navon 53 36 6 3 2 80 Yitzhak Rabin 19 45 22 10 4 32 Menachem Begin 29 29 13 27 2 18

Abba Eban 8 34 24 24 10 -6 Ariel Sharon 20 23 14 40 3 -11

Shimon Peres 3 20 28 46 3 -51

Average score 22 31 18 25 4 10 The differences between Israeli and American responses are evident. For example, more Israelis found Abba Eban unacceptable than acceptable, while the most acceptable person by far to all sides of the political spectrum was Yitzhak Navon, the former President. Yitzhak Rabin was also reasonably acceptable, but 32 percent expressed an unfavorable opinion about him. -21-

In the Israeli survey, 58 percent found Prime Minister Begin acceptable, but 40 percent gave him an unacceptable rating. Among government supporters, 95 percent found him acceptable, while 15 percent of the opposition found him acceptable and 83 percent found him unacceptable. Among the crucial undecided, 58 percent found Begin acceptable and 35 percent found him unacceptable.

Ariel Sharon won an acceptable rating from 75 percent of the coalition supporters, but only 12 percent of the opposition gave him a positive rating and 79 percent gave him the lowest rating "unacceptable." Among the undecided, only one-third gave him a positive rating compared to 56 percent who gave him a negative one. Thus, as in America, he was near the bottom of the list.

Last on the list in Israel was the opposition leader, Shimon Peres. Strongly disapproved by coalition and undecided, his support even in his own camp was quite mixed, in sharp contrast to his generally acceptable rating on the American scene.

In general, the Israeli ratings reflected the deeper involvement of Israelis in their own political life and the intense political feelings and polarizations in the country. The American Jews viewed Israel's political leaders much more sympathetically, but on balance, tended to prefer opposition leaders over government leaders. The reason probably lies in their differing views on key policy issues involving Israel and its neighbors.

IV. ISRAEL'S EXTERNAL POLICIES

In addition to examining whether the respondents felt that the Israeli Government's policies were hurting its position in the U.S., the surveys in both countries also asked a more general question: whether Israel has been hurt by the policies of Menachem Begin and his Government. "The policies of Menachem Begin and his Government have damaged Israel." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 36 38 27 Israeli Jews 45 46 9 Coalition Supporters 17 76 7 Opposition 84 9 7

Undecided, others 37 47 16

Israel-born, Asia-Africa 30 61 9 Israel-born, Europe/America 63 29 8 -22-

The responses of the U.S. sample (but not the Israeli sample) were somewhat different to this query than to the earlier one, suggesting that American Jews may be more ambivalent about the Begin policies than about their impact on U.S. public opinion. No such subtleties appeared in the Israeli answers to the two questions. Government supporters and opposition supporters stood firmly in opposite camps, one overwhelmingly supporting, the other rejecting, the propositions stated. Among the main ethnic groups, the Israeli-born of Asian/African parents generally supported the government's policy while the Israeli-born of European origins generally opposed it, paralleling their general political preferences. The same sharp polarization between opposition and government supporters shows up in the answers to many of the questions that follow.

Israel and the Arabs

On certain aspects of Israel's relations to Arabs and the peace process the views of American Jews and Israelis converge; on others they tend to be at odds with one another. One area examined was the issue of territorial compromise for peace.

"Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria and Gaza in return for credible guarantees for peace."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 42 34 23 Israeli Jews 43 46 11 Coalition Supporters 18 72 10

Opposition 74 17 9

Undecided 38 43 19

European origins (all) 54 32 14

Asian/African Origins (all) 27 63 10

On this issue, Israelis are fairly evenly divided, with strong polarization along political lines, while the American view leans mildly toward territorial compromise. Again, among the Israelis, the differences between those of European and Asian/African origins tend to echo the political differences. -23-

The views of American Jews and Israelis diverged more clearly on the question of expanding settlements in Judea and Samaria. "Israel should suspend the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria in order to encourage peace negotiations." Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 51 28 21

Israeli Jews 47 45 8

Coalition Supporters 28 65 7 Opposition 72 21 7 Undecided 44 42 14

In Israel coalition and opposition supporters differed sharply on this issue, with the undecided in the middle. However, a plurality of American Jews leaned toward suspending expansion of settlements. The divergence on views was even greater when it came to permanent settlement of Jews in occupied territories. "Israel should maintain permanent control over Judea and Samaria." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 42 29 30 Israeli Jews 56 33 11

Coalition Supporters 81 12 7 Opposition 26 65 13 Undecided 58 26 6 Asian/African (all) 74 18 8 European/American (all) 43 33 13 -24-

It is interesting to note that on this issue the politically undecided in Israel, by a solid majority joined with the coalition supporters in supporting permanent control of the territories. Conversely, a very large majority of the opposition opposed the idea.* Asian/African Jews overwhelmingly supported permanent control, while those of European origin had mixed views on the subject.

American and Israeli respondents found little agreement on the subject of the P.L.O. and a Palestinian state.

Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 70 17 13

Israeli Jews 48 41 11 Coalition Supporters 34 55 11 Opposition 65 25 10 Undecided, other 48 41 11 Israel-born-Europeans 65 27 8

While Israelis were fairly divided on this issue, a large majority of U.S. Jews favored talking with the PLO if they met the two stated conditions. This was also the general view of the opposition supporters in Israel, and the Israeli-born of European origin. Conversely, only one-third of the coalition supporters indicated a readiness to talk with the PLO even on the terms stated.

*This strong rejection by opposition supporters of permanent control of Judea and Samaria is fairly recent. In an earlier Smith poll less than a year ago, a majority of opposition supporters agreed to permanent control of the West Bank. -25-

The same pattern of differences prevailed on the issue of a Palestinian state. "Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S. Jews 46 26 27

Israeli Jews 33 56 11 Coalition Supporters 17 76 7

Opposition 53 34 13

Undecided, other 32 54 14

Asia/Africa (all) 26 66 8 Israel-born-Europeans 50 39 11 On this issue, there was general agreement between U.S. Jews, Israeli opposition supporters and the Israel-born of European origin. Coalition supporters and Israelis of Asian/African origin took strong exception toft a Palestinian homeland, even if it did not threaten Israel.

V. ISRAELI LIFE Certain questions asked of both groups dealt with internal Israeli issues. One series of questions related to democracy in Israel. "Continued Israeli occupation of Judea and Samaria will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character." Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure U.S. Jews 26 42 24

Israeli Jews 38 48 14 Coalition Supporters 16 71 13

Opposition 65 20 15 Undecided 34 50 16

Asia/Africa (all) 25 61 14 Europe/America (all) 48 38 14 -26-

Once again, the same political divisions surfaced in the Israeli's responses. Coalition supporters and Israelis of Asia/Africa origin saw no threat; opposition supporters were very worried. A majority of Israelis of European origin agreed that democracy was endangered by continued occupation. In the United States, more respondents disagreed than agreed with the proposition as stated, though a sizeable number were not sure.

That some of these disagreements stem from different conceptions of democracy is evident from the responses to the statement below.

"Israelis who strongly criticize some of the government's policies are bad for Israel."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S.Jews 17 70 13 Israeli Jews 60 35 5 Coalition Supporters 78 17 5 Opposition 34 62 9 Undecided 65 28 7 • Asia/Africa (all) 74 22 4

n-Europeans 40 53 7־Israel-boi

U.S. Jews strongly rejected the idea that Israelis who criticized their government were bad for Israel, while 60 percent of Israelis supported that notion and only 35 percent opposed it. Coalition supporters and those of Asia/Africa origin all lined up strongly against open criticism, and one-third of the opposition supporters and 40 percent of the Israeli-born of European origin, supported the proposition. -27-

A related question concerning Israeli democracy drew somewhat different responses. "Israel's commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 24 52 24

Israeli Jews 51 39 10

Coalition Supporters 34 56 10

Opposition 70 21 9

Undecided, other 51 36 13

Asia/Africa (all) 45 46 9

Europe/America (all) 56 34 10

American Jews solidly rejected the idea that democratic values have eroded in Israel in recent years. Israelis, on the other hand, were divided on the issue. Opposition supporters joined majorities of the politically undecided in agreeing that there has been erosion, and even one-third of the coalition supporters concurred. A majority of those of European origin agreed that democratic values have eroded, while those of Asian/African origin were almost equally divided.

Apparently, Israelis sense a battle taking place over the state's democratic values, whereas most American Jews view Israel's democracy as firm. If, as suggested earlier, Israelis tend to idealize American Jewish life, the same might be said, in this instance, about the American Jewish perception of Israeli democracy. ־28־

Religion in Israel Orthodox Judaism is the dominant religious force in Israel, and to date the efforts of Conservative and Reform Judaism to gain equal recognition have had little success. How do Israelis and U.S. Jews feel about this fact? "Israel should grant Conservative and Reform the same status as Orthodox rabbis."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure

U.S. Jews 79 9 13 Israeli Jews 47 29 24 Coalition Supporters 33 42 25 Opposition 67 16 17 Undecided, other 43 23 34

Asia/Africa (all) 33 38 29 Europe/ Am erica (all) 57 22 21

By an overwhelming 79 percent to 9 percent, U.S. Jews agreed that Israel should grant Conservative and Reform rabbis a status equal to Orthodox and Reform rabbis. In Israel too, a plurality of 47 percent supported equal status, but only one third of the coalition supporters agreed, while 42 percent disagreed. Among the opposition equal status was strongly supported and a plurality among the undecided also agreed.

A majority of those of European origin supported equal status, while Jews of Asia/Africa origin were divided, with one-third advocating equal status and slightly more disagreeing. Divisions were also evident among religious groupings. Secular Jews supported equal status by 61 percent, and 39 percent of Traditional Jews (Masorati) agreed. Among the religious, 19 opted for equal status, while 68 percent were opposed and 13 percent were undecided. -29-

Internal Tensions in Israel (Israelis Only) The internal tension between Ashkenazi and * is of great concern to both American and Israeli Jews. Two questions probed how Israeli respondents felt about this issue. "The present tension between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews is temporary and will disappear in the near future."

Percent Agree Disagree Not Sure

Israeli Jews 49 35 16 Asian/African-born 57 31 12

Israel-born-Asia/Africa 51 33 16 Europe/American-born 53 29 18

born-Europe/Am erica 37 44 19־Israel

Israel-born - third generation 34 49 17 Coalition Supporters 55 33 12 Opposition 42 42 16

Only about half the population believes that the Ashkenazi/Sephardi tension is a temporary and passing circumstance. Over one-third, 35 percent, do not believe this; the remainder is not sure. The Asian/African Jews surveyed were optimistic that tensions will decline as were the Europe/American born. The most pessimistic about an early reduction in tension were the Israel-born of European origin and third-generation Israelis, also mostly of European origin. Fifty-five percent of the coalition supporters thought the tensions would soon disappear, while opposition supporters were equally divided on the issue.

*In the context of this report Ashkenazim are defined as of Europe/America origin and Sephardim as of Asia/Africa origin. -30-

Additional light is cast by responses to the following question: "The differences or gaps (paarim) between Ashkenazim and Sephardim in such areas as education, income, etc., will disappear within a generation."

Percent

Agree Disagree Not Sure

Israeli Jews 58 26 16

Asian/African-born 60 28 12

Israel-born-Asia/Africa 61 22 17

Europe/Am erica-born 61 23 16

Israel-born-Europe/Am erica 52 28 20 Israel-born - third generation 47 35 18

There was obviously greater confidence that the situation would improve

within a generation than in the near future. A clear majority (58 percent) csaw the problems solved within a generation, and this group included over 60 percent of those of Asia/Africa origin. But 26 percent of all the respondents disagreed and another 16 percent were not sure. As in the previous question, the second and third generation Israelis of European origin were most doubtful that the gaps would be closed in a generation, though the majority in these groups expressed hope that they would. SUMMARY

On many fundamental issues, Israelis and American Jews hold common views. But a number of questions of deep concern to both communities are perceived quite differently among Israelis than they are among their American counterparts. And in both countries, perceptions of Israel's basic political dilemmas and options play a major role in shaping attitudes towards many other issues that affect the lives of Jews.

These were the major findings in recent public opinion polls commissioned by the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations. The two polls, conducted simultaneously in the U.S. and Israel in the summer of 1983, were the first to pose many identical questions to respondents in both countries, permitting a more direct comparison of Israeli and American Jewish attitudes and perceptions than was heretofore possible.

Perhaps the strongest agreements were evident in areas dealing with relations between Israel and the United States. Eighty-six percent of the American Jews polled and 79 percent of the Israelis agreed with the formulation that "U.S. support for Israel is in America's national interest." Despite this conviction, however, a majority of the respondents in both countries expressed concern about the depth of the U.S. commitment to Israel and a fear that America's support could not be fully counted upon.

Nearly two-thirds of both groups acknowledged the possibility that anti- offered quite ״Semitism could become a problem for American Jews; but they different evaluations of the current situation. Two-thirds of the Israeli respondents rejected the suggestion that anti-Semitism was a current problem in the U.S., and roughly 60 percent felt "virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews." In response to a question asked only in the Israeli poll, a large majority of Israelis indicated they believed that American Jews have a strong influence on U.S. foreign policy and control important branches of the American economy.

By contrast, a plurality of the American Jews polled said anti-Semitism constituted a serious problem in the U.S. today, and only one-third said it did not. Only about one quarter of the American respondents believed that Jews had full access to all positions of power and influence in their country, and a clear majority of American Jews (but fewer Israelis) said that non-Jews could not be depended on to support Israel "in a crunch."

Regarding attitudes toward Israel, both groups tended to evaluate key American institutions in a similar light. They judged the U.S. Congress to be most friendly to Israel, perceived President Reagan and the U.S. military as neutral to somewhat friendly, and saw the State Department and the news media as leaning against Israel. Thirty-eight percent of the Israeli respondents were convinced that the U.S. media are unfriendly to Israel. More than 70 percent felt that when Israel is smeared, U.S. Jews are also hurt. -32-

Though most Israelis would like all American Jews to emigrate to Israel, they also recognize that the overwhelming majority of American Jews consider America their home. And while many Israelis feel Americans lead a good life, nearly three quarters of those polled felt assimilation and the weakness of Jewish education were endangering the survival of Judaism in the U.S.

Other immigration issues also divided the American and Jewish respondents. Seventy percent of the Israelis, but only 15 percent of the Americans, felt that Israelis who emigrate are doing something bad. And Israelis also felt strongly that Russian Jewish emigres are wrong to go anywhere but Israel, a view that most American respondents rejected.

Another controversial issue concerned religious pluralism. American Jews supported overwhelmingly the right of Conservative and Reform rabbis to be granted equal status with Orthodox rabbis in Israel, a view rejected by virtually all the Orthodox Israelis, though approved by a plurality of 47 to 29 percent among the respondents as a whole. On most of the political questions, the sharpest divisions were evident not between Israelis and Americans, but among the Israelis themselves. Thus, while the Israeli respondents as a whole were about equally divided over whether Prime Minister Begin's policies hurt Israel in the U.S., only 19 percent of those who supported the Begin coalition agreed with that proposition, as against 74 percent of those supporting the opposition. And the same strong differences marked questions on territorial compromise for peace, suspension of settlement expansion, permanent control of the West Bank and talks with the PLO, as shown by* the percentages agreeing with the statements below.

Percentage Agreeing Government Opposition Question Supporters Supporters Policies of Begin government have hurt Israel. 17 84 Israel should suspend settlements in Judea and Samaria to encourage peace negotiations. 28 72 Israel should offer territorial compromise in return for credible guarantees for peace. 18 74 Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism. 34 65 Continued Israeli occupation of Judea and Samaria will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character. 16 65 -33-

On most of these issues, the American Jewish respondents were also divided, but less sharply; and in a number of their answers they tended to lean toward the "dovish" view. Forty-six percent said they would suspend expansion of West Bank settlements to encourage peace; only 26 percent said they would not. Forty-four percent said they would give the Palestinians the right to a homeland if it did not threaten Israel; only 24 percent said they would not. (Israelis overall rejected this proposal by 56 to 33 percent.) And 65 percent of the American respondents felt Israel should talk with the PLO. if it renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel. (Israelis as a whole are fairly evenly divided on this.) Furthermore, American Jews disagreed very strongly with those Israelis who supported the coalition view that public disagreement by Israelis with their government is bad for Israel. American Jews and Israelis also have different favorites among Israeli leaders. Abba Eban headed the list among the Americans polled, followed by Yitzhak Rabin, Yitzhak Navon and Shimon Peres, with Prime Minister Begin and Ariel Sharon both trailing. Navon was most favored by the Israelis, and Rabin was next; Begin won the backing of the coalition supporters while Peres garnered few supporters overall. Just as Israelis expressed greater faith in the security of American Jews than the latter did themselves, American Jews expressed greater confidence in the strength of Israeli democracy than the Israelis themselves. But both agreed that the ties between the two Jewish communities were strong and lasting, and that despite any short-range differences between them, their future was inextricably linked.

October 1983 #83-505-35 INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

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October 1983