From Despotism to Democracy: the Rise of Multiparty Politics in Malawi
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ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 225± 247, 1997 Fromdespotism to democracy: the riseof multiparty politics in Malawi JULIUSO IHONVBERE DrHastings Kamuzu Banda instituted what was probablythe most repressive, corrupt,predatory and violent political system inAfrica.Through a combination ofbribery, intimidation, election malpractices, and the suffocation of civil society,Banda not only closed all democratic openings inherited at political independencein 1964, but also erected the structures of a corruptand highly repressiveone-person and one-party state. There was hardlya separation betweenpublic and private funds as Bandahimself owned almost half the economy.Trade unions were not allowed. The so-called parliament was ajoke set upandmanipulated by Banda to give the veneer of democracy.A backward moralcode was imposedand the activities of all sectors weremonitored. Press andacademic freedom did not exist under Banda, the country did not even have televisionservices! Thosewho dared oppose the ` lifepresident’ or daredto show some interestin succeeding him were either assassinated, forced into exile, or simplyjailed. 1 Anotoriousculture of sycophancywas createdto singthe praises of the Ngwazi orconqueror. His special security apparatus, the Malawi Young Pioneers,along with an array of spies andparamilitary units, were used to intimidatecivil society and harass Malawianexiles abroad. 2 By1970 Dr Bandahad total control over the political system. Elections to parliamentwere underhis direct control. He coulddissolve parliament and dismiss hiscabinet at will. Anyone desiring to compete in parliamentary elections had to ®rst seekDr Banda’s approval.As aresult,parliament [was] turnedinto a socializingforum where, once a year,the members of parliament gather to get to knoweach other and to shower with praises the ª wiseand dynamic leadership of Dr Banda.ºPolicies formulated elsewhere [were] approvedwith little meaningful debateor constructive criticism by the parliament. 3 Therewere pockets of opposition,though most of thesewere located outside the countryand often ineffective, especially in the context of solidWestern tolerance andsupport for Banda’ s dictatorship.It is dif®cult not to agree with Denis Venterthat ` Forall intents and purposes Malawi was noteven a one-partystate: itwas aone-manstate, a politicaldespotism in which the state apparatus was answerableto onlyone man. The result was aclimateof fear almostunparalleled anywherein Africa, even in countries wracked by violence.’ 4 UnderBanda, the statewas largely` irrelevant’to theneeds of thepeople; violence was partof the popularculture; the institutions of the government were inef® cient; and behind JuliusO Ihonvbereis atthe Department of Government,University ofTexas atAustin,Burdine Hall 536, Austin, TX78712-1087,USA. 0143-6597/97/020225-23$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 225 JULIUS OIHONVBERE thefacade of growthstatistics (largely the results of foreign aid and the activities ofthe foreign-owned plantations), was aworldof fear, decay, poverty, disease, intolerance,ethnic and regional antagonisms, and a weak,unproductive and illegitimateelite: ` theMalawian state was astrongand authoritarian, one-party state,dominated by a small,autocratic and dictatorial political clique and characterisedby `top-down’¯ owofpolicydirectives and government decreesÐ anarchetype of the ª Leviathanºstate. In this respect, the ministerial and parliamentarystructures were purely nominal and had the facile function of rubber-stampingand rationalising handed down policies.’ 5 Itis thecontext above,characterized by deepeningeconomic crisis, repression, and the asphyxi- ationof civil society that we examine the process ofpoliticalliberalization, and thepolitics of the opposition in Malawi. Dismantling despotism: the marchto multiparty democracy Severalfactors forced political liberalisation on Malawi in spite of Banda’ s initialresistance and refusal to acknowledge on-going changes in the world, Africaand the southern Africa region. There were already too many cracks in hisrepressive political set-up to isolate it from the monumental rejection of and challengesto one-party, one-person, and life-presidential arrangements. First,the economy was indeep trouble. In¯ ation was around22% at the end of1993. Unemployment, crime and hunger had reached unprecedented propor- tions.The drought of 1992 made matters worse as displacedpeasants migrated tothe urban centres. The introduction of the IMF-andWorld Bank-supervised structuraladjustment programme in 1980unintentionally facilitated the march to multipartydemocracy through the unequal distribution of thepains and costs of adjustment.The badly run monetarist policies of the programme further impov- erishedthe already poor, alienated them from the state, its institutions and custodians,and forced them not just to adopt coping strategies but to resist the state,which they saw as beingdirectly responsible for their poverty. Adjustment forcedthe people to ask newquestions beyond Banda and his repressive rule and toseek solutionsin themessage ofthe opposition. In short, economic crisis and vulnerabilityto externalpressures madeit easy forlenders, donors and investors toput pressure onMalawi to meet political conditionalities. Asecondpoint had to do with pressures fromdonors who withheld new foreignaid. Until the rapid changes in the global order, Western donors were very` comfortablewith Banda’ s strict,paternalist, Protestant style, his cultural conservatismand his friendliness towards the West¼ Because ofhis pro-Western policies,Banda’ s regimegot off rather lightly.’ 6 Thechanges in South Africa in particularleft Banda high and dry without support from the apartheid regime. In Mozambiqueand Angola, steps towardsmultiparty democracy also reduced Banda’s relevanceto rebelorganisations like RENAMO.In1993 donors froze $74 millionin aid to Malawi. The UK and the World Bank played a majorrole in thisregard by refusing further economic assistance untilhuman rights were respectedand a politicalliberalisation agenda was announced.During a visitto Malawiin 1992, the Vice-President of the USA, Dan Quayle, made it clear to Bandathat relations, especially economic relations with the USA would be 226 MULTIPARTY POLITICS INMALAWI reviewedif human rights were not improved and steps takento open up the politicallandscape. For an aid-dependent economy like Malawi, this had immediaterepercussions for the government’ s abilityto keep projects a¯ oat and buypolitical support and loyalty. The situation was nothelped when the EC in March1992 openly condemned Banda’ s humanrights record and closed style of governance.The UK government was verydirect in insisting on good gover- nance,respect for human rights, political liberalisation and accountability. To showthat it was seriousin its new postures, the UK government cut aid to Malawiin half. Norway terminated its aid programme to Malawi, citing gross humanrights abuses as themain reason. This action immediately jeopardised a $22million telecommunications project. When Malawi asked donor nations and theWorld Bank for nearly $800 million in balance of payments support, it receivedan unprecedented shock when the donors meeting in Paris respondedby `suspendingall new aid, except for drought and refugee relief, expressing deep concernabout the lack of progress in the area ofbasic freedoms and human rightsand linking new aid to ª goodgovernanceº .’ Though the donors claimed thatit was nottheir intention to dictate or determine a `speci®c system of governance’for Malawi, they made it obvious that clear signs of political liberalisationwere required to do business as usual. 7 Thedonors only pledged $170million to support drought and refugee programmes of a totalaid package of$270 million required by Malawi. AmnestyInternational released a highlydamaging report on Malawiin which itrevealedthat detainees were badly treated and that hundreds had been illegally heldin over-crowded prisons. Speci® cally, Amnesty pointed out that about 258 personswere kept in detention cells meant for one and were kept in leg irons. Thereport also revealed that feeding was poor,detainees were frequently ¯ogged,and subjected to all forms oftorture including electric shocks. The Amnestyreport also indicated that many prisoners had died from ` illtreatment ormedicalneglect’ . TheAmnesty report was supportedby theSouthern African HumanRights Foundation ( SAHRF)ina March1992 report. 8 Thisand other chillingaccounts of the brutality of Banda’ s governmentin a rapidlychanging post-coldwar global order encouraged Western diplomats, investors, lenders and donorsto impose political conditionalities on Malawi. 9 Third,the church in Malawiplayed a majorrole in forcing Banda to recognise thepressures forchange. On Sunday8 March1992, the country’ s eightCatholic bishops(six Africans and two Europeans) released a pastoralletter entitled LivingOur Faith ,inwhich they denounced the corruption, indiscipline, re- pressionand human rights abuses inthe country. The letter addressed the `growinganger and resentment’ in the country, and noted that: ` Academic freedomis seriouslyrestricted, exposing injustices can be considereda betrayal, revealingsome evilsof oursociety is seen as slanderingthe country, monopoly ofmass mediaand censorship prevent the expression of dissentingviews’ . 10 The priestsalso complained about the detention, often illegally, of hundreds of Malawiansand the harsh treatment detainees received in prison. It was thevery ®rst ofsuch actions coming from the