AMER. ZOOL., 31:286-296 (1991)

Nature-Nurture and the Debates Surrounding and Sociobiology1

GEORGE W. BARLOW Department of Integrative Biology and Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720

SYNOPSIS. The central problem in the history of animal behavior has been the inability Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 to perceive the phenotype as the result of an interaction between genome and environ- ment, despite the considerable lip service paid to the interaction. In North America the comparative study of animal behavior was overshadowed by the growth of an experimental psychology that produced the general-process view of learning, holding that the mecha- nisms underlying learning are much the same in all species. That made evolution irrelevant. During the same period ethology emerged in Europe as the study of naturally occurring behavior in an evolutionary context. Because evolution is fundamental to ethology, the genetic basis of behavior was a central precept. Ethology and psychology collided after World War II. After a vigorous exchange on the issues, a synthesis by Robert Hinde materialized, one that advanced the study of behavior and produced a sophisticated under- standing of nature and nurture. A few decades later appeared and was immediately assailed for making what were seen as unwarranted extensions from animal to human behavior, and for emphasizing genetic control of behavior. Much of the debate that ensued was distractingly political and threw little light on the scientific merits of the issues although it moderated the stance of sociobiologists; on the other hand, the politically inspired debates may have harmed the field of animal behavior.

INTRODUCTION nant recurrent theme that has generated acrimony and misunderstanding. The "The yin-yang principle is not . . . what ethology debate was potentially highly per- we would ordinarily call a dualism, but sonal and political, but a rapprochement rather an explicit duality expressing an produced a productive resolution (Hinde, implicit unity" (Capra, 1983, p. 26). 1966). In contrast, the controversy sur- To what extent is the development of rounding sociobiology yielded a less posi- behavior molded by its genetic substrate as tive outcome because the scientific issues opposed to the pervasive effects of the were so clouded by the political nature of environment? That question has engaged the debate. natural historians and philosophers for I am not a historian. I merely offer a centuries (Richards, 1987), perhaps because perspective, one appropriate for an audi- of society's fascination with the inheritance ence of biologists. It is a personal, and will of behavior, whether cultural or genetic be to some a provocative view but one that (e.g., Twain, 1894). Why does the issue so is meant to cause readers to examine both intrigue people, even in the seemingly sides of the issues. innocuous framework of animal behavior? And why do people have such great diffi- EVENTS LEADING UP TO ETHOLOGY culty admitting that nature and nurture Many date the start of the modern study are inseparable, even though they can be of animal behavior with Darwin's (1872) analyzed separately? Recent events in the book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man study of animal behavior provide some and Animals. More relevant to this essay, insight. however, was that Darwin (1871) treated The nature-nurture issue is the domi- human and animal behavior on a contin- uum. Biologists long before him, and even some noted theologians, had commonly

1 assumed such a continuity (Richards, 1987). From the Symposium on Animal Behavior: Past, But now, together with his persuasive pro- Present, and Future presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Zoologists, 27-30 Decem- motion of the principles of natural selec- ber 1989, at , . tion, biology impinged on the realm of 286 NATURE-NURTURE: ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 287 morals and ethics in a way that alarmed gists to the study of animal behavior in the theologians and others. Many notable biol- period preceding and following the turn of ogists attacked Darwin because of the the century. The picture that surfaces is a inference that even the moral sensitivities rich mixture of field and laboratory inves- of humans resulted from organic evolution tigations on a remarkable variety of ani- (Richards, 1987). mals, vertebrate and invertebrate. One Less familiar to biologists was the largely leading group was the Allee school at the independent formulation and advocacy by University of Chicago; they became Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 Herbert Spencer of what was to be called increasingly occupied with two issues, social Darwinism. According to Kalikow dominance hierarchies and cooperation (1980) and Stein (1988) the biologist Ernst (Banks, 1985); their conception of coop- Haeckel elaborated a particularly perni- eration, however, differed from our cur- cious expression of this doctrine, though rent image, was organized around group Richards (1987) presented a gentler inter- selection, and died out. pretation of Haeckel's world view. Haeck- Psychologists followed a different path. el's conception, based on genetic deter- Some continued to be comparative in the minism and natural selection, was seen by best sense of the word (Dewsbury, 1989). Stein (1988) as advocating adherence to And some were homing in on concepts that the dictates of society and as good stuff for later emerged as central tenets in ethology totalitarian governments. Haeckel was said (Glickman, 1985; Thorpe, 1979). to espouse eugenics, racism (Kalikow, Those contributions of comparative pys- 1980), and the inherent inequality of indi- chologists, however, were overshadowed viduals and the sexes (Richards, 1987). by the proliferation of experimental psy- Stein (1988) perceived Haeckel's main chologists pursuing learned behavior. The themes in Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf. main thrust of that school was that the basic The Zeitgeist of the nineteenth century, processes of learning are common to all however, was that socioeconomic status vertebrates. This became known as the resulted from superior "blood"; racism and general-process model of learning, as pio- sexism were rampant, even in the writings neered by Thorndike (1911; see Glickman, of Darwin (e.g., 1871). Lamentably, a num- 1985). Because learning is general, it was ber of biologists in the early part of the reasoned, one need not consider phyletic twentieth century favored eugenics, and relationships, hence also not evolution. some of them worked in animal behavior This perspective underlies the publica- in North America (Dewsbury, 1989). tions of a substantial literature involving I mention this extension of Darwin's the- famous experimental psychologists (see ory to political philosophy because that Lehrman, 1971), culminating in the per- philosophy became anathema in North suasive papers and books of B. F. Skinner America during the twentieth century, (e.g., 1959): "Pigeon, rat, monkey, which especially among experimental psycholo- is which? It doesn't matter." gists. Consequently, it was a powerful com- Psychologists were not entirely content ponent underlying the altercation that with this view, however. Lehrman (1971) developed after World War II (WW II) faulted the experimental psychologists for between the ethologists and American psy- feeling that the laboratory rat and humans chologists. It also makes understandable were fundamentally the same with regard some of the heated rhetoric during the to "learning, motivation, sensation, social sociobiology quarrel, especially that dominance, etc." (p. 462). Earlier, Frank involving biological determinism. Now let Beach (1950, p. 119) had written: us turn to the situation in the field of ani- mal behavior in North America before the "From its inception, American psy- advent of ethology. chology has been strongly anthropocen- Dewsbury (1989) painstakingly docu- tric. Human behavior has been accepted mented the important contributions of sev- as the primary object of study and the eral biologists and comparative psycholo- reactions of other animals have been of 288 GEORGE W. BARLOW

interest only insofar as they seemed to winism has unpalatable ramifications (see throw light upon the psychology of our also Crawford, 1987; Hodos and Camp- own species. There has been no con- bell, 1969). certed effort to establish a genuine com- parative psychology in this country for THE RISE OF ETHOLOGY the simple reason that with few excep- Shortly after the close of WWII, Konrad tions American psychologists have no Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen together

interest in animal behavior per se." advanced an approach to thinking about, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 and studying, animal behavior, called The overshadowed branch of compara- ethology, that was new to North America. tive psychology most relevant to the ethol- In part, ethology was a reaction against the ogy controversy was the one inspired by subjective interpretations of behavior that Z.-Y. Kuo. He emphasized the importance characterized one school in Europe as well of development, including embryogenesis. as unorthodox interpretations of" Darwin- In his early papers (e.g., Kuo, 1922, 1929) ian evolution (Richards, 1987). Lorenz and he rejected any role for genetics in behav- Tinbergen held that ethology, in contrast, ior, a view he later moderated (Kuo, 1967). was the objective study of behavior, which Kuo (1967) also echoed the negative view offended the North American psycholo- that many experimental psychologists had gists who viewed their discipline as yet more toward field studies as compared with the objective than ethology. tightly regulated circumstances of labora- But what truly distinguished ethologists tory experimentation. The school that was that they dealt "with behavior patterns developed around T. C. Schneirla, follow- drawn from the life cycle of the animals ing Kuo, made development central to their discussed, rather than with the laboratory comparative psychology (e.g., Maier and situations most often found in American Schneirla, 1935); although the evolution- comparative psychology" (Lehrman, 1953). ary perspective entered in, it was treated The Tinbergen school was particularly gingerly and kept at arm's length (Rich- active in field studies (e.g., Tinbergen et al., ards, 1987). 1962). In contrast, the Lorenz group was Even Frank Beach, who rebuked the not. Typically, but not always, Lorenzians experimental psychologists for not being went to pains to recreate a semblance of truly comparative, did not appreciate the the natural habitat in captivity, or to employ issue of adaptiveness of behavior. I recall a seminatural situation, such as fish in well that after his lecture on copulation in aquaria, jackdaws nesting in an attic, and dogs, which I heard a number of times, ducks and geese on ponds. It was this biologists present predictably asked about framework that permitted Lorenz to rec- the functional significance of the genital ognize behavior that was inappropriately lock. Beach, just as predictably, became vis- triggered in captivity (Lorenz, 1950, 1965). ibly annoyed because he regarded the The supporting framework for etholo- question as trivial. Ethologists, in contrast, gists was evolution. Little attempt was made were concerned with just such questions of in the beginning, however, to show how adaptive significance. behavior is adaptive. The assumption of When you appreciate the stress of the adaptation was nonetheless important Schneirla school, including Beach and because it guided them to questions about Lehrman, on development, and their sus- behavior that had been all too often picion of evolutionary arguments, you ignored, as in their studies of communi- begin to understand some of the roots of cation and displacement behavior. the debate. Glickman (1985) observed that The attention of ethologists in the begin- for psychologists in general, evolutionary ning was drawn to naturally occurring theory was (and to an extent remains) sus- behavior of animals. That enterprise, how- pect because of three beliefs: (1) The the- ever, grew into an attempt to provide ory is circular. (2) Humans are plastic, so reductionistic models for neurobiologists, evolution is irrelevant. And (3) social Dar- probably because of Lorenz's early train- NATURE-NURTURE: ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 289 ing in medicine and his close association nection to Haeckel, however, was tenuous with Erich von Hoist; that lineage persists at best (Richards, 1987). as neuroethology. Lorenz and Tinbergen Long after the stinging critique by Lehr- were also concerned with learned behav- man, Kalikow (1980) documented that ior. Much of the early work of Tinbergen Lorenz joined the Nazi party eight weeks and his students, most notably Gerard after Anschluss with Austria (Kalikow, Baerends, was on learning in digger wasps, 1980). It is nonetheless unclear whether which led to the then controversial prop- Lorenz was opportunistic or simply accom- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 osition of one-trial learning (Tinbergen, modated to a difficult situation. As Rich- 1951). ards (1987) pointed out, Lorenz's views on For his part, Lorenz wrote about learn- the application of the "laws" of nature to ing under a number of different cir- human society, and on the degenerative cumstances. His major contribution was effects of modern society on humans, were drawing attention to the remarkable phe- not unique to Germany. nomenon of imprinting among ducks and geese. Lorenz distinguished sharply "At this point in Lorenz's career, certain between instinctive and learned compo- well-entrenched evolutionary ideas hap- nents of behavior. In his theoretical pened to intersect with despicable Nazi scheme, development was a process of dogma. Certainly he fostered the union intercalating instincts and learning (Lorenz, of biology and propaganda, but I doubt 1937, 1965). that his main concerns would have been markedly different had the Weimar THE CONFLICT BETWEEN Republic survived. Nonetheless, just this ETHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY sort of public association of Nazism with human evolutionary biopsychology froze The field of ethology rapidly gained any enthusiasm for the discipline (of attention, particularly for its stress on ethology) immediately after the war, and innate behavior. It was not long after WW continues to chill its development within II before a critical review was published by contemporary biology of behavior as well the comparative psychologist Daniel Lehr- as within the social sciences" (Richards, man (1953). Reading the article today, its 1987, p. 536). essence does not seem so outrageous, but it did to ethologists at the time. Lehrman's For the rest of his life Lorenz was trou- frequent use of terms such as "gratuitous," bled by his experiences in the Third Reich "rash," "patently shallow," "facile," "pre- and turned away from political issues. But formationistic," and "preconceived and as a measure of how he was accepted after rigid ideas" were less vexing than the sub- WW II, the friendly collaboration between stance of the penetrating critique. To fully Lorenz and Tinbergen, started in 1936, appreciate the undercurrents of the attack, resumed. Bear in mind that Tinbergen was you have to know more about the individ- imprisoned by the Germans for protesting ual players. against the dismissal of three Jewish faculty At that time, Lorenz's critics suspected members (Dewsbury, 1990). he had been a Nazi. He rose rapidly, for The biting nature of Lehrman's critique such a young academician, to Kant's chair must therefore be taken in the context of at Konigsberg. His writings, especially an a recent war in which genocide was directed article in 1940 (Lorenz, 1940), could be at Jews and others and was said to be jus- considered (e.g., Kalikow, 1980; Klopfer, tified in Haeckelian biopolitics. Lorenz was 1977; Richards, 1987) to have been instru- perceived as a vestige of that tradition. The mental in the promulgation of a suprem- original, submitted version of Lehrman's acist racist doctrine, even eugenics. Kali- critique was scathing and personal; fortu- kow (1980) argued that Lorenz was greatly nately, the editor insisted the article be influenced in his youth by the world view recast and focussed on the scientific issues of Haeckel, and that that perspective made (Eckhard Hess, personal communication). him receptive to Nazi philosophy; the con- The content of the critique reflected the 290 GEORGE W. BARLOW thinking of Kuo and the Schneirla school two sides had been moving toward under- and was fairly representative of compara- standing one another, especially in Britain. tive psychology in North America at the Changes were taking place there that facil- time. Lehrman (1953) objected to the use itated resolution of the controversy of terms such as innate and instinctive to (Thorpe, 1979; Durant, 1986). With David explain behavior. So naming behavior, he Lack's support, Oxford University hired argued, substituted for an explanation of Niko Tinbergen. Shortly thereafter, how behavior works. Lorenz was also said Oxford and Cambridge, as is their way, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 to be insensitive to the interactive nature divided up the world of ethology. Oxford of development and to its underlying pro- was to pursue behavior in the context of cesses in producing the behavioral phe- evolution and field biology. Cambridge, notype, as reflected in the use by etholo- under the guidance of William Thorpe and gists of maturation as opposed to learning. later Robert Hinde, was to concentrate on Lehrman faulted the ethologists for what mechanisms of behavior. he felt was pseudo-physiological explana- Right from the beginning, the English tions. Finally, Lehrman took exception to ethologists took to heart Lehrman's cri- what he perceived as careless drawing of tique. Hinde and Lehrman developed a parallels between the behavior of animals close friendship that modified the way each and humans. viewed animal behavior. And Tinbergen The criticism was accurate with regard and Lehrman progressed to a warm and to the dichotomization into innate and cordial relationship. One of Lehrman's last learned behavior but was nonetheless an essays (1971), shortly before his untimely overstatement because Lorenz wrote death, reveals how far he traveled toward abundantly about ontogeny and imprint- the perspective of ethologists. ing. Yet it was true that ethologists were The culmination of the rapprochement insufficiently concerned at that time with was the appearance of Hinde's (1966, 1970) how behavior was produced through tome subtitled, A Synthesis of Ethology and development. And they had been careless Comparative Psychology. The book effec- in a number of ways. tively demonstrated the intricacies of The dispute was polarized and exagger- behavioral explanations, particularly the ated into the environmentalist doctrine of delicate interplay of genome and environ- the American psychologists versus the ment that results in the behavioral phe- genetic determinism of the European notype. Lorenz (e.g., 1965) softened his ethologists. Nonetheless, Lehrman's cri- position, now writing of the genome and tique had the desired effect of bringing the environment as sources of information two camps together. Much of the ensuing during ontogeny. But in many respects debate took place at small meetings rather Lorenz seemed to be merely attempting to than in the literature, as in the first Etho- make his original ideas more palatable logical Conference in Freiburg in 1953. without making fundamental changes But passions ran high for several years, (Lehrman, 1970). Nonetheless, ethology especially in the interactions with the Ger- gradually entered a less turbulent period man ethologists. For instance, in 1959 in characterized by more refined analyses. Cambridge, Lehrman met one evening in For many years after the peak of the a small room to discuss some of the issues controversy, ethology was often used in the with a group of German ethologists that pejorative sense. Oddly, as the term became included Lorenz and von Hoist. At one less frequently heard among biologists it point, von Hoist referred to Lehrman's became increasingly accepted in allied areas 1953 article as the Vergewaltigung (rape) such as medicine (e.g., McGuire and Fair- of ethology (Lehrman, who understood banks, 1977) and political science (e.g., some German, asked with a disarming smile Schubert, 1975). for the meaning of the word and chuckled The controversy had been intense but in when told). publications, at least, done without Despite such heated conversations, the impugning one another's motives. The NATURE-NURTURE: ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 291 issues were those of science, and the debate behavior by kinship and its consequences, accelerated understanding. Further, start- as articulated by Hamilton (1964), Wil- ing in the late fifties, many universities liams (1966) and Trivers (1971). across North America created new posi- "Sociobiology" also evoked vigorous but tions in animal behavior. constructive criticism (e.g., reviews in Ani- mal Behaviour, 1976). One group of sci- THE ADVENT OF SOCIOBIOLOGY entists, however, ripped the book as a polit-

Meanwhile at Oxford, Tinbergen's ical tract. Those attacks were unequalled Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 group had started asking how specific in recent times in vituperation and seemed behavioral differences affect the survival, aimed at Wilson as much as at the content hence fitness, of individuals (e.g., Tinber- of the book, obliquely questioning his gen et at., 1962; Patterson, 1965). John motives. The most extreme assaults were Crook (1965), under David Lack's super- written by fellow academicians, some of vision, showed how avian mating systems whom professed a fondness for Wilson and displays ultimately derive from feed- (Wade, 1976). The group behaved con- ing habits, predation, and physical envi- trary to our expectations of academicians ronment. Other major contributors were as responsible critics by flagrantly distort- W. D. Hamilton (e.g., 1964) on kinship and ing Wilson's position (Wade, 1976). altruism, and John Maynard Smith (e.g., During that period, a network of activist 1972) on the theoretical substrates of social scientists triggered graduate seminars in behavior. In the Netherlands, Lukas Tin- universities across North America. Oddly, bergen, Niko's brother, helped set the stage the participants were seldom those who for optimal foraging in his pioneering study studied behavior (see below); typically, they of search image (L. Tinbergen, 1960). were molecular biologists, geneticists and Things were also stirring in North the likes. One spin-off was a group that America. The Scottish biologist Wynne- called itself something like the Committee Edwards' (1962) advocacy of group selec- Against Racism; in 1979 they mounted the tion stimulated George Williams (1966) to speakers' platform at a symposium on write his classic "Adaptation and Natural sociobiology in Washington, D.C., and Selection"; he was between jobs in Berke- physically assaulted E. O. Wilson. Prior to ley and had time to write (personal com- and during that symposium other anti- munication). Williams' book was foreshad- sociobiologists tried unsuccessfully to take owed by a seldom cited article (Williams over and subvert the symposium to their and Williams, 1957) on the evolution of own agenda. altruism among social insects. Alexander But why should "Sociobiology" have (1977) credited Williams for triggering a drawn such organized, passionate and sus- revolution in our thinking about evolution. tained attack at the biopolitical level? Jer- Alexander himself was contributing ram Brown's (1975) textbook covered importantly, especially on the costs and much the same material, interpreted sim- benefits of social aggregations (Alexander, ilarly, and appeared the same year as Wil- 1974). Three pivotal articles by Trivers son's book. Brown, however, did not (1971, 1972, 1974) finished setting the extrapolate to human society. Brown was stage for the climax by E. O. Wilson (1975), also more sensitive to the issue of behav- Sociobiology. The New Synthesis. ioral processes and development. The year before "Sociobiology" came out, Michael THE STORM SURROUNDING Ghiselin (1974) published a book that SOCIOBIOLOGY addressed much the same issues in what Wilson's book was acclaimed by many might be considered an even more pro- biologists. It cut a scholarly swath through vocative manner with regard to humans; animal behavior, ecology, population biol- other than some uncharitable reviews, ogy and evolution. Although Wilson nothing more followed. touched on a wide range of topics, the unit- The strong response to Wilson's book ing theme was the modulation of social was said to have two roots, possibly three. 292 GEORGE W. BARLOW

The first and most frequently mentioned issue of responsibility was echoed in suc- reason was the content of Wilson's last ceeding critiques in a form that appeared chapter. There he speculated incautiously at times to advocate prior censorship (e.g., on the genetic basis of human social behav- Kitcher, 1985). ior, and often with regard to highly com- Later, the Sociobiology Study Group plex, situation-sensitive behavior. That was (1976) characterized genetic determinism the target of most of the blistering reviews as follows: Present societies are a conse-

(see below). Unfortunately, Wilson's last quence of a combination of inherent prop- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 chapter resulted in the nature-nurture erties of humans and of "biological forces." debate regressing to a polarized state such The status quo is justified by the homeo- as prevailed when Lehrman (1953) took static nature of societies; attempts to alter the ethologists to task. the situation are fruitless because society The second reason for the negative will return to its natural arrangement. response is found in the first chapter. There Genetic determinism is merely an out- Wilson presented the infamous "dumb- growth of the author's particular socioeco- bell" model of the future. The two large nomic prejudices. spheres represented population biology on In a number of essays, sociobiologists in the one side and physiology on the other. general were accused of being genetic The thin connecting link was all that was determinists but, except for Wilson, with- to remain of animal behavior in the con- out naming them (e.g., Gould, 1978). ventional sense. Further, sociobiology (the Dawkins (1985), taking note of the anon- population level) would replace the social ymous nature of the repeated accusation, sciences, such as anthropology. That flatly asserted that no legitimate sociobiol- shocked those in the fields ordained to dis- ogist advocates genetic determinism or appear, and it galvanized them into action anything approaching it. Probably true, but (e.g., Sahlins, 1976; Washburn, 1978). the views of David Barash and Pierre van The last reason was inferred by Wade den Berghe came close (Kitcher, 1985). (1976), and the evidence is at best circum- Wilson is on record as rejecting genetic stantial; it might be called local competi- determinism. He declared that the envi- tion. First a little background. Science for ronment is more important than genetics the People, consisting of academicians and to human behavior. "When any genetic bias other scientists, championed progressive is demonstrated, it cannot be used to justify to radical social issues at that time. From a continuing practice in present and future them came the Sociobiology Study Group. societies ... it would invite disaster" (Wil- The most active segment of that group was son, 1976). at , Wilson's home One of the curious things about the institution. Most notably, three of them, attack on Wilson and "Sociobiology" was Steven J. Gould, Richard Levins and Rich- the absence, among the outspoken critics, ard Lewontin, were in Wilson's adminis- of any authoritative student of animal trative unit and interacted with him. behavior. This sharp contrast to the ethol- The first critique was the most scathing. ogy controversy has gone without com- Allen et al. (1975, in Wilson, 1976) stated ment. I was therefore intrigued, during that that sociobiology in an earlier form pro- turbulent period, when individuals from vided "an important basis" for sterilization the Sociobiology Study Group directed my laws and restrictive immigration policies attention to one example, a paper by an during the period between 1910 and 1930, eminent student of animal behavior, Peter and also "for the eugenics policies which Klopfer (1977). The brief abstract of that led to the establishment of gas chambers paper stated that, "Sociobiology has made in Nazi Germany. . . . Wilson joins the long a resurgence in recent years, but has parade of biological determinists whose become enmeshed in political controversy. work has served to buttress the institutions Indeed, much of the work on sociobiology of our society by exonerating them from has been used to justify repressive or racist responsibility for social problems." The measures." To my surprise, the so-called NATURE-NURTURE: ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 293 sociobiologist he attacked was Konrad attitudes and racial discrimination we all Lorenz, who abhorred sociobiology. Klop- see. Still, their injunctions are a chilling fer referred to Wilson's book in but one reminder of Lysenko's damaging proscrip- sentence: "The recent monumental study tion of all studies of genetics in the Soviet by E. O. Wilson, through the impetus it Union (see Caspari and Marshak, 1965; has given biosociology, no less through theJoravsky, 1970)., controversy it has spawned, makes this a To return to the starting point, the particularly topical issue" (emphasis added). nature-nurture issue, I quote a passage from Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 Otherwise, Klopfer said only a few cau- the Sociobiology Study Group (1976) that tiously approving words about the writings illustrates their environmentalistic view of of sociobiologists sensu stricto. the dichotomy: ". . . the truth is that the The main thrust of the attack on "Socio- individual's social activity is to be under- biology" by the Sociobiology Study Group stood only by first understanding social was that Wilson was politically motivated, institutions" (emphasis added). Extreme even if he were himself unaware of it. I environmentalism can result in a doctrine would be remiss, therefore, if I did not as dangerous and loathsome as genetic mention the political views of the leading determinism, as the Minister of Propa- scientists of the Study Group. It is not out ganda in the Third Reich well appreciated. of the ordinary for scientists to distort views Anti-sociobiology scientists obviously of the opposing camp (Hull, 1980). It is had, and have, a sophisticated understand- unusual, however, for the distorting groups ing of the contributions of environment to have such openly political aims. and genome to the development of the Richard Levins and phenotype (Kitcher, 1985). Yet they have professed to being Marxists (Lums- seemed to move in a different world where den and Wilson, 1981a; Joravsky, 1970; behavior was concerned, one blind to that Wade, 1976), and Steven J. Gould has pub- understanding. On different occasions licly proclaimed that he learned Marxism shortly after the publication of "Socio- on his father's knee. (I am compelled to biology" Richard Lewontin and Lawrence add that their personal politics are of no Slobodkin gave lectures in Berkeley in concern to me.) Lumsden and Wilson which they bluntly asserted that animal (198 la) provided the following quotes from behavior, unlike other biological traits, has The Radicalization of Science by Lewontin and no genetic basis. Levins: "As working scientists in the field In the space of a few years after "Socio- of evolutionary genetics and ecology, we biology" much of the heat went out of the have been attempting with some success to debate. Workers started calling themselves guide our own research by a conscious behavioral ecologists instead of sociobiol- application of Marxist philosophy. . . . ogists. Wilson wrote further books in which There is nothing in Marx, Lenin or Mao he took greater pains to make explicit his that is or that can be in contradiction with views on human behavior (Wilson, 1978; the particular physical facts and processes Lumsden and Wilson, 19816). Had these of a particular set of phenomena in the books appeared without the prior publi- objective world." cation of "Sociobiology" they still would This type of thinking led Lewontin have received hostile reviews, but I believe (1977) to advocate stopping all studies on the debate would have been on a higher, IQ, Allen et al. (1975) to question whether more objective plane. Problems remained, the genetics of human behavior in any form however. Wilson carefully explained the is warranted, and Gould (1978) to assert contributions of both genetic and environ- that human nature is simply too complex mental substrates, and their intricate inter- and difficult to understand, so any attempt actions. But he then proceeded to discuss to do so is bound to fail. Kitcher (1985, p. specific aspects of human behavior in a 9) seemed to oppose even hypothesizing selectionist framework that requires about human behavior. I understand and genetic control (Kitcher, 1985). appreciate their concerns, given the sexist Critical reviews and commentaries con- 294 GEORGE W. BARLOW

tinued to appear, though for the most part sociobiology as anathema. When asked they became progressively more cautious about the workings of the field, they had and constructive (e.g., Gould, 1978, 1980; no understanding whatsoever. They knew but see Lumsden and Wilson, 1981a). it had to do with animal behavior, and that Recently, Kitcher (1985) stressed the need it was bad, it was sexist and racist or some- to apply a higher standard of evidence when thing like that, but little more. I believe writing about human behavior because of the aftermath, from which we still suffer,

the potential for misuse; in his view, a lower is that such faculty often argued against Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icb/article-abstract/31/2/286/1992173 by guest on 19 January 2019 standard has prevailed in the publications hiring in the area of animal behavior. At of sociobiologists. the heart of all this is the nature-nurture Kitcher's injunction can be applied to issue. both sides in the argument, not just to the The issue will not die. It is all too easy sociobiologists. Kitcher (1985:292) illus- to demonstrate the effects of environment, trated this point when he accused socio- often reversible, on the behavior of indi- biologists of the "... parading of gossip as viduals. It is difficult, but not impossible, observational data," but then did the same to tease out the contribution of the genetic to support his own arguments. The worst substrate in animal behavior. Where the example of this double standard came when problem becomes acute is when the exten- he sought to refute the notion of unitary sion is made to humans, with implications drive by describing a lascivious banquet for ethical, hence political, behavior. from the cinema "Tom Jones," but many Genetics of human behavior is pretty much other lapses occurred. Kitcher also faulted limited to family histories and adoption sociobiologists for not entertaining alter- studies. The argument will continue to be native hypotheses. Yet, when he claimed propelled by our growing understanding that sociobiological conclusions about of the evolution of behavior among ani- human behavior merely coincided with folk mals, the perceived continuity between the psychology, he never considered the myr- behavior of animals and humans, and the iad of alternative interpretations of human temptation to resort to correlations. behavior available in folk psychology. repeatedly held ACKNOWLEDGMENTS up the claim that sociobiologists were irre- I am grateful to Donald A. Dewsbury, sponsible (see also Kitcher, 1985). On their Stephen E. Glickman and Judy Stamps for side, their attack so exceeded the usual their constructive comments on an early bounds of scientific debate that they were draft of this article, and to Colin G. Beer, open to the charge of irresponsibility. The Patricia A. Gowaty and an anonymous debate did advance our appreciation of reviewer for invaluable criticism of the many sensitive issues, and the complex penultimate draft. Not only did their interrelationship of science and politics; remarks improve the manuscript, they led that must be counted as a plus. On the me to a deeper exploration of the issues. I other hand, their attack contributed little also thank Zuleyma Halpin for inviting me to clarifying purely scientific issues. Their to present this essay. main accomplishment seems to have been the creation of an image of sociobiology as REFERENCES an evil doctrine, an image that extended Alexander, R. D. 1974. The evolution of social to those studying animal behavior. That behavior. Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 5:325-383. image cost the field, and precipitated a Alexander, R. D. 1977. Review of The use and abuse scramble to call oneself a behavioral ecol- of biology: An anthropological critique of sociobiology, by M. D. Sahlins, University of Michigan Press, ogist. Ann Arbor, 1976, 120 pp. Araer. Anthropol. 79: During and after the sociobiology tumult 917-290. I traveled to a number of meetings and Allen, E. et al. 1975. Against sociobiology. The New York Review of Books, 13 November. universities. Old colleagues, not reading the Banks, E. M. 1985. Warder Clyde Allee and the Chi- primary literature nor working the field of cago school of animal behavior. J. Hist. Behav. behavior, responded to the mention of Sci. 21:345-353. NATURE-NURTURE: ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 295

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