Temporal Justice, Youth Quotas and by Prof. Dr Marcel Wissenburg

bstract: Quotas, including youth quo- it offers too little guidance for our imperfect tive facts but also about actual and potential tas for representative institutions, are world. While that implies more tolerance for support and resistance.2 Adequate represen- A usually evaluated from within the so- quotas, I nevertheless propose an alternative tation can take many forms, but in a classic cial justice discourse. at discourse relies on more suited to a representative, deliberative typology Hanna Pitkin distinguished two several questionable assumptions, seven of : veto rights. types that are definitive of a fundamental which I critically address and radically revise in dilemma for : representation as this contribution from a libertarian perspec- Representation, justice, and youth acting for versus representation as standing tive. Temporal justice then takes on an entirely quotas1 for.3 different form. It becomes a theory in which re- No political system, democratic or other, Representation as acting for demands that sponsibilities are clear and cannot be shifted can function successfully without some de- representatives defend the opinions and fur- onto the shoulders of the weak and innocent. I gree of representative consultation, for ther the interests of whomever it is they shall only briefly sketch some outlines and gen- starters because must be based on represent. While perhaps in an ideal democ- eral implications of such a theory, arguing that adequate not just about objec- racy, the representative can be expected to

20 Intergenerational Justice Review Issue 1/2015 be able to act for any citizen, the real world ness of the choices that the committee is ex - young to represent currently non- existent is obstinate and obstructive. It is unlikely pected to make. ese days, it does not hap - future generations – I will call this justice to - that a white, religious, healthy male octoge - pen often that groups have to publicly wards future generations. 6 narian knows what it is like to be a black, remind us of their exclusion with large, in - atheist, handicapped young female; it is also tensive and sometimes even violent cam - It does not take a to prevail unlikely that any member of any of the lat - paigns like the feminist and coloured ... but rather an irate, tireless mino - ter sociological groups would trust their rep - movements of the 19th and 20th century rity, keen on setting brushfires of resentative to be able to adequately represent needed in order to be heard. As a sort of pre- freedom in the minds of men. them. emptive strike against formal quotas, we / Samuel Adams / Both because of the objective obstacles the have become our own thought police and representative faces, and because of the sub - have assimilated a directive demanding uni - Quotas are almost always developed and jective hesitations of the represented, mod - versally fair sociological representation as evaluated from a broadly social liberal per - ern democracies increasingly pay attention part of our standard operating procedure. spective – as has also happened in the case of to representation as standing for. On the lat - Quotas are also on the minds of many of us youth quotas. at is to say, many among us ter view, representatives are expected to re - in the booth, who, already having assume that societies ought to be − broadly flect the (relevant) sociological categories picked a party, subsequently find ourselves speaking − constitutional liberal democratic that make up the electorate. us, one ex - unable or unwilling to express a strong pref - societies, that they should have governments pects to contain percentages of erence for any particular candidate. We − the controlled by representative institutions, women and men, colours, creeds and edu - undecided − then often ask ourselves that governments have tasks other than de - cational and professional backgrounds more whether we should vote for a woman, for an fence against enemies abroad. And at home, or less similar to those among the popula - academic, for someone from our home town and they, you, we, assume that there is a sort tion at large. Of course, since one cannot ex - or region or from a particular ethnic or reli - of collectively owned hoard, a stock of re - pect a female representative to represent gious group. And sometimes we really can - sources that has to be distributed over soci - emancipated women’s interests merely not choose. I admit that, for want of a more ety in a fair, just and impartial way, so as to because she is female (she may well be an or - sensible criterion, I once decided to vote for enable all of us to enjoy the greatest freedom thodox Muslim), democracies are continu - the candidate most closely related to me by to live our lives in accordance with our own ally trying to square the circle, hoping to family ties – a politician with whom I share convictions, as long as that freedom is com - offer both adequate sociological and a four-times-great-grandfather. Any random patible with a similar freedom for others – ideational representation. criterion, however offensive, will do when in John Rawls’ words. 7 I usually share these no relevant criterion applies. convictions, 8 but for the sake of academic Justice is indiscriminately due to all, Several countries have, in recent years, in - sincerity, one occasionally needs to take without regard to numbers, wealth, troduced quotas in politics. Most of these some distance from these standard views and or rank. quota rules aim to reduce the underrepre - adopt a more libertarian perspective on so - / John Jay / sentation of women in politics – in parties, ciety and politics. parliaments and governments – and most Libertarianism defends as just a society Both forms of representation may be empir - are voluntary, for example where parties based on and religiously respectful of volun - ically necessary for the smooth and stable agree internally to either put up a minimum tary association among consenting adults; functioning of political systems, but – to - percentage of women to be elected, or re - no other form of association can be com - gether with democracy − they have also be - serve for each sex only the (un)even posi - patible with respect for humans as au - come part of the normative framework of tions on candidate lists. Other quota rules, tonomous moral agents (as deontological liberal democracies. Guaranteeing adequate again mostly voluntary, guarantee represen - libertarians argue) and no other society can representation of all relevant groups and cat - tation of particular creeds, sexual prefer - as efficiently and effectively guarantee both egories in society has become a matter of jus - ences, regions, native languages and individual freedom and prosperity tice, more specifically of distributive social ethnicities. One of the latest additions to the (as consequentialist libertarians argue). 9 justice. And one of the most popular and list is quotas for the youngest generations ere is no role for a state in libertarianism widely used instruments of justice in repre - under the banner of temporal justice. except as a guarantor of the freedom of as - sentation is the institution of quotas 4 – For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that sociation and no room for taxes except to which is ultimately the subject of this article. we are only talking about youth quotas in that purpose. Libertarians reject the idea of Quotas are on everyone’s minds these days, , although most of what I have to social or redistributive justice as it requires both when we select people and when we say applies to other institutions as well, mu - the existence (and creation) of a common elect them. When we, or at least the more or tatis mutandis . Even so, we are talking about stock, and that is impossible without violat - less experienced administrators and politi - two fundamentally different youths, two dif - ing individuals’ property rights. at said, a cians among us, select members of a com - ferent quotas, and two quite different forms young branch of the libertarian tree called mittee, we never ever pick people at random. of temporal justice. 5 One refers to intergen - left-libertarianism that nature is We select them, and we do so on the basis of erational justice between existing generations common property, and argues that since pri - knowledge and experience, political or so - or age cohorts, to ensure the proper repre - vate property equals work mixed with re - cial interests, gender, culture, ethnicity, and sentation of the presently young, which I sources taken out of nature, a redistributable any other trait or characteristic that might shall refer to as intergenerational justice. e tax to correct the deprivation of others from be relevant to the legitimacy and effective - other type of quota would have to allow the natural resources can be justified. 10

Intergenerational Justice Review 21 Issue 1/2015 I choose a libertarian critique of social lib - Jonas 11 who effectively put justice towards their societies. eral thoughts over other popular schools in future generations, particularly environ - So no duty to procreate, then. What is in - political because libertarianism mental justice, on the political agenda – and stead consistent with a liberal is comes closest to functioning as a conscience it was also Jonas who explicitly stated that the idea that having children can be part of for social . My argument will be humanity has a duty to ensure the contin - an individual ’s plan of life, if he or she so that, by unquestioningly adopting a social ued existence of the species. 12 e grounds chooses , and if the execution of that choice liberal perspective in the context of tempo - Jonas quotes for this duty remain a bit vague does not harm anyone else. It follows that if ral justice, we run the risk of importing and but the gist of his argument is that it is a any social or political duty in relation to fu - overlooking several quite dubious assump - Christian duty, a divine command implicit ture generation exists, it is a prima facie duty tions. Now if the assumptions of a model are in our creation. 13 towards the prospective parent: other things flawed, then the standards by which we eval - Most current authors in the field of tempo - being equal, we may have duties (and I will uate the desirability and permissibility of ral justice, even those working on questions assume that we do have those duties) to tol - policies and institutions will be flawed too. of population growth, do not take the trou - erate the wish to procreate, and to enable In less abstract terms: if we want to know ble to offer an argument but simply assume him or her (the parent) to enjoy the same whether or not youth quotas are a morally that humanity must continue to exist, sim - lib erties, to have the same opportunities and good idea, we need to be sure that we mea - ply by never discussing the alternative, the means to create a new human, that we grant sure right and wrong, just and unjust, by an passing or fading out of humanity. Whether to contemporary others. arguably legitimate standard. or not has a place in a polite society, that is a moot point – but it will be clear that (2) Moving on more rapidly and succinctly All men have equal rights to liberty, this idea has no place in a social liberal con - to the second major misunderstanding in to their property, and to the protec - text. For social liberals, there can be no re - temporal justice discourses: there is no col - tion of the laws. course to religious or other unreasonable lective responsibility for future generations. / Voltaire / doctrines as foundations of the public good. Or more precisely: any collective responsi - And that precludes the possibility of argu - bility taken on behalf of future generations I shall identify seven dubious, usually un - ing that there can be a duty to ensure the is a political , not a moral obli - seen and unquestioned assumptions – and continued existence of humanity. To whom, gation. for brevity’s sake I shall refer to them as mis - after all, would we owe this duty? Let us take is follows logically from our observation understandings. Some of these have to do a moment to consider this question seri - that we have no duty to ensure the contin - with intergenerational justice, some with ously. ued existence of humanity, only duties to justice towards future generations, and some First, it cannot be a duty towards future gen - give individuals who want to procreate as with the way resources and the environment erations or future individuals themselves – fair opportunity to do so as others, including are conceived of in the temporal justice dis - that would be a case, straight out of the those who do not, or do not want to. ere courses. Having shoved these seven dwarfs handbooks, of circular reasoning. Secondly, are a couple of provisos that have to do with aside, we discover we are left with a perhaps it cannot be a duty towards our fellow citi - duties towards the incompetent and the theoretically consistent, intellectually chal - zens either – that would make our repro - abandoned. But in general, the proper lib - lenging and morally sincere view of tempo - ductive organs, our wombs and testicles eral attitude in the area of justice for future ral justice – but also one that is highly their property, to be used at their discretion generations should be that it is the responsi - unpractical. So I will then move on to de - (by majority vote or government directive). bility of the procreating parent or - velop a more pragmatic analysis of our two- More precisely, it would make our bodies ing parents to ensure their children will have headed sleeping beauty, youth quotas. the property of the collective, and thereby a life worth living, and that does not even turn us into mere tools and test tubes in the seem to have to include the option of en - Seven misunderstandings about temporal service of an alleged common good. abling them to create a third generation. justice irdly and finally, ensuring the continued Let me next discuss three misunderstandings (1) e first and most important misunder - existence of humanity, a.k.a. having chil - that are relevant to both types of temporal standing in temporal justice theory is that dren, cannot be a duty to ourselves either. justice, misunderstandings that have to do there must be future generations. It is very at would imply one of the most invasive with environmental sustainability, or envi - common to assume that humanity will, in - paternalistic limitations imaginable on the ronmental management or however you deed must, procreate, either because chil - individual’s freedom to formulate and exe - want to call it. dren would be a collective or public good, cute his or her own authentic plan of life and or because it is a moral and religious duty. theory of the good. By making parenting a Justice is not a prize tendered to e command to ensure the survival of hu - necessary element of a life worth living, it the good-natured, nor is it to be manity is, quite tellingly for our cultures, the would also be an insult to, and a failure to withheld from the ill-bred. topic of one of the most classic flirtation recognise the existence of, those who cannot / Charles L. Aarons / strategies and even more, it is part of the ul - procreate – as much as those who are by law timate and most definitive rejection: “I excluded from parenthood. I mention in (3) Our third temporal justice misunder - would not go out with you even if you were that connection in particular more or less standing is to believe that, because planet the last human being on Earth.” In circles civilised people in parts of Europe who opt Earth is not any individual’s property, it more directly related to my own sub-disci - for openly supporting a truly antediluvian, would therefore be the exclusive property of pline, green political theory, it was Hans barbaric attitude towards homosexuality in humanity as a whole. Traditional libertari -

22 Intergenerational Justice Review Issue 1/2015 ans stress that nature is unowned before erty rights, private or other, necessarily in - erations. Hence the idea that specifically the what is called “original acquisition”, the clude the right to destroy with impunity. A young would be in a good position to repre - appropriation by individuals of natural property right to an object x is in fact a sent future generations, and hence quotas. resources with an eye to using them. 14 whole series of rights – rights to use x in this Much of the literature on temporal justice So-called left libertarians and virtually all or that way, in this or that context, and to assumes that justice between presently exist - social liberals assume that before exploita - this or that purpose; rights to delegate and ing generations and justice between those tion, natural resources are the collective transfer, rights to mould and shape, and so generations and the one coming after is property of a people, a nation, a state or the on. But none of those rights is a priori abso - much the same. ose who are up and com - whole of humanity. 15 lute; they are all limited by other people’s ing cannot speak for themselves but have to e difference between these two positions rights, including but not limited to property be represented, but what, after all, is the real is crucial: from the traditional libertarian rights in other objects. And this implies that, difference between them and the 0−5 year point of view, any act of acquisition, any in - while arguably the crucial difference be - olds who are basically equally silent? If we trusion on sovereign nature, has to be posi - tween ownership and possession is the right accept that the next unborn generation does tively justified – and though admittedly the to destroy x, that right too is a priori never not differ in any morally significant way average libertarian’s standards for justifiable unlimited. It furthermore implies that one from existing children, putting all further fu - acquisition are abysmally low, they do have of those limits may be a duty to provide ture generations on a par with our youngest standards and are not principally opposed to compensation to those now deprived of the offers no further moral challenges, only raising them. public benefits of the destroyed good x. 18 practical ones – like how to predict their One typically social liberal objection to pri - numbers, tastes and technologies. Or so one Earth provides enough to satisfy vate property, and thus one classic argument might think. every man's needs, but not every for the legitimacy of taxation or collective man's greed. ownership and government-controlled re - The planting of a tree, especially one / Mahatma Gandhi / distribution, is that individual owners can of the long-living hardwood trees, destroy their property with impunity, to the is a gift which you can make to posterity at almost no cost and with On the collective ownership view, however, disadvantage of the rest of humanity – say, almost no trouble, and if the tree what has to be justified is not that nature is the owner of a gorgeous historic mansion takes root it will far outlive the turned into resources but how, and for what can tear it down and replace it with a Kool - visible effect of any of your other purpose. It is assumed beforehand that there haas skyscraper. While laws may allow that, actions, good or evil. is a legitimate use for each and every bit of morality − as we have just seen − does not / George Orwell / nature – the question is how to identify a support such an automatism. In addition, if precise legitimate purpose and legitimate the justification of taxation and redistribu - Yet as we have seen above, there is no duty to user. 16 Yet social liberals offer no justification tion is that private property would otherwise create future individuals; their existence is a for the primary assumption that a people or be destroyed for no good reason, it seems the choice, not a given. While we can procreate humanity are the initial owners of nature. same should apply to collective property – and thereby create duties that arise at the e social liberal position is internally in - there too we risk wanton destruction by the moment of birth, we cannot owe anything consistent. Either property rights are derived owner to the disadvantage of the excluded, to non-existing entities as long as we can from natural law, or they are conventions. If such as future generations. choose not to create them. And reversely, we derived from natural law, then we must jus - do have obligations to the existing young tify acquisition in broadly Lockean terms, (5) A further mistake follows from the pre - and we cannot “unbirth” them. assuming initial non-ownership. If property vious four: it is the mistake to believe that rights are based solely on convention, then the collective has any rights over my prop - (7) e final mistake is to assume, as many nature is by definition unowned before ap - erty or over my use of it in relation to my democratic theorists seem to do these days, propriation. In either case, the onus of proof offspring. It is admittedly my duty to pro - that egoism − that is, representing and pro - lies with whoever intends to exploit nature. 17 vide any offspring I choose to create with the moting one’s own interests − is either neces - More down to earth, the social liberal atti - means to live a life worth living (indeed a sarily good or morally neutral. It can be, but tude towards nature does not protect nature duty undermined by pre-emptive welfare it need not be; it can under circumstances itself against exploitation, which implies a state interference on behalf of an unborn also be immoral. In the context of intergen - bias towards turning nature into resources collective), but anything above that is at my erational justice, of justice between existing now rather than later, which in turn pre - discretion – I am not morally obliged to pro - generations, and in defence of youth quotas cludes future generations from developing vide for my neighbour’s children, nor for my as an instrument of intergenerational justice, other resources based on the now exploited children’s children, nor for future genera - we must assume egoism to be good. Quotas rather than protected bits of nature. It is this tions in general. are there to ensure that the interests of a po - attitude that, in the pursuit of improved Moving on, let me now address a final tentially underprivileged or underrepre - welfare for the presently worst-off and their pair of mistakes specific for intergenerational sented cohort are protected and defended; descendants, is for instance willing to sacri - justice. this cannot be justified without presuming fice currently useless animal and plant that it is morally good to represent and pro - species. (6) e sixth mistake is to assume that there mote those interests, which is the definition is a special relation between intergenera - of egoism. (4) A further mistake is to assume that prop - tional justice and justice towards future gen - Now to understand democracy as the repre -

Intergenerational Justice Review 23 Issue 1/2015 sentation of selfish interests is a very old and Libertarian views on temporal justice do of a context that does not yet exist; like Carl respectable, or at least aristocratic and anti- course, as a matter of principle, leave little Baron von Münchhausen, libertarianism has democratic, view. It dates back to Aristotle, room for state intervention. Natural re - to tear itself out of the swamp by its own who actually defined democracy as mob sources are not the state’s to distribute or re - bootstraps. It offers a choice between ulti - rule, as rule by the many in their private in - distribute, procreation and population mate good and ultimate evil, between a per - terests rather than in the interest of the com - policy is not its concern, and since govern - fect libertarian society – where autonomous munity. 19 It is precisely for its pure and ment is there only to catch thieves and pro - individuals know their responsibilities, take undiluted promotion of egoism that tect sov ereignty, a parliament’s task will be them seriously, and respect those of their philosophers throughout the ages have al - light too. Instead, individuals have the clear, neighbours – and every other world, each of ways rejected democracy, or in their most undivided and exclusive responsibility to de - which would be equally unjust and oppres - permissive moods have sought to counter - cide on whether or not to procreate, limited sive. Like utopianism, libertarianism offers balance it by adding elements of rule by the only by the obligation to ensure a life worth no guidelines for choices between the fifty neutral, the wise or the better – as indeed living for their immediate offspring − and shades of grey that our evil real-existing Aristotle already did. While Machiavelli was limited by nothing else. world offers. perhaps the first to appreciate egoism neu - In such a world, it is obvious that quotas trally, it took until Adam Smith to develop have no place. ey would not just be re - Whenever a separation is made a positive understanding of self-interest as dundant, they would be considered straight - between liberty and justice, neither, “enlightened self-interest”, the rational man’s forwardly unjust, expressions of a deeply in my opinion, is safe. understanding of his best interest given the perverted notion of morality. Two versions / Edmund Burke / necessities of social cooperation and of of the veto on quotas exist: one is conse - therefore having to take others’ interests into quentialist, the other deontological. I would therefore like to suggest a more account as well. 20 Some libertarians of the consequentialist pragmatic answer to quotas, still inspired by Now if we could trust the young to be this would argue that quotas, if effec - libertarianism, if not orthodox. I would sug - kind of egoists, this kind of enlightened in - tive, are instituted when the cultural battle gest that quotas for the young can be toler - dividuals who define their self-interest on for recognition of an excluded group is al - able in the context of justice between the basis of their needs as much as of those ready won, i.e., when quotas have in fact al - existing generations, since they may, under three of four generations that will come after ready become all but superfluous. Support the right circumstances, limit the risk of use them, then youth quotas will contribute to for existing quotas thus shows their political and abuse of power in negotiations between justice for future generations. But not only is legitimacy but not their philosophical, the free and autonomous individuals who the jury still out on whether or not they are moral legitimacy. e consequentialist lib - wish to enter into voluntary associations. in empirical sufficiently capable of ertarian would warn us not to commit the at would make them the lesser evil. Here, doing this, and more capable than others – democratic fallacy of believing that what a quotas might imaginably guarantee a fair it is also already in theory evident that the majority believes must be true or good. It representation of interests, and thus prevent interests of distinct generations may not al - suffices to point to the 19th century’s ma - the construction of exploitative institutions, ways coincide. It is in fact because of such jority views on women’s rights, race, , that is, oppressive institutions – institutions conflicts of interests that cohort quotas have etc. to reject democracy as the ultimate limiting the individual’s negative freedom. been suggested. However, if one sees youth source of ethics. What then is the lesser evil in temporal jus - quotas as a means to defend the “partial” in - Quotas are also immoral, from the deonto - tice? First, as far as intergenerational justice terests of one cohort against others, one can - logical libertarian’s point of view, for the is concerned, we must recognise quotas for not at the same time task that lucky cohort simple reason that any cooperative venture what they are: on the one hand, vessels of with the “impartial” defence of the interests should be the result of free and unrestrained Smithian comprehensive egoism, to which of another generation, existent or non- individual choices. Democratic decision- no libertarian can object; on the other hand, existent. making, majoritarianism, is nothing but dic - an unrealistic (unrepresentative) redistribu - tatorship or tyranny, unless and as long as a tion of bargaining power. If there can be an I knew, as every peasant does, that decision is unanimously, voluntarily and in argument in favour of deliberately misrep - land can never be truly owned. full reason agreed to. 21 A self-proclaimed resenting the distribution of power in soci - We are the keepers of the soil, the democracy, where a collective (majority) ety, it cannot be an argument in favour of curators of trees choice can be pushed through with the sup - youth quotas specifically – it must necessar - / Lisa St Aubin de Terán / port of overrepresented groups, is even more ily be one in favour of any cohort or group evidently tyrannical. In a genuinely libertar - requiring and deserving a bit of extra power. Libertarian temporal justice: ian society, democratic decision-making is Perhaps that implies a permanent special orthodox and pragmatic versions pre-empted by individual rights. provision for those born from 1990 to 1999; With these seven mistakes eliminated, what Now, while a libertarian perspective on tem - and perhaps in fifteen years those born be - room does libertarianism leave for quotas? poral justice is helpful, refreshing and per - tween 1960 and 1970 will turn out to de - At first sight, one would have to say: none haps even liberating, the libertarian theorist’s serve an advantage. whatsoever. I will analyse and defend this attitude towards quotas is also predictable, e question is, of course, if there is such an first sight observation in detail momentar - unpractical and unhelpful – regardless of argument, a reason why a libertarian, forced ily, but please keep in mind that first sights whether it is correct or not. e problem is to live in a parliamentary democracy under are often deceptive. that libertarianism, like utopianism, assumes (from his or her point of view) the tyranny

24 Intergenerational Justice Review Issue 1/2015 of social liberalism, could tolerate cohort ests of future generations are like the inter - of intergenerational justice acknowledge an quotas. ere may actually be one such ar - ests of endangered species, a beautiful land - intellectual debt to Jonas as the source of the gument, though it will only find favour in scape, a language, a religion or an art form: idea that future generations are a given, none the eyes of a very small part of the libertar - they are private preferences. Such private acknowledge his deeply illiberal reason for ian tribe. A deontological libertarian might preferences can and will be defended, and believing so: a religious duty to ensure the accept skewed representation of group in - may be promoted, as long as they do not in - continuation of the human species. terests if that creates a level playing field – fringe upon or prescribe other people’s tastes 14 See e.g. Anderson / Leal 1991; Feser that is, if quotas help to protect the inalien - and preferences, and the way to defend and 2005; Miron 2010; Narveson 1998; Nozick able rights of autonomous individuals practise those private preferences is by the 1974; Rothbard 2006; Scriven 1997. e against abuse of power advantages. In more execution of individual rights. Whoever original acquisition theory goes back to John precise and therefore less legible terms, given wants to protect a forest against develop - Locke’s 1689 social contract theory (Locke any starting point or baseline in negotia - ment can join forces with others, buy it and 1924). tions, quotas may counter the unproductive thereby veto any development plans even if 15 See note 10; see also Hale 2008. effects of the involuntary creation of cir - supported by a majority; whoever wants to 16 See Wissenburg 2013. cumstances under which the relatively pow - protect resources in general on behalf of a 17 Aside from the question which collective erless no longer have a viable exit option future generation or an endangered species (humanity, state, people, tribe, family), col - back to the baseline. or any other private fancy, is free to do like - lectives have to explain their intentions and wise. justify their action just like any other “legal person”. Note also that, by implication, the Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit. We become just by Notes property of one dead intestate reverts to na - doing just acts, temperate by doing 1 is is an extended, revised and improved ture, not by default to the state. temperate acts, brave by doing brave version of my more informal afterword ‘Jus - 18 See Hadley 2005; Hale 2008; Wis - acts. tice and Youth Quotas: Libertarian Hesita - senburg 2012. / Aristotle / tions’ in: Tremmel et al. 2015. 19 Aristotle 1962: 1297a, 22-24. 2 Crick 2000: 17-19. 20 Smith 1984. at is not to say that youth quotas are an 3 Pitkin 1967: 59. 21 And even then the deontological liber - obvious choice. Where justice towards fu - 4 ere are alternatives, of course. For ex - tarian would hesitate to accept voluntary ture, non-existing generations is concerned, ample, for a period between uncompromis - slavery in any form – because that is, obvi - and remembering the distinction made ear - ing Apartheid and the post-Apartheid ously, what democracy is. For a further, con - lier between representation as acting for and regime of Mandela, South Africa’s parlia - sequentialist critique of democracy, see as standing for, it is rather quotas ensuring a mentary system consisted of several separate Hoppe 2011. minimum representation by the elderly, or Chambers reserved for representatives of the better still the elderly without offspring, that white, coloured and black populations – References would be appropriate. And tied to that idea, based, obviously, on the Apartheid regime’s Ackerman, Bruce (1980): Social Justice in probably outright exclusion of the middle- own myopic definition of relevant sociolog - the Liberal State. New Haven: Yale Univer - aged and young would also be defensible. If ical categories. sity Press. the aim of a quota rule is to represent the au - 5 See Juliana Bidadanure’s contribution to thentic interests of absentees, then it would Tremmel et al. 2015. Anderson, Terry / Leal, Donald (1991): Free be rational to seek to remove all temptation 6 Only when I refer to the two together will Market Environmentalism. Boulder: West - to deviate from the absentees’ enlightened I use the term temporal justice. view Press. self-interest. Given that the interests of gen - 7 Rawls 1999: 266. Other famous social lib - erations may always clash, this points be - eral formulations of the social justice Aristotle (1962): e Politics. Har - yond any form of representation as acting are Ackerman 1980; Barry 1989, mondsworth: Penguin. for by potentially self-interested parties. e 1995; Galston 1980, 1991; Miller 1999. most sensible candidate for representation 8 See Wissenburg 1999. Barry, Brian (1989): A Treatise on Social Jus - is, after all, he or she whose personal inter - 9 Famous formulations of the libertarian tice I. eories of Justice. London: Harvester ests are least likely to be hurt by the repre - credo include Narveson 2001; Nozick 1974; Wheatsheaf. sented. And that is the man or woman on Rothbard 2002, 2006; Simon 1996. his or her way out, with no offspring to be 10 See e.g. Steiner 1994; Otsuka 2003; Val - Barry, Brian (1995): Justice as Impartiality. partial to. lentyne 2007. Oxford: Clarendon Press. is said, the average libertarian would still 11 Jonas 1979. maintain that representing future genera - 12 Jonas 1966. Bidadanure, Juliana (2015): Better Proce - tions in the process of resource distribution 13 is is the cornerstone of Hans Jonas’ dure for Fairer Outcomes. Can Youth Quo - is to put the horse behind the cart. Even in (1979, 1966) arguments for justice towards tas Increase our Chances of Meeting the a social justice-based political system, a lib - future generations, for the responsible man - Demands of Intergenerational Justice? In: ertarian will argue that there are better, and agement of nature and natural resources, Tremmel, Jörg et al. (eds.): Youth Quotas more legitimate, instruments available to and for sustainability as a standard of re - and other Efficient Forms of Youth Partici - protect the interests that particular groups sponsible management. It is interesting to pation in Ageing Societies. Heidelberg: in society feel deserve protection. e inter - note that while most social liberal defenders Springer, 37-55.

Intergenerational Justice Review 25 Issue 1/2015 Crick, Bernard (2000): In Defence of Poli - Narveson, Jan (1998): Who Owns Nature? Participation in Ageing Societies. Heidel - tics. 5th edition. London: Continuum. A Debate. http://www.bioethics.iastate.edu/ berg: Springer. forum/narveson.html. Viewed 30 Oct. Feser, Edward (2005): ere is No Such 2014. Vallentyne, Peter (2007): Libertarianism and ing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition. In: the State. In: Social Philosophy & Policy, Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 22 (1), 56- Narveson, Jan (2001): e Libertarian Idea. vol. 24 (1), 187-205. 80. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Wissenburg, Marcel (2015): Justice and Galston, William (1980): Justice and the Nozick, Robert (1974): Anarchy, State, and Youth Quotas. Libertarian Hesitation. In: Human Good. Chicago: Chicago University Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Tremmel, Jörg et al. (eds.): Youth Quotas Press. and other Efficient Forms of Youth Partici - Otsuka, Michael (2003): Libertarianism pation in Ageing Societies. Heidelberg: Galston, William (1991): Liberal Purposes. Without Inequality. Oxford: Oxford Uni - Springer, 177-185. Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal versity Press. State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Wissenburg, Marcel (2013): e Concept of Press. Pitkin, Hanna (1967): e Concept of Rep - Nature in Libertarianism. Nijmegen: Un - resentation. Berkeley: University of Califor - published paper. Hadley, John (2005): Excluding Destruc - nia Press. tion. Towards an Environmentally Sustain - Wissenburg, Marcel (1999): Imperfection able Libertarian Property Rights Regime. In: Rawls, John (1999): A eory of Justice. Re - and Impartiality. An Outline of a Liberal Philosophy in the Contemporary World, vised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard Univer - eory of Social Justice. London: UCL Press vol. 12 (2), 22-29. sity Press. / Routledge.

Hale, Benjamin (2008): Private Property Rothbard, Murray (2006): For A New Lib - Marcel Wissenburg is and Environmental Ethics. Some New Di - erty. e Libertarian Manifesto. 2nd Edi - Professor of Political rections. In: Metaphilosophy, vol. 39 (3), tion. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute. eory and Head of 402-421. the Department of Rothbard, Murray (2002): e Ethics of Public Administration Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2011): Democ - Liberty. New York: New York University and Political Science at racy. e God that Failed. New Brunswick: Press. the Radboud Univer - Transaction Publishers. sity Nijmegen, the Scriven, Tal (1997): Wrongness, Wisdom Netherlands. His research interests cover Jonas, Hans (1966): e Phenomenon of and Wilderness. Towards a Libertarian e - classical themes such as social justice, liber - Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology. New ory of Ethics and the Environment. Albany: alism and libertarianism, but, more particu - York: Harper & Row. State University of New York Press. larly, “green” political thought, reinventing the position of animals, nature and environ - Jonas, Hans (1979): Das Prinzip Verant - Simon, Julian (1996): e Ultimate Re - ment relative to humans. wortung. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. source 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Contact details: Locke, John (1924): Two Treatises of Gov - Prof. Dr Marcel Wissenburg ernment. London: Everyman (first pub - Smith, Adam (1984): e eory of Moral Department of Public Administration and lished in 1690). Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (first Political Science published in 1759). Radboud University Nijmegen Miller, David (1999): Principles of Social PO Box 9108 Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Steiner, Hillel (1994): An Essay On Rights. 6500 HK Nijmegen Press. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Netherlands E-Mail: [email protected] Miron, Jeffrey (2010): Libertarianism from Tremmel, Jörg et al. (eds.) (2015): Youth Website: www.wissenburg.org A to Z. New York: Basic Books. Quotas and other Efficient Forms of Youth

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