The , Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020

The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity and the Role of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora, 1961 - 2019 By Emmanuel Yenkong Sobseh, PhD The University of Bamenda, Cameroon Email: [email protected]

Abstract This paper revisits the history of the Anglophone Crisis and the role of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora since 1961. Contrary to expectations at reunification in October 1961, most Anglophones eventually felt marginalized, exploited and above all, assimilated by the numerically majority Francophones. This problem inspired many disgruntled Anglophone Cameroonians to seek alternative ways of surviving through migration. Pushed out of their country due to frustration, more than one million members of the Cameroon Anglophone Diaspora with huge concentrations in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Nigeria, have recently been recognized as a force that could spearhead political and economic changes. The Anglophone Diaspora has exploited what started in November 2016 as legitimate grievances by Common Law lawyers, teachers, students and civil society over the prolonged marginalization of Southern Cameroons, to return to federalism or fight for secession and independence by creating organisations, organizing internet-based campaigns, campaigning for diplomatic pressure, promoting fundraising and sponsoring armed groups against Government forces. The study argues that the role of the Anglophone Diaspora, and the lack of professionalization of the Defence Forces and Government military in the Anglophone Crisis has led to human insecurity and human rights violations. It further reveals that, the Anglophone Crisis has resulted in unbearable human insecurity in the North West and South West Regions, obliging individuals to escape to the bushes, other regions and countries as Internally Displaced Persons. However, Government’s delay and failure to call an inclusive and broad-based dialogue with Anglophone Diaspora without preconditions has prolonged the Crisis. This study has adopted the thematic and chronological approaches, using a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The study concludes that, for peace to reign, the Government of Cameroon must initiate a broad-based dialogue without preconditions, especially as the Anglophone Diaspora has become a formidable force in Anglophone’s politics. Keywords: Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity, Anglophone Diaspora, 1. Introduction Since independence, Cameroon has been viewed as a model of stability in a region fraught with crises. Recently, the political agenda in Cameroon has 130

The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 become increasingly dominated by what had been known as the “Anglophone problem”, which poses a major challenge to the efforts of the post-colonial state to forge national unity and integration (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). Since reunification, Cameroon has been grappling with diverse security challenges that present a potent threat to its national stability and development. These challenges against Cameroon Armed Forces that had led to human insecurity include the fight against Nigeria Islamic sect Boko Haram (Sobseh, 2020), the maritime pirates along the Cameroon Nigeria Bakassi Peninsula, threats from sectarian rebels in the Central African Republic and above all, the Ambazonian separatist fighters patronized by Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora. The most immediate of these security challenges is the growing state violence against the rising separatist agitations in the Anglophone regions of the North West and South West. The context and root of this problem that has resulted in human insecurity may be traced back to 1961 when the political elites of British Southern Cameroons and independent Republic of Cameroon, with different colonial legacies, agreed to reunify and form the Federal Republic of Cameroon (Ndi, 2014, p. 14). Contrary to expectations, this did not provide for equal partnership for both parties, and as such, most Anglophones felt marginalized, exploited and above all, assimilated by the majority Francophones. The sustained repressive state policies and actions against the pro-separatist groups in the South West and North West Regions of Cameroon have within the past few years led to widespread humanitarian crises such as hunger, starvation and poverty and this has heightened the displacement of the vulnerable groups such as women and children both as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees (Ebune, 2016). The Anglophone crisis has evolved in different stages. The last and deadliest stage that escalated since 2016, was provoked by teachers and lawyers strikes. Both government and armed separatist fighters have been blamed for human insecurity in Anglophone Cameroon (Human Rights Watch, 2019). In late 2016, peaceful demonstrations gave way to violence when protests against the government’s imposition of Francophone teachers and lawyers in Anglophone schools and courts were met with military action. The government’s reaction to the protests resulted in the formation of several non-state armed groups and fueled existing separatist sentiments. Armed groups enforced school boycotts, and the subsequent violent confrontations have forced more than half a million people to flee their homes (International Crisis Group, 2019). The Anglophone diaspora that did not initiate the crisis, only played a dominant role after the 17 January 2017 arrest of Consortium leaders. Internet-based campaigns contributed to mounting public anger and increased the popularity of diasporan ideas. The diaspora helped to give the crisis a higher profile at the international level by organising demonstrations outside the parliaments of Western countries and through diplomatic initiatives, such as commissioning the American law firm Foley Hoag to advocate for the independence of

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Southern Cameroons. This crisis also marked a generational renewal within the Anglophone movement and in the diaspora. Irrespective of the spirit of renewal within the diaspora community, the diaspora movements are weakening because of internal divisions over ideology, strategy and actions. There are also differences - which are intensified by rivalries and the struggle for power - about whether to use violence (International Crisis Group, 2017). Also, majority of the diaspora movements have resorted to violence and this has contributed to the rise in the incidence of human insecurity in the Anglophone regions (Lunn & Brook-Holland, 2018). In addition, various confrontations involving Cameroon’s security forces with various armed separatist groups sponsored by different diaspora organisations, especially, the Ambazonian Defence Force (ADF) have also escalated the number of cases of killings, kidnapping, and vandalization of properties in the Anglophone regions. These aspects of human insecurity, clashes and confrontations have recorded unprecedented casualties in terms of the numbers of deaths from both Cameroon’s security forces and the separatist groups (United Nations, 2019). In fact, many issues about the Anglophone crisis and the role of Cameroonians in the diaspora remain unclear, contested and have dominated policy debates among academics and policy makers interested in Cameroon’s politics. The roots and exact reasons triggering the Anglophone crisis, the role of Cameroon’s Armed Forces and the armed Ambazonian separatist fighters in fostering human insecurity in the Anglophone regions, the contributions of Anglophone diaspora in triggering insecurity by sponsoring the crisis, and the prospect or future of the Anglophone crisis, are all within the scope of this discussion. 2. Conceptual Framework In this conceptual framework, we shall be dealing with key words such as Anglophone, Anglophone crisis, Anglophone Cameroonians, Anglophone separatist groups, Government armed forces, human insecurity, and Anglophone diaspora. The first term is Anglophone. In Cameroon, the use of the terms Anglophone and Francophone to distinguish between inhabitants of the former colonial states of British Cameroons and those of French Cameroun began to be common after the birth of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The two states formed in 1961 was abrogated in 1972 by the United Republic that was, in turn, superseded in 1984 simply by Republic (Fanso, 2017, p. 386). Ngoh (2019, p. 380) adds that an Anglophone in the Cameroonian context is not necessarily a Cameroonian who speaks and writes English or who is imbibed with the Anglo- Saxon culture. To him, the two principal criteria in defining an Anglophone were the territory and ethnic groups. Fanso (2017) opines that, the term Anglophone, for the people who originates from the North West and South West Regions, in the first place, refers to any Cameroonian who lived his or her first experience for long in the former (colonial) British Southern Cameroons 132

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(and Nigeria). In addition, this Cameroonian must had been naturally exposed or became accustomed to the Anglophone ways, that is colonial language, education, political philosophy, freedom of speech, an unarmed police and other innumerable influences that such exposure implanted in him or her. To him, the second category of Anglophone refers to any Cameroonian whose ethnic group of origin is located in the regions that formerly constituted British Southern Cameroons. Finally, any descendant of such a person, even if he or she is raised as a Francophone, is regarded and treated as an Anglophone in Cameroon. To this effect, Anglophone Cameroonians, are Anglophones whose ethnic group of origin is found in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon. The Anglophone Crisis, formerly referred to as the Anglophone problem has often been contested by academics and politicians. Fanso (2017, p. 385) argues that, the Anglophone problem is the political, economic, social, and linguistic marginalization and reduction to the status of second-class citizens of the English-speaking (Anglophones) Cameroonians who originate from the former West Cameroon at unification until 1972 and who presently are the traditional inhabitants of the North West and South West Regions. To Ngoh (2019, p. 382), the Anglophone problem in Cameroon was/is, first and foremost, a minority problem; linguistic/language (Anglo-Saxon culture and values) minority as against the linguistic/language (Gaullic culture and values) majority. The Anglophone crisis, therefore refers to decades of arrest, struggle, rioting, protest of marginalization and desire by the people of English-speaking regions of Cameroon to secede from the Republic of Cameroon (Sobseh, 2020). Anglophone Separatist Groups are non-state actors of recent generation, predominantly populated by the youths of English-speaking regions of former Southern Cameroons established to fight against marginalization and to pressurize the government to grant the independence of Anglophone Cameroon. In 1960, the Cameroon Armed Forces came into existence. These forces include the Cameroon army, navy, air force, gendarmerie and presidential guard. Their main objective is to defend and protect the territorial integrity of Cameroon. In addition to the fact that it has established training bases in Ngaoundere, Garoua, Yaounde, Douala and recently Bamenda to overcome training and deployment challenges, the government has partnered with foreign powers like France, USA, Germany, Britain and China to benefitted from logistic training, supply of equipment, repair of military vehicles and naval vessels, and support of Cameroon’s efforts to improve their capacity. Human insecurity refers to a condition of fear and tension among citizens arising from the routine clash between the government security forces and separatist groups that has led to the rising spate of killings, kidnapping, burning of houses, schools and incidentally, has also restricted the movement of people from their daily business. Those who have suffered from insecurity are the vulnerable groups in the North West and South West Regions. Vulnerable groups are group of persons who arising from the devastating impacts of the Anglophone crisis, were being exposed to threats emanating from violence. 133

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There is no standard definition of the term diaspora (Cohen, 1997, p. 2). Today, we encounter various usages, meanings and typologies of the term that have developed over the course of time (Sheffer, 2003). In Cameroon, the point at which the various academic and journalistic meanings intersect may refer to governments, nations, peoples, languages, cultures or regions. In fact, the Anglophone diaspora includes individuals with very different personal histories, expectations, and potentials living abroad, especially out of the African continent (Ionescu, 2006, p. 4). With its origin in Greek where “diaspora” as a noun means “a dispersion” or as a verb means to “scatter about”, the term is used in this paper to refer to the dispersion or scattering of Cameroonians from their original Cameroonian homeland - now living in countries other than their own (Sobseh, 2017). 3. Background: Roots and Evolution of the Anglophone Crisis The Anglophone problem that emerged from colonialism, turned into a crisis towards the end of 2016. It has plagued relations between the English-speaking people of the North West and South West Regions and the Cameroon government from the early years of unification, to the abrogation of the federation in 1972 and the annulation of the United Republic in 1984 (Fanso, 2017, p. 397). The origins and evolution of the Anglophone problem can thus be argued from the perspectives of colonial legacy, independence and reunification, the abrogation of federalism and annulation of the United Republic, the December 1990 Law of Association, and the outburst of the teachers and lawyers strike of 2016. The Anglophone problem in Cameroon is often attributed to colonial legacy. This has been contested by Cameroonian historians. Fanso (2017, p. 387) takes us back to 1916, during World War One, when the Allied forces defeated Germany in their Kamerun protectorate and provisionally divided it into the British and French spheres. He adds that, during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the partition was confirmed by the newly formed League of Nations that officially assigned the spheres to Britain and France as mandated territories. When Britain decided to administer her spheres of British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons as an integral part of her colony and protectorate of Nigeria, the Anglophone problem tacitly began. In 1945, the United Nations Organisation superseded the League of Nations and the mandates became trusteeship territories of the United Nations. This development, ushered in a new phase of the Anglophone problem. The problem could be traced back to 1961, essentially from what emerged from the Foumban Constitutional Conference of July 1961, the Yaounde Tripartite Talks of August 1961 and the subsequent reunification of British Southern Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961. Ngoh (2019, p. 384) disagrees with Fanso (2017), stating that, instead of tracing the origin back to the 1916 Picot Provisional Partition which was confirmed by the Milner-Simon Accord of 10 July 1919, it should be traced back to 1961. To him, there would have been no 134

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Anglophone problem in Cameroon if the proposed joint Anglo-French Administration or Condominium aimed at partitioning Cameroon had succeeded. He further opines that, there should be absolutely no argument that there would have been no Anglophone problem if British Southern Cameroons had achieved independence as a separate entity in 1961 in spite of the 1916 partition (Ngoh, 2019). Lastly, he thinks there would have been no Anglophone problem if the electorate in February 1961 had voted to achieve independence by joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria, another Anglophone country. This argument is supported by the fact that, British Northern Cameroons which opted to achieve independence by joining Nigeria never complained of an Anglophone problem in Nigeria. To Ngoh (2019), the failure of the political actors in the successive governments in Cameroon to implement the letter and spirit of the outcome of the Foumban Constitutional Conference and the Yaounde Tripartite Talks of 1961 was unquestionably the origin of the Anglophone problem. The problem has been accelerated by the watering-down of the Federal Structure, the dismantling of the Federal Structure and the replacement of the United Republic of Cameroon by the Republic of Cameroon in 1984. When the Federal Republic of Cameroon came into existence on 1 October 1961, Southern Cameroons became the Federal State of West Cameroon and La Republique du Cameroun became the Federal State of East Cameroon (Sobseh, 2020). During the constitutional talks, it was agreed that, the federal form of union must not be tampered with, even if the constitution was amended. During the federal period, President Ahmadou Ahidjo centralized the government, monopolized political power and minimized the effectiveness of the federated state governments, especially of West Cameroon. To further strengthen his position in power, in 1972 and without prior information and discussion, President Ahmadou Ahidjo decided against the Federal Constitution to abrogate the federation through a national referendum (Fanso, 2017, p. 388). The Anglophone problem now moved to another level, a move that was worsened in February 1984, when President signed Law No. 84-001 of 4 February 1985 which abolished the name United Republic of Cameroon and replaced it with Republic of Cameroon (Ngoh, 2019, p. 388). The reaction was swift from Anglophones like J. N. Foncha, who described it as an attempt to annex, assimilate and destroy the Anglophone tradition and culture. What appears to be the final stage of the Anglophone crisis was the lawyers and teachers strike in 2016. On 9 May 2015, some 700 Common Law lawyers from the North West and South West Regions, and other Regions met in Bamenda demanding that, the Division of Common Law and Civil Law should be clearly defined and should operate side by side in Ecole Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature (ENAM); the creation of the Law School; the non-adulteration of the educational sub-system in the North West and South West Regions and the protection of the Anglophone minority(Human Rights Watch, 2019). These lawyers deposited their resolutions at the Ministry of Justice and gave the government a reasonable period to react. Unfortunately, the government failed

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The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 to react to their demands. In February 2016, the Cameroon Education Forum (CEF) drew the attention of the government to the plight of the English sub- system of education in Cameroon. In a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Philemon Yang, the CEF lamented that about twenty-years since the ordinance on Education was signed, its provisions have either been consistently violated or only partly implemented. The CEF also decried the francization of education for Anglophones, non-appointment of an Anglophone as Minister of Education and the reorganization of the Ministries of Education to reflect the bi-cultural nature of the country. The inaction of the government to lawyers’ demands of May 2016 led to the call for a four-day strike action from 11 to 14 October 2016 (Ngoh, 2019, p. 390). This strike was endorsed by teachers in Anglo-Saxon Universities in Cameroon. The government ignored the lawyers’ demands and strike actions and on 21 November 2016, the Teachers’ Trade Union in the North West and South West Regions declared an indefinite strike action until their grievances earlier tabled to the government were addressed. They organised a rally and several thousand people joined them to express grievances. At the end, Mancho Bibixy, a radio animator in Bamenda, seized the opportunity to launch his “Coffin Revolution” protesting against the dirty nature of the Bamenda City Council, the dilapidating road network and the slow advancement of the water project in Bamenda. In response, government security forces violently dispersed the demonstrators, arrested dozens of protesters, killed at least two, and wounded many (International Crisis Group, 2017). All these factors responsible for the Anglophone Crisis, also led to human abuses in Anglophone Cameroon. 4. Human Insecurity and Abuses by Government Security Forces and Armed Separatist Fighters Insecurity in the North West and South West Regions remains high, with continuing armed attacks and confrontations between the military and armed groups. Both the Cameroon security forces and armed groups have committed abuses that have resulted to human insecurity and deaths. This subsection focuses on human insecurity and abuses perpetuated by the Cameroon’s security forces and armed separatist groups. 4.1 Human Insecurity and Abuses by Government Security Forces Government security forces have created an environment of insecurity against Cameroonian civilians living in the Anglophone regions through the excessive use of force, burning of villages, the use of live ammunition against protestors, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, sexual abuse, and killing of civilians, including women, children, and the elderly (US House of Representatives, 2019). These abuses are many and include the following. Cameroon’s security forces have indulged in extrajudicial killings of armed fighters and civilians. Since late 2016, increased insecurity, violence and loss of lives have forced thousands of families to flee their homes. Many civilians 136

The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 have been killed and displacement continues to have serious consequences on livelihoods and living conditions of the affected populations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2019) reported in their situation report, that: Parties to the conflict continued targeting and killing both their opponents and civilians. Fighting between Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) and security forces on 5 June 2019 reportedly led to the death of three people in Ndekwai, South West (SW) and three in Babungo, North West (NW). On 15 June 2019, four Government forces were allegedly killed, and others wounded after their vehicle was blown by an explosive in Otu (SW). In a statement released the same day, the Minister of Communication accused opposition armed groups of conducting the attack with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)(OCHA, 2019). Cameroon security forces also indulged in the burning of villages, private property, homes and businesses. The devastation and pain they have caused is unbelievable. The trauma, fear and hopelessness of the local population facing such atrocities is beyond description. These atrocities constitute crimes against humanity. As a result of these burnings, the military has caused mass displacement of people and forced many to become refugees. Thousands of people have been rendered homeless, entire life investments destroyed, family members killed while others hide in the bushes(Tembon, 2018, p. 11). The Cameroon military has burned villages, businesses, markets, private homes and property in the Anglophone regions between 2017 and 2018. Tembon further highlights that: The Cameroon soldiers have a modus operandi. When they attack a village, often they first burn the shops and businesses, then the homes of the people and kill some. It was the case in Kwakwa, Kembong, Oku, Munyenge, Kake, in Njikwa … When soldiers came to Kwakwa, they burned down the shops and homes. Two elderly people who could escape were burned at home. In Kembong village after four soldiers were ambushed and killed by restoration forces, the military invaded the village and houses were burned, farms destroyed with many allegations of rape and looting (Tembon, 2018, p. 11). Also, the CHRDA (2019) has reported 206 settlements raided and partially destroyed by state defence forces during attempts to crack down on armed separatists, 134 of which have been severely damaged. Several villages in Mbonge and Konye Subdivision have been abandoned by the populations. The government has frequently denied these allegations. (UN OCHA, 2018). Cameroon security forces have also committed gender-based violence and sexual abuses. Military and security forces have mistreated female IDPs and sexually exploited female refugees travelling without national identity cards in exchange for letting the women through security checkpoints. In the North West Region, the Governor established a curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a. m., which affected women involved in informal businesses (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2018). The curfew encouraged corrupt and sexually

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The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 exploitative practices, such as women being asked for sex in exchange for permission to travel past roadblocks and security checks after curfew. More so, female students at the University of Buea were molested and physically assaulted by state forces. At least one female student was raped on 28 November 2016, in Buea by a police officer. No concrete steps have been taken to identify or hold accountable the perpetrators (CHRDA, 2018). Human insecurity has been caused by arbitrary and inhumane detention conditions and internet shutdown by the Cameroon Government. In early January 2017, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) agreed to meet with the government about the release of protesters arrested during a 2016 demonstration in Bamenda (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The Consortium accused the government of shooting four unarmed youth and proceeded to declare “Ghost Towns” on January 16 and 17. In response, the government cut the Internet and banned the activities of two groups, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Consortium, on January 17, 2017. The same day, two prominent Anglophone civil society activists who headed the Consortium – Barrister Felix Agbor Nkongho and Dr. Fontem Neba – were arrested (CHRDA, 2019). On January 9, 2017, armed soldiers forcibly entered the home of Mancho Bibixy, a journalist and newscaster of Abakwa FM and arrested him, along with six other activists (Bibixy, 2018). Bibixy was working closely with the Anglophone Consortium. He was hooded, arbitrarily detained and later sentenced. 4.2 Human Insecurity and Abuses by Armed Separatist Fighters Armed separatist fighters in the North West and South West Regions have killed and kidnapped members of the military, as well as government officials. Non-state forces have caused havoc by seizing ammunition and burning down military posts, vehicles, and prisons. They further worsened situations by burning school buildings, threatening education officials who refused to boycott schools, and kidnapping children and teachers who defied the boycott for ransom (US House of Representatives, 2019). Armed separatist extremists are responsible for unlawful killings and violence against civilians in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon. Some separatists have been active in killing both military and civilian targets throughout the crisis. Human Rights Watch (2019) reported that during the course of 2018, secessionist extremists have attacked with guns and machetes both government workers and local businessmen who have broken these boycotts. These unlawful killings affected The University of Bamenda (UBa). On Thursday 25 October 2016, the Director of Administrative Affairs and Associate Professor of Linguistics at UBa, Paul Mbufong was shot dead by unidentified assailants, alleged to be secessionist fighters, who chased and killed him at Bambui not far from the University (Ngoh, 2019, p. 407). Also, on 30 October 2018, Rev. Charles Trumann Wesco from Mishawaka, Indiana, and a missionary of the Believers Baptist Church in Warsaw, Indiana, was shot in Bambui. According to the Cameroonian Minister of Defence, “a group of

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The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 terrorists” shot at Wesco’s vehicle, and he later died in the Bamenda Regional Hospital (Ngoh, 2019). Armed separatist fighters have also launched attacks on schools, teachers, and students. Education has has been terribly affected by the ongoing crisis in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon. Since 2017, several schools are used by armed groups as their bases and hideouts, preventing children from pursuing their education. Violence against educational institutions and teachers, as well as students, has led to school closures. Teachers and students who refused to boycott schools have been threatened, attacked, kidnapped or even killed (UNESCO, 2018). The CHRDA has recorded 33 school arsons allegedly perpetrated by armed fighters since October 2018 and has also documented witness accounts of several dozen attacks on teachers and students that, in some cases, have resulted in loss of life. Examples include: Ashu Thomas Nkongho, the senior discipline master of Bilingual High School (BHS), Kossala, in Meme Division of the South West region, was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen, while on school campus on 25 April 2018, for failing to respect school boycott orders. Sophie Mandengue Maloba, a 42-year-old teacher of a government primary school in Muyuka, in Fako Division of the South West region, and a mother of three children, was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen suspected to be separatist group members on 30 April 2018 (CHRDA, 2018). The separatists’ attacks on education, analyzed by many in the North West and South West Regions as an attempt to render the regions ungovernable, have prevented tens of thousands of children from attending classes over the past school years. However, government security forces have failed to stop Separatists and end violent threats and attacks on schools to allow for the full and safe resumption of classes throughout the regions (Sobseh, 2020). Armed separatist fighters have attacked, abducted and molested several traditional rulers and chief in the North West and South West Regions. They have been attacked by armed separatists for allegedly collaborating with the Cameroonian government. On 13 February 2018, the residence of Myerem’s traditional chief was burnt down by a group of men believed to be ADF members. On 24 February 2018, the residence of the interim traditional chief in Nguti was burnt down by a group of 25 armed men, who accused the chief of collaborating with the government against the secession movement. According to a witness’s testimony, the assailants had machetes, local guns, and sticks, and they poured petrol on the house to burn it. They beat seven elders to find out where the chief was, as his house was empty. The villagers nearby did not say a word, as they feared the reprisals (CHRDA & RWHRC, 2019, p. 33). This has led to mass exodus due to fear of insecurity and threats. There are several cases of kidnappings and disappearances of civilians and military perpetuated by armed separatist extremists in the North West and South West Regions. Abductions and forced disappearances are common form

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The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 of violence against civilians practiced by the separatists. The suffering of innocent civilians, despite the condemnations, continue unabated. On 5 November 2018, about seventy-nine (79) students of the Presbyterian Secondary School (PSS), Nkwen, in the North West Region, their principal, a teacher and their driver were abducted by unidentified armed men and released by their captors, alleged to be armed separatists on 6 November 2018 (Ngoh, 2019, p. 410). The highest number of abduction and forced disappearance events occurred in 2019. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as of 30 June 2019 reported that kidnapping rates increased in June 2019. (OCHA, 2019) Such abuses by armed separatist fighters has created further mistrust and grievances amongst Anglophone communities. 5. The Anglophone Crisis and Role of Cameroonians in the Diaspora The Anglophone diaspora has played an unmeasurable role in popularizing the crisis, and pressurizing the Cameroonian Government and the international community. This subsection revisits the role of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora since 1961. Their role in the Anglophone crisis has led to human insecurity, human rights violations, killings, mass migration, illiteracy, poverty and refugees’ problems. The part played by Cameroonians in the diaspora include the following. Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora have created organisations, rebel militia groups and armed groups to pressurize the government of Cameroon and the international community to grant independence to the North West and South West Regions in what they called the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. The creation of these associations was triggered by the December 1990 Law on Association that facilitated the formation of pressure groups and politics parties. The Anglophone diaspora formed an Interim Government (IG) led by Julius Tabe Ayuk, who finally accepted the position of the President of the imaginary Federal Republic of Ambazonia. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), consisted of two main armed groups or militias (Ngoh, 2019, p. 403. The first group comprised the Tigers, Vipers and Ambaland forces. The second group was made up of several rebel militia groups including:  The (ADF) led by Lucas Ayaba Cho and Benedict Nwana Kuah;  The Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF) headed by Ebenezer Akwanga;  The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SCDF) led by Nso Foncha Nkem;  The Lebialem Red Dragons reportedly led by Ivo Tapang. He was later disowned as the leader by Oliver Lekeaka (Field Marshall) in a video;  The Ambazonia Self-Defence Restoration Army led by former police officer, Paxson Agbor;  The Ambazonia Restoration Army in Boyo and the Nso Liberation Army in Bui in the North West Region; and

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 The Tigers of Ambazonia and the Manyu Ghost Warriors in the South West Region. The activities of the main groups are more violent and deadly in Anglophone Cameroon. In February 2017, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia United Front (SCACUF) was created as an umbrella association for all the main groups in the Republic of Ambazonia. In March 2018, the Ambazonia Self-Defence Council was founded to represent the armed groups. These groups under SCACUP include:  The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) founded in 1995 led by Ebenezer Akwanga;  The Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation (SCAPO) created in 2001 to handle legal cases;  The Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC) created in 2011 by former SCNC and SCYL members; and  The Movement for the Restoration of the Independence of Southern Cameroons (MoRISC) created in 2016 led by Herbert Boh. Most of these separatist organisations are based abroad. At the start of the violent crisis in 2016, not all of them were convinced about the need to take up arms. But as the violence intensified, they prepared for an independence and secession struggle. However, armed fighters have evolved to become more structured and organized defence and insurgent groups, and have taken control of certain parts of former Southern Cameroons. Considered by most separatists and many Anglophones to be the government of Ambazonia on its creation in June 2017, the IG was weakened politically by the abduction in January 2018 in Nigeria of its leader, Julius Ayuk Tabe. Several separatist activists accuse the new leadership under Ikome Sako of incompetence and misappropriation of funds. Some activists now see the IG as just a separatist organisation among many others (International Crisis Group, 2019). Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora organized internet-based campaigns and also helped to give the crisis a higher profile at the international level. The Anglophone diaspora did not initiate this crisis, however, it played a dominant role after the 17 January 2017 abduction of the Consortium leaders (Nkongho, 2017). Internet-based campaigns contributed to mounting public anger and increased the popularity of secessionist ideas. Although the great majority of the Anglophone diaspora probably supports the current movement, a minority (like Ayaba Chou Lucas, Chris Anu and Mark Barata) has reacted in a hostile manner to calls for secession and to the movement as a whole, to the extent of sometimes writing to the authorities of the countries where the leading exponents of the secessionist current are living to call for their expulsion. The diaspora has also played the role of prioritising diplomatic offensives supporting Operation Ghost Town in the North West and South West Regions. Within the secessionist movement, divergences persist about strategy and operational methods. Some prefer to prioritise diplomatic offensives, while others put the emphasis on supporting Operation Ghost Town. Since March

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2018, several small violent groups such as the Ambazonia Restoration Army in Boyo and the Nso Liberation Army in Bui have been formed. On social networks, they circulate contact details of people and organisations failing to observe Ghost Town operations, as well as those of local authorities and senior Anglophone officials hostile to the strike. They call on the public to burn down their properties. These groups also call on citizens not to pay tax and encourage attacks on Francophones living in the North West and South West Regions. Most of these messages are public and accessible on Facebook and YouTube (Africa News, 2018). The diaspora activists promoted fundraising to fund armed separatist fighters and encouraged the leaders of the different diaspora organisations to seek international support against the Cameroon government. Since 2016, diaspora activists have been promoting fundraising campaigns on social media for the purchase of Kalashnikovs and other firearms, and there is an increasing, if uncoordinated, effort to get guns to those willing to fight the Cameroonian government. Cameroonians in the diaspora before the Anglophone problem turned into the Anglophone crisis sent financial remittances to their envisaged homeland to help families and relatives pay for a wide range of expenses including food, medical bills, rented accommodation, funerals, education of children and investment in small shopping enterprises and agriculture (Sobseh, 2017, p. 347). The diaspora became more determined to sponsor the Anglophone crisis when Nigerian authorities arrested and at least six of his putative cabinet members during a meeting at the Nera Hotel in Abuja on 5 January 2018. On 22 January those men and three dozen other Anglophone activists – a total of 47 – were handed over to the Cameroonian authorities (DW, 2018). Finally, Cameroonians in the diaspora have pressurized the Cameroon government to engage in dialogue and restore peace in the North West and South West Regions. Before President Biya’s declaration to the nation on 10 September 2020 that “I have decided to hold … a national dialogue which, in line with our constitution, will help us identify and find ways to satisfy the main expectations of the people of the Northwest and Southwest” (Domon, 2019, p. 1), the leaders of Anglophone diaspora associations had laid groundworks for Swiss-led mediations, accepted by the Swiss Government. Swiss mediation attempt failed due to cooperation problems. The government of Cameroon that was initially in favour of the mediation, surprised the world through its Prime Minister, Joseph Dion Ngute, during the in Yaounde, when he told participants that Cameroon is ripe enough to solve its problem. At the end of the Major National Dialogue, held in Yaounde from 30 September to 4 October 2019 with major recommendations, separatists described the dialogue as inadequate because it sidelined certain major actors and did not tolerate the question of secession and form of state. They vowed to keep fighting ((Domon, 2019, p. 4).

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6. Specific Recommendations In a bid to respond to and resolve the Anglophone Crisis and the human rights violations that have been perpetrated, this paper offers the following recommendations to the Cameroonian Government, Anglophone diaspora separatists, armed separatist groups, foreign partners, United Nations, and African Union. 6.1 To the Government of Cameroon The Government of Cameroon must revisit its mediation measures. These measures include the resolutions of the Major National Dialogue. It must also initiate broad-based dialogue without preconditions and make a credible, full faith effort to work with religious and community leaders in the Anglophone regions to address grievances and seek nonviolent solutions to resolve the Anglophone crisis. It must put in place constitutional reforms that would protect minority concerns, such as reconstituting a Federal System (US House of Representatives, 2019, p. 10). The Government should ensure that any security operations by the military and its security forces are conducted with full respect for international human rights law. It must abide with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Firearms, respecting the principles of proportionality, endorse and implement the Safe Schools Declaration (by protecting students, teachers and property), and promptly charge or release all those detained in the context of the Anglophone crisis, and ensure that any future detainees are brought before a judge within 48 hours of their arrest, in line with the Cameroon’s Penal Procedure Code. 6.2 To Anglophone Diaspora Separatists Cameroonians in the diaspora must stop sponsoring armed separatist groups in the North West and South West Regions and seek peaceful means of dialoguing with the Cameroonian government to resolve the Anglophone crisis. They should ensure that the forceful implementation of ghost towns leading to violence against teachers, lawyers, priests, government officials and other civilians should stop immediately. 6.3 To Armed Separatist Groups They should refrain from committing human rights abuses, including killings of civilians and military forces, torture, kidnapping, and extortion; and immediately release all civilians illegally detained or kidnapped. They should lay-down their arms and publicly denounce school boycott, ghost town and immediately cease attacks on schools, teachers and education officials, and allow for the safe return of all students to class. 6.4 To Cameroon’s Foreign Partners Cameroon’s international partners including France, Britain, USA, Germany, Russia, China and Switzerland should review any support to Cameroonian security forces and ensure that it does not contribute to or facilitate the perpetration of human rights violations. They should strongly condemn human 143

The Anglophone Crisis, Human Insecurity Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. III, No. 1, September 2020 rights violations by all actors and separatists threats and attacks on teachers and schools as impermissible and unacceptable in any conflict or political struggle (Agence France Presse, 2018). Individual state parties should leverage military and financial assistance to ensure parties are complying with regional and international measures. 6.5 To the United Nations The United Nations Secretary General should raise the situation in Cameroon at the United Nations Security Council as a situation that could threatens international peace and security. The Human Rights Council should mandate an investigation into violations and abuses, through a mission dispatched by the High Commissioner for Human Rights or joint report by relevant Special Procedures, and encourage Cameroon to cooperate with such an investigation and facilitate access to the affected areas. The United Nations must revisit the processes leading to the United Nations organised Plebiscite of 11 February 1961 in Southern Cameroons, as well as the processes leading to reunification with The Republic of Cameroun on 1 October 1961 in order to peacefully resolve this crisis. 6.6 To the African Union On 18 January 2017, African Union issued a press statement to express concern about the situation in Cameroon and indicated its willingness to assist in its resolution. The African Union should therefore follow up on this and call on Cameroon’s government and all armed separatists to end all attacks on civilians and facilitate the immediate resumption of school. The African Commission for People and Human Rights’ Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons should request an invitation to visit Cameroon and publicly report on the crisis situation. 7. Conclusion This paper, based on the Anglophone crisis and the role of Cameroonians in the diaspora, has examined human insecurity and abuses committed by both armed separatists and government forces since the advent of the Anglophone Crisis. These abuses include extrajudicial executions, excessive use of force and the unjustifiable use of firearms against unarmed demonstrators, torture and ill- treatment of suspected separatists and other detainees, and the burning of homes and property in several villages by government security forces. In the same light, abuses perpetrated by the separatists included threats against teachers and parents aimed at preventing them from sending their children to class, attacks on schools, killings, kidnappings, and extortion from civilians and state workers. The paper raised pressing concerns including the continued escalation of the conflict; the complexity of issues fuelling it; the inadequacy of the government-organised dialogue of September 2019; the lack of accountability for human rights abuses; the desire by armed separatist groups and Anglophone diaspora to continue the crisis; and the wider implications of the crisis on peace in Cameroon. In light of the evidence considered, the paper provides a

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