ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 225± 247, 1997

Fromdespotism to democracy: the riseof multiparty politics in

JULIUSOIHONVBERE

DrHastings Kamuzu Banda instituted what was probablythe most repressive, corrupt,predatory and violent political system inAfrica.Through a combination ofbribery, intimidation, election malpractices, and the suffocation of civil society,Banda not only closed all democratic openings inherited at political independencein 1964, but also erected the structures of a corruptand highly repressiveone-person and one-party state. There was hardlya separation betweenpublic and private funds as Bandahimself owned almost half the economy.Trade unions were not allowed. The so-called parliament was ajoke set upandmanipulated by Banda to give the veneer of democracy.A backward moralcode was imposedand the activities of all sectors weremonitored. Press andacademic freedom did not exist under Banda, the country did not even have televisionservices! Thosewho dared oppose the ` lifepresident’ or daredto show some interestin succeeding him were either assassinated, forced into exile, or simplyjailed. 1 Anotoriousculture of sycophancywas createdto singthe praises of the Ngwazi orconqueror. His special security apparatus, the Malawi Young Pioneers,along with an array of spies andparamilitary units, were used to intimidatecivil society and harass Malawianexiles abroad. 2 By1970 Dr Bandahad total control over the political system. Elections to parliamentwere underhis direct control. He coulddissolve parliament and dismiss hiscabinet at will. Anyone desiring to compete in parliamentary elections had to ®rst seekDr Banda’s approval.As aresult,parliament [was] turnedinto a socializingforum where, once a year,the members of parliament gather to get to knoweach other and to shower with praises the ª wiseand dynamic leadership of Dr Banda.ºPolicies formulated elsewhere [were] approvedwith little meaningful debateor constructive criticism by the parliament. 3 Therewere pockets of opposition,though most of thesewere located outside the countryand often ineffective, especially in the context of solidWestern tolerance andsupport for Banda’ s dictatorship.It is dif®cult not to agree with Denis Venterthat ` Forall intents and purposes Malawi was noteven a one-partystate: itwas aone-manstate, a politicaldespotism in which the state apparatus was answerableto onlyone man. The result was aclimateof fear almostunparalleled anywherein Africa, even in countries wracked by violence.’ 4 UnderBanda, the statewas largely` irrelevant’to theneeds of thepeople; violence was partof the popularculture; the institutions of the government were inef® cient; and behind

JuliusO Ihonvbereis atthe Department of Government,University ofTexas atAustin,Burdine Hall 536, Austin, TX78712-1087,USA.

0143-6597/97/020225-23$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 225 JULIUS OIHONVBERE thefacade of growthstatistics (largely the results of foreign aid and the activities ofthe foreign-owned plantations), was aworldof fear, decay, poverty, disease, intolerance,ethnic and regional antagonisms, and a weak,unproductive and illegitimateelite: ` theMalawian state was astrongand authoritarian, one-party state,dominated by a small,autocratic and dictatorial political clique and characterisedby `top-down’¯ owofpolicydirectives and government decreesÐ anarchetype of the ª Leviathanºstate. In this respect, the ministerial and parliamentarystructures were purely nominal and had the facile function of rubber-stampingand rationalising handed down policies.’ 5 Itis thecontext above,characterized by deepeningeconomic crisis, repression, and the asphyxi- ationof civil society that we examine the process ofpoliticalliberalization, and thepolitics of the opposition in Malawi.

Dismantlingdespotism: the marchto multiparty democracy Severalfactors forced political liberalisation on Malawi in spite of Banda’ s initialresistance and refusal to acknowledge on-going changes in the world, Africaand the southern Africa region. There were already too many cracks in hisrepressive political set-up to isolate it from the monumental rejection of and challengesto one-party, one-person, and life-presidential arrangements. First,the economy was indeep trouble. In¯ ation was around22% at the end of1993. Unemployment, crime and hunger had reached unprecedented propor- tions.The drought of 1992 made matters worse as displacedpeasants migrated tothe urban centres. The introduction of the IMF-andWorld Bank-supervised structuraladjustment programme in 1980unintentionally facilitated the march to multipartydemocracy through the unequal distribution of thepains and costs of adjustment.The badly run monetarist policies of the programme further impov- erishedthe already poor, alienated them from the state, its institutions and custodians,and forced them not just to adopt coping strategies but to resist the state,which they saw as beingdirectly responsible for their poverty. Adjustment forcedthe people to ask newquestions beyond Banda and his repressive rule and toseek solutionsin themessage ofthe opposition. In short, economic crisis and vulnerabilityto externalpressures madeit easy forlenders, donors and investors toput pressure onMalawi to meet political conditionalities. Asecondpoint had to do with pressures fromdonors who withheld new foreignaid. Until the rapid changes in the global order, Western donors were very` comfortablewith Banda’ s strict,paternalist, Protestant style, his cultural conservatismand his friendliness towards the West¼ Because ofhis pro-Western policies,Banda’ s regimegot off rather lightly.’ 6 Thechanges in in particularleft Banda high and dry without support from the apartheid regime. In Mozambiqueand Angola, steps towardsmultiparty democracy also reduced Banda’s relevanceto rebelorganisations like RENAMO.In1993 donors froze $74 millionin aid to Malawi. The UK andthe World Bank played a majorrole in thisregard by refusing further economic assistance untilhuman rights were respectedand a politicalliberalisation agenda was announced.During a visitto Malawiin 1992, the Vice-President of the USA, DanQuayle, made it clear to Bandathat relations, especially economic relations with the USA wouldbe 226 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI reviewedif human rights were not improved and steps takento open up the politicallandscape. For an aid-dependent economy like Malawi, this had immediaterepercussions for the government’ s abilityto keep projects a¯ oat and buypolitical support and loyalty. The situation was nothelped when the EC in March1992 openly condemned Banda’ s humanrights record and closed style of governance.The UK governmentwas verydirect in insisting on good gover- nance,respect for human rights, political liberalisation and accountability. To showthat it was seriousin its new postures, the UK governmentcut aid to Malawiin half. Norway terminated its aid programme to Malawi, citing gross humanrights abuses as themain reason. This action immediately jeopardised a $22million telecommunications project. When Malawi asked donor nations and theWorld Bank for nearly $800 million in balance of payments support, it receivedan unprecedented shock when the donors meeting in Paris respondedby `suspendingall new aid, except for drought and refugee relief, expressing deep concernabout the lack of progress in the area ofbasic freedoms and human rightsand linking new aid to ª goodgovernanceº .’ Thoughthe donors claimed thatit was nottheir intention to dictate or determine a `speci®c system of governance’for Malawi, they made it obvious that clear signs of political liberalisationwere required to do business as usual. 7 Thedonors only pledged $170million to support drought and refugee programmes of a totalaid package of$270 million required by Malawi. AmnestyInternational released a highlydamaging report on Malawiin which itrevealedthat detainees were badly treated and that hundreds had been illegally heldin over-crowded prisons. Speci® cally, Amnesty pointed out that about 258 personswere kept in detention cells meant for one and were kept in leg irons. Thereport also revealed that feeding was poor,detainees were frequently ¯ogged,and subjected to all forms oftorture including electric shocks. The Amnestyreport also indicated that many prisoners had died from ` illtreatment ormedicalneglect’ . TheAmnesty report was supportedby theSouthern African HumanRights Foundation ( SAHRF)ina March1992 report. 8 Thisand other chillingaccounts of the brutality of Banda’ s governmentin a rapidlychanging post-coldwar global order encouraged Western diplomats, investors, lenders and donorsto impose political conditionalities on Malawi. 9 Third,the church in Malawiplayed a majorrole in forcing Banda to recognise thepressures forchange. On Sunday8 March1992, the country’ s eightCatholic bishops(six Africans and two Europeans) released a pastoralletter entitled LivingOur Faith ,inwhich they denounced the corruption, indiscipline, re- pressionand human rights abuses inthe country. The letter addressed the `growinganger and resentment’ in the country, and noted that: ` Academic freedomis seriouslyrestricted, exposing injustices can be considereda betrayal, revealingsome evilsof oursociety is seen as slanderingthe country, monopoly ofmass mediaand censorship prevent the expression of dissentingviews’ . 10 The priestsalso complained about the detention, often illegally, of hundreds of Malawiansand the harsh treatment detainees received in prison. It was thevery ®rst ofsuch actions coming from the Church and it stunned Banda. The letter ignitedprotests against the government across thecountry for the ® rst timeand, inZomba, the police opened ® re todisperse rioting crowds. The bishops were 227 JULIUS OIHONVBERE immediatelyordered to report to Banda within two days and effectively restric- tedfrom leaving Blantyre. They were accused by the (MCP)of` seekingto disturbthe peace, stability, progress and hard-won freedom whichhas beenachieved under the wise and dynamic leadership of Ngwazi’ . 11 ThoughBanda had them all arrested and interrogated for eight hours, on 10 March,the message ofthe letter, which was readin all churches, was already out.’ 12 Theletter and the government’ s responseto it attracted the attention and interestof theVatican and one of Malawi’ s majoraid donors, the UK, toissues ofhuman rights and instability, even the potential breakdown of law and order inthe country. People began to realise that Banda’ s regimewas notGod- ordainedand once the religious leaders had condemned it, ordinary citizens had aspiritualresponsibility to work hard to change the system. In August 1992 the LivingstoniaSynod of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian ( CCAP) set up acommitteeto support the calls for a referendumon multiparty politics and to providesupport for other pro-democracy constituencies. In addition the Christian Councilof Malawi ( CCM)releasedan open letter in support of the growing populardemands for a referendum.The letter was endorsedby its 17 Protestant churches.The Ecumenical Council of Malawi,the Muslim community, and other independentchurches joined the campaign for multiparty politics and this gave ordinarycitizens the courage to stand up to Banda. Afourthfactor which encouraged the political liberalisation of the Malawi landscapewas therole of the foreign-based opposition which had been con- strainedby division, suspicions, harassment and poor leadership. 13 However, thesepeople were often united in their commitment to getting rid of Banda’ s dictatorship.The Socialist League of Malawi ( LESOMA),ledby Attati Mpakati, hada largefollowing in and was quiteactive until its leader was `mysteriously’murdered in Harare, in March 1983. Until then he had operated fromZambia but was deportedto Zimbabwe. L ESOMA hadannounced the creationof a militarywing which was tobe trained in Cuba and had dedicated itselfto theoverthrow of theBanda regime. The Malawi Support Committee was supportedby trade unions and Labour parliamentarians in the UK. TheMalawi FreedomMovement (Mafremo) counted among its eminent leaders persons like OrtonChirwa, who was arrestedin 1982, charged with treason and sentenced to death.This sentence was commutedto life imprisonment in June1984. This did notdeter the activities of Mafremo, which remained a majorsource of concern forBanda. It organised an unsuccessful guerrilla attack in northern Malawi in 1987but did nothing as drasticafter that. Kanyama Chiume’ s Congressfor a SecondRepublic ( CSR)was theweakest of the exiled groups but was notedfor frequentcriticisms of Banda and thus gave publicity to the crisis ofgovernance withinthe country. The activities of the numerous exiled opposition frequently drewscathing attacks from Banda. A®fthpoint relates to the growing con® dence of local opposition forces. Studentsat the university of Malawi embarked on several strike actions to protestat humanrights abuses. When the Catholic bishops released their pastoral lettercriticising human rights abuses andrepression in Malawi, the students led theopen riots and demonstrations against the government. They capitalised on theopportunity to openly call for the introduction of multiparty politics. Riot 228 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI policedispersed them with gun ® re atZomba and the Banda government promptlyclosed the university. In the midst of deepening economic crisis, civil servants,including workers in hospitalsas wellas teachersin thecountry, called astrikein late 1993 bringing the machinery of the state to a halt.Electricity supplywas disruptedwhen workers in that sector also joined the strike. When workersat the SUCOMA sugarplantation set thesugarcane ® eldon ® re insupport oftheir strike action, the police moved in to confront them. The strikes forced thegovernment to grant a 35%pay increase to public servants. Unaccompanied byincreased production, the pay rise simplyfuelled in¯ ation, thus further worseningthe already declining standards of living. The pay increases tothe publicservants encouraged those in the parastatals to make similar demands. Workersat Air Malawi, the Reserve Bankof Malawi,Malawi Railways and the NationalBank of Malawiembarked on strikes which quickly spread to therural communities,especially to the tea, coffee, rubber, tobacco and sugar estates. As DenisVenter has noted,` thesestrikes and demonstrations marked a riteof passage forthe country. At lastthe people had found their voices and one could sense thata majorpsychological barrier had been swept away. In fact, the crack hadwidened in the granite edi® ce ofthe Malawian regime and the process of changenow seemed almostirreversible.’ 14 Whilethe strikes re¯ ected a newbold attemptat challengingBanda’ s dictatorship,they did not immediately lead to the emergenceof a strongand uni® ed labour movement. Finally,Malawi’ s exiledpro-democracy movements were able to maintain contactswith local underground opposition organisations, and to forceBanda to agreeto multiparty democracy. Following a four-dayconference (20± 23 March 1992)in Lusaka, , which was attendedby about 80 opposition activists operatingas theUnited Front for Multiparty Democracy ( UFMD),thedecision was reachedto distancethe new opposition from the old breed of politicianswho hadeffectively identi® ed with Banda over the decades. Disagreement over strategyled to the creation of the Interim Committee for a DemocraticAlliance (ICDA),withthe primary objective of operating inside Malawiand pushing the strugglefor political liberalisation to the maximum possible. The new organis- ationwas alsomandated to consult and where possible forge alliances with popularorganisations and constituencies in the country in order to create a broad-basedmovement. Followingthe meeting, Chihana returned to Malawi from exile in 1992 to confrontBanda. He read a speechat the airport calling for multiparty democ- racy.He was arrestedthat very day and taken into detention. The news spurred Malawians,especially in the major cities, to embark on mass demonstrations againstthe government calling for multiparty politics, the release ofpolitical detaineesand an end to one-party rule. On 6 May1992 workers at David Whitehead’s textilefactory initiated a strikeand called on other workers to join them.This ability to challenge a Lonrhoboss was likechallenging Banda directly,since both were in business together. The strikes and protests became violent,especially after the police shot at the protesters. This was followedby thedestruction of property and the looting of shops, especially those belonging tothe Press Holdings.Some MCP of®ces inthe districts were destroyed. It soon becameclear that the strikes were mostly political in nature. The demands 229 JULIUS OIHONVBERE includednot just the immediate release ofChihana but also the introduction of multipartypolitics. In October 1992, the Alliance for Democracy ( AFORD) was set upto ` press foran end to (Banda’ s) dictatorship’. 15 The AFORD announced thatit would ` campaignopenly through peaceful and lawful means fordemo- craticreform’ . 16 ThoughBanda had boasted after the March release ofthepastoral letter by the Catholicbishops that ` ifexileddissidents returned to Malawi, they would be ªmeatfor crocodilesº ’ , 17 thepolitical landscape had been signi® cantly altered andMalawi was nevergoing to be the same again.In response to the protests andgrowing demands for political liberalisation, Banda, who was clearly insensitiveto these demands, dissolved parliament and called new elections to 91 ofthe 141 seats. Inthe June 1992 elections under the usual single party, Banda regulatedand manipulated the process. It was embarrassingto Banda and the MCP whenthe exercise recorded the lowest voter turnout in the country’ s politicalhistory. 18 Theelections, which also witnessed the defeat of almosthalf theparliamentarians, including those nominated and endorsed by Banda, sent democracysignals to Banda. But he was stillnot ready to givein. In July he had Chihanarearrested and this sparked new demonstrations as wellas loudercalls fordemocracy. Chihana’ s eventualsentencing to two years imprisonmentwith hardlabour in December 1992 led to further public demonstrations. The death ofOrton Chirwa in prison forced Banda to release hiswife Vera in early 1993. Thisserved as anotherrallying point for pro-democracy activists. Journalists pickedup courage to attack Banda and draw his attention to the on-going democratisationagenda around the world. While he was ableto censorthe media andsilence intellectuals, Banda could not control the cellular phones and fax machineswhich were effectively used by the opposition to disseminate infor- mationwithin and outside the country. Eventually, Banda was forcedto amend theconstitution through parliament for a referendumon multiparty democracy. InhisNew Year’ s EveMessage toMalawians, Banda, the ` lifepresident’ of the country,announced that a referendumon the introduction of multiparty democ- racywould be held on 15th March 1993. The opposition complained about the shorttime available for campaigns as wellas againstthe constraints of Banda’ s dictatorshipÐwhich mandated the need for a policepermit to organise and hold rallies.The latter was importantgiven the total control the MCP had over the policeand security forces. In fact, the Young Pioneers were still busy ¯ ogging andintimidating pro-democracy activists and their supporters. They had no regardfor constituted authority and during Chihana’ s seditiontrial, they attacked AFORD supportersand threw stones at Chihana’ s lawyer,Bazuka Mhango. Several AFORD members werearrested for identifying openly with the party or forpossessing its membership cards. The United Nations became concerned aboutthe liberalisation process andconvinced Banda, through a letterfrom its secretary-general,Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to change the date for the referendum fromMarch to June 1993 to enable its monitors to attend. The UN also recommendedthe use ofone ballot box instead of two to assure complete secrecy; equalrepresentation of all opposition parties and the MCP on the ReferendumCommission; free andequal access tothe media, and improved relationsand dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition. 230 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI

ThoughBanda had invoked the usual discredited arguments against multiparty politicsÐhe was `father’of thenation, democracy would increase tribalism and regionalism,it would lead to waste and intolerance and so on, most voters supportedmultiparty democracy. By an overwhelming majority, 63.5% of Malawianssupported multiparty politics. Voter turnout was 67%or 1993996 of atotalof 3 133448 voters who participated in a countrywith 4.7 million registeredvoters. 1 088473 votes were cast insupport of continued one-party rulewhile 70,979 votes were spoilt and not counted. When the results of the referendumwere announced on 16June,` Malawianspoured on toVictoriastreet inBlantyre making V forvictory signs and chanting ª thecock is deadº’ . 19 A 14-membercommittee was set upto identify required constitutional amend- ments,and on 29June1993, parliament amended section 29 of the constitution, effectivelyterminating the one-party state and the monopoly of the MCP, legalisingpolitical parties and paving the way for multiparty politics. The army, whichhad somehow managed to maintain its neutrality, disarmed, the Young Pioneersas theyhad become unusually aggressive and violent towards oppo- sitionelements.

The1994 multiparty elections

Thethree major parties that contested the May 1994 elections were the MCP, UnitedDemocratic Front ( UDF) and AFORD.Otherminor partiesÐ the Malawi DemocraticUnion ( MDU)ledby Harry Bwanausi, the UFMD,ledby George Kanyanya,the CSR,ledby Kanyama Chiume, the Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP)ledby TimMangwazu and the Malawi Democratic Party ( MDP) led byKamlepu KaluaÐ emerged but made no impact on transition politics. They wonno seats inparliament. There were ® vecandidates in the presidential race, includingHastings Kamuzu Banda, who had ruled the country since 1964. Only threereceived any serious attention: Banda, Muluzi and Chihana. The campaigns werebitter and dirty. They did not address criticalissues andprogrammes: ` The campaignturned out to be disappointing, mainly because the contestants failed toaddress seriousissues andseemed rathershort on constructive ideas. This causedthe editor of the FinancialPost todescribe the debate in the run-up to electionsas ªsadlylacking in substanceº .’ 20 Though the UDF and AFORD had workedtogether during the referendum campaigns, they were like bitter enemies duringthe real electioneering campaigns. All the parties were involved in makingpromises they knew they would not be ableto keep if votedinto power. Jan Kees vanDonge has notedthat there was aseeminglypathological ® xation on`themurkypast of MCP,ratherthan a visionfor the future’ among the parties andthat ` personalityissues dominatedthe campaigns and¼ none of the leading personalitiescould command a clearmoral lead over the others’ ; thiswas a majorobstacle to `securingnational appeal’ . 21 Thismight sound absurd because ofthe record of Kamuzu Banda. Yet it is aclearre¯ ection of how,in 30 years, Bandahad succeeded in soiling virtually every political elite in Malawi; those whohad managed to escape hisregime of graft and repression have been unable tocultivate a rigorousand credible national constituency. In fact, until early 1992,Chihana was notwell known in Malawian politics, having being in exile 231 JULIUS OIHONVBERE andonly able to communicate with underground groups within the country. He remainedin jail in Malawi until a daybefore the 14 June 1992 referendum on multipartypolitics. Bowingto pressures fromdonors (who had suspended all aid except that for humanitarianpurposes) and to internal pressures, Bandamade several con- cessions tocivil society, even going against decisions reached at the September 1992 MCP conventionin Lilongwe. These included his announcement of a referendum,the establishment of a PresidentialCommission on Dialogue ( PCD), anda NationalReferendum Commission ( NRC),andthe creation of a Public AffairsCommittee ( PAC)withthe churches and the two leading opposition movementsrepresented. This was anopen concession to the opposition and a dramaticchange from the earlier style of politics in Malawi. Other concessions includedthe change in the membership of the NRC onthe insistence of the PAC, aswellas agreementon a®naldate for the referendum. In fact, just a fewmonths afterthe Lilongwe Convention, the opposition parties, which had been selling membershipcards tothe public, were allowed to hold rallies and to campaign openlyfor multiparty democracy. Following the referendum and victory for multipartypolitics, a NationalConsultative Council ( NCC),madeup ofrepresen- tativesfrom the various pressure groups,was established.The parties rotated the chairmanshipof the NCC amongthemselves, although its meetings were closed tothe public. A ratherstill-born National Executive Council ( NEC) was later createdfrom the NCC.TheNational Electoral Commission, under the chairman- shipof JudgeMsosa oftheSupreme Court, played an activerole in pushing the process aheadand avoiding delays invoked by the parties to serve narrow interests.For instance, Judge Msosa disagreedwith the government on theearlier traditionwhich had barred the army and police from voting in elections. The UDF,whichhad operated underground in Malawi for a while,was launchedin October1992. It was ledby BakiliMuluzi, a successful businessman whohad been a topmember of the MCP. The UDF dedicateditself to unseating Bandaand returning Malawi to the people. Its leadershipincluded powerful ex-MCP politicianslike Aleke Banda, Edward Bwanali and virtually all the dismissedor disgraced ministers of the previous Banda cabinets. It was without doubtthe conservative alternative to the more militant AFORD. The party nominatedMuluzi because he was wellknown and had been part of the Banda regimebut had fallen out of favourwith the life president. Its majorproblem in therun-up to the election was howto convince Malawians that it was reallya majordeparture from Banda and the MCP. The UDF was accusedof being `has-beenopportunists, since many of its leaders had once been Banda’ s henchmenin theruling Congress party’ . 22 Muluzi, the UDF presidentialcandidate hadserved as MCP secretarygeneral until 1982. Its publicitysecretary had served Bandaas ministerfor health until he was sackedin 1991, while its vice president,Aleke Banda, had acquired a notoriousreputation as headof themuch fearedYoung Pioneers. In reality, the only reason they had come together in the UDF was thatthey had been marginalised from the political and power arrange- mentsof theBanda regime. AFORD capitalisedon thisfact and frequently referred to the UDF as `MalawiCongress Party ª Bº’ . 23 AFORD alsomade a lotof capital outof the fact the UDF leaderhad been convicted of petty theft and sentenced 232 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI toasix-monthprison term over two and a halfdecades ago. They tried to show thathe was morallybankrupt and lacked the credibility to inspire the youth and thenation. The UDF ofcourse, tried to turn this around by contending that, irrespectiveof the past, if one did the right thing and took the right decisions, onecould become a leader,even president of a country!It in turn attacked the AFORD asabunchof inexperiencedelements who lacked national credibility and acceptability.In its campaigns, it also drew the wrath of the MCP, the Young Pioneersand Banda. 24 UDF campaignswere the most focused. They were able to draw on their past experienceand from a deepunderstanding of the inner workings of the Banda government.They were able to show that they were not in theopposition for the sake ofjust being an opposition but from a desireto distance themselves from aregimeand system theyhad initially helped to construct. According to van Donge, `UDF was themost explicit party on policy measures buttheir proposals weremore aspirational than concrete: labour migration to South Africa should beresumed; anduniversal free primaryeducation should be reintroduced’. 25 The partyalso promised to cut government expenditure drastically and to increase expenditureon social services. It subscribed to a continuationof the World Bank-supervisedstructural adjustment programme and it promised to support mediumscale businesses,especially those which had been marginalised from the MCP powerstructures. The UDF promiseda transparentand ef® cientgovernment andto respect human rights. The AFORD onthe other hand was ledby a veterantrade unionist who had experienceas agrassrootsorganiser. had been head of the SouthernAfrica Trade Union Coordination Council ( SATUCC)andwas knownas acommittedhuman rights and pro-democracy activist. He hadoffended the ` life president’in 1964 and was restrictedto Rumphi in the north as punishmentbut was takenout of the country by a Catholicpriest, where he immediately launchedhis trade union career inKenya. His militant trade union activities earnedhim a deportationto his home country, where the MCP government promptlythrew him into detention. Released in 1978after seven years inprison, heproceeded to Europe where he took courses includinga stintas research fellowat the Peace Research Institutein Oslo. This was followedby an academicposition at the University of Botswana until he became secretary- generalof the SATUCC.Hereturnedto Malawi in 1988to run SATUCC, which had relocatedto Lilongwe. He was forcedto leave the country shortly after and did notreturn until 1992 in the face ofgreat odds. He likes to regard himself as an intellectualand as someonewhose praxis emanates from a thoroughunderstand- ingof theoretical issues. Whilein exile, Chihana had spent time making contacts with exiled opposition elementsand building the structure of AFORD.Launchedin September 1992 insideMalawi its leadership included well respected politicians like Harry Chiumeand Reverend Aaron Longwe. Within a shorttime, cracks hadappeared withinthe ranks of the opposition, especially within AFORD.Chihanawas `accusedof dictatorial tendencies and of driving around in presidential motor- cades’ .26 Its leadershiphas beendescribed as a`¯uidgroup of people’ which foundit dif®cult to worktogether as themovement was `plaguedby quarrelsand 233 JULIUS OIHONVBERE resignations’. 28 As soon as AFORD was launched,the MCP brandedit a northern organisationbecause Chihana was fromthat region. This was alsoan attempt to cast aspersionson itsnational credibility and to marginaliseits ideas. In spite of Chihana’s popularityas acommittedpro-democracy activist, and in spite of the factthat his arrest onhisreturn to Malawihad sparked riots in several cities, he couldnot translate the ` clean’image of the movement into widespread national acceptability.It is almostunbelievable that Chihana ` failedto get the necessary signaturesto stand as presidentialcandidate’ in Malawi despite his ` popular- ity’ .28 Accordingto vanDonge, the party also had problems with getting enough signaturesfor many of its parliamentary candidates and could not ® ndsuitable andcredible candidates to run on its platform in most of the constituencies outsidethe northern region. 29 The AFORD remainedisolated in the northern region. The AFORD subscribedto the structural adjustment programme and, in a rather strangecampaign style, Chihana refused to `address socialand economic issues’ andthis affected his ability to builda broadnational base. 30,Theparty promised toreconstruct the economy, attract investors, promote rural development and education,improve infrastructure and respect human rights. In spite of the numerousstrike actions which preceded the elections and the support from workers, AFORD didnot launch any critical attack against the IMF and World Bankor against the structural adjustment programme. The MCP hadits own problems. After losing the referendum election, Banda and the MCP `soberedup’ . Thishumiliation, which was openlyand loudly celebratedby Malawians, contributed signi® cantly to a willingnessto make concessionsto the opposition. In spite of Banda’s recordof corruption,intimida- tion,human rights abuses andbrutality, his nomination by the MCP as its presidentialcandidate demonstrated to the opposition that the MCP had no other reallycredible candidate to present to the nation. The party had problems convincingMalawians that it was notthe same terrorthey had lived with since 1964.Though Banda tried to invoke his age and experience, and pretended to haveseen thelight of democracyand thus become a changedperson, Malawians foundit dif® cult to believe him. The party did all it could to re¯ ect the new realityin Malawi: it denounced some ofits previous policies and actions and evenhad its newspaper the Daily Times runa storyon Orton Chirwa’ s wife Vera,who at that time represented the painful experiences of those who had beendetained under Banda, for her work at the Legal Resource Centre. The pastoralletter which had incurred the wrath of Banda was nowpraised and describedas a`blessing’for drawing the attention of the party to the need for urgentreform and to support calls for change. Ironicallythough, Banda had very strong support from the central region, his homebase. This was theonly region where there had been a strongvote in favourof one-partyrule during the referendum of June1993. In its main strategy the MCP investedtime and resources instrengthening its hold in the central region,in the hope that, if the UDF and AFORD splitthe votes in theother regions, itmight just emerge as winnerin the elections. However, Banda, in spite of his age,visited all the country’ s districttwice during the campaigns. The party also broughtin some newfaces inorder to split the opposition vote, extend its 234 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI in¯uence beyond the central region and present a reformedimage. Gwanga Chakuamba,a down-to-earthpolitician who was fromthe Lower Shire in the southernregion, was theparty’ s biggestcatch. He had been charged with plottingto assassinate Bandaand was jailedfor 13 years in1980. On hisrelease hehad declared and vigorously campaigned for the opposition UDF, which had recruitedhim in prison. Demonstrating a rather® cklecommitment to party loyaltyhe abandoned the UDF, joined the MCP,andwas appointedsecretary general.When Banda went to South Africa for brain surgery, he chaired the PresidentialCouncil which acted as asortof interim government. Chakuamba hadalso served as headof the notorious Young Pioneers before he fell out of favourwith Banda and this put a negativemark against his record. , whowas hatedby most Malawians, including the army, for his extensive powers underBanda, remained a leaderof the MCP andthis alienated those who had wantedto supportthe party, at least while there was hopethat the frail and ailing Bandawas soonto pass away.The MCP showedits desperation in retaining powerwhen it sought support from the African National Union ( KANU) byrecruitingthe services ofsix` strategists’who had come to Malawi posing as electionmonitors. With Arap Moi’ s record,especially in the Rift Valley of Kenya,the opposition had reason to worry. The MCP alsoenjoyed the privilege of incumbency. It had the support of the mediaand the Malawian Broadcast Corporation ( MBC)didnot hide the fact that itwas stillfully behind the incumbent president. It also had unrestricted access tostate funds as wellas tothe resources ofPress Holdings:Banda did all his campaignsin his capacity as presidentof the republic. This enabled him to commandthe loyalty of the security forces andthe respect of the public. Comparedto the opposition, the MCP has beendescribed as more` resilient’and `moredisciplined than its rivals’ . 31 Thesecurity forces wereemployed to intimidatethe opposition and to prevent or disrupttheir campaigns. In February 1993,while campaigning in the north, Banda banned all opposition rallies in the regionbecause he did not want his message challengedand he wanted to show hisstrength in theregion as leaderof the country. Many MCP of®cials, especially atthe local councils, did not believe that Banda could be defeated. Hence city councilsin Blantyre and Lilongwe, for example, prohibited opposition rallies andmeetings on ` publicproperty’ as awayof demonstrating loyalty to Banda. AFORD supportersin particular were subject to harassment, as whenReverends JohnMwambira, Willie Zingani, Aaron Longwe and Peter Kaleso were pre- ventedfrom addressing public meetings. It took a courtorder to declare such actionsillegal. While discussions were still in progress about creating the relevantinstitutions for multiparty politics, the Banda government banned the newspapersof the two leading opposition parties, the MalawiDemocrat and UDF News.Theywere unbanned only after the opposition abandoned further talkswith the government. Compared to the opposition parties, the MCP had all theresources tomake a signi®cant impact on the elections. Therewere no ideologicalissues inthecampaigns. Though press freedomhad beenrelaxed and the press lawamended, thus eliminating the life imprisonment penaltyfor offending the government, and also allowing individuals to set upprivate newspapers, there were still several constraints on the free press and 235 JULIUS OIHONVBERE theability to express opinionswhich the sitting government did not like. Theestablishment of the FinancialPost and the Michiru Sun contributed signi®cantly to alternative outlets for news dissemination. Unfortunately, none of theparties really presented the electorate with a focusedand holistic agenda for rebuildingthe nation, mobilising the people, meeting their basic human needs, andplacing Malawi on thepath to self-reliantgrowth and development. In spite ofthe early enthusiasm showed by the public for the transition to multiparty politics,the poorly focused, opportunistic and super® cial campaigns of the oppositiondiscouraged and frustrated many Malawians. The hunger for raw powerwas alltoo evident as thedriving factor behind the politics of the opposition.Many Malawians were amazed at how soft and conciliatory the oppositiongenerally was towardsBanda. Even who had been detainedfor 12 years alongwith her husband was exceedinglyconciliatory, re¯ecting on the ` goodtimes’ they had with Banda in the past which were only `spoiled’not by Banda but by ` others’! 32 Because theopposition spent so much timeattacking each other and arguing over mundane and irrelevant issues, they hadno time either to unite or effectively erode the support base ofthe MCP in orderto defeat Banda decisively. While Banda’ s appallingrecord did provide juicymaterial for campaigns, these amounted to nothingbut super® cial and often diversionaryand sensational interpretations of why it had been possible for someonelike Banda to have emerged in the country, succeeded in suffocating civilsociety, imposing himself as aruthlessdictator, surviving for three decades, andeven having the courage to present himself for election in spite of the on-goingchanges in the global system. Van Donge might have overstretched it bysuggesting that during the campaigns, ` therewas simplynot much political capitalfor the opposition in rallying against KamuzuÐ there was toomuch popularrespect, admiration for his intelligence etcÐ while to be seen with himÐfor example, at the presentation of presidential nomination papersÐ was anasset whichhe distributed carefully’ . 33 Certainly,the numerous strikes and demonstrations,the humiliating referendum vote, massive supportfor opposition parties,and the fact that Banda’ s ralliescould not draw a quarterof thecrowds drawn by the UDF and AFORD,demonstratethat the people were fed up with the dictatorwho had toyed with their lives and mortgaged the future of the country ina cocoonof backwardness. If theopposition failed to explode the myth of invincibilityand vulnerability, and if they failed to cultivate the fact that the Banda±Tembo± Kadzimira triumvirate as collectivelyresponsible for the Malaw- iandisaster, it was morea re¯ection of their poor strategies, weaknesses, inexperienceand limited resources, and the fact that they were ® ghtingan entrenchedincumbent. All the parties were involved in acts ofintimidation and violence,although the MCP andremnants of the Young Pioneers were more guiltyof these charges than all the others. The UN JointInternational Observer Group (UNJIOG)con®rmed these acts ofintimidation as wellas briberyin the effortsto win support from the electorate. The Independent Electoral Com- missionalso con® rmed the observations of the UNJIOG. The MCP was accusedby theelectoral commission of ` stealingor illegally purchasing voter registration cards inatleastnine of thecountry’ s 24electoraldistricts’ , whilethe opposition wereaccused of ` transgressions,including being engaged in turf wars’ . 34 236 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI

BakiliMuluzi won the presidential election with 1.4 (47%) million votes. Bandacame secondwith 996 363 (33%) votes, and AFORD leaderChihana came thirdwith 552 862 (19.5%) votes. The MDP leaderKamlepo Kalua had 15 624 (0.5%)votes. The parliamentary elections followed a similarpattern, with the UDF winning84 seats, the MCP 56 and AFORD 36.The elections were declared by monitorsto have been free andfair as mostof the2066 voting centers recorded noviolence. Voter turn out was heavy,three million of a totalof 3.7 registered voters.In a countryof seven to eight million people with about half the populationbelow voting age, this was anoutstanding demonstration of public enthusiasmfor multiparty democracy. To besure,the desire to getrid of Banda andhis dictatorship and developments in South Africa contributed signi® cantly tothe enthusiasm to participate in the elections. Noneof the three leading candidates performed signi® cantly outside their ethnicand regional enclaves and the campaigns and election results clearly re¯ected that. The UDF performedwell in the South and Muluzi hails from there. WhileMuluzi performed brilliantly in his home district of Machingaby scoring 91%of the votes, he only managed 43% in Nsanje, largely because of the in¯uence of Chakuamba of the MCP whocomes fromthat region. The MCP did wellin the central region (Banda’ s homebase) althoughthe other parties, especiallythe UDF,madesigni® cant inroads, restricting Banda to only a 24% votein Nteceu. The AFORD sweptthe seats inthe north, Chihana’ s homebase, wherehe received between 85± 92% of the votes. While ideological issues did notfeature seriously, personality issues wereoften overplayed. The UDF bene®ted mostly from redirected support from the MCP. AFORD madepractically noinroads into the strongholds of the MCP and UDF.Although,on abroadscale, regionalloyalties in¯ uenced the voting pattern, there were also ethnic disparities whichmediated the over-arching in¯ uence of regionalism.

Frompopulism toopportunism: the politics ofopposition movements Theopposition in Malawi is similarin severalrespects tothe opposition in other Africanstates. They often start off united and appearing to have some vision, andas beinggenuinely committed to democracy. Given the harsh political and economicconditions in which the people had lived for decades, and the clearly deterioratingliving conditions, the message ofchange,hope, life more abundant, anend to corruption, nepotism and repression drew extensive support across ethnic,regional, religious, class andgender lines. In Malawi, within a shortspan oftime, the opposition had squandered public goodwill and could not remain committedto its originally declared agenda. It is easy toconcede that it took a lotof courage to challenge, even criticise, Kamuzu Banda. In fact, many of the pro-democracyleaders suffered personal hardships to remain on the frontline of thestruggle to unseat the life president. The path to change was certainlynot easy,as thepolice and security forces, especially the Young Pioneers, trying to pleasethe president unleashed a reignof terror on all opposition activists. John Tembo,who was regardedas theheir apparent, saw thenew movements as a directchallenge to his political future and an open effort to deprive him of his `inheritance’. Hisstrong relationship with the RENAMO rebelsin Mozambique, 237 JULIUS OIHONVBERE whowere seeking a newrole as politicalnormalcy was beingnegotiated, evoked fears ofa possiblepre-emptive strike against the pro-democracy forces by Tembo.Further, the Young Pioneers became over zealous in rounding up oppositionelements and detaining them illegally as long-termdetainees were set free fromprison and replaced with new ones. The rate of arrest anddetention was so massive that` therewas notenough room, and scores ofdetainees[had] tobe held under guard in tents set upnear Blantyre jail’ . 35 Followingthe May 1994 election in which Chihana performed badly, the AFORD leadereasily demonstrated why he was inpolitics.The hunger for power andpolitical relevance and visibility was so strongthat he immediatelyinitiated negotiationsfor power with the UDF.Accordingto Muluzi, ` immediatelyafter theelections, Chihana wanted to be executive vice president. A FORD wanted eightministries. 37 Butwe asked on what basis?’ 37 Muluzireminded Chihana of histerrible performance in theelections and that there was nobasis tomake such demands.Failing to get what he wanted,Chihana made an alliance with Banda’ s MCP!Beforeannouncing this ` unholy’alliance, Chihana urged the UDF govern- mentand Malawians to eschew attacks against Banda and to accord him the respecthe deservedas fatherof thenation. With its leader’ s newline of pro- MCP dialogue, AFORD beganto bene®t fromthe ® nancialpower of the MCP: `AFORD’ s biggest® nancialproblems disappeared overnight. Air Malawi’ s case against Chihanaceased tobe mentioned, and neither was thereany further mention of hisdebts to Hardwareand General Dealers, a subsidiaryof Press Corporation.’ 38 ManyMalawians could not believe it when the MCP and AFORD signed a `memorandumof understanding’ in which they pledged to cooperate in parlia- ment.The newspapers were full of lamentationsat the announcement, including openallegations that Chihana had been bribed by Banda. This was thesame Banda and MCP thathad jailed Chihana twice, forced him into exile, terrorised thecountry, ruined the economy, and suffocated civil society for three decades. Byforging an alliance with the MCP, AFORD deniedthe ruling UDF amajorityin parliament,almost precipitating a politicalstalemate. The pain for most AFORD members was,however, unmistakable:

Thepact was abitterpill to swallow for manyAford members,who saw themselves asthetrue champions of democracyin Malawi and the natural enemies of the MCP. Veterannorthern politician, Machipisa Munthali, who spent twenty-seven years in detentionunder the MCP government,publicly expressed disgust with the alliance; andthe Reverend Peter Koleso, who led Aford’ s delegationin coalition talks with thegovernment, defected to the UDF.Dr MapopaChipeta, one of the brightest youngpoliticians in Aford, also fell out with Chihana over the issue but remained loyalto theparty. However, the MCP was buoyantbecause for itthepact has proved tobe an escape route from politicalmarginalisation. 39

Thehopes of the MCP fora lastingalliance with AFORD didnot last long. Once again,demonstrating his ® cklepolitical philosophy, Chihana abandoned the MCP±AFORD allianceto enterinto a newalliance with the UDF aftera newposition ofvice president had been created for him and ® vecabinet posts reserved for him and some AFORD leaders.Chihana was alsomade minister for irrigation and waterdevelopment. 40 Ofcourse,this new alliance which combined the UDF’ s 84 238 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI seats with AFORD’s36gavethe new government a comfortablemajority. 41 At the ceremonyat Sanjika Palace in Blantyre, declared that the new alliancewas `inspiredby an idea of togetherness so thatthe country can be unitedto forge ahead with its development efforts’ . 42 Muluzistated that the alliancewould help ` guarddemocracy’ in Malawi and show the people that individualsfrom different political platforms could indeed work together. The questionis: howdifferent is AFORD from the UDF?Chihanaalso declared at the ceremonythat the alliance was designedto bring peace and make it possible for thegovernment to improve the well being of the people of Malawi. VanDonge has arguedthat it is essentialto go beyond issues of` political opportunismand politicians being for sale’ in order to understand these ` shifts inposition’ on the part of Chihana. He called for an appreciation of ` the pertinentchallenge faced by any political party in Malawi: how to overcome regionalcon® nement’ . 43 Thismight be so,but it begs the question. Did Chihana justrealise that his power-base was mostlyin the northern region? What strategieshave been put in place to actually develop and nurture a national appeal?Is Chihanaso naiveas toassume thatan initial alliance with Banda woulddemonstrate to Malawians that he had a nationalspread and in¯ uence? Howdo we reconcile the struggle for power and the preparedness to abandon onefor another if the position/ pricewas rightand attribute such political prostitutionto the search fora nationalidentity? If Malawianscontinue to accommodateand rationalise such actions from leaders who de® ned themselves fordecades as pro-democracyleaders, then it is likelyto continue and without apologies.A seriouspro-democracy/ oppositionparty must begin by identifying itsstrong and weak points, map out an agenda for extending its in¯ uence and programmesto areas whereit has littlein¯ uence, distinguish itself as an alternativeparty through its programmes, be ready to make concessions which donot compromise those principles and programmes, and not see electionsand thecapture of poweras theultimate goal of everyelection. Malawi’ s opposition movementsare basicallyopportunistic movements and have not put in place any seriousagenda for genuine democratisationÐ a deepeningof the transition processes beyondmere liberaldemocracy and the massive involvementof the peoplein decision making.

Conclusion: Malawiafter Banda

The UDF governmenthas triedas muchas possibleto distance and differentiate itselffrom the Banda regime and the MCP.Ithas declaredits priorities to be in theareas ofimprovedhealth care delivery,education, infrastructure and poverty alleviation.It has triedto clean up the corrupt customs service and the police, thoughwith only limited success. Ghostworkers are being® shedout of the publicservices andover K33 million (the national currency is theKwacha) was savedin two months. Trade unions are enjoyingunprecedented freedom and new onesare beingorganised. There is astrongdesire to operate the government on acash basis onlyrather than on credit. Revenue collection has beenstepped up whilethere is agenuinedesire to control in¯ ation and generate employment. Free primaryeducation has beenintroduced to address theproblem of illiteracy, 239 JULIUS OIHONVBERE whichstill affects about60% of thepopulation. But we mustrecall that the UDF inheriteda terriblydeformed and mismanaged economy from Banda and its very limitedachievements thus far are testimonyto the contradictions of its inherit- anceand agenda for reconstruction and recovery. Nonetheless, Malawians are quicklydiscovering the fact that ` democracyalone is notenough’ and there is agrowingfeeling that there is a`lackof sense ofdirection’, inthe new system. 44 Oneof itsearliest actions was therelease ofpoliticalprisoners, the commuta- tionof outstanding death sentences to life, and the closure of some ofthe country’s mostscandalous prisons at Dzeleza, Nsanje and Mikuyu. The govern- mentpledged to respect press freedomand, unlike in the past, journalists have beeninvited to State House for free dialoguewith the president. A `Truth Commission’to investigate human rights abuses inthe past has beenset up.As Muluzideclared, ` wewantto know what happened in the past. We willforgive butwe mustknow the truth.’ 46 Listingsome ofthe` atrocities’of the30-year rule ofBanda, President Muluzi identi® ed the following: i)Prisoners were chained to the ¯ oorand left to die in a prisonin Nsanje districtafter which their bodies were thrown into a crocodile-infested river. ii)A wholevillage of Moslems was arrestedin Mangochidistrict and thrown intoprison and fed on rats. iii)Members ofthe Jehovah’ s Witnesssect wereforced into exile and childrenof the sect wereforced to sleep with their mothers and fathers. Accordingto Muluzi, one of the reasons forthe Truth Commission was to exposethose who were responsible for the atrocities in order to prevent `murderers’from being voted into of® ce. 46 Tothis effect, Kamuzu Banda, John Temboand the country’ s so-called` of®cial hostess’ Cecilia Kadzamira were arrestedand brought to trialfor the murder of fourpoliticians in 1983 along with threepolice of® cers. Nonewas convictedalthough the of® cers remainon trial. The UDF has beencautious about this for fear ofopening up a case thatmight consumesome ofitsown leading members whohad been part of Banda’s brutal rule.Citizens have been suing the government for past atrocities and winning hugecash settlementswhich could easily bankrupt the cash-strapped govern- ment.In mid-1995 the government announced that it had paid out about K500000 ` tothosewho had suffered, honouring the 1994 election promise to redress thewrongs of Dr Banda’s regime’. 47 Muluzihimself complained bitterly that,` Thegovernment is willingto pay, but where do we get the money from? Somany people are comingto make claims against the past atrocities of the MalawiCongress Party and my government has topay for those sins.’ 48 Inless thana yearin of®ce, unemployment had grown to `chronic’levels and in¯ation had skyrocketed to 80%.In fact, by January1995 in¯ ation had reached 96%,although it was cutin halfby theend of theyear. The minimum wage has notbeen raised and it is notenforced. The ability of Malawito service its foreign debtwas alreadyin doubt by the end of June 1995. The government has been unableto respond effectively to deepening socioeconomic crisis inthe country. Thecrime wave has increasedto unprecedented levels. The murder of army commanderGeneral Manken Chigawa by armed robbers in April 1995 was one 240 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI ofthenumerous indicators of violentcrime in themajor cities. 49 Eventhe home ofthe inspector-general of police was burgled.To some, the rise incrime was thedirect result of thedemocratic opening because, under Banda’ s rule,criminals weresummarily punished by his numerous kangaroo courts and some were detainedinde® nitely. Under the new system, the rule of law and due process are respectedand criminals are entitledto bail. Beyond this however, is theeconomic desperationthat is drivingthousands into extra-legal ways of making a living. Somemembers ofthearmed Young PioneersÐ now disbandedÐ still retain their weaponsand have been using these to commit numerous crimes. Added to the continuingdisruptive and criminal acts ofremnants of the Young Pioneers and Mozambicanrefugees, is thefact that the police are notproperly trained, are poorlypaid and poorly equipped. Many have no vehicles and accommodation problemspersist. Corruption is alsorife within the forces as wealthyindividuals easilybribe their way out of crimes committedagainst the state. 50 Muluzi has calledon all Malawians to support the government in its efforts to contain the crimewave in order to avoid a `securitybreakdown’ . Therehas alsobeen a majornational debate on the constitution. The governmentcirculated a provisionaldocument in the three languages of Chichewa,Chitumbuka and Yao and followed this up with a constitutional conferencein February 1995. One major debate arising from the report of the conferencewas onthe creation of asecondparliamentary chamberÐ the senate. Though the UDF hadfavoured a singlechamber, the conference approved the creationof a senate.Muluzi had argued against it because it would be too expensiveto operateand maintain. However, he hada largecabinet, with many irrelevantministerial appointments. More importantly, it was strangethat a price was beingput on democracy, checks and balances and the containment of tyranny.The conference had recommended that, to save moneyto run the senate, ministerialpositions should be reducedfrom 34 to24. A decisionon thecreation ofa senatechamber has nowbeen reserved for 1999. It also recommended that boththe president and vice president should be elected, rather than the current practicewhere the vice president is appointedby the president. Another recommendationwas thatno personrunning for either position should have been convictedof any crime in the previous seven years: Muluzihad been convicted ofpettytheft as ayoungman and this did not directly affect him, although it did drawattention to that blot on his record. The conference felt that the of® ce of thesecond vice president, currently occupied by AFORD leaderChihana, was not necessary andshould be abolished. Of course, this position had been created to `attract’Chihana into an alliance with the UDF.Parliamentarianswho wanted to joinanother political party had ® rst toresign their seats inparliamentand subject themselvesto by-elections on the platform of the new party. This recommenda- tionwas designedto limit political prostitution and promote party loyalty and discipline.Appointed ministers were expected, according to Article 88 of the constitution,to declare their assets fullywithin three months of their appoint- ment,and the death penalty was retainedin spite of pressure frominternational humanrights organisations. In contrast to the Banda days, the traditional courts would,however, have no jurisdiction over crimes involvingthe death penalty. Jurisdictionover murder cases has beenreserved for the high courts in Lilongwe 241 JULIUS OIHONVBERE andBlantyre. The latter recommendation was obviouslyin¯ uenced by the unprecedentedcrime wave, something which was newto most Malawians. Thedelay in establishing a senatehas angeredmany organisations and the opposition.This means thatthe checks and balances which the senate would haveprovided would be absentand it is clearthat the AFORD±UDF alliancewants tocontinue to enjoy its parliamentary majority and ability to get bills through parliamentwith ease, as ithad done with the Press TrustBill on 7 November 1995.By appointing Chihana to a vice-presidencythat was notprovided for in theconstitution, many Malawians also feel that the UDF,ifnot checked early, coulddevelop into another one-party system, intolerant of constitutional provi- sionsand the rule of law. Indeed, Muluzi has beenslow in erecting institutions whichare necessary tocheck political excesses, theabuse of of® ce, and to facilitatethe consolidation of democracy, such as thelaw commission, the humanrights commission and the Ombudsman. These are providedfor in the provisionalconstitution and are completelywithin the president’ s gift. UnderBanda, corruption was moreor less of®cially sanctioned provided it did notdirectly offend the ` lifepresident’ . Thistradition had been somewhat mediatedbut remains rampant: ` Oldpolitical habits are provinghard to break. Multi-partypolitics under president Bakili Muluzi’ s UnitedDemocratic Front- ledcoalition have inherited much of the character of the old one-party state. Growingaccusations of corruption and constitutional manipulation reminded peopleof theBanda era.’ 51 Manypolitical appointments have not been based on meritand the UDF’ssloganof `PovertyAlleviation’ has quicklybecome ` Pocket Alleviation’or ` PersonalPoverty Alleviation’ as UDF politicianshave become corrupted.Muluzi’ s ministersare widelyperceived to be as corruptas Banda’s and,like Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, the president has beenquite reluctant to reprimandthem. Sam Paso,the education minister enabled private businessmen tomake a K36.3million pro® t whenhe spent K45.9 million on notebooks. Thoughhe was calledto appear before an inquiry, he was notrelieved of his positionfor such a reckless use ofpublicfunds. Rather, Paso was redeployedto thehealth ministry. In a recentreport by Transparency International ( TI), the Berlin-basedgroup noted that the degree of political openness is Malawihad certainlyincreased under the UDF±AFORD governmentbut also that there was an `explosionof corruption’. Itnoted that this explosion has permeatedevery sector andclass ofsociety as `Ma® agroups’operate in both the public and private sectors.52 In May 1995, AFORD and UDF parliamentarianswere each paid K50 000 (about US$3300)out of the ` povertyalleviation’ account. This payment, which was donebehind the back of Aleke Banda the ® nanceminister, was allegedlyto be usedto maintain their constituencies. In fact, in a signof confusion and lack of transparencyand consultations within the government, information minister BrownMpinganjira initially announced that no such payments had been made. Muluzihad to acknowledge publicly that the parliamentarians had received the moniesbut could not explain why only AFORD and UDF parliamentarianshad beenpaid (and MCP members leftout) with money that was genuinelymeant for the` povertyalleviation’ programme. Without doubt the MCP has capitalisedon thisscandal to show how corrupt and unreliable AFORD and UDF politiciansare 242 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI andit hadmade a majordent in thegovernment’ s credibility.At apersonallevel, Muluzi,in spiteof his MCP backgroundis perceivedto be fairlyhonest but many ofhis supporters, and the MCP has mademuch of this, point out that, by remainingin Banda’ s SanjikaPalace in the capital, rather than the less opulent StateHouse in Lilongwe, he was beingcorrupted by the perks of of® ce and remindsmost Malawians of the wickedness and ruthlessness which the Palace hadrepresented under Banda. Moreover, in a ratherstrange development, Muluzihas issuedK200 notes with his photograph and has retainedsome banknoteswith Banda’ s photoas well.Many ministers have embarked on irrelevantand unnecessary foreign missions which have drawn criticisms from themedia and public. In early 1996 the parliament passed abillallowing ministersand parliamentarians to bring goods into the country duty free! The implicationsof this unnecessary policy can easily be imagined. When a K200 millionloan facility was set upfor the Development of Malawi Traders Trust (Dematt)to ` encouragesmall businesses’ ,Muluzisent a listwhich ` included ministers, MPs, andother top government of® cials’ , 53 toTrust of® cials who promptlyrejected it. This was reminiscentof theBanda days when programmes meantto strengthen small investors and businesses wereappropriated by the politicaland economic elite. Inthe context of expectations which had been raised to the maximum during thecampaigns, the implementation of painful adjustment policies have only deepenedalienation and anger against the new democratic government. This `crisis ofexpectation’ is erodingsupport for the democratic enterprise and makinggovernance even more dif® cult. The World Bank itself has admittedthat inthe implementation of adjustment ` therural poor have been extremely hard hit’ .54 Ithas belatedlycalled for safety nets to protect the poor and vulnerable. Thismight already be toolate, as democracyand the removal of Bandafrom the scene havenot helped the living conditions of the poor majority in any signi®cant way. If the UDF governmentis unableto make a signi®cant difference in the lives ofMalawians, it will not just lose credibility but its democratic enterprise will beseriously endangered. The people will measure itssuccess bythe extent to whichthe new government is ableto make a visibledifference in their lives. Giventhat the Banda government had spent only 11% of itslast budget on social services,the challenge is toughbut it should not be dif® cult to see whatever differencethe government can make. 55 AFORD has squanderedits initial credi- bilityby jumping from one alliance to the other and by its involvement in the `povertyalleviation’ scandal. Yet, while Chihana cannot count on a major politicalfuture in Malawian politics, local, especially grassroots AFORD members willcontinue to do well. There are stillsome credibleMalawians residing abroad.If theyreturn to take over the leadership of AFORD,theymight yet rebuildit into a formidablepolitical party with national spread and credibility. If the UDF is ableto maintain an open political system, it can gradually incorporate AFORD intoits fold. Yet Muluzi cannot overlook the army which, whilededicated to Banda, had been opposed to the Young Pioneers, the Mobile PoliceForce, and to John Tembo and Cecilia Kadzamira. It had also refused to actagainst pro-democracy activists in the days of Banda. The height of its 243 JULIUS OIHONVBERE resentmentagainst the Young Pioneers was demonstratedin ` OperationBwe- zani’in 1993when junior of® cers tookto thestreets ofLilongwe,killing Young Pioneermembers whohad initiated a massive attackagainst pro-democracy activists.While this uncoordinated and unplanned response to the Young Pioneerssigni® cantly advanced the struggle for democracy and severely dislo- catedthe Young Pioneers, it also directly involved the military in politics.Such anincreasinglypoliticised military can be expected to playa moreintervention- istrole if politicians and political parties fail to deliver. There were rumours of acoupagainst the UDF governmentin April 1995 though no arrests weremade. ButMuluzi did threaten to launch another ` OperationBwezani’ in response to agrowingcrime wave. This simply means afurtherpoliticisation of the army. InApril and May the Mobile Police and Army raided several locations in Lilongweand Blantyre in search of` illegalarms’ .Thiscon® rmed fears thata coupplot had actually been uncovered and that the crime issue was overwhelm- ingthe government, hence the involvement of the army. Some soldiers have beenarrested for plotting against the government and the UDF governmentis still scared ofa possiblemutiny in support of Banda.The fact, however, is thata too frequentinvolvement of the army in political and social operations will only drawit into the vortex of the country’ s politics. 56 Press freedomand other liberties have increased signi® cantly. There are over 20newspapers in the country today engaged in the struggle for relevance, survivaland acceptability. This is certainlya majordeparture from the past. 57 Muluziis moreopen to the media and relates well to scholars and students, unlikeBanda who had clearly lost touch with the people and was immersedin theworld of sycophants. However, the corruption issue mentionedearlier and some cases ofhuman rights abuses continueto cast ashadowon how open the UDF governmentis willingto be and how much it is willingto invest in strengtheningcivil society. The MBC remainsthe main mouthpiece of the government,functioning more or less theway it had done under Banda. Recently,one of its reporters was sackedfor raising the issue ofwhy MCP parliamentarianshad not bene® ted from the scandalous ` PovertyAlleviation’ largesse.Only one religious radio station has beenlicensed so far,thus protectingthe monopoly of the state broadcasting service. There is as yetno indicationof a seriouscommitment to the mass educationand mobilisation of thepeople and to theirinvolvement in decisionmaking. Though newspapers now proliferate,many are ownedby powerful politicians and ministers or their businessassociates. Some ` journalistsstill ® ndit dif® cult to exercise indepen- denteditorial judgement. The country’ s onlytwo newspaper printing presses are ownedby politicians: one by Banda himself, the other by a UDF cabinet minister.’ 58 Themedia, especially the state broadcasting corporation, continue to playthe same sycophanticrole they had played under Banda: the news begins andends with Muluzi or some importantminister: ` Beforeit was Banda,Banda, BandaÐevery day. Now it isMuluzi,Muluzi, Muluzi. Every presidential arrival anddeparture is onthe air.’ 59 MelindaHam and Mike Hall believe that most of Muluzi’s overturesto the media are `super®cial’ , evenopportunistic, because `Banda’s legacyis strong.Under his rule, almost every institution was sub- servientto theruling party and to himpersonally. The political culture he created 244 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI is deeplyentrenched. A wholegeneration of journalists worked under strict censorship,trade unions existed in nameonly, lawyers were afraid to takeaction againstthe authorities, and those who spoke out against human rights violations weredetained, tortured, and murdered.’ 60 Theycontend that it will take a long time,new institutions, mass education,strengthening of civil society and the institutionalisationofdemocracy to alter the social and political landscape. Muluzirecognises this predicament: Ina countrywhich has been under oppression for 30years, it will be dif® cult for thisdemocratization to ® lterinto the villages. Some villagers do not even under- standthat there has been a change.We haveto do a lotof civil education and tell themwhat their rights are. The constitution must be published in local languages. It willtake time for thepeople to appreciate the change. 61 Simplistic,even patronising and paternalistic populism will not be enough. The UDF willneed to attack the structural roots of the Malawian crisis. As Denis Venterhas rightlyargued: Alarm bellsare already ringing: for mostMalawians, the outcome of multi-party politicshas fallen woefully short of expectations¼ ridding Malawi of Dr Banda seemsto have been the easy part; but now comes the dif® cult partÐ to erase the stainsof thepast, press on towardsa newera of socialjustice, peace and prosperity inthe Second Republic and yield the fruits of independence promised but not deliveredto arestiveelectorate that naively believes that the new-found democracy isa magicwand which can produce miracles. 62 Thestate which had been employed in the oppression and brutalisation of the peoplewill need to bereconstructedto serve thepeople. Clearly, the UDF and the otheropposition movements, including the reformed MCP,haveopened the way toa newpolitical future in Malawi. However, the really dif® cult struggle for goodgovernance, accountability, social justice, popular participation, rural development,gender equality, respect for the environment and human rights is onlyjust beginning.

Notes 1 MelindaHam &MikeHall, `MalawiÐfrom tyranny to tolerance’ , AfricaReport ,Vol39, No 6, 1994,p 56. 2 Denis Venter, `Malawi: thetransition to multi-party politics’ , inJohn Wiseman (ed), Democracy and PoliticalChange in Sub-Saharan Africa ,London:Routledge, 1995, p 155. 3 Ibid, p 35. 4 Venter, `Malawi’ ,p155. 5 Ibid,p156.Venter notesalso that the Malawian state was `predatory’and it entailed a `mutuallyreinforcing politicaland economic system inwhich the dominant minority of the political elite andtheir economic agencies preyedon the populace for their own bene® t andat theexpense of the absolute welfare ofa majorityof the population and long-term development goals’ . 6 Venter, `Malawi’ ,p159. 7 Ibid,pp160± 161. 8 Quotedin ` MalawiÐAnger builds up’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,March1992, p 10509. 9 See MelindaHam, `Looseningthe reins?’ , AfricaReport ,Vol.38, No 1, 1993, pp 29± 31. 10 Quoted in ibid. 11 Ham, `Looseningthe reins?’ 12 Ibid. 245 JULIUS OIHONVBERE

13 Venter, `Malawi’ ,p157. 14 Ibid, p 159. 15 `MalawiÐdemocracy polldate’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,1992,p 10818. 16 `MalawiÐnew pressure group’, AfricaResearch Bulletin ,September1992, p 10719. 17 `MalawiÐanger builds up’ . 18 Turnoutnationally was amere 40%and in the main commercial cities itranged between 10%and 20%. Designedto give the impression that political liberalisation was alreadyin place andto convincedonors to resume aidto the country, the referendum failed to convince lenders, donors, and pro-democracy agitators. 19 `MalawiÐthe old man andhis chickens’ , BBCFocus on Africa ,Vol.4, No 4, 1993. 20 Venter, `Malawi’ ,p176. 21 Jan Kees vanDonge, ` Kamuzu’ slegacy:the democratization of Malawi’ , AfricanAffairs ,No94, 1995, p 235. 22 `MalawiÐthe old man andhis Chickens’ . 23 The AFORD was notentirely `MCP free’ because RodwellMunyanyembe, a foundingmember of AFORD had served as MCP secretary-general andcabinet minister. 24 MelindaHam, `MalawiÐBanda’ s last waltz’ , AfricaReport Vol38, 3, May± June 1993, p 19.Mlombwa Phiri, the MCP chairman forDedza actuallykilled a policecommander fornot resisting multipartyism. He was condemnedto death for his actions. 25 Van Donge,` Kamuzu’ slegacy’, p235. 26 `MalawiÐthe old man andhis chickens’ . 27 Van Donge,` Kamuzu’ sLegacy’, p246. 28 Ibid, p 237. 29 Ibid. 30 Venter, `Malawi’ . 31 Ibid, p 176. 32 See BBCFocuson Africa Vol4, No 3, 1993, p 61.When Banda was hospitalisedfor a `shrunkenbrain’ inSouth Africa, theleaders ofthe UDF and AFORD sentmessages wishinghim well anda speedyrecovery. Suchmoves, well intentionedand good in themselves, alsoconvinced the public that Banda might, after all, notbe that bad. 33 Van Donge,` Kamuzu’ slegacy’, p264. 34 Ibid. 35 `MalawiÐBanda’ s daysnumbered?’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,September1992, p 10720. 36 Aside fromthe ` executive’vice presidencywhich Chihana demanded for himself, he also wanted seven otherministerial portfolios,including agriculture, justice, works and supplies, a 43%quota of deputy ministers,as well as aquotaof parastatal anddiplomatic positions. For a partythat came adistantthird, these were rather ridiculousdemands. Chihana knew that the demands were sel® sh,hence hisparty insisted thatsuch a deal shouldnot be made public.The UDF demandedthat any deal hadto be made publicand disagreement onthis and other issues scuttledpossibilities for an initial deal. 37 MelindaHam &MikeHall, ` BuildingDemocracy’ Interviewwith President Bakili Mulzi, AfricaReport Vol39, 6, November± December 1994,p. 61. 38 Van Donge,` Kamuzu’ slegacy’, pp249± 250. 39 Venter, `Malawi’ ,p179. 40 Followinga major cabinetreshuf¯ e inmid-1996, Muluzi dismissed Chihana from his cabinet. The new cabinetdid not include a secondvice president.Though Chihana announced that he had resigned from the cabinetand government, his political credibility had been eroded. This will certainly have some effect on hisparty’ s politicalfortunes. 41 Itis possiblethat, by forging an alliance withthe MCP, the UDF became thoroughlymarginalised in parliament.This certainly prompted Muluzi into making far-reaching concessions to AFORD tolure it away froman alliance withthe MCP,tothe extent of creatingan unconstitutional position of second vice-president. Yet, ifthat was the AFORD strategy,the cost was tooheavy for the pro-democracy front. Whatever the end result,it demonstrated crass opportunismand emphasised raw powerat theexpense of deepening the democratic struggle.At theend of the day, neither the UDF not MCP willhave any respect forChihana and the AFORD. 42 `MalawiÐcoalition government’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,August1995, p 11943. 43 Van Donge,` Kamuzu’ slegacy’, p243. 44 `MalawiÐdemocratic pain’, AfricaCon® dential ,Vol36, No 2, June 1995, p 6. 45 `MalawiÐBanda pleads ª NotGuiltyº ’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,July1995, p 11923. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 See `MalawiÐarmy commander killed’, AfricaResearch Bulletin ,April1995, p 11829.The murder forced PresidentMuluzi to postpone his scheduled trip to Kuwait. In late April,Lieutenant-General Owen Muluni was promotedto the rank of general and made commander ofthe army. 246 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI

50 `MalawiÐcrime wave’ , AfricaResearch Bulletin ,May1995, p 11859. 51 `MalawiÐbad memories’ , AfricaCon® dential Record ,Vol36, No 25, December 1995,p 4. 52 Reported in ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ham &Hall, `Buildingdemocracy’ ,p60. 56 Ibid. 57 AndrewMeldrum, ` MalawiÐnew actors, same play’, AfricaReport ,Vol39, No 4, 1994, p 53. 58 Ham &Hall, `Malawi: fromtyranny to tolerance’ ,p57. 59 Kalera Mhango,editor of New Voice, quoted in ibid. 60 Ham &Hall, `Malawi: fromtyranny to tolerance’ ,p57. 61 Ham &Hall, `Buildingdemocracy’ ,p60. 62 Venter, `Malawi’ ,pp180, 183.

Religion State & Society EDITOR Dr Philip Walters, Keston Research, Oxford, UK Religion, State & Society is a unique source of information and analysis for individuals and institutions involved in a wide variety of ways with communist and formerly communist countries. It is still the only English-language academic publication devoted to issues of church, state and society in these countries. Responding to the new situation in Russia and Eastern Europe, the journal explores its conviction that the experiences of religious communities in their encounter with communism will be central to the evolution of the new Europe and of the Western world in general in the next century. Tackling social, cultural, ethnic, political and ecclesiological problems is in future going to be a cooperative effort, in a way hitherto impossible, involving the religious communities of both East and West. Religious communities in Western Europe, the USA, Australasia and Latin America will have much to learn from the way in which their counterparts in the East have tackled such problems in the past, and vice versa Volume 25, 1997, 4 issues. ISSN 0963-7494. Carfax Publishing Company PO Box 25 · Abingdon · Oxfordshire OX14 3UE · UK Tel: +44 (0)1235 521154 · Fax: +44 (0)1235 401550 E-mail: [email protected] · WWW: http://www.carfax.co.uk

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