Paul Milgrom
Top View
- Supplement to "Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games"
- Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms∗
- Information Economics
- (I) 產業組織一 Course Outline
- Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C
- An Examination of the Influence of Theory and Individual Theorists on Empirical Research in Microeconomics
- Collusion Agreements in Auctions: Design and Execution by an Informed Principal⇤
- Minimax Rates in Permutation Estimation for Feature Matching
- Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices
- Playing General Imperfect-Information Games Using Game-Theoretic Algorithms
- The Failure of FCC Spectrum Auctions
- Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation FINAL
- On the State of the Art in Game Theory: an Interview with Robert Aumann*
- Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategy- Proofness for the Random Assignment Problem∗
- Reading List 1998
- The Book Review Column1 by William Gasarch Department of Computer Science University of Maryland at College Park College Park, MD, 20742 Email: [email protected]
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding by Lawrence M
- Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms∗