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Athanasios Orphanides Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management MIT Sloan School of Management

VOWI_Tagung _2013.indb 78 25.11.13 13:20 Is Full Employment an Appropriate Monetary Policy Target?1

Full employment is an important public policy objective. The unprecedented level of unemployment observed in the aftermath of the global crisis represents a major policy failure. This paper re-examines whether this policy failure is one we should associate with monetary policy and whether full employment is an appropriate target for monetary policy. It is recalled that a few decades ago, full employment was considered by many to be a proper monetary policy target. This changed with the advent of inflation targeting that recognized the value of the primacy of price stability. Following a brief historical review, it is argued that full employment is not an appropriate target for the central bank and should be avoided for the same reasons that led central banks to put price stability above other objectives as an operational target in the latter part of the 20th century. Lack of knowledge about what constitutes full employment in real time and the risk of politicization of the central bank in the face of possibly politically motivated disagreements about its measurement make full employment an unsuitable target. Keywords: Natural rate of unemployment, full employment, potential output, monetary policy, real-time output gap JEL Classification: E50, E52, E58

Full employment is an important public we observe in the elevated unemploy- policy objective. The unprecedented ment rates one we should associate level of unemployment in the aftermath with monetary policy? Alternatively, is of the global crisis has become a cause full employment an appropriate mone- of grave concern in a number of devel- tary policy target? Should full employ- oped economies. Aggregate production ment be part of the legal mandate of remains far below what would have central banks or should the mandate of been expected before the crisis. “Under- a central bank be interpreted in this utilized” resources impose a welfare manner? loss on any economy and a strong desire To address this question it is useful is seen for public policy to intervene to consider the role of monetary policy and correct the situation. in the broader context of serving the In the euro area, the situation is public interest. In theory, all govern- particularly dramatic in countries un- ment policies and institutions, includ- der an IMF/EU program, where in ing the central bank, could coordinate some cases unemployment has reached to achieve maximum social welfare. depression era proportions (chart 1). Monetary, fiscal, regulatory, labor, The contrast with Germany, where un- structural and other policies could con- employment has been declining during tribute, in small or large part, to the at- the crisis is striking. Focusing on youth tainment of multiple objectives: Price unemployment rates (chart 2) high- stability, financial stability, full employ- lights the risk of creating a lost genera- ment, high productivity, fairness, equal- tion as a result of the potentially per- ity, social justice and so on. But at times manent scarring effects of unemploy- there may be conflicts among the vari- ment. ous objectives and the roles of different Without question, the dismal per- institutions. Different policies and dif- formance of unemployment reflects a ferent institutions may vary widely in major policy failure. But is the failure the effectiveness with which they can

1 Correspondence: MIT Sloan School of Management, E62-481, 100 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. Phone: +1-617-324-4051. E-mail: [email protected].

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Chart 1 the targets assigned should be achiev- Unemployment Rates able. With regard to monetary policy, % these considerations have led to the 30 view that it is best performed by inde-

25 pendent central banks and that a primary task can be identified in the pres- 20 ervation of price stability, an objective 15 which is squarely under its control over 10 time. Because of the short-term influ-

5 ence of monetary policy on aggregate demand and employment, monetary 0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 policy is also recognized as a countercy- Germany Cyprus Greece clical stabilization tool and, in this Ireland Portugal Spain light, full employment might be consid- Source: Eurostat. ered as another objective. A practical Note: Germany versus program countries. difficulty arises, however, once it is recognized that full employment can- Chart 2 not be accurately determined, espe- Youth Unemployment Rates cially in real time, when monetary pol- % icy decisions are taken. As a result, the 70 pursuit of full employment as a mone- 60 tary policy target may compromise the

50 pursuit of price stability. In this context, the question to address is whether 40 full employment is an appropriate mon- 30 etary policy target despite the risks this 20 could pose to the achievement of price stability over time. 10 In fact, full employment had be- 0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 come part of the legal mandate of some th Germany Cyprus Greece central banks during the 20 century, Ireland Portugal Spain and, in some cases, monetary policy Source: Eurostat. was de facto operating with full em- Note: Germany versus program countries. ployment as a target. In the United States, the Employment Act of 1946 contribute to their attainment. And in proclaimed that it was the continuing the context of modern democracies, in- policy and responsibility of the govern- tertemporal conflicts may arise due to ment and the Federal Reserve to “pro- electoral considerations. Elected gov- mote maximum employment, produc- ernments and politicians more gener- tion and purchasing power.” The Act ally, may have different objectives and was enacted in the shadow of the Great shorter horizons than would be ideal Depression, a period when the social for society as a whole. pain associated with persistent unem- In practice, these considerations sug- ployment was as dramatic as ever. As gest that better results may be attain- DeLong (1997) notes, however, pre- able for social welfare as a whole if in- cisely this motivation to achieve full stitutions and policies are assigned employment following the experience more specific targets and, further, that of the Great Depression, led to a ne-

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glect of price stability as the predomi- man had argued, such errors add to nant objective of monetary policy, lead- economic instability (Orphanides and ing to the Great Inflation. Nelson Williams, 2013). But revisions in real- (2005) documents that neglect of price time estimates of the economy’s poten- stability as a responsibility of monetary tial need not be symmetric. Then, in policy was observed in a number of addition to greater instability, such pol- countries. icies may induce a bias. The infeasibility of pursuing full Politics and human optimism could employment policies in the manner result in an asymmetry in the revisions pursued following the Employment of full employment estimates in a man- Act, and the inflationary consequences ner that would imply an inflation bias if that would eventually materialize by such policies was a recurring theme in Milton Friedman’s work (1947, 1953, 1968). Friedman stressed that our lack of knowledge of the precise dynamics of the economy and of the measurement of the business cycle made it in- feasible for monetary policy to pursue a full employment target. Friedman argued that doing so would likely increase instability in the economy as it would compromise what monetary policy could achieve, that is to deliver price stability over time. Unfortunately, the consensus policy advice provided by full employment is used as a policy tar- our profession failed to heed these get. Political pressure to attain higher warnings at that time. It was only fol- and higher employment when the pre- lowing the Great Inflation, a disastrous cise definition of full employment re- experience with high and volatile infla- mained unknown could induce faster tion accompanied by slow growth and revisions from estimates that appear high unemployment, that the error was pessimistic than from estimates that ap- recognized. pear optimistic. Such a pattern in the Misperceptions in real-time esti- process of revisions would result in an mates of full employment and potential inflationary bias, overall, when mone- output unavoidably become a signifi- tary policy is guided by a full employ- cant problem when policy is guided by ment target. Meltzer (2005) argues a full employment target. A monetary that such a political dimension is essen- policy strategy based on a full employ- tial to fully understand the origins of ment target would produce periods of the Great Inflation. When policy is high and sustained inflation and peri- guided by two targets – full employ- ods of sustained and low inflation (or ment and price stability – conflicts deflation) depending on whether esti- arise as “[p]oliticians elected for four-or mates of the economy’s potential used five-year terms put much more weight to guide policy subsequently prove to on employment – jobs, jobs, jobs – than have been overoptimistic or over pessi- on future inflation.” mistic. Recent macro econometric ex- The pattern of revision of official ercises have confirmed that, as Fried- estimates of potential output and the

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associated output gap in the United geted full employment, led to a series States during the 1970s offers a clear case of policy errors. of the resulting inflationary dynamic. The experience at the Federal Re- Chart 3, reproduced from Orphanides serve at the beginning of the 1970s (2003), shows the evolution of histori- is characteristic of the errors. When cal estimates of the output gap during Arthur Burns became Chairman of the the 1970s. The chart shows official es- Federal Reserve in 1970, the economy timates of the output gap produced by was entering into a recession. Even the Council of Economic Advisers in though inflation was on the rise, the es- 1973, 1976, 1977 and 1979. At that timates of the output gap available at time, other institutions, including the the time argued that aggregate demand Federal Reserve, employed the Coun- was below the economy’s potential and cil’s estimates for potential output in policy was eased. Similarly, in 1973, their analysis. For comparison, the un- the economy appeared to underper- labeled line at the top shows the Fed- form, and estimates suggested that only eral Reserve staff’s estimate of the out- part of the output gap resulting from put gap based on estimates of potential the recession of 1970s had been recov- output produced in 1994. During the ered. At the time, both fiscal and mon- 1970s the US economy had experi- etary policy actively targeted full em- enced a productivity slowdown and an ployment and the estimates of the out- increase in the natural rate of unem- put gap influenced policy decisions ployment. But these adverse supply de- towards excessive accommodation. As velopments were recognized only grad- the decade progressed, growth gener- ually and with a significant lag. This ally frustrated expectations and infla- delay in recognition, while policies tar- tion exceeded forecasts. Subsequently, it was realized that Chart 3 earlier estimates of full employment were overoptimistic. This led to up- US Output Gap Revisions: 1973, 1976, 1977, 1979 ward revisions in the natural rate of unemployment and corresponding down- percentage points 7 ward revisions in the estimates of po- 6 tential, as seen in the chart. By 1979, 5 4 several percentage points of the output 3 gap previously estimated for the early 2 1 1970s were revised away. Still, the 0 –1 1979 vintage of the output gap only –2 1979 corrected part of the problem. Subse- –3 1973 –4 quently, potential output estimates –5 were revised to show that the output –6 –7 gap was generally positive during the –8 1977 –9 decade, consistent with the inflationary –10 experience. On the basis of these re- –11 –12 vised estimates, the economy was over- –13 1976 heated both in 1970 and in 1973. Had –14 –15 monetary policy not targeted the 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 flawed estimates of full employment, Source: Orphanides. and instead focused on price stability, Note: Reproduced from Orphanides (2003). the inflation experience would have

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been averted and the economy would Unlike the ECB, the Federal Re- have experienced less instability. serve’s mandate has not been as explicit The traumatic experience associ- on the primacy of price stability. The ated with the Great Inflation around Federal Reserve Act was revised in the the world, shifted attitudes and led to 1970s to recognize explicitly price sta- the rebirth of modern central banking bility as one of its objectives. According (Bordo and Orphanides, 2013). The to the revised Act, the Federal Reserve limits of monetary policy were better should “promote effectively the goals of recognized and central bank mandates maximum employment and stable adjusted to avoid the risk of compro- prices.” However, literal interpretation mising price stability. For example, in of this language continued to suggest the case of the European Central Bank, full employment as a target for policy, the 1992 Treaty explicitly recognizes and thus would not have freed the Fed- that: “The primary objective ... shall eral Reserve from the failed policies of be to maintain price stability.” The the 1970s. Treaty goes on to recognize that the One might ask how policy was ac- central bank can possibly help attain tually practiced in the United States other objectives but that these should follow: “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union ...” This mandate suggests a lexicographic nature, with goals such as full employment seen as subor- dinated to that of price stability. The primacy of price stability is also a prominent feature of the Inflation Tar- geting (IT) framework for monetary policy. In the quarter century or so before the recent crisis, the policy strategy of putting price stability first, and avoid- ing a parallel target of full employment was practiced successfully by a large number of central banks. The framework is associated with inflation target- following 1979, when starting with Paul ing but has been practiced explicitly or Volcker the central bank dealt deci- implicitly both by central banks that sively with its inflation problem. The self-describe themselves as inflation- answer is that both Chairman Volcker targeters and others. The success of the from 1979 on and Chairman Greenspan framework can be summarized as en- who succeeded him in 1987 effectively suring a credible nominal anchor, help- interpreted the legal mandate of the Fed- ing central banks achieve an environ- eral Reserve as if it recognized the pri- ment of well-anchored inflation expec- macy of price stability. That is, the Fed tations around the central banks’ price was implicitly acting as an inflation tar- stability objectives which in turn en- geting central bank (Orphanides, 2006). hances stability in the real economy and Consider for example how Chair- indirectly attains full employment. man Greenspan explained the success

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of policy in the post-1979 period. In an the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal address in 2004 he explained this was Reserve respected the primacy of price achieved by: “... maximizing the prob- stability in the formulation of monetary abilities of achieving our goals of price policy. stability and the maximum sustainable More recently, the role of full em- growth that we associate with it.” The ployment as part of the mandate of the key, in this interpretation, is that by fo- central bank has again been brought cusing on price stability, the Federal into question. Frustration with the Reserve could ensure that the real slow improvement in output and em- economy could grow along its maxi- ployment growth following the 2008 mum sustainable growth path which is global collapse permeates most devel- associated with “it” – that is with price oped economies. Decisive policies averted a repetition of the Great De- pression experience, but in the aftermath of a prolonged period of subpar growth and high unemployment, expectations are high that monetary policy can do more to facilitate faster growth and employment. Should full employment once again become a monetary policy target? At the Federal Reserve, the com- munication of the committee in the recent past has shifted following the crisis to place more symmetric emphasis on employment and price stability than stability – that need not be explicitly had been the case during the Volcker- identified nor targeted by the central Greenspan era. In its announcement bank. following the November 2010 meeting, One may ask why this roundabout the Federal Open Market Committee way to help the economy achieves max- (FOMC) added the following descrip- imum employment over time? As mention of its objectives: “Consistent with tioned earlier, the answer is our lack of its statutory mandate, the Committee knowledge regarding the appropriate seeks to foster maximum employment real targets, concepts such as the natu- and price stability.” According to the ral rate of employment and unemploy- minutes of the meeting, “members ment and potential or natural output. agreed that it was appropriate to adjust For example, as Chairman Greenspan the statement to make it clear that the noted back in 1994, “while the idea of a unemployment rate was elevated, and national ‘threshold’ at which short-term that measures of underlying inflation inflation rises or falls is statistically ap- were somewhat low, relative to levels pealing, it is very difficult in practice to that the Committee judged to be con- arrive at useful estimates that would sistent, over the longer run, with its identify such a natural rate.” He went dual mandate.” The change in commu- on to conclude: “In light of these uncer- nication in part reflected the frustra- tainties, I do not think that any one es- tion with the pace of economic recov- timate of the natural rate is useful in ery. During the discussion “[p]rogress the formulation of monetary policy.” In toward the Committee’s dual objec-

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tives of maximum employment and when it may be more permanent in na- price stability was described as disap- ture? pointingly slow.” In December 2012, Unfortunately, the answer to all the FOMC has introduced explicit these questions is “No!” Confidence in mention of the rate of unemployment the reliability of real-time estimates of as a guide to its unconventional mea- either the natural rate of unemploy- sures during the crisis. Specifically, the ment or the corresponding level of po- associated statement stated that the tential output, if anything, can only be FOMC “currently anticipates that this lower today than it had been before the exceptionally low range for the federal crisis. The extent of the decline in funds rate will be appropriate at least as economy activity during the crisis had long as the unemployment rate remains been so large and the damage to the fi- above 6.5%.” These changes have cre- nancial sector so extensive that it is ated a tension that could be interpreted harder to assess how much of the fall is as a shift away from the recognition of structural and likely persistent, and price stability as primary to the achieve- how much could be corrected with fur- ment of other objectives. In a recent ther policy-induced increases in aggre- speech, Chairman Volcker reiterated gate demand. the concern that if policy is explicitly The difficulty of assessing the path directed towards a dual mandate that of full employment in the past few years puts employment on par with price sta- can be highlighted by examining the re- bility, the outcome could well be coun- cent pattern of revision in the estimate terproductive. “Asked to do too much of potential output published by the ... [the Federal Reserve] will inevitably Congressional Budget Office (CBO). fall short. If in the process of trying it The CBO is an independent, non-parti- loses sight of its basic responsibility for san organization tasked to evaluate the price stability, a matter which is within government budget for which estimates its range of influence, then those other and forecasts of both actual and poten- goals will be beyond reach.” (Volcker, tial output are a critical input. Chart 4 2013.) It seems that much like in the af- presents the data as available in early termath of the Great Depression, frus- 2010. The blue line shows the estimate tration with the slow pace of economic of potential GDP available in early recovery in the United States and else- 2007, before the crisis. The green line where has elevated demands to place shows actual GDP, ending with the greater attention on the achievement of fourth quarter of 2009, the last avail- full employment. able data point at that time. As can be Should full employment once again seen, for several years prior to the cri- become a monetary policy target? One sis, output growth exhibited remark- way to examine the issue is by asking a able stability and deviations of actual number of related questions reflecting GDP from what was thought to have the rationale for recognizing the pri- been potential output were very small. macy of price stability as a policy strat- The recession opened a considerable egy: Has the measurement problem as- gap that was forecast to close slowly sociated with what constitutes full em- over many years. The CBO revised ployment been solved? Can we reliably downward its estimate of potential out- detect shifts in the natural rate of un- put (the orange line) going forward and employment in real time? Can we tell adjusted its forecast of actual GDP so when a shift in output is temporary and the gap closed by 2014. Unfortunately,

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the subsequent growth in the economy The green line with actual GDP data did not meet the forecasted path for now extends to the fourth quarter of GDP. Chart 5 presents the data as avail- 2012. As can be seen, the disappointing able in early 2013, replacing the 2010 growth led to a further significant vintages of actual and potential GDP downward revision of potential GDP forecasts with their 2013 counterparts. and a corresponding less optimistic path for the level of GDP of the econ-

Chart 4 omy. But whether this revision will prove adequate cannot be judged yet. US GDP and Revisions of Potential Chart 6 plots together the evolution of GDP: 2010 actual GDP and the three vintages of Trillions of 2005 USD 18.000 potential output 2007, 2010 and 2013. 2010 2007 Despite the evident downward revi- 17.000 sion, the output gap implied by the cur- 16.000 rent estimate over the past five years 15.000 remains implausibly persistently large.

14.000 At the same time, inflation has not de- clined over the past several years, as 13.000 would have been expected if the econ- 12.000 omy was persistently operating sub- 11.000 stantially below its potential. This sug-

10.000 gests that the output gap may have been 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 significantly smaller than what is im- 2007 estimate of potential GDP plied by even the recent downwards- 2010 forecast of GDP Actual GDP until Q4/09 adjusted estimates of potential output. 2010 estimate of potential GDP Using past experience as a guide, it Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce. is more likely than not that the CBO

Chart 5 Chart 6 US GDP and Revisions of Potential US GDP and Revisions of Potential GDP: 2013 GDP Trillions of 2005 USD Trillions of 2005 USD 18.000 18.000 2010 2007 2007 17.000 17.000 2013 2013 16.000 16.000

15.000 15.000

14.000 14.000

13.000 13.000

12.000 12.000

11.000 11.000

10.000 10.000 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2007 estimate of potential GDP Estimate of potential GDP as of 2007 2013 forecast of GDP Estimate of potential GDP as of 2010 Actual GDP until Q4/12 Actual GDP 2013 estimate of potential GDP Estimate of potential GDP as of 2013

Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce. Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce.

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will further revise downwards its esti- these factors together with technology mate of potential output for the first determine potential output. Over the half of this decade. If the disruption in medium term, fiscal policy can provide the growth path of the economy proves better incentives for job creation and as dramatic as the slowdown experi- investment. Over the longer term, enced in the 1970s, another decade structural and labor policies determine may need to go by before we can accu- the degree of flexibility and efficiency rately assess whether and to what extent the economy today is underper- forming its potential. The main difficulty with full employment as a target for monetary policy remains that we cannot know how to measure it pre- cisely enough in real time, when it is needed as an input to policy decisions. If monetary policy decisions are guided by full employment, instead of assigning a primary role to price stability, then, sooner or later, price stability will be compromised and the economy will likely experience greater instability overall. of labor markets in an economy, and Assigning full employment as a tar- thus the level of employment and pro- get to monetary policy under such cir- duction corresponding to full employ- cumstances would raise expectations ment over time. The cases of Spain and that the central bank can do what it Greece where, as can be seen in charts takes to deliver on higher employment. 1 and 2, the unemployment rate has The threat of politicization of the cen- risen particularly dramatically during tral bank and eventual neglect of price the crisis are instructive. The greatest stability could soon follow. In an envi- tragedy of the current record high un- ronment with asymmetric political employment rates in these countries pressures for “more jobs,” uncertainty primarily reflects a failure of the euro regarding the measurement of full em- area construction and flawed policies ployment would once again introduce that predate the crisis. Instead of has- an inflationary bias to policy. tening reforms that could have en- Assigning full employment as a tar- hanced productivity and flexibility, the get to monetary policy also obscures euro perpetuated dysfunctional ele- the role of other policies and institu- ments in labor markets. Needed adjust- tions and can be counterproductive for ments that ideally should have taken the very attainment of higher employ- place before the crisis were avoided. ment. After all, monetary policy does The failure to correct these sources of not determine the level of employment vulnerability before the crisis added ri- consistent with full employment and gidity to labor markets and magnified maximum sustainable production over the impact of the crisis on the rate of time. Other policies, together with unemployment. household preferences determine the Understandably, the slower than level of employment that is consistent desired progress of the recovery with full employment over time and following the crisis is frustrating to

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politicians and monetary policymakers. do more harm than good. The primacy But the temptation to seek an improve- of price stability as the bedrock of mon- ment by declaring full employment etary policy should not be compro- a monetary policy target is likely to mised.

References Bordo, M. and A. Orphanides. 2013. The Great Inflation: The rebirth of modern central banking. Chicago: University of Chicago. DeLong, B. 1997. America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s In: Romer, C. and D. Romer (eds.). Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy. University of Chicago Press. Friedman, M. 1947. Lerner on the economics of control. In: Journal of Political Economy 55 (5). 405–416. Friedman, M. 1953. The Effects of Full-Employment Policy on Economic Stability: A Formal Analysis. In: Essays on Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, M. 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review 58(1). 1–17. Greenspan, A. 1994. Statement to the U.S. House Committee on the Budget. 1994 Federal Reserve Bulletin 80(8). June 22. 714–719. Greenspan, A. 2004. Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy. In: American Economic Review 94(2). 33–40. Meltzer, A. 2005. Origins of the Great Inflation. Federal Reserve of St. Louis Review. March/April 87(2, Part 2). 145–175. Nelson, E. 2005. Monetary Policy Neglect and the Great Inflation in Canada, Australia and New Zeland. In: International Journal of Central Banking, 1(1). 133–179. Orphanides, A. 2003. The Quest for Prosperity without Inflation. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 50(3). Orphanides, A. 2006. The Road to Price Stability. In: American Economic Review 96(2). 178–181. Orphanides, A. and J. Williams. 2013. Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations. In: Bordo, M. and A. Orphanides (eds.). The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking. University of Chicago Press. Volcker, P. 2013. Central Banking at a Crossroad. Remarks at the Economic Club of New York. May 29.

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