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DO POLICIES OF THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR BRING ABOUT SYSTEM-LEVEL SOCIAL CHANGE? EXAMINING THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF THE TORONTO REGION IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL

OLGA SHCHERBYNA B.Sc., The Odessa State Economic University (1998)

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE (PLANNING) in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) September 2012 © Olga Shcherbyna, 2012

Abstract

The employment outcomes of Canadian immigrants have been deteriorating over the last two decades. Given the scope of the problem, a more systemic-based problem solving approach that involves multiple stakeholders is required to address immigrant labor market misfortunes in Canada. The Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) has been recognized as a promising multi- stakeholder collaboration model in the area of immigrant economic integration. This study attempts to examine the conditions that contributed to the perceived success of TRIEC, with the goals being to discover critical success factors that made TRIEC a ‘success story’, and to identify lessons that could be learned by other Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs) in Canada. The study finds six success factor groups that were associated with TRIEC’s accomplishments. These include TRIEC’s highly professional operational practices, its action-oriented approach, its strong leadership model (which included business, community and municipal leaders), its focus on employers, its unique contextual environment, and its professional and highly effective communication and public relations strategies. It is argued that the last factor contributed to the formation of TRIEC’s ‘successful multi-stakeholder model’ branding in Canada and overseas. When the strategies and activities of TRIEC were compared to those of seven other IECs in Canada, it was revealed that TRIEC was the only IEC whose leaders either were or became truly vocal on the topic of immigrant integration. It was also discovered that TRIEC was the only IEC to openly and consistently share its results, activities and finances with the general public. Finally, TRIEC was the first group in Canada and only one of IECs that managed to bring three levels of government together to discuss immigration issues. Shedding light on the role of municipalities in relation to immigrant economic integration issues, this research has shown that all the Canadian municipalities of reviewed communities were recognized by IECs for their capacity to initiate and support collaborative community efforts. The final discussion focuses on the implications of solely adopting an economic perspective in promoting the benefits of hiring immigrants to Canadian society. The study concludes that more research should be conducted to define the success of multi-stakeholder collaborations such as TRIEC, to develop appropriate frameworks to measure their effectiveness and to evaluate to what degree their interventions contributed to societal change(s).

Preface

This study involved human subjects. Thus, ethics approval was required by UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board. The application was approved on June 28 2010. UBC BREB number is H10-01561.

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Table of Contents

Abstract...... ii Preface ...... iii Table of Contents ...... iv List of Tables ...... viii List of Figures ...... x List of Equations...... xi Glossary ...... xii Acknowledgements ...... xiii Dedication ...... xiv Foreword ...... xv

Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1.1 Research Background...... 1 1.1.2 Significance of the Study in the Planning Context ...... 3 1.1.3 Research Objectives and Primary and Supplement Questions ...... 4 1.2 Theoretical Foundation and Conceptual Framework of the Study ...... 5 1.2.1 Defining Collaborations...... 6 1.2.2 Systems Change and Outcomes of Collaborations...... 7 1.2.3 Systems Change Success Factors...... 9 1.2.4 Current Trends in Canadian MSCs Regarding Immigrant Economic Integration...... 10 1.3 Study Methodology ...... 12 1.3.1 Overview of Study Design and Methods ...... 13 1.3.2 Participant Observation and Role of the Researcher ...... 15 1.3.3 Extreme Case Study Approach ...... 17 1.3.4 Literature Review ...... 19 1.3.5 Two-phased Research: Interviews with Various Stakeholders ...... 21 1.3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews with TRIEC Key Stakeholders...... 22 1.3.5.2 Structured Interviews with IECs Across Canada...... 23 1.3.6 Quantitative Comparative Analysis of Factors, Sub-factors and Indicators ...... 24 1.3.7 Research Protocols and Procedures...... 25 1.3.8 Sampling and Limitations of the Study ...... 26 1.4 Outline of the Thesis ...... 28

Chapter 2: Immigration to Canada: Policy and Social Contexts of Immigrant Employment Challenges...... 30 2.1 Introduction ...... 30 2.2 Contemporary Immigration to Canada...... 31 2.2.1 Three Major Immigrant Classes ...... 31 2.2.2 Recent Canadian Immigrant Destinations and Demographic Characteristics...... 32 2.2.3 Reasons for High-level Immigration to Canada...... 34 2.3 Immigrant Integration Challenges ...... 35 2.3.1 Immigrant Settlement Challenges ...... 35 iv

2.3.2 Immigrant Employment Challenges...... 36 2.3.3 Toronto CMA’s Specific Immigrant Employment Challenges ...... 37 2.4 Causes of Immigrant Employment Challenges...... 39 2.4.1 Immigrant Individual Attributes ...... 39 2.4.1.1 Composition of Immigrant Classes Admitted to Canada...... 39 2.4.1.2 Fluency in English Language...... 40 2.4.1.3 Essential, Soft and Literacy Skills...... 41 2.4.1.4 Lack of Social Networks...... 43 2.4.2 Societal Development ...... 43 2.4.2.1 Changes and Fluctuations in the Canadian Economy...... 43 2.4.2.2 Increased Level of Education of Canadian-born Workers ...... 44 2.4.3 Institutionalized Systemic Barriers...... 45 2.4.3.1 The Foreign Credential Recognition Issue...... 45 2.4.3.2 Canadian Work Experience...... 47 2.4.3.3 Employer Racial Discriminatory Practices ...... 47 2.5 Government Roles and Responses to Challenges...... 50 2.5.1 Contemporary Canadian Immigration Polices since the 1990s...... 50 2.5.2 Major Immigration Policy Shifts and Implications for FSW Class...... 51 2.5.3 Role of Municipalities in Immigrant Integration...... 52 2.5.4 The Settlement Sector Crisis as Part of the Problem...... 55 2.6 Chapter Conclusions...... 58

Chapter 3: TRIEC and its Programs ...... 60 3.1 Introduction ...... 60 3.2 Goals and Objectives of TRIEC...... 60 3.3 TRIEC’s History...... 61 3.4 TRIEC Governance and Operational Structure ...... 64 3.4.1 Leadership and Founding Members ...... 64 3.4.2 TRIEC’s Council and Board...... 65 3.4.3 TRIEC’s Working Groups / Advisory Committees ...... 67 3.4.4 TRIEC’s Secretariat and Staff...... 69 3.5 TRIEC Geographical Boundaries...... 70 3.6 TRIEC’s Programs and Initiatives...... 71 3.6.1 Employer Engagement and Recognition ...... 71 3.6.2 Partnering with Local Community and Immigrant Serving Agencies ...... 72 3.6.3 Career Bridge ...... 73 3.6.4 The Mentoring Partnership...... 74 3.6.4.1 A Different Approach...... 74 3.6.4.2 Program Results and Evaluation...... 76 3.6.5 Resources for Employers ...... 77 3.6.6 Public Awareness Campaign...... 78 3.6.7 Resources for Immigrants...... 79 3.6.8 BUILD I.T. in York Region...... 80 3.6.9 Policy and Advocacy ...... 81 3.7 TRIEC Budget and Funders ...... 82 3.8 TRIEC Results, Outcomes and Outputs...... 84 3.9 TRIEC Recognition and Legacy ...... 85 3.10 TRIEC Success Factors Identified by Other Researchers...... 86 3.11 Chapter Conclusions...... 91

Chapter 4: Semi-structured Interview Findings and Analysis...... 93 4.1 Introduction ...... 93 4.2 Semi-structured Interview Findings ...... 93 4.2.1 Identifying Immigrant Employment Barriers ...... 93 4.2.2 Defining Systemic Change in the Area of Immigrant Economic Integration ...... 94 4.2.3 Defining Ultimate Success for TRIEC ...... 95 4.2.4 Defining TRIEC Objectives and Approaches...... 95 4.2.4.1 Champion Qualities...... 96 4.2.4.2 Communication Model...... 97 4.2.4.3 ‘Business Case’ Message...... 98 4.2.4.4 Role of Local Municipalities...... 98 4.2.5 TRIEC Current Achievements...... 99 4.2.6 Exploring TRIEC Success Factors...... 101 4.3 Analysis of Semi-structured Interview Findings...... 101 4.3.1 Immigrant Employment Barriers – Analysis...... 101 4.3.2 Systemic Change, TRIEC Ultimate Success and Objectives ...... 102 4.3.3 TRIEC Philosophical and Operational Approaches...... 106 4.3.3.1 Business Case Messaging ...... 107 4.3.3.2 TRIEC’s Current Achievements...... 110 4.3.4 TRIEC’s Success Factors...... 112 4.3.4.1 High Standard Practices ...... 114 4.3.4.2 Action-oriented Approach ...... 117 4.3.4.3 Strong Leadership Model ...... 119 4.3.4.4 Employer-driven and -focused Council ...... 125 4.3.4.5 Communication and Public Awareness Strategies...... 126 4.3.4.6 Unique Location ...... 129 4.3.5 What should TRIEC do differently? ...... 131 4.4 Chapter Conclusions...... 133

Chapter 5: Structured Interviews Findings and Analysis...... 137 5.1 Introduction ...... 137 5.2 Methods ...... 137 5.2.1 Developing Success Factors: A Comparative Framework...... 137 5.2.2 Calculating and Reporting the Results ...... 139 5.2.3 Characteristics of IECs Participating in the Study ...... 140 5.3 Comparative Analysis Findings and Discussion...... 141 5.3.1 Factor One: High Standard Practices (HSP) ...... 141 5.3.2 Factor Two: Action-oriented Approach (A)...... 145 5.3.3 Factor Three: Strong Leadership Model (L) ...... 148 5.3.4 Factor Four: Employer-driven and -focused Council (E)...... 150 5.3.5 Factor Five: Communication and Public Awareness Strategies (CS)...... 152 5.3.6 Factor Six: Unique Location (UL)...... 155 5.3.7 Similarities between IECs and TRIEC ...... 158 5.3.8 Major Differences Between TRIEC and other IECs...... 159 5.4 Chapter Conclusions and Lessons from TRIEC...... 161

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions...... 165 6.1 Discussion and Reflections...... 167 6.1.1 What is 'Success' for an IEC? ...... 167 6.1.2 What is TRIEC's Philosophy?...... 168 6.1.3 Why Doesn't TRIEC Talk About 'Race'? ...... 169 vi

6.1.4 Can Discrimination be Explained by Employer Productivity Concerns Alone? ...... 170 6.1.5 Why is the Issue of Immigrant Employment Challenges De-politicised? ...... 171 6.1.6 Why is it Difficult to Talk about Racial Discrimination? ...... 173 6.1.7 Is There Evidence of Systemic Change?...... 175 6.1.8 How Does Our Language Affect our Actions and Expected Results?...... 178 6.1.9 Why Aren't Policies of the Lowest Common Denominator Bringing System-Level Change?...... 180 6.2 Conclusion ...... 183

Endnotes...... 185 Bibliography...... 188 Appendices...... 210 Appendix A Developmental Stages and Structures of Collaborations ...... 210 Appendix B Systemic Problem Analysis Model ...... 212 Appendix C Challenges and Outcomes of Collaborations ...... 214 Appendix D Success Factor Frameworks ...... 219 Appendix E Success Factors Identified in the Literature...... 222 Appendix F List of Semi-structural Interview Key Informants ...... 229 Appendix G TRIEC Funders and Sponsors as of November 24, 2010 ...... 230 Appendix H Interview Questions (Categorized by Key Informant)...... 231 Appendix I Immigrant Employment Council (IEC) Questionnaire ...... 232 Appendix J List of Canadian Immigrant Employment Councils, as of January 1, 2011...... 239 Appendix K Letter of Initial Contact – Semi-structured Interviews...... 240 Appendix L Letter of Initial Contact – Immigrant Employment Councils...... 241 Appendix M Consent for Semi-structured Interview Participants...... 242 Appendix N Consent for Participants (Immigrant Employment Councils' Staff).... 244 Appendix O Four Waves of Canadian Immigration ...... 246 Appendix P Overview of the Federal Skilled Immigrant Category ...... 248 Appendix Q Most Frequently Cited Reasons for High-level Immigration to Canada...... 252 Appendix R Selected Fees for Ontario’s Self-regulated Professions ...... 257 Appendix S List of TRIEC Staff, 2004-2010 ...... 259 Appendix T TRIEC Project Milestones and Impacts 2003-2010 ...... 260 Appendix U TRIEC’s Factors, Sub-Factors and Indicators At-Glance...... 262 Appendix V Developing Success Factor Comparative Framework...... 263 Appendix W Developing Indicators and Sub-factors ...... 265 Appendix X Issues Identified in “Fulfilling the Promise”, 2002 versus TRIEC’s Actions by 2012 ...... 272

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Study Interviews by Informant Category...... 21 Table 1.2 Study Interviews by Format ...... 22 Table 2.1 Comparing Selective Temporary and Permanent Immigration Classes...... 52 Table 3.1 Number and Proportion of Immigrants by GTA Regions Since 1991...... 70 Table 3.2 Growth Rate for Total, Non-immigrant and Immigrant Populations, Ontario and GTA ... 71 Table 3.3 TRIEC’s Funding, 2003-2011...... 83 Table 4.1 Immigrant Employment Barrier Responses...... 94 Table 4.2 Defining Systemic Change in the Area of Immigrant Economic Integration Responses ...... 94 Table 4.3 Defining Ultimate Success for TRIEC/IEC Responses...... 95 Table 4.4 Defining TRIEC Objectives Responses...... 96 Table 4.5 TRIEC Approach Responses...... 96 Table 4.6 TRIEC Approach: Champion Qualities Responses ...... 97 Table 4.7 TRIEC Approach: Communication Model Responses...... 97 Table 4.8 TRIEC Approach: TRIEC Business Case Message Responses...... 99 Table 4.9 TRIEC Approach: Role of Municipalities in TRIEC/IECs Responses ...... 99 Table 4.10 TRIEC Current Achievements Responses ...... 100 Table 4.11 TRIEC Success Factor Responses...... 100 Table 4.12 Objectives and Top Three Systemic Change Responses ...... 102 Table 5.1 TRIEC’s Key Informant Success Factor Responses by Factors and Sub-factors ...... 138 Table 5.2 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, High Standard Practices Factor (HSP) ...... 142 Table 5.3 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Action- oriented Approach Factor (A)...... 146 Table 5.4 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Leadership Factor Model (L)...... 149 Table 5.5 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Employer- driven and -focused Factor (E) ...... 151 Table 5.6 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Communication and Pubic Awareness Strategies Factor (CS) ...... 154 Table 5.7 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Unique Locality (UL) ...... 156 Table 5.8 Summary of IEC Sub-factor Averages ...... 158 Table B.1 Analysis of Immigrant Labour Market Integration with Precursors and Consequences (Adapted from Blum, 1981 and Kreger et al. 2007) ...... 213 Table D.1 Success Factors by Developmental Stages of Coalitions, Kreuter et al. 2000 ...... 220 viii

Table E.1 Success Factors by Publication and by Success Factor Groups ...... 224 Table P.1 Federal Skilled Worker Category Selection Factors ...... 248 Table P.2 Changes Proposed to FSW Program as of October 2011 ...... 251 Table V.1 TRIEC's Key Informant Success Factor Responses by Factors and Sub-factors...... 264 Table W.1 High Standard Practices Sub-factors and Indicators ...... 265 Table W.2 Action-Oriented Approach Sub-factors and Indicators...... 266 Table W.3 Strong Leadership Model Sub-factors and Indicators ...... 267 Table W.4 Employer-driven and -focused Council Sub-factors and Indicators ...... 268 Table W.5 Communication and Public Awareness Strategy Sub-factors and Indicators...... 270 Table W.6 Unique Location Sub-factors and Indicators ...... 271

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Study Analytical Framework ...... 7 Figure 1.2 Study Design ...... 14 Figure 1.3 Study Logic Model ...... 15 Figure 2.1 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 1986-2010...... 31 Figure 2.2 Canadian Permanent Residents by Top Seven Canadian CMAs, 2001-2010...... 33 Figure 2.3 Percentage of Toronto CMA Labour Force with Post-Secondary Education by Major Field of Study ...... 38 Figure 2.4 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 2001...... 40 Figure 2.5 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 2010...... 40 Figure 2.6 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category and Language Ability, 2010...... 41 Figure 3.1 TRIEC’s Funding Sources, 2003-2010...... 83 Figure 3.2 TRIEC’s Expenses, 2003-2010 ...... 84 Figure 4.1 Rating of the Effectiveness of TRIEC’s PR and Communication Tools by Funders/Sponsors, N=7, n=42 ...... 98 Figure 4.2 Success Factor Analysis by Success Factor Groups, N=20, n=98...... 113 Figure 4.3 Success Factor Analysis by Category of Key Informants, N=20, n=98...... 114 Figure 6.1 Evaluation Flow, Adapted from Fowler, 2002...... 167 Figure 6.2 Linking Language and Interventions...... 179 Figure A.1 Types of Collaborations, Backer, 2003...... 211

List of Equations

Equation 5.1 Percentage of ‘Yes’ Answers for Seven IECs ...... 139 Equation 5.2 Sub-factor Average for Seven IECs ...... 139 Equation 5.3 Percentage of ‘Yes’ Answers for an IEC...... 140

Glossary

ALLIES – Assisting Local Leaders with Immigrant Employment Strategies AEO – Arrangement Employment Offer CEC – Canadian Experience Class CIC – Citizenship and Immigration Canada COIA – the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement EASI – Employment Access Strategy for Immigrants FARPA - the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act FCM – the Federation of Canadian Municipalities FCR – Foreign Credential Recognition (issue) FCRO - Foreign Credential Referral Office FSW(s) – Federal Skilled Worker(s) GTA – the Greater Toronto Area HRSDC – Human Resources and Skills Development Canada IEC(s) – Immigrant Employment Council(s) IEC of BC – Immigrant Employment Council of British Columbia IGR Committee – Inter-government Relations Committee IRPA – the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act LINC - Language Instructions for Newcomers to Canada LIP(s) – Local Immigrant Partnership(s) LMPA - the Canada-Ontario Labour Market Partnership Agreement NOC - National Occupational Classifications OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OCASI – Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants PA – Principal Applicant PN(P) – Provincial Nominee (Program) PR – Public Relations TCSA – Toronto City Summit Alliance (also known as Greater Toronto CivicAction Alliance) TIEDI – Toronto Immigrant Employment Data Initiative TRIEC – Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council

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Acknowledgements

This thesis represents the end of my journey in obtaining a graduate degree, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all those who made this study possible. I feel very fortunate that I was allowed to select the topic of research that I feel very passionate about. Thus, first and foremost, I want to thank the School of Community and Regional Planning and its faculty and staff for being extra flexible with me, and for allowing me to complete this research at my own pace. I have been indebted in the preparation of this study to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Nora Angeles. Despite her extremely busy schedule, she always found time to meet with me and provide feedback. I will never forget hours and hours of our discussions that I believe greatly improved my understanding of qualitative research processes and comparative analysis methods as well as expanded my knowledge in the field of social justice. Nora showed extraordinary patience in reading many revised versions of this study and consistently providing feedback and making corrections. I deeply appreciate her endurance and assistance in navigating this research and her invaluable guidelines in my writing process. She is a truly inspiring scholar and a wonderful human being whose intelligence, wisdom, kindness and understanding made all the difference in the world and will always be remembered. I owe my deepest gratitude to my second reader, Dr. Dan Hiebert, a well-known expert in the area of immigrant integration. Dan’s constructive criticism and extensive but very helpful comments made me question many of my assumptions, polish my writing and crystallize the interpretation of my findings. I am extremely thankful to Dan for challenging my thinking and for convincing me to write more precisely to dramatically improve the quality and readability of this study. I would like to extend my gratitude to the other member of my committee, Dr. Penny Gurstein, for reviewing my thesis and providing useful suggestions. I appreciate that Penny was able to find time from her busy schedule as a Director of SCARP to serve as my external reader. I offer my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Bonnie Slade, whose research draws on adult education and labor and migration studies, and who kindly provided her feedback and encouragement after reading my first draft of Chapter 2. Also, I was fortunate to have Dr. Edward Grabb, who specializes in social inequality and political sociology, reading my concluding chapter and providing his comments with respect to my arguments and conclusions. This research would not have been possible without the 27 key informants. I would like to pay homage to all my interviewees for their time, sincere answers and valuable insights and, particularly, to TRIEC, Maytree Foundation and ALLIES staff who assisted me in reaching out to a great number of their stakeholders. A very special thanks goes out to Mary Portelance, Thomas Deane and Sarah-Nelle Jackson for their assistance in formatting and editing my thesis. Last, but by no means least, I thank my family members, who has been my save haven, and a source of inspiration and joy in my life. For any errors and/or omissions that are still present in this study, the responsibility is utterly my own.

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Dedication

First of all, to my supportive and patient husband, Oleg, and our amazing children, Masha and Luka. Without their easy-going personalities, constant encouragement and unconditional love I would never have been able to finish my graduate studies. I also dedicate this to my mom and my brother who helped me to take care of my family while I was at school, and to my late father, who always encouraged me to express my own views and never take anything for granted. It is because of his hard work that we were able to immigrate to Canada and start a better life for our family.

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Foreword

This thesis is a reflection of my journey as a researcher. I started this study with two particular research questions in mind – what contributed to Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council’s success, and what did it do differently from other Immigrant Employment Councils across Canada? However, as the research evolved, I came to the realization that my subsidiary questions, what system-level successes look like and whether TRIEC is successful in bringing about system-level changes, were more important to explore. Two major factors affected my approach in the initial stages and impacted the evolution of my thoughts. First, I started my journey with assumptions based not so much on evidence, but on ‘common wisdom’, i.e. I naturally assumed Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) was successful because most of the literature on TRIEC referred to it as a ‘best practice model’. Now, I realize that in my initial literature review, which took place in 2007-2008, I was under the influence of a highly effective public relations strategy that was developed by TRIEC and the Maytree Foundation, and which abundantly praised TRIEC’s programs as ‘working solutions’. Secondly, I believe that because I spent more time on my research than was initially planned, I had the luxury to be more reflective than usual. I trust that this allowed me to produce more accurate interpretations of information obtained from key informants, and what was and was not said. This is not to suggest that I did not answer my initial research questions. Three chapters of my thesis (3,4, and 5) are dedicated to exploring in detail what TRIEC had achieved, why it became known as a ‘best practice model’, and how its practices and approaches differ from those of other Canadian Immigrant Employment Councils. However, somewhere in the middle of my research journey I came to realize that there was a flaw in my initial thinking that guided the development of the whole study. Initially, I truly believed that the ‘business case’ argument that TRIEC utilized to engage employers was an excellent strategy, subsequently generating the system-level change in businesses hiring practices and enabling immigrants to be considered as equals of Canadian-born job applicants. However, later on, while economic reasoning proved to be successful in engaging employers, I was not able to find strong evidence that after eight years of TRIEC’s work, true system-level change in immigrant employment outcomes took place in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), an area with one of the highest proportion of visible minorities in Canada. Furthermore, I realized that most of the outcomes reported by TRIEC reflected either their program outputs or short-term, individual level outcomes, and that no baseline or concrete long-term goals were identified by the government and involved partners for TRIEC as a model. I came to the conclusion that while the economic argument might be working in the short- term – to generate employers’ interest in hiring immigrants – it is not going to change people’s attitudes and belief systems, which have been influenced by white Canadian racial identity and practices for generations. This level of societal and individual change will not happen just because it makes good business sense for companies to hire immigrants. At the beginning of my research I felt perfectly comfortable to accept the framing and rationalization that TRIEC ‘deliberately focused on manifestations of racial discrimination’ or those challenges that all immigrants encounter in the Canadian labour market (i.e. no Canadian experience, no business connections, no access to information for employers and job seekers). I now argue that this is a very narrow conceptualization of the problem. When paired with no concrete long-term outcomes, unsurprisingly, such an approach has resulted in little if any system-level change taking place in the area of immigrant economic integration or poverty reduction in the GTA and beyond.

You can never solve a problem with the same kind of thinking that created the problem in the first place.

- Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

History will have to record that the greatest tragedy of this period of social transition was not the strident clamor of the bad people, but the appalling silence of the good people.

- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

Canada is recognized as a world leader in the field of multiculturalism, immigration and immigrant settlement. Its public discourse is still focused on the positive impacts of immigration as opposed to the dominance of the ‘security and terrorism dialogue’ in Europe, it has one of the most open and welcoming immigration policies among developed countries. For the last ten years, at least a quarter of a million immigrants have been admitted into Canada as permanent residents each year and an increasingly larger number of temporarily visas are issued on an annual basis (Citizenship and Immigration Canada – CIC, 2010a). In fact, the last Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration stated (CIC, 2011a: 3) that, since 2006 “Canada has welcomed the highest sustained level of immigration in nearly a century”. In this report, the Honourable Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, attributes this boost in immigration levels largely to an increase in the proportion of highly skilled immigrants who were chosen based on their skills and talents to meet Canada’s labour market needs. The Minister concludes that “for immigration to continue to support our economy’s development, it is crucial that we maintain an immigration system that responds to Canada’s economic needs in a timely manner” (ibid: 3). However, a substantial body of literature attests to immigrants’ deteriorating employment outcomes in the Canadian labour market (Bonikowska, Green and Riddell 2008; Pecout, Hou and Coulombe 2007; Plante 2010). Additionally, the Ontario settlement sector, in its current form and level of funding1, struggles to address the labour integration needs of skilled immigrants (Government of Ontario, 2010; Stasiulis, 2011) as employers put less value on credentials obtained outside of Canada (Bonikowska et al., 2008; Oreopoulos and Dechief, 2011). Also, while the evidence suggests that access to social capital, and its main component, social networks, leads to better employment outcomes,

1 Overall settlement funding in Canada has more than tripled from 2005-2006 to 2012-2013 (from less than $200M to over $577M). While per capita settlement funding has not decreased since that time, however, Ontario’s allocation for settlement services decreased from $346.5M in 2011-2012 to $314.9M in 2012-2013. Cumulatively, as a result of changes introduced through the Strategic Review and the Settlement Allocation Model, the cuts to the province represent $70M in 2011-2013, in addition to $207M in under-spending from COIA (OCASI, 2011a). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 1

immigrants lack social and professional connections in Canada, which negatively affects their economic performance (Kunz, 2005; Xue, 2008). Finally, visible minority immigrants and their children face racial discrimination in the workplace, including access to employment. For example, immigrants with non-Canadian names are less likely to be called for interviews (Oreopoulos, 2009), racialized Canadians face employment-related discrimination, such as discriminatory remarks made by employers and/or co- workers, limited access to promotion or “participation in work-related social interactions”, etc. (Agocs and Jain, 2001: 5; Reitz, Banerjee, Phan and Thompson, 2009). Subsequently, visible minority groups earn less income than the Canadian-born white population group, despite the fact that immigrants and the children of visible minority parents are more highly educated than the rest of the Canadian population (Li, 2001; Pendakur and Pendkakur, 2011). One of the most prominent Canadian organizations with a mandate to improve the employment outcomes for immigrants is the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC). TRIEC was founded in 2003 by a broad range of civic and community leaders to address some of the above mentioned challenges. Its major objectives are: 1. “To convene and collaborate with partners, creating opportunities for skilled immigrants to connect to the local labour market. 2. To work with key stakeholders, particularly employers, building their awareness and capacity to better integrate skilled immigrants into the workforce. 3. To work with all levels of government, enhancing coordination and effecting more responsive policy and programs for skilled immigrant employment.” (TRIEC website) Since its inception, this multi-stakeholder group was a well-known advocacy group and expert- organization in the area of immigrant economic integration. It contributed to the development of new policies and agreements in the area of immigration by creating an opportunity for funders and key policy makers to meet on a regular basis (through an Inter-government Committee), to discuss and take actions towards better coordination of the settlement sector in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), and expand the range of services to address immigrant employment challenges. It developed innovative programs to assist immigrants in accessing professional networks in Canada (The Mentoring Initiative) and overcome the “catch 21” phenomenon when immigrants cannot find jobs without Canadian experience (Career Bridge program). Finally, it managed to engage top-ranked employers in the development of its programs, and what is more important, in the implementation of solutions to improve newcomers’ labour market outcomes. Following TRIEC’s path, a number of other Canadian communities embraced a multi-stakeholder approach to improve immigrant employment results. However, research has shown that although some of the groups were convened or launched approximately at the same time as TRIEC, many of them struggled to sustain their organizational

structure and/or funding, were not as successful in producing and/or reporting on results from their activities, and none of the eleven other IECs became as well-known as TRIEC. While other researchers (Allahwala, 2011; Fong 2008; Lewkowicz 2008) have already studied TRIEC, none of them has focused on the causes of its perceived success and/or conducted in-depth independent analysis of TRIEC’s success factors. This study aims to explore what differentiated TRIEC from other IECs and what and how other multi-stakeholder groups can learn from TRIEC.

1.1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY IN THE PLANNING CONTEXT

Immigration falls under Federal jurisdiction. However, when immigrants come to Canada, they tend to settle in cities. Hence, many cities are struggling to address the emerging needs of newcomer-residents in accessing schooling, library, housing, parks, etc. (Good, 2009) and need to adapt their various policies and practices on the municipal level. Some cities went beyond their jurisdictional mandates stated in the Canadian Constitution. The City of Toronto is a particular good example of how civic leadership, supported by municipal elected officials and bureaucrats, contributes to the development of, arguably, the most successful multi-stakeholder collaboration to address immigrant employment barriers in Canada – TRIEC. A number of scholars and Canadian think tanks have already attested to the role of municipalities in addressing immigrant integration. Alboim and McIsaac (2007: 11) pointed out the unique economic conditions in cities and regions, which require local approaches where “cities and regions must also be given the means to convene businesses, educational institutions, immigrant groups and other stakeholders in order to identify which programs and services are needed to facilitate individual and community growth”. Indeed, municipalities and planning departments increasingly play more significant roles in “state-civil society collaboration in managing immigrant integration” (Sandercock, Attili, Cavers and Carr, 2009: ix). Not surprisingly, Paul Born, President of Tamarack Institute for Community Engagement in Canada, identified cities’ leadership roles in ‘transforming their communities” (quoted in Pero, 2011: 25). Finally, a recent report by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), identified employment challenges facing municipalities as one of the top three major barriers to successful immigrant integration (Federation of Canadian Municiapalities, 2011). Given the increased recognition of municipalities as important ‘actors’ in immigrant economic integration, among other objectives, this study examines the role of municipalities in addressing immigrant employment challenges. More importantly, this study aims to identify the critical success factors of TRIEC, a collaboration which engages multiple stakeholders from various sectors and is recognized as a ‘best practice’ model in this field. In the last four years, a number of researchers have conducted critical independent studies of TRIEC, either praising its innovative, collaborative, and local approaches to the 3

immigrant employment issue (Lewkowicz, 2008) or questioning this emerging regional collaborative governance infrastructure. Scholars in the latter camp argue that TRIEC is guided by the ‘competitive multiculturalism’ philosophy, promotes neoliberal ‘city-regional economic development policy’ (Allahwala, 2011: 174) and does not address fundamental systemic problems of inequality and racial discrimination in the labour market (Fong, 2008). Additionally, a number of studies were carried out by researchers and evaluators with the intention to showcase the success of TRIEC and other Immigrant Employment Councils and elaborate on their success conditions (Wayland, 2007a; Wayland, 2007b; Wayland, 2007c; ALLIES, 2010). However, as these studies were contracted by TRIEC and/or the Maytree Foundation, they are not considered to be independent scholarly opinions. As TRIEC’s model receives significant recognition from settlement sector stakeholders, researchers, the business community and funders2, an increasing number of communities are implementing regional/province-wide collaborative approaches to improve immigrant employment outcomes. As of 2011, eleven other jurisdictions have received funding to conduct environmental scans in order to establish Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs), launch IECs and/or introduce programs (such as a Mentoring Initiative). However, while there is a substantial body of literature outlining the success factors governing multi-stakeholder collaborations in other social arenas, as noted later in this chapter, there seems to be a research gap in examining the success factors for Immigrant Employment Councils in Canada. This study aims to address this gap.

1.1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND PRIMARY AND SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONS

Two primary research questions guided this study:

1. Why did TRIEC become successful?

2. How can other Canadian multi-stakeholder collaborative groups, aiming to address immigrant challenges, learn from TRIEC’s experience?

In order to identify the critical success factors, the baseline conditions of success for TRIEC had to be established. Therefore, all key informants were asked the following question: • What factors contribute to the success of TRIEC?

As I began to investigate the above-stated primary research questions, I realized that the premise of these questions is that TRIEC was successful. This assumption was built on anecdotal evidence only, as no independent evaluation of this collaboration had been conducted at the time when

2 In 2009, TRIEC received the Canadian Centre for Diversity’s Legacy Award for the Mentoring Partnership. More about TRIEC’s recognition see in Chapter 3, Section 3.9 TRIEC Recognition & Legacy. 4

I started my research. A number of supplementary questions were posed to all key informants to investigate the notion of success in the context of immigrant labour market integration: • What is systemic change, and what will it look like?

• How do you define the ultimate success of TRIEC?

• Is TRIEC successful? How do you know that?

In retrospect, these secondary questions appeared to be more important than my major research inquiry. Additionally, my two directed studies (Shcherbyna 2008, 2010), examined systems change concepts and collaborative approaches, and reviewed the grey literature on TRIEC. These previous studies provided me with the opportunity to understand the mostly commonly-cited success factors for multi-stakeholder collaborations. A number of researchers, including those who studied TRIEC’s degree of success suggested that strong leadership, existing unique conditions (including historically-strong diversity and immigration policies at the City of Toronto, in particular), and smart communication strategies contributed to the success of multi-stakeholder collaborations. Furthermore, clearly stated objectives and a narrowly defined business approach that excluded discussions about race, played an important role in TRIEC’s success. Therefore, I included several questions to further examine who TRIEC leaders were (e.g. what their leadership qualities were, etc.), how TRIEC addressed the racial discrimination issue, how TRIEC communication tactics contributed to its success, and what role the City of Toronto played in its formation and development.

1.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Despite being more educated than previous cohorts of immigrants as well as the Canadian- born population, recent immigrants are lagging behind in terms of their employment and income rates (Bonikowska et al., 2008; Galarneau and Morissette, 2008)3. Immigrant employment is a complex issue, which is connected to many aspects of our lives. Without meaningful and well-paid employment immigrants not only face higher levels of poverty and poor quality of life (Kazemipur and Halli, 2001; Li, 2001; Li, 2003; Picot, Hou and Coulombe, 2008) but, not surprisingly, they also experience a loss of identity (Laroche and Rutherford 2006) and deteriorating health (Chen, Smith and Mustard, 2010; De Maio and Kemp, 2010; Ng, 2011). From the societal point of view, poor immigrant employment outcomes contribute to a more polarized and less inclusive society. From the state’s viewpoint, less employment means fewer tax contributions, less robust economy and greater need for social services

3 An evaluation of a new FSW program suggests that recent professional immigrants are doing much better in terms of their financial outcomes. Due to certain limitations of this evaluation, it is too early to make any substantial claims in this regard. 5

and support. From business perspectives, immigrant labour underutilization makes Canadian companies less competitive in the global economy. Finally, from the city’s standpoint, immigrants’ inability to find meaningful and well-paid employment as well as the increases in immigrant poverty rates imply greater social inequality, community segregation and an increase in the number of poor neighbourhoods (Murdie, 2008).

1.2.1 DEFINING COLLABORATIONS

The field of multi-sectoral collaborations (MSCs) is flourishing. An internet search for ‘multi- stakeholder collaborations’ generates close to 3 million webpages, revealing a range of organizations, news, resources as well as what worked and what did not for partnering agencies. Probably one of the most cited definitions of collaboration can be found in Barbara Gray’s book: Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. According to Gray (1989: 11), collaboration is “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”. Nowell emphasized the ability of collaborations to build community social capital while addressing their two- faceted mandate in “both improving the level of coordination among organizations within the existing community system as well as making needed changes to the infrastructure of the system itself” (Nowell, 2009: 209). Kreger and colleagues argued that collaborations “affect systems change through their ability to simultaneously engage and mobilize multiple constituents and sectors of the system” (Kreger, Brindis, Manuel and Sassoubre, 2007: 306). In his second book on collaborative leadership, David D. Chrislip (2002: xvl) asserted that “collaboration is not just another strategy or tactic for addressing public concerns, it also provides a means for building social capital, sustaining a democratic society, and transforming the civic culture of a community or region”.4 Drawing on the works of the above- mentioned authors, multi-stakeholder collaboration is defined in this research as collective, innovative community efforts to bring about systemic change in the community and where all relevant multiple stakeholders from public, and/or private, and/or nonprofit agencies are engaged in a coordinated manner, and share decision making power and resources to realize mutually-agreed goals. Given the complexity and interconnectedness of the problem, this study adopts a systems approach in examining the issue of poor immigrant employment outcomes and one of its potential solutions – multi-stakeholder collaboration. In recent years, this approach has received increased attention from researchers.i As can be seen in Figure 1.1, immigrant employment is a part of the labour market subsystem, which is a part of a larger system – our society.ii Everything in a system exists in

4 While it is not essential for this theses, it is important to remember that MSCs undergo different developmental stages and have various organizational structures as noted in Appendix A: Developmental Stages and Structures of Collaborations. 6

connection with each other and changes in one aspect might trigger positive or negative changes in other aspects, and consequently, transformations in the form of the system and how it operates (Hirsch, Levine and Miller, 2007). There are many instruments that can be utilized to address the immigrant employment issue, from state policies and employer practices, to public opinion and accreditation processes. Selective tools featured in Figure 1.1 are part of the problem, as well as the solution. Multi-stakeholder collaboration (MSC) is not the only or best solution but one of many tools to address a systemic societal problem (Kreuter, Lezin and Young, 2000).

Figure 1.1 Study Analytical Framework

1.2.2 SYSTEMS CHANGE AND OUTCOMES OF COLLABORATIONS

Arguably, one of the greatest assets of this collaborative approach is its ability to bring about systems change, i.e. to introduce “those activities which work to create environments that are more supporting to people (as opposed to individual level activities that focus on supporting people directly)” (Janzen, Nelson, Hausfather, and Ochsocka, 2007: 288, emphasis supplied). There are probably as many definitions of systemic change as there are studies about the phenomenon.iii For the purposes of this study, the following definition of systems change is adopted: “systems change is change efforts that strive to shift the underlying infrastructure within a community … , including shifting

existing policies and practices, resource allocations, relational structures, community norms and values, and skills and attitudes” (Foster-Fishman and Behrens, 2007: 191). While systems change efforts in the social services field have become increasingly popular around the world, many of them fall short on reporting about their successes and/or were not able to reach systemic change they hoped for (Foster-Fishman, Nowell, and Yang, 2007a). The lack of a conceptual understanding of the system’s complexity and the non-linear process of change, i.e. “leveraging change in one part will lead to the desired outcome only if concurrent shifts happen in the relational and compositional elements of the system” (Foster-Fisher et al., 2007a: 198), greatly contributes to the disappointing results of many systems change efforts. If a change agent is a linear thinker, he might think that interventions and outcomes “are predictable, uni-directional, and sequential” (ibid: 198). This approach fails to recognize the complexity of how a system works in reality and fails to distinguish multiple system characteristics and ever-changing boundaries. Thus, how change agents think about systems change critically affects the outcomes. Thus, the system boundaries or scope of the problem should be established early in the planning stages to ensure that multiple environments and the system context are considered in the design of interventions. Furthermore, having a well- defined problem with an established scope and identified actors is important in the process of social change evaluation (Burton, Goodlad, and Croft, 2006).5 However, as this research has re-confirmed, it remains difficult to assess the effectiveness of multi-sectoral collaborations to bring about significant, systemic and sustained social change (Backer, 2003; Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Florin, Mitchell, and Stevenson, 1993; Kreuter, et al., 2000; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006).6 Recently, scholars became interested in learning about intermediate outcomes of MSCs – namely improved community capacity and outcomes at the individual level, which, evidently, are easier to measure and track (Allen et al., 2008; Javdani and Allen, 2011; Kegler, Norton, and Aronson 2007; Lasker and Weiss, 2003; Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011; Tseng, Liu and Wang, 2011). Moreover, it has been suggested that collaborations can create a ripple effect of change in communities since “part of what is valuable about coalitions is what they make possible outside of the immediate collaborative setting” (Allen, Watt and Hess, 2008: 70, emphasis supplied). Additionally, MSCs allow for multiple stakeholders who, potentially, have quite different point of views on the subject (in our case, immigrant employment) to come up with innovative solutions which, most likely, would not have been created by individual stakeholders (Gray, 1989). For example, participating employers and settlement sector representatives might be guided by rather different philosophies, whereby employers are looking for the most efficient way to find the best workers and

5 For a ditailed discussion on a problem analysis framework in defining system boundaries, see Appendix B: Systemic Problem Analysis Model. 6 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Appendix C: Challenges and Outcomes of Collaborations. 8

make a profit and settlement workers might believe that immigrants are not being hired and discriminated against because of employer biases, including racial stereotyping. Similarly, when post- secondary educational institutions introduce bridging programs to improve immigrant chances in obtaining professional licenses, professional accreditation bodies might not eagerly welcome the increased volume of qualified applicants as it is not in the interest of their current paying-dues-members to increase the supply of licensed professionals in their occupation, which, potentially, might reduce wages for this occupation. Thus, MSCs serve as a platform for understanding and negotiating the differences in perspectives and allow these different groups to identify their common goals.

1.2.3 SYSTEMS CHANGE SUCCESS FACTORS

There is a voluminous literature on success factors of MSCs (Conway, Greenaway, Casswell, Liggins, and Broughton, 2007; Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Emshoff et al., 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007b; Kreger et al., 2007; Perrault, McCelland, Austin and Sieppert, 2011; Ramsey, 2010; Reast, Lindreen, Vanhamme, and Maon, 2011; Witherbee, 2008) and a number of assessment frameworks were introduced by scholars to identify pre- conditions and/or factors that contributed to the effectiveness of collaborations, including the Wilder Collaboration Factor Inventory (Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey, 2001), the collaboration stages approach (Kreuter et al., 2000), operational and structural change factors (Antelo and Henderson, 1990), a combination of two approaches (Tseng, et al., 2011)7 and others. To inform this research, a broader literature review on success conditions for multi-stakeholder collaborations in the social arena was conducted.8 As a result of this exercise, a number of the most- cited success factor groups identified were: (1) Strong Leadership; (2) Trust and Personal Relationships; (3) Common Language/Shared Values; (4) Broad Group Membership/Public Engagement; (5) Adequate Resources /Use of Resources; (6) Specialized Expertise; (7) Measurable and Achievable Outcomes; (8) Local Focus/History; (9) Communication; and (10) Shared Responsibility/Decision Making.iv One interesting observation was made in the process of analyzing goals of collaborations in reviewed articles. Out of all reviewed collaborations, very few groups were found to have specific goals with measurable outcomes, in a definitive timeframe.9. For example, the Boston Healthy Start Initiative, discussed by Kreuter and colleagues (2000: 51) as a successful collaboration, identified the following goal: “Reduce infant mortality in high risk area of Boston by 50% over 5 years”. While setting

7 For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Appendix D: MSCs Success Factor Assessment Frameworks. 8 For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Appendix E: Success Factors Identified in the Literature. This analytical exercise greatly informs my thesis and provides a sound framework for developing TRIEC’s sucess factors. 9 Not all authors listed the goals of collaborations they reviewed. So, potentially, there were other groups which had more definitive vs. abstract goals but they were not reported by authors of reviewed articles. 9

definitive outcomes does not guarantee the success of an intervention, it addresses the uncertainty around what is being changed and holds groups accountable in their efforts. This observation echoes findings of many authors of studies reviewed for this chapter, which urged collaborative groups to establish specific outcomes and set reasonable expectations for their efforts (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Granner and Sharpe, 2004; Perrault et al., 2011; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). An extensive literature review on success factors for MSCs was found to be very helpful in the development of the comparative success factor framework for this study.

1.2.4 CURRENT TRENDS IN CANADIAN MSCS REGARDING IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION

The Canadian government has increasingly recognized the local, collaborative, multi- stakeholder approach in addressing newcomer integration challenges. For example, since 2009, CIC and the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Ontario allocated over $9 million to fund 45 Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) across the province which, among other government expectations, will “establish or enhance partnership and participation of multiple stakeholders in planning and coordinating the delivery of integration services” (CIC, 2011b: 7). Additionally, over the last eight years, eleven Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs) were established and (co)-funded by the Canadian government in five different provinces. These Councils have a more narrowly defined mandate – to improve immigrant labour market outcomes. Similar to IECs, LIPs are not expected to deliver services but rather contribute to the empowerment of local communities to create enhanced integration infrastructures with better coordination between service providers and other stakeholders (Bradford and Andrew, 2010). However, the recent adoption of strategies where local communities assume active roles in immigrant integration has already received strong criticism from academics (Allahwala, 2011; Pero, 2011). Rebecca Pero (2011), in her Master’s essay, argues that while “collaborative forms of governance that involve informed community members, have been cited as a ‘best practice’ by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration … [however] attempts to align empowerment and responsibility materialize as responsibility with no authority to substantiate what happens in communities where immigrants live, work and play” (Pero, 2011: 25 and 29, emphasis supplied). Additionally, Pero questions the perceived effectiveness of MSCs. She asks, “who benefits the most from this new form of local governance?” Is it immigrants, communities, the settlement sector, or the government, which gradually dismantles its mandated responsibilities by funding new governance structures with no legal entity, sustained sources of funding, specific outcomes and/or evaluation strategies and consequently, lack of accountability to the public? These important questions resonate

with the statements made in the 2006 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Report From Immigration to Integration Local Solutions to a Global Challenge, which identified TRIEC and similar multi-stakeholder initiatives as promising practices in the area of immigrant integration but urged the Canadian government to invest “in creating a strong culture of evaluation” (ibid: 94). The report concluded: “A key problem arising out of all the case studies was the lack of strong evaluation data available for the initiatives visited. In order to understand the effectiveness of local initiatives and their longer term impact on immigrants it is vital that policy makers create and maintain a strong culture of accountability and evaluation. At the same time it needs to be recognized that evaluation and monitoring can be more difficult when local initiatives are delivering ‘soft’ interventions. Outputs should be broad and long enough to avoid encouraging local policy markers to deliver short-term responses to integration issues without investing in longer career progression for immigrants or encouraging more systemic change” (ibid: 94, emphasis supplied).

Furthermore, Allahwala (2011: iv), who studied the TSCA/Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance (CivicAction) and TRIEC, calls our attention to the shift from “state-led employment equity and anti-discrimination efforts to a market-based and meritocratic approach to recognizing immigrant skills…[and concludes that] the new politics of competitive multiculturalism promoted through Toronto’s civic regionalism is a part of a wider process of neoliberalization within the Canadian urban context” [original emphasis]. Allahwala expanded on the argument developed earlier by another young scholar who asserted that “in conforming to the liberal model of multiculturalism, which emphasized harmonizing race relations to facilitate global capital accumulation, TRIEC has neglected the social justice dimension of the issue” (Fong, 2008: 1). Therefore, four major conclusions were made based on the literature review of key theoretical concepts and current trends in Canadian MSCs in the area of immigrant integration: 1. In the last decades, MSCs, in general, received much attention from scholars, funders and community activities for their perceived ability to create innovative solutions to systemic social problems. 2. It was found fairly difficult to assess the effectiveness of collaborations and, particularly, their ability to bring about systemic change. Therefore, scholars increasingly consider intermediate outcomes of collaborations, i.e. their impacts on enhanced community capacity and better coordination between stakeholders. 3. Recently, the Canadian government has been quite supportive and has funded a number of MSCs in the area of immigrant integration. 4. However, some scholars criticized existing MSCs, particularly those promoting only a business case for hiring immigrants, as direct products of neoliberal strategies that Canadian

government and businesses push forward as ways of decreasing responsibility for the state and increasing profitability for corporations. These four conclusions guided the development of the study and encouraged me explore the concepts of systemic change in the immigrant employment area, as well as systemic barriers to immigrants and the perceived effectiveness of TRIEC to address these barriers. While the evaluation of TRIEC was not the ultimate goal of this thesis, it became evident that some basic level of assessment is required before any discussion of success factors can be initiated. Important questions that arose in the initial phases of this study were ‘how’ and ‘why’ some MSCs become, arguably, more successful than others. I was encouraged by a number of prominent academics who urged for further advancement in this type of inquiry, including Perrault and her colleagues (2011: 295) who stated that “[m]ore research is required to determine the unique factors involved in a community collaboration”, as well as Berger et al. (2004: 88) who asserted that “Managers on both sides of the “profit” divide require a full and rich understanding of the factors and processes that drive, sustain, and support this new organizational form. Furthermore, researchers need to continue to develop concepts, theories, and frameworks that capture the challenges and opportunities presented by social alliances” (Berger, Cunningham and Drumwright, 2011). This statement is echoed by Czajkowski (2007: 1) who declared that those involved in collaborative efforts “need to acquire a working knowledge of collaboration theory and an understanding of the factors that assist in the development of successful inter-institutional collaborations”.

1.3 STUDY METHODOLOGY

A mixed methods research approach is introduced to analyze the data. I build my base knowledge on pragmatic grounds, which are “consequence-oriented, problem-centred, and pluralistic” (Creswell, 2003: 18). In this type of methodology, qualitative inquiry is complemented by quantitative analysis. This pragmatic ‘what works’ approach “allow the researcher to address questions that do not sit comfortably within a wholly quantitative or qualitative approach to design and methodology. … “[Furthermore] the pragmatic paradigm can be adopted for the purpose of social and management research endeavors as this is congruent with the mixed quantitative and qualitative approach taken within the predisposition of ‘practitioner-based’ research” (Armitage and Keeble-Allen, 2007: 30, emphasis supplied).

1.3.1 OVERVIEW OF STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS

This study’s mixed-method approach has been conducted in two phases and follows the Sequential Exploratory Design process (Creswell, 2003: 215), whereby qualitative data collection and analysis is followed by quantitative data collection and analysis and the two phases culminate in the final interpretation of entire analysis (Figure 1.2). The study utilized a number of qualitative and quantitative methods: (1) participant observation; (2) literature review; (3) semi-structural interviews with TRIEC key informants; (4) structured interviews with IECs informants; and (5) quantitative comparative analysis of indicators, sub-factors and factors identified in the research. The main goal is “to explore the phenomenon …to expand on the qualitative findings [to test] elements of an emergent theory resulting from the qualitative phase” (ibid: 215-216). Exploring and analyzing TRIEC’s success factors in the first phase was achieved using the case study approach. A comparative analysis of the success factors in the work of TRIEC and other IECs was introduced in the second phase. In both phases, TRIEC and its success factors were the units of analysis. While the goal of the first phase was to identify success factor groups based on interviews with key informants, the second phase was developed to identify critical success factors – those TRIEC factors in which the indicator values scored the highest in comparison with other IECs. Thus, the method was introduced to check the following hypothesis: (1) if TRIEC is considered to be a success model and; (2) A, B, C are conditions of its success (identified by key informants), and; (3) a1, a2, … b1, b2, … c1, c2, … are indicators, i.e. activities/approaches that contributed to its success.

Then, if we compare the values of TRIEC' indicators to those of other IECs and we don’t find any significant differences or indicators of other IECs are scored better than those of TRIEC, then we either did not correctly identify TRIEC's success factors / indicators or TRIEC is not the most successful model, in the first place. However, if the opposite occurs, and individual and average indicator values of other's IECs scored lower than those of TRIEC, then we could discover critical success factors for TRIEC, i.e. those indicators (factors) that showed the highest scores in comparison with other IECs. Graphically, this hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.2 Study Design

Figure 1.3 Study Logic Model

1.3.2 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AND ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER

I came to Canada ten years ago as an immigrant. Similar to other immigrants, I have gone through some situations where my intellect was judged based on my English language facility. Also, my employee rights were compromised by an employer who once assumed that immigrants were not familiar with Canadian law. As it was my decision to change my occupation and start working in the social services as opposed to the corporate world, I cannot claim that I have experienced the hurdles of de-skilling and/or other challenges in the job search process to the same extent that other skilled

immigrants when they had to take odd jobs or were unemployed for a long period of time. However, I have witnessed my husband, a former Financial Director in a multi-national corporation, taking a junior accounting position, which was a big step down from the position he last held in our country. Also, I was a close observer of the struggles of our new friends, highly-educated immigrants, who worked in low-paying positions for years. In the last eight years, I have been working in the area of immigrant integration, either assisting recent immigrants in their settlement processes or working with business and non-profit organizations in developing tools and resources to encourage BC’s employers to tap into the immigrant talent pool and to assist them to better understand the hurdles immigrants experience when searching for jobs in Canada. Additionally, in the course of my work and my community volunteering, I have been engaged in a number of multi-stakeholder collaborations in BC. My introduction to the multi-stakeholder collaboration concept was initiated in 2004, during my brief participation in the late stages of the Looking Ahead Initiative, which was mostly composed of BC’s immigrant employment agencies and funders. This group slowly transformed in the mid-2000s into the Employment Access Strategy for Immigrants (EASI), with a slightly broader representation from community organizations. Concurrently, I was fortunate to be involved in the Vancouver Mayor’s Immigration Task Force and, most recently, in the Immigrant Employment Council of BC (IEC of BC), which was developed as a result of the cumulative efforts of the above-mentioned groups. This group in BC is the counterpart of TRIEC in the GTA. It is composed of many stakeholders from various sectors and has strong ties with ALLIES and TRIEC (e.g. it received funding from ALLIES and program development support from both organizations). Consequently, I have met many members/staff of TRIEC and other Immigrant Employment Councils from different parts of Canada (e.g., Halifax, Toronto, Ottawa, etc.) by attending national conferences, as well as events organized by EASI and the IEC of BC. My familiarity with many key informants presents both opportunities and challenges to me as a researcher. On the one hand, it is an advantage to know them, as it was easier to contact and set up meetings / interviews. However, I realized that my role as a researcher could be compromised. One might even argue that my objectivity could be called into question, as I knew some of my informants and might have my particular biases towards the subject. As Kathleen and Billie DeWalt (2002: 93) pointed out in their book Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers, “the use of participant observation allows for greater rapport, better access to informants and activities, and enhanced understanding of the phenomena investigated using other methods … [however as] the observer is the research tool, [t]he limits of objectivity flow from this fact. Understanding from where any observer is observing is fundamental to understanding the products of research ”. Therefore, the only way to overcome this problem is to be as reflective as

possible, challenge my own assumptions, and, finally, reveal my background subjectivity in the research paper, which is the goal of this section. With respect to researcher’s subjectivity, I entered this study with my eyes wide open and acknowledging my potential biases in the interpretation of the findings. For instance, I assumed that TRIEC was successful in addressing systems level issues as it developed programs that ‘got immigrants jobs’ and/or ‘made them more employable’. Secondly, being an immigrant myself as well as a Caucasian woman also influenced my research directions. Finally, knowing some of the people I was interviewing could have led to biased interpretations of their answers. I was inspired by Suzanne Schwarz McCotter (2001) who also experienced the role of ‘insider’ in her research. Based on her experience, Schwarz McCotter advised at the beginning of the research “to critically look at and question everything that went on, particularly my role in the research” and encouraged young scholars to accept the researcher’s subjectivity as ‘inevitable’ and while checking for it periodically, not to try to escape ‘the role of the self’ (McCotter, 2001, online text, emphasis supplied).

1.3.3 EXTREME CASE STUDY APPROACH

A case study approach has been utilized in the first phase of this thesis. Case study research design has evolved over the past few decades as a useful tool in many social disciplines. In comparison with other research methods, a case study approach is used when such questions as ‘how’ and ‘why’ are primary foci of the inquiry (Yin, 1984; 2009). Yin suggests that the case study research method is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984: 23). The case study approach is quite valuable when an interesting story can be told and learning occurs as a result of it. Therefore, it was found particularly useful in this research, which aims to discover critical success conditions of a well-known multi-stakeholder collaboration. The case study method has received rigorous criticism from academics because of its perceived weakness in design, i.e. the fact that it is frequently based on only one or several cases, its poor suitability for full-scale research and low objectivity due to extent of the researcher’s personal biases in the analysis and interpretations (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Geddes, 1990). While the case study method was greatly criticized for its inability to yield sufficient validity, a number of scholars caution against such strong statements, stating that the approach has greatly contributed to the development and strengthening of social science. Flyvbjerg (2006: 219) argued that: “a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systemic production of

exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one”. Tellis (1997), in his exploration of case study history and its methodological value, concluded that “Case study is a valuable method of research, with distinctive characteristics that make it ideal for many types of investigations. It can also be used in combination with other methods. Its use and reliability should make it a more widely used methodology, once its features are better understood by potential researchers” (Tellis, 1997, online text, emphasis supplied). The literature identified different typologies of case study. Yin (1993), proposed three major types of case studies: Exploratory, Explanatory and Descriptive. Gerring (2007: 88) suggested nine different case study types: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar and most-different (ibid: 88). I believe that an exploratory approach to an extreme case study is the best means of identifying the success factors for TRIEC. Along with the investigation of the phenomenon, it provides an excellent opportunity to describe the events (steps) of TRIEC’s development and yields contextually-rich data for further analysis. There are a number of reasons why a researcher might consider selecting an extreme case study. Yin (2009) argued that studying only one case is appropriate, particularly when a case is unique or extreme. Another scholar pointed that, “an extreme case corresponds to a case that is considered to be prototypical or paradigmatic of some phenomena of interest“ (Gerring, 2007: 101). If a particular phenomenon is studied, like fascism, a case study of the German fascism movement would be an appropriate extreme study of this phenomenon (ibid). Similarly, if the health and global environmental consequences from radiation are examined, then the Chernobyl reactor accident in 1986 would be one the most effective case studies. In Chapter Three, I illustrate why TRIEC has been identified as a model for other Canadian communities to follow. Thus, other researchers pointed to the fact that the City of Toronto has one of the highest immigrant rates (Fong, 2008; Lewkowisz, 2008), emphasized TRIEC’s proximity to funding (Wayland, 2007a), and argued that it has emerged at the right time, in the right place, and emphasized the history of civic engagement in Toronto prior to TRIEC’s formation (Allahwala, 2011; Good, 2009). One of the most problematic but significant properties of extreme case is that it is not representative of a broader population group (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), in our case – other IECs . In other words, findings from extreme cases cannot be generalized, as for example, if research was to develop a blueprint of activities that should lead to success for any IEC. However, this is not the goal of this study. I do not treat findings from my research as representative of a population. I simply suggest that having a broader understanding of why TRIEC became successful and knowing what it did differently than other IECs is useful to other multi-stakeholder groups working in the area of immigrant labour market integration. Additionally, these groups might find the lessons learned from TRIEC’s success to be quite valuable regardless of the latter’s unique position.

1.3.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Given the dual analytical framework of this study (Figure 1.1), the literature review was conducted in two major areas. Firstly, the conceptual foundations of systems change theory were investigated. Then, current trends and concepts in the area of immigrant economic integration were explored. Systems change and collaborative efforts concepts were explored through diverse discipline lenses from community psychology (Allen et al. 2008; Berkowitz, 2001; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a; Javdani and Allen, 2011; Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011) to urban health and community issues (Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Lasker and Weiss 2003) to non-profit management and leadership (Alexander, Hearld and Mittler, 2011) to organization development and business ethics (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Reast et al., 2010). Additionally, two dissertations by Ramsey (2010) and McNamara (2007) were found to be quite helpful in understanding collaboration processes and factors and conditions, which, potentially, contributed to their successes. A number of books, workshop and conference proceedings were reviewed to develop a broad understanding of the phenomena. To set the historical context of Canadian immigration, this study draws on the works of Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009), Dewing and Leman (2006), Day (2002), and Troper (2003). Murdie (2008) and Bernard (2008) were reviewed to provide a brief review of recent immigrant destinations and demographic characteristics. A number of studies on reasons behind high-level immigration to Canada were reviewed. Various scholars, business organizations and government agencies are in favor of mass immigration and identified a number of reasons behind the high-level immigration to Canada. It is important to note that almost all reviewed have their supporters and critics. While the reasoning behind high immigration to Canada is not a focus of this thesis, it is believed to provide an important contextual framework for the research. Immigrant integration challenges were illustrated based on the findings and conclusions of researchers representing diverse disciplines -- from prominent community advocates, such as Ted Richmond and Ratna Omidvar (2003) who discussed how deteriorating immigrant employment outcomes impact immigrants’ sense of belonging in a society, to multicultural urban planning researchers, such as Mohammad Qadeer and Sandeep Kumar Agrawal (2006) who called our attention to the impacts of ethnic enclaves on social inclusion of immigrants and their children. Toronto’s specific immigrant integration challenges were discussed based on works by Murdie (2008), who explained immigrants’ movement to suburban areas and how it is connected with their income levels, and Frisken and Wallace (2002), who examined municipal responses to address immigrant settlement challenges (including the City of Toronto).

Finally, an extensive literature review, pertaining to immigrant labour market outcomes was conducted, which revealed nine major causes of immigrant employment challenges, including (1) composition of immigrant classes admitted to Canada (Hiebert 2006); (2) fluency in English language and accents (Aydemir and Skuterud, 2005; Boyd, 1999; Creese and Kambere, 2003; Preston and Giles, 1997; Scassa 1994); (3) essential, soft and literacy skills (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000; Casimir and Waldman, 2007; Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2011; Laroche and Rutheford, 2006; Peters and Austin, 1985); (4) lack of social networks (Bauder, 2005; Xue, 2008; Ooka and Wellman, 2006; Reitz 2007a); (5) changes and fluctuation in the Canadian economy (Hiebert, 2006; Phythian, Walters and Anisef, 2009); (6) the increased level of education of Canadian-born workers (Hiebert, 2006; Seidle, 2010; Reitz, 2001b); (7) the foreign credential recognition issue (Basran and Zong, 1998; Girard, 2010; Picot, 2004; Reitz, 2001; Reitz 2007a; Reitz 2007b); (8) Canadian work experience (Alboim and McIssac, 2007; Chetty, 2002; Girard and Bauder, 2005; McIssac, 2003; Slade, 2008); and (9) employer discriminatory practices, which were detected by analyzing the gaps in earning between visible minority immigrants and Canadians and/or visible minority and other Canadian-born population (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; 2002; 2011; Skuterud, 2010; Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002; Yoshida, 2008). There are more specific studies that provided a comparative analysis of job interview return rates on resumes with ‘foreign-sounding’ and Western names (Oreopoulos, 2009; Oreopoulos and Dechief, 2011) and those that analyzed legal complaints of racial discrimination, which showcased existing systemic racism in employment in Canada (Agocs and Jain, 2001). Additionally, a broad spectrum of grey literature on immigrant integration was reviewed, including the Governments of Canada and Ontario websites, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) facts and figures reports, Statistics Canada analytical reports and tables, mainstream media newspaper articles (The Toronto Star, The Vancouver Sun, The Ottawa Citizen, etc.), relevant professional, business and community organization websites, and social media, including blogs and online publications. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of TRIEC’s materials was conducted, including a review of its Annual Reports, official website, articles about TRIEC, publications and other publically accessible materials pertaining to TRIEC. Also, websites of all eleven IECs, ALLIES, the Maytree Foundation, and the City of Toronto were examined. Finally, an effort was made to review all previous research on TRIEC. A number of researchers have made attempts to describe TRIEC’s practices and activities and explore its success or lack of thereof (Allahwala, 2011; Fong, 2008; Lewkowicz, 2008; Wayland, 2007a), including TRIEC’s links to civic movements and municipal responses to increasingly multicultural population in the area (Good, 2009).

1.3.5 TWO-PHASED RESEARCH: INTERVIEWS WITH VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS

Two types of interviews were utilized for this research: semi-structured interviews with TRIEC’s key informants in the first phase (n=22) and structured interviews with other IEC representatives in the second phase (n=7). As can be seen from Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, a total of 29 interviews were conducted with 27 various stakeholders. For the purpose of this study, TRIEC’s stakeholders are called key informants as they were consulted in the first phase of the research. Five categories of stakeholders were identified10: (A) TRIEC/Maytree Staff; (B) TRIEC Board/Council members; (C) Experts/Researchers of TRIEC/Civic Leaders; (D) Other Immigrant Employment Councils’ representatives; (E) TRIEC Funders/Sponsors.

Table 1.1 Study Interviews by Informant Category

Key A – B – C – D – IECs E – Informants Key Informants / TRIEC / TRIEC Experts / staff TRIEC interviewed Analysis Category, Maytree/ Board / Total Civic across funders / in two Key N=interview informants ALLIES Council leaders Canada sponsors Informant staff members categories

N, Phase 1 and 2 3 5 4 8 7 1 27 N, Phase 1: Semi-structured 3 5 4 3 7 1 22 Interviews N, Phase 2: Structured 7 7 Interviews N, participated in both 2 2 phases N, interviewed and analyzed 1C 1 in TWO categories N, interviewed and analyzed in ONE but belonged to two categories 1 2C 1B 1B 5 N, interviewed, analyzed and belonged to ONLY ONE 2 3 1 8 5 19 category N, Foreign-born 2 1 3 0 1 7

On average, interviews took 47 minutes and interviews with TRIEC/Maytree Staff were the longest. Most of the interviews were conducted over the phone (n=19), followed by interviews in person (n=9) and one was done over email. Twenty semi-structured interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded. Two interviews were coded based on partial recording and note-taking. Seven interviews with IECs staff used structured questions where the majority required simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ type of answers with some brief examples.

10 Immigrants who participated in TRIEC’s programs were originally included as a separate category. However, as access to this category key informants was not granted, the category was not included in the research. 21

Table 1.2 Study Interviews by Format

B-TRIEC D-IECs Interview Category / A-TRIEC C-Experts E-TRIEC Board / staff Analysis Category, / Ma ytree / Civic funders / Total Council across n=number of interviews staff leaders sponsors members Canada n, by question format 3 5 4 10 7 29 n, Semi-structured 3 5 4 3 7 22 n, Structured 7 7 n, with two key informants 0 0 1 0 0 1 n, by recording format 3 5 4 10 7 29 n, recorded with Notes / Questionnaire 7 1 8 n, Transcripts 3 5 4 3 6 21 n, by contact format 3 5 4 10 7 29 n, In person 3 2 3 1 9 n, By phone 3 1 8 7 19 n, Via email 1 1 Average Interview Duration, min 61 50 48 41 52 47

One interview was conducted with two key informants; one key informant was interviewed and analyzed in two categories as s/he was suggested by one of the stakeholder agencies as its representative but s/he had already been interviewed in another category earlier11. Also, two category D key informants were interviewed in the first and second phases of the research. Finally, some key informants referred to their backgrounds in their responses and based on this information, it was revealed that at least seven out of 27 interviewees were immigrants. I used data transformation in analyzing semi-structured interview responses where the qualitative data was quantified (Creswell, 2003: 220). I developed and coded the answers as I was reviewing interview transcripts for responses related to TRIEC’s success factors. Then all factors were combined into six major success factor groups and presented based on a number of responses in each category.

1.3.5.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH TRIEC KEY STAKEHOLDERS

All key informants for the first phase were contacted in June – December 2010. The semi- structured interviews were conducted in two major batches. The first one took place in the summer of 2010 and the majority of key informants were interviewed then (Category A-D). Category E informants, i.e. TRIEC’s Funders/Sponsors were interviewed in the winter of 2011. Initially, TRIEC and the Maytree Foundation were approached with a request to interview their staff and Board

11 While most of key informants were asked the same core questions, some questions vary from one category to another. 22

members. Thus, in Category A, all of the interviewed key informants were chosen by TRIEC/Maytree, as were two Board members in Category B. ALLIES management provided the contact information for two IEC staff who agreed to be interviewed for the first phase of the study. The third semi-structured interview with IEC staff was conducted in Vancouver and I approached this key informant independently as all of the key informants in Category E – Funders/Sponsors. All key informants of this study are listed in Appendix F.12 A Funder/Sponsor list was accessed from TRIEC’s website (See Appendix G) and all organizations in this category were approached with an invitation for an interview.13 Seven agreed to participate in the study and among them, five reported contributing monetary funding/sponsorship to TRIEC. The other two did not consider themselves as direct TRIEC funders/sponsors, although they were listed as such on TRIEC’s website. It was decided that all the key informants who were initially approached as Funders/Sponsors and who agreed to be interviewed, remained in this category and were analyzed as such because all of them either allocated financial support or provided in-kind contributions (office space, employees acted as spokespersons for TRIEC, contributed to TRIEC as advisors etc.) and/or funded the organizations that partnered with TRIEC in the delivery of their programs. All transcripts were coded into response categories for each question. All key informants received their transcripts and were given an opportunity to reflect on their answers. As a result, some transcripts were modified and some key informants asked to remain unnamed. Success factor response categories were further synthesized into six major categories. This analysis served as a baseline for the development of the comparative framework to compare TRIEC’s strategies and tactics with other IECs’ actions. Some examples that key informants provided were included as indicators of success in the comparative analysis. A summary of all interview questions broken down by key informant categories is available in Appendix H.

1.3.5.2 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH IECS ACROSS CANADA

All structured interviews with IECs representatives were conducted over three months, from January to March 2011. TRIEC’s data for all six factors was retrieved either from the interviews and/or from their website or from other materials about TRIEC. A structured questionnaire was developed based on the list of identified factors/sub-factors/indicators and all eleven Immigrant Employment Councils across Canada were approached to fill in the questionnaire (See Appendix I). The

12 Many of key informants asked to stay incognito, so while they are listed under one of the five key informant categories, their names/titles are not revealed. 13 The list of TRIEC Funders/Sponsors was retrieved from TRIEC’s website in November 2010. Since that time, this list has changed. 23

questionnaire has eight distinct sections. The first six sections correspond to six factor groups, whereby the majority of questions in each section are reflected in the corresponding factor-indicators in the comparative analysis tables (Chapter Five). One section examines the role of municipal government, including pre-existing conditions that might have affected a municipal government’s capacity to support an IEC. The last section, “Outcomes”, presents optional and selective responses, which were incorporated into different factor-indicators and/or were discussed in the narrative analysis. Out of eleven existing IECs, seven agreed to participate in the study.14 Answers were provided either by Coordinators of the IEC’s programs or Executive Directors of IECs. Questionnaires, partially filled out by myself, were sent to IEC staff. The latter were invited to either fill in the gaps in the questionnaire by themselves or go over the questions together on the phone. A comparative analysis of indicators revealed significant differences between TRIEC’s and other IECs’ approaches that go beyond the general success factors identified by other researchers (Wayland 2007a; ALLIES 2010). As a result, proposed critical success conditions for TRIEC were identified.

1.3.6 QUANTITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS, SUB-FACTORS AND

INDICATORS

All the success factors, identified through semi-structural interviews, were categorized and analyzed. Six major themes (factors) have emerged which served as a foundation for the comparative analysis framework.v All factors were broken down into 19 sub-factors. Each sub-factor was further broken down into 3-5 indicators to ensure a better understanding and scope of the factor, i.e. what kind of activities TRIEC undertook that showcase its action-oriented approach; what kind of leadership TRIEC was able to utilize; what were the unique conditions, etc.? A more detailed overview of the development process of the comparative analysis framework is provided in Chapter Five. In terms of the analysis, TRIEC was used as a baseline for comparing success factors. Consequently, all of its factors, sub-factors and indicators scored perfect 100% with three exceptions.15 Once all data was compiled, indicator values for individual agencies and average values for all seven IECs were compared against those of TRIEC. No individual values on indicators were reported to maintain the confidentiality of respondents. Only averages for indicators and sub-factors were revealed

14 For a full list of all existing IECs, see Appendix J. 15 Out of 83 indicators three of TRIEC’s indicators had 0% values. These are ‘Board/Council/Working Group Meeting Notes are on the website’, ‘Publically accessible independent evaluation of TRIEC’ and ‘Hosting agency is a business organization’. Two of these indicators are in the High Standards Factor group and one is in Employer-driven factor. The first were included because they are considered to be markers of transparency and accountability and were mentioned by some key informants as something that IECs should be doing more. The last one was included because it was suggested by TRIEC’s key informants that other IECs might benefit from having stronger connections with local business organizations and even being hosted by them. 24

and discussed in this thesis. However, some of the summarized success factors for each IEC were presented to illustrate that not only cumulative, average values of success factors and indicators for all IECs are different but the individual divergences in success factors between almost any of the existing IECs and TRIEC are quite significant. Finally, once the study is finished and the thesis is defended – summaries of individual analysis of each IECs will be shared with all respondents who participated in the second phase of this study. This type of comparative analysis would provide an opportunity for all participating IECs to reflect on their successes as well as potential gaps / barriers they might face in their work, which were identified in the independent comparative analysis of their activities and outcomes against ‘the best practice model’ IEC – TRIEC.

1.3.7 RESEARCH PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES

I entered the case study process with a specific case study design. First of all, based on my literature review, I developed my research questions, which informed the development of my semi- structural interview questions. For triangulation (or to ensure the validity of my research), I used multiple sources of information in the literature review and in my empirical research, both of which are discussed in detail in earlier sections of this Chapter. To ensure reliability, I ensured that all the semi- structured interviews were well-documented, i.e. the protocol for gathering and analyzing data was designed and followed; permission to record, transcribe and use quotes was received from all interviewees (see Appendices K, L, M, and N). Additionally, I conducted two pilot interviews. These procedures were expected to ensure a well-documented research process and some level of confidence that the same results could be generated over again. I triangulated all information and outlined the chain of my analytical conclusions to ensure credibility and that ‘the phenomena be viewed and explored from multiple perspectives” (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 556). Additionally, I had extensive discussions with my supervisor, particularly during the data analysis process to clarify my perspectives and limit potential biases. Finally, in the analysis process (ibid: 556), “to ensure the consistency of the finding or ‘dependability’ of the data”, I coded all interviews, with the help of an assistant, and final codes were compared and contrasted to determine the final interpretations. In the first phase of the study, when interviewing TRIEC’s key informants, I was actively engaged in the conversation and referred to my personal experience, when asked and / or used information gathered in previous interviews to probe for new explanations of the same phenomenon. In the second study phase, I strictly followed the structured interview protocol that included questions, which mostly called for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or ‘true’ or ‘false’ answers and brief examples, when required.

However, several IEC respondents suggested indicators for some factors that were not included in my questionnaire. Suggestions repeated at least twice were added to the questionnaire and all IECs were followed up to obtain the answers.16 While my goal is to discover how other groups could learn from TRIEC, I recognize the limited applicability of my research as it heavily relies on data from a unique, atypical case study and is opinion-based, even with survey/statistical data support. However, I believe that TRIEC’s unique case, its eight-year lifespan, its perceived success which is widely-recognized across the country by various stakeholders, and finally, its ability to expand its programs and scope every year all provide a unique opportunity to reflect on potential critical success factors which could be useful in the formation and development of future and existing multi-stakeholder groups as well as making funding decisions and conducting evaluations of this type of collaboration.

1.3.8 SAMPLING AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

In both phases of my research I used a purposive sampling method, whereby the depth and richness of information collected are more important properties than the random selectiveness and/or statistical representativeness of the information (Patton, 1990). In brief, “the purpose of purposeful sampling is to select information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study” (ibid: 169). In the first phase of the research, five major groups of key informants were interviewed; thus, I used stratified purposeful sampling, which “illustrated characteristics of particular subgroups of interest [and] facilitates comparison” (ibid: 183). As was noted before, immigrants who participated in TRIEC’s programs were not part of the sample in this study because it was difficult to identify and reach them from Vancouver and TRIEC’s staff did not believe immigrants were major key informants for this study, given my research questions. Also, TRIEC’s representatives were not able to provide much assistance in reaching out to other groups, as they were pre-occupied with the internal evaluation process. Additionally, settlement agencies, which partnered with TRIEC were also not interviewed for the same reason as immigrants. I believe that immigrants and settlement service providers are important players in the arena of immigrant integration and not including them in the equation is one of the limitations of this thesis. Fortunately, Paul Lewkowisz (2008) interviewed seven immigrant-mentees and thirteen service providers for his study whose findings on barriers and successes of TRIEC are comparable with those of my study. I also added one key informant group that was not included in earlier studies about TRIEC – its funders and sponsors. Seven out of fifteen funders/sponsors, listed on

16 The following indicators were added based on suggestions provided by IEC respondents: High Standards factor: Indicator - Results revealed at IEC’s Annual Summit; IEC brought together three levels of government; Communication factor: Indicator - General public could subscribe to IEC newsletter/twitter/blog; Unique Location factor: Indicator - Municipality played a role in the launch/development of an IEC. 26

TRIEC’s website, provided their opinions about why TRIEC became successful and what kind of impact it made.17 Insights from this group are invaluable to other IECs and could be useful for TRIEC’s staff, Board and Council members. In total, the study sample included the practices and activities of eight IECs and claims a 67% response rate, which could be considered representative of the sampling group. However, the representative sample should meet at least two tests: it has to be large enough and members have to be randomly selected (Bickenbach and Davies, 1997: 282). While my sample is relatively large, members were not selected at random, therefore, there is still the potential for sampling error. There are a number of other limitations to this study. It is impossible to create a template of success for IECs as “no two IECs are alike. … The local political, economic, leadership and organizational climate in [each] city will determine what model of IEC is right” (ALLIES, 2010: 3). Although all IECs were created to address similar issues, these groups were organized at different times with different funding and organizational structures. This presented certain challenges in conducting a comparative analysis of IECs’ activities and strategies. Thus, this study does not aim to create a “rulebook for how to establish an IEC” (ibid) but rather offers some insights about what TRIEC did differently from the other groups. Without a doubt, the success of any IEC depends greatly on the personal qualities of IEC leaders, notably their ability to initiate/maintain personal connections, to present compelling arguments, and to demonstrate professional capacity and charisma in working with a wide range of stakeholders and the general public. The leadership factor has been identified in the literature as a vital component of MSC groups’ success (see Appendix E). While attempts to develop leadership assessment frameworks for MSCs have recently been initiated (Alexander, Hearld, and Mittler, 2011), it is close to impossible to measure leadership qualities such as leaders’ knowledge and skills managing MSCs or to quantify leaders’ levels of energy, commitment and passion about relevant issues, nor is it the goal of this study to do so. Thus, although TRIEC leaders’ qualities were discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4, they were not included in the comparative analysis in the phase 2 of this study. Furthermore, in the initial interview phase, TRIEC’s ability “to create a culture of strong personal relationships and trust between stakeholders” was identified by several key informants as its success factor. However, no special indicators were developed to verify this type of success conditions with other IECs in the second phase, as it is believed that validation of trust or personal qualities would also require more extensive interviewing process with a number of representatives from each IEC, which is outside the scope of this thesis. The ‘trustworthy relationships’ success factor has been identified by a number of other scholars examining MSCs (see Appendix E). In this study, the ‘building relationships

17 Fifteen funders were listed on TRIEC’s website as of November 24, 2010. 27

and smart partnerships’ category was included in the ‘High Standard Practices’ factor group as interviewees commented that TRIEC was able to build strong professional and social networks between its partners. The organization achieved this by being accountable for its promises and actions to all its partners, being reasonably transparent about its goals to all stakeholders and running an organization in a highly professional manner. Additionally, a number of activities and processes that might have contributed to building strong linkages and a highly professional culture within an IEC were included in other indicators under the following sub-factors: ’Communication capacity’, ‘Employers are well represented’, ‘Employers are well-recognized’ and an ‘Action-oriented philosophy’. Similarly, the personal qualities of TRIEC’s leaders were discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4. All of the indicators in the comparative framework were developed based on my personal interpretations of key informant responses, which were substantiated by in-depth overview of the existing literature on the topic, yet are prone to personal biases. Furthermore, the indicators were not weighted, even though some of the factors had twice as many indicators as other factors. Basic quantitative analysis of responses was adopted, which I believed to be sufficient to identify trends and make necessary comparisons. Finally, one might argue that comparing activities and operations of TRIEC with those of other IECs is not just when only TRIEC’s case is fully presented. I argue that because I was mostly interested in the success factors for TRIEC, utilizing an extreme or unique case study of TRIEC in examining it success factors and then, comparing these conditions against those of other IECs yields sufficiently rich data, which provides a better explanation of TRIEC’s success and its conditions and helps to identify future research directions.

1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

I present my thesis in six chapters. Chapter One outlines the research background, study design and illustrates the significance of the study in the planning context. It briefly describes fundamental theoretical concepts of my arguments, including the analytical framework of the study wherein immigrant employment barriers are positioned as a part of the labour market subsystem, which is part of larger system – our society. It is important to note that multi-stakeholder collaboration is introduced as only one of the instruments that societies have in their ‘tool boxes’ in addressing immigrant challenges in the labour market. Finally, this chapter describes how the study was conducted, i.e. its design, research questions, protocols, sampling, etc. methods and reveals its limitations. Chapter Two places the issue of immigrant employment challenges in the modern contexts of immigration to Canada. It briefly describes existing immigration classes and categories and presents five

major reasons for the high-level immigration to Canada. Also, it attempts to explain current immigrant settlement and employment challenges by drawing on changes in federal immigration policies and, consequently, changing demographic characteristics of recent immigrants. Overall, nine main reasons explaining immigrant employment challenges are identified, which are classified under the three major groups (immigrant individual attributes, societal development and institutionalized systemic barriers). Additionally, the discussion of the role of municipalities in immigrant integration is initiated. Finally, the Ontario settlement sector crisis, which came about as a result of the Canadian government’s neoliberal position, is identified as an important component of immigrant employment problems. Chapter Three conducts an in-depth analysis of TRIEC as an organization. As a number of other researchers have already described TRIEC’s organizational structure, activities and programs (e.g. Allahwala, 2011; Fong, 2008; Lewkowicz, 2008; Wayland, 2007a), I contribute to the exiting literature by focusing on program outcomes and conducting an analysis of TRIEC’s major milestones (major events), inputs (sources and amount of funding etc.) and outputs (program outcomes) as well as the overall impact of its activities. Finally, given the focus of this study, I provide a detailed overview of success factors that were explicitly or implicitly identified by other researchers of TRIEC. Chapter Four reports findings in the first phase of the research. It documents and analyzes the responses of twenty-two key informants. In semi-structured interviews and other data collection methods, TRIEC’s stakeholders provided their opinions on the major immigrant employment barriers, the definition of systemic change in the area of immigrant economic integration, the definition of ultimate success for TRIEC, the definition of TRIEC’s philosophical and operational approaches and reasons why TRIEC became so successful or why it is known as a success story. These responses were categorized into six success factor groups and the analytical thinking in the process of categorization is presented and supported by corresponding quotes from key informants. Chapter Five summarizes the findings of the seven questionnaires conducted with IECs staff and introduces the comparative analysis between TRIEC and other IECs at the factor, sub-factor and indicator levels. Results are presented in eight sections, whereby the first six are broken down into Findings and Discussion sub-sections for each factor. The seventh section introduces a meta-analysis between factors and the eighth section summarizes all the conclusions from findings and analysis and introduces the critical success factors for TRIEC. The chapter is concluded with the lessons for IECs. The final chapter attempts to link the existing theory and new findings in this study. Additionally, the concluding chapter provides an opportunity for me, as a researcher, to reflect on the research process and my assumptions in developing my research questions.

CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION TO CANADA: POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES

We shall all respect the principals of each other and do nothing that would be regarded as an act of oppression to any portion of the people.

- Alexander Mackenzie, the second Prime Minister of Canada Speech to the House of Commons, 1875

2.1 INTRODUCTION

According to the International Organization for Migration’s 2010 World Migration Report, the number of people crossing boarders increased almost 20% in the last ten years, and was estimated at 214 million worldwide in 2010. One of every 32 people is an international migrant and if this trend continues, the world will have 405 million migrants by 2050 (International Organization for Migration website). Historically, people move because of wars, political or religious conflicts, natural disasters, famine, epidemics, etc. However, in the last century, economically-driven immigration was on the rise which divided the contemporary world into emigration and immigration countries, where more developed, westernized countries are usually the latter and the developing part of the world is the former. Immigration has always been a vital component of the Canadian economy and national identity. It has the highest per capita immigration rate in the world (Dolin and Young, 2004) and it was the first country in the world to pass a multiculturalism law (Dewing and Leman, 2006). According to the most recent census, one in five people living in Canada is foreign-born representing over 200 ethnicities (Statistics Canada, 2006a). In this chapter, I will discuss the policy and social contexts of immigrant employment challenges. My research shows that opinions are divided as to the role of immigration in solving the Canadian demographic crisis, addressing its labour needs and boosting economy. Additionally, I will provide a detailed overview of the most cited causes of poor immigrant labour market outcomes and discuss how senior and municipal governments play a role in the immigrant settlement processes. Finally, I will argue that the current settlement services infrastructure and funding mechanisms negatively impact immigrant settlement outcomes in Ontario.

2.2 CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

2.2.1 THREE MAJOR IMMIGRANT CLASSES

Historically18, there have been three major immigration categories to Canada: the refugee, family and economic classes. There are two ways by which Canada provides protection to refugees. Inland Claims are made when refugees come to Canada and claim refugee status here. Additionally, the Canadian government selects thousands of refugees from overseas whether from refugee camps or from a temporary country of refuge. The number of refugees Canada accepted in the last two decades has been relatively stable at 20,000-25,000, annually, with the exception of the 1990-1992 period (Figure 2.1). In 2010, Canada accepted 24,696 refugees, who represent 9.9% of all permanent residents accepted to Canada in this year (CIC, 2010a).

Figure 2.1 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 1986-2010

Source: Reprinted from CIC, 2010a, List of Figures.19

Under Family class immigration, Canadian permanent residents and citizens can sponsor their close relatives/spouses to come live with them in Canada. From 1986 till 1997, on average, Family class immigrants represented more than one third of all newcomers arriving in any given year, and in the last twelve years their proportion has been decreasing steadily to an average of 29.5%. In 2010, over 60,000 immigrants reunited with their families, or 21.5% of all permanent residents (CIC, 2010a). Since 2006, the target number for parental sponsorship has been dropping and as of November 4, 2011 Canada has frozen the intake of new applications to sponsor parents for at least two years in order to clear a backlog of 180,000 applications and allow time for redesigning the program. In the meantime, a 10-year super visa was introduced for parents and grandparents who wish to re-unite with their children and

18 The literature identifies four major peaks of Canadian immigration, with the fifth wave ongoing since the late 1980s. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Appendix O: Four Waves of Canadian Immigration. 19 The reproduction is a copy of an official work that is published by the Government of Canada. It has not been produced in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of the Government of Canada. 31

grandchildren. Applicants will have to provide proof of minimum income and ensure that their visitors have private medical insurance. Introduction of this temporary visa is seen as a necessary measure by Canada’s Immigration Minister Jason Kenney to “ensure that the system is financially sustainable” (Payton, 2011). In other words, these new policy directions aim to ensure that immigrant parents are not a “burden” to the Canadian healthcare and welfare systems. The economic class is a more complicated and diverse category which has been modified considerably in the last several years. It includes the Investor class, Entrepreneurs class20, Self-employed persons class, Provincial Nominee Program immigrants, Canadian Experience class, Temporary Workers, and Skilled Workers and Professionals class.21 For the purpose of this thesis I will focus primarily on the latter category.22 As can be seen from Figure 2.1, in 1986, Economic Immigrants accounted for only 38% (97,909) of all immigrants coming to Canada, and this number almost doubled to 66.6% (186,913) by 2010.

2.2.2 RECENT CANADIAN IMMIGRANT DESTINATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC

CHARACTERISTICS

In the last couple of decades, immigrants chose to settle in larger urban areas such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. In fact, by 1971 these three Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) housed 40% of recent immigrants. In 2006, close to 70% of all Canada’s recent immigrants were found in these large cities, which accounted for 62.7% of all immigrants in Canada in 2010 (Murdie, 2008). The presence of an ethnic community, in particular friends and families, seemed to have a much larger impact on where immigrants decide to live than the availability of jobs, educational opportunities or quality of life (Statistics Canada, 2005). However, while Canadian immigration is still considered an ‘urban and large-city phenomenon’, immigrants also increasingly settle and move (secondary migration) to suburban areas and smaller communities (Murdie, 2008). As can be seen from Figure 2.2, while in 2001 the top seven CMAs accounted for 87.5 of all immigrants in Canada, by 2010, their share decreased to 79.3% while the rest of Canada accounted for over 20%. Not only did the patterns of immigration settlement change in the last decade, but so did immigrant demographic characteristics. According to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, big

20 CIC has temporarily stopped accepting applications for the federal immigrant Enterpreneur program. Only applications postmarked or received before June 26, 2010 are to be processed. 21 As of July 1, 2012 CIC temporarily stopped accepting applications for the FSW program. For selection rules, current status of this immigration steam as well as the proposed changes to the category of ‘Skilled Workers and Professionals”, see Appendix P: Overview of the Federal Skilled Immigrant Category. 22 There are many definitions of a skilled immigrant. According to ALLIES, skilled immigrants are “individuals who have immigrated to Canada with international post-secondary education, professional credentials and/or work experience” (ALLIES website, FAQs). 32

cities are losing their share of economic immigrants, while “the rest of Canada’s share … more than doubled during this time” (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009: 2). Fifty years ago, the vast majority of immigrants (over 83%) came from the Commonwealth countries, the United States and other Western European countries. In the 1970s, the proportion of immigrants from China and India was only 3.6% and 3.8% (Statistics Canada, Immigration statistics. Various years) By 1980, the immigration composition was quite different with the percentage of Chinese (including Hong Kong) and Indian immigrants increasing to 13.8%, Vietnamese accounting for 17.8% and Filipinos for 4.2% (Statistics Canada, Immigration statistics. Various years).

Figure 2.2 Canadian Permanent Residents by Top Seven Canadian CMAs, 2001-2010

Source: CIC, 2010b.

Within a ten-year period, by 1990, the proportion of immigrants from the UK and the United States dropped to 3.8% and 2.8%. In the last decade, the majority of immigrants came from so-called non-traditional immigration source countries. In fact, CIC reported that in 2010, immigrants were accepted from over 170 countries with Philippines, China and India being the top three immigration source countries, representing 13%, 10.8% and 10.8% of all immigrants (CIC, 2011a). In terms of the demographic balance between smaller and larger cities in Canada, immigrants who settle in smaller Canadian cities come mostly from Europe and the United States, while Asian immigrants are stypically found in larger urban areas. Not surprisingly, only 1 in 4 immigrants from smaller communities reported to have no knowledge of official language in comparison with 2 in 5 in very large urban centres (Bernard, 2008). Finally, the immigrant population is increasingly more educated than previous cohorts According to CIC, “of the immigrants who arrived between 1996 and 2001, more than one-third had a university degree, twice the proportion of native born Canadians” (CIC, 2005).

2.2.3 REASONS FOR HIGH-LEVEL IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

The world population is growing by approximately 77 million people annually (United States Census Bureau, 2011). To put this in perspective, the daily increase in world’s population is similar to the population of Regina – over 210,000 people (Statistics Canada, 2011a). As a result of globalization, resource scarcity, and uneven demographic trends, large-scale migration has become a prominent part of modern life. While the Canadian government has continued to modify its immigration policies in an attempt to find a perfect formula for the social engineering exercise, what has not changed is the government direction in terms of need for high-level immigration. Canada accepts more immigrants per capita than any other country in the world. Every year, Canada welcomes close to a quarter of a million immigrants, whereby each day “the equivalent of an entire 10-storey residential tower or approximately 344 new immigrants arrive in Ontario” (Haq, 2009). In fact, by 2030, it is estimated that net population growth will come mainly from international migration, while most net labour force growth will come from immigration as early as in 2015 (Statistics Canada, 2008a; 2008b). The literature identifies a number of reasons behind the government’s strong stand on massive immigration. For the last several years, the question of immigration to Canada has been linked to the demographic crisis in the country. Canada, as other developed countries in the world, has a below replacement birth rate (Li, 2002; Statistics Canada, 2011b). Another most frequently cited reason for high immigration in Canada is its role in addressing skill shortages (The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2010). A wide array of scholars and experts strongly believe that immigrants make (or could have made) a significant contribution to the Canadian economy (Beauchesne, 1995; Conference Board of Canada, 2004) and they boost innovation and competitiveness (Downie, 2010, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010). Finally, immigration has been historically recognized for its role in shaping the fabric of the Canadian nation (CIC, 2011a). Another camp of scholars contributed to the debate by criticizing mass immigration and debunking its value in resolving the above-mentioned problems, i.e. immigration cannot resolve the demographic crisis (Banerjee and Robson, 2009; Beaujot, 2003; Francis, 2002); Canadian skill shortages are not properly understood to justify mass immigration as a solution (McMullin and Cooke, 2004; Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, 2011); high-level immigration to the economy is overrated (Borjas, 1999: Francis, 2002; Green and Green, 2004; Grubel, 2008; United Kingdom

Parliament, 2008; Macdonald, 1985); and mass immigration does not necessarily contribute to increased productivity or competitiveness (Bouvier, 1992).23

2.3 IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

This section will draw on the works of scholars representing diverse disciplines and points of view. It will discuss major immigrant settlement and employment challenges and shed light on hurdles specific to immigrants settling in the Greater Toronto Area.

2.3.1 IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT CHALLENGES

Canada is recognized as a world leader in the field of multiculturalism, immigration and immigrant settlement. Its public discourse is still focused on positive impacts of immigration as opposed to the ‘security and terrorism dialogue’ in Europe and it has one of the most open and welcoming immigration policies among developed countries (Nadeau, 2011; Richmond and Shields, 2005). In the last twenty years, as the immigrant population has become more ethnically diverse, a number of settlement-related problems emerged. First is what Richmond and Shields called ‘a contradiction between official inclusion policies and the growing social exclusion of Canada’s newcomers in the economic sphere and in social and public life more generally” (Richmond and Shields, 2005: 515). Immigrants are increasingly found in the poorest neigbourhoods of our country (Harvey and Siu, 2001) and they are less likely to be involved in the civic life of their communities (e.g., volunteering, voting, assuming civic leadership positions etc.), which negatively impacts their sense of belonging and inclusion (Hall, Lasby, Ayer, and Gibbons, 2009; Omidvar and Richmond, 2003). As research has shown, increased ethnic diversity frequently results in less social cohesion of communities (Putnam, 2007; Bouchard and Taylor, 2008; Lai and Hynie 2010). Additionally, Qadeer and Agrawal (2006), while focusing their research on a positive correlation between ethnic enclaves and social cohesion, admitted that children of immigrants living in ethnic enclaves might not fully adopt mainstream values and might have difficulties in learning English. Twenty years ago, there were only six census tracks defined as enclaves in Canada and by 2011 this number grew to 260 (Todd, 2011). Many immigrants deliberately choose to settle in ethnic enclaves of large metropolitans as they are connected to their families and communities, can speak their native languages, and gain access to ethnic businesses (Murdie, 2008). However, there is a price attached to living in larger Canadian cities.

23 For a more detailed discussion on the subject of mass immigration, see Appendix Q: The Most Frequently Cited Reasons for High-level Immigration to Canada. 35

The latest Quality of Life report by the Federation of Canadian Municipality, which looked at issues and trends related to immigration and diversity in the 24 largest Canadian municipalities, showed that immigrants residing in larger municipalities are falling behind in all five key indicators in comparison with all non-immigrants and with immigrants in smaller communities. Recent immigrants in larger cities have higher unemployment rates, they earn less money and as a result, within larger cities, they are less likely to be homeowners while “recent immigrant homeowner households in the rest of Canada experience a net improvement in housing affordability” (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009: iv). Interestingly, in some municipalities like Waterloo, London, and particularly Regina, immigrants are catching up on a number of indicators. However, low income was the only indicator which showed no change for any of the 24 immigrant communities studied. In other words, recent immigrants in all participating cities were far behind their non-immigrant counterparts in terms of income.

2.3.2 IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES

While immigrants are usually better educated, they are at a disadvantage when compared with their Canadian-born counterparts in terms of employment rate and earnings. According to Statistics Canada, only 75% of internationally-educated immigrants aged 25-64 were employed in 2006 in comparison with 82% of their counterparts educated in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2010). Of one million internationally-educated working immigrants, only half were doing so on a full-time, full-year basis in comparison with over 60% of Canadians with the same characteristics. Moreover, this immigrant group earned close to $9,000 less per year than their Canadian counterparts and only 20% of employed immigrants with post-secondary education reported working ‘in the best corresponding occupation’ which shows low education-job match rates among internationally-trained workers (Plante, 2010). Additionally, immigrant employment outcomes have deteriorated in comparison with those of earlier cohorts and, as a result, there is a higher number of low-income immigrant families and increased immigrant poverty in the last two decades (Li, 2003) while, in the same period, the poverty rate of the Canadian-born population declined (Hiebert, 2006). As mentioned before, recent immigrants are more educated than those who came in previous cohorts. According to Picot et al., since “1992 to 2004, the educational attainment of entering immigrants rose dramatically (among those age 15 years or older, 17% had a degree in the 1992 entering cohort, 45% in the 2004 cohort), and many more were in the “skilled economic” class, with far fewer in the “family” class” (Picot, Hou, and Coulombe, 2008: 396). Nevertheless, very recent immigrants, those who lived in Canada for less than five years, have the lowest employment and wage

rates in comparison with recent and established foreign-trained professionals (Statistics Canada, 2010), and therefore, their returns on internationally-obtained education and experience have decreased dramatically. Moreover, “the dramatic move toward more labor market friendly characteristics of entering immigrants had only a very small effect on poverty outcomes, in part because the relative advantage of holding a degree diminished, and “skilled economic” class immigrants were more likely to enter poverty than their “family” class counterparts” (Picot et al., 2008: 393).24

2.3.3 TORONTO CMA’S SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES25

Understanding the local context of the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) is important, given the focus of this study. Approximately 42% of the population is visible minorities and more than a half of Torontonians over 15-years old are immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2006a). As mentioned before, while the poverty rates for the Canadian-born population have decreased over the last two decades, the gap between the rich and poor has widened. This is particularly evident in the Toronto area with the highest proportion of immigrants living below the poverty line. According to Statistics Canada, there are only 11.7% of low-income non-immigrant families in Toronto CMA, compared with 20% for immigrant families. Moreover, the situation is much worse for recent immigrants who came to Canada between 2001-2006 (39%) compared to immigrants who have been in Canada for at least 15 years – 10.7% (Statistics Canada, 2006a). Additionally, immigrants tend to move to suburban areas (i.e., area code 905) and so called ‘culturally comfortable’ areas with a high concentration of selected ethnic groups. According to Haq (2009: 12-13), these environments play “a particularly important role in helping newcomers secure initial employment … [however, they] also act as social barriers resulting in less interaction with mainstream Ontario and offer fewer opportunities to develop networks in the marketplace”. Additionally, while decentralization is seen as a good thing when immigrants are more evenly geographically distributed, suburbs are not well-equipped to accommodate newcomer needs, and the poverty rates increase. Murdie argued that decentralization can be explained by the re-location of “lower-waged employment opportunities from the inner city to the suburbs” and “the gentrification of many of the inner-city Toronto neighbourhoods that once housed new immigrants” (Murdie, 2008: 8). In their qualitative and spatial research of the immigrant settlement

24 Although the new FSW program evaluation suggests that this trend might be changing, it is too early to confirm that this is the case for the majority of new FSW who have come under new immigration rules. 25 Toronto CMA is smaller than the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). The GTA consists of the City of Toronto and the municipalities of Halton, Peel, York and Durham. Durham and a part of Halton (Burlington) are not included in the Toronto CMA, but a number of other smaller towns are part of this area (Bradford West Gwillimbury, etc.). However, as most of the official employment statistics are available for the Toronto CMA, and TRIEC does not specify the exact geographical boundaries of its operations and instead emphasizes the regional scope, this study refers to these areas interchangeably. More information about the GTA versus the CMA of Toronto can be found at the University of Toronto website. 37

sector in the Toronto CMA (including language training, employment and housing services), Lo and colleagues concluded that the current provision, location and delivery of settlement services in the Toronto CMA did not adequately reflect the diverse needs of decentralized ethnic groups (Lo, Wang, Wang, and Yuan, 2007). In terms of current employment outcomes for immigrants located in Toronto CMA, the participation rate of 25-54 year old non-immigrants was 88.6%, 6 percent higher than for all immigrants in this area (Toronto Immigrant Employment Data Initiative [TIEDI] Labour Force Update, 2011). While the proportion of full-time employment was similar for both groups (90.4% and 89.3%, respectively), the unemployment rate for immigrants of 9.4% was much higher than for Canadian born (5.8%). Additionally, recent immigrants in the Toronto CMA have predominantly business and engineering post-secondary degrees (see Figure 2.3). Over 57,000 immigrants with some sort of engineering degree landed in the Toronto CMA between 2001 and 2006, while the Canadian born population (15 years and older) has significantly more graduates in visual and performing arts, communications technologies, social and behavioural sciences and law. However, from February 2011 onwards, immigrants experienced large job losses in professional, scientific and technical services (ibid). One might conclude that there is a potential mismatch between the demand in the Toronto CMA for workers in this field and the supply of recent immigrants with architecture, engineering and related degrees.

Figure 2.3 Percentage of Toronto CMA Labour Force with Post-Secondary Education by Major Field of Study

Immigrants arrived between 2001-2006 Canadian-born population, 2006

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006b.

2.4 CAUSES OF IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES

In this section, I will discuss nine major reasons cited in the literature as to why immigrants are not able to fully utilize their potential in the Canadian labour market. I divided all the reasons into two categories. The first four reasons fall under individual attributes: (1) immigration class, (2) fluency in English language, (3) essential, soft and literacy skills, and (4) immigrant ability to develop social networks. The remaining five are factors that immigrants have no or very little control over and could be divided into two sub-categories: societal development (e.g., (5) the state of the economy and, consequently, (6) increased numbers of educated Canadians) and institutionalized systemic barriers (e.g., (7) the process of foreign credential recognition, (8) ‘Canadian work experience’ phenomenon, and (9) the issue of racial discrimination.

2.4.1 IMMIGRANT INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES

2.4.1.1 COMPOSITION OF IMMIGRANT CLASSES ADMITTED TO CANADA

In the last decade, over 60% of all immigrants have been of the Economic Class (Figure 2.4). However, there is a false assumption that the majority of immigrants entering Canada go through the point-based selection process. In fact, very few permanent residents are skilled worker principal applicants who went through this careful selection process. Hiebert (2006) suggested that the proportion of skilled worker class immigrants decreased starting from 1980s. Indeed, the composition of economic class immigrants has changed significantly. As can be seen from Figure 2.4, in 2001, economic class immigrants accounted for 63% of all immigrants entering the country. However, out of those, only 23% were principal applicant skilled immigrants and the rest were economic class spouses and dependents, self-employed, PNPs, investors, live-in caregivers and entrepreneurs. Most of these immigrants were not selected based on their professional skills and qualifications and for the majority of these categories, there is no standardized language assessment requirement. (CIC, 2010c). Thus, only 14% of all admitted immigrants in 2001 came as skilled worker principal applicants. In 2010, the proportion of economic class immigrants slightly increased from 63% to 67% (Figure 2.5). Within this class, the proportion of PNPs increased five-fold, a new Canadian Experience category was added, and yet, when combined with skilled worker principal applicants, the total for these three categories is still only 23% and the proportion of FSWs decreased from 23% to 17%. It is a general assumption that those that entered Canada outside the points system might experience deeper challenges in the Canadian labour market (Hiebert, 2006).

Figure 2.4 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 2001

Figure 2.5 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category, 2010

Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 Source: CIC, 2010c.

2.4.1.2 FLUENCY IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE

In 2005, Statistics Canada reported that employment rates of immigrants increased with their ability to speak English, and also that their ability to find “a high-skill job, a job in the intended field, a job similar to the one held before immigrating and a job related to training or education” was impacted by their fluency in an official language (Statistics Canada, 2005). Additionally, a recent Canadian survey, which included 150 senior executives with human resources responsibilities, found that 87% of employers cited “inadequate language skills as a serious barrier for immigrants to finding suitable employment” (COMPAS, 2009: 6). At the same time, York University professor, Jelena Zikic, who surveyed immigrants registered to attend the Internationally-Educated Immigrants (IEP) conference, found that “very few IEP respondents see themselves as having communications difficulties” (ibid: 6). This suggests that employers and immigrants may have different perceptions of linguistic competency.

The gap in understanding of employer expectations by immigrant-job seekers might present a significant problem to immigrant economic integration. In the last twenty years, there have been substantial shifts in immigrant source countries. Instead of immigrants from European countries whose first languages were either English or French we now see more migrants from Asia, Latin America and Africa who have limited fluency in either Canada’s official languages and/or speak with noticeable accents. According to Aydemir and Skuterud (2005: 656), “roughly one-third of the long-term decline in the entry earnings of Canadian immigrant men and women [entering Canada from 1966-2000] can be explained by compositional shifts in language abilities and region of birth”. As can be seen in Figure 2.6, while economic immigrant principal applicants have the highest language fluency rate in both English and French, still close to 10% of this group did not speak either of the official languages and only slightly over 60% showed English language facility (CIC, 2010d).

Figure 2.6 Canadian Permanent Residents by Category and Language Ability, 2010

Source: Reprinted from CIC, 2010d.26 *principal applicants ** spouses, dependents

Finally, research has shown that Canadian employers tolerate only a small range of accents, and that strong language facility has become more critical in our time than in the past, particularly in Westernized workplaces which emphasize teamwork and communication (Boyd, 1999; Bresnahan et al., 2002a, Creese and Kambere, 2003; Preston and Giles, 1997; Scassa, 1994).

2.4.1.3 ESSENTIAL, SOFT AND LITERACY SKILLS

The ability to understand and quickly process information is becoming increasingly important in the knowledge-based economy. Basic literacy skills, such as reading, writing, document use and

26 The reproduction is a copy of an official work that is published by the Government of Canada. It has not been produced in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of the Government of Canada. 41

numeracy, as well as essential skills (computer use, thinking, oral communication, etc.) were identified by the Canadian government as skills that “are used in nearly every job” (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. Literacy-Essential Skills. Definitions). However, according to the International Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey, working age recent and established immigrants (16- 65 year old) scored significantly lower than the Canadian-born population in prose and document literacy, numeracy and problem solving skills in 2003 (Statistics Canada, 2003a).27 According to this survey, proficiency of working age Canadians in literacy skills is associated with their employment outcomes, i.e. the higher the scores, the more likely the survey participant is employed. Additionally, immigrants with English or French as their mother tongue were found to have higher average scores than those without. In 2007, Human Resources and Social Development Canada’s Workplace Skills Branch conducted a survey of 1,500 employers in Canada about their perceptions of the importance of essential skills. Among other findings, it revealed that working with others, oral communications and thinking abilities were rated as ‘very important’ by roughly 90% of all employers. Additionally, at least 80% of all employers ranked basic literacy skills such as reading text, numeracy, using documents, and writing as ‘ very or somewhat important’ (Ecos Research Associates Inc., 2007). A growing body of literature suggests that while 20-30 years ago, technical skills were in high demand, currently, employers increasingly recognize the value of soft skills and social attitudes as well as their role in improved productivity and customer satisfaction (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2011; Peters and Austin, 1985). Laroche and Rutheford (2006) assert that there is tremendous difference between how much value Canadian-born workers and immigrants place on developing soft skills. They argue that while an average Canadian worker’s skill portfolio is 60% soft skills and 40% technical skills, a typical immigrant ratio is 1:9, i.e. immigrants tend to focus more on developing their technical abilities which might not generate the high level of income that immigrants expect from the Canadian labour market. Finally, cultural differences come into play in the workplace environment. Studies have shown that there are significant cultural divergences between Western and Eastern nations in how they approach conflicts (Yu, 2007), what leadership traits are mostly valued (Casimir and Waldman, 2007), or how they respond to criticism (Bresnahan et al., 2002b). Thus, given the importance employers place on essential and basic literacy skills, immigrants with English as a second language and/or those coming from Asian, African and/or Latin American countries might be at a disadvantage when competing with Canadian-born applicants or immigrants

27 Implications for measuring certain dimensions of the survey, which might be influenced by differences in cultures, such as teamwork, were recognized. For example, different behaviours and communication strategies reflecting teamwork skills were identified ‘that were least likely to vary’. However, there was no assessment of the cultural appropriateness of the survey (Murray, Clermont & Binkley. 2005: 242). 42

whose native languages are either English or French and who are accustomed to North American workplace culture.

2.4.1.4 LACK OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

Lack of social networks is frequently referred to as another significant barrier for immigrants to finding adequate employment. Social networks belong to the broader concept of ‘social capital’. The importance of social capital in the labour market has been well-documented by scholars. According to Reitz (2007a: 29), “immigrants who lack friendship networks within the host society are less likely to receive assistance in finding jobs, and those who do not receive such assistance have greater difficulty finding good jobs”. Many scholars focused their research on the role of ethno-specific social capital in the economic settlement outcomes for immigrants. Bauder (2005) illustrated how South Asian immigrants mobilized their community networks to overcome labour market barriers. Ooka and Wellman (2006) provided a thorough overview of existing literature on social capital and networks and concluded that contacts outside one’s ethnic group were frequently rewarded with higher incomes. Similarly, Xue (2008) found that having strong and ethnically diverse social networks (mostly friends and family networks) in the first years after arrival are correlated with the prospect of getting employment in one’s chosen occupation and positively impacts the level of wages. Having professional networks is essential in Canadian labour markets and Canadian-born job seekers learn the importance of networking in Canada early in their lives. However, many immigrants are not familiar or might not be comfortable with the networking process and might have limited social networks upon their arrival to Canada (George and Chaze, 2009). This lack of awareness puts immigrants at a disadvantage when competing with Canadian-born job seekers in a labour market where over 80% of job openings are not advertised but filled in through referrals (Ryerson University).

2.4.2 SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT

2.4.2.1 CHANGES AND FLUCTUATIONS IN THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

There have been fundamental economic changes in the last several decades. Those immigrants who arrived in 1960-1970s enjoyed high demand for both highly skilled and blue-collar workers. Most of these jobs were often offered in unionized environment, which provided good working conditions, stable income and a sense of security (Hiebert, 2006). Additionally, because of ethnic concentrations in the resource, manufacturing and construction sectors, language requirements for low-skill jobs were often not very high. As Hiebert (2006: 195) stated “… immigrants also gravitated to low-level service

jobs in the 1960’s and 70s, but the availability of well-paid blue-collar jobs was central to their economic well-being.” In a knowledge-based economy ‘educational expectations’ are much higher, and as was mentioned before, as contemporary jobs require higher communication skills, employers demand higher language fluency and are less willing to recognize foreign education and experiences. Labour demand in the service industry grew, but fewer Canadians were inclined to do janitorial, domestic, and other service jobs which, subsequently, were filled by new immigrants. On top of it, a substantial number of immigrants entered Canada at a high unemployment rate and newcomers had to compete with Canadian professionals and recent graduates for scarce jobs (Hiebert, 2006). Additionally, “between 1970 and 2006, for instance, the share of jobs in manufacturing declined by 9.1 percent” (Phythian, Walters and Anisef, 2009: 367) and according to Statistics Canada, the manufacturing sector has been in “sharp decline since 2004” (Bernard, 2009). In the same vein, Ken Georgetti, President of the Canadian Labour Congress, proclaimed “Canada’s manufacturing sector is in crisis. We’re losing our best paying and highly skilled jobs at a rate that should have the alarm bells ringing in Ottawa” (CBC News, May 11, 2007). As a result, many newcomers had to take low-skill and low-paid service jobs to support their families while other skilled workers became self-employed and created an ‘ethnic service economy’ phenomena (Hiebert, 2006).

2.4.2.2 INCREASED LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF CANADIAN-BORN WORKERS

As was established before, in general, immigrants are more educated than Canadians28. However, currently, immigrants face more competition from the Canadian-born population which has become more educated than in the past. After World War II, the Canadian government made substantial investments in post-secondary education to support returning war veterans (Seidle, 2010). According to Statistics Canada, “in 1951, only 2% of all Canadians aged 15 and over had university qualifications. Over the next five decades, the proportion of university graduates climbed steadily … and by 2001, it was 15%” (Statistics Canada, 2003b: 6). In the 1960-‘70s, new college programs were introduced, resulting in a twofold increase in college graduates to 36%. Thus, together with university graduates, the proportion of Canadian population with post-secondary degrees climbed to 51% by 2001. Despite common beliefs that immigrants are more educated than Canadian-born population, when Reitz compared educational attainment between recent and established immigrants and native Canadians, he found that “increases in immigrant skills have not kept pace with increased skills in the native-born workforce” (Reitz, 2001b: 595). For both sexes, increase in mean years of education was smaller for the immigrant group than for Canadian-born, for the period between 1981 and 1991. Thus,

28 This reference is to formal education or hard skills. 44

as Hiebert suggested, “while [immigrant] absolute level of human capital has been increasing, their relative educational advantage in the labour force has declined” (Hiebert, 2006: 193).

2.4.3 INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEMIC BARRIERS

2.4.3.1 THE FOREIGN CREDENTIAL RECOGNITION ISSUE

There is a growing body of research which asserts that institutionalized barriers, such as recognition of foreign credentials in Canada, or rather lack thereof, contribute to deteriorating immigrant employment and income outcomes (Basran and Zong, 1998; Girard, 2010; Wanner, 2001; Picot, 2004; Reitz, 2001a; 2001b; 2007a; 2007b). As Girard argues, most of the literature in the area of foreign credential recognition is focused mainly on the increasing earning gaps between immigrants and Canadian-born workers and ‘the return on investment of foreign education and foreign work experience” (Girard, 2010: 8). The complexity of the foreign credential recognition process for an immigrant depends on whether the occupation is in a regulated profession or not. To be licensed in the regulated professions, an immigrant might be required to go through a formal assessment and/or interview with a regulatory body expert panel, pass licensing and other pre-requisite exams and submit a proof of Canadian experience. These might take years. Moreover, each province has its own agency for each profession; credential recognition is not easily transferrable from one province to another; and there is no pan-Canadian authority to evaluate foreign credentials. According to recently published UNESCO report, “there are 13 provincial/territorial jurisdictions, 55 government departments/ministries, more than 50 regulated occupations with more than 400 regulatory bodies, five provincially mandated assessment agencies, two private assessment agencies, and over 270 post- secondary institutions, all of which have some role in recognizing credentials…[plus] there are seven “third party” credential evaluation services across Canada, including five provincially mandated services [and] there are two other private services” (Owen and Lowe, 2008: 12). Additionally, Canadian employers individually assess immigrant employability and, in cases of non-regulated professions, they might not be familiar with or recognize existing credential evaluation organizations, even those established by the provinces (ibid). However, while employers might not be well-equipped to assess immigrant skills and qualifications (Girard, 2010), particularly in non-regulated professions, immigrants could still start from a junior position and move their way up to a job, which utilizes their skills and qualifications. For example, in the accounting field, one might start as a Bookkeeper/Junior Accountant while taking part- time evening accounting courses towards his professional designation. However, in many regulated professions, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, engineers, lawyers, architects, etc. there is generally no

junior or mid level positions for internationally trained workers to start their careers in Canada (Hiebert, 2006; Reitz, 2003). In 2009, the federal government through HRSDC, in collaboration with all provincial/territorial governments, introduced a new framework to improve immigrant labour market integration. While “The Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications” is not a legal document, it shows government commitment to work together to improve the qualification assessment and recognition processes in Canada. The framework places priority on regulated occupations and attempts to develop assessment processes that are fair, transparent, timely and consistent, i.e. recognized in each province and territory. The government allocated $50 million to work collaboratively with the provinces and territories to address the credential recognition issues in Canada (The Government of Canada, 2010a). Ontario was the first province in Canada to introduce legislation that aimed to establish more fair and transparent licensing processes for internationally trained and/or educated applicants. Passed by the provincial government on December 12, 2006, The Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act (FARPA) covers Ontario’s 14 non-health related occupations directly through the laws and 21 health professions through amendments to the Regulated Health Professions Acts, 1991 (Turegun, 2008). The new law required regulatory bodies in Ontario to ensure “transparent, objective, impartial and fair” registration processes. While the introduction of this legislation has been recognized as a significant “political gain for internationally trained professionals and their advocates” (Turegun, 2008: 9), there are a number of substantial limitations in terms of what the law covers and how it is enforced. Firstly, the legislation targets only regulated professions and does not cover trades.29 Secondly, the Act does not apply to all non-health regulatory bodies in Ontario, and health profession bodies are covered by a different legislation. Subsequently, health regulators are not required to make their audit reports public, which diminishes the whole notion of transparency of the process. Additionally, in some regulated professions, formal recognition of immigrant credentials does not warrant access to employment due to the same issues that immigrants in non-regulated professions experience. Finally, the only consequences for regulatory bodies covered by the legislation for non-compliance are fines. These fines are set up to a maximum of $100,000, while operating budgets for some of these agencies exceed one hundred million dollars.30 Thus, it was suggested that “FARPA does not have enough teeth to bring about ‘transparent, objective, impartial and fair’ registration practices on the part of regulatory bodies” (ibid: 9).

29 Trades will be required to follow the fair credential evaluation processes and procedures under the Ontario College of Trades and Apprenticeship Act, 2009, starting from 2012. 30 To review a list of fees for selected Ontario’s regulatory bodies, see Appendix R. 46

2.4.3.2 CANADIAN WORK EXPERIENCE

Given that only 20% of jobs in Canada belong to regulated occupations (The Government of Canada, 2010b), immigrants should not have problems finding employment in non-regulated fields. However, as research has shown, all immigrants overall are lagging behind in employment and income rates. ‘Lack of Canadian work experience’ is frequently cited by scholars as one of the most significant immigrant employment barriers (Alboim and McIssac, 2007; McIssac, 2003). Studies have identified the ‘Canadian work experience’ requirement as an obstacle in the licensing process (Girard and Bauder, 2005) and as the largest barrier to employment, identified by immigrants themselves (Schellenberg and Maheux, 2007), by employment and settlement counsellors (Chetty, 2002) and by employers (Association for New Canadians Newfoundland and Labrador, 2007; Canadian Human Resources Council, 2006; The Brampton Board of Trade, 2007). It is frequently referred to as a ‘Catch 22’ phenomenon as immigrants need ‘Canadian experience’ to be hired, but how can an immigrant get ‘Canadian experience’ if one cannot find a job without it? What is ‘Canadian experience’? Slade (2008: 3) argues that “Canadian work experience is more than an individual attribute that one has or does not have; rather, it has been created as a problem, an ideological construction”. In her research, Slade found that the reference to ‘Canadian work experience’ increased dramatically both in academic and popular media in the 2000s. She contends that “this increase in usage reflects … the rise of work practices that make Canadian work experience into a concept and a problem. These work practices include employers who articulate the need for Canadian work experience as a prerequisite to employment” (ibid: 13). According to Dan Kelly, a senior executive at the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses “Canadian work experience is regarded as being very helpful in terms of ensuring that [the employer] is not taking as big of a risk as they would be without it” (The Charlatan, February 4, 2010). In other words, it is to a certain extent, a warranty for employers who do not want to take risks. Hiebert proposed an alternative explanation based on human capital perspectives: “these problems stem from the self-regulation of the labour market i.e., institutions like professional associations, and employers, place a premium on credentials obtained in English/French countries, and on prior experience of the Canadian labour market for rational, instrumental reasons: workers with these background characteristics are more productive” (Hiebert, 2006: 195).

2.4.3.3 EMPLOYER RACIAL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

Some researchers believe that the challenges immigrants face are institutionalized and have more of a racial discriminatory nature. Canadian immigration policies changed the mosaic of

immigrants and instead of looking-and-sounding-like-Europeans, Canadian employers are increasingly receiving resumes from applicants who belong to visible minority groups. According to The Employment Equity Act, “a visible minority is persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Statistics Canada, Definitions, Data source and methods, Variables). In the 1960s, there were only 300,000 people in Canada who could be classified as visible minority (Pendakur, 2005). By 1981, this group grew to over 1 million people but still represented less than 5% of total Canadian population. In 2006, there were over 5 million individuals who belonged to this group (16% of the total population) and it grew five times faster than Canadian population as a whole (Statistics Canada, 2008b). Similar to Aboriginal people, visible minorities were discriminated against for the last 100 years. The institution of the Chinese head tax (Cho, 2002) and establishment of internment camps for Japanese Canadians during WW II (Omatsu, 1992) are only two examples of discriminatory actions of the Canadian government. Since then, Canada has made incredible progress, given that Chinese and Indo-Canadians were not allowed to vote up until the 1940s (Smith, 2010). In its pursuit of social justice, Canada introduced a number of laws and policies to address the issue of discrimination, including the new Immigration Act (1968), Canadian Human Rights Act (1977), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988), and the Employment Equity Act (1995) (CIC. Laws and Policies). Canadian multiculturalism has become a ‘gold standard’ and has been admired by international leaders. The Aga Khan described Canada as "the most successful pluralist society on the face of our globe and a model for the world" (Stackhouse and Patrick, 2002). However, according to a 2010 report produced by Gay McDougall, the UN’s independent expert on minority issues, “Canada has a long way to go before it can claim to have eliminated racial discrimination … [there are] persistent problems affecting certain ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in Canada” (Smith, 2010, emphasis supplied). In a similar vein, a number of scholars found significant gaps in earnings between either Canadian-born visible minorities and white Canadians or native-born workers and visible minority immigrants (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; 2002; 2011; Skuterud, 2010; Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002; Yoshida 2008). In these studies, scholars argue that the gaps in earnings serve as a proof of discriminatory practices against minority immigrants and/or ethnic Canadians. Another study conducted by economics professor, Philip Oreopoulos found that applicants with English-sounding names were much more likely to be called for interviews than those with Asian names. The author suggests that, the results of the study demonstrate “considerable employer discrimination against ethnic Canadians and immigrants” (Oreopoulos, 2009: 7).

In his research, Turegun, (2008: 5) recognized the introduction of FARPA (2006) as an “antiracist” piece of legislation, since it holds professional bodies accountable for their registration practices”. This legislation challenged the language that regulatory agencies used to justify their ‘exclusionary strategies’ in their defensive statements, i.e. ‘in the public interest’ and ‘to maintain professional standards’. It introduced a new requirement to consider immigrant applicants through ‘transparent and fair’ processes. Additionally, as Turegun points out, the law presents moral or just reasons for hiring immigrants, i.e. their human rights. One of recent developments to address systemic discrimination of visible minorities was the introduction of the National Action Plan Against Racism in 2005. Over $56 million dollars were allocated to fund programs to fight racism and promote practices to “reflect Canada’s commitment to create a fair, just and decent society” (the Government of Canada, 2005a). While government efforts in combating racial discrimination for visible minority Canadians and immigrants are commendable, the evidence suggests that visible minority groups suffer from higher earnings gaps even when third-and- higher-generation Canadians are reviewed (Skuterud, 2010) and they continue to report discriminatory and unjust situations they experience in Canadian society. Bakan and Kobyashi (2007) proposed that one of the reasons for the continuing workplace racial discrimination in Canada lies in the ideological foundation of this legislation. Its lack of advancement could be explained by its very narrowly defined scope (only a limited number of employers are covered), deliberate avoidance of ‘controversial elements’, such as 'affirmative action' and limited enforcement power. Finally, while the above-mentioned nine reasons have been cited frequently in the literature, there are other barriers impeding immigrant economic integration in Canada, and in Ontario in particular. These include the mismatch between newcomer qualifications and the labour market needs of Ontario, i.e. a province has yet to acquire a more independent position in selecting immigrants as do other provinces, such as Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbiavi (Stasiulis, 2011); the effects of anti- Muslim “Islamophobia” post 9/11 attacks, which, most certainly, increased the scope of growing challenges that Muslim immigrants face in the Ontario labour market (Janhevich and Ibrahim, 2004; Hanniman, 2008); the lack of timely and accurate information about the credential evaluation processes as well as lack of access to information for immigrants (Association of Canadian Community Colleges, 2008); and lastly, the consequences of ‘the Harris era’ during which one of the most comprehensive provincial employment equity legislation regimes was repealed by the anti-immigration Conservative government (Bakan and Kobyayshi, 2007; Stasiulis, 2011). Additionally, a crisis situation in Ontario’s settlement sector might significantly impact the outcomes of current and future

newcomers to the province, and particularly those of visible minorities. This will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

2.5 GOVERNMENT ROLES AND RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES

This section provides a brief overview of contemporary Canadian immigration policies and a more detailed discussion about the shifts in the FSW program, the role of municipalities in the immigrant integration process as well as the state of settlement services infrastructure and its funding model.

2.5.1 CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICES SINCE THE 1990S

According to Canada’s Constitution, the federal and provincial governments have ‘concurrent power’ in the area of immigration. While the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over what kind and how many immigrants are allowed in the country, as well as who will become citizens, recently the federal government began to collaborate with lower levels of government on immigration goals and policies. Quebec became the first province in Canada to establish its own immigration department almost fifty years ago (Makarenko, 2010). In 1991, it signed the Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens agreement, the first of its kind, which allowed the province to establish its own immigration targets and selection criteria. Currently, Quebec manages its skilled labour program, separate from the federal Skilled Worker program. It also assumed full responsibility for settlement and integration services with partial federal funding. Since that time, all provinces have signed federal-provincial immigration agreements which vary in their scope and breadth. Each agreement was negotiated separately and, in the last five years, the majority of provinces introduced the Provincial Nominee Programs (PNP) which allowed them to address local specific- labour market needs more efficiently. Manitoba was the first province to use PNP to attract immigrants and since the cap was removed in 2003, close to 8,000 PNPs entered the province only in 2008, accounting for 36% of all PNPs admitted to Canada in that year (Seidle, 2010). Ontario was the last province to sign federal-provincial Immigration Agreement in 2005. It was a historical mark not only for Ontario but for all of Canada since the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) introduced a provision under which municipalities were recognized as partners ‘in planning and discussions on immigration and settlement” (CIC, 2008). This is the first time that all three levels of government in Canada formally agreed to work together on the immigration issues (the Government of Canada, 2005b).

2.5.2 MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY SHIFTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FSW CLASS

Since the introduction of the points system, two major policy and administrative shifts have occurred: Canadian provinces received more and broader responsibilities in the area of immigration (expansion of the Provincial Nominee Program) while the Federal government pushed for so called ‘two-step’ migration programs. This meant that more stringent rules were applied to the Economic class immigrants, and Skilled Immigrant category numbers have decreased while the numbers of temporary workers have increased dramatically. In 2008, Bill C-50, a new, controversial and heavily criticized legislation that gave the Minister broad discretionary power to decide who would be allowed to Canada and who would not, was adopted. The Bill was promoted as a way to decrease the backlog of 900,000 applicants to make the immigration system more flexible, and to address changing labour market needs more efficiently. However, one of the most serious implications of this legislation was that it removed the guarantee that an applicant who met all the requirements would be accepted, i.e. “the visa or document shall be issued” vs. “the visa or document may be issued” (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 11.1 revised in 2008). The new legislation became a law in 2008 and it affected not only new applicants but those who already applied and were awaiting their visas before February 27, 2008. If their applications were not considered as a priority (i.e. having work experience in priority occupations, having an arranged employment in Canada or residing in Canada for at least one year as a temporary foreign worker or an international student), their waiting time would be increased. The new Priority Occupation List included 38 occupations, predominantly in health, finance, resource extraction sectors and in skilled trades. Additionally, on September 17, 2008, a new immigration category, the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) was introduced by the federal government. It allowed temporary foreign workers and international graduates of a Canadian educational institution with Canadian work experience to apply for permanent residency on a fast track basis (8-12 months) while still residing in Canada. One of the major differences between the FSW and the CEC is that the latter is based on a pass/fail versus point-based system. Later, Canada introduced a new list of occupations in demand, which reduced the previous list to 29 occupations. Finally, starting from July 1, 2011, the number of applicants without job offers was set at a maximum of 10,000 and only 500 applications in each occupation would be processed on an annual basis. No cap for FSW applicants with job offers has been placed. However, with the introduction of a new economic class, no additional resources were allocated to process new applications and the number of FSW was reduced by approximately 15% to

allow for the introduction of new economic category – CEC (Lowe, 2010). Additionally, “there have been greater uptake, expansion and support for employer-driven such as Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) and Temporary Foreign Worker Programs or TFWPs” (Lowe, 2010: 25). As can be seen from Table 2.1, the number of TFWs more than doubled from 2001 to 2010, the number of international students increased by 50%, while permanent residents numbers increased only by 12% and Economic class numbers increased by 20%. Meanwhile, Skilled Worker category numbers decreased significantly. According to the Government of Ontario, recent changes to immigration policies, such as the expansion of the PNP in other provincesvii, live-in caregiver and Quebec skilled immigrant programs “have contributed to a decline in FSW class landings in Ontario” (Government of Ontario, 2010, online version). Thus, in 2010, Ontario received 40% fewer FSWs compared to 2001 (53,885 versus 89,078). However, more family class and refugee immigrants are settling in the province, shifting the mosaic of Ontario’s newcomers from predominantly economic class to immigrants “who were not selected on the basis of their human capital” (ibid).

Table 2.1 Comparing Selective Temporary and Permanent Immigration Classes

Category 2001 2005 2010 Change since 2001, % Temporary Foreign Worker (initial 186,798 224,095 432,682 +132% entry, re-entry and still present) Foreign Students (initial entry, re-entry 185,948 221,369 278,146 +50% and still present) Permanent Residents 250,638 262,241 280,681 +12%

Economic Class 155,716 156,312 186,913 +20%

Skilled Worker (principal applicants) 58,910 52,269 48,821 -17%

Source: CIC, 2010a.

2.5.3 ROLE OF MUNICIPALITIES IN IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Municipalities face unprecedented challenges in their efforts to accommodate the needs of newcomers (Qadeer and Agrawal, 2011). A recent report by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), Starting on Solid Ground: The Municipal Role in Immigrant Settlement, identified three major barriers to immigrant successful integration – access to adequate employment, housing and public transportation. Additionally, as Canada is in ‘the global race for talent’, the report emphasized the importance of solid municipal infrastructure that ensures a high quality of life in order to attract a talented workforce to Canadian cities. The report maintained that there is “$123 Billion municipal

infrastructure deficit, chronic homelessness, and growing traffic gridlock” (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2011: 12). According to Ray, inclusive urban environments rely on: street design, pricing and availability of public transportation, location and accessibility of employment, management of schools, management of police services, economic development that benefits a range of social groups, etc. (Ray, 2003). As the Canadian urban population increases in number and becomes more ethnically diverse, municipalities are under pressure to revise existing policies and decision-making processes. In physical and land use planning, for example, existing municipal zoning by-laws might not work for ethnic retailers who would like to operate in accordance with their culture or traditions, i.e., having tables on the streets. Additionally, Qadeer (2000; 2009) suggests that current housing policies which limit the availability of subsidized housing only to nuclear families might affect multi-generational and large immigrant families. Burial regulations might be conflicting for different religions. Open park spaces, as they were designed by Canadian engineers and planners 20-30 years ago, might not accommodate the leisure needs of ethnic communities. Additionally, newcomers might experience challenges when interacting with local governments, as immigrants might have trust issues when dealing with authorities based on past experiences in their home countries and existing ethnic stereotypes in the mainstream media. Ley and Murphy (2001: 122) echo Qadeer in saying that “the diversity of immigrant origins introduces new challenges in terms not only of language, but also of religion, schooling, service needs, and the definition of the family, and thus the family home”. Having or not having places of worship in a location of residence might influence new resident decisions to stay or leave. So, the lack of a mosque was blamed for driving Muslim immigrant professionals away from Prince Edward Island, an area which desperately needed doctors and engineers (CBC, October 27, 2009). In order to address these issues, planners started to introduce new policies and practices in their consultation processes and planning of public and built spaces (Shcherbyna, 2011). Sandercock writes about how the nature and the delivery of many social programs have been modified to attend to newcomer needs and how cities like Vancouver began to introduce new positions, such as a ‘Multicultural Planner’ to “instruct and advise staff in other City departments on engaging diverse communities in civic processes, from neighbourhood planning to arts and cultural initiatives.” (Sandercock et al., 2009: 8). In 2002, Frisken and Wallace published a study which compared the responses of seven GTA municipalities, including the City of Toronto, to address immigrant settlement challenges. The key challenges identified by interviewed municipal and community agency workers included: • “the pace of change in the region’s population and the lack of information needed to plan for new immigrant groups; • overcoming language and cultural barriers when communicating with immigrant clients;

• making municipal councils aware of and sympathetic to the service needs of increasingly diverse populations; • a loss of financial support and leadership from the provincial government; • adjustments necessitated by provincial downloading; … • differences in the capacity and level of awareness of agencies across the GTA that are called on to meet immigrant settlement challenges” (Frisken and Wallace, 2002: ix)

There are other factors that might hinder public sector workers’ capacities to attend to the special needs of newcomers. First and foremost, cities have to serve all the residents regardless of their backgrounds and it is not easy ‘to balance the preferences and demands of the Canadian-born population against those of immigrant newcomers’ (Frisken and Wallace, 2002: 3). As an example, Toronto’s immigrant population is not represented by one or two ethnic groups but rather is a mosaic of over 200 nationalities which might sometimes experience conflicting interests and require somewhat different approaches in settlement (City of Toronto website, Toronto’s racial diversity). While demands for such special services are growing in Toronto, the resources are dwindling. After the introduction of the Government Expenditure Restraint Act (1991), Canadian municipalities gradually assumed social services responsibilities which were not previously part of their portfolios, i.e. emergency, social housing, welfare and community health services (Dewing and Leman, 2006). At the same time, municipality revenue is limited to property taxes which do not grow with the economy to the same extent, as do other taxes. Besides, senior government provides inadequate funding with tight control over the design and implementation of city programs (ibid: 17). Thus, new responsibilities added to Canadian municipalities resulted in inadequate resources in the social service sector and made it even more difficult for cities to operate and serve their residents. Finally, as many new Canadians are not allowed to vote until they become citizens, their settlement challenges could be ‘politically irrelevant’ to civic officials and ‘are unlikely to enter into the electoral calculations of political office-seekers’ (Frisken and Wallace, 2002: 4,5). It might take extra efforts for social planners and other civic bureaucrats to convince local Councillors to devote funding to initiatives that are out of direct municipal jurisdiction and do not benefit their voters/tax payers (ibid). To conclude, having adequate access to information about municipal services, an ability to obtain affordable housing, and enrolling kids in schools and childcare centres are all important factors of successful immigrant settlement. However, securing adequate employment is foremost a central aspect of successful immigrant establishment in Canada as participation in the labour market gives immigrants a sense of belonging, inclusion and full citizenship (Omidvar and Richmond, 2003). A 2004 study on municipal immigration issues conducted by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2004: 7) concluded that: “support for a rapid transition into the work place contributes directly to

enhancing immigrants’ financial stability, which in turn eases demands on other services”. In cities with a large influx of immigrants “employment was cited as the primary area of urgency” (ibid).

2.5.4 THE SETTLEMENT SECTOR CRISIS AS PART OF THE PROBLEM

There is a growing body of literature focusing on the role of the Canadian settlement sector in the immigrant integration process. It is suggested that there is a connection between the philosophy which guided the development and implementation of the settlement services model in Canada and immigrant poor employment outcomes. The Canadian government started to fund settlement services in 1949 which aimed to help war and Soviet Union refugees to adjust to a new life in Canada (Biles, 2008). Following that, starting from 1953, the majority of provinces introduced some type of language training programs funded by the federal government. According to Richmond and Shields (2005: 515), “The settlement process is a lifelong journey. … Some aspects of the process even continue into the second and third generation ”. They recognized three stages of immigrant integration, where in the first stage, immigrants need to get access to short-term housing and language training, enroll kids into schools, access health services, etc. Once basic needs are taken cared of, immigrants start looking for jobs and seek professional training to improve their employment opportunities. After immigrants are satisfied with their employment situation, in the final integration stage, they might become more active civically and, hopefully, develop a stronger sense of belonging in Canada. Richmond and Shields argue that, traditionally, the Canadian government puts more policy and funding emphasis on the first stages of the settlement process. Also, a number of programs and policies falling under the third stage were developed to combat racism, address institutional barriers and assist new Canadians to become more active citizens. However, the middle settlement phase, where immigrants enter the labour market to find professional employment, has ‘fallen between the cracks’ as no single government agency is as responsible for the evaluation of immigrant foreign credentials as it is in Australia (Hawthorne, 2006) and “there is a lack of coordination and integration of efforts for two of three stages of settlement” (Richmond and Shields, 2005: 516). Additionally, unlike the case of other developed countries, settlement services were historically delivered by third parties – community agencies which are funded by different levels of government (Penninx, 2003). According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, by 2008 it had 300 contractual agreements with service provider organizations (Biles, 2008). Traditionally, the Canadian government funded newcomer adjustment services for the first three years after their arrival. However, as newcomer integration processes become increasingly more complex, federal and provincial settlement programs are lagging behind in terms of the scope and depth of immigrant needs. Additionally, starting from 2001, the settlement sector saw significant changes in funding mechanisms from a more stable or core funding

to short-term contracts (Richmond and Shields 2005). The contemporary funding system is set up in such a way that settlement agencies have to compete with each other for government funding and even when they succeed, usually funding is provided on a short-term (one to two-year basis) and the government has strict control over the expected outcomes and spending. This new approach generated business-like competition between community agencies, which resulted in higher survival rates of larger community agencies, and, consequently, the monopolization of settlement services by organizations which could afford to allocate adequate resources for proposal writing and competition. Thus, smaller ethno-specific organizations are quickly disappearing. Moreover, the settlement sector is progressively losing its advocacy voice, as agencies are afraid of not getting government contracts. According to Slade, as of 2009, one of the conditions of settlement funding is that organizations were only allowed to spend 5% of their funds on advocacy (via email communication, December 15, 2011). Richmond and Shields (2005) warn that the decreased capacity of the settlement sector to have an independent advocacy voice negatively affects the community sector, diminishes its role in promoting societal well-being, and raises the issue of public accountability in a democratic state. Also, there is a definite detachment between federal policy, wherein immigration is seen as an economic engine for the country, yet the immigrant settlement sector is perceived as delivering mainly social services “making them more amenable to cuts by a deficit- slashing government” (Stasilus, 2011: 4). It is important to note that despite the pressures that community-based organizations face from the government, they continue to make important contributions to immigrants’ settlement processes. Finally, to complicate the situation, there are a number of government departments which fund settlement services. Citizenship and Immigration Canada is recognized as the lead federal immigration department. It is not only responsible for the selection of immigrants and refugees, but it also allocates funding for settlement programs and it is the major funding agency in this area. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada is another government agency which funds labour market- related services that immigrants can access. Finally, there is Heritage Canada, which funds antiracism and other multicultural programs to better facilitate newcomers and diverse population social inclusion. The settlement funding allocation formula (which includes basic settlement services, language training and anti-racism initiatives) is based on the number and categories of immigrants (with higher allocation for large refugee groups due to their special needs) and on the jurisdictional capacity to provide settlement services as some provinces are in less advanced stages and are therefore less prepared (FCM, 2011). As was briefly mentioned before, overall settlement funding in Canada has more than tripled from 2005-2006 to 2012-2013 (from less than $200M to almost $600M). However, while funding allocation to other provinces has gone up, Ontario’s portion of funding for settlement services

has decreased from $346.5M in 2011-2012 to $314.9M in 2012-2013 (CIC, 2011c). The decrease reflects the changes in immigrant settlement patterns, whereby Ontario’s share of immigration in Canada has declined from 64% in 2005 to 52% in 2010. Thus, Ontario received 63% of settlement funding or $3,400 per immigrant compared to $2,900 for all other provinces, with the exception of Quebec which receives $5,000 per immigrant. (Keung, 2011a; Pagliaro and Mahoney, 2010). According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The end of the existing agreement [with Ontario] is an opportunity to ensure that settlement funding is more fairly allocated where newcomers are choosing to live. Ontario will receive over 300% more than British Columbia, which will receive the next highest allocation for 2011–12” (CIC, 2010e, emphasis supplied). Additionally, as result of a Strategic Review in 2010, settlement funding allocation across Canada was reduced by 5% for 2011- 2012 as the total number of immigrant arrivals shrunk from over 280,000 in 2010 to approximately 250,000 in 2011 (CIC, varied years). Over 80% (or $43M) of the cuts for 2011-2012 came out of Ontario’s share. In the last two decades, Ontario has been accepting more immigrants than any other province in Canada (CIC, various years). However, the settlement and integration funding awarded to the province has not increased since 1996 when it received an increase of 50% over the $70M base allocation, which still did not reflect the fair share of settlement funding per capita at that time (OCASI, 2009). As the number of immigrants settling in Ontario grew, the demands for settlement and integration services dramatically increased. The federal government attempted to recognize this historic underfunding of Ontario’s settlement sector by allocating $1,460 Billion for the period of 2005 to 2010 under the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement, (COIA); $540M represented the base Ontario allocation and $920M was an additional amount allocated under the COIA (The Government of Ontario, Chapter 10). However, as of 2011, the federal government had under-spent $207.4M from COIA which partially came about as a result of government’s limited administrative capacities to process a large number of contribution agreements. Understandably, such dramatic cuts generated negative reactions from the general public, the settlement sector and the Government of Ontario as neither a transitional plan was introduced nor transparent consultations conducted31. The province of Ontario did allocate $500,000 to support the most impacted agencies but “the relief money can be spent on administrative and core functions rather than direct services to newcomers” (Keung, 2011). Finally, no adequate timeframe was adopted to offset the potentially devastating impact on the sector. As a result, the agencies serving some of the most vulnerable segments of the population (such as South Asian women and Francophone Immigrant

31 In January 2011, CIC sent a memo to 26 settlement agencies forbidding them to discuss recent cuts and/or meet regarding this issue. When this fact became public, CIC suggested that “the email was sent “by mistake,” with incorrect information” (Keung, 2011b). 57

communities from French-speaking Africa, Haiti and the Middle East) are being severely impacted. Combined with reductions in funding announced in 2010, Ontario’s immigrant and refugee serving sector faces ‘unprecedented’ challenges whereby the smallest and/or highly specialized agencies will suffer the most, and as Toronto Liberal MP Bob Rae concluded, these were the most “harsh, draconian and inexplicable cuts to the most vulnerable people in our midst” (CBC News, December 23, 2010). These hefty cuts present significant challenges for settlement agencies to provide adequate support to immigrants and send an alarming message about future policy directions of the Government of Canada in this area. (For impacts on Ontario’s settlement infrastructure, see OCASI 2011a).

2.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

As is evident from the literature, the employment successes of immigrants who arrived in Canada in the last two decades seem to be on the decline when compared with the Canadian-born population and/or with earlier immigrant cohorts32. Additionally, despite controversial evidence of immigration’s economic impact and its role in solving Canadian demographic challenges, the Canadian government has been accepting hundreds of thousands of immigrants annually. The changes in the point system, introduced during the 2000s, were recently evaluated by the Canadian government and it appears that employment outcomes of immigrants who came under the new requirements have improved. However, more research should be done to establish a causal relationship between implemented changes in the point system and reported immigrant labour market successes. Besides, a better evaluation of the reliability of entrance assessment tests for skilled immigrants (language, etc.) is required to ensure that they meet employer expectations. Furthermore, more research is needed to validate high levels of immigration, not only as a short-term labour market policy tool which promotes employer interests (i.e. expansion of PNPs) but as a long-term economic and social growth generator for the whole country. The government has introduced a number of policy responses to address immigrant employment challenges. However, there are gaps between government policy directions and the settlement needs of recent immigrants, e.g., the settlement sector infrastructure, and its funding model impose additional challenges for immigrants to access adequate resources. Furthermore, while there is a

32 With the exception of Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker program which showed that both employment and earning outcomes have improved for after-IRPA skilled immigrants, i.e. those who were processed after 2002. However, it should be noted that sample of evaluation is not representative, i.e. ethnic characteristics were not reflective of the total sample (11.2% of British immigrants participated in the survey vs. 6.6% in total sample; 8.3% immigrants from India vs. 16.8% in total sample; 6.9% immigrants from China vs. 15.8%). Additionally, those immigrants who participated in the survey were more educated and more likely to speak English as their mother tongue. 58

strong logic behind federal government attempts ‘to advance fairness’ in allocating settlement funding across all Canadian provinces, COIA’s under-spending fails to recognize the historic fiscal gap in settlement funding to the province with the largest immigrant population and significant influx of newcomers. Finally, while there are substantial numbers of studies which focus on immigrant integration challenges, there seems to be a gap in the literature with respect to successful immigrant labour market integration solutions in Canada. This thesis aims to address this gap by exploring the success of TRIEC as an organizational model, which brought together multiple stakeholders, including government, settlement agencies, regulatory bodies and the business community. Through the exploration of TRIEC’s success factors and by comparing TRIEC’s activities with those of other IECs, the study aims to identify critical success factors that greatly contributed to the perceived success of TRIEC. Additionally, this study explores the role of municipalities in addressing immigrant employment challenges, including the role that city leaders and bureaucrats played in the development of the most successful Canadian multi-stakeholder collaboration to address immigrant employment issues. Given the significance of the ‘racial discrimination’ barrier identified by other scholars who explored immigrant employment hurdles in the Canadian labour market, and those who specifically focused on TRIEC and the TSCA / CivicAction network, I explore how TRIEC attends to the moral and ethical dimension of immigrants’ misfortunes. The next chapter will provide a detailed review of TRIEC’s activities and achievements.

CHAPTER 3: TRIEC AND ITS PROGRAMS

TRIEC is a citizen’s response to a stubborn problem. It is based on the premise that the GTA will not prosper if skilled immigrants do not.

-Leadership Message (TRIEC, 2004)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

TRIEC is a multi-stakeholder collaboration that aims to address immigrant employment barriers at the systemic level. It brings together players from various sectors including businesses, immigrant serving and other community agencies, post-secondary institutions, regulatory bodies and three levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal). In fact, TRIEC was the very first initiative in Canada to have brought together all three levels of government to discuss and act upon identified immigrant employment barriers. Additionally, TRIEC introduced a new concept in the area of immigrant economic integration, that of employer engagement. Instead of focusing on immigrant deficiencies and trying to help newcomers with language/job search training TRIEC decided to employ business reasoning to argue for immigrant hiring and engage employers in problem-solving. The active engagement of high profile employers became TRIEC’s special ‘know-how’ and brand. This Chapter provides a detailed overview of the history and the development of TRIEC and its programs. It delves into the origins of TRIEC, its goals and objectives as well as its past and existing structures. Finally, it provides an overview of TRIEC’s funding and funders as well as summarizing TRIEC success factors identified by other researchers.

3.2 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF TRIEC

TRIEC’s ultimate goal was to bring together diverse stakeholders in Toronto’s labour market, i.e., businesses, immigrant serving and other community agencies, post-secondary institutions, regulatory bodies and three levels of government, to develop and implement “practical solutions that lead to meaningful employment for skilled immigrants.” (TRIEC. 2006. Sec 1:3). To achieve this, TRIEC focused on three core objectives: 1. “Increase access and availability of services and programs to immigrants that will facilitate their effective inclusion in the labour market; 2. Work with key stakeholders to build their capacity to better relate to skilled immigrants;

3. Work with all orders of government (federal, provincial and municipal) to increase public policy and programming coordination and cooperation in the Toronto Region” (TRIEC Annual Review, 2006 Sec 1:3).

3.3 TRIEC’S HISTORY

TRIEC was formed in September 2003 as one of the first projects of a Toronto City Summit Alliance (the TCSA, currently known as Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance, aka CivicAction). In June 2002, a City Summit was convened by then mayor Mel Lastman and funded by the City of Toronto. A large group of civic and business leaders was invited to attend a one-day conference to discuss the issues that the Toronto region was facing and to identify the region’s strengths and weaknesses. Over 140 people attended the conference, among them David Pecaut, a prominent business and civic leader, who gave an inspirational keynote speech at the event. On that day, he proclaimed that the Summit should not be a one-day event and that an alliance should be created to act on the identified issues. Pecaut made a call for civic leaders to stop talking and to generate solutions to the key challenges the region faced: “finance, infrastructure, education, immigration, and the underlying health of our regional economy” (Toronto City Summit Alliance, 2003. Introduction). Good, who for the last ten years has examined municipal multicultural polices, suggested in her earlier research, that the TCSA was “a part of an urban autonomy movement in Canada seeking a “New Deal” for Canadian cities including a new fiscal and political relationship with provinces and the federal government … [and it] emerged as a result of a leadership vacuum at upper levels of government and a confluence of interests between former Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman and prominent actors in civil society” (Good 2004: 22). Thus, a coalition of civic and business leaders was convened, with David Pecaut as a Chair. Other prominent bureaucrats such as Shirley Hoy, at that time Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Toronto, were also involved in the TCSA. A coalition brought together leaders from a broad range of sectors including representatives from public agencies, the business community, unions, post-secondary educational agencies, scholars and social services. It was led and dominated by the concerns of ‘a globally-oriented business elite’, who expressed their frustration with the government’s oversight of urban needs and issues in the GTA region, whose prosperity, as business leaders believed, should emanate from pure economic perspectives. In April 2003, the TCSA produced a report entitled “Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region” which proposed practical solutions to city challenges that were prioritized by Summit members. The Steering Group members came up with thirteen vision statements, one of which was “to become a center of excellence in integrating immigrants” (Toronto City Summit Alliance, 2003: 19). It is important to note that the challenges of immigrant integration in this Action Plan were also

presented from a purely ‘global competitiveness’ point of view. While the report recognized that immigrants “… should play an important role in our region’s economic, social and political life” (ibid: 19), the reasoning for hiring immigrants is based on their purely economic advantage to the region:

“ The large numbers of immigrants in our region are an unparalleled competitive advantage in today’s global economy. … Toronto is not fully capitalizing on this multicultural and highly skilled labour force advantage. … In order to capitalize on the advantage of immigration, we need to improve our ability to address the second stage needs of new immigrants…” (ibid:19, 20, emphasis supplied).

The creation of TRIEC emerged as one of the recommendations to improve immigrant employability and find solutions to assist skilled immigrants to enter the labour market at the level that is appropriate to their qualifications and experiences. It was envisioned that the Council would serve as a vertical coordination body between employer and immigrant-serving agency communities. It would engage multiple stakeholders in the Toronto region and bring three levels of government together ‘to improve information sharing for planning purposes and ensure accountability and predictability of funding” (ibid: 20). More importantly, TRIEC was envisioned as an action-oriented and employer-led enterprise. Ratna Omidvar and Alan Broadbent, Executive Director and Founder of the Maytree Foundation, were invited to participate on the TCSA Immigration Working Group and Maytree Foundation agreed to be a ‘hosting agency’ for TRIEC for the first two years.33 By that time, the Maytree was already recognized as a champion and well-known advocate in the area of immigrant integration. For years, the organization acted on its mandate – poverty reduction and equal opportunities for everyone in Canada. Prior to TRIEC, Maytree mostly funded other organizations to develop and administer projects and/or conduct research. As discussed earlier in this paper, immigrants are one of the most impoverished population group in Toronto. Thus, it was a logical step for Maytree to direct its funding and efforts towards solutions that create opportunities for immigrants to connect with the local labour market. What were new was the focus and the language of organization, which shifted from the social justice reasoning to one of economic advantage. In the same year the TCSA was formed, the Maytree Foundation and public policy expert Naomi Alboim co-wrote and released a paper titled “Fulfilling the Promise: Integrating Immigrant Skills into the Canadian Economy” (Alboim and Maytree Foundation, 2002). Ratna Omidvar and Naomi Alboim travelled across the country and hosted a number of consultations with other experts and leaders in the field of immigrant integration. One of the recommendations in their paper was the creation of a multi-stakeholder national group in Canada to address immigrant labour challenges at the systemic level. After several months of discussions with industry experts throughout the country a more

33 From interview #3. Category A. July 12, 2011. 62

local rather than national approach was embraced. The difference between TRIEC and other Maytree initiatives is that it took the administration of TRIEC in-house and Ratna Omitvar, who was Maytree’s Executive Director, became the Executive Director of TRIEC. Consequently, Maytree’s staff became involved in the development of the Council and its programs. Thanks to connections that Alan Broadbent and David Pecaut brought to TRIEC, a very influential business leader, Dominic D’Alessandro, who was then the President and CEO of Manulife Financial, agreed to Chair the Council. Under his leadership many doors opened and it was easier to engage other influential decision-makers in the initiative. The first meeting of TRIEC was attended by at least 120 leaders including Ministers, corporate Presidents, CEOs and elected officials, including the Mayor of Toronto. At that first meeting in November 2003, TRIEC was launched and its first program, entitled the Career Bridge pilot project, an internship program for immigrants, was introduced to the business community. During the meeting, attendees were asked to select areas where they would like to be involved. These themes identified directions for TRIEC’s Working Groups. In November 2004, less than a year after the launch of Career Bridge, a new initiative – the Mentoring Partnership – was introduced with Toronto Mayor David Miller giving the keynote speech at the program launch. Since 2003, TRIEC has introduced a variety of new initiatives. Some were built on programs delivered by service providers, but were either restructured and/or scaled up, like Career Bridge and the Mentoring Partnership. Others were quite new and a number of innovative ideas were introduced to assist employers in tapping into the immigrant talent pool. They aimed to provide employers with tools and resources (e.g., www.hireimmigrant.ca); to raise awareness of the issue of immigrant employment barriers; to recognize employers with outstanding immigrant hiring practices (e.g., Immigrant Success Awards); and finally, to assist immigrant professional organizations to build and expand their capacities to advocate and connect with each other (e.g., Immigrant Professional Networks). From the beginning, all the programs and initiatives had one thing in common – they all developed some kind of partnership and utilized existing community resources but they also promoted only the business case for hiring immigrants while omitting some other important reasons. Not one single project generated public debate or a public educational campaign on the moral reasoning of hiring immigrants or uncovering the social injustice situation when immigrants are being discriminated against in the labour market based on their race, place of origin, nationality etc. This important point will be discussed later in this thesis.

3.4 TRIEC GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

For the first a couple of years, TRIEC was a project of the Maytree Foundation. Thus, it did not have a formal governance structure. At different stages, TRIEC tried different governance models including creating a Council, Circle of Champions (Mentoring Partnership), Working Groups, Advisory / Steering Committees and, finally a Board of Directors. They were not mutually exclusive but rather co-existing to fulfill different purposes. Over time, this initial governance model would change to adjust to new circumstances. A more detailed overview of the governance model will be discussed later in this Chapter.

3.4.1 LEADERSHIP AND FOUNDING MEMBERS

TRIEC became well known for its ability to achieve results through a unique leadership model where employers, particularly prominent business leaders, were actively involved in crafting solutions. Dominic D’Alessandro, President and CEO of Manulife Financial became the first Chair of TRIEC. Additionally, Deane Bean, Executive Vice-president, Corporate Affairs and Human Resources of Manulife became TRIEC’s Co-Chair. Having these high-profile decision-makers and business leaders showed an unprecedented level of executive commitment from one of the largest Canadian corporations to tackle the issue of immigrant employment. Manulife ‘walked the talk’. Its commitment was not only about the visible involvement of the top company executives as Chairs of TRIEC’s Council but also because the company championed several TRIEC projects and participated in many different ways to support TRIEC and its programs. To name a few: Manulife staff served on TRIEC Working Groups; it was recognized as one of six most active recruiters of Career Bridge interns in 2004; Dominic D’Alessandro was listed as one of the Mentoring Circle Champions in the same year; the company’s immigrant hiring practices were featured at the hireimmigrants.ca website; Manulife has provided sponsorship and in-kind support since 2003 (facilities, etc.). Even when Dominic D’Alessandro and Deane Bean stepped down as Chair and Co-Chair in 2009 and passed TRIEC’s leadership torch to Gordon M. Nixon, President and CEO, Royal Bank of Canada, one of Manulife Vice-Presidents stayed on as a TRIEC Board member to continue showing the company’s commitment to TRIEC (TRIEC, 2004-2009). Three other leadership figures are worth mentioning. Alan Broadbent, Chairman of the Maytree Foundation, is also Chairman and CEO of the Avana Capital Corporation, an organization that created and funded a number of civic engagement projects that aim to strengthen Canadian civic society. Besides being a businessman and philanthropist, he is a well-known expert in urban issues and recently published the book, Urban Nation: Why We Need to Give Power Back to the Cities to Make 64

Canada Strong (Broadbent, 2008). This book, along with other ideas showcases, praises and promotes local citizen action groups for coming together to make their cities better places. Because of his ‘behind- the-scene’ role in promoting the ‘cities’ agenda for the last 15 years, Broadbent was invited to become a part of the Toronto City Summit Alliance in 2002 and was able to introduce Ratna Omidvar to the Toronto corporate leaders circle. Ratna Omidvar nurtured and championed the idea of multi-stakeholder collaboration and employer engagement long before TRIEC was formed. As an immigrant herself, Ratna was passionate and knowledgeable about the issue and was well positioned to become its leader. Also, she worked for one of Toronto’s immigrant serving agencies before joining the Maytree Foundation. As early as in 1990s, Maytree was already strongly involved in the social change movement and advocacy and policy development. For example, in 1992, it co-founded the Caledon Institute of Social Policy, which is known for its critical voice in social policy and educating the public on income security and poverty- related issues. However, after Ratna joined Maytree as Executive Director, the Foundation became particularly vocal on the topic of immigrant employment. Through the Caledon Institute, which Maytree founded, a number of studies were conducted, which called on cities and senior levels of government to take actions and make changes in the area of immigrant economic integration. Elizabeth McIsaac, who later became Executive Director of TRIEC, has been involved in the project since its inception. She held a variety of positions at Maytree, including that of Director of Policy and co-authored a number of papers on the topic of immigrant employment challenges. Prior to that, she was Executive Director of the Association of International Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Thus, she brought strong policy development expertise in the area of foreign credential recognition as well as hands-on experience in working closely with immigrants and refugees. This combination of knowledgeable, passionate community leaders and high-profile corporate executives created a powerful leadership engine to generate a unique level of local collaboration and innovation, although the lenses of equality and social justice in addressing immigrant employment misfortunes were replaced with more promising and better-funded ideas of ‘regional prosperity’ and ‘global competitiveness’.

3.4.2 TRIEC’S COUNCIL AND BOARD

According to the 2004 TRIEC Annual Review, over 250 citizens were involved in TRIEC in 2003-2004. There were over 60 Council members who were divided into twelve category groups. These were: Chair and Co-Chair (2), Community (10), Employers (10), Municipal Government (8), Post- Secondary Institutions (6), Advisors (6), Occupational Regulatory Bodies (5), Expert Funders (4), Federal Government (4), Labour (3), Ontario Provincial Government (2), Council Secretariat (2),

Credential Assessment Services (1). Additionally, the Mentoring Circle of Champions was introduced in the 2004 Report. These 43 champions were CEOs, Vice-presidents, Presidents, Chairs, Chiefs, Directors and Partners, i.e. major business executive decision makers in the GTA. This list demonstrated the criteria that TRIEC used when people were invited to become Council members – i.e., they had to be in high-profile positions. According to one of my key informants, another important feature of the Council was to be inclusive and to represent the voices of those affected by the issue. The list above shows that TRIEC did make significant efforts to reach out to many players that were identified in the White Paper “Fulfilling the Promise”. However, as TRIEC’s Board is dominated by business representatives the question remains: to what degree is the decision-making process democratic? Did Council members that represent different categories have equal opportunities in participating or was the process influenced by the most powerful Council members – employers and/or staff? Stasiulis (2011: 13) has raised the same concerns about MSCs when asking: “who sits at the ‘table’ that is often mentioned with respect to these initiatives, especially among ‘social forces’, and what the impacts are of the exclusions?” In 2008, TRIEC moved from an individual to an organizational membership base, as reflected in TRIEC’s Annual Reviews. Thus, from 2004-2007, TRIEC Council members were listed by individual names; in 2008 all Council members were divided into Organizational (47) and Individual (8) memberships. This move is believed to have created a better responsibility and accountability structure for organizations to join. Additionally, three membership criteria were introduced. According to TRIEC staff, in order to remain as a Council member, organizations have to (1) be involved in one of TRIEC’s activities; (2) be champions of programs, e.g., media spokespersons and (3) provide input through Advisory/Working /Ad hoc Groups. In the 2006 Annual Review, TRIEC reported its plans to incorporate as a not-for-profit charitable organization in 2007 and fourteen future Board members were identified. Accordingly, in 2007, TRIEC was incorporated and a formal Board of Directors consisting of fifteen individuals was formed. As mentioned before, it was mostly composed of corporate leaders and all 2006 Board members remained on the Board in 2007. Ratna Omidvar became the Chair of the TRIEC Board of Directors and Elizabeth McIsaac became its Executive Director. Since 2006, there has been at least one Board member who either benefited from TRIEC’s programs and/or represented an immigrant-led non-profit group. In 2009, Gordon M. Nixon, President and CEO, RBC became TRIEC’s Chair and Zabeen Hirji, Chief Human Resources Officer, RBC became Co-Chair of TRIEC. By 2012, seven individuals were on the board for over five years. Additionally, the same three corporations remained on the board since its inception but they were represented by different employees.

3.4.3 TRIEC’S WORKING GROUPS / ADVISORY COMMITTEES

At TRIEC’s launch in September 2003, all invited guests were asked to identify their areas of interest under six headings. Accordingly, the following Working Groups were formed: 1. Internship for Internationally Trained Professionals – Career Bridge Advisory Group 2. Employer Promising Practices Working Group 3. Information, Public Awareness and Recognition Working Group 4. Mentoring Working Group 5. Occupation and Licensing Bridge Working Group 6. Intergovernmental Relations Committee (IGR)

All Working Groups were asked to develop project ideas/action plans in their respective areas. All but one of the Working Groups produced such plans for new projects, which were further developed by TRIEC/Maytree staff and funded by either corporate partners and/or government funding agencies. The Occupation and Licensing Bridge Working Group was the only committee, which did not come up with a ‘fast-result’ plan. No reference to the work of this group is found in any of TRIEC’s reports or documents. The Career Bridge Advisory Group worked on the expansion and enhancement of a recently launched immigrant internship project. The Employer Promising Practices Working Group participated in the development of tools and resources for employers, i.e. hireimmigrants.ca website, etc. The Information, Public Awareness and Recognition Working Group worked on developing the Raising Public Awareness campaign, which started with the initiation of the Immigrant Success Award in 2005 and was fully launched in 2006 with multiple initiatives supporting the campaign. The Mentoring Working Group embarked on further development of the model for the Mentoring Partnership Initiative, which was launched in 2004. While there is no report on the results of the Occupation and Licensing Bridge Working Group in TRIEC Annual Reviews, according to one of its participants, this group provided an excellent opportunity for building bridges between occupational bodies and post-secondary educational institutions. S/he provided an example of discussions between York University representatives and the Association that administers licensing for nurses in Ontario about how to reduce the barriers for internationally trained nurses or ‘the best way for foreign trained nurses to get accelerated into the [university] program’. Finally, the IGR Committee was created to provide an opportunity for three levels of government to start the discussion about challenges in the area of immigrant integration (i.e., vertical approach). Additionally, different ministries and departments, which fund immigrant integration programs and services, were also invited to the table (i.e., horizontal approach). The IGR Committee 67

was only composed of government representatives. The goal for the Committee was to allow for collaborations and “new mechanisms for funding and policy making” (TRIEC, 2004: 11). In 2004, the Committee initiated an analysis of existing immigrant labour market integration government-funded programs and services and the results were summarized in the report titled: “ To Employment: Services for Skilled Immigrants in the Toronto Region” (TRIEC, 2004a). This report was submitted during the consultations that CIC and the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration held before the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement was signed in 2005. According to TRIEC, it “provided an important contribution to shaping the resulting strategic plan” (TRIEC, 2006: 12). In 2007, the IGR Committee was reported to be focusing on the following main areas:

1. Inventory of workplace-related programs: Mapping Toronto Region employment-related services and programs with a work experience component in order to analyze possible gaps to be addressed; 2. Qualifications “Passport’ for skilled immigrants: Investigating the feasibility, potential effectiveness, and recognition by employers of a standards documentation process, including academic, language and competency assessments;

3. Alternative work experience programs: Exploring a range of interventions that facilitate work experience opportunities (e.g. co-op, wage subsidies, tax credits) to assess their applicability for skilled immigrants.” (TRIEC, 2007: 15).

In 2010, three other priority areas were identified: 1. “Connecting new immigrants to employment-related information; 2. Discussing income and other supports for skilled immigrants to facilitate access to labour market integration programs (immigrants are not eligible for income supports for employment preparation);

3. Developing an employer engagement strategy (labour market programming has been largely developed around the needs of the unemployed individual, and does not have an explicit focus on engaging employers)” (TRIEC, 2010: 17).

The Working Groups were convened to identify and brainstorm ideas. As TRIEC moved into its implementation mode, and as one of the key informants suggested ‘bringing those ideas to life’, Working Groups were disbanded and instead, Advisory Groups/Committees were formed. As TRIEC staff suggested, the membership in the Advisory Committee, created for the maintenance or implementation modes, was not necessarily that of the initial Working Groups. When comparing the Mentoring Working Group in 2004 with the Mentoring Partnership Advisory Committee in 2007, some differences in membership become evident. While the number of members in both groups is

quite similar (21 and 18), the Chair of Working Group (Mario Calla, COSTI Immigrant Services) became a lead member of the Advisory Committee. In addition, only four organizations, which were present in the first group stayed in the second. The membership makeup is also quite different. In the initial group, there was a strong presence of government funding agencies but the Advisory body for this initiative was mostly composed of service delivery and community agencies (e.g., ACCESS, Dixie Bloor Neighbourhood Centre, JobStart, JVS Toronto, Seneca College, Skills for Change) and employers which were active and supportive of the project. Thus, each group was convened to support the development of an idea or implementation /maintenance/expansion of the project.

3.4.4 TRIEC’S SECRETARIAT AND STAFF

TRIEC started with two staff members, who were initially both Maytree Foundation employees: Ratna Omidvar who was Executive Director of Maytree and Elizabeth McIsaac who held the position of Director of Policy at Maytree and was seconded to become TRIEC’s Manager. They were the only staff in the early initiation stage and were listed as TRIEC’s Secretariat in TRIEC’s first Annual Review. In 2004, TRIEC reported having seven staff, including Omidvar and McIsaac. Its employee base gradually increased from seven to ten in 2005 and eleven in 2006. In 2007, with over a million dollars increase in funding, TRIEC expanded to seventeen employees. By 2010, it reported eighteen staff members. As can be seen from Appendix S, TRIEC created over 30 job categories.34 In the first three years, all jobs were concentrated either in administration, communications or serving the Mentoring Partnership or the hireimmigrants.ca website. Starting in 2007, TRIEC began to expand to York, Peel and Halton areas and staff were hired to initiate stakeholder engagement and programs outside the City of Toronto area. Additional employees were recruited to develop employer-related resources and tools and as the Mentoring Partnership expanded, its employee base increased as well. Finally, as TRIEC matured as an organization, more senior administrative positions were created, such as Director of Operations as well as support positions, such as Executive Assistant. The distribution of labour over six years of operations shows that 44% of TRIEC jobs were in ‘general’ administration; 22% in employer-related initiatives (hireimmigrants.ca, resources, workshops etc.), 14% in the Mentoring Partnership, 11% in communications and 9% of staff were involved in outreach activities outside the City of Toronto, i.e. Peel, Halton, York regions (Appendix S). It is worth mentioning that in 2007-2008 TRIEC had close to five employees working in communications / media relations (Mentoring Partnership, hireimmigrants.ca, general communications) making it the third largest employee group (17% of TRIEC jobs) after General Administration and Employer-related

34 The job category number might be considerably higher than the number of jobs as the job titles could have changed over time. 69

programs employees. In addition, TRIEC employees in executive positions spent a significant amount of their time promoting projects and ideas, but this portion of the budget is not reflected in communication expenditures.

3.5 TRIEC GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES

When TRIEC was established, it was meant to be a regional initiative, for the Greater Toronto Area (the GTA), which is the largest Canadian metropolitan area. The GTA includes the City of Toronto, the Halton, Peel, York and Durham regions and accounts for 18% of Canada’s population or 6 million people (Statistics Canada, Census 2011). However, initially, most of the programs and employer engagement took place in the City of Toronto (Lewkowicz, 2008: 71), which represents 8% of Canada’s population, 20% of all immigrants and 22.9% of all visible minorities living in Canada (City of Toronto website). Given the high number of recent immigrants who chose the City of Toronto as their first point of destination, this approach is justifiable (Table 3.1). However, as can be seen from Table 3.2, York and Peel Regions experienced a rapid growth in the immigrant populations from 2001-2006. TRIEC expanded and formally established ‘mini-TRIEC’ groups in these areas and staff was hired to facilitate corporate and stakeholder relations in Peel and Halton and York regions.

Table 3.1 Number and Proportion of Immigrants by GTA Regions Since 1991

Geography Immigrants, 2006 Before 1991 1991-2001 2001-2006

Total, GTA, n 2,400,795 1,210,855 734,415 455,530 City of Toronto, n 1,237,720 592,490 377,380 267,855 City of Toronto, % 52% 49% 51% 59% Peel, n 561,240 262,010 181,005 118,220 Peel, % 23% 22% 25% 26% York, n 380,530 203,840 130,230 46,465 York, % 16% 17% 18% 10% Durham, n 113,390 81,165 22,340 9,890 Durham, % 5% 7% 3% 2% Halton, n 107,915 71,350 23,460 13,100 Halton, % 4% 6% 3% 3%

Source: Statistics Canada. Census 2006. Community Profiles.

Table 3.2 Growth Rate for Total, Non-immigrant and Immigrant Population, Ontario and GTA

Total Population Growth Non-Immigrant Total Immigrant Geography Rate 2001-2006 Population Growth Rate Population Growth Rate

Ontario 7% 4% 12% York Region 22% 14% 34% Durham Region 11% 9% 20% Halton Region 17% 13% 30% Peel Region 17% 5% 32% City of Toronto 1% -1% 2%

Source: The Regional Municipality of York, 2008, reprinted by permission.

3.6 TRIEC’S PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES

As mentioned earlier, Working Groups were tasked to develop action plans/achievable ideas in a limited time frame and, as a result of this action-oriented approach, a number of initiatives emerged in the first two-three years: Career Bridge Internship for Skilled Immigrants, Mentoring Partnership Initiative (the MP), Raising Awareness Campaign, etc. Over the years, TRIEC developed a number of programs that aimed to develop bridges between immigrants and employers. There are ten major programs listed on TRIEC’s website as of August 31, 2011. The following provides brief descriptions of these programs and initiatives.

3.6.1 EMPLOYER ENGAGEMENT AND RECOGNITION

Since TRIEC’s goal was to improve immigrant access to employment, it recognized the importance of involving businesses and corporations in its initiatives. High profile corporate engagement was TRIEC’s ‘winning card’ and this differentiated it from any other initiatives / organizations / partnerships in the GTA. TRIEC’s connections with the TCSA members allowed it to reach out to high profile business leaders in the city, mostly from the financial and banking sectors. Each year, TRIEC reported on its employer engagement record and was quite diligent in recognizing corporations, which were actively involved in TRIEC and/or championed its programs. Thus, as early as in the 2004 Annual Review, TRIEC featured eighteen companies highlighted on hireimmigrants.ca and listed six top Career Bridge corporate recruiters and six top corporate partners in the MP. It also listed 43 Mentoring Circle Champions – high ranked individuals who came from the public and private sectors. Showcasing these individuals proved to stakeholders and the general public that TRIEC ‘walked

the talk’ in achieving a high level of commitment from the corporate world in a very short period of time. It was also an excellent opportunity to recognize employers and say ‘thank you’ for their support. In its 2005 Report, TRIEC quoted four high level executives who spoke about the benefits of diverse workforces for their companies (RBC, TD Canada Trust, Procter and Gamble Inc. etc.) and how they benefited from participating in TRIEC’s programs. In all consecutive Annual Reviews and on its website, TRIEC recognized its new corporate partners. In the last two years, 2009-2011, TRIEC reported having engaged its first law firm and a hospital to become a partner in the MP. Two important observations are worth noting. First, while TRIEC makes significant efforts to reach out to different business sectors, there is still a high prevalence of large size employers, public agencies and post-secondary institutions both on its Council and on the Board of Directors. While there is a significant concentration of larger corporations and headquarters in the GTA, small-size (<100 employees) firms represent 97.5% of all companies in the province. (Industry Canada, January 2010:10). Additionally, these companies do not necessarily have similar capacities, as do large corporations in terms of hiring skilled immigrants, i.e. they might not have HR Departments, or not have the capacity to provide diversity training or send their Hiring Managers to attend free workshops, etc. In the 2009 Report, TRIEC recognized that small to medium-sized companies might have different challenges than larger corporations in hiring and retaining skilled immigrants. Thus, TRIEC reported it would “continue to focus on the small and medium-sized employers to better customize solutions to meet their needs” (TRIEC, 2009: 17). In 2010-2011, Maytree researchers, in collaboration with the McConnell Foundation, long-time partners and supporters of TRIEC, initiated an eight- month study “to research why there is a hiring gap, what the job markets in selected city centres actually need in terms of skilled labour, and what kinds of skilled immigrants are available to fit the bills” (Pulfer, 2010).35 Secondly, all TRIEC efforts to engage employers in the conversations and its programs are based on the notion of ‘how would businesses benefit from hiring immigrants?’ While this call seems to generate employer interest in participating in TRIEC’s programs, it does not appear to be the fairest or most balanced approach in presenting the problem and thus, raises question about the appropriateness and effectiveness of solutions that only focus on part of the problem.

3.6.2 PARTNERING WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND IMMIGRANT SERVING AGENCIES

In 2003, TRIEC was the ‘new kid on the block’ in the GTA, particularly, among immigrant and community serving agencies. Some of these immigrant service organizations had been around for a

35 In 2011, Maytree Foundation conducted consultations with 300 small to medium-size businesses from five Canadian cities and summarized recommendations in the report titled “Global Talent for SMEs: Building Bridges and Making Connections” (2012). The research findings will be used by ALLIES to develop project ideas to connect immigrants and small business sectors. 72

long time and the vast majority of them relied on public money to fund their activities. TRIEC’s entry into the GTA potentially meant that less money would be available to other agencies and that some of the services might be shifted or modified. TRIEC spoke about ‘systemic change’ and, subsequently it meant operational ‘change’ for immigrant serving agencies. For example, community agencies joining the Mentoring Program might consider decreasing their operational capacities (and funding) to deliver mentoring programs, as TRIEC takes over the employer engagement piece. It was crucial for TRIEC to win the trust and build good working relationships with this stakeholder group and ensure that their organizational capacities to deliver services wouldn’t be affected but rather that they would benefit from collaborative efforts. In 2004, TRIEC managed to engage eight community agencies in the delivery of the MP. These were members of Consortium of Agencies Serving Internationally-trained Persons (CASIP).36 These agencies were: A.C.C.E.S. Employment Services, Brampton Neigbourhood Resource Centre, Caledon Community Services, COSTI Immigrant Services, Dixie Bloor Neigbourhood Centre, JobStart, JVS Toronto, and Malton Neighbourhood Services. By 2011, there were ten community agencies listed on the MP website as community partners. Five of these agencies were involved in the pilot project between 2004-2005 (60%) and five were new agencies joined in the last six years.

3.6.3 CAREER BRIDGE

The Career Bridge Internship for skilled immigrants was the first project that TRIEC helped to initiate. The program, administered by the Career Edge organization, was announced at TRIEC’s launch in September 2003. The organization has been around since 1996 and since then, it has developed two internship models for recent graduates in all disciplines (Career Edge) and for graduates with disabilities (Ability Edge). In 2003, TRIEC approached Career Edge with the idea of modifying existing models to develop an internship program for skilled immigrants. Career Edge had already had a successful track record in placing students in the workplace environment on a fixed-fee basis and it already had a good reputation with local employers. According to the Career Edge website: “Career Edge Organization provides strategic staffing solutions including on-line access to candidates, payroll administration and HR expertise to help employers recruit, hire and retain quality talent. Interns benefit from on the job coaching and training in a supportive and professional environment” (Career Edge website). Career Bridge was a first Canadian internship program that offered unique opportunities for skilled immigrants to apply their skills in the Canadian workplace environment in mid-level professional paid jobs. The requirement bar was set so high that only highly qualified immigrants were able to get into the database of candidates that employers used in their search for potential employees.

36 Interview # 8. Category C. Key Informant 5A. July 12, 2010. 73

For example, the language requirement for immigrant-applicants was set at Level 8 or 9 of the Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB)37, which is considered to be a very high level of English. Immigrants who show the corresponding Canadian Language Benchmark level 5 or 6 on their language assessment tests are qualified to apply to come to Canada under the skilled immigrant category. TRIEC was instrumental in the development of the immigrant internship program and assisted in the outreach and promotion of the program to employers. Since 2003, over 1,300 immigrants have completed paid Career Bridge internships; however, no publicly available evaluation of this project is available.

3.6.4 THE MENTORING PARTNERSHIP

While TRIEC initiated the development of Career Bridge, it was not directly involved in the delivery of the project. The Mentoring Partnership was the first TRIEC project where it initiated the idea, brought together all important stakeholders (community agencies, employers and funders), got directly involved in program delivery, and received annual funding for promotion, orientation, training, and coaching support to employers. The objectives of the program were to provide an opportunity for immigrants to learn about their occupations, develop specific industries’ vocabularies, became familiar with trends, and expand their professional networks in order to find professional employment commensurate with their education and experiences. Paul Lewkowicz (2008) provided a thorough overview of the program, i.e. target market, mentor and mentee requirements, goal settings, origins of the program, and corporate involvement. This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the key features that differentiate the Mentoring Partnership from other mentoring programs, the progress and growth of the project as well as its evaluation to date.

3.6.4.1 A DIFFERENT APPROACH

This research found that there were five major features that differentiated the Mentoring Partnership from existing programs: 1. TRIEC created a Mentoring Partnership Working Group, and later on an Advisory Committee, composed of the following key stakeholders: community agencies, immigrant professional organizations, funders and employers. This alliance approach allowed for more collaboration between stakeholders and built a more sustainable foundation, where participants, funders and delivery agencies were involved in the development and growth of the project. 2. TRIEC acted as a coordinating agency for employer-mentor recruitment. It introduced a central database for matches between mentors and mentees and all participating agencies had

37 For more information about the Canadian Language Benchmarks see http://www.language.ca/display_page.asp?page_id=1. 74

access to the database of employers. This eliminated the problem that employers usually complain about – when companies are approached by numerous agencies with invitations to participate in their singular mentoring programs. 3. TRIEC created the Mentoring Circle of Champions, which was composed of high level civic and business leaders from a variety of sectors. Forty-three CEOs, Vice-Presidents and Directors signed on to champion the project and, consequently, it attracted the attention of their competitors and the media. That created a ‘snowball or domino effect’, which greatly impacted further efforts in promotion and mentor recruitment. 4. TRIEC managed to work with local agencies so instead of competing with them and creating a new mentoring program, it developed a model that built on existing projects. 5. The MP was the first project sponsored by a number of private corporations. The Canada Trust Financial Group is considered to be a founding sponsor of the MP. According to TD Canada Trust, it contributed $540,000 to the program in the initial years (TD Canada Trust Financial Group website).

Finally, the Mentoring Partnership overcame three of the major deficiencies of previous mentoring programs: limited scope, single mentor recruitment vs. corporate commitment, quality of services and actual results. 1. Prior to the launch of the MP, there were fewer than 100 matches made by other Toronto- based agencies (Lewkowicz, 2008: 66) and the MP reported to making close to 1,000 matches in the first year (TRIEC, 2005: 3). Those numbers attracted media attention and showed the public that TRIEC was about making an impact in the area and should not be dismissed as yet another minor initiative. 2. The MP was the first project in the GTA, which did not rely on single professionals but engaged dozens of companies that became ‘Mentoring Corporate Partners’. What that meant was that mentors were supported by their companies to participate in the project. Furthermore, corporations took pride in being a part of the MP, i.e. they were featured in local media, received awards (Best Employers for New Canadians, Mentor of Year Award, etc.) Finally, some of the companies included participation in the project as ‘leadership and coaching skill development’ in their employee evaluation processes.38 3. Community agencies that delivered mentoring programs before TRIEC had different program parameters. Once they became a part of the MP, they all agreed on a common set of standards in mentor/mentee requirements, selection, orientation, training and support processes. This standardized approach increased the level of professionalism and credibility of the program and employers were more willing to participate and be associated with the MP.

38 Category A. Interview #7. July 13, 2010; Category C. Interview #5. Key informants A/B. July 12, 2010. 75

3.6.4.2 PROGRAM RESULTS AND EVALUATION

According to TRIEC, by 2010, over 5,600 skilled immigrants were matched with local professionals through the Mentoring Partnership (TRIEC, 2004-2010). As of September 2011, The Mentoring Partnership website listed 57 organizations (private and pubic companies, crown corporations, and public agencies) that signed up as corporate partners and supported their staff in participating in the program as a way to develop their coaching, leadership, and cross-cultural skills. In 2006, TRIEC introduced the Mentoring Partnership Awards and since then, has been honoring Mentors of the Year, Mentees of the Year and giving a Special Achievement Award on an annual basis. In 2010, TRIEC honored two employers that reached 500 matches: TD Bank Financial Group and the City of Toronto. Four other corporations were recognized for reaching at least 100 matches: CIBC, Deloitte, KPMG and Scotiabank. Finally, twenty seven companies and agencies, in total, were mentioned as 2009-2010 Active Corporate Partners in the MP (The Mentoring Partnership website). In 2008, The Mentoring Partnership was evaluated by Full Circle Consulting. Ninety five mentee survey responses and 141 mentor surveys were used for the analysis. Four major outcomes for mentees were evaluated: 1. “skilled immigrants have increased their professional networks; 2. skilled immigrants have received appropriate counsel that has helped them to better focus their career direction; 3. skilled immigrants have increased their competitiveness in the professional field of their choice; 4. skilled immigrants have what they deem to be appropriate employment” (Weston and Nikolova, 2008: 6-7).

According to the Program Evaluation Report (Weston and Nikolova, 2008), overall, all four outcomes were met. Above others, unemployment decreased from 50% before mentoring to 11% after; only 13% of skilled immigrants reported not working in their fields compared with 32% before mentoring and employment in the field increased both in ‘own level’ (from 14% to 51%) and at appropriate level (from 4% to 22%). Two major outcomes for mentors were analyzed: 1. “to sensitize mentors and corporate partners to the knowledge and experience internationally trained professionals bring; 2. to sensitize mentors and corporate partners to the barriers faced by internationally trained professionals in accessing appropriate employment opportunities” (ibid: 13).

According to the Program Evaluation Report, mentors dramatically increased their understanding of the employment barriers immigrants face (from 52% before mentoring to 95% after) and shared this information with their colleagues (from 41% to 74%). Analysis also showed some 76

changes in mentor recruitment behaviours. After mentoring, 95% of mentors suggested that they ‘would hire internationally trained professionals, or refer them to professional contacts, if they appear[ed] to have the right skills’ compared to 76% before mentoring (Weston and Nikolova, 2008:13). At the same time, mentees reported that mentors ‘will less often than not refer’ them to recruiters, take them to industry events or provide job leads. The evaluation report concluded that these responses are ‘in line with the objectives of the program in that mentors are expected to support the mentees and share useful information rather than find the mentees a job’. However, this statement conflicts with the fourth program objective for mentees, i.e. skilled immigrants have what they deem to be appropriate employment. Furthermore, the report identified a number of ‘issues that will require attention,’ such as the capacity of the database to provide appropriate matching, the role of coaches, inconsistency in funding, and support for mentees. Additionally, the analysis showed that the effectiveness of the model depends on TRIEC’s role, shared accountability and the effective use of a common pool of mentors which creates a high level of competitiveness among coaches from different agencies. Finally, given its plans for expansion, the report suggested that ‘decisions will need to be made about structure, operations, the relevance of current service standards, communications, knowledge transfer and how to support coaches ‘long distance’ (Weston and Nikolova, 2008: 24).

3.6.5 RESOURCES FOR EMPLOYERS

Canadian employers in general, and HR practitioners in particular, have limited access to free cultural sensitivity and/or immigrant workforce integration training and resources (Shcherbyna and Coady, 2008a; 2008b). Hireimmigrants.ca was the first online resource that TRIEC developed for employers. It was launched in June 2005 by local leaders, Dominic D’Alessandro (Manulife), Roger Martin (Rotman), and Gordon Nixon (RBC). Initially, a number of employer ‘best practices’ were featured under each of the identified topics (Job Posting, Screening, Hiring, etc.) Additionally, TRIEC partnered with Upwardly Global (the US-based immigrant serving agency) and secured links to its online cross-cultural presentations and workshops. Since November 2005, regular HR e-tips have been distributed to e-list subscribers and in March 2006, four tele-seminars for employers were launched, Soon a regional resources section was added for employers from other provinces to access local resources. In 2007, the hireimmigrants.ca program was focused on reaching out to small to medium-sized employers. No reports about the results of the outreach campaign can be found other than one paragraph about TRIEC providing free HR consulting on developing and implementing diversity plans to small enterprises. However, as was mentioned before, Maytree Foundation continues to explore the

unique hiring needs of small companies (see footnote 35). In January 2007, TRIEC partnered with the Consortium of Agencies Serving Internationally-trained Persons (CASIP) to develop a more coordinated outreach to employers (Job Developers Network), whereby 23 job developers from CASIP agencies collaborated on marketing their services to the business community. Over 2,300 employers were reached in the first year and by 2008, over 275 job leads had been shared. In January 2008, hireimmigrants.ca and Ryerson University launched free “How-to” Human Resource (HR) Workshops for employers which where were attended by 200 Hiring Managers and HR professionals. In 2009, the hireiimmigrants.ca added a new online resource – called Roadmap. This tool “is designed to equip anyone with human resources responsibilities with strategies and tools to engage skilled immigrants more effectively at every state of the HR lifecycle” (hireimmigrants.ca). In the same year, TRIEC reported having partnered with the Human Resources Professionals Association (HRPA) to include a “How-to” workshops into the professional development series for HRPA members. Finally, in 2010, TRIEC developed three training cultural competencies videos for employers that are hosted on the hireimmigrants.ca website. Videos are supported by facilitator’s guides and can be downloaded for internal training purposes. The Finding Talent video was launched at HRPA’s Annual Conference, which was attended by 2,000 HR professionals. Also, in 2010, TRIEC initiated a new pilot project – the Immigrant Talent Employer Helpline, which served as a referral centre for employers. The service is free-of-charge for employers located in the GTA.

3.6.6 PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN

While TRIEC’s monthly e-Lerts started early in 2004-2005 and TRIEC’s first Chair wrote an Open Letter to the Prime Minister in 2004, the official public awareness campaign commenced in June 2006 with funding from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The “World of Experience” week was launched on May 29th and ran until June 2nd. It included 20 Journey exhibits, which featured 20 newcomers and their journeys in Canada. Additionally, the first New Home, New Job special section in the Toronto Star was published in 2006. The Mentoring Partnership Awards were launched along with The Immigrant Success Awards. First winners were featured in the special recruitment and stuffing issue in the Canadian HR Reporter. Around the same time, TRIEC in partnership with a local advertisement agency developed four 30-second commercials, which portrayed highly skilled immigrants doing odd jobs. These videos received considerable attention across Canada as they were thought provoking, high quality media materials and they could be used free-of-charge by service providers and employers. The videos were utilized in many business and community-led conferences and forums as an innovative way to initiate the discussion on current immigrant employment challenges and potential solutions.

In 2007, the Best Employers for New Canadians new national award was introduced through the partnership between TRIEC and MediaCorp Canada, editors of Canada’s Top 100 Employers. According to 2008 TRIEC Annual Report, this competition was funded by the Government of Canada’s Foreign Credential Recognition Program. Karen Fong, in her research of TRIEC’s communication materials concluded that TRIEC took a “very solution-oriented but de-politicized approach to the issue of poor economic outcomes for skilled immigrants. … that its main emphasis is to facilitate the entry of skilled immigrants into the labour market for the benefit of business and employers.” (Fong 2008: 2, emphasis supplied). By taking this neoliberal stand on immigrants’ integration, TRIEC does not seem to contribute to systemic transformations in Canadian society and does not initiate change at the policy level, an insight that will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Six.

3.6.7 RESOURCES FOR IMMIGRANTS

In 2006, less than three years after the launch of its first program, TRIEC secured the sponsorship from Deloitte and Touche, an international audit company, to organize and deliver a day- long seminar for immigrants – called ‘Living the Dream’ in 2006 with Mike Lipkin as motivational speaker in the event attended by over 500 immigrants. Starting from 2007, TRIEC reported to provide ‘logistical, strategic planning and communications support’ (TRIEC. 2007: 17) to a new immigrant-led organization – CAMP, which stands for Communication, Advertising and Marketing Professionals. The organization was established by twelve Toronto-based immigrant professionals to assist other skilled immigrants to connect with employers and learn about industry trends. Among the founders of CAMP were former Career Bridge interns, including Alan Rego who later became TRIEC’s Board member. TRIEC’s association with CAMP laid the foundation for its future involvement with immigrant professional networks. On November 8, 2008, TRIEC hosted another free day-long training event for immigrants – called ‘The Power of Networking’ which was also attended by close to 500 immigrants from the GTA. In 2009, TRIEC conducted an environmental scan of existing immigrant networks in the province and found 70 grassroots and established organizations, which represented close to 30,000 immigrants connected through these groups.39 According to TRIEC, all of these organizations deliver some form of support for and organized activities to their members. Ninety percent have a formal structure and slightly less than half (42%) are incorporated (TRIEC, 2009a). Approximately two thirds of these are ethno-specific and two-thirds are sector-specific. Engineering immigrant networks

39 For a full list of all professional immigrants networks visit http://networksforimmigrants.ca/directory. 79

represented close to 16,000 immigrants and over 16% of all the networks. The most recently-organized groups were in the legal and IT sectors (TRIEC website, Immigrant Networks, Facts and Stats). In the same year, TRIEC launched the Professional Immigrant Network initiative with the major goal “to work collaboratively with immigrant networks to increase their capacity to connect their skilled immigrant members to meaningful employment” (TRIEC website, Immigrant Networks). In February 2010, TRIEC organized and delivered the first Learning Exchange conference for professional immigrant networks, which was attended by 20 leaders from immigrant networks. In less than a year, Scotiabank became the first corporate sponsor of this initiative, which among other support activities aims to create an online platform to enhance connection and communication between existing immigrant networks. To date, four training sessions for network leaders have been hosted by TRIEC: (1) Networking Beyond Boundaries, (2) Working with the Media, (3) DiverseCity onboard and DiverseCity Voices, and (4) Providing Career Information and Referrals for Your Members. Also, TRIEC assisted networks to pilot the Intercultural Mentoring Network which is an extended version of the group mentoring program whereby established members of networks mentor groups of new immigrants who share the same ethnic and professionals backgrounds. Additionally, in 2010, TRIEC, through its new collaboration with York Region business leaders and in partnership with CASIP, was in the process of developing a pilot project ‘Achieving Success in the Canadian Workplace: the first 90 days and beyond’. The goal of the project is to assist new immigrant hires in their first three months on the job. Immigrants will have access to this unique initiative through CASIP agencies beginning in September 2011.

3.6.8 BUILD I.T. IN YORK REGION

BUILD (Business Utilizing Immigrant Skills and Leveraging Diversity) I.T. is another partnership between TRIEC and a group of civic and business leaders in York Region that began in 2009-2010. Its goal was to connect local employers with the existing pool of I.T. foreign trained professionals. TRIEC set up the BUILD I.T. Working Group and hired a Manager to coordinate its efforts. Defined outputs were developed to meet the project objectives, i.e. to engage 10 new corporate partners in the Mentoring Partnership in York Region, in the Career Bride internship, and in How-to- HR Workshops by December 2010. According to TRIEC’s website, as of August 2011, two new York- based employers joined the MP; six showed interest in the Career Bridge program and ten employers attended How-to HR Workshops.

3.6.9 POLICY AND ADVOCACY

One of TRIEC’s main objectives was “to work with all levels of government, enhancing coordination and effecting more responsive policy and programs for skilled immigrants into the workforce” (TRIEC, 2008. Introduction page). The Intergovernmental Relations Committee (IGR) is a good example of how TRIEC attempted to achieve this objective. The Committee was brought together in 2003-2004 and since then, has worked on a number of policy issues and funding mechanisms (see Section 4.4.3). TRIEC has been using its strong advocacy voice in open public discourse, although promoting only the economic advantages of hiring immigrants. In 2004, the first TRIEC Chair, Dominic D’Alessandro wrote an open letter to Prime Minister, Paul Martin, summarizing six recommendations on how to address skilled immigrant barriers for the government of Canada (TRIEC, 2004b). Two years later, another open letter to the new Prime Minister of Canada was written by one of TRIEC’s Council members, Alan Broadbent and in 2008 (The Maytree Foundation, 2008), another letter from TRIEC was written to the Honorable Maurizio Bevilacqua, Member of Parliament (TRIEC, 2008a). That letter outlined five investing mechanisms for the federal government to enhance immigrant economic performance. As TRIEC matures, it takes many different avenues in the policy development and advocacy areas. It makes presentations, works with post-secondary institutions on advocacy for bridging programs, conducts surveys about public perceptions towards immigrants in the GTA, and participates in provincial and federal consultations. Allahwala (2011: 160), while recognizing that “it is difficult to access the actual impact of the lobbying efforts of TRIEC”, identified a number of significant federal and provincial-level policy shifts which ‘arguably’ and ‘partially’ became possible as a result of TRIEC and Maytree advocacy efforts for increased intergovernmental cooperation in the area of immigration. These include: the Canada- Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA), signed in November 2005, and which formally recognized the role of the government of Ontario and local municipal governments; the Canada-Ontario Labour Market Partnership Agreement (LMPA), signed in 2005 between federal government and the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities (MTCU) “which allocated $1.368 billion over six years to fill gaps in labour market programming” (ibid: 159); the Federal Credential Recognition Program, introduced by Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC) “which provides $73 million from 2007 to 2012 to fund stakeholders to implement project that will facilitate the assessment and recognition of credentials acquired outside of Canada” (ibid:160); the Canadian Language Benchmarks/Essential Skills in the Workplace initiative, introduced by HRSDC in 2005 , and which allocated “$40 million … and describes the occupations in National Occupational Classifications (NOC) in terms of nine essential skills” (ibid: 160); the Foreign Credential Referral Office (FCRO),

launched in 2007 “to provide information on labour market and credential assessment to immigrant at Service Centre centres … with $32 million over five years [coming from] CIC” (ibid: 160); the Enhanced Language Training program, introduced in 2005 in addition to the federal program Language Instruction for newcomers to Canada (LINC) “to enhance occupation-specific language skills for newcomers (ibid: 161); and the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act (FARPA), passed in March 2007, and which aimed to establish ‘a fair and transparent’ credential evaluation processes for internationally-trained professions. Despite these progressive policy shifts, currently, Ontario’s immigrant settlement sector faces what Stasiulis (2011: 1) called ‘a very unsettling moment’. For instance “Ontario has yet to successfully negotiate a new COIA [Canada Ontario Immigration Agreement] with the federal government; Ottawa has withheld $207 million owed to Ontario under the first COIA; there has been a notable decrease in immigrants arriving in Ontario in relation to the Prairie provinces; the federal government has imposed sizeable federal funding cuts ($44 million) to Ontario’s settlement agencies, leading to the demise of long-standing, deeply-rooted community agencies” (ibid: 1,2).

3.7 TRIEC BUDGET AND FUNDERS

Since its establishment, TRIEC secured funding and sponsorship from many public agencies as well as private corporations. Based on TRIEC’s Annual Reports and website, these agencies are Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Promotions/Ontario Region), Heritage Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Government of Canada, Foreign Credential Recognition Unit, Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, The Ontario Trillium Foundation, The Region of Peel, United Way of Peel Region (public agencies); The Maytree Foundation, TD Bank Financial Group, Manulife Financial, Scotiabank, and Royal Bank of Canada (private agencies). CIC (Ontario Region) and Canadian Heritage provided initial funding along with the Maytree Foundation and the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation (Allahwala, 2011: 152). According to TRIEC’s unaudited financial statements, its cumulative funding from May 2003 to November 2010 was $14,773,670. As shown in Table 3.3, every year (with the exception of 2010), funding for TRIEC increased significantly and in 2007-2008 TRIEC received the largest portion of funding. While TRIEC was the first immigrant employment initiative in Canada to generate such a high level of sponsorship support from the business community, over 82% of its funding still came from public agencies (Figure 3.1).

Table 3.3 TRIEC’s Funding, 2003-2010

Change from the % from the total Year Funding, $ previous year funding

2003 $129,783 _ 0.9% 2003-2004 $565,940 336% 3.9% 2004-2005 $882,170 55.9% 6% 2005-2006 $1,314,581 49% 9% 2006-2007 $2,288,126 74.1% 15.5% 2007-2008 $4,154,576 81.6% 28.1% 2008-2009 $2,530,417 -39.1% 17.1% 2009-2010 $2,908,077 15% 19.7% TOTAL $14,773,670 - 100.00% Source: TRIEC Annual Reports 2004-2010

Figure 3.1 TRIEC’s Funding Sources, 2003-2010

Source: TRIEC Annual Reports 2004-2010

With respect to TRIEC’s expenses, shown in Figure 3.2, over 40% was spent on Salaries and Benefits. Close to one fifth of all TRIEC’s budget was spent on the Awareness Campaign (19.65%), which was the second largest expense for TRIEC in seven years.40 General Expenses and Administration was the third largest expense (8.83%). Hireimmigrants.ca, The Mentoring Partnership and Communications each took slightly over 6% of TRIEC’s budget.

40 It should be noted that the ‘Programs and activities’ expenses for 2009-2010 were reflected as a cumulative amount in TRIEC’s 2010 Annual Report. No break down of expenses on Raising Awareness, the Mentoring Partnership, Employer Inititiatives, Immigrant Success Awards and other TRIEC’s program was provided in this fiscal year in TRIEC’s report. Therefore, the total amount allocated to PR strategies from 2003-2010 might be much higher than it is shown in Figure 3.1. 83

Figure 3.2 TRIEC’s Expenses, 2003-2010

Source: TRIEC Annual Reports 2004-2010

3.8 TRIEC RESULTS, OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

It is not the intent of this study to conduct a full-scale evaluation of TRIEC’s activities and projects. However, as no independent evaluation of TRIEC was undertaken, a summary of its project activities and results provides a snapshot of the results and potential impacts that TRIEC made in the GTA, as well as in other Canadian regions. TRIEC was quite vocal about its outputs and shared this information with the general public through e-news, annual reports and in presentations. In 2008, TRIEC took stock of its activities over five years and dedicated its annual report to describing the development of each project and listing major project milestones. In the 2009 Annual Review, it reported major outputs recorded since the launch of each project, i.e. the number of matches, number of internships, number of employers engaged, number of downloads and website visitors, etc. In the same report, there was an attempt to showcase how TRIEC influenced policy or systemic change by engaging employers and working with HR organizations. In 2010, TRIEC published its annual report, ‘Creating Impact on Immigrant Employment’. The impact is told mostly through personal stories of TRIEC project participants, supplemented by brief summaries of project outputs. As shown in Appendix T, TRIEC regularly reported on the employment outcomes of immigrants who were either mentored or went through internships.

According to TRIEC, 75-80% of these immigrants found full time employment in their occupations. Thus, it may be concluded that in seven years of TRIEC’s activities at least 5,520 skilled immigrants in the GTA found employment that matched their skills and qualifications.41 Given that the Toronto Region welcomes close to 100,000 new immigrants each year (City of Toronto website), TRIEC has made a difference for less than 1% of these new arrivals42. However, as described in earlier sections, the story of TRIEC’s impact and success cannot be told in simple numbers. Table 4.4 provides various examples of policy-level and incremental changes where TRIEC aimed to achieve and succeed.

3.9 TRIEC RECOGNITION AND LEGACY

In Canada, TRIEC has been recognized as a leader, an expert body and an innovative model of collaboration in the area of immigrant economic integration at many levels. It was praised by community groups that attempted to adopt TRIEC’s model in their cities as well as government funders and private sponsors that funded ‘risky and innovative projects’. Since its inception, TRIEC has received several awards for its leadership in the area of immigrant integration. In 2007, TRIEC’s project, the Mentoring Partnership won an Urban Leadership Award granted by the Canadian Urban Institute. This annual initiative recognizes organizations, groups or individuals who made significant contribution and showed civic leadership in “improving the quality of life in Canada’s cities and urban regions” (Canadian Urban Institute website, Urban Leadership Award). In 2008 TRIEC received the Toronto Vital Signs Award from the Toronto Community Foundation. In June 2009, TRIEC was the recipient of the 2009 Newcomer Champion, which was presented by the Ontario Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Michael Chan, for active citizenship and engagement efforts for greater social and civic inclusion of newcomers. TRIEC has also been recognized internationally. It has been invited to speak at a number of international conferences and it is listed among the world’s best practices in the ‘Labour migration policies and programmes’ by the International Labour Organization (International Labour Organization website). In 2007, Maytree Foundation hired Sarah Wayland to conduct a study about three existing Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs). She was tasked to interview key informants of IECs and summarize the history, challenges and achievements of each Council. These reports were shared at the “Learning Exchange Conference” that Maytree hosted in June 2007. Participation in the forum was by invitation only and close to 150 participants were invited from eighteen different regions. Building on

41 The number is based on the following calculation: 80% from 1,300 interns and 5,600 mentees. 42 The percentate is based on the following calculations: approximately 700,000 immigrants came to Toronto’s region from 2003 to 2010; thus, 5,520 immigrants equals less than 1% of the total newcomers in these seven years. 85

‘TRIEC’s success story’, in 2007, Maytree in partnership with the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation, secured funding from the TD Canada Trust, CIC and The Government of Canada’s Foreign Credential Recognition Program to launch ALLIES – Assisting Local Leaders with Immigrant Employment Strategies. This project provides funding, expert coaching, support and online resources to community and business organizations across Canada to develop local collaborative solutions to improve the immigrant employment situation. It is officially acknowledged on ALLIES website that ‘ALLIES builds on the success of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council’. TRIEC has not only become a collaboration model that is being replicated in other Canadian regions and even in other countries; it has also become an expert in developing tools and resources for employers. Moreover, it offers all of its resources to other communities for free. Tools and resources are downloadable from TRIEC, hiremmigrants.ca, the Mentoring Partnership, and ALLIES websites. Additionally, TRIEC offered all of its promotional materials developed for the MP to other communities that were in the processes of developing their mentoring programs (building business case, training curriculums, flyers, etc.)43. While some of ALLIES’ online tools and coaches were provided by different IECs, approximately 90% of its resources were contributed by or replicated after TRIEC. Since 2007, ALLIES has provided funding to six community/business agencies with a view to developing local solutions for better immigrant economic integration. Currently, there are eleven immigrant employment collaborations in Canada and one in New Zealand that have used TRIEC’s model and ALLIES funding and/or tools. Additionally, ALLIES introduced the National Mentoring Initiative (which also builds on TRIEC’s mentoring model). Currently, there are mentoring programs in ten Canadian regions. ALLIES assists cities by engaging large corporations, such as TD Bank Group, RBC Group and others, as national partners. This level of corporate engagement throughout the country became possible thanks to TRIEC’s efforts to engage the headquarters of large organizations that had the capacity to create and coordinate their community involvement strategies on a national scale.

3.10 TRIEC SUCCESS FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY OTHER RESEARCHERS

Prior to this thesis, a number of researchers studied TRIEC, its activities and results as well as offered their views about TRIEC success. Each scholar took a unique angle of analysis and used different bodies of knowledge to inform their studies and support their findings.44 Four were

43 Category A. Interview #7. July 13, 2010. 44 Researchers who studied TRIEC : Sarah Wayland, a consultant; Naomi Alboim, a public policy consultant, who is also a professor at the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and TRIEC Board member; Elizabeth McIssac, the executive 86

independent studies, one was contracted by a paid consultant and another one was written by a TRIEC staff and Board member. In their 2007 study, Alboim and McIsaac described major immigrant employment barriers including “the lack of policy and program coherence” and presented TRIEC and its programs as a promising practice in the area of immigrant economic integration and an intervention with a capacity to ‘resolve the bigger systemic issues” (ibid: 19). A number of lessons and elements of success were identified: • Strong rational for engaging in the issue, i.e. in cities with large immigration population / in regions that experience skills shortages; • Support and readiness: there are local business leaders who are ready to lead, a host agency to facilitate the collaboration, and a catalyst to bring stakeholders together; • Programs aimed to improve immigrant employability: “immigrants are provided with Canadian work experience, labour market communication skills, specific gap- filling training and mentoring; and when employer capacity is developed” • Involvement of all stakeholders: “initiatives … with the active participation of all the relevant stakeholders are obviously more likely to generate success” • Programs are aligned with local labour market needs: “It has been difficult for employers and government to accurately forecast labour market needs and for the immigration program to process immigrants expeditiously so that they can bring their skills to the labour market when the are needed” • Local context: “local lens … will permit local labut markets to identify their particular needs” (Alboim and McIssac, 2007: 12,13)

In 2007, in preparation for the first Learning Exchange conference, Sarah Wayland was contracted by the Maytree Foundation to provide an overview of three existing Immigrant Employment Councils, including TRIEC. The intent of the paper was to describe “the context in which TRIEC was created and provide a brief history of the council… ” (Wayland 2007a: 1) Additionally, a brief summary of TRIEC’s accomplishments and success factors was outlined in the eight-page study. Wayland interviewed a number of key TRIEC stakeholders including its founding members (Ratna Omidvar) and high-level civic leaders and supporters, such as the late, David Pecaut among others. Based on her findings, Wayland identified four major conditions for TRIEC’s success. Some of these conditions echo the factors introduced by Alboim and McIssac: • “Case for support: A community, city or region needs to understand the issue in the local context. … approach and solutions, are grounded in the real conditions of the local community. • Catalyst: … Organizations like the TCSA created momentum and drew attention to the issues. Individuals like TCSA Chair David Pecaut were instrumental …” director of TRIEC; Paul Lewkowicz, a Masters student from the Department of Geography, Queen’s University; Karen Fong, also a Masters student from the Planning Program at University of Toronto and Mohammed Ahmed Allahwalla, a Ph.D. student from the Graduate Program in Political Science at York University. Additionally, while Kristin Good, Associate Professor at the Dalhousie University did not focus her research on TRIEC, in her comparative analysis of municipal multicultural policies, Good touched on some of the events prior to TRIEC and offered some insights about why a multi- stakeholder collaboration such as TRIEC became possible in the GTA. 87

• Corporate Champions: … When corporate leaders champion a cause, other employer become interested.” • Convening capacity: … The Maytree Foundation had a long-standing knowledge of immigrant employment issues and benefited from the perception that foundations are neutral players. Maytree’s capacity to financially support TRIEC was also very important…” (Wayland, 2007a: 6) • Wayland also identified building blocks for success based on TRIEC’s model: (1) having strategic focus (practical and doable objectives); (2) applying a local lens; (3) showing early wins; (4) engaging specific leaders; (5) securing a broad base of support (public awareness). Fong, in her 47-page paper, attempted to shed light on TRIEC’s efforts in “working towards structural or policy change versus the immediate need to match skilled immigrants with appropriate jobs.” (Fong, 2008: 15). Fong looked at the way TRIEC conceptualized its message to employers, funders and the general public. She reviewed TRIEC’s communication materials, website content and media coverage to 2008 and conducted two interviews with TRIEC’s employees. Based on her findings, she concluded that TRIEC neglected ‘the social justice dimension’, i.e. the racial discrimination barrier in the process of immigrant economic integration. Fong recommended that TRIEC could and should play a more active role in raising awareness on the racial discrimination issues in the Canadian labour market by initiating stakeholder discussions on the subject and by modifying its communication message from a pure ‘business case for hiring immigrants’ to a more social justice reasoning. While it was not the primary concern of her research, Fong identified several of TRIEC’s achievements and recognized a couple of factors that contributed to TRIEC’s becoming a well-known organization and arguably (my emphasis) successful. These reasons are: • Results speak for themselves: Fong acknowledged that TRIEC was effective at placing immigrants into jobs; • Location, location, location: Fong emphasized the advantages of TRIEC being located in the region with a large number of corporate headquarters; • Neutral social justice position: While Fong criticized TRIEC’s silence on the “race card,” she acknowledge that it might have been a smart tactical move to win employers by ‘speaking their language’ and emphasizing the ‘business case for hiring immigrants’, i.e. taking a neoliberal stand on the problem of foreign credential recognition.

Lewkowicz’s thesis (2008) examined the effectiveness of TRIEC “as a new governance institution in the Toronto city-region” which was created to address immigrant employment challenges. In his evaluation of TRIEC’s success, Lewkowicz conducted a thorough examination of the Mentoring Partnership. Additionally, he interviewed 63 individuals from broad stakeholder groups. It is important to note that while TRIEC was the central piece of Lewkowicz’s research, he also looked at other innovative ways to integrate immigrants (co-ops, Settlement and Education Partnership in Toronto, York Region Inclusivity Action Plan, the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act, etc.) As

for TRIEC’s effectiveness, 67% of his respondents agreed that TRIEC was successful, 15% suggested that TRIEC was quite young and they had to ‘wait and see’ and none stated that TRIEC was unsuccessful. While Lewkowicz did not focus on success factors, similar to Fong, he mentioned some of TRIEC’s achievements and subsequent reasons for success such as: • The Mentoring Initiative. Key informants praised TRIEC for creating a project which yields results in helping immigrants integrate better by expanding their professional and social networks (Lewkowicz, 2008: 87); • Active Employer Engagement. Key informants highlighted successful employer involvement as the key condition that made TRIEC a ‘successful model’ (ibid: 136, 137); • Broad-stakeholder Approach and TRIEC’s Structure. Key informants felt that TRIEC’s uniqueness was rooted in its ability to involve the whole community, i.e. presence of all the players who needed to be at the table in its decision-making process (ibid: 137); • Strong Public Awareness. Key informants suggested that public awareness has been a very successful TRIEC move (ibid: 136).

Good’s book Municipalities and Multiculturalism. The Politics of Immigration in Toronto and Vancouver (2009) examined the role of municipalities in immigrant integration processes. Good interviewed over 50 key informants from eight Canadian municipalities (four in the GTA and four in Greater Vancouver). She touches on three important pre-conditions that existed before TRIEC was created. These are: • Amalgamation of the City of Toronto and its impact on the civic movement in the city and the region. Good argues that “Amalgamation had a powerful effect on patterns of mobilization in Toronto. … It also led to an unprecedented level of cooperation among immigrant groups in the city under the banner of new Voices for the New City. Toronto is the only city in the sample in which a strong urban empowerment coalition emerged; it is also the only city that was amalgamated”. (Good, 2009: 287); • Presence of political leaders who believe that municipality has a role to play in formulating and acting on diversity and immigration policies. Good found that “ compared to those in other municipalities, political leaders in Toronto tend to emphasize opportunities for municipal action and to downplay their jurisdictional limitations” (ibid: 96); • Existing responsive multicultural policies in the City of Toronto. Good argues: “The City of Toronto … has built on the strong foundation of diversity policies that was developed in the former Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the former City of Toronto. The former City of Toronto and Metro Toronto were active in multiculturalism policy as early as the mid-1970s” (ibid: 57).

In his dissertation, Allahwala argues that TRIEC along with the TCSA/CivicAction are exemplars of new civic metropolitan governance structures that lack accountability to the public and promote a neoliberal agenda of the Canadian government and businesses under the auspices of ‘the politics of competitive multiculturalism’. Similar to other researchers, Allahwala did not specifically

look at TRIEC’s success factors but he identified a number of key features of this multi-stakeholder collaboration. These are: • Preexisting civic and business activism. Allahwala develops his argument by listing a number of events that supported and led to the formation of new regional governance models, such as the TCSA/CivicAction and TRIEC. He notes two events “that focused on Jacobs’ work” organized by Alan Broadbent in the late 1990s, which resulted “in the publication of the book, Toronto: Considering Self-Government,”(ibid: 103); emergence of a number of economic reports produced by the Toronto Board of Trade and TD Bank Financial, focused on ‘regional competitiveness’; the establishment of the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues, and the emerging federal New Deal for Cities etc. He concludes, “Toronto’s civic regional movement gained momentum in 2002 when then-Mayor Mel Lastman convened the first Toronto City Summit.” (ibid: 112); • Maytree Foundation was known as a strong advocate in issues of immigration and settlement long before TRIEC was developed. Allahwala (2011) notes: “The foundation’s policy advocacy towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s was crucial in linking immigrant employment to then-emerging policy debates about the future of Canada’s city-region…” (ibid: 143); • Arguably neutral position of key leader of the TCSA and stellar supporter of TRIEC – David Pecaut. This champion was an extraordinarily talented visionary, very influential and caring about the future of Toronto citizens. Allahwala argues that his involvement in the TCSA was generally perceived and presented as one of a ‘non- partisan outsider’ but this is not entirely correct: “despite this often self-cultivating image of political ousider and non-partisan “convener,” Pecaut’s involvement in provincial and city-regional politics goes back to the late 1980s and early 1990s” (ibid: 117); • Politicized TRIEC’s decision-making process and structure. Allahwala (2011) argues: “despite the fact that TRIEC is an initiative of Toronto’s corporate elite, key actors in TRIEC refer to the participants as “citizens” …Stakeholder governance lacks clear procedures of securing and maintaining accountability” (ibid:151,152)TRIEC’s clear objectives not to compete with existing settlement services agencies but cooperate and collaborate. One of key informants shared: “TRIEC made it clear from the outset that it was not going to deliver services because Toronto has a functioning community infrastructure …” (ibid 2011: 153); • Horizontal and vertical policy collaboration. TRIEC was quite successful in engaging different levels of government and “increased nation-wide political awareness about urban policy issues” (ibid: 154). Additionally, it entered into partnerships with many local community stakeholders to initiate ‘innovative response’ to the issue of immigrant economic integration, including local settlement service agencies, community and business organizations, employers, universities and colleges and immigrant networks; • Formation of ALLIES contributed to the success and branding of TRIEC. Allahwala (2011) asserts: “ … what has become known as the ‘TRIEC model’, largely due to the concerted policy activism of the Maytree Foundation, has become a catalyst for the replication of similar initiatives elsewhere” (ibid: 170).

There are some mutually-agreed to and conflicting opinions expressed implicitly or explicitly by other scholars as to why TRIEC became known as a ‘successful model’. All researchers emphasized the importance of committed leadership from local government, corporate partners, and influential

civic leaders as well as the hosting agency – the Maytree Foundation. Additionally, scholars agreed that the formation of TRIEC became possible because of a unique set of conditions, which ranged from immigrant demographics in Toronto to strong multicultural policies in the City of Toronto to civic movements in the region, which, among other ideas, supported the approach to immigrant skill utilization from the business point of view. However, while Wayland and Lewkowicz praised TRIEC’s truly multi-stakeholder approach and presented employer engagement both as a success factor and success for TRIEC, Allahwala saw the former as not being representative of the community and issues and the latter as a problematic division of power. Both Allahwala and Fong strongly criticized the philosophical approach and language that TRIEC adopted in their actions and messages.

3.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

An in-depth review of the activities, outputs and outcomes reported by TRIEC presents evidence of its achievements and potential impacts in the region and in other communities. TRIEC became associated with a ‘successful multi-stakeholder’ brand by: • Bringing broad public attention to the issue of immigrant employment challenges in the GTA, although the focus and emphasis in its public awareness campaign was on ‘what immigrants could do to become more employable’ and ‘how employers could benefit from hiring immigrants’ (Fong, 2008), i.e. the competitive advantage of managing diversity well; • Showing to businesses, government, funders, sponsors and community agencies that collaboration between public and private agencies could be successfully sustained and expanded. However, this level of collaboration proved to be the most successful when TRIEC assumed a business-oriented or ‘regional prosperity’ approach to the issue of immigrant integration as opposed to a more balanced view of systemic problems, which, possibly, would have not found as much support from employers and funders; • Creating a different brand of immigrant services and showing a high level of professionalism that employers expect from their community partners; • Providing a platform for municipalities to collaborate with senior levels of government on immigrant related issues which was intended to lead to better coordination and communication between funders; • Engaging a large number of community service providers in its initiatives which resulted in better coordination in the industry and generated more partnerships; • Introducing a new concept and culture of corporate immigrant mentorship in the GTA and in other regions, which scaled up existing mentoring/internship projects that proved to be helpful for immigrants in securing meaningful employment.

Although no systematic evaluation of TRIEC’s programs and/or outcomes has been conducted, this chapter showed that by focusing on business incentives, this first-of-its-kind multi- stakeholder collaboration in Canada managed to engage employers and three levels of government not only in ‘discussions’ but in taking collaborative actions to improve immigrant labour market outcomes. However, addressing ‘systemic inequalities in the workforce’ were not on TRIEC’s priority list (Stasilius, 2011: 15). Additionally, TRIEC is recognized as a facilitator of change and praised for its introduction of ‘innovative tools and programs’ for immigrants and employers. Finally, its role is acknowledged in bringing about change through its advocacy efforts in the policy arena. Yet, regardless of these efforts, Ontario’s settlement sector is in a critical state as the federal government introduces new funding cuts in the province, which fail “to recognize the redress that was built in to the first COIA” (OCASI, 2011b: 2). The next chapter, based on responses from over twenty of TRIEC’s stakeholders, will explore even further if TRIEC was successful in bringing about systemic change and what conditions contributed its perceived success.

CHAPTER 4: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

… if you want to be able to engage funders and if you want people to really understand how impactful an Immigrant Employment Council can be then you need to talk about outcomes and the change that is occurring.

- Shelley White TRIEC funder representative and Board member

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results and their interpretations from the first interview phase. Twenty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with all five categories of key informants. The Chapter consists of four major sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Semi-structured Interview Findings; (3) Semi-structured Interview Analysis; (4) Summary of the Chapter. Section Two is broken down into eight sub-sections, which provide an in-depth overview of the findings in the semi-structured interviews. Section Four analyzes interview transcripts, with direct quotes from key informants. It interprets answers at the categorical level and attempts to make links between key concepts used in this research, i.e. immigrant systemic barriers, systemic change, TRIEC’s ultimate success, and TRIEC’s objectives and approach. Finally, it introduces six success factors, the baseline for the development of indicators, and illustrates commonalities between stakeholder responses and the success factors discovered in the literature.

4.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS

This section provides a summary description of answers to core questions that were asked to the majority of key informants and a brief overview of their responses. Selectively, it will provide the breakdown of interview results by category. It is important to note that not all respondents provided answers to all questions.

4.2.1 IDENTIFYING IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS

Key informants (with exception of the Funder/Sponsor Category) were asked to name systemic barriers that prevent immigrants from successful economic integration. As shown in Table 4.1, a total of nineteen responses were given, which were thematically categorized into seven response groups. The

following top three barriers were identified: ‘Racial discrimination/Canadian attitudes towards different faiths’, ‘Recognition of foreign skills and qualifications / Skill utilization’ and ‘Lack of social capital’.

Table 4.1 Immigrant Employment Barrier Responses

Identifying Immigrant Employment Barriers, N=8, n=19 45 N % 1. Recognition of foreign skills and qualifications/skill utilization (n=5) 26% 2. Racial discrimination/Canadian attitudes towards different faiths (n=5) 26% 3. Lack of social capital (n=3) 16% 4. Luck of coordination between service providers/funders (n=2) 11% 5. Limited language training/bridging programs (n=2) 11% 6. Lack of Canadian work experience (n=1) 5% 7. Non inclusive workplaces (n=1) 7% Total Responses (n=19) 100%

4.2.2 DEFINING SYSTEMIC CHANGE IN THE AREA OF IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION

When conducting interviews, key informants were asked to provide their opinions on the question “What would systemic change in the area of immigrant labour market/economic integration look like?” A total of nineteen responses were generated and categorized into nine response groups. As seen in Table 4.2, the most common response was ‘Employer hiring techniques’. The next most common responses mentioned ‘Change in public perceptions’ and ‘Change at the policy level’.

Table 4.2 Defining Systemic Change in the Area of Immigrant Economic Integration Responses

Defining Systemic Change in the Area of Immigrant Economic Integration, N=11, n=19 N % 1.Change in employer hiring techniques across many industries and organizations (n=4) 21% 2. Change in public perceptions about the challenges immigrants face andthe benefits they bring (n=3) 16% 3. Change at the policy level, i.e. employers do not care where qualifications were obtained; government 16% creates standardized equivalencies and qualification recognition processes; employer equity being reinforced (n=3) 4. Immigrants can find jobs without any services/newcomers are integrating very easily (n=2) 11% 5. Easier and fairer process of foreign credential recognition (n=2) 11% 6. Employers are more open minded /understand benefits of hiring immigrants (n=2) 11% 7. Change in service delivery to immigrants (n=1) 5% 8. The changes gets sustained with the system, i.e. desired outcomes happen on their own (n=1) 5% 9. Tools and services are easily available to immigrants at a minimum cost (n=1) 5% Total Responses (n=19) 100%

45 N – number of respondents, n – number of responses. 94

4.2.3 DEFINING ULTIMATE SUCCESS FOR TRIEC

Stakeholders were asked to imagine ’the ultimate success scenarios of TRIEC’. A total of 43 possible scenarios of TRIEC/IEC success were provided and synthesized into twelve response categories. Close to 20%, or eight key informants, suggested that it was difficult to assess the success of TRIEC or any IEC, in general (Table 4.3). This answer was given by at least one representative from each category of respondents. Twelve percent (5 responses) suggested that the ultimate success of TRIEC/IECs should be measured by the number of skilled immigrants hired. Creating cohesion among stakeholders was also considered to be a great success for TRIEC or any IEC. The following three success scenarios each received at least three responses or 27% cumulatively: ‘Immigrants are getting jobs because the right infrastructure is in place’, ‘Systemic policy changes are introduced’, and ‘Employers are changing their systemic processes’ (of hiring and/or considering immigrant applicants).

Table 4.3 Defining Ultimate Success for TRIEC/IEC Responses

Defining Ultimate Success of TRIEC/IEC, N=20, n=43 n, % 1. Difficult to assess the success of TRIEC (n=8) 19% 2. Number of professional immigrants hired (n=5) 12% 3. Creating high level of cohesion among key stakeholders (particularly government) / creating 12% connections between different stakeholders (n=5) 4. Immigrants are finding the right jobs as appropriate programs and services are in place to enable 9% them to find their way (n=4) 5. Policy is changed at the system level, i.e. funding, immigration point system, employment equity, 9% foreign recognition, dissemination of information to immigrants (n=4) 6. [Number of] employers [who] are making changes in their systemic processes (n=4) 9% 7. Small measurable outcomes (the success rate of mentoring program etc.) (n=3) 7% 8. TRIEC is not needed (n=3) 7% 9. Immigrants compete as ‘equal players’ (n=2) 5% 10. Increased awareness of immigrant skill level utilization (n=2) 5% 11. Hiring immigrants becomes a mainstream practice (n=1) 2% 12. Employers are benefiting from hiring immigrants (n=1) 2% 13. Immigrants are declaring that they made the right decision to move to Canada (n=1) 1% Total Responses (n=3) 100%

4.2.4 DEFINING TRIEC OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES

A total of sixteen responses were provided by stakeholders when asked about TRIEC’s objectives (four response categories). As evident from Table 4.4, slightly less than half of the responses (7 out of 15) suggested TRIEC was created ‘to better facilitate the entrance of skilled immigrants into the Canadian labour market’. The second most common answer was ‘to help employers to hire immigrants and/or bring employers to the table’ (5 responses). Only one respondent mentioned the ‘collaborate with partners’ objective. In addition, a question about TRIEC’s approach was posed to key

informants, i.e. how TRIEC did what it did (operational approach) and what guided its actions (philosophical approach). Fourteen responses were categorized into seven response groups.

Table 4.4 Defining TRIEC Objectives Responses

TRIEC Objectives Response Groups, N=9, n=15 N % 1. To better facilitate the entrance of skilled immigrants into the Canadian labour market, i.e. to 53% increase a number of immigrants hired/to tap into immigrant talent so the province will benefit (n=7) 2. To help employers to hire immigrants/bring employers to the table (n=5) 33% 3. Collaborating with partners (n=1) 7% 4. Come up with practical solutions (1) 7% Total Responses (15) 100%

As shown in Table 4.5, over half of all responses (nine key informants) emphasized TRIEC’s employer-focused and collaborative approach. The next most cited response was the economic reasoning for hiring immigrants that TRIEC used.

Table 4.5 TRIEC Approach Responses

TRIEC Approach Response Groups, N=13, n=20 N, % 1. Inclusive / Collaborative (n=6) 29% 2. Employer driven/Employer focused (n=5) 25% 3. Business case for hiring immigrants – “apolitical vs. social justice reasoning” (n=3) 15% 4. Action-oriented, i.e. output/outcome driven (n=2) 10% 5. Focused on systemic barriers / Holistic approach to the integration of immigrants (n=2) 10% 6. Quick wins – might not even be the best idea but have strong leadership behind an IEC (n=1) 5% 7. Transparent (n=1) 5% 8. Focused on the organizational change (n=1) 5% Total Responses (n=20) 100%

In the following, I will examine in more detail some of TRIEC’s tactics that were mentioned by other scholars as potential success factors, i.e. TRIEC’s approach in selecting leaders and choosing communication messages. Additionally, since the City of Toronto initiated the civic forum, which resulted in the TCSA/CivicAction, and ultimately became the supporting employer engagement platform for TRIEC, I became interested in how stakeholders viewed the role of municipalities in multi-stakeholder collaborations.

4.2.4.1 CHAMPION QUALITIES

A total of 40 responses were generated with respect to the ‘Champion Qualities’ of TRIEC’s leadership, and were categorized into nine response groups (see Table 4.6). ‘Ability to take actions’ and

‘Ability to articulate the problem and promote the solution’ were named as the top two Champion qualities, both as existing and desired attributes for IEC’s leaders.

Table 4.6 TRIEC Approach: Champion Qualities Responses

Champion Qualities Response Groups, N=11, n=40 n, % 1. Ability to take action/Company is involved in TRIEC programs/Lead by example (n=7) 18% 2. Media Spokesperson/Ability to articulate the problem and promote the solution (n=7) 18% 3. Authority within their organization/High profile in the field/Respect from fellow business leaders 15% (n=6) 4. Ability to open doors/Bring followers and influencers/Make phone calls him/herself (n=6) 15% 5. Understands the issue (n=3) 8% 6. Charismatic/social/good networker/Having a broad network (n=3) 8% 7. Willing and capable to provide input through Board /Working Groups work (n=3) 8% 8. Passionate about the issue (n=3) 8% 9.Bringing organizational commitment, i.e. represents the company, not just his personal interest (n=2) 5% Total Responses (n=40) 100%

4.2.4.2 COMMUNICATION MODEL

Key informants were asked about TRIEC’s communication tactics to raise awareness on the issue of immigrant employment and celebrate TRIEC’s achievements. A total of 24 responses were generated (five response groups). As illustrated in Table 4.7, of the responses, 42% emphasized the unique combination of effective communication tools that TRIEC used while 33% mentioned that TRIEC took a very professional approach to its communication strategy and built it on the principle on transparency. Two respondents stated that TRIEC could have been more transparent, pointing out its ‘pure business case messaging’ in the Public Awareness Campaign, which avoided any reference to racial discrimination as a barrier in immigrant hiring in most, if not all, of its communication materials,

Table 4.7 TRIEC Approach: Communication Model Responses

Communication Model Response Groups, N=11, n=24 n, % 1. Combination of effective communication tools – social marketing, TV ads, annual reports, website, 42% awards (n=10) 2. Transparency is built into communicating results/Important to have professional reports/Website to 33% communicatethe results to the public and employers/Transparency is important as public money isinvolved (n=8) 3. TRIEC was not transparent/could be more transparent/TRIEC had a luxury of producing reports, i.e. 13% high-level funding (n=3) 4. Difficult to find a balance between core business and raising awareness/budget issues (n=2) 8% 5. Message in published materials (articles) is focused on what immigrants should do – network, have a 4% mentor to help them vs. what the society should do – address racial discrimination first (n=1) Total Responses (n=24) 100%

Over the course of the first eight to ten interviews, key informants referred to a number of TRIEC’s effective communication tools. Thus, Funder/Sponsor Category key informants, who were interviewed later, were asked to rate the effectiveness of the most cited communication mechanisms. As shown in Figure 4.1, the content and look of TRIEC’s website received the highest rating, followed by TRIEC’s effective methods in engaging stakeholders and the public through their E-Newsletter and electronic updates. Overall, out of six listed communication mechanisms, only two received ‘somewhat important’ ratings by at least one informant: ‘Annual Reports’ and ‘IS and Mentoring Awards’. However, both of these communication tools were rated as ‘Very important’ by at least one of the informants.

Figure 4.1 Rating of the Effectiveness of TRIEC’s PR and Communication Tools by Funders/Sponsors, N=7, n=42

4.2.4.3 ‘BUSINESS CASE’ MESSAGE

When a direct question about ‘business case messaging’ and TRIEC’s perceived silence about the racial barrier was posed to key informants, 57% of 14 responses confirmed that it was a smart communication move, i.e. ‘TRIEC is aware of real problems. Business case messaging is a strategic approach to be effective and achieve objectives’ (Table 4.8, six response groups).

4.2.4.4 ROLE OF LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES

Key informants were asked about the role municipalities played/should have played in multi- stakeholder collaborations like TRIEC. Seventeen responses were generated and combined into four categories. As Table 4.9 shows, 35% of seventeen responses suggested that cities should act as ‘champions’. The same number of responses identified a role for the city ‘to be one of the stakeholders’. The third most common response was ‘to be involved as employers’.

Table 4.8 TRIEC Approach: TRIEC Business Case Message Responses

TRIEC Business Case Message vs. Systemic Barrier – Racial Discrimination Response Groups, n % N=12, n=14 1. TRIEC is aware of real problems. The business case approach is a strategic approach shown to be 57% effective and achieve objectives/helping all immigrant groups vs. just visible minorities is more important/focusing on business case brings employers on board (n=8) 2. TRIEC should talk more openly about real systemic barriers (n=2) 14% 3. Social justice won’t get immigrants into jobs in Canada (n=1) 7% 4. TRIEC deliberately focuses on the manifestation of race discrimination (n=1) 7% 5. TRIEC is affiliated with Maytree, which has a policy and strong social justice message and programs 7% on the issue of racial discrimination (n=1) 6. Racial discrimination is only one barrier (n=1) 7% Total Responses (n=14) 100%

Table 4.9 TRIEC Approach: Role of Municipalities in TRIEC/IECs Responses

Role of Municipalities in TRIEC/IECs Response Groups, N=12, n=23 n, % 1. City should be a Champion (n=8) 35% 2. City is one of the stakeholders (n=8) 35% 3. City is an employer (n=6) 26% 4. City is a funder (n=1) 4% Total (n=23) 100%

4.2.5 TRIEC CURRENT ACHIEVEMENTS

When asked whether TRIEC was successful, the majority of respondents answered ‘Yes’. When asked: ‘How do you know that TRIEC is successful? and/or What kind of impact has TRIEC made in Toronto and elsewhere?’, 41 responses were received and categorized into fifteen response groups. As shown in Table 4.10, 20% identified TRIEC’s ability to produce measurable outcomes as the best example of TRIEC achievement, i.e. interns are getting jobs etc., 12% said it was ‘TRIEC’s ability to bring multiple stakeholders to work together’, and, at least 10% identified one of the following: ‘TRIEC’s public relations and online tools are a great way to educate and influence employers’, ‘Employers are participating in programs and changing their practices and mindsets’ and ‘TRIEC created a model that works, i.e. showed that their programs are getting immigrants into jobs’.

Table 4.10 TRIEC Current Achievements Responses

TRIEC Current Achievement Responses, N=16, n=41 n, % 1. Measurable Outcomes: Interns are getting jobs, mentors and mentees are matched (n=8) 20% 2. Brought multi-stakeholders together; created a large network of influential partners who are willing to 12% work with TRIEC (n=5) 3. PR and online tools: hireimmigrants.ca and awards: promoting immigrant friendly hiring practices to 10% be replicated by other employers (n=4) 4. Employers are participating in bridging programs and changing their practices (n=4) 10% 5. Created a model that worked: TRIEC identified to government and corporate leaders what change is 10% needed; showed that programs are getting immigrants into jobs (n=4) 6. Raised awareness of immigrant skill utilization as an issue (n=3) 7% 7. TRIEC’s approach is replicated in other jurisdictions (n=3) 7% 9. Impact on government policies: policy to fund programs to get employers on board; how results 5% helped shape future policy directions/funding; funding of multi-sectoral groups (2) 10. Their professionalism; budget and activities (n=2) 5% 11. Mentoring idea- addressing social capital barrier (n=1) 2% 12. Intergovernmental Committee service mapping exercise – governments work together to identify 2% gaps (n=1) 13. Advocacy role in setting up bridging programs, i.e. Legal Pilot Project at University of Toronto (n=1) 2% 14. Anecdotal success stories (n=1) 2% 15. Respect from other stakeholders, unique place in community (n=1) 2% Total (n=41) 100%

Table 4.11 TRIEC Success Factor Responses

TRIEC Success Factor Response Groups, N=19, n=98 n, % 1. Action-oriented: Actions vs. consultations/Actions first-governance second/Action on solutions vs. 15% problem; Direct actions to impact immigrants in the first 2 years of TRIEC existence/Successful innovative pilot programs (n=15) 2. Good management of relationships and building right partnerships (n=11) 11% 3. Created respect among stakeholders about their work / became central resource-expert (n=9) 9% 4. A variety of strong communication mechanisms/raising public awareness/honest marketing / 8% professional communication products (n=8) 5. Unique leaders on both staff and Board (n=8) 8% 6. Unique location, i.e. number of immigrants, civic movement– the TCSA, City of Toronto 7% Mentoring Program/immigrant policies, No Federal-Provincial Immigration Agreement. (n=7) 7. Host agency/Unique structure of host agency/Existing body of knowledge developed by the 6% organization/Existing relationships with the City of T/Career Bridge (n=6) 8. Employer driven / Corporate engagement/Access to employers through the TCSA (n=6) 6% 9. Employer-focused/speaking employer language (n=5) 5% 10. Scale up successful innovative projects (n=4) 4% 11. Everyone bought into the vision/Cohesion among stakeholders/Engaging groups that could make a 4% difference vs. those that have to be around politically (4) 12. Quality of work/running the organization as a business (n=3) 3% 13. Collecting and reporting metrics (n=3) 3% 14. Clearly articulated goals (3) 3% 15. Creating business opportunities for employers (n=2) 2% 16. Did not ask for permission/risk taker (n=2) 2% 17. Level of funding (n=2) 2% 18. Willing to listen to stakeholders/innovative and responsive to change 2% Total (n=98) 100% 100

4.2.6 EXPLORING TRIEC SUCCESS FACTORS

When asked “What, in their opinion, contributed to the success of TRIEC?”, 98 responses were received from 19 respondents, which were combined into seventeen categories. From Table 4.11, the most commonly cited success factor was ‘TRIEC’s action-oriented approach’ (15%), followed by ‘TRIEC’s ability to manage relationships and build the right partnerships’ (9%) and ‘TRIEC’s is a go- to resource centre in the area of immigrant integration’ (9%) and ‘A variety of strong communication mechanisms’ (8%). It is interesting to note that TRIEC’s unique location and its level of funding (or resources) were not mentioned by respondents among the top three reasons for its success neither, a point that will be discussed further in Chapter Five. What follows is a detailed discussion of responses received in the semi-structured interviews.

4.3 ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS

4.3.1 IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS – ANALYSIS

Seven major immigrant employment barrier groups were identified by key informants in this research. Furthermore, while response numbers are quite different in two studies (Lewkowicz, 2008), there are some interesting observations that are worth mentioning. In Lewkowicz’s study (2008) eight response groups were identified:

1. Credential Recognition Process 5. Immigration Process and Funding Mechanisms 2. Language / Communication Skills 6. Access to Networks 3. Canadian Work Experience 7. Systemic Discrimination 4. Cultural elements 8. Job Search Process

Not surprisingly, even with a much smaller response rate, this study identified five out of eight barrier categories named by stakeholders in Lewkowicz’s study (Table 4.1). However, there is a notable difference in the order of barriers. For example, ‘lack of social capital’ or, a lack of professional and personal networks, was mentioned in both studies but was among the top three in this research. While ‘foreign credential recognition process’ was among the top three barriers in both studies, ‘racial discrimination’, which is rated as one of the top immigrant employment barriers in this study, has not received much attention in Lewkowicz’s study. In this research, the ‘foreign credential recognition’ barrier received the same number of responses as ‘racial discrimination’. In fact, one of the key informants suggested that racial discrimination is the major barrier for immigrants:

101

I think race is a barrier. … The rest of the barriers are to some extent manifestations of that difference in race. Canadian work experience is a proxy for a certain kind of discrimination, not recognizing skills and education is a proxy, Canadian attitudes towards different faiths are to some extent an expression, a more heightened expression of a growing Islamaphoebia, I would suggest.46 Several key informants talked about the subtlety of racial discrimination in Canada. They argued that it is more rooted in ignorance and lack of awareness than in hostility and hate. Julia Deans, the former CEO, Toronto CivicAction Alliance (former TCSA) and TRIEC Council members says: I think discrimination is generally rooted in a lack of understanding of what is being presented to you. I don’t think we’re a place where people say, “I’m not going to hire somebody who comes from Brazil.” It’s going to be, “I’m not going hire somebody who’s not worked here before, I’m not going to hire somebody who’s outside of my network.” I don’t think it’s directed at a certain race or culture so much as this idea that those people simply don’t know what they need to know to get this job done. Ignorance.47

4.3.2 SYSTEMIC CHANGE, TRIEC ULTIMATE SUCCESS AND OBJECTIVES

Key informants suggested nineteen desirable scenarios of the systemic change in the area of immigrant economic integration. These were categorized into nine response groups. Interestingly, in its first 2004 Annual Review, TRIEC reported on the following three objectives (see Table 4.12), which happened to be the top two systemic change scenarios identified by a wide range of stakeholders in this study, excluding the ‘Change in public attitudes’ scenario.

Table 4.12 Objectives and Top Three Systemic Change Responses

TRIEC Objective Reported achievements in Top Three Systemic Change 2004 Annual Review scenarios by Key Informants Increase access and availability of value Greater access and support: Change in employer hiring added services that support labour Career Bridge techniques across industries market integration of skilled immigrants The Mentoring Partnership Change the way stakeholders value and Changing perceptions Change in employer hiring work with skilled immigrants Hireimmigrants.ca techniques across industries Change the way governments relate to Enhancing collaborations: IGC Change at the policy level one another Source: TRIEC Annual Review (2004: 4).

Many interviewees talked about the difficulty of bringing about systemic change and concluded that TRIEC is only one of the important players that should be ‘at the table’. Says one of the TRIEC Board/Council members:

46 Category A, Interview # 9, July 15, 2010. Line 366. 47 Category B, Interview # 4, July 12, 2011. Line 130. 102

No individual body, even the government, cannot bring about systemic change. No employer, no NGO by itself can bring about systemic change. I think systemic change is a process, it takes time, it involves many people, many agencies and a lot of resources. … I think systemic change is very fancy, very appealing, romantic, but to bring about systemic change in reality is very hard. It does cause social upheaval of some kind or another.48

The scope of expected systemic change might be defined by system boundaries, i.e. the definition of systemic changes might be different for different jurisdictions and for different groups, depending on their definition of the problem and their objectives. Informant responses echoed the findings from scholars who believed that defining system boundaries is the most vital step in the systems change process (Checkland, 1981). A key informant suggests: I don’t think there’s a single [solution], and this is one of the challenges of Immigrant Employment Councils, there’s no single bullet. There’s no single thing that’s going to work. I think you have to be very diligent and identify what the main barriers are, and begin working at addressing them. I think that the analysis has to go deep enough that you get to the systemic pieces. 49

S/he offers the definition of systemic change as a phenomenon that should sustain itself:

For me systemic change is where we see the way in which an organization or a number of organizations and stakeholders work with each other in a way that creates outcomes that then begin to happen on their own. That it’s not a deliberate single intervention that creates the output but it gets sustained within the system. Be that the relationship, the organization, the policies and so forth.50

Several participants, when talking about impacts that TRIEC made in the GTA, distinguished between incremental and systemic changes. Key informants suggested that while TRIEC aims at the systemic changes it does so by initiating incremental steps. A TRIEC Board / Council member remarks: In immigrant employment for example, incremental change is you create an internship and through that internship, the immigrant gets the foot into the door, gets the Canadian experience and the employer gets to know how the person performs, whether he or she can fit it. That’s incremental change. I think a systemic change would be if I’m taken in without the help of any internship, without the help of mentorship and if I’m taken at the same level that I previously was or at a higher level.51

According to Corrigan and Boyle (2003), while first-order change requires incremental steps within an existing mode of practice, the radical change happens when the problem is redefined and new strategies are employed to address it. The radical change is more focused on shifting the status quo, i.e. addressing the root of the complex problem. Whereby, “the evolutionary perspective views the status quo in an alternative manner: it is not a barrier to be overcome, it is a reality that must be reckoned with” (ibid: 2003: 385). In the evolutionary change process, various stakeholders are granted

48 Category B, Interview # 8. July 22, 2010. Line 303. 49 Category A, Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 357. 50 Category A, Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 318. 51 Category B. Interview # 8. July 14, 2010. Line 275. 103

opportunities to provide their input and the change “seems more logical and incremental, targeting only a few dimensions” whereby “revolutionary change may seem to be irrational and is marked by qualitative jumps in most program dimensions and among most service participants” (ibid: 383). When analyzing key informant responses in this study, it seems that TRIEC has chosen an evolutionary path of change. As a rule, the majority of stakeholders agreed that incremental change is crucial in bringing about systemic changes. Explains a key informant: It [incremental change] paints a picture of what is possible, it has people understand that change is not unpalatable, that it’s doable. That it’s not going to threaten their life out of existence, it’s important to show them that. …52

Julia Deans, a TRIEC Council member, provided a ‘critical mass’ explanation of how TRIEC ‘incremental’ programs contribute to systemic change: … as the numbers [of participating companies] increase you have organizations that are committed to the benefits of doing it. You have people who have done it themselves and maybe next time don’t need a program and can shift the whole way of doing of their organization. At some point you hit a tipping point where enough organizations are either using a program or embedding it in their own processes and it starts to mainstream it. 53

Daniele Zanotti, Executive Director, United Way of York Region and TRIEC Board member also believes that incremental change is imperative to bring about systemic change: When you look at the toolbox that TRIEC has and the links with Maytree and the Toronto City Summit, I think that it’s proof that incremental change, in partnerships, is a more sustainable path to systemic long-term changes. It’s really difficult to shift policy in fell swoops, but it’s much more possible to produce pilots or programs so that people buy into change slowly. So I think on that level, TRIEC has been helpful to government and to corporate leaders to identify what changes might be beneficial.54

Close to half of all informants felt that it was difficult to assess the success of TRIEC. This finding is in line with the conclusions made by various scholars who argued that it was much easier to examine ‘proximal or intermediate’ outcomes of collaborative efforts as opposed to systemic change results (Allen et al., 2008; Berkowitz, 2001; Tseng et al., 2011; and Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). When commenting on how they evaluate the success of the TRIEC initiative, one of the Funder/Sponsor category key informants shares: I mean that is our hope and our belief. In terms of being able to assess the exact impact it is quite difficult… So we are making the assumption, I guess, but we do not have concrete numbers as to how much of a difference that makes.55

52 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 262. 53 Category B. Interview # 4. July 12, 2010. Line 234. 54 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 244. 55 Category E. Interview # 28. March 4, 2011. Line 138. 104

Another key informant brings up the difficulty of establishing causal relationships when attempting to assess TRIEC’s success and learn whether change had actually happened: I don’t think we know how to do that, yet. I think we know how to measure our outputs, and we have a sense of impact … We do know that there are numbers of employers who are changing specific practices or specific approaches, whether we can even attribute their work to our work, I don’t know.

It’s very hard to measure. So we have faith that this is important work to do, that our job is to continue to show success, and to innovate and take risks and to look for new ideas, and that societal change will follow. 56

Daniele Zanotti, TRIEC Board member, maintains the same point and talks about how this difficulty to establish causal relationship impacts the whole non-profit sector, serving immigrants: I think it’s a philosophical debate that the entire non-profit sector has. Are we ultimately improving the employment transition of skilled immigrants? I think for those that benefit from TRIEC, yes [TRIEC is successful]. For the ultimate base of skilled immigrants, it’s a much harder one. I think we’re far better at measuring our outputs, than the ultimate outcome of our intervention.57

Informants agreed that it is challenging to assess the impact and level of change by TRIEC. Most of ‘systemic change’ definitions provided by them are not easily measured, as for example, ‘change in employer hiring techniques’, ‘policy changes’, ‘change in public perceptions’, and ‘more fair process of foreign credential recognition’. Furthermore, when analyzing systemic change and ultimate success responses, the study uncovered that respondents provided rather polarized definitions for two linked concepts. For example, one characterization of systemic change reads as ‘[systemic change will happen] when immigrants can find jobs without any services’, in comparison with another definition, which states: ‘[systemic change will happen when] tools and services are easily available to immigrants at minimum cost’. Similarly, one of the ultimate successes of TRIEC/IECs was worded as ‘immigrants can find jobs as the right services and programs are in place’. These conflicting findings are congruent with conclusions made by other scholars who studied multi-stakeholder collaborations (MSCs). While community collaborative groups are becoming an increasingly popular community tool to tackle social problems, their effectiveness in bringing about systems-level change has not been substantiated due to a number of reasons, including non-specificity and scope of MSC goals and limitations of conventional evaluation methods to assess the level of change and how certain interventions contributed to the change (Backer, 2003; Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Florin, et al. 1993; Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011). Three key informants suggested that the ultimate success of TRIEC would be ‘when TRIEC is not needed’ However, Daniele Zanotti, Executive Director of United Way of York Region and

56 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 236 and 244. 57 Category B. Interivew # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 171. 105

TRIEC’s Board member, challenged this notion by saying that no non-profit organization operates in a hope that they won’t be needed: It’d be great, … to think of a day when TRIEC was not necessary and that would be a huge success. But I don’t think this is the way TRIEC is set up, to work ourselves out of business, I think we’re trying to improve the integration of skilled immigrants currently. If our ultimate goal was to work ourselves out of business, we might be looking at things differently. I don’t know what that would be, but I just feel that it’s a lofty statement to say, “It’d be great if TRIEC wasn’t necessary.” I don’t know if that’s the way TRIEC or any non-profit really works.58

4.3.3 TRIEC PHILOSOPHICAL AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

Key informants provided a number of different versions of what philosophical and operational approaches look like. The former guides the work of TRIEC, i.e. why and how we should do what we are doing, the latter gives a glimpse on how things were done at TRIEC in practice (for more discussion on the role of strategic and operational approaches in MSCs, see Antelo and Henderson, 1990). As can be expected, responses in this area resemble the success conditions answers. Many informants felt that TRIEC’s strength was, first and foremost, in its collaborative and inclusive approach to working with its broad stakeholder base. Elaborates a key informant: … at September 2003, that meeting, we asked every Council member to sign up either themselves or a representative to be a part of that working group. Ideally we wanted each working group to have representation from each of the stakeholder groups, and, to your point earlier, to make sure that we had direct immigrant representation on those working groups so that we would make sure that the idea we were creating would serve all of the interests. Again, the philosophical assumption is that if every stakeholder is at the table when you create the idea, the idea has a better chance of being relevant to everyone and being successful. So that’s how we wanted to move forward. 59

An employer-driven and -focused approach was the second most frequent response to the question. A representative of one of the funding/sponsoring agencies notes: Engaging employers – I would say that. I think that approach to bringing on private sector employees to have leading positions in their organization – particularly TD Bank and from Deloitte – bringing them on helped raise awareness but also helped bring on more private sector involvement and there is more – RBC I believe was also involved. Getting large, well-respected private sector employers to be involved in the issue [was key]. 60

A Board / Council Member category key informant elaborates even further: … with the TRIEC name and the TRIEC connections, and TRIEC visibility, the publicity, the communications about the program. It was able to attract employers like

58 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 141. 59 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 53 and 151. 60 Category E. Interview # 22. February 1, 2011. Line 182. 106

… and others that Career Edge on its own could not. At the end of the day you need employers to take these people [immigrants].61

Finally, one of the top three approaches mentioned by key informants was its ‘apolitical’ approach in engaging employers and promoting a ‘business case for hiring immigrants’. States Karen Fong: their approach was to say to the business community, “if you want to be effective and progressive in the changing labour market (in order to be on the cutting edge) you need to bring in skilled and professional immigrants into the labour market because, more and more, as we go into the future these are the types of people who will be in the labour pool. So if you don’t get going on this now you’ll be behind.” So that was their approach, very practical, very business oriented.62

4.3.3.1 BUSINESS CASE MESSAGING

Business case messaging was embedded into TRIEC’s Communication Strategy and Public Awareness campaigns. Fong (2008: 32) argued that “many TRIEC stakeholders do not believe racism is an issue in Canada”. This study intentionally posed the question about ‘TRIEC’s business case versus racial discrimination messaging’ to all five categories of key informants. The results, presented in Table 4.8, showed that only twelve respondents engaged in ‘a race card’ discussion. Several stated that they ‘were not in a position to comment on the issue’. However, out of twelve participants eight suggested that ‘TRIEC is aware of the problem’ and that the reason why TRIEC is not bringing up the ‘race card’ is because it is not its objective to address racial discrimination, and raising it won’t bring employers to the table and won’t get immigrants jobs. A TRIEC/Maytree/ALLIES category key informant agreed that raising race issues is a necessary step in attending to systemic change in the workplace. However, s/he maintains that first, employers should be ‘hooked’ and s/he advocated for a more implicit approach in getting employers on board. Well, I think it’s a question of strategy. TRIEC does not say that there isn’t discrimination or that there isn’t racism in the world or workplace. Of course there is. The question is, strategically, are we going to be more effective in bringing employers to the table, in getting employers engaged if we begin the conversation by saying that they’re running organizations that are racist …. Or are we going to more effectively engage them by helping them see the value of a more inclusive workplace … . I don’t think we’ve buried our heads in the sand and said there is no racism in the workplace. It’s simply that leading off with that in your core messaging does not generate the kind of engagement that our goal is. After we get employers engaged, absolutely, those are issues that come to the floor. That’s part of it. That’s part of creating systemic change in the workplace.

S/he provides an example of how TRIEC addresses the ‘race card’ barrier:

In our workshops, we absolutely, with employers, we talk about discrimination. How could you not? You have to. I mean that’s part of the reality. Some of the practices that we highlight are focused on getting around discrimination. There’s an example of

61 Category B. Interview # 8. July 14, 2010. Line 156. 62 Category C. Interview #1. July 6, 2010. Line 136. 107

employers that have experimented with their recruitment managers by asking for all names and places of education and places of origin to be whited out, to see who else gets to the next level of hiring. They’re finding that more immigrants are making it, when they remove name and place of education. So, that’s a fairly obvious example of anti- discrimination. It’s just its framed differently. Working with them to get them involved in a manner that is more positively framed, and it’s a strategic decision. How are you going to communicate this?63

Shelley White, President and CEO of the United Way of Peel Region, Board member and a representative of TRIEC’s funding agency, agrees that not talking about racial discrimination is like ‘ignoring a pink elephant in the room’. However, given TRIEC’s success with placing immigrants into jobs, she believes that the business case strategy is working and starting the conversation about race might ‘shut people down’: … people react so negatively to racial discrimination and people’s backs go up and sometimes what it does is shuts down communication. On the other hand this is an important issue and is one of the elephants on the table, but – and we have been having this discussion [in our organization] … If we don’t talk about it we are missing out on, we’re avoiding, a very important part of this discussion but it is the one thing people get extremely defensive about and it shuts down discussion, and if you accuse any organization or if an organization accuses another organization then it shuts down communication. So, TRIEC has been so successful with the strategies and approach that it has already taken that I think we should just continue to move forward on the same trajectory. 64

Daniele Zanotti, TRIEC Board member, also confirms that TRIEC is aware about racial discrimination and explains that speaking about the ‘race card’ is not in TRIEC’s mandate. TRIEC is affiliated with the TCSA/CivicAction and Maytree Foundation and these organizations are quite vocal on the issue and develop programs like DivereseCity to monitor and report on visible minority numbers in the executive management positions in GTA. He states: I think that when the only tool you have is a hammer, every tool looks like a nail. In the case of TRIEC, I agree that theirs is more closely a business case. I also think that that’s their goal and intention. ...They are mothered or parented by the Maytree foundation. Maytree has a huge policy role and a strong language in their narrative about some of the issues you’ve discussed. … So within the family of TRIEC and the key partnerships I think some of those components that initial study referenced [Fong, 2008] exist. Granted, it’s not in TRIEC, nor is it in their mission but I think they’re aware of it and they are using other tools in their family tool box to speak to those issues. 65

Jeffrey Reitz, Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto and TRIEC’s Council member, is positive that TRIEC (Board, Council members and staff) are aware of systemic racial discrimination. He confirms that talking about the business case for hiring immigrants is just a smart strategic move: If you talk to employers about racial discrimination, their reaction is likely to be defensive and possibly hostile. If you want them to be sympathetic, it’s better to talk to them in terms of their own interests. … I guess what I’m saying is you could see

63 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 545. 64 Category E. Interview # 15. January 10, 2011. Line 282. 65 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 181. 108

TRIEC as an experiment in attempting to address those kind of issues of employment disadvantage of racial minorities in a more politically positive way, at least positive from the point of view of employers. So I think that’s why they’re doing it, and I suspect they’re quite well aware of that.66

Several funder/sponsor representatives discussed how TRIEC, in fact, addresses racial discrimination by promoting the business case approach and ‘selling’ immigrant skills. Argues a key informant: Well, actually, I think they did open a conversation on it but the way they did open a conversation was by looking at the immigrant population as an asset and making employers understand what the ITPs had beyond the racial – beyond the color of their skin – to bring to the table … they decided to focus on actually showcasing the skill set of these immigrants, these ITPs, and if they are hired, does that not in a way really bring the point home that it is not the color of someone’s skin but the skill set that comes with it with people from another country? 67

Another funder/sponsor representative talked about the complexity of immigrant employment barriers and argued that racial discrimination is not the only barrier and, therefore, should not be given special attention in the work TRIEC does: I do not want to minimize the significance of racial discrimination because I think it is a significant issue. I think that that is the barrier that immigrants face and employment is much more multifaceted. I would not want to put emphasis on that, given TRIEC goals, I think. So, for example, language barrier is a huge issue, lack of recognition, whether they are from European, African or Latin country. So, I do not think and personally not agree that they should be emphasizing racial discrimination more than any other barriers that exists. 68

The direct question about transparency and TRIEC and/or IECs provoked a lively debate in regards to the meaning of transparency for a multi-stakeholder collaboration and whether TRIEC was transparent or not. Karen Fong believed that TRIEC is not entirely honest about the scope of the problem: I think they could be a little bit more transparent. ... If there are people behind TRIEC who really are interested in social change, in improving social equity, I think that could come out a little bit more.69

Several informants believed that a publicly-funded organization is transparent when it is open about its objectives, outcomes and financial resources. States a key informant: I think transparency is sharing the objectives, mission and results and resources. Sharing with the stakeholders, also to an extent to the media, to the public, to the wider community. Funders need to know because they’re funding the programs. Stakeholders need to know because they’re collaborating with the program. Skilled immigrants need to know, employers need to know, governments.70

66 Category B. Interview # 12. July 26, 2010. Line 158. 67 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 360. 68 Category E. Interview # 14. January 5, 2011. Line 224 and 232. 69 Category C. Interview # 1. July 6, 2010. Line 233. 70 Category B. Interview # 8. July 14, 2010. Line 371. 109

Other key informants proposed a broader concept of transparency, whereby the sharing about how decisions are made is a part of equation. States Daniele Zanotti, TRIEC’s Board member: I think it’s [transparency] in how dollars are used, especially because the bulk of those dollars are government, in how decisions are made and policy is set so that the general public has an understanding and a comfort with how business is getting done.71

However, according to one of the Category A key informants, there was very little transparency about how decisions were made at TRIEC in the first years of its existence. In his/her interpretation, all operational and strategic decisions that were made in early days of TRIEC were made in closed-door discussions by a small but ‘committed’ group of people. This was possible because TRIEC was hosted by the Maytree Foundation, which had a very informal governance structure, whereby decisions were made in a very different fashion than they would have been made by an organization with a formal Board of ten-fifteen members. Later on, when TRIEC was incorporated and a formal Board of Directors was established, TRIEC’s decisions became more transparent. S/he elaborates: But transparency to me, also means some transparency of how decisions were made, and quite frankly the decisions were made in the closed room by a little group of people for a long time. That’s been also, part of the success of TRIEC. … Little group of people, passionate, committed, determined ‘we’re going to do this’. Transparency has come afterwards. Now we make decisions as a board.72

4.3.3.2 TRIEC’S CURRENT ACHIEVEMENTS

While key informants suggested that it was difficult to assess the ultimate or future success of TRIEC, they had no trouble describing current TRIEC achievements and impacts. Questions like “How do we know that TRIEC is successful? Or what kind of impacts did TRIEC make in the GTA and in other jurisdictions?” generated a wide variety of answers. Measurable results were named among the top four TRIEC achievements. One of the Funder/Sponsor representative shares: The work I did with TRIEC, looking at … [the] project, developing it, funding it, that has worked out well and has been successful… where I see that their impact has been – really with the clients, the ITPs, getting them jobs in good occupations, well-paid jobs that really make use of their talents and expertise. That’s where I see them having the most impact from my side of things, because I deal with employment.73

Several informants argued that the impact from TRIEC could not necessarily be quantified in numbers. States a key informant: It is TRIEC’s responsibility to measure its own success. I think it has to watch if we’re moving the needle on public attitude, if we’re moving the needle on employer practices, I mean those are the things that matter to us. The fact that 10 people found jobs, or 500

71 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 307. 72 Category A. Interview #9. July 15, 2010. Line 185. 73 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 268. 110

matches were made is just an indicator on the road. Ultimately in this city at least we have to keep pushing the needle on systemic behaviours and approaches. 74

Askin Taner, Senior Program Advisor, Global Experience Ontario, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, speaks about long-term impacts, that he believes TRIEC is making, such as changing behaviours and attitudes of hiring managers, i.e. ‘structural change’: From the perspective of the government of Ontario and other funders involved in the mentoring partnership or other programs in general, we immediately look at the employment outcomes – has this person through the professional coaching, through the development, got a job. But even more importantly than what we track on the short- term basis is what the mentor gets out of the process. Let me expand this: So in the sort-term the mentee gets a job, that’s great, but the mentor as the hiring manager – if he or she gets a positive view of international-trained persons he or she mentored, and is convinced that this person would be an asset to their business or another business, they immediately change their attitude towards hiring immigrants. So this person, as a hiring manager, this person is then likely to make more favourable hiring decisions towards newcomers, and he or she will go on to hire many other people. So on one hand we have the mentee getting a job in the short-term and then this other structural change in the long-term, this hiring manager making pro-immigrant hiring decisions. Also with that, he or she will likely be able to work better with internationally-trained individuals, so at many levels, in fact what the mentor gets out of it in the longer-term might be more important than what the mentee gets out of it. 75

Several participants felt that TRIEC’s ability to create a true multi-stakeholder collaboration was one of its achievements. Says a former TRIEC Council’s member: To my mind, having done this work and trying to create some cohesion within my own limited capacity, I think the biggest success of TRIEC is to create not only that cohesion but to be able to make a high level cohesion. Get commitment from government, employers, immigrants, social service organizations. 76

Another key informant in the Funder/Sponsor category echoes this statement and praises TRIEC for its ability to bring stakeholders together and deliver results in a short timeframe: I think it has been successful… it is quite a young organization and has done quite a lot of good things in such a short time. There is still more to do but you can’t expect TRIEC to single-handedly do it, and no one thinks that. 77

Finally, while many study participants stressed TRIEC’s ability to bring together key stakeholders and leaders from different sectors, several key informants noted TRIEC’s ability to engage existing players in the immigrant serving sector – community and immigrant serving agencies and secure their support by building partnership as opposed to competing with them. Praises TRIEC Board members: I think the good think about TRIEC is instead of saying I will compete with Career Edge, what TRIEC said is I will collaborate with Career Edge because Career Edge has that expertise.78

74 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 228. 75 Category E. Interview # 27. February 15, 2011. Line 168. 76 Category B. Interview # 11. July 22, 2011. Line 176. 77 Category E. Interview # 20. January 26, 2011. Line 166 and 207. 78 Category B. Interview # 8. July 14, 2010. Line 154. 111

Echoes a former TRIEC Council member:

I think, one of the strengths of TRIEC is that rather than saying ok we are a new kid on the block and we are going to play with our own ball and we’re not going to share, what they decided to do, which I think is the right thing to do, is that they looked who are the players who are already doing this work and how can we leverage our partnerships and funds so that they can do it better. Which I think is one of their biggest successes.79

While it was not easy to get immigrant-serving agencies on board, as key informants shared, TRIEC was able to offer solutions that benefited all involved: immigrants are getting jobs, employers are getting highly-qualified labour, social agencies provide better services. States Daniele Zanotti: I mean I can comment on the fact that for some of our United Way funded partners and agencies, they’ve benefited immensely from TRIEC’s interjection. Whether it’s at a mentoring level or whether it’s engaging corporate leaders, they’ve truly benefited from TRIEC.80

Key informants talked about TRIEC’s raising awareness campaign as one of its incredible successes (and success factors). Jeffrey Reitz, a Board/Council Member category key informant says: I think they have an enormous affect on the awareness of immigrants skill utilization as an issue. They have put this topic on the map, so to speak and I think there are very few employers in Toronto now who haven’t hear about this problem and aren’t aware that immigrants are employed below their level of skill and this is a problem for the workforce and for the country. That’s one important contribution.81

TRIEC’s ability to scale up and use innovate approaches was named as one of its successes (as well as success factors). Maintains TRIEC’s Board/Council member: I think what TRIEC did is: it was able to take one solution at a time, take the internship idea, make a success of it, demonstrate that it work, get the numbers, the results, than take a second one called mentorship. I think what they’ve done is develop and/or execute, scale up or whatever word you use, specific solutions, demonstrate that it works, bring people together, so you can get results faster.82

4.3.4 TRIEC’S SUCCESS FACTORS

In total, key informants listed 98 success factors, which were combined into nineteen categories with the exception of two responses on the level of funding. Once all responses were analyzed, six major success factor categories emerged, i.e. High Standard Practices; Action-oriented Approach; Strong Leadership; Employer-driven and -focused Council; Communication Strategies and Unique Location. Analysis of responses revealed certain trends and preferences in factor categories by different key

79 Category B. Interview # 12. July 22, 2010. Line 9 and 177. 80 Category B. Interview # 6. July 12, 2010. Line 158. 81 Category B. Interview # 12. July 26, 2011. Line 117. 82 Category B. Interview # 8. July 14, 2010 Line 500. 112

informant groups. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, Category A key informants (TRIEC/Maytree/ALLIES Staff) strongly believed that Strong Leadership and Unique Location were the most significant factors that contributed to TRIEC’s success. To compare, TRIEC funders and sponsors (Category E) suggested that High Standard Practices and Employer Driven and Focused Council played a key role in TRIEC’s achievements83. Category B (TRIEC Board/Council member) responses were relatively evenly distributed among all six factor groups, with Unique Location and Action-oriented Approach factors each receiving the highest number of this group responses (29% each). Category D (other IECs’ staff) informants were not asked about why TRIEC became successful; however, one of them talked about the difficulties that other IECs were facing and identified aggressive marketing and PR campaigns as well as TRIEC’s level of funding as key conditions that greatly contributed to its success.

Figure 4.2 Success Factor Analysis by Success Factor Groups, N=20, n=9884

As key informant category groups had different numbers of participants, a success factor analysis by key informant groups was conducted. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the Action-oriented Approach was the factor that showed relatively equal distribution of responses among four key informant categories. The High Standard Practices factor received the highest number of responses from TRIEC’s Board/Council members as well as its Funders and Sponsors. Interestingly, the Category E informants did not mention TRIEC’s Unique Location as one of its potential success factors in comparison with Researchers and Exerts who emphasized it quite a bit. One factor ‘ ‘Level of Funding’ was brought up by Funders/Sponsors and by one of the IEC’s staff. What follows is a more detailed discussion of each factor categories.

83 It is important to note there are twice as many key informants in Category E than in category A or C. 84 N-number of key respondents, n – number of responses. 113

Figure 4.3 Success Factor Analysis by Category of Key Informants, N=20, n=9885

4.3.4.1 HIGH STANDARD PRACTICES

The success factor of High Standard Practices received the highest number of responses (33). TRIEC was referred to as an organization that was very clear about its goals, its customer profile and that it operated as a business. A number of scholars have identified focused objectives and clear strategies as important conditions for the success of MSCs (Antelo and Henderson, 1990; Foster- Fishman et al., 2001; Reast et al., 2011)86. A few of my key informants also felt that TRIEC’s ability to clearly formulate its goals and expectations and share them with all involved were part of its success. Shares a representative of the sponsoring corporation: With MP [Mentoring Partnership], they very clearly define what they want people to achieve out of mentoring relationship – they are not looking for people to get jobs. They are not biting more that they can chew – not creating expectations for mentees that are not realistic.87

Another group of stakeholders emphasized TRIEC’s consistent efforts to report out on its results to the public. Stakeholders discussed how TRIEC’s set the bar high in terms of its accountability to the public and to corporate partners when it decided to regularly report about its results, whether it was about its outputs or outcomes and/or qualitative or quantitative results. Conveys Daniele Zanotti, TRIEC’s Board member: I think it’s critical. I think it’s another example of TRIEC knowing its niche. Knowing that to engage and maintain interest of those corporate leaders, it’s important to speak that language. Accountability means all of the same things in the business sector:

85 N-number or key respondents suggesting TRIEC’s success factors, n – number of responses. 86 For a more detailed discussion on MSCs success factors, see Appendix E: Success Factors Identified in the Literature. 87 Category E. Interview # 14. January 5, 2010. Line 97. 114

metrics, measurement, telling people where you’re at. It’s just part of their philosophy, and knowing the audience that they’re trying to go after and engage.88

Preliminary research has shown that very few other IECs produced annual reviews. TRIEC, on the other hand, has produced Annual Reports since 2004, and key informants commented on TRIEC’s commitment to metrics. A Category A key informant explains: It is in keeping with the principle of transparency and making sure that people knew what we were doing. It was an accountability measure in many ways. It was to say this is that we have done, we’ve brought you all together, we have asked for your help. We have a lot of people contributing time and effort and money and ideas. So that’s an accountability marker. I think.89

Clarke and Fuller (2010), Cornelius and Wallace (2010), Kania and Kramer (2011), and Kreuter et al. (2000) have previously identified consistent reporting of the outcomes and adequate measurement systems as a critical condition of success, which made it easier for MSCs to assess the results and ensure they were continuing to improve. Another key informant from Funder/Sponsor category discusses how TRIEC ‘puts itself in a different league’ by producing professionally looking reports and how this approach helped them to build their case with employers and funders and attract more funding/sponsorship: Obviously when you are going into new business or new ventures, that usually involved needing funding and support, and when you have an annual report that is really kind of detailed, valid and highlights the successes you will probably go a lot further in terms of looking at structured funding or a structured response in terms of a business sense. It looks professional, it looks well and shows you are good at your business, you are good at controlling your business and you have got that in place. Usually an annual report will do that.

You sometimes get an audit or an annual report that really looks like its two pages of what I have done for the year. Something that is solid, is outcome-based, is easy to read, has all your financial numbers and structures in place really puts you in a different league when someone is looking to invest in you or fund your project because they want to make sure you have got your ducks in a row and usually annual reports that are good do that.90

Interviewees talked about TRIEC’s ability to bring together a diverse array of stakeholders and their efforts to include people who were interested in participating. The importance of having representative, but also truly committed and active members, was also illustrated in several other studies that were reviewed and considered in this thesis (Emshoff et al., 2007; Golden, 1991; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). Category A key informant elaborates: We did start with sitting down and saying, “who’s out there and who do we need at the table.” Then as buzz grew about the story of TRIEC, and companies or other stakeholders came to us and said “I want to be a part of this,” we found a way of

88 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 330. 89 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 712. 90 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 288. 115

including them. Whether it was on Council, or whether it was in a working group, the idea was to be inclusive and to bring leadership to the table. 91

This approach in engaging stakeholders created an unprecedented amount of support in the community. One of TRIEC’s Board members shares his observation about multi-stakeholder approach that TRIEC successfully utilized and how it created a snowball effect of support: There is a rareness about TRIEC and TRIEC programs. There is some amount of support for it, I don’t know how much support there is, but there is some amount of support for it. Various bodies come together, they discuss, they do support whether it’s funding, whether it’s new program delivery, whether it’s employers willing to sign on. So there is some amount of support.92

Several key informants emphasized TRIEC’s exceptional professionalism and high quality standards in its work with employers, immigrant-serving agencies, funders and all other stakeholders. It was a mutual agreement that because TRIEC was run professionally it received high accolades and unprecedented support from the employer community. States one of TRIEC’s funder representatives: … also they have very good service standards, dealing with either projects or research, and they are not stale – they are always trying to do something new, but they understand their mandate and that is important. … Well I think that their reputation is what gave them the numbers, because they are successful numbers. … So to me, it is their networking, their place in the community and the respect they have and the professionalism they carry everything out with is probably their success.93

Another corporate sponsor representative praises TRIEC’s professionalism:

TRIEC has always been very professional and they appear to run their organization as a business; they provide annual reports and statistics; they take a very systematic approach and they do a great job in providing many reasons why their programs are great for business and the community at large94

TRIEC has been recognized by key stakeholders as an expert and go-to resource on immigrant employment issues in the GTA and in Canada. Mattessich (2003) also found that the reputation of a collaborative group greatly contributes to its success. Additionally, Selsky (1991) pointed out that an organization’s ‘external credibility’ increases with broader community involvement and presence. Similarly, it was suggested that by becoming an expert organization in the area, TRIEC not only increased public awareness on the issue, but also raised its credibility with other partners and funders. As one government funding agency representative states: Because I think that given Toronto is one of the largest communities serving immigrants, they serve as an example to other settlement agencies across the country, and recognizing immigrants as a bigger part of the labour force in the near and distant future becomes increasingly important. I think smaller communities look to TRIEC, at least initially, for information, direction, and I know they do some work

91 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 53 and 151. 92 Category B. Interview # 8, July 14, 2010. Line 350. 93 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2010. Lines 197, 206, 229. 94 Category E. Interview # 20. January 26, 2011. Interview Notes, page 5. 116

with other immigration settlement agencies across the country so I know they serve as a major information source as well as sharing their best practices that goes on. I don’t know the extent to which this goes on in different communities but I know they are quite open.95

Another corporate sponsor representative echoes this sentiment:

TRIEC is an expert in the area of immigrant integration; if we have questions about resources, statistics, they are a ‘go to’ organization for us in this field.96

4.3.4.2 ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH

Quite a few respondents argued that TRIEC became a successful project because it was ‘all about solutions and actions’ as opposed to being about challenges and consultations. Several other researchers argue that task-oriented MSC groups are more successful (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). In her research, Wayland (2007a) identified ‘early wins’ as one of the building blocks for TRIEC’s success, quoting Ratna Omidvar, Executive Director of the Maytree Foundation: “We did not ask anybody’s permission. If we had, we would still be talking. We said we were going to do this, and we invited people to join us. We did not build an organization first … we had no bureaucracy, no bylaws. Instead, we focused on action, results and early wins”. (Wayland, 2007a: 3)

As shown in Figure 4.2, an Action-oriented Approach was mentioned by four informant categories. TRIEC Funders and Sponsors were quite vocal about the importance of an action-oriented approach in the multi-stakeholder collaboration, particularly when dealing with corporate partners. One sponsor representative maintained that: You would not want to go too much longer than a year without showing that you started to implement something. Just because people’s patience is, sometimes, short and I think you want to show, particularly, when partnering with corporations you are moving quickly and implementing initiatives and act decisively.97

Another Funder representative spoke about the importance of keeping a strong focus in the first years of IEC existence: There are an awful lot of immigrant employment councils out there right now, and we know that. There are an awful lot of groups that focus on programs for newcomers and there are a lot of different councils and I think, honestly, that if you want to set yourself apart, you really need to have really good strong focus, definitely in the first or second year of existence because that is when you make the biggest difference. 98

95 Category E. Interview # 28. March 4, 2011. Line 31. 96 Category E. Interview # 20. January 26, 2011. Interview Notes, page 3. 97 Category E. Interview # 14. January 5, 2011. Line 245. 98 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 388. 117

A TRIEC/Maytree/ALLIES Staff category key informant echoed the same point, stressing the action- oriented philosophy of the organization: TRIEC was all about solutions, all about action, all about making a difference to the immigrants on the street and we didn’t care about structure, or governance, or profit, or accountability or hierarchy or all those things that create organizational paralysis sometimes.99

Key informants referred to a number of programs that were initiated as yet another indicator of the action-oriented approach. This finding is congruent with conclusions made by other scholars, i.e. a greater variety of unique, innovative and flexible programs were associated with greater success of MSC groups (Emshoff et al., 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001, Kreger et al., 2007, Selsky, 1991, Witherbee, 2008). TRIEC was quite successful in developing, implementing and scaling up multiple programs, key informants said. Maintains Daniele Zanotti, TRIEC Board member: TRIEC’s success has been this ability to take small successful programs, pilot them and then ramp them up to scale at a bigger level; whether it’s the mentorship program, hire an immigrant, the ALLIES network that evolved. This ability [is] to seed solutions and then scale them. 100

However, some participants raised concerns about IECs following TRIEC’s path and getting into actions without building strong organizational infrastructure and/or true collaboration between key stakeholders. Shelley White, a representative of TRIEC’s funding agency and TRIEC’s Board member states: I think that they [IECs] have got to build relationships and engage and build trust with the organizations that support immigrants and secondly they have got to build relationships and trust of the employment sector, of the business, corporate sector and the government as well as an employer. That’s huge.101

A few key informants believed that because TRIEC was focused on action as opposed to ‘asking for permission’ or ‘ensuring that everybody is happy with proposed solutions’ it became as successful and well-known as it is. Notes one Category A key informant: Creating consensus is a very slow process, and often consensus means agreement on the lowest common denominator. We never had to do that, because we didn’t ask anybody for permission, we didn’t go to anyone and say do you think internships are a good idea?102

Concludes another TRIEC’s Funder/Sponsor representative:

I think the issue of immigrant under-employment is so long-standing and has been discussed so much that it is refreshing to see an organization take action so soon and I think that Career Bridge and mentoring partnerships and hireimmigrant.ca, and others,

99 Category A. Interview #9. July 15, 2010. Line 197. 100 Category B. Interview #6. July 13, 2010 Line 117. 101 Category E. Interview # 15. January 10, 2011. Line 84. 102 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2011. Line 465. 118

even if you disagree with what they are saying, the point is that TRIEC is trying to address the issue quickly. …Certain things can’t be rushed but I think the implementation piece is critical but the issues are well known and long-standing and it is just a matter of getting action.103

According to interviewees, based on TRIEC’s experience, most IECs have come to realize about how important it is to produce results, particularly when employers are partners in projects. However, it was suggested that over time, it is important not only produce results but match them up with the scale of the problem and start making impacts as opposed to introduce pilot projects over and over. Argues a key informant: They [IECs] have actually produced some kind of results even if it’s modest. Now I think they have also, understood that when you deal with employers, you also have to say, in a city of a million people, you can’t have a program that serves 50. You have 1,500 new immigrants coming every year in a particular sector, you can’t produce 25 internships. That’s scale, it has to match. I think they’re realizing that and I think the next challenge for a few communities and a few immigrant employment councils is to actually take it from a rather modest level to a rather ambitious level. … The key lesson that is worth replicating is the focus on being action-oriented is certainly, action is golden. If you don’t have action, you’ll find, back to your earlier question, employers won’t stay engaged unless you have an orientation towards doing things that are actions and that will produce some results. 104

4.3.4.3 STRONG LEADERSHIP MODEL

Study participants identified three major types of leadership that contributed to TRIEC success: leadership from the hosting organization, strong leadership support from prominent business leaders and strong leadership support from the local government. Having visionary, charismatic, influential and skillful leaders was identified as a key success factor for MSC groups by many other scholars (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2003; Kreger et al., 2007; Kreuter et al., 2007; Mattessich, 2003). Additionally, Selsky (1991: 106) emphasized the role of a “change agent” (a host organization) as a convener and facilitator that brings community leaders to work together “to increase collective decision-making capacity … [and] orchestrate networking and resource sharing in a non- threatening way”. Similarly, Kania and Kramer (2011), in their recent study highlighted the importance of having a “backbone support organization” with “dedicated staff separate from the participating organizations who can plan, manage, and support the initiative through ongoing facilitation, technology and communications support, datat collection and reporting” (online text). Having Maytree Foundation as a host-agency was one of the greatest fortunes for the TRIEC group. As was mentioned before, the organization had a great reputation in the city and developed a sound knowledge base on the issue of immigrant integration. States a Category A key informant:

103 Category E. Interview #22 January 26, 2011. Line 328. 104 Category A. Interview #7. July 13, 2010. Line 309, 551. 119

I think that Maytree has provided the organizational leadership, it’s had thought leadership. …So I think the thought leadership and the intellectual capital that was at the Maytree foundation allowed TRIEC to be created with a fair amount of thoughtfulness and the ideas were ready. So, whereas with some immigrant employment Councils there’s energy about wanting to do something, there isn’t necessarily that history and deep thought and idea depth that we benefited from. The Maytree leadership provided organizational leadership in terms of financial support, human resources support.105

The Maytree Foundation had an Executive Director, Ratna Omidvar, who was exceptionally committed to – and passionate about – the issue of immigrant integration. Her true passion on the topic, hands-on experience in working with funders and immigrant serving agencies, and extraordinary commitment as a Chair of TRIEC are believed to be critical in TRIEC’s success. Other scholars argued that collaborations with more tenured chairs were more likely to succeed (Emshoff et al., 2007). Additionally, the literature suggests that the level of staff/members’ specialized expertise in fundraising or facilitating community engagement (Kreuter et al., 2000) as well as their knowledge about the issue (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a) can impact MSC outcomes. It is difficult to overestimate the role Omidvar played in the development of TRIEC. In fact, she championed the ideas of mentoring and internships even before TRIEC was formed when she was actively involved in the conversations with the City of Toronto about the value of mentoring immigrants in the early 2000s. Expert/Civic Leader key informant elaborates: TRIEC, as well as the Maytree Foundation had been in contact with the city of Toronto and previously the metropolitan Toronto Government, to advocate to the metro- Toronto government and after amalgamation, the City of Toronto to launch a mentoring program. Initially through Ratna Omidvar when she was with the Maytree Foundation. And actually that maybe predated her days at Maytree too. It was Skills for Change. Skills for Change is a Toronto local, community based, employment agency. Ratna was the executive director, she would come to the Metro-Toronto Working Group on Immigration/Refugee Issues, the Councillor David Miller was very receptive of this idea. But it took quite a number of years before the city really got its act together and officially piloted this mentoring program.106

The Maytree Foundation continued its work in the areas of fighting poverty, sharing knowledge and best practices and promoting diversity in Canada long before TRIEC was established. As a result of its efforts, DiverseCity: The Greater Toronto Leadership Project, was initiated in partnership with the Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance (former TCSA). Currently, this project has eight distinct initiatives aimed to change the face of leadership in the GTA. Recently, Maytree initiated another project – the Cities of Migration, which is an online platform that allows cities in Canada and across the globe to share successful immigrant integration practices. Additionally, Maytree, regularly produces a number of briefs on immigration policy in its online publications, such as Maytree Opinion and

105 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 72. 106 Category C. Interview #5. Key informant A. July 12, 2010. Line 30. 120

Maytree Policy in Focus (The Maytree Foundation website). In sum, Maytree had strong expertise, interest and passion in the area of immigrant integration and association with this powerhouse was quite advantageous for TRIEC and brought a level of credibility to its work. One of the observations made in the interviews with Funders/Sponsors is that government funders highly regarded TRIEC and Maytree staff. Some key informants mentioned that TRIEC would not be able to achieve what it did without the support it received from funders. According to study participants, TRIEC proposed something very new and risky and yet, funders provided quite substantial funding for TRIEC’s ambitious projects. In 2003-2004, TRIEC received around $321,333 in funding from provincial and federal governments. It was doubled by 2005 ($646,427). In 2010, TRIEC received four times of the 2005 level of funding – $2,617,922 (2004, 2005 and 2010 TRIEC Annual Reports, Financial Statements). The significance of having adequate financial support to develop innovative solutions was emphasized in several other studies of MSCs (Emshoff et al., 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Mattessich, 2003; Witherbee, 2008). One government representative notes: To be honest, they could not have done it without the money, the funding from the federal government, and they could not have continued it without the funding from the … at the time.107

Once again, Maytree’s credibility as well as the passion and commitment its leaders exhibited in the area of immigrant integration were ‘the winning card’ for TRIEC and served it well in securing the funding, particular in the first years, states a Category A key informant: … in terms of relationship capital, Maytree had a lot of credibility with government partners and so we were able to get government funding to our initiative based on the fact that Maytree was involved. So there was a lot of trust that was leveraged to invest in this, to make it successful because there was already a track-record in relationship, again, between Maytree and some of the government funders. … . So I think that Maytree’s role, was extremely pivotal in leveraging buy-in and support and in creating the success that resulted. 108

Naturally, employer leadership was identified as another critical factor in the TRIEC leadership model. TRIEC was able to generate unprecedented interest among the higher echelons of corporate decision makers such as David Pecaut, a prominent civic leader who was called ‘the best mayor Toronto never had’ who ‘for every minute of his life spent 60 seconds striving to improve the city’ (Jones, 2009). Manulife Financial’s former President and CEO, Dominic D'Alessandro, and former Executive Vice President of Corporate Communications and Human Resources, Diane Bean, became the Founding Co-Chairs of TRIEC and actively participated in promoting the issue of immigrant integration in the GTA. Having high-profile business champions was crucial. States a key informant:

107 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 171. 108 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 96. 121

I think at the end of the day the employers play a critical role in a multi-stakeholder group like an immigrant employment council. For the reason, that at the end of the day, it’s the employers who have the jobs. … I’m sure business leaders mean well but a lot of them might support something vocally, but till they actually get it and change their HR practices, I think that kind of change happens when there’s a very committed senior business leader. They are able to convince people that actually they have to be changing their business and hiring practices. So, I think it’s important that it should be an employer. 109

Echoes Shelley White, Board member and a representative of one of the TRIEC funders: …if I think about TRIEC, what they did was form a council of champions that was comprised of corporations and other key stakeholders who really believed in this and were willing to run pilots and be some of the first organizations out of the gate in terms of promoting the benefits of hiring new immigrants with skills.110

Not surprisingly, with this level of leadership other corporations were willing to join. Conforms Askin Taner, a representative of government funding agency:

You also have a key threshold of popular employers being in the program that just brings other employers. Once you have someone like TD on board, that will bring other banks – it brings Scotiabank, Bank of Montreal… Once you have Bell Canada that brings Rogers etc – I’m not necessarily following any order or sequence of events here but that is basically how it happens and how success breeds success.111

The question that remains is how TRIEC was able to generate an unparalleled level of employer engagement. A reasonable explanation could be drawn from the fact that TRIEC was created by the Toronto City Summit Alliance – a group, which was largely represented by high profile business and civic leaders. It is through the TCSA that TRIEC received this unique opportunity to reach out to the employer community, making use of the fact that the TCSA was civically active and had already identified immigrant employment as an issue for city’s prosperity. Julia Deans, the former CEO of the Greater Toronto CivicAction (former TCSA) and TRIEC Council member concludes: So what we provided was a leadership group that was able to validate the track that they were on and that was able to help create a fact-base. We helped develop a mechanism for them to reach more people and we opened the doors to the employers. So TRIEC, or Maytree had a well recognized foundation community, it was well recognized in the immigrant serving agency community but it didn’t have broad access to employers and influencers. So, we helped them make the case for what they were doing, identify what their really winnable ideas were, and then sell those to a much broader audience than they’d ever had access to.112

When asked about the municipal role in the formation and development of IECs, most key informants suggested that municipalities have a role to play and, moreover, they should champion

109 Category A. Interview # 7. July 13, 2010. Line 93. 110 Category E. Interview # 15. January 10, 2011. Line 91. 111 Category E. Interview # 27. February 15, 2011. Line 136. 112 Category B. Interview #4. July 12, 2010. Line 71. 122

IEC’s programs and promote solutions, as the City of Toronto did. As was mentioned before, the City of Toronto played its role in the initiation and development of TRIEC’s programs. According to key informants, TRIEC incorporated some major aspects of the city’s immigrant mentoring model into its Mentoring Partnership. Additionally the city’s employees were actively engaged in TRIEC’s Working Groups, and Toronto became one of the first larger employers to participate in the Mentoring Partnership as well as in the Career Bridge (an internship program for skilled immigrants). Finally Toronto’s Mayor launched some of TRIEC projects and showed unprecedented support to TRIEC’s work. Similarly, Witherbee (2008) identified the ‘right’ political and social climate as important conditions that impacted the success of a multi-stakeholder group. Notes a Category C (Experts/Researchers) key informant who used to work at the City of Toronto:

We actually started mentoring a year before TRIEC initiated its mentoring partnership program. We have been participating in TRIEC’s activities from the beginning. We did participate in TRIEC’s discussion with the communities and with the employers regarding developing a mentorship model to facilitate the integration of internationally trained professionals in Toronto’s labour market. It helped TRIEC sometime before they officially initiated the mentoring partnership program. We have been involved along the way, but a year before the mentoring partnership started, we actually launched our pilot of profession to profession mentoring immigrant programs with a consortium of community based employment agencies.113

Echoes another key informant in the same category:

As a matter of fact, the City’s Profession-to-Profession mentoring partnership program was launched and announced by Counsellor David Miller in the inaugural meeting of TRIEC, in the later part of 2004. There was a close working relationship between the city and TRIEC. Although, in the beginning when we piloted the program we did not use TRIEC’s resources, we used a consortium of community based service agencies. This consortium actually, in the following year, also worked with TRIEC for the launch of the mentoring program. Now TRIEC had different components in its work. Mentoring partnership is one of the components. There is another component called “inter-governmental relations.” So, the City’s inter-governmental unit in the city manager’s office sat on this inter-governmental committee as well. So, we work with TRIEC in many different capacities, mentoring being only one of them. 114

One of TRIEC/Maytree/ALLIES Staff category key informants recollects how the City of Toronto has supported TRIEC: I think the municipality has to play a really important role, and it needs to be on council, it needs to be a partner in the strategies. … [the previous] mayor is an emotional supporter, and he’s come out to many things, and he’s championed and he’s launched the mentoring program. … it’s a good involvement.115

113 Category C. Interview #5. Key Informant A. Line 18. 114 Category C. Interview #5. Key Informant B. Line 48. 115 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 433, 444. 123

According to key informants, the City of Toronto has been the initiator of the 2002 conference that brought together many prominent civic leaders. This gathering ‘gave birth’ to the TCSA/CivicAction, and was a critical piece in the development of TRIEC. Recollects Julie Deans: In 2002, the then Mayor of Toronto asked a number of civic leaders to help bring together a larger group of civic leaders to think about what the issues were that were facing the Toronto region.116

Other key informants also highlighted the positive role of municipal involvement in the IECs. Kelly Pollack, Executive Director of the Immigrant Employment Council of BC suggests that municipal involvement helps to bring other government funders on board and agrees that municipalities should be involved and champion projects. She warns that strong municipal engagement might be difficult to achieve in smaller urban areas. However, local government involvement is important as they are employers and they could show ‘the way’ to other employers in addressing immigrant poor economic integration.117 As the goal of this research was to understand the underlying conditions for success in more detail, key informants were asked to name two to three top champion qualities. Nine major champion quality categories were identified. Key informants felt that the three most important champion attributes are his/her ‘Ability to take action’, ‘Be a spokesperson for an IEC’ and ‘Be a high-profile figure’. Julia Deans, TRIEC Council member, eloquently summarizes some important champion qualities identified by other stakeholders: they [champions] have a network of influencers around them and that they’re willing to open the doors to those influencers. So it’s not just enough that they know other people but that they’re actually willing to make the phone calls or write the letters or whatever, speak to them, whatever they have to do. That’s the key one. The second one is that they can stand up and make a convincing case for what the organization is doing, what TRIEC is doing. So that they actually understand what the case is and can speak to it convincingly. The third big one is that they’re willing to put in the time and effort to be a part of the organization, whether it’s to understand the case, open the doors or advise the organization if they’re willing to put some time and effort against that. You can’t just have figure heads at the front. You need people who are actually willing put the work in. 118

After initial interviews for this study were conducted, in the winter of 2011, ALLIES produced aToolkit: Establishing an Immigrant Employment Council, which lists eleven desirable champion qualities, the majority of which were identified by key informants for this study. It is worth mentioning that a champion’s ability to ‘be IEC’s media spokesperson, who is good at articulating the problem and

116 Category B. Interview # 4. July 12, 2010. 117 Category D. Interview # 2. July 6, 2010. Line 178 (No transcript for the second half of the interview. Quoted as recorded in notes). 118 Category B. Interview # 4. July 12, 2010. Line 91. 124

promoting the solution’ (this study finding) was listed among the top champion qualities in the ALLIES Toolkit.

4.3.4.4 EMPLOYER-DRIVEN AND -FOCUSED COUNCIL

While TRIEC stands for Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council, it is not an immigrant but an employer-driven group. The ‘know-how’ of TRIEC is rooted in the nature of a free market economy or, as other scholars pointed out, it was guided by the neoliberal agenda of the state and corporations to promote immigrant hiring solely from the economic point of view. In the past, the majority of immigrant serving and community agencies focused mostly on the immigrant deficiencies, or the supply side of the labour market. However, TRIEC decided to engage employers who represent the demand side of the equation, and craft solutions that will help the employer community and, consequently, contribute to regional prosperity. Argues a key informant: There’s been a lot of work and government funds a lot of things about helping immigrants with language skills, with all kinds of things, it’s almost like you want to fix the immigrant. Make him or her better so that they’ll be able to find work in Canada. I think part of TRIEC’s thinking was that you know what, organizations need to change as well. This is our new reality.119

The factor of employer-related success was mentioned by almost all key informant groups. Participants talked about how important it is for an IEC to realize the value of meaningful employer engagement and suggested that Board/Council employer-dominated membership is one of the indicators that Council is employer-focused.. Maintains a key informant: I think most of the councils that were formed realized quite early that it has to be employer-led because that’s where the jobs are. If you have to make a difference in the life of an immigrant, you have to be able to convince the employer that a skilled immigrant brings value to their organization.120

Another indicator of employer engagement is the degree to which employers are actually involved in the decision-making process or/and in the solutions themselves. Argues Askin Taner, Senior Program Advisor at the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration – a government agency that funds TRIEC: Employers themselves are TRIEC in the capacity of the advisory committee, they know what the needs of the industry are, what the employers need, so they were able to sort of organically build this within the fibre of TRIEC. They had a high awareness of what the needs of industry and business were. From that point on, obviously they took a result-oriented approach to the initiatives, which brought success and success just basically bred success in terms of the results and a pleased employer in terms of their

119 Category A. Interview # 7. July 13, 2010. Line 555. 120 Category A. Interview # 7. July 13, 2010. Line 209. 125

recruitment practices, professional development for their employees engaged in the program meant they kept coming back to the program. 121

Key informants suggested that employers like to be recognized for their community involvement. The ability of MSCs to provide benefits to its members and understand their needs and priorities was identified as a pre-condition of success in other systems change studies, including those of Kreuter and colleagues (2000), Mattessich (2003), Perrault et al. (2011), Reast et al. (2011), Zakocs and Edwards (2006), and Thompson et al. (2003). TRIEC was able to create a mega-infrastructure that recognized employers’ good immigrant hiring practices such as Immigrant Success (IS) Award and Mentor of the Year Award. Participating corporations were promoted in the Globe and Mail’s special editions and employer practices were featured on the hireimmigrants.ca website etc. These were not only educational and awareness-raising tools in the TRIEC’s communication strategy, the success stories also generated interest from the competitive corporate world and for many employers these stories resonated with the success of their competitors. A key informant supports the argument: … employers are competitive. There is always one that wants to be better than another and when you profile that it really gets back to the employers to want to be better and then certain things happen, usually like they need to hire more high- qualified people and they happen to be the ITPs then everybody benefits from it.122 Confirms another corporate partner representative:

While we do not sponsor with money we give a lot of time. That counts for a lot. [in return] You want to see you get some profile, you get some benefit as an organization, you get some opportunity to participate in the program … 123

Echoes Daniele Zanotti, Executive Director of United Way of York Region and TRIEC’s Board member:

I think one of the things we heard loud and clear when we started the York region corporate team around TRIEC was their interest in recognition and celebrating success. I think TRIEC has actually been really successful at making these awards and celebration as a way of public awareness and engagement.124

4.3.4.5 COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC AWARENESS STRATEGIES

Key informants felt that TRIEC was very successful in using a combination of effective communication tools – social marketing, TV ads, annual reports, website and awards. Similarly, having open and frequent communication (in-person meetings, via social or mainstream media or by emails) with key stakeholders and the general public was identified as a success factor for MSCs in other studies (Antelo and Henderson, 1990; Foster-Fishman et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2003; Kania and Kramer,

121 Category E. Interview # 27. February 15, 2011. Line 129. 122 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 323. 123 Category E. Interview # 14. January 5, 2011. Line 257. 124 Category B. Interview # 6. July 13, 2010. Line 350. 126

2011; Mattessich, 2003; Reast et al., 2011; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006, Witherbee, 2008). In general, key informants felt that keeping the general public as well as its partners and other interested parties well-informed about what the IEC is doing is imperative for any multi-stakeholder group in this field. Julia Deans, former CEO of Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance and TRIEC’s Council member praises TRIEC for its ability to ‘tell the story’ and ensure the visibility of their champions. Well, they’ve been a real communications machine. So, they tell the story a lot. They are constantly renewing their relationship with their stakeholders (that’s employers and also the immigrant serving agencies). They don’t assume that those relationships will stay there forever. They’ve renewed their leadership. They’ve seen a transition from Dominic D’Alessandro to Gord Nixon [RBC] and Zabeen Hirji which was hugely powerful. When you have one of the top business people in Canada say, “this is important, I’m going to become the new chair.” That’s a big deal, that’s a very big deal. I think they’ve really capitalized on that.125

Many informants believed that Annual Reports were a great Public Relations (PR) tool and TRIEC used them very efficiently. A former TRIEC Council member, agrees that producing annual reviews was a smart communication move for an IEC as it generated more involvement from employers. Particularly if IEC is dealing with the ‘big boys’ (e.g. CEOs, VPs, senior government officials etc.) it is important to ‘speak their language’: I think more reports is probably better because that way everybody stays informed and stays committed. I think that when you produce a report and you actually mention what different people are doing and how they are stepping up, it creates the right kind of environment to encourage others to do the same … If you’re going to attract RBC and Manulife and Deloitte and KPMG and put their name on it, they don’t want to put their name on some little rag, I’m sure. So it goes with the territory. 126

Another key informant agrees that producing annual reports was a good public relations move, i.e. to say thank you to those involved and raise the profile of the work TRIEC did: It was to show the world and to show leaders in Toronto that they were allied to a cause, that was making change that we were doing good work, that it was surrounded by influential people. It was an entirely public relations, always was a public relations. 127

One of key informants questions the whole notion of celebrating success. S/he delves into questions like: “How much are we supposed to celebrate?” “What is our core business? to get immigrants into jobs or praise a couple of employers? ”128 S/he agrees that celebrating successful events does raise awareness but argues that ‘loud’ communication strategies are more smart PR strategies for IECs than raising awareness on real problems. “It does build support for an IEC. However, at the end of the day, what is success?” A key informant brought up a recent study (Pendakur and Pendakur, 2010), which pointed to the increase in poverty rates, self-reported cases of discrimination and

125 Category B. Interview # 6. July 12, 2010. Line 260. 126 Category B. Interview # 10. July 22, 2010. Line 325, 343. 127 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 402. 128 Due to sensitive nature of comments, key informant is left anonymous. 127

unemployment rates of the demographic incorporating Canadian-born, visible minority groups in Canada, in general, and in Ontario, in particular. According to the study, both rates worsened in the eastern part of Canada, including the GTA. Additionally, 2010 poll showed that 50% of surveyed Canadians suggested that Canada should decrease the annual intake of immigrants (Lilley, 2010). Thus, a key informant questions ‘celebrating success’ campaigns while public attitudes on immigration have worsened and systemic discrimination persists. Finally, one key informant argues that the amount of funding TRIEC spent on raising awareness campaigns is not available in other regions. However, the vast majority of key informants believed that this type of communication strategy is imperative to the work of IECs. Shelley White, TRIEC Board member and funder representative comments on TRIEC’s success in building relationships with the media and using multi-media approach in its communication strategies: I think it has contributed immensely to their success – the relationships they have built with the media ... I think the awards program they have created ensures that TRIEC is in the public domain and is being talked about throughout the year and has been very well planned. …they have used mainstream media but are also using the internet, and social media has helped get the message out. The fact they have used media to get the message out about how ridiculous it is that we are not using foreign trained professionals in our workplace. The commercials that were made about foreign trained professionals doing mundane jobs even though they have the skills and expertise to take on leadership roles in companies, you know the business person who is a cleaner or working in a fast food place, they are very impactful commercials.129

Shelly commended TRIEC for producing professional communication strategies on much modest budgets than businesses: … the approach that TRIEC has used is similar to the one the for-profit sector has used but they haven’t done it at nearly the expense so kudos to them, but they are marketing it as diligently as a for-profit company would with respect to a new product launch ...130

Another funding representative shares that s/he did not give much thought about TRIEC’s communication strategy as s/he relied on his/her previous experience with TRIEC/Maytree and that’s what counted for him/her. However, s/he praised TRIEC’s honest marketing: For the communications strategy, I think that marketing the mentorship partnership was that they were honest – it was always honest marketing – and they really knew how to focus on what was important and again I go back to the employers and the corporate sponsors – what did they want from it? So it was clear communication, it was focused, and really that was it.131

Developing a broad communication strategy was a learning experience for TRIEC and the Maytree Foundation. One of the key informants in the TRIEC/Maytree/ALLIES category shared some

129 Category E. Interview # 15. January 10, 2011. Line 230. 130 Category E. Interview # 15. January 10, 2011. Line 245. 131 Category E. Interview # 18. January 21, 2011. Line 334. 128

lessons they learnt in the early days of their communication strategy. S/he shares how the messaging in TV ads should have been modified: I think we have made mistakes in communication. If you want a mistake, we were approached by this media relations company that offered to do free advertisement for us, and they were beautiful, they were wonderful. The ones you must have seen, you know the cleaning lady in the office. But we didn’t know enough about communications, to ask ourselves the question, if we go out with this ad, as we did (we spent a lot of money putting ads out on television rates) and the ads were very compelling, but they didn’t give the viewer any idea of what they were supposed to do. … We weren’t smart enough about communications at that point. Now I know better. [Instead of] Hire immigrants (But how? There was no where to go!) … Now, I would say, hire an intern, become a mentor.132

Additionally, a key informant talks about the over-branding of TRIEC, which, s/he believes, is another example of TRIEC’s being inexperienced in the communication field: I also think we have over branded at TRIEC. We’ve got TRIEC, we’ve got hireimmigrants, we’ve got the Mentoring Partnership, each of these has its own brand. I think, these brands are too embedded now, we can’t pull ourselves out of them, but in retrospect a strong central brand may have been a better idea. But because we did things incrementally and we did things organically, we didn’t really have the luxury of the strategic communications plan, or the strategic communications director or all that.133

Quite a few other category participants talked about IEC’s communication capacity and the importance of its communication strategy. States one of the IEC Executive Directors: Communication is one of the activities we have. All the work that we do would be of no use if we would not be able to communicate it to employers and, so, communication is very important in promoting the tools and resources that employers could use, as well as the activities that we put on, as well as better understanding of the economic value that immigrants bring to the table.134

S/he continues on saying that having adequate funding ensures the communication capacity of an IEC and that without a Communication specialist the quality of IEC work would be jeopardized: … it would be difficult to disseminate information as effectively and efficiently as we were able to do it now. It would mean that somebody will have to take this as a part of their responsibilities and that would mean that might not have the expertise to do that kind of work. It will impact how much outreach we will be able to do.135

4.3.4.6 UNIQUE LOCATION

All researchers who studied TRIEC named at least one unique factor that contributed to its success. Key informants in this study mentioned most of the unique success factors described earlier in Chapter Three. A number of participants confirmed that the City of Toronto had a long history of

132 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 313. 133 Category A. Interview # 9. July 15, 2010. Line 315. 134 Category D. Interview # 13. July 8, 2010. Line 247. 135 Category D. Interview # 13. July 8, 2010. Line 268. 129

addressing multicultural immigrant issues. This finding is congruent with conclusions made by Foster- Fishman and colleagues (2007b) who emphasized the role of ‘community readiness’, i.e. coalition members are able to work together and believe that ‘change is possible’. States a key informant: Do you know the city’s official motto: Diversity is our Strength. So, the City has been taking this position for years. We’ve been saying that by 2011 the net growth in the labour market, would be attributed to immigration and then by 2031, even Canada’s population growth would come from immigration alone. The city has been feeling labour shortages here and there, and they know that the City knows that, it has to integrate immigrants in the labour market.

Every city division has a responsibility towards the immigration population, every. Even the finance budget division, if they have to do the budget consultation how do they make sure that they would reach the immigrant community. 136

Echoes another key informant, who used to work for the City of Toronto:

I’ve been with the city for nearly 30 years, I’ve been doing this work in the city since 1981. I’ve been doing work with Metro, we started right around the same time, in the late 70’s. The work in the city started in 1973, with the mayor’s taskforce and women and that work was eventually expanded in 1977 with the formal equal opportunity policy and then in 1981 it was expanded to include disability, race and aboriginal affairs. So we’ve had a trend, when you look at the school board, it started formalizing its policies on immigration and on dealing with children in early 1971. Is when it started doing that work. So we’ve got four decades of doing that work in various forms.137

A number of other scholars concluded that the ‘urgency, seriousness or visibility’ of the problem makes it easier for an MSC to generate community involvement and buy-in. (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007b, McNamara, 2007; Thompson et al., 2003). Echoes Julia Deans, TRIEC’s Council member: I think Toronto’s kind of unique in just being such a focal point for immigrants. It is by far the highest preference of immigrants. Here the issue is in your face. If you get on the subway you can’t help but recognize that most of the people around you have come from somewhere else. So it’s very hard for us to avoid. In some Canadian cities, you don’t see any person of colour for hours. That’s not Toronto. That makes Toronto kind of unique in the respect.138

Karen Fong suggested in her paper that TRIEC was successful in employer engagement because of the specific economic conditions in the Toronto CMA. Toronto is considered to be a capital city for corporate headquarters in Canada. Karen Fong summarized the point in her study: “One of the advantages of being located in the main economic centre of Canada is that TRIEC has access to many large head offices, which have the capacity to take on immigrant interns. Almost all of the big banks have become active stakeholders and supporters of TRIEC initiatives. It has proved more of a challenge for TRIEC to influence small and medium-sized employers because smaller employers often do not have as great a capacity to dedicate personnel to human resources. Thus, with the extra steps that are frequently involved in assessing immigrants’ qualifications, small and

136 Category C. Interview # 5. Key informant A. Line 333, 305. 137 Category C. Interview # 5. Key informant B. Line 356. 138 Category B. Interview # 4. July 12, 2010. Line 359. 130

medium-sized employers are often less inclined to consider immigrants as potential employees. TRIEC is attempting to devote greater attention towards assisting these employers in hiring immigrants”. (Fong, 2008: 18).

Another category key informant talks about pre-TRIEC civic mobilization and re-emphasizes a point about the unique demographic situation. Similarly, Mattessich (2003) and McNamara (2007) highlighted the importance of having a strong history of successful collaborative efforts. It is suggested that TRIEC benefited from being connected to the strong civic and business leaders collaboration – the Toronto City Civic Alliance. Because the Provincial government decided in the late 1990s to amalgamate six cities into one – the City of Toronto, strong political mobilization against the amalgamation has emerged, such as those coming from Citizens for Local Democracy, New Voices of the New City, and later on, New Deal for Toronto. While early civic mobilization was not successful in stopping the amalgamation, it gave birth to unprecedented civic coalitions, such as the TCSA and later on – TRIEC. S/he elaborates: There was a spirit of coming together to do work that was for the greater good of the city and I think that created an incredible fertile ground for civic initiatives like an immigrant employment Council. Toronto also has a unique experience of immigration, 50% of the city was born outside Canada. There was already a fairly accepted and widespread understanding that this was important to the vitality of the city. Other cities of Canada don’t have that self-imperative, it may very well be an imperative but there may not be that overarching sense of “this is important to the future of the city.” 139

4.3.5 WHAT SHOULD TRIEC DO DIFFERENTLY?140

Key informants were asked what TRIEC could have done/should do differently. Several participants insinuated that there is nothing they could suggest other than for TRIEC to do more of what it is already doing. One funder/sponsor key informant suggests to TRIEC to make more efforts in engaging mentors: They just need to do more of what they are doing. Increase participation and get some more leverage and keeping people engaged longer, more just a mentor one time.141

TRIEC should try to become less Toronto-centric and expand its scale, become more self- sustainable, develop better ways to evaluate its success, and continue its focus on policy and systemic change, a key informant argues: I think scale, I think that in some ways, it still is a Toronto-centric organization. By Toronto-centric I mean the Toronto region, York and Peel, but for all intents and purpose, it really is Toronto-based. So, how do you scale this across the entire nation, if that’s what’s required. I think … it is still very much beholden to different levels of

139 Category A. Interview # 3. July 12, 2010. Line 385. 140 In this section, all quotes are listed as unattributed due to the sensitive nature of statement. 141 Category E. 131

government for funding. That is a risk and there’s got to be ways of making this self- sustaining. I think the continued focus is on policy and system change. So, you know, are we shifting public perception? Are we shifting policy? I know the difficulty in measuring that, but if we don’t I just feel that, it’s a successful programming but it may not be measured beyond that. 142

Another key informant is concerned with the public awareness in the City of Toronto on the issue of immigrant integration: I’d like to see continued awareness among the general public because that’s important in terms of building support and understanding for the issue from the public as a whole. I think the private sector is also important but more the public as a whole, so, that when we have elections it will put this issue on our radar and in a way that doesn’t want to ban immigration but address it effectively.143

Yet, another key informant suggests that, given the scope of the problem, the scale of programs should be increased: … the size of the programs that they’ve been able to mount are still relatively small compared to the size of the problem. I think what they’ve done is demonstrate that these kinds of programs are actually feasible, and succeed in getting immigrants into better jobs. I think what needs to be done is to actually implement those programs on the scale that is necessary to actually make a dent in the overall problem.144

Stakeholder engagement should be expanded beyond non-profit and employer communities, a key informant suggests: I think for long-term impact, TRIEC will need to engage many more stakeholders. For example, the Universities, Colleges and the academic world. For example, the public libraries, for example student groups and student bodies, for example unions, trade unions. Trade unions in some ways could be an opponent for what TRIEC is trying to do. So how do you make them collaborators?145

TRIEC’s work needs to be evaluated on system-level scale, a key informant maintains:

I don’t know what is missing, quite frankly, I think the jury is still out. I think what TRIEC has done is the right thing, as far as building those partnerships and relationships. But the jury is still out as to the final analysis, how many immigrants have actually gotten gainful employment and has it really opened the door permanently, in terms of acceptance of immigrant skills?146

Several participants made suggestions in terms of how TRIEC could be more open on the racial discrimination issue. One key informant suggested that more training should be developed by TRIEC: Maybe delving a little bit into cultural sensitivity, or anti-racism training. I think that there is certainly room for that to be part of what they do. Because they do so much work with employers, and they tell employers “ Okay there’s this gap: you’re looking for

142 Category B. 143 Category E. 144 Category B. 145 Category B. 146 Category B. 132

employees, and there is this huge pool of skilled immigrants that are looking for work.” That’s a very simplified, shallow portrayal of the problem. I think that TRIEC could have a role in reminding employers of the real equity issues that are also at play.147

Another key informant pointed out that there is no united multi-stakeholder group that addresses racial discrimination issue in the GTA at the systemic level. This is something that TRIEC might take into consideration. States a participant: You’ve got the community sector, you’ve got the corporate world through city summit alliance. You’ve got the community networks, the women’s organizations, the racial organizations and so on. But there does not exist some unified place for the advocacy groups institutions, employers, school system where there is a way of talking about this issue [racial discrimination]. 148

Finally, one more key informant was quite vocal about the potential role that TRIEC could play in fighting this systemic discrimination: TRIEC has the capacity to do whatever … it wants, TRIEC has a buy-in from a lot of people precisely because TRIEC doesn’t talk about racism. … But my point is, what does it do to racism then? Does it mean there’s less racism or does it mean that there’s many more people who now just don’t want to talk about it. That’s the issue. The issue is not what TRIEC ought to do and ought not to do. … That’s not the issue. The issue is, TRIEC is doing something and it will go so far and no further because the issue of racism is not eliminated and is not dealt with. If it isn’t eliminated and dealt with, it’ll show up in different ways down the road. 149 One of the funder/sponsor representatives suggested that doing more research and sharing broadly with the public and employer community the actual data about how bad the employment situation is for visible minorities might be a good starting point for TRIEC to initiate the discussion on ‘race card’ with its current employer-partners:

Probably the most objective way to do this is through research and perhaps by demonstrating that people of colour having less success entering the labour market despite the skills and education they have might generate awareness and be something of a conversation starter. But I think if we use an objective research and actual data so it is not taken personally, perhaps that is the most productive way to start the conversation. …We have other statistics around – youth from some specific ethno- cultural groups, visible minority groups, have higher incarceration than others, so how do we address this as a community?150

4.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

In sum, this Chapter identified conditions that contributed to TRIEC’s success. Six major success factor groups were identified by categorizing 98 responses from over 20 key informants, which varied from TRIEC’s staff and Board and Council members to funders and sponsors. These key

147 Category C. 148 Category C. 149 Category B. 150 Category E. 133

respondents concluded that a combination of the following factors contributed to TRIEC’s success: TRIEC’s capacity to effectively manage its stakeholder relationships and share its funding and results (High Standard Practices)viii, take actions in a short period of time and continuously develop new innovative programs (Action-oriented Approach)ix, engage prominent leaders (Strong Leadership Model)x, be focused on the demand side of the labour market (Employer-driven and -focused Council)xi, communicate effectively (Strong Communication and PR Strategies)xii and take advantage of its unique context (Unique Location)xiii. It can be suggested that TRIEC’s strategies and activities resemble those of a business organization or entrepreneurial social change agent (Helm and Andersson, 2010). TRIEC’s key stakeholders referred to its strategies as being innovative, proactive and risk taking – the same three behavioral characteristics of the entrepreneurial change agent that were identified in the existing literature (ibid). While the goal of this research was not to examine immigrant employment barriers in detail, a more in-depth inquiry into this topic sheds a light on a wide range of stakeholder perceptions of major immigrant employment barriers, information that is helpful in the conceptual analysis of ‘success’ for an IEC. When compared with the nine most frequently cited barriers identified in the literature (Chapter Two), it becomes evident that TRIEC stakeholders placed more emphasis on the institutionalized systemic barriers, i.e. the credential recognition issue, the Canadian experience, the racial discrimination, etc. Although a lack of social networks was identified as a barrier by a few informants, other individual immigrant-associated attributes such as fluency in the English language, and immigrant class or newcomer soft skills were not as prominent among the responses. The same is true for societal development barriers (e.g. changes in the Canadian economy and tougher competition with increasingly more educated Canadian-born workers), which were not present among responses. When comparing the top three immigrant employment barriers and the top three systemic change scenarios it is evident that the majority of responses key informants provided are logically linked to each other. For example, the foreign credential recognition issue can be partially solved at the employer level (industry hiring practices), public level (public perceptions) and policy level (changes in accreditation processes, more accessible profession-specific language training, etc.). TRIEC stakeholders, who participated in this study, showed a very good understanding of TRIEC’s overarching goal but very few accurately named all three objectives of the organization. Particularly, there were very few who referred to TRIEC’s objective ‘to provide better coordination’. Interestingly, TRIEC became more conservative and cautious in the language it used for its objectives. While in 2004, one of the objectives was to “Change the way stakeholders value and work with skilled immigrants” (TRIEC, 2004: 4), a couple of years later it turned into “To work with key stakeholders, particularly employers, building their awareness and capacity to better integrate skilled immigrants into

134

the workforce” (TRIEC, 2006: 3). Thus, one might notice that the latter objective is quite narrowly focused on working with stakeholders ‘to enhance coordination and awareness’ rather than create the ‘change in their attitudes’. Many TRIEC stakeholders believe that TRIEC is well aware of the racial discrimination barrier that immigrants face in the Canadian labour market. However, the vast majority of key informants suggested that business case approach, which TRIEC introduced in its communication and employer engagement strategies is a more effective way to advance its mandate than leading with ‘race card’ discussions.151 This strategic and neutral approach allows TRIEC to engage employers not only in discussions but ‘proved’ to be successful in maintaining employer engagement over a long period of time and hopefully, making changes to their hiring practices. Key informants agreed that racial discrimination exists in Canada but they believed that neither is it in TRIEC’s capacity, nor is it in its mandate to address this issue directly. The study discovered that while TRIEC was quite open about its goals and results, which, to some extent, are the dimensions of the ‘transparency’ concept, it was not as transparent about how decisions were made and /or about its understanding of the scope of the immigrant employment issue. TRIEC stakeholders who participated in this study agreed that TRIEC effectiveness is difficult to evaluate; however, they provided many examples of TRIEC’s achievements, particularly, its ability to bring together a variety of stakeholders, above all from business community and produce measurable results (i.e. immigrants are getting hired). More importantly, key informants concluded that TRIEC won’t be able to solve all the employment problems that immigrants experience in the GTA, which range from language and foreign credential recognition barriers to the lack of social networks and racial discrimination. It can only be achieved by a much broader collective efforts of multiple groups. In an unpredicted move, key informants did not identify TRIEC as the major convener of these efforts, and many were satisfied with its narrowly defined position on what it can achieve as an organization. Additionally, the study discovered that while TRIEC is quite diligent in reporting its program outputs and short-term outcomes, it does not track or report how many employers do change their hiring practices, nor how TRIEC’s interventions might have contributed to these changes. Finally, there is no evidence as to how TRIEC’s programs contribute to lifting immigrants out of poverty – the system-level change that Maytree was hoping to achieve. In the next chapter, I will discuss what TRIEC did differently from seven other Immigrant Employment Councils spread across Canada. This comparative analysis will provide invaluable insights

151 Neither immigrant-serving organizations that partnered with TRIEC nor immigrant-program participants were interviewed though. 135

into the concrete activities and actions of TRIEC in all six factors identified by key informants in this stage of the study and elaborate how they differ from those of other IECs.

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CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

It is their networking, their place in the community and the respect they have and the professionalism they carry everything out with is probably their success.

-Funder/Sponsor Category Key Informant

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous Chapter, I reviewed and analyzed answers from over twenty key respondents, which informed the development of the comparative framework. This Chapter summarizes the findings of the seven questionnaires conducted with IEC staff and introduces the comparative analysis between TRIEC and other Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs) at the factor, sub-factor and indicator levels. The first section delves into methodological processes of developing the comparative framework and provides a general overview of the IECs that participated in the study. The results are presented in eight sections, wherein the first six are broken down into Findings and Discussion sub-sections for each factor. The seventh section provides an overview of the similarity between IEC’s and TRIEC’s factors and the eighth section presents the major differences. In the final section of this Chapter, I introduce five major lessons from comparing TRIEC with other IECs in Canada.

5.2 METHODS

5.2.1 DEVELOPING SUCCESS FACTORS: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

As seen in Table 5.1, the success factors identified by key informants served as a baseline for the development of the comparative framework. At least eleven of TRIEC’s key informants mentioned ‘trust and personal relationships’ as one of the pre-conditions of TRIEC’s succces. As mentioned before, my research methodology did not allow examining trust and personal relation factors for the reasons explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.8 (Sampling and Limitations of the study).xiv However, even if “Trust and Personal Relationship” responses were not included in the HSP factor group, the latter would still remain the most important factor group, based on other related answers in this category.152

152 Currently, the HSP factor reflects 33 key informant responses. If eleven ‘trust and personal relationship’ responses were subtracted, then, the remaining 22 responses would still make HSP the most cited success factor followed by Action-oriented approach factor (21 responses). 137

Table 5.1 TRIEC’s Key Informant Success Factor Responses by Factors and Sub-factors

TRIEC Success Factors in semi-structural interviews, n=98 Example Sub-factors HIGH STANDARD PRACTICES - Good management of relationships and building the right partnerships/ willing to All sub-factors in HSP listen to stakeholders / innovative and responsive to change (n=11) - Created respect among stakeholders about their work / became central resource-expert HSP5: TRIEC is an expert in the (n=9) field - Everyone bought into the vision/Cohesion among stakeholders/Engaging groups that HSP1: Clear Directions, could make a difference vs. those that have to be around politically (n=4) Governance HSP2: Consistent Reporting to the public - Quality of work/running the organization as a business (n=3) HSP3: Outcome-oriented - Collecting and reporting metrics (n=3) HSP4: Funding info is in the public domain (website, etc.) - Clearly articulated goals (n=3) HSP1: Clear Directions, Governance Total Responses n=(33) Sub-factors (5) Indicators (21) ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH - Action-oriented: Actions vs. consultations/Actions first-governance second/Action on All A sub-factors solutions vs. problem; Direct actions to impact immigrants in the first 2 years of TRIEC existence/Successful innovative pilot programs (n=15) - Scale up successful innovative projects (n=4) A2: Tangible Results are Generated - Did not ask for permission/risk taker (n=2) A1: Action-oriented philosophy Total Responses (n=21) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (16) STRONG LEADERSHIP MODEL (SL) - Unique Leaders on both staff and Board (n=8) SL2: Employer Leadership SL3: Municipal Leadership - Host agency/Unique structure of host agency/Existing body of knowledge developed SL1: Leadership from Host by the organization/Existing relationships with the City of T/Career Bridge (n=6) Organization Total Responses (n=14) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (12) EMPLOYER-DRIVEN and -FOCUSED COUNCIL (E) - Employer driven / Corporate engagement/Access to employers through TCSA (n=6) E3: Employers participate increasingly … - Employer-focused/speaking employer language (n=5) E1: Employers are well represented … - Creating business opportunities for employers (n=2) E1. Employers are well represented … Total Responses (n=13) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (11) COMMUNICATION STRATEGY (C) - Strong and variety of communication mechanisms/raising public awareness/honest All sub-factors marketing / professional communication products (n=8) Total Responses (n=8) Sub-factors (2) Indicators (10) UNIQUE LOCATION - Unique location (# immigrants, economy, # HQ, civic movement-TCSA, municipal All sub-factors mentoring program/immigrant policies, no federal/provincial agreement) (n=7) Total Responses (n=7) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (13) OTHER - Level of funding (n=2) – Category C and E respondents Not included Total Responses (n=2) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (13) Total Responses (n=98) Sub-factors (19) Indicators (83) 138

This study not only detects major success factors based on key informant responses but it examines each factor in greater detail and attempts to explain why TRIEC is considered to be a successful collaboration model from many different angles. Given the richness of data provided by key informants in semi-structured interviews, major factors were broken down into at least two sub-factors (on average 3-4) and even further into at least two (on average 4-5) indicators for each sub-factor. While factors and sub-factors sound more like abstract statements, indicators are intended to provide examples of concrete activities, approaches, and tactics, which are easier to analyze and compare. For a more detailed explanation about how the comparative success factor framework was developed, see Appendices U, V, W.

5.2.2 CALCULATING AND REPORTING THE RESULTS

All data provided by IEC staff was entered into the comparative tables and the average for each IEC’s indicator, sub-factor and factor were calculated. While no individual answers are shown for each of IECs in the reporting sections of this thesis, the average percentages for all seven IECs in each indicator, sub-factor and factor are presented. Each IEC’s staff answered ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, ‘True’ or ‘False’ or ‘NA’ to over 90 structured questions. These answers were reflected in the comparative analysis under one of 84 indicators. The ‘Yes’ and ‘True’ answers were counted as ‘1’ and ‘No’, ‘False’ or ‘NA’ as a ‘0’. Overall, there were 28 ‘NA’ answers or 4.8% of all answers153, which meant that certain questions were considered by respondents as ‘Not Applicable’ to their particular cases. There was no ‘NA’ answer for the ‘Unique Location’ factor. The average percentages were calculated as the following:

Equation 5.1 Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for Seven IECs

Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs = (Sum of all ‘Yes’ answers per indicator / 7) x100

Equation 5.2 Sub-factor Average for Seven IECs

Sub-factor Average Percentage for 7 IECs = (Sum of all ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs in sub-factor / Total possible number of ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IEC for this sub-factor) x100

153 4.8% is calculated based on the number of participating IECs (7) and the number of indicators (84); A number of ‘NA’ was distributed as follows: A-9; E-7; L-6; HSP-5; CS-1; UL-0. 139

Equation 5.3 Percentage of ‘Yes’ Answers for an IEC

Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for an IEC = (Number of ‘Yes’ answers per IEC per indicator / Number of indicators) x100

For comparative purposes, for TRIEC, if the answer is ‘Yes’, the Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC for each indicator is shown as 100%; if the answer is ‘No’ – 0%. The rest of the average percentages for TRIEC are calculated using the same above-mentioned basic mathematical formula as for other IECs. Questionnaires were sent to IEC staff partially filed-in. For each IEC, I attempted to retrieve information that was publicly available and could be accessed from their websites/reports. IEC staff then either confirmed or rejected my suggested responses and provided answers for questions for which I was not able to find answers online.

5.2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF IECS PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY

Overall, there are twelve IECs in Canada, including TRIEC. The staff of seven IECs agreed to participate in the study and filled in questionnaires. Due to the sensitive nature of this study, the names of the Immigrant Employment Councils (IEC) are kept confidential in both the Findings and Analysis sections. While it is highly unlikely that all the IECs that participated in the study are recognized, there is a slight chance that some IECs might be identified. There are only eleven IECs in existence (excluding TRIEC) and seven participated in the study. While the intention of this study is to report on the aggregated data, in some cases indicator specifications might be sufficient to recognize one or another IEC. Efforts were made to emphasize and specify only those IECs which scored highly.154 The youngest participating IEC was launched less than a year before the second phase of interviews was conducted, and the oldest ones had already been in existence for several years.155 As was mentioned in other Chapters, TRIEC was launched in 2003 and, therefore, it is the oldest IEC in Canada. Research has shown that, on average, it took groups three and a half years from the time they started to develop multi-stakeholder approaches in their jurisdictions until the time they officially launched IECs. The majority of IECs that participated in the study are located in CMAs with the population of 500,000 and over, and have large immigrant demographic groups.156 At least half of these

154 All IEC representatives signed the consent form, which specifies the risks and level of confidentiality that can be ensured. 155 The time is calculated based on information provided by the IEC, i.e. when IEC was officially launched. 156 Large immigrant population groups is considered if over 20% of total population are immigrants or there are at least 200,000, whichever is greater. 140

jurisdictions have high immigrant unemployment rates of over 10%. The questionnaires were filled in by two IEC Program Coordinators and five IEC Executive Directors. Information for TRIEC was retrieved from publicly available sources and from previously conducted initial semi-structural interviews.

5.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.3.1 FACTOR ONE: HIGH STANDARD PRACTICES (HSP)

The High Standard Practices (HSP) factor received the highest number of responses in semi- structured interviews. As can be seen in Table 5.2, the factor is divided into five sub-factors and 21 indicators. It is notable that while not all IECs utilized their websites to make their goals public, 100% list them in other non-electronic promotional materials. The HSP is the only factor where TRIEC did not receive a perfect 100% score for two sub-factors. The first sub-factor intends to show if an IEC has clear directions and governance and decision making models. As it was discussed before, TRIEC does not make its Board/Council/Working Group meeting notes public. Neither do most of IECs with the exception of one.157 Less than half list their Board member names/terms of references of their Working Groups/Councils on their websites. Also, less than half have a history of an IEC (why an IEC was needed; how it was developed, etc). It is important to note that four out of the seven conducted some type of research in the area of immigrant integration, which is available on their website. TRIEC has always been quite vocal about its objectives and goals. The latter could be found on its website and in many other promotional materials. It publishes its Board/Council members in its Annual Report and regularly produces briefs and research papers which are available on the Internet. Finally, there is a story of how and why TRIEC was formed on its website as well as terms of references for its groups. The sub-factor average for all IECs is 53% and for TRIEC is 86%. One of the indicators is concerned with whether an IEC has done an independent evaluation. Only one of the IECs has done it in the past and there was no independent evaluation of TRIEC’s work. TRIEC produced Annual Reports for the last seven years of its work, while only two (or 29%) of the IECs, participating in the study, have ever produced any annual reports about their results/work.

157 Very few meeting notes of this IEC were available on its website, and only in the very initial stage of its work. 141

Table 5.2 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, High Standard Practices Factor (HSP) HSP Factor - Sub-factor 1: Clear Directions and Governance Structure

IECs Answers / 1.1 Goals 1.2 Goals are on 1.3 Board 1.4 Council 1.5 History of 1.6 Terms of 1.7 Research of Sub-factor Indicators are on other /Council/ /Board member Why and How reference of WG IEC is on the Average IEC’s promotional Working Group names are on the IEC was and Council are website Percentage website materials (WG) Meeting web / Annual created is on on the website Notes are on the reports the website website Indicator Percentage 100% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 86% of ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage 71% 100% 14% 43% 43% 57% 57% 53% of ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs HSP Factor - Sub-factor 2: Consistent Reporting About the Results to the Public

IECs Answers / Indicators 2.1 Publicly accessible 2.2 Publicly accessible 2.3 Results of the 2.4 Results are shared at the IEC Sub-factor Annual Reports independent evaluation program/IEC work are Annual Summits Average of IEC on the website Percentage Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 0% 100% 100% 75% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 29% 14% 43% 43% 32% for 7 IECs HSP Factor - Sub-factor 3: Outcome Oriented Council

IECs Answers / Indicators 3.1 Long and 3.2 Outcome 3.3. Indicator 3.4 Qualitative, 3.5 Individual / Organizational / Sub-factor short term indicators are benchmarks quantitative Societal changes are identified Average impacts and identified are identified outcomesand Percentage objectives are inputs and outputs identified are identified Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 86% 71% 14% 71% 57% 60% for 7 IECs

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HSP Factor - Sub-factor 4: Funding Information is in the Public Domain (amount of funding and spending)

IECs Answers / Indicators 4.1 Annual Reports with financial 4.2 Financial information is easily accessible through other channels Sub-factor statements are on the website (HO reports, articles, sponsor website) Average Percentage Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 100% 100% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 14% 29% 21% for 7 IECs HSP Factor – Sub-factor 5: IEC is an Expert / Go-to-resource in the Immigrant Employment Field

IECs Answers / Indicators 5.1 IEC produced briefs 5.2 Champions wrote open 5.3 IEC brought together three levels of government Sub-factor / response to letters to public officials into one Inter-Governmental Committee Average government actions/ Percentage research on immigrant integration topic Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 100% 100% 100% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 29% 0% 0% 10% for 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC - 90% Factor Average for 7 IECs - 41%

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However, three IECs do share their results on their website and /or at the IEC’s Annual Summits. As a result, the sub-factor average for TRIEC is 75%, and for other IECs – 32%, which means that collectively seven IECs reported that they performed activities identified in indicators answered ‘Yes’ 32% of the time. The third sub-factor is concerned with whether IECs have an outcome-oriented approach in their work. TRIEC shows a perfect 100% average in all five indicators. Since its formation TRIEC aimed to build on existing programs and scale them up. TRIEC conducted preliminary basic research and discovered that while, for example, mentoring was a great idea, existing non-profit agencies were able to make less than 100 matches cumulatively in the Toronto area (Lewkowicz, 2008: 66). Thus, benchmarks were identified very early in the game. Also, long-term impacts and short-term objectives were identified as well as outcome indicators, which were reported in its Annual Reviews, i.e. ‘1000’ mentor-mentee matches in one year’ (TRIEC, 2004). As can be seen from the discussions in earlier sections, it is quite challenging to identify and track systemic change; however, TRIEC came up with tracking and reporting systems which showcased their efforts in the individual, organizational and societal levels. In their first Annual Review they clearly stated their objectives and linked them to three major projects they had initiated. While the majority of IECs reported to have identified their long-term impacts and short-term objectives and outcome indicators, only one has done benchmarking for the programs they initiated. Thus, the baseline was not established for the majority of programs initiated by IECs. One of the potential explanations might be that IECs started new initiatives and there were no existing programs to compare them with. Also, only 4 out of 7 IECs identified the three-level change linkages as a result of their work (individual/organizational/societal change). The sub-factor average for all seven IEC is 60% and 100% for TRIEC. The fourth sub-factor shows how transparent IEC has been about their funding. While TRIEC was not required to share its funding information, as it was a project of a private foundation, it has been sharing its funding structure with the public since 2004 when it published its first Annual Report. Additionally, as its projects received more corporate sponsorship, TRIEC started to feature this news on its website. However, only two IECs participating in the study shared their funding information either in their publicly accessible reports and/or on their website. The average for all seven IECs for this sub-factor is (21%). Finally, the fifth sub-factor intends to discover whether an IEC was able to establish itself as an expert / go-to-resource in the area of immigrant integration in its jurisdiction and/or in Canada. While TRIEC regularly produces briefs/responses to government actions and policies and conducts research on the issue, only two other IECs did so. TRIEC became quite vocal publicly about its goals and why

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new solutions were needed. Some TRIEC key informants suggested that many IECs are quite young and, therefore, are focused on building relationships and initiating programs, which leaves less time for advocacy, developing their brands and/or good public relations. The factor average for all seven IECs is 41%, the lowest among all six factor averages; for TRIEC it is 90%.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘HSP’ FACTOR VALUES

There was only one IEC which showed the level of business professionalism that is relatively close to that of TRIEC (71%). Moreover, although the HSP factor average associated with this IEC is still lower than that of TRIEC, the IEC showed a higher value than TRIEC’s in one of the HSP sub- factors – consistent reporting to the public about the result sub-factor (100% vs. 75% for TRIEC). When compared with others, this IEC utilized one of the most action-oriented approaches in its activities (88%) and one of the best factor averages for the Communication and Raising Awareness Strategies. Also, this IEC was one of the most mature groups among all the IECs. However, the second most ’high standard practices’ IEC was among the youngest. At the same time, out of four IECs which received the lowest HSP factor average three were found to have a weaker leadership model than, on average, other IECs; all four showed less developed Communication and Raising Awareness Strategies in comparison with the average for all seven IECs; three of them tended to be less action oriented and less employer driven than the others.

5.3.2 FACTOR TWO: ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH (A)

The Action-oriented Approach factor received the second highest number of key informant responses in the semi-structured interview phase. Thus, it was perceived as one of the most important success factors for TRIEC. This factor was broken down into three sub-factors and sixteen indicators. TRIEC received 100% on each of the indicators (Table 5.3). Key informants, in semi- structural interviews, suggested that it was because of an action-oriented philosophy that TRIEC was able to move so quickly, whereby idea generation and fast results were the foundation for its success. In comparison, only 43% of other IECs that participated in the study suggested that they are guided by a ‘quick results and taking risks’ philosophy. In addition, TRIEC’s hosting organization – the Maytree Foundation – has a rather flexible governance structure. Maytree is a private foundation and has only 4 Board members: Alan Broadbent, his wife and their two close friends. 158 This arrangement sped up the decision making process for TRIEC and made it easier to follow the ‘let’s do it’ philosophy.

158 Interview # 9. 145

Table 5.3 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Action-oriented Approach Factor (A)

Sub-factor 1: Action-oriented Philosophy

IECs Answers / Indicators 1.1 Idea generation and fast results is 1.2 IEC’s HO has a flexible Sub-factor Average foundation for IEC success governance structure Percentage Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC for each indicator 100% 100% 100% Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for seven IEC for each indicator 43% 0% 21% Sub-factor 2: Multiple Programs

IECs Answers / 2.1 2.2 2.3 Cross- 2.4 2.5 Online 2.6 Online 2.7 Public 2.8 2.9 Sub-factor Indicators Mentoring Internships cultural Employer resources resources awareness Employer Other* Average workshops for Awards for for campaign Events/ Percentage employers employers immigrants Forums Indicator Percentage of 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of 57% 14% 86% 43% 86% 57% 100% 86% 86% 68% ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs Sub-factor 3: Tangible Results (Outputs and Outcomes)

IECs Answers / Indicators 3.1 1st program is 3.2 Tangible results are 3.3 At least 100 3.4 At least 200 3.5 At least 300 Sub-factor generated in the first reported to the public in immigrants participated immigrants immigrants participated Average 12 months of IEC’s 24 mo of IEC’s work in programs participated in in programs Percentage work programs Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 86% 57% 57% 43% 29% 54% answers for 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC – 100% Factor Average for 7 IECs – 58%

*Other: Speed Networking, Other Networking Programs, Loans, Immigrant Forums, Hiring Practices Assessment, etc.

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None of the participating IECs were hosted by organizations with this kind of governance infrastructure. Thus, the average percentage for the Action-oriented philosophy sub-factor for seven IECs is only 21%. Another important feature of the action-oriented approach is how many and what kinds of programs were initiated by IECs. A total of nine different program categories were identified for this sub-factor, including a Mentoring program, Internship, Employer Awards, etc. As can be seen in Table 5.3, gradually TRIEC initiated all the category programs. The Public Awareness campaign was the only ‘program category’ that was initiated by all seven IECs. The average for this sub-factor for all seven IEC is 68%, i.e. three IECs developed and/or delivered workshops to employers, developed online resources for them and organized employer forums; four had resources for immigrants on their websites; three initiated Employer Awards and only one introduced an internship program. Finally, this factor looks at the tangible results of IECs. TRIEC’s average for this sub-factor is 100%, meaning that its first program was launched in the first 12 months of its work; it shared the results with the public as early as in the first two years since its formation; and over thousands of immigrants have benefited from / participated in its programs in the first two years.159 With respect to other IECs, the majority of them reported that they launched their programs in the first year (six out of seven) and only four shared their results with the public in the first two years. While 57% reported that at least 100 immigrants had benefited from/participated in their programs by the time of the interview, only two IECs suggested that at least 300 immigrant benefited from/participated in their programs. It is interesting to note that one of the latter IECs was established relatively recently. The average for all seven IECs for this sub-factor is 54%. The factor average for all seven IECs is 58% and for TRIEC it is 100%.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘A’ FACTOR VALUES The study showed that there were three IECs that achieved the highest Action-oriented Approach factor averages (88% and 69%x2). Two of them belong to the oldest IECs and the third is the youngest. Two of these IECs scored rather poorly on the HSP sub-factor: Consistent reporting to the public about the results (25%x2). So, even though these IECs were making efforts in their core business – changing employer attitudes about immigrant skills and/or assisting skilled immigrants in

159 In fact, according to TRIEC’s 2010 Annual Report, over 5,000 immigrants participated/benefited from TRIEC programs by 2011. However, for comparative reasons, three benchmarks were proposed with the average – 200 immigrants. IECs that participated in the study, on average, have existed for at least two years. In the firest two years TRIEC has placed 200 interns and matched close to 1,000 mentees. Given the much smaller size of other IECs’ jurisdictions, the total amount of immigrants that participated in TRIEC programs in the first two years were divided into 6, which equals 200 – the average two-year benchmark for IECs. 147

accessing adequate employment, their communities might not be as aware about how these groups contribute to the change and/or how successful their programs are. This approach might prevent IECs from building a case for their work and might weaken their abilities for advocacy. One more IEC received a perfect 100% average for the Tangible Results ‘A’ sub-factor. It facilitated programs in which over 300 immigrants participated (and/or benefited from), something that no other IEC (except TRIEC) was able to do. What is more striking is that this IEC is one of the youngest Councils. In general, it was observed that the majority of IECs received rather good factor averages in Tangible Results and Multiple Programs sub-factors (with the exception of one IEC).

5.3.3 FACTOR THREE: STRONG LEADERSHIP MODEL (L)

The Strong Leadership Model Factor (L) received the third-highest number of responses from key informants in the first phase of interviews. This factor is broken down into three sub-factors (Table 5.4). It is difficult to overestimate the support and leadership that Maytree Foundation provided to TRIEC (for details see Chapter Four). Thus, it is not surprising that information about TRIEC is featured in many of Maytree’s publications. Maytree provided visible support to TRIEC, i.e. there is a link to TRIEC on the first page of Maytree’s website; Alan Broadbent, who is a Founder of the Maytree Foundation, was and still is involved in TRIEC as Council member and is an influential supporter. Finally, Maytree had a history of being a strong advocate in the area of immigrant integration for years, which made it easier for TRIEC to build relationships with local community agencies and funders. Less than half of EDs/Presidents of hosting organizations (HO) for other IECs actively participated in the work of IECs or launched their programs. Additionally, over half of IECs reported that their HOs did not have a history of being an advocate/leader in the area of immigrant integration. However, five out of seven suggested that their HOs featured information about their IECs both in their publications and on websites. Overall, the average of this sub-factor for all seven IECs is 63%. As was established earlier, TRIEC had ‘unprecedented’ support from the business community. IECs were also able to secure a relatively good level of business leadership support. TRIEC was always co-chaired by at least one and/or two business leaders. Since the very first years, it managed to secure monetary sponsorship from several larger financial institutions (for example, TD Canada Trust provided generous support to the Mentoring Initiative in first years and recently, in 2011; Scotiabank became a sponsor of Immigrant Networks). While only four out of seven IECs are chaired by business leaders and have at least three of their Council/Board employer-members as active Champions for their programs, the majority of IECs managed to secure some level of sponsorship (mostly in-kind) from their employer Council/Board members. Five of them reported to have links from employer websites to their IEC’s websites. The average for this sub-factor for all seven IEC is 68%.

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Table 5.4 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Leadership Factor Model (L)

L Factor – Sub-factor 1: Strong Leadership Support from the Hosting Organization (HO)

IECs Answers / Indicators 1.1 ED/President of 1.2 Info / Logo / 1.3 Info about IEC 1.4 Board 1.5 HO has a history of Sub-factor HO launches IEC Link about IEC is is in HO reports members of HO strong voice in the area Average programs on the HO website are involved of immigrant Percentage integration (event, research) Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 43% 86% 71% 71% 43% 63% answers for 7 IECs L Factor – Sub-factor 2: Strong Leadership Support from Prominent Business Leaders

IECs Answers / Indicators 2.1 Chair / Champion 2.2 Employers as 2.3 At least 3 Council /Board 2.4 Link to/information Sub-factor of IEC are employers corporate sponsors (in- members launches about IEC from Average kind and $) events/Champion of the employer websites Percentage program Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 57% 86% 57% 71% 68% answers for 7 IECs L Factor – Sub-factor 3: Strong Leadership Support from Local Municipality

IECs Answers / Indicators 3.1 Mayor launches events / pilot 3.2 Municipality is a partner 3.3 Staff is on Council/Working Sub-factor programs in pilot programs Groups Average Percentage Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for 100% 100% 100% 100% TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers for 86% 100% 100% 95% 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC – 100% Factor Average for 7 IECs – 73%

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The third Leadership sub-factor shows how supportive local municipalities were to IECs. The vast majority of IECs (six out of seven) confirmed that Mayors launched events/pilot programs for them and all seven IECs confirmed municipalities as employer partners in pilot programs (participated in internships, mentorships, other programs). Finally, municipalities were actively involved in the work of IECs by having their representatives on Councils/Working Groups in all seven IECs. The sub-factor average for all seven IECs is the highest among all sub-factors – 95%. The factor average for all seven IEC is 73% and for TRIEC is 100%.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘L’ FACTOR VALUE Out of three IECs with the highest factor averages in the Strong Leadership Model factor, two had the highest scores in ‘A’ and ‘E’ factors. Interestingly, while for all other IECs the third sub-factor (Strong leadership from the local government) increased their overall factor averages, for the IEC with the highest ‘L’ factor average, local government support was below the average. The IEC that managed to generate impressive support from all three leadership pillars was one of the oldest IECs.

5.3.4 FACTOR FOUR: EMPLOYER-DRIVEN AND -FOCUSED COUNCIL (E)

This factor generated the fourth-highest number of key informant responses in the initial interviews. As can be seen from Table 5.5, this factor is broken down into three sub-factors and eleven indicators. TRIEC’s know-how included working not only or mostly with immigrants, as other community agencies did, but focusing on engaging employers in developing and participating in programs that would benefit both employers and immigrants. Recently, TRIEC started working with a Network of immigrant-led organizations. However, in the first five years, its focal point was employer engagement and their approach was rather business oriented. Similarly, six out of seven IECs reported having similar approaches, i.e. ‘our clients are mostly employers’. However, when looking at the composition of Board/Champion Circles, less than half of participating IECs reported having employer driven Boards / Councils (i.e. when the majority are employer representatives). The make up of TRIEC’s Board and Council was always employer driven, i.e. it had more employer representatives160 than non-profit and other groups. While having a community agency as the hosting organization did not affect TRIEC’s ability to engage businesses (as TRIEC had access to employers through the TCSA), key informants suggested that for other jurisdictions it might be challenging to start an IEC without strong support of local business community. The study revealed that very few IECs were hosted /administered by business organizations. The average for this first sub-factor for all seven IECs is 51% and for TRIEC is 92%.

160 The following groups were considered as employer/business members: companies, labour & business agencies, municipalities (HR and other staff), hospitals (HR and other staff), and post secondary institutions (administration staff but not faculty teaching staff). 150

Table 5.5 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Employer-driven and -focused Factor (E)

E Factor – Sub-factor 1: Employers Are Well Represented

IECs Answers / Indicators 1.1 ‘Our 1.2 The Board of 1.3 The Council / 1.4 HO is a 1.4 Our Chair is Sub-factor clients are Directors is Champion Circle is business a business leader Average Percentage mostly composed mostly of composed mostly of organization employers’ employers employers Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100 100% 100% 0% 100% 92% answers for TRIEC % Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 86% 43% 43% 29% 57% 51% answers for 7 IECs E Factor – Sub-factor 2: Employers Are Well Recognized

IECs Answers / Indicators 2.1 Links from IEC website to 2.2 Board/Council members 2.3 Top Diversity / New Canadians Sub-factor Board/Councils employer are mentioned in articles Award Employer Winners are Average Percentage members written about IEC/its engaged on Board/Council programs Indicator Percentage of 100% 100% 100% 100% ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of 43% 100% 86% 76% ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs E Factor – Sub-factor 3: Employers Increasingly Participate in Programs

IECs Answers / 3.1 At least 9-10 3.2 At least 20 3.3 At least 50 3.4 At least 100 employers/hiring Sub-factor Indicators employer are employers are employers/hiring managers participated in programs Average Percentage engaged on Council/ engaged on managers since IEC’s formation program in the 1st Council/in programs participated in year in the 2nd year programs since IEC’s formation

Indicator Percentage of 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ‘Yes’ answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of 100% 86% 57% 29% 68% ‘Yes’ answers for 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC – 92% Factor Average for 7 IECs – 63%

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Indicators in the second sub-factor look at how well employers are recognized by IECs. TRIEC has been quite successful in this area. It has links from its website to the websites of employers engaged in TRIEC’s activities. Board/Council employer members are featured in articles written about TRIEC programs. Additionally, many of the Best Employers for New Canadians and Canada’s Best Diversity Employers listed their participation in TRIEC’s programs as one of the reasons why they were selected for this award (Canada’s Top 100 Employers website). The majority of other IECs that participated in the study were also able to engage national corporate leaders, who are recognized for their diversity / immigrant integration practices, as their Board/Council members. All IECs recognized their employer partners in articles written about IECs/their programs. Only three out of seven reported to have links from their websites to employer- partners. The average for this sub-factor for all seven IECs was 76%. The third sub-factor is concerned with how many employers are engaged. Since, on average, the majority of participating IECs were around for at least two years, the progression in indicators goes from ‘10 employers are engaged on Council and IEC’s programs in the first year’ to ‘at least 100 employers are engaged by now’. All IECs reported having at least 10 employers on board in the first year and this number was doubled for the majority of IECs by the second year. Not surprisingly, given the age of the IECs, the number of IECs that reported having at least 100 employers being currently engaged in IEC was just to 29% or two IECs. What is surprising is that one of these IECs, which managed to recruit more than 100 employers, has not been around for a long time. The average sub- factor score for all seven IECs is 68%. The factor average for all seven IECs is 64% and 92% for TRIEC.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘E’ FACTOR VALUES All three IECs with the highest ‘E’ factor averages showed the highest ‘CS’ and ‘HSP’ factor averages as well. They were some of the most action-oriented groups and enjoyed high levels of support from their hosting agencies, the business community and local municipalities. Two were among the oldest Councils. The study revealed that IECs managed by business organizations had the highest (perfect) employer participation and employer recognition sub-factor scores, similar to TRIEC. Additionally, they scored among the top three IECs on all other factors. It is important to note that two IECs with the lowest values in the ‘E’ factor are among the youngest Councils in Canada.

5.3.5 FACTOR FIVE: COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC AWARENESS STRATEGIES (CS)

The Communication and Public Awareness Strategies success factor generated lots of discussions and deliberations in the initial interviews and ranked the fifth among all the factors. This factor is broken down into two sub-factors and ten factors (Table 5.6).

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TRIEC performed all five activities that were reflected in the first sub-factor – Communication Capacity. TRIEC had a full time Communication Coordinator from the very first year. In the early years, updates were sent to stakeholders on a monthly basis (or even more frequently) and the general public had access to these updates, i.e. could subscribe to TRIEC’s e-newsletter. Finally, TRIEC produced Annual Reports with detailed overview of their activities. Less than half of all surveyed IECs had a Communication Coordinator at the time of the interview. Only three sent updates to their stakeholders on a regular basis and six provided updates at least 3-4 times a year. In more than half of participating IECs, the general public could subscribe to their newsletters/twitters/blogs. Only two produced reports about their activities, which were publicly accessible. The average sub-factor for the seven IECs is 51%. The second sub-factor reflects Public Awareness-Raising activities. TRIEC was quite successful in raising awareness on the issue of immigrant “de-skilling” (Chapter Four). Other IECs were also quite successful in getting the word out. All of the surveyed IECs reported having articles written in the mainstream media about their activities/programs and appeared on TV/radio talks. Most IECs organized events for employers and/or immigrants, several launched Employer Awards and one reported to have a regular column on the issue of immigrant integration/activities of the Council in local newspaper. The sub-factor average for all seven IECs is 68%. The factor average for all seven IECs is 60% and for TRIEC is 100%.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘C’ FACTOR VALUES Three IECs showed the above average efforts in their communication and public awareness campaigns (70% and 80%x2 vs. 60% average for all seven IECs). Two were more mature organizations and one was a relatively young Council. The IEC with the highest score in the CS factor showed also a perfect Communication Capacity sub-factor average. Similar to TRIEC, it has a communication specialist on staff; sends regular monthly and quarterly/ad hoc updates to its stakeholders on the progress; and produces Annual Reports and utilizes social media tools, which allow the general public to be informed and engaged. Another observation was made with respect to the imbalance between the communication capacities that IECs exhibited and public awareness activities. More than half of the participating groups (4 out of 7) averaged much higher in raising awareness efforts in comparison with their Communication Capacity sub-factor (60% vs. 40%, [80% vs. 20%]x2, 80% vs. 60%). There is a definite trend to do more with less, which, possibly, backfired in regards to the IEC’s capacity’s to engage employers and the general public. Two of the above-mentioned IECs scored quite poorly in employer engagement, recognition and participation.

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Table 5.6 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Communication and Public Awareness Strategies Factor (CS)

CS Factor – Sub-factor 1: Communication Capacity

IECs Answers / Indicators 1.1 Having a full 1.2 Sending monthly 1.3 Sending 1.4 Producing 1.5 General public Sub-factor Average time updates to quarterly updates Annual Reports could subscribe to Percentage Communication stakeholders about the to stakeholders about the IEC Coordinator progress/news activities161 newsletter/twitter/ blog Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 43% 43% 86% 29% 57% 51% for 7 IECs

CS Factor – Sub-factor 2: Raising Public Awareness Campaign

IECs Answers / Indicators 2.1 Organizing 2.2 Initiating 2.3 Articles about IEC and 2.4 Had a 2.5 IEC Sub-factor Average events/confere Employer its programs in mainstream monthly/annual story/program/suc Percentage nces for Awards newspapers throughout the edition in cesses are on TV/ employers/im year mainstream Radio migrants newspapers – immigrant stories Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ answers 86% 43% 100% 14% 100% 68% for 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC – 100% Factor Average for 7 IECs – 60%

161 CS 1.4 indicator is different from HSP 2.1 and HSP 4.1. CS 1.4 indicator is concerned with whether an IEC shared about his activities with public; HSP 2.1 shows if an IEC produced any kind of Annual Reports, whether they show activities, outcomes, future directions or financial information. HSP 4.1 indicator is specifically focused on reporting about funding to the public.

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5.3.6 FACTOR SIX: UNIQUE LOCATION (UL)

The Unique Location factor, combined, received seven responses from key informants in the initial interview phase. The factor was divided into three sub-factors and thirteen indicators (Table 5.7). In previous studies conducted by other researchers, this factor was frequently brought up as ‘one of the most important success factors’ meaning that because of TRIEC’s unique location with unique set of conditions, it became such a success. As was reported before, several key respondents in this study also felt that this factor played a role in the success of TRIEC. TRIEC is located in a large CMA with a high percentage of immigrants. The Toronto City Summit Alliance (currently known as CivicAction), a multi-stakeholder group composed of civic and business leaders, identified the immigrant employment challenges as one of the serious barriers for the city’s growth and prosperity. Ratna Omidvar and Alan Broadbent were invited to participate in the TCSA in its formation stages. By that time the idea of the Council was brought up by Maytree and, as a result of the combination of these events and conditions, TRIEC was created and flourished. Additionally, research showed that TRIEC was created when the Ontario and Federal governments were working on the first Federal-Provincial Immigration for the Province of Ontario. When comparing TRIEC with other IECs, it is evident that they did not have the same kind of favourable conditions that TRIEC had. While the majority are located in larger CMAs with relatively high immigrant populations, only four reported civic forums where business and/or civic leaders recognized immigrant challenges as an issue for the city. Furthermore, only one reported that an IEC was formed as a result of an employer/civic leaders forum. Thus, the employer engagement piece might not have been as easy for other IECs as it was for TRIEC. Overall, the average of this sub-factor for seven IECs is 46%. In terms of the economy, TRIEC was created in a region with a large number of corporate head quarters and a strong financial sector. TRIEC was able to build on these advantages in their employer engagement process. Additionally, in 2003-2004, the economy was quickly recovering from a recession of the early 2000s and was picking up in 2005-2006. Thus, employers were more willing to look at alternative sources for their hiring needs. Interestingly enough, all seven IECs reported having a strong presence of selected business sector(s) in their cities/regions. Only three IECs suggested that their municipality has strong presence of HQs, which again, means that it might have been more difficult to engage employers without the presence of corporate key decision makers. Over a half of surveyed IECs believed that their Councils were formed when the economy was in a state of growth.162 As was mentioned before, it is generally perceived that employers look more favourably upon immigrant applicants when they experience a shortage of workers. The sub-factor average for all seven IECs is 67%.

162 For different regions and provinces the state of economy could have been different in the same year. 155

Table 5.7 Comparable Analysis Between TRIEC’s and Other IECs’ Tactics and Activities, Unique Locality (UL)

UL Factor – Sub-factor 1: Demographics, Immigration Policies and Civic Movement

IECs Answers / Indicators 1.1 IEC is 1.2 Large immigrant 1.3 No Federal- 1.4 Immigrant 1.5 IEC was created as Sub-factor located in population (over Provincial challenges identified at a result of Average 500,00+ 20% or over Immigration business forum(s) as a employer/civic leader Percentage city/CMA 200,000 people) Agreement before IEC barrier for city's growth forum was launched Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 71% 71% 14% 57% 14% 46% answers for 7 IECs UL Factor – Sub-factor 2: Local Economy

IECs Answers / Indicators 2.1 Strong presence of 2.2 Strong presence of HQs 2.3 When IEC was formed the economy was in the Sub-factor selected business sector(s) state of growth Average Percentage Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 43% 57% 67% answers for 7 IECs UL Factor – Sub-factor 3: State and History of Local Municipal Multicultural and Immigration Policies

IECs Answers / Indicators 3.1 Strong history of 3.2 Strong 3.3 City has 3.4 City introduced 3.5 Municipality played Sub-factor multicultural and Mayor/Council support Diversity/EE programs to support a role in the Average immigrant policies of immigrant issues before O Units immigrant economic development of IEC Percentage in the city IEC integration before IEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% answers for TRIEC Indicator Percentage of ‘Yes’ 86% 100% 86% 57% 86% 83% answers for 7 IECs Factor Average for TRIEC – 100% Factor Average for 7 IECs – 65%

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The third sub-factor looks at the level of support that IECs could have received from the local municipality.163 Even before TRIEC was formed, the City of Toronto had launched its own Mentoring Program for Immigrants in 2004. Additionally, it co-founded and co-sponsored the Provincial Skilled Immigrant Conference since 2003. Furthermore, the city had adopted a number of Multicultural and Immigration policies long before TRIEC was created and it had several Departments which were actively involved in the area of immigrant economic integration (Economic Development, Diversity Unit etc.). Its Mayor and Council showed significant interest in and support for immigrant-related programs and policies in their political platforms in the early 2000s. Finally, the city sponsored the civic forum which gave birth to the Toronto City Summit Alliance and, consequently to TRIEC. It turned out that the municipalities/regional governments of surveyed IECs had and continue to have strong capacities to provide support to IECs. All IECs reported that the Mayor/Council of their respected municipalities/regions were and are quite supportive of the issue. While only four out of seven reported that municipalities/regions had introduced programs to enhance immigrant economic integration before IECs were launched, the majority (six out of seven) confirmed that there were municipal multicultural/immigration policies in place before IECs came into existence. It was reported that municipalities/regions have special Equal Employment Opportunity / Diversity / Social Planning Departments, which are, usually, good first points of contact for advocacy and non-profit groups. Six IECs concluded that the local municipality/region ‘played a role in the development of their IECs’. The sub-factor average for all seven IECs is one of the highest – 83%.

IECS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST ‘UL’ FACTOR VALUES Three IECs have a Unique Location factor average (77%) relatively close to that of TRIEC. One of these IECs scored as the top IEC in terms of the leadership support and employer engagement it generated. Another one came across as the most action-oriented group. Two are mature groups while the third one is a younger IEC, and in both cases the factor averages are in the bottom three averages for each factor but the UL. Another three younger IECs, which were founded approximately at the same time, received 62%, 54% and 46% respectively as their UL factor averages, meaning that all of them had far less favourable conditions than any of the IECs with a high ‘UL’ factor; hence, these were almost 50% less favourable than that of TRIEC’s. However, among these, one IEC showed values for the other factors that compared similarly with the IECs in more favourable locations – it scored as one of the top IECs in the Communication Strategy factor, the

163 UL, Sub-factor 3 is different from SL, Sub-factor 3. The former looks at the municipal capacity to be involved and the later is concerned with how the municipality actually was involved.

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second highest for Employer-driven and -focused Council factor, as well as the second highest for High Standards factor.

5.3.7 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IECS AND TRIEC

A number of practices and strategies of seven IECs were compared against those of TRIEC. As Table 5.8 shows, the Strong Leadership Model factor received the cumulative highest factor average of 73% (for seven IECs).

Table 5.8 Summary of IEC Sub-factor Averages

FACTORS / SUB- 7 IECS’ 7 IECS’ 7 IECS 7 IECS’ 7 IECS’ 7 IECS’ TRIEC’S FACTORS AVERAGES SUB- SUB- SUB- SUB- SUB- FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 High Standard 53% 32% 60% 21% 10% 41% 90% Practices

Action-oriented 21% 54% 68% _ _ 58% 100% Approach Strong Leadership 63% 68% 95% _ _ 73% 100% Model Employer-driven 51% 76% 68% _ _ 64% 92% and -focused Council

Strong 51% 69% _ _ 60% 100% Communication and PR Strategies Unique Location 46% 67% 83% _ _ 65% 100%

Once factors are broken down into greater detail, we learn that there are three IEC sub- factors that received high sub-factor averages. While the leadership support that TRIEC had is comparatively unique, the majority of IECs had leadership models similar to that of TRIEC’s. Particularly, they enjoyed great support from local municipalities, i.e. Mayors were involved in the launch of events/programs, municipalities participated in pilot programs and cities were well represented in the IECs (the highest sub-factor average for all seven IECs). Additionally, results in the second phase of this study confirmed what key informants in semi-structured interviews suggested: municipalities should and have considerable capacities to be involved in multi-stakeholder collaborations similar to TRIEC. The sub-factor 3 for the UL factor – ‘Strong municipal multicultural and immigrant policies infrastructure’ – received 83% as the average for all seven IECs. Finally, another sub-factor, which received the third highest score for all seven IECs is ‘Recognition of employers’ which confirmed that IECs used rather comprehensive strategies to

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recognize employers. It is worth noting that there are ten indicators that received positive answers from all seven IECs. They are distributed among all but ‘A’ factors. Thus, all IECs reported that they have: 1. Clearly-stated goals on other promotional materials (HSP) 2. Municipality as a partner in pilot projects (L) 3. Municipal representatives on IEC’s Council (L) 4. Featured IEC and its programs in mainstream newspapers (C) 5. Featured IEC and its programs on TV/radio (C) 6. Strong presence of selected industrial/business sectors in a city/region (UL) 7. Strong mayoral support of immigration issues (UL) 8. Initiated public awareness campaign (C) 9. Mentioned Board /Council members in articles (C) 10. At least 9-10 employers are engaged in the first year (E)

5.3.8 MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRIEC AND OTHER IECS

In-depth analysis at the indicator level revealed that there were eight individual positive indicators of actions that were only performed by one IEC. Out of eight single positive answer indicators, five were reported by the same IEC, which has the highest overall average of 79% for all six factors. The individual positive indicators that were only met by one IEC in each case are as follows: 1. only one IEC released an Annual Report with financial information in it (HSP); however none released full financial information for all funding years; 2. only one IEC made efforts to establish indicator benchmarks for program(s) it initiated (HSP); 3. only one IEC went through independent evaluation of its activities (HSP); 4. only one IEC ensured that Board/Council meeting notes were on its website (HSP); however, they were not updated regularly; 5. only one IEC was created as a result of employer/civic leader forum (UL); 6. the majority (but one) of IECs were created after Federal-Provincial Immigration agreements were signed in their provinces (UL); 7. only one IEC initiated an Internship program (A); 8. only one IEC arranged for a Monthly/Annual special immigrant employment column in a newspaper (C). As can be seen, half of the activities identified above are in the ‘HSP’ factor. It is important to reiterate that TRIEC never conducted and released an independent evaluation of all its activities and/or made public notes from its Board/Council meetings in the last five years.164 While these are not indicators of TRIEC’s success factors, they were introduced because key informants believed that these types of activities would show the highest level of transparent business practices that an organization could demonstrate. Thus, these indicators were introduced along with others, and even

164 In the first two years, some TRIEC Council meeting notes were publically accessible but no Board meeting minutes were released.

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when ‘0’ values for the-above mentioned indicators were counted for TRIEC, it still maintained the highest overall score for the ‘HSP’ factor. As the study showed, only one IEC produced independent, publicly-accessible evaluation and/or only one released its meeting notes. Additionally, we learnt that local contexts of IECs are quite different from the one of TRIEC. The study revealed that only one IEC was created as a result of employer/civic leader forum, which, potentially, provided this IEC with more connections in the employer community (this IEC scored highly on employer engagement). Additionally, the majority of IECs were created after Federal-Provincial Immigration agreements were signed in their provinces, which is quite different from the context where TRIEC was created. Furthermore, while the majority of IECs created a number of programs and prominent awareness-raising campaigns, only one participated in the development of the internship program, which provides paid working experience to immigrants. Finally, while some IECs introduced fairly comprehensive communication strategies, only one reported consistently communicating with the public in a monthly column of a local newspaper. Further analysis at the indicator level showed that there were three indicators with ‘0’ values for all seven IECs. Thus, none of IECs brought together three levels of government (the HSP factor), no IECs Champions wrote open letters (the HSP factor), and none of IEC’s hosting organizations had a flexible governance structure (the A factor). Additionally, TRIEC showed uncomparable level of transparency by sharing its funding and results. As can be seen from Table 6.14, two factors that received the most number of responses in the semi-structural interviews by TRIEC’s key informants (‘HSP’ and ‘A’) have the lowest average for all seven IECs across all factors. Thorough investigation, described in this Chapter, showed that this is the area where TRIEC and other IECs seem to have the largest deviations at the factor/sub-factor/indicator levels. While no quantitative analysis was introduced to confirm the correlation between the ‘HSP’ factor and the success of TRIEC and/or other IECs, the study established a certain pattern, which suggests that if an IEC scored lower than average for the HSP factor, its performance in other factors also tends to deviate quite significantly in comparison with TRIEC and with the average values for other factors in all seven IECs. Thus, very few IECs diligently shared their financial information and/or reported on their results to the public. At the same time, no other IEC was hosted by an organization with a flexible governance structure, such as the one Maytree Foundation had, whereby the decisions were made more informally by a Board of ‘two founders and their two close friends’, which supported the ‘idea generation and fast results’ philosophy. Until 2007, TRIEC was formally a project of the Maytree Foundation and although it had the Circle of Champions, which later became TRIEC’s Board of Directors, operationally, it was administered by the Maytree Foundation, which introduced this ‘quick win’ approach, which other stakeholders, and particularly employers, gladly bought into.

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From the first sight, these two findings are somewhat controversial. On one hand, the study claims that one of the major differences between TRIEC and other IECs is its transparency values, which are reflected in its diligent reporting to the public about its funding and program outcomes. On the other hand, the study argues that TRIEC was at an advantageous position as it was governed by an organization with an informal governance structure, which allowed decisions to be made in a non-transparent and/or democratic way, at least in the initial stages. It might be that a combination of these, at first sight, contentious conditions created a winning formula for TRIEC, at least in terms of engaging employers and impressing funders with fast results. It is possible that this approach is what allowed TRIEC to explore risky, innovative ideas, to think out of the box in terms of solutions, move quickly, focus on metrics and, ultimately, could be why TRIEC has been referred to by key informants as a highly action-oriented and successful group.

5.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FROM TRIEC

To conclude, this chapter identified four particular conditions where TRIEC stood out the most when compared with the other seven IECs. These included: (1) TRIEC’s transparency in sharing its financial information and program outcomes on an annual basis; (2) its Champions’ ability to publicly speak about immigrant skill under-utilization and promote TRIEC’s solutions; (3) the fact that TRIEC was hosted by the Maytree Foundation, which is a privately-owned foundation with a rather flexible governance structure, and which greatly supported TRIEC in its ‘risky’ endeavors. It allowed TRIEC to move fast without ‘trying to please or convince’ all stakeholders but effectively engage those who were ready to take actions165 and; (4) finally, TRIEC was the only Council which was able to bring together three levels of government ‘under one roof’. This study learnt that those were the conditions, which were not reported by any of other IECs that participated in this research166. However, it is important to note that all six identified factors and many sub-factors and indicators are interconnected and might have impacted each other directly or indirectly. For example, the top three Councils which scored highly on the ‘HSP’ factor were also the three top-ranking IECs on Strong Communication and PR Strategy factors, showing a similar pattern of activities and strategies found in TRIEC’s work. Thus, the study

165 From interview with key informants. 166 While other organization(s) reported about their funding and outcomes they did not do it on a regular basis.

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did not establish whether smart communication mechanisms, which intended to raise awareness on benefits in utilizing immigrant skills and promote the work of IECs and their strong communication capacities contributed to Councils becoming more ‘transparent’ in sharing its results or vice versa; i.e. IECs initially had strong accountability values, which prompted them to allocate extra resources and report to the public about the results by utilizing a number of communication tools. What is highly likely is that both explanations have merit. Additionally, the study revealed that two IECs that were administered by business organizations were found amongst the top three IECs on High Standard Practices, Strong Communication and Employer-led factors. Furthermore, the study showed that the majority of municipalities have existing capacities to support IECs, and that IECs were quite successful in utilizing local municipalities in their work. The latter were found to be highly supportive of IECs in most communities and in many cases greatly contributed to the establishment and development of IECs. Also, the results were inconclusive as to whether the maturity of IECs impacts their performances as two mature Councils showed rather high performance across the majority of factors when compared with those of TRIEC, as did one of the youngest IECs. Finally, it was confirmed that the majority of IECs that participated in the study adopted TRIEC’s philosophical approach in framing the problem of poor immigrant employment outcomes from a purely economic perspective. Their first customers are employers, whose requirements for Canadian experience are positioned as the chief employment barriers for immigrants and presented as obstacles for community economic prosperity. Thus, programs developed by IECs aim to assist employers to tap into the immigrant talent pool, to better understand the value of immigrant skills to their companies, and to help immigrants to expand their networks. There are other factors which most likely contributed to the success of TRIEC but were not included in the comparative analysis framework of this study and which are difficult to measure. For example, such factors as the passion and commitment of TRIEC’s leaders, their ability to build the trusting and personal relationships with stakeholders and the Maytree Foundation’s credibility with funders and NGOs might have greatly impacted the development of TRIEC and its perceived success. Additionally, the Maytree Foundation made a strong financial commitment to TRIEC when it provided funding in its initial stages, showing unprecedented support as a hosting organization. Furthermore, TRIEC received relatively high level of funding from the provincial and federal governments. While these conditions might have contributed to TRIEC’s success, and they were discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter 3 and 4), they were not included in the study comparative framework either because the study design did not allow it or because data was not publicly and/or easily accessible. Nevertheless, the findings from the comparative analysis between TRIEC and other IECs is a useful exercise for future researchers of multi-stakeholder groups, evaluators and funders as well as for the existing IECs. It illuminates and re-afirms the conditions which were identified by

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other scholars but also introduce a new success factor, such as High Standard Practices, and examine the municipal role in these multi-stakeholder groups. Finally, as the previous research has shown, there is no ‘silver bullet’ or a blueprint that fits all IECs and each collaborative solution should always be designed with a local context in mind. However, the study identified some important operational and strategic lessons as a result of comparing TRIEC with other IECs. These are the following:

• To increase their credibility with funders and other stakeholders, multi-stakeholder groups might focus more on establishing target outcomes, tracking their results and diligently sharing them with the general public. These accountability measures seem to be appreciated by funders and corporate sponsors who can relate to – and highly value – the metrics language. Additionally, when funding information is shared with the general public it creates a culture of transparency and generates trust from the stakeholders. Finally, as was suggested by TRIEC’s key informants, there is a need to match the scope of their projects to the scope of the issue in the communities these groups address. • To boost employer engagement, IECs might benefit from partnering with business organizations or even being hosted by them. While TRIEC was a Maytree-associated project, it benefited immensely from its linkages to the TCSA. Research has shown that other IECs/groups which had strong connections with business organizations were able to generate results comparable to those enjoyed by TRIEC. Additionally, IECs might take advantage of the specific strengths of their local economies and establish closer relationships with more pronounced business sectors in their communities (c.f. TRIEC, which managed to capitalize on the high presence of financial institutions in the GTA); • To maximize the impacts from advocacy efforts and awareness raising campaigns, IECs need to ensure that sufficient funding is allocated for their communication strategies. The research has shown that those IECs which did not have communication specialists on their staff rosters showed the lowest level of employer engagement; • To develop an ‘expert on immigration’ brand, multi-stakeholder groups might benefit from partnering with local scholars and/or developing internal research expertise to produce immigration briefs and policy papers. These reports might suggest both practical solutions and policy alternatives. They should not only be publically accessible, but should be widely used and promoted by IEC members in policy discussions and media interviews. Finally, they should be produced in a consistent and timely manner in order for the IEC to develop and maintain its position of expertise in the region; • To ensure a systemic approach in addressing immigrant economic hurdles, IECs need to balance a TRIEC-like ‘business case’ philosophy with a more holistic viewing of immigrant

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employment barriers. While a narrow focus on the problem might generate faster results, messaging and advocacy efforts should recognize the many barriers that immigrants face. IECs should champion and/or partner with other organizations to develop not only “soft measures” but introduce long-term, systems-level solutions to improve immigrant integration in the Canadian labour market.

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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

If our concepts are inadequate or inconsistent, we cannot hope to identify problems and formulate appropriate policy solutions.

- David Harvey, 1973. Social Justice and the City

The goal of this study is to identify critical success factors for TRIEC. In the last two chapters, study participants identified a number of conditions that they believed contributed to TRIEC’s success. These include TRIEC’s highly professional operational practices, its action-oriented approach, strong leadership model (which included business, community and municipal leaders), focus on employers, a unique contextual environment, and professional communication and PR strategies, which resulted in TRIEC’s ‘successful multi-stakeholder model’ branding. Additionally, as was mentioned in earlier chapters, the success of any IEC depends greatly on the personal characteristics of group leaders, their levels of energy, commitment and passion about relevant issues. When TRIEC’s specific activities for each factor were compared to those of other IECs, a number of unique actions and conditions have emerged. We learned that TRIEC was more transparent about its finances and outcomes than most of other Councils. We also leart that it was the only group whose leaders became fairly vocal public activists at the regional and national levels, i.e. wrote open letters to public officials. TRIEC was the only Council that managed to bring three levels of government into the Intergovernmental Relations Committee. As a result, for the first time in the Canadian history, the municipal governments in the Toronto CMA were provided with an opportunity to participate in the immigration dialogue as ‘equal’ partners. TRIEC was also the only organization which openly and consistently shared its results, activities and finances. Thus, this study suggests that TRIEC’s practices resemble those of a business or entrepreneurial non-profit organization that employs innovative, proactive and risk-taking strategies. Additionally, in TRIEC’s case, it was found that its management puts a lot of emphasis on developing the metrics for stakeholders, promoting its products (projects), and establishing solid relationships with the media. Additionally, TRIEC was the only collaboration that was hosted by a private foundation, which had been a strong advocate on the issue of immigrant poverty. Thus, it had a solid knowledge base, connections with the immigrant service provider community and with funders, but also, it had a relaxed (but perhaps slightly less

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transparent) governance structure167 that allowed TRIEC to by-pass bureaucratic decision making processes and permitted it to move quickly in taking on ‘risky and innovative’ projects. In comparison, other reviewed community collaborative groups had to take time to develop consensus between their stakeholders and work on establishing credibility with local players. Notably, they were administered by organizations with rather more structured and formal governance models. Additionally, the study found that TRIEC was one of two IECs created, partially, as a result of civic forum discussion. TRIEC was highly successful in taking full advantage of this connection to business elite and initiated an unprecedented employer engagement in its programs and in the governance of TRIEC once it became an independent organization in 2007. Shedding light on the role of municipalities in relation to immigrant economic integration issues, the research has shown that all the Canadian municipalities of reviewed communities were recognized by Immigrant Employment Councils for their capacity to initiate and support collaborative community efforts. In a nutshell, those are the major findings. If we assume that TRIEC represents a successful model worth replicating in other jurisdictions, then these findings have important implications at the policy level for funders, as well as for other IECs across Canada. Even taking into consideration TRIEC’s unique context,168 there are some valuable lessons for other IECs and government funders to learn from TRIEC’s experience.169 If we do not take for granted that TRIEC’s approach is highly effective in addressing a problem of immigrant economic inequalities, then it is worth discussing the perceived success of this organization one last time, given that my initial assumptions about its success guided my research process for years. As it turned out, while the success factors and indicators identified in this study provide a great opportunity for TRIEC and its funders, as well as other communities, to reflect on their activities and approaches in addressing immigrant employment challenges, my major discovery was the degree to which my assumptions influenced the focus and scope of the research. I presumed that TRIEC was successful when I initiated this inquiry and I believed that learning about its success factors would benefit many stakeholders, as it allows us to more accurately understand the reasons behind its success, and potentially replicate it and adapt its model to make it even more effective. However, when I started exploring TRIEC’s success and comparing its activities to those of other IECs, I realized that my subsidiary inquiry – what success looks like for an organization like TRIEC – is a much more important question to answer.

167 For more discussion on this finding, see Chapter 4, Business Case Messaging section, a Category A key informant’s quotes. 168 These include GTA’s size, economy structure, demography, TRIEC’s connection with the TCSA/CivicAction, and the roles of the Maytree Foundation and the City of Toronto. 169 Major lessons from TRIEC’s experiences are summarized in the Concluding section of Chapter Five.

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6.1 DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS

6.1.1 WHAT IS ‘SUCCESS’ FOR AN IEC?

What does success mean for a multi-stakeholder group like TRIEC? If we assume that TRIEC’s role is (1) to establish better coordination between three levels of governments and within the settlement sector; (2) work with stakeholders to develop programs that provide more opportunities to immigrants to access professional employment and (3) engage employers in program development and participation, then TRIEC proved quite successful in achieving these non-tangible objectives. However, we make assumptions about TRIEC’s success mostly based on anecdotal and short-term reported results, since no tangible targets or comprehensive, publicly-accessible evaluation of TRIEC’s efforts was conducted. According to Fowler (2002), the taskbook evaluation flow consists of four major pillars presented in Figure 6.1. As no tangible outcomes for each objective were established we could only assume the success of TRIEC in building better coordination or providing more opportunities based on reported success stories and selected outputs.

Figure 6.1 Evaluation Flow, Adapted from Fowler, 2002

IDENTIFICATION OF DIFFERENCE WHAT HAS CHANGED?

ATTRIBUTION WHAT CAUSED THE CHANGE?

JUDGEMENT WAS IT WHAT WAS INTENDED?

LEARNING AND ADJUSTMENT WHAT NEXT?

Source: Fowler (2002), adapted by permission.

Additonally, Fowler (2002) argues that a typical intervention evaluation model includes (1) a problem; (2) inputs; (3) processes; (4) outputs; (5) outcomes and (6) enduring change. The last three components are the results whereby the outputs measure the efforts, outcomes measure the effectiveness of efforts and enduring change measures the change. Evaluation of collective efforts to bring about social change is not as straightforward and requires a number of modifications in evaluation methods to reflect different types of change. However, if we follow the basic rules of evaluation, outlined by Fowler, we will learn that TRIEC is fairly good at reporting its outputs and short-term outcomes. Yet there are still questions about the effectiveness of TRIEC’s processes, the

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causual relationships between its interventions and reported results and, finally, the ultimate goal of TRIEC – systemic-level changes. These questions cannot be answered without exploring the definition of the problem and philosophy of operations TRIEC has adopted.

6.1.2 WHAT IS TRIEC’S PHILOSOPHY?

One of TRIEC’s success conditions identified by this study was its deliberate efforts in focusing on employers as its first and foremost important customer and promoting a ‘business case’ path of logic for companies to follow when deciding to hire immigrants, therefore, avoiding any reference to social justice reasoning in its communication, operational and philosophical strategies. This type of approach silences the racial discrimination issue, the same hurdle recognized by many key informants as one of the major systemic barriers that many immigrants face. This tactic allowed TRIEC to stay away from the pitfalls of public debate on such a controversial issue, focus mainly on solutions and actions while introducing the benefits of ‘hiring immigrants’ from pure business perspectives. Not surprisingly smart public relations moves, such as speaking employer-language, avoiding race card discussions, building cohesive collaborations (where only those who are invited and/or who are ready to act are involved), and focusing on fast results were much appreciated by the globally-oriented business elite of the GTA, who willingly ‘jumped on board’ to ‘tap into immigrant talent’. This kind of thinking also found great support and became quite popular with our ruling government, which strongly emphasizes economically driven immigration policies as opposed to a more balanced nation-building approach to immigration where refugees were not seen as invaders and sponsored family members as burdens to society. Observing the strategy that TRIEC followed, it appears to have adopted a similar practical motto of one of the U.S. Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt who once said: “Have you got a problem? Do what you can where you are with what you've got”. However, given the scope of the problem, can it be addressed within the system that created it? One of the most prominent human rights activists of our times and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Archbishop Desmond Tutu proclaimed, “We must not allow ourselves to become like the system we oppose”. As was illustrated in the previous chapters, several scholars and study participants argued that TRIEC failed to recognize the critical component of systemic immigrant barriers – racial discrimination. Did it happen by an accident of history that immigrants, particularly those who come from Asia, Africa and Latin America, are often unable to find jobs? And can we address this kind of issue by working in the same context and system that is perceived to have created the problem? These are valuable questions worth being explored.

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6.1.3 WHY DOESN’T TRIEC TALK ABOUT ‘RACE’?

Structural social inequality is deeply embedded in our modern society. Wallis and Kwok (2008: 17) argues that: “Systemic racism – the way institutional policies and society’s assumptions work, without explicit racial intent, to exclude racialized groups – is increasing in Canada. The official denial of its existence further absolves individuals’ and society’s accountability and responsibility to address this grave injustice experienced by Canadian citizens”. For a considerable time, discriminatory policies and practices towards visible minorities had been legitimized in Canada. This historical trend perpetuated the spread of stereotypical images of these different ethnic groups as well as “their social conditions [which] became inseparable in defining the meaning of race … [and] provided the ground for segregating people for different treatment” (ibid: 22). Thus, despite the adoption of employment equity/human rights legislation, as well as strong multicultural policies, both structural and systemic racismxv exist and thus race continues to affect labor market outcomes for visible minority Canadians. One of TRIEC’s objectives was to engage employers in developing solutions. Hence, the participants of this study acknowledged that TRIEC might not have been as successful in engaging the business community by pursuing social justice and/or moral reasoning. The study discovered that while TRIEC and many of its stakeholders are well aware of the problem, the organization deliberately focused on manifestations of the ‘race’ barrier, i.e. not to deal with it explicitly because it might scare away decision makers whom TRIEC was trying to influence. Thus, they adopted a ‘business case’ or ‘bottom line’ argument in working with employers to engage them in a positive way. This strategy was pursued in the hope that incremental changes in employees’ individual experiences will eventually result in modified hiring practices at the company level. The expected result would be that the system undergoes a structural transformation. Additionally, a number of study participants argued that TRIEC, as any other social change group, had to define the problem boundaries and work within its boundaries in developing particular interventions to generate change, i.e. within its focused mandate. Some systems scholars believe that defining system boundaries is the most vital step in the systems change process (Checkland,1981). However, TRIEC’s mandate defines the problem and the solution from a rather narrow perspective, i.e. the Toronto region is not fully capitalizing on immigrant skilled labour and employers should hire immigrants because it makes perfect business case.

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6.1.4 CAN DISCRIMINATION BE EXPLAINED BY EMPLOYER PRODUCTIVITY

CONCERNS ALONE?

Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011) differentiate the ‘productivity or statistical discrimination’ from the ‘taste-based model of discrimination’. The former arise when employers make assumptions about the capabilities of job applicants based on ‘observable characteristics’ of the group to which they belong. The latter is racism in its pure form, i.e. employers favor particular ethnic groups while potentially sacrificing greater productivity (Demuijnck, 2009). Scholars argue that hiring decisions might be influenced by previous negative experiences (Fryer and Jackson, 2007; Mullainathan, 2002), the lack of clear company policy on hiring internationally trained professionals and/or ‘right fit’ argument (Esses, Dietz, and Bhardwaj, 2006). TRIEC has been recognized for developing programs that offer opportunities for local workers to interact with skilled immigrants (mentoring, internships and networking). These new interactions could potentially moderate hiring biases based on previous negative experiences. Additionally, TRIEC developed a number of resources, such as its highly regarded free diversity workshops. These training sessions raise awareness about the benefits of hiring immigrants and educate hiring managers about the ‘best immigrant hiring practices’ in selected companies. However, hiring preferences could also be explained by deep-rooted yet unintended biases such as the ‘white supremacy concept’, which is believed to have arisen as a result of historical discriminatory practices (Wallis and Kwok, 2008) and/or our subtle unconscious associations, i.e. ‘white is good’ and ‘black is bad’ (Nosek et al., 2007). According to Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011: 44), “the statistical discrimination model predicts that adding information related to important characteristics not listed on the resume should reduce the degree of discrimination”. However, adding such variables to resumes170 did not seem to impact the callback rates for applicants with Chinese or South Asian names. Thus, while recruiters interviewed by Oreopoulos and Dechief identified expected communication issues as a major reason for a lower callback rate for applicants with non- English sounding names, the study concluded that “evidence, however, does not easily corroborate with the view that all the discrimination we observe is statistical, driven by language skill concerns” (ibid: 44, emphasis supplied). Therefore, there might have been other implicit, subconscious biases that triggered employers’ decisions.xvi As this thesis shows, TRIEC does not recognize these barriers – neither does it attend to them in their programs or awareness raising strategies. I do not deny the importance of the ‘bottom line’ argument for businesses or the difficulties for Canadian employers to evaluate foreign credentials (Reitz, 2001a), nor do I reject the notion that

170 Examples of variables: listing of accreditation, legal working status in Canada, Canadian references, Canadian graduate- level education, etc.

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non-racial factors such as job seekers motivation, efforts, and skill sets as well as “structural changes in the economy” (Pager and Shepherd, 2008) might impact immigrant and/or visible minority applicant employment outcomes. Yet I have my reservations about the ‘language issue’ argument that hiring managers tend to bring up as an explanation of their hiring preferences. I wonder how much of this explanation could be attributed to their concerns over labour productivity and to what extent their hiring decisions might be impacted by unconscious biases, which influence our decision-making processes without us being aware of them (Demuijnck, 2009). What if it is also an excuse for employers to avoid the ‘inconvenient truth’ about their internal stereotypes, or, as Wallis and Kwok elegantly put it (2008: 16): “There are circumstances where an explicitly racist discourse is modified in such a way that the explicitly racist content is eliminated, but other words carry the original meaning”. Finally, even if we assume that Canadian employers hire new employees based solely on productivity concerns, then why do the second and third generations of Canadian visible minorities still experience labour market discrimination and report lower earnings than their white Canadian-born counterparts? (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; 2002; 2011; Skuterud, 2010; Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002). If anything, children of ethnic immigrants should be at an advantage when competing for work in Canada since they do not face immigrant labour market barriers (FCR issue, ‘Canadian experience’, language, etc.), very often speak one or two ethnic languages and have been exposed to different cultures and ways of doing business though their ethnic roots. If Canadian-born visible minorities experience racial discrimination, can we still argue that employers’ main concern in hiring ethnic immigrants is productivity?

These findings resonate with conclusions that other scholars made when examining and/or evaluating the success of multi-stakeholder groups that aimed to address high-level social problems. For example, very often these groups were found to be focusing on the consequences of the problem or its easiest short-term fix as opposed to dealing with the fundamental roots of the issue (Hirsch et al., 2007; Kreger et al., 2007).

6.1.5 WHY IS THE ISSUE OF IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES DE-

POLITISIZED?

A number of critical questions arise in this regard. Can mega-big problems be handled by focusing merely on individual parts therein? Isn’t whole ‘systems thinking’ approach an antidote to reductionist ‘focusing’? If TRIEC recognizes that discrimination is a part of the whole problem, even if there are other dimensions such as language barriers, foreign credentials recognition, lack of

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sufficient settlement funding or adequate coordination in the immigrant integration sector, etc., how much change can be generated if the system’s structure that created these inequalities stays the same? Isn’t it TRIEC’s responsibility to recognize that the problem is much bigger than as it is currently formulated and presented to the employer community and the public? Moreover, should it not be stressing the point that racial discrimination is a part of the equation as much as the Canadian experience or lack of professional networks? What are the consequences of solely pursuing only a ‘business case’ type of strategy, which promotes hiring immigrants because it is beneficial for businesses, while disregarding other arguments and strategies? What TRIEC says to employers is as follows: “Immigrants reflect your customer base and they can help expand your business. They could help your company become more competitive in the global economy because of their multiple language abilities, international experience, knowledge of other culture, etc. It is just a good business practice plus common sense to hire them, since immigrants will account for 100% of net labour force growth by 2011”. However, what if Canada introduces incentives for nationals to raise more children? In less than two decades, there will be more Canadian-born workers and the labour force growth would not depend so much on immigration. What if the country goes into a long-term recession? Labour shortages fluctuate “with time, sector and geography” (Wrench, 2003: 9) and hiring is generally frozen in turbulent economic times and companies might not be expanding to the international markets or exploring new customer bases. Then, Wrench argues, following the same line of thought, it is not necessary for employers to consider immigrants in a downturn economy because they don’t benefit the business as much (2003)! By silencing the ‘race card’ discussions, as Wallice and Kwok observe, aren’t we compromising the fundamental principals of a democratic society and our human rights (2008)? Aren’t we dismissing immigrant access to employment and recognition as an economic and social right because employment provides us with the resources to feed our families and ourselves and because no human being should be discriminated against based on his/her race, accent, nationality, place of origin, etc.? At the same time, is it fair to expect TRIEC to be able to attend to all the problems that immigrants face in GTA’s labour market? There is a credential recognition issue for regulated professions. There is the language barrier problem. There is stringent union-protectionism in some of the highly-paid occupations. There is a lack of profession-specific bridging programs and so on. As can be see in Appendix X, TRIEC does not address all of these issues, or at least not directly. Why is it that other scholars and some of the key informants in this study were not as concerned about TRIEC’s silence and/or quiet advocacy role on these issues? Could it be because one could improve his/her language, pay for courses and gain experience through practicums and/or internships, but no

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one could change the colour of their skin or place of origin and that such issues need to be recognized and discussed openly with the employer community?

6.1.6 WHY IS IT DIFFICULT TO TALK ABOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION?

It is important to note that any researcher, policy maker or organization that aims to bring public attention to issues of racial discrimination will face an array of major problems. First, it is difficult to provide clear proof of outright labour market discrimination as the process of ‘empirically identifying’ this phenomenon is rather complex, both in terms of selecting the correct analytical methodologies and in finding accurate data sources (Skuterud, 2010: 862). Secondly, there are serious disagreements between scholars and practitioners with respect to the source of discrimination, i.e. whether it can be explained by productivity or taste-based theories of discrimination (Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002). Thirdly, it is impossible to treat Canadian visible minorities as a homogeneous group and therefore, different policy responses might be needed to accurately reflect the unique challenges faced by ethnic immigrants (Pendakur and Pendakur, 2011; Skuterud, 2010; Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002).xvii One might argue that Maytree Foundation, which is the host agency for TRIEC, has been working in the area of multiculturalism and anti-racism for many years. More recently, it co-founded the DiverseCity initiative, which advocates for diversity in the boardroom, the media, public offices and other leadership roles. However, when many wonderful projects of this initiative are reviewed, the same main massaging is promoted – ‘the business case for diversity in leadership’. This is a very similar argument that TRIEC pitches to employers – ‘ hiring immigrants is good for your business’. Similar to TRIEC, the “mandate” argument might be brought to attention. The mission of the DiverseCity initiative is to diversify Toronto’s leadership in order to ‘create a stronger and more prosperous society’ (DiverseCity website). It did not aim to raise awareness on systemic barriers that Canadian immigrants face in their day-to-day lives. In this initiative, Maytree attends to the systemic racial discrimination issue by focusing only on the positive contributions that ethnically-diverse leaders could make to the regional economy and, similar to TRIEC, it develops platforms that enable diverse leaders to be heard and consulted. An honorable goal, I thought, yet I was still challenged. One of my key informants asked: By putting people of colour in one room, does it make an equitable room? … Are people of colour more progressive or radical than anybody else? …by having [Barack] Obama as a President, has he suddenly made the United States a post-racial society? … It means something in terms of the larger scheme of emotional euphoria … but in terms of fundamentally

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restructuring relations of inequality in the United States between black and white populations? No!171

Thus, I am asking, will it make a difference – and by how much – if we have more people of color at the wheel of power? Probably, yes.172 But do we still need to “change the structures of what produces inequality in the first place?”xviii While there are other structural roots of immigrant underutilization, the problem of racial inequality, while seemingly acknowledged by all involved parties, does not appear to be on the radar of the most influential stakeholders in the region with the largest visible minority population in the country. Several participants in this study suggested that there is no single group or collaboration of TRIEC or Maytree’s magnitude in the GTA that is vocal on the subject of racial discrimination in the public domain and that conducts public educational campaigns on the subject. Owen and Lowe (2008) in a paper prepared for the UNESCO Expert Group Meeting on Migration and Education, among another eighteen recommendations, based on their review of promising practices of immigrant employment integration in Canada, put forward the following suggestion for Canada and other governments: Relevant stakeholders should engage in public education efforts to develop better understanding about the benefits and skills that immigrants bring, and about systems of education outside their own jurisdiction. These efforts should include initiatives to combat racism and discrimination. (2008:46)

Moreover, in 2006, another influential think-tank, the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development, “contributed to the current policy debate on the integration of immigrants” (OECD 2006: 3) by producing a report which among other recommendations urged Canadian government to “develop a consistent overarching policy framework which includes robust anti-discrimination legislation” (ibid: 92). Elizabeth McIsaac, at that time a representative of the Maytree Foundation and currently the Executive Director of TRIEC, was one of the contributors to this research. While the Canadian government, as well as provincial and municipal agencies, makes commendable efforts to educate the public and the employer community about the issue of racial inequality, such efforts are not sufficient. Recent immigrants continue to experience consequences of racial discrimination, such as poor employment and income outcomes. What is becoming increasingly concerning is the way that the Canadian government supports and gradually transfers the responsibility of governing immigration, and to certain extent, multiculturalism issues, to local

171 Due to the sensitive nature of this comment, the key informant is left anonymous. 172 For more discussion on exclusion of the visible minorities from the political and other decision-making processes in the GTA, see Haq (2009).

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groups whereby the promotion of employment equity is substituted by the ‘business case’ for hiring immigrants’ campaigns. Some of these groups, which are composed of elite business and civic leaders (like CivicAction), promote their profit-driven interests under the ‘regional prosperity mandate’ while claiming to represent a ‘citizens voice’ (Allahwala, 2011). The others are emerging coalitions of community groups, such as Local Immigration Partnerships, which have a very broad mandate but limited capacities and are dependent on funding by governments, which can often dictate economic priorities (Pero, 2011). It is bothersome to learn that TRIEC is not only getting involvement from employers because of a “narrow focus on employment, competitiveness and prosperity” but that it is enjoying strong support from current policy makers and politicians for the same reason: “ … the Harper government loves us! … He is putting the economic lens on the multiculturalism file…” (TRIEC’s key decision maker, quoted in Allahwala, 2011: 174). Reflecting on my enthusiasm in studying TRIEC, I recollect how impressed I was by its proclamation from the outset – ‘we are not going to talk about the problems, we are all about solutions’. And while I am still very fond of their action-oriented approach, I now see not only the benefits, but also the drawbacks of a ‘jumping-into-action-strategy-that-yields-the-fastest-results’. This is probably an appropriate operational move in the first years of any collaborative social change group working with employers and the general public “for a process to shift the discourse over time in order to reach a point where we can name race” (Maytree, 2002); but as the organization matures, a more solid foundation for systemic-level actions should be introduced.

6.1.7 IS THERE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE?

Maytree’s mandate is to reduce poverty in the GTA. Thus, when TRIEC was championed and hosted by this Foundation, TRIEC’s objective to improve immigrant labour market outcomes was tightly connected with Maytree’s vision – lifting immigrants out of poverty. I am asking myself how TRIEC has evolved after eight years of work, whereby, based on my research, the lion’s portion of its budget was allocated to Raising Awareness Campaigns, i.e. published ads, TV ads, and other projects celebrating the achievements of individual employers and encouraging businesses to take advantage of immigrant talents ‘as it makes business sense’. Have immigrant employment situations in the GTA improved because of these actions? If so, by how much? How did TRIEC contribute to this change? Has immigrant poverty decreased in the area? We do not know the answers to these important questions as no comprehensive and publicly-available evaluation was conducted of the work of TRIEC and no baseline or clear outcomes were established.xix Moreover, even funders

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admitted to having difficulties in answering this question: “How do we know TRIEC is successful?” Most of them suggested that they rely on reported numbers of immigrants being matched and/or employed after they participated in programs. However, it was recognized that no data is available to illustrate significant system-level changes in the GTA area. Once again, this finding is in line with conclusions made by scholars who studied multi-stakeholder collaborations in other communities and who also had difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder groups (Allen et al., 2008; Berkowitz, 2001; Tseng et al. 2011; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). Maybe it is time for federal and provincial governments, which showed strong interest in the MSC concept, as well as for Immigrant Employment Councils, to start entertaining ideas of developing and introducing systemic evaluations of the work of these groups as their collective impacts (Kania and Kramer, 2011) as opposed to relying on project-based reporting evidence. Given the scope, increasing popularity and government support of collaborative groups in the area of immigrant integration, it is evident that more research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of this type of collaborative effort in bringing about societal-level change. Following the same thought, how do we know that spending close to 15 million dollars that TRIEC received over eight years was the best systems change-related investment that could have been made by our government? What kind of alternative interventions could have been introduced to change the system and improve immigrant employment outcomes? Finally, have the public attitudes towards immigrants improved in the GTA? According to TRIEC’s key informant, attitudes did not change. TRIEC conducted a public opinion survey in 2003-2004, which showed that 25% of the GTA population did not support immigration, 25% felt that ‘we needed to do immigration way better’ and 50% thought ‘it was just right’. S/he explains:

So for us, it’s really about affecting that 50% in the middle to move them to yet a more positive or a greater awareness for the challenges so that we can make better us. That 25 % of people who don’t like it, probably are never going to like it. That’s heavy lifting, that’s not what we’re going to work on. We’re going to work on that 50% middle to get them more activated. Changing that is hard, I mean there’s five million people in the GTA. … We did a follow up this spring. And we found not a lot of change. But I also think it would be fairly naive to think that the work that we’ve done with the budgets that we’ve had, also on the cusp of recession. I think, that it would be naive to think that we had caused a movement in that attitude. Perhaps, and it’s hard to do this type of analysis, but perhaps all the work that we’ve been doing has resulted in the fact that it didn’t go down during the recession. That we didn’t get a negative backlash. Maybe that’s the success. I mean it’s hard to analyze because we are a drop in the bucket of media impact.173

173 Due to the sensitive nature of these comments, the key respondent is left anonymous.

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However, is it enough to focus solely on those who are neutral or supportive of your ideas? Will this approach change the system? In October 2010, residents of the City of Toronto elected a new mayor, Rob Ford, a former city Councillor. Earlier, on August 17, 2010, in a televised CP24 mayoral debate, Rob Ford, then a mayor candidate said of Toronto:

… [we] can’t even deal with the 2.5 million people in this city. I think it is more important to take care of people now before we start bringing in more people. There’s going to be a million more people, according to the official plan (which I did not support) over the next ten years coming into the city. We can’t even deal with the 2.5 million people. How are we going to welcome another million people in? It is going to be chaotic. We can’t even deal with the chaos we have now. I think we have to say enough’s enough (National Post, August 18, 2010).

At another debate Mr. Ford suggested that thousands of people in Toronto are on waiting lists for housing and family doctors and the city should first eliminate these backlogs before accepting more immigrants (The Globe and Mail, September 21, 2010). Furthermore, a September poll conducted by Nanos for the Globe, CTV and CP24 reported that almost half of Ford’s supporters did not believe that “Toronto would benefit from welcoming more new Canadians to the city”. However, an astonishing 32% of all Torontonians who participated in the poll did not see how Toronto would benefit from immigration and 45.8% would vote for Ford (ibid). Thus, a candidate with a ‘no-more- immigration-to-Toronto’ political platform not only became a front-runner for the highest office in the most diverse city in the world, but was elected as a mayor. But even more surprisingly, he was supported by a large portion of Toronto’s residents, including immigrant voters174. This fact does not seem to support TRIEC’s claim that the attitudes towards immigrants did not change (or did not become more negative) in the late 2000s as pro-immigration mayor David Miller was elected in 2003 and re-elected in 2006, while an anti-immigration politician came to power in 2010. Lastly, as we all know, the TRIEC model promotes a local approach to the problem of immigrant integration. However, initially, when in 2002 Ratna Omidvar and Naomi Alboim produced their blueprint paper “Fulfilling the Promise,” and conducted consultations with stakeholders across the country, they entertained the idea of country-wide collaborative efforts and a national level Council. After the consultations, the idea was dropped, ‘the locally based’ private- public collaborative approach was adopted, and with the help of the TCSA/CivicAction, TRIEC was born. Very soon, the multi-stakeholder group was proclaimed as a successful collaboration and the

174 The fact that the new anti-immigration Mayor received support from immigrant voters echoes the point made earlier by my key informant about immigrants and/or visible minority groups being neither more radical nor more progressive than other groups.

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local approach was recognized as being worthy of replication without any independent evaluation suggesting so. Furthermore, TRIEC and Maytree received another boost and further recognition after ALLIES was launched. This project features TRIEC as ‘a successful model’ and administers and allocates funding, provided by the Canadian government and other funders, to many communities across the country to establish ‘local multi-stakeholder groups’, and promotes TRIEC’s philosophy in engaging employers. As Allahwala (2011: 170) asserts: “what has become known as the ‘TRIEC model’, largely due to the concerted policy activism of the Maytree Foundation, [which] has become a catalyst for the replication of similar initiatives elsewhere”. Thus, the same existence of ALLIES is another seal of approval by the government that TRIEC is a success model and this experiment quickly turned into the innovative model to be imitated by other cities without the existence of significant proof that it was effective in addressing systemic problems.

6.1.8 HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE AFFECT OUR ACTIONS AND EXPECTED

RESULTS?

As I mentioned earlier, when I started this research several years ago, I had a very strong assumption that TRIEC was a successful model, and that it makes significant improvements in the systemic issue of immigrant economic integration. I remain quite impressed by the results that TRIEC has achieved and reported, i.e. the scope of its programs, the level of engagement it was able to generate from various stakeholders and its ability to promote the collaborative approach to other communities. However I am hesitant to laud it as being a total success story because I am unsure how the incremental steps that TRIEC takes are affecting the system and, moreover, how the language that TRIEC uses is contributing to systemic change. Based on the definition of systems change that was adapted for this thesis, “systems change is change efforts that strive to shift the underlying infrastructure within a community or targeted context to support a desired outcome, including shifting existing policies and practices, resource allocations, relational structures, community norms and values, and skills and attitudes.” (Foster-Fishman and Behrens, 2007: 191). Language is one of the most powerful tools that human beings were able to develop. It shows our way of thinking. Thus, when we communicate things, we share with the world how we see things, who we support and what we believe in. It has a powerful effect on those around us and defines who we are. Norms, values and attitudes are communicated through the language we use. According to community members who were brought together by the Maytree Foundation in 2002 to brainstorm the development of Funder’s Network on Race and Poverty, avoiding references

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to race “was interpreted by some as de-politicizing the issue. The issue of language was understood as key in terms of affecting the way we think” (Maytree, 2002:4). Academic research has shown that, depending on how a collaborative group defines the scope of the problem, that definition will affect the boundaries of the group’s operations and, consequently, the definition of success as well as the direction of its interventions. Figure 6.2 illustrates the path of logic adopted by Maytree and TRIEC to encourage employers to hire immigrants. While the scope of the problem, TRIEC’s vision and TRIEC’s intervention are logically connected and described in the same business language, the following questions come to mind: how might the reference to hiring immigrants being ‘risky’ change employers’ attitudes towards immigrant qualifications? Why should we expect employers to go outside Career Bridge program to hire immigrants if it is more ‘cost-effective’ for them to do otherwise? What kind of systemic change we could anticipate as a result of this kind of language?

Figure 6.2 Linking Language and Interventions

SCOPE OF THE “Toronto is not fully capitalizing on this multicultural and highly skilled PROBLEM labour advantage.” The TSCA, 2003: 20.

BOUNDARIES OF Business case for promoting immigrants. OPERATIONS

DEFINITION TRIEC’s Vision: “A Greater Toronto Region that prospers by fully OF SUCCESS engaging the contributions of skilled immigrants.” TRIEC’s Annual Reports, various years.

DIRECTION OF Description of Career Bridge, an internship program for immigrants: INTERVENTIONS “The program is a low-risk, cost-effective way for Canadian organizations to tap into the skilled immigrant talent pool.” TRIEC, 2004 :5.

So far, even taking into consideration all the excellent programs and improved employment outcomes of thousands of immigrants who benefited from participating in TRIEC’s programs, the language that this organization is using feeds the system that created the inequality in the first place. It perpetuates the problem that Canadian society is facing – we have more people who do not want to talk about the racism and discrimination and refuse to recognize how it affects new immigrants, permanent residents, and citizens alike.xx

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6.1.9 WHY AREN’T POLICIES OF THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR

BRINGING SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGE?

One might argue that actions speak louder than words. While TRIEC’s activities were frequently referred to as ‘risky and innovative’ by its many stakeholders, including funders and sponsors and it became well-known for its ‘revolutionary’ approach in engaging employer community, this study illustrates that TRIEC took more of an evolutionary approach to tackling immigrant employment challenges and attempted to work within the system that created these problems. Immigrants will always face difficulties in integrating into the mainstream of host countries because of differences in language, culture, educational systems, economies, etc. However, we must ensure that the fundamental human rights of Canadian immigrants are not jeopardized and the racial discrimination issue, which manifests in poor immigrant employment outcomes, is not addressed solely from the diversity management perspective. If in the early stages of TRIEC’s existence, the focus on promoting the business case rationale for hiring immigrants was ‘a deliberate move’ to engage employers, now might be a good time, eight years later, for this organization to re-examine its mandate and re-evaluate its development and priorities, i.e. moving from focusing on “commonalities” to identifying and recognizing existing “differences” (Maytree, 2002: 4) which persist in spite of all the efforts of finding our common ground. Advancing favourable and popular policies will always attract more significant funding and higher-profile recognition, as illustrated by TRIEC’s story. However, what is popular might not be in the interests of the less powerful and marginalized members of society – presumably the demographic it is Maytree’s mandate to represent. Policies of the lowest common denominator very rarely bring systemic social change, such as changing public opinions or opening up discussions about the reasons why immigrants face discrimination. Furthermore, by adopting a holistic approach to the issue and treating and recognizing all the parts of the problem as existing and interconnected, TRIEC will be able to not only attend to the ‘race card,’ but recognize that more work should be done with other various stakeholders (e.g., unions, governments, post- secondary institutions, professional regulatory bodies, etc.) and that the systems change won’t happen if most of the work is focused only on one dimension (i.e., the business case) and one major stakeholder (i.e., employers). Moreover, access to employment is important to consider, but not as the only indicator of immigrant labour market outcomes in Canada. Using a job quality framework and employment characteristics such as work schedules, job permanency, non-wage benefits, union coverage etc., provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of the inequalities that immigrants might

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experience in the labour market and how they will affect their social and economic wellbeing. In 2010, there were over 4.6 million unionized workers, which translates as a 30.8% unionization rate (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2010). Unionized jobs are generally more secure and provide higher earnings than those in non-unionized environments (Statistics Canada, 2007). However, immigrants have much lower (1.3-1.5 times) union coverage than Canadian nationals, even when the period of landing is taken into consideration. The same is true for almost all or many other job quality dimensions. More immigrants than Canadian-born workers earn less than $10 per hour and work longer hours; fewer immigrant workers have access to pension plans, life insurance coverage and flexible work arrangements (Statistics Canada, 2009). For many years, TRIEC focused its efforts on improving employment outcomes for immigrants in non-regulated professions. One might argue that there are only 15% of immigrants that come to Canada under the regulated professions. However, this group of immigrants is having the most difficult time in finding employment in their trained-for occupations (Slade, 2008). Moreover, as a general rule, regulated professions are some of the highest paid and the most prestigious jobs in the country. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Fair Access Act in Ontario, while being recognized for its contribution in making licensing process fairer for immigrant applicants, has many limitations in its attempt to significantly improve immigrant access to and/or practice regulated professions. We should ask ourselves: why did the Occupation and Licensing Bridge Working Group become the only one out of six working groups organized by TRIEC in 2003-2004 which did not develop any practical solutions or a workplan for TRIEC? Why are we not helping to create ‘prosperous regions’ by putting more efforts in improving immigrant access to highly-paid prestigious and secure jobs in the country? It turns into a particularly contested question, given that visible minority skilled immigrants are less likely to secure employment in regulated professions than either the Canadian-born or other immigrants (Girard, 2010). During my research, I came to understand that to initiate change in public attitudes, employers should have not only more interactions with skilled immigrants to appreciate the international skill value such people can bring to their companies, but they should also be engaged in more open discussions about their personal and inter-personal reasons for not hiring immigrants. While these frank conversations might not be easy to initiate or justify with employers, these are necessary steps to recognize that racial discrimination is a part of the problem. Also, it needs to be acknowledged that Canadian multicultural and employment equity policies in their current forms, as much as they are praised by the international community, have not proved to be successful in eliminating discriminatory workplace practices in Canada. Legislation with ‘more teeth’ needs to be

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introduced to combat inequality. I echo Pendakur, who suggested that the ‘cultural-diversity-critical- mass’ argument does not seem to be working in Canada, as visible minority immigrants and their children still earn less than the Canadian-born, Caucasian population with a comparable level of education. Pendakur, a Professor of Economics, agreed that government will have to intervene and “employment equity laws to the private sector might be necessary” (Friesen, 2011). I agree with sociology professor, Stasiulis (2011: 15), who declared that: “TRIEC and the other employment partnerships need to be supplemented by strong legislated anti-racist and employment equity programs in the workplace if they are to have a broader impact”. As was illustrated earlier, while the racial discrimination issue was listed as only one of the nine most frequently cited causes of immigrant employment challenges, this hurdle becomes a very serious problem in Canada, given the demographic make-up of recent immigrants and, particularly, of Toronto’s immigrants. It is especially bothersome to learn that the children of visible minority immigrants continue to face discrimination and earn less regardless of the merit of their post-secondary education, which is typically comparable to that of white Canadians. When an organization such as TRIEC claims to address systemic issues it should recognize that the problem immigrants face in the Canadian labor market is bigger than just a lack of networks. People tend to discriminate by their nature – this is how we make choices in what we like and dislike. However, when it comes to accessing employment, our likes and dislikes are in conflict with basic human rights. Thus, promoting the business case for hiring immigrants is not necessarily the only reason for hiring immigrants, neither is it the most important one for the ‘prosperity’ of our society. In other words, in addition to promoting the business case argument, we should also recognize other reasons and only then can we claim to be looking at the problem from a systemic point of view. My research has showed that most of the IECs (and TRIEC) treat employers as their 'first customers'175. One might find it quite worrisome, as the objectives of these organizations are to improve immigrant employment outcomes, and funding is allocated for this purpose. Yet their programs are tailored for employers in such a way that companies feel it is 'safe to participate'. I concur with Allahwala who pointed out that the “focus of business-led immigrant integration strategies is on “soft” measures, mostly workplace socialization such as mentoring and internship programs, and as such, it is based on the weakest kind of reform” (Allahwala, 2011: 174, emphasis supplied). This statement is confirmed by an empirical study that examined the outcomes of a variety of diversity programs (Kalev, Kelly and Dobbin, 2006). Thus, the introduction of “soft” measures

175 For TRIEC, information was retrieved from personal interviews with TRIEC key informants; for IECs it was retrieved from questionnaires.

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such as diversity training and “other programs that target managerial stereotyping through education and feedback” (ibid: 590), proved to be the least effective way of increasing the proportion of women and visible minorities in employment, while mentoring and networking programs showed only a moderate effect176. The focus of these interventions is on changing individuals as opposed to modifying the organizational structure. Changing this structure by assigning “organizational responsibility for change” (ibid: 611) yielded the best results in addressing workforce inequalities. The ‘soft’ measures, tailored to the needs of corporations, are understandable if they are introduced as an initial strategic move to bring employers on board. However, they are not justifiable if an organization claims ‘to change the system’. Neither is a guiding philosophy, which narrowly defines the immigrant employment problem. As was illustrated, such approaches are being adopted by many other groups across Canada as ‘the best practice model’, despite their limited ability to bring about systemic-level structural change (i.e. changes in public attitude, regional immigrant employment situations, foreign credential recognition processes, etc.).

6.2 CONCLUSION

While I did not find strong evidence that TRIEC’s strategy was a ‘total success story’ in significantly improving immigrant labour market outcomes in the GTA, I have to acknowledge that there is, probably, no one single approach that will generate system-level change, i.e. it is “not at all the panacea” to societal problems (Siegel, 2010: 7). It is a combination of pull (local, incremental solutions, similar to those of TRIEC) and push (adequate employment equity legislation, funding, immigration policies, settlement infrastructure, etc.) methods that most likely generate true societal changes. However, while achieving something is better than achieving nothing, seemingly the motto adopted by TRIEC and other groups, I believe that IECs should embrace a more holistic view with regards to the issue of immigrant employment. They should be more transparent about their results and long-term goals and introduce a more robust evaluation methods to showcase not only the effectiveness of their interventions but track the way their programs address the societal problem of immigrant underutilization at the systemic level.177 As illustrated in Appendix X, TRIEC founders initially took a much more solid approach in identifying core barriers in immigrant employment integration, where balanced, if not equal, roles were recognized for ten stakeholder groups in the process, although the economic reasoning was still

176 In fact, networking and mentoring programs showed the negative coefficient for black men. 177 For examples of tangible outcomes and mid/long-term targets of collaborative efforts , see Strive Partnership website.

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prevalent. By re-visiting the alma mater and historic document of TRIEC, “Fulfilling the Promise”, a paper written by Ratna Omidvar and Naomi Alboim in 2002, I hope, this very powerful organization will be able to acknowledge that while ‘low-hanging-fruits’, ‘fast results’ and ‘support from the powerful leaders’ brought some important but still incremental changes, the commitment to unpopular but value-based language and active engagement in a long-term processes, such as working with regulatory bodies, unions, post-secondary institutions and governments is as important as working with employers in changing the structure of the system that created inequality.xxi Our society is a system of interlocked parts whereby “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, was a famous declaration made by Dr. Marin Luther King, Jr. and re-quoted by Ratna Omidvar in her recent speech in Europe (The Maytree Foundation website). Thus, we need to recognize that the lowest common denominator policies, regardless of the level of support and consensus generated, might not shift status quo thinking. While it is unreasonable to expect that one organization will be able to ‘cure injustice’ and redress all the ills of racism, TRIEC and Maytree are in a very strong position to raise the profile of this problem and support other organizations and stakeholders in addressing this societal issue. To conclude, TRIEC and the Maytree Foundation’s success with employer and government engagement is unprecedented and unquestionable. I also commend them on their promising new endeavors, such as their work with immigrant professional groups, and their decision to reach out to small businesses. Recently, Ratna Omidvar wrote a powerful article published in the Globe and Mail (March 9, 2012) criticizing our prevailing government and recent changes in immigration polices which seem to favour ‘efficiency’ and ‘exploitation’ over ‘human rights and ‘fairness’. Omidvar invited all Canadians to commence an open discussion about these changes and their consequences to our country. I want to believe that we now see the beginning of TRIEC and Maytree becoming truly vocal about the real challenges that Canada faces when cost-efficiency and cheap labour for businesses are associated with the prosperity for our country. It is my hope that some day these outstanding organizations and their influential leaders will take their work of addressing the economic exclusion of racial minorities and immigrants to another level.

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Endnotes i A number of academic journals have published special feature issues on collaborations and systems change efforts. To name a few, The Nonprofit Quarterly, Fall 2001 special issue is focused on how to build strategic collaborative relationships. The Journal of Urban Health, March 2003 issue, features a collection of articles on community partnerships and multi-sectoral interventions. Finally, in 2007, the American Journal for Community Psychology published a special issue featuring conceptual and empirical articles on systems change efforts and effective collaborations. ii According to Hirsch et al. “a system is a functional whole, composed of a set of components, coupled together to function in a way that might not be apparent from the functioning of the separate component parts” (Hirsch, Levine and Miller. 2007:239). In general terms, a system is a group of mutually dependent elements forming a complex whole. The term ‘system’ could be applied to explain many phenomena. Thus, a family, a school, a labour market, a region, a country or a globe could all be defined as systems. iii Hirsch et al. (2007) emphasizes the importance of looking at the origin of a problem: “systems change deals with changing the root causes of a problem…systems change occurs when there are substantial changes in the structural, relational and institutional makeup of a system or its subsystems” (Hirsch, Levine, and Miller, 2007: 240). Other authors stress the importance of the changing status quo: “system change is an intentional process designed to alter the status quo by shifting and realigning the form and function of a targeted system” (Foster- Fishman, Nowell, Yang, 2007a: 197). Thus, systems change occurs only when the real causes of a problem are attended to and no one convenient solution, even if it addresses the most obvious part of the problem and/or was identified by multiple players as a ‘potential common ground resolution’, is able to make a significant shift in a system. In sum, the politics of the lowest common denominator rarely address any systemic challenges. iv Out of the ten most cited factors identified through this research, at least five (1, 2, 3, 9, and 10) are present in larger systemic studies of collaboration success factors by Mattessich and Monsey (1992), Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) and Zakocs and Edwards (2006). v The framework was developed based on answers from all key informants except for funders. As was mentioned before, it took much longer to contact and interview TRIEC’s funders and sponsors. Thus, their answers were coded and added to the success factor comparative framework after the questionnaire was developed. However, it was revealed that the content of funder responses did not differ from those of other categories; thus, no new success factor group was identified. However, the importance of factor groups, which was based on a number of similar answers from different groups, did change. Two major changes that were introduced to the comparative analysis framework are: (1) the ‘Unique Location’ factor moved from # 4 to #6 as no funders mentioned TRIEC’s location as being relevant; (2) “High Standard Practices” became the #1 success factor as many category E respondents referred to TRIEC’s professionalism, including its reporting mechanisms to the public, its clear objectives, its different approach in working with employers and funders, etc. Lastly, no changes were introduced to the questionnaire as no new factor groups were proposed and funder responses were aligned with the previously developed comparative analytical framework. vi On April 12, 2012, the Government of Canada announced that it “is resuming the management of federally funded settlement programs in British Columbia and Manitoba, bringing these programs in line with every other province and territory outside Quebec. … [to ensure] a more consistent level of services regardless of where they choose to settle in Canada (CIC, 2012. Online text). vii Ontario was the last province where the PNP was introduced. Additionally, an annual cap of 1,000 principal applicants represents a small share of the total annual volume of immigrants settling in Ontario (The Government of Ontario, 2010).

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viii Several underlying High Standard Practices indicators emerged based on the analysis of interview transcripts. According to key informants, TRIEC became successful because it had clear goals and directions, built smart and inclusive partnerships with key stakeholders, showed a high level of professionalism in managing the relationships and in program delivery, consistently reported to the public about its results and finances, and shared its knowledge, thereby creating for itself a trusted name as an expert-organization in the community. ix Three major sub-factors emerged in the analysis of Action-oriented Approach success factor responses. TRIEC, had an action-oriented philosophy, it developed and successfully implemented not one, but a number of programs, each attempting to address a different niche of the problem, and it was able to scale up existing and new programs in a rather short period of time. Finally, it reported program results to the public, partners and funders in the first two years of its existence on a number of occasions. x TRIEC generated very strong support from a variety of stakeholders in the area of immigrant integration. Three major leadership pillars were identified by study participants: TRIEC’s ability to involve prominent business and civic leaders, Maytree’s exceptional leadership as well as the City of Toronto support of TRIEC’s projects. Finally, according to key informants, the most sought after qualities of any IEC champions are their high positions within their organization, their ability to take actions and be skilled spokespersons for an IEC. xi There were many attempts in the past by the non-profit sector to bridge the gap between employer needs and immigrant labour force. TRIEC was the first group which managed to generate broad employer engagement on the issue by focusing on employer needs. It did so by ensuring that employers were actively engaged in crafting solutions and taking ownership of them, i.e. participating and championing the programs. Additionally, TRIEC ensured that corporations were well-recognized for their efforts xii While some key informants questioned the amount of efforts and funding TRIEC spent on public awareness campaigns, and regardless of communication strategy mistakes that TRIEC made in the early days, the majority of informants felt that TRIEC was very successful in raising awareness on the issue and that it efficiently used a variety of communication tools to advance its objectives. Two major themes emerged as indicators of TRIEC’s success: TRIEC’s communication capacity (specialized staff, consistency of communication etc.) and public awareness strategy (multiple ways to promote, established media relationships etc). xiii After systemic investigation of all responses in the Unique Location factor, a number of major themes have emerged, including Toronto’s demographics, political, legislative and civic movement situations. Additionally, the success was attributed to Toronto’s unique economy which enabled TRIEC to gain access to larger corporations as their HQs were located in the GTA. Finally, key informants elaborated on the unique supportive position of the City of Toronto which had a long history of immigration and multicultural policies. xiv The study included two major phases whereby the first phase aimed to identify major success factor categories based on common themes found in key stakeholder interviews. Then, critical success factors/indicators were discovered by comparing activities and approaches (indicators) between other IECs and TRIEC. The second phase was done through structured interviews with representatives of IECs across Canada. The study’s second phase was guided by the following principle: (1) The structured interviews were introduced to obtain the data which could be analyzed using simple quantitative methods. Structured interview questions were mostly the polar questions which required yes/no or true/false answers in order to determine if certain activities/approaches were taken (equals ‘1’) or not (equals ‘0’). This strategy precludes perception calls by interviewees and benefits from the answers based on facts that could be verified; (2) Additionally, only one representative from each IEC was interviewed; (3) Moreover, all indicator data with respect to TRIEC was retrieved from preliminary interviews and no follow up interviews with TRIEC stakeholders were required, given the proposed design of the study. However, further investigation and comparative analysis of ‘building relationship’ processes between TRIEC stakeholders and among those involved in other IECs would have required collecting data in additional open-ended interviews. Secondly, the data won’t be validated if only one representative per IEC provides his/her perceptions about the processes of building trust and relationships. Thus, a further investigation and interviewing of TRIEC stakeholders would have been required to identify

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TRIEC’s internal trust and relationship-building processes for comparative analysis. This type of research design is out of the scope of this study; thus, no separate sub-factor/indicator was developed for this category. xv Frances Henry differentiated between institutional and systemic racism: “Institutional racism is manifested in the policies, and procedures of various institutions, which may, directly or indirectly, consciously or unwittingly, promote, sustain, or entrench differential advantage or privilege for people of certain races. … Systemic racism, although similar to institutional racism, refers more broadly to the laws, rules, and norms woven into the social system that result in an unequal distribution of economic, political, and social resources and rewards among various racial groups. It is the denial of access, participation, and equity to racial minorities for services such as education, employment, housing” (1995: 48 quoted in Wallis and Kwok, 2008: 17). xvi Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011) found that applicants with Greek names received similar callback rates to those with Chinese names. While the study findings are inconclusive with respect to the role of race in dictating Canadian employer hiring practices, it clearly illustrated that job seekers with English-sounding names were considered significantly more attractive as applicants by their prospective employers. xvii Canadian ethnic immigrants experience different labour market disadvantages. For example, women from visible minorities tend to have better labour market outcomes than male immigrants (Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002); visible minority immigrants who came to Canada when they were older tend to have the highest income disparities (ibid); black immigrants, their children and even their grandchildren have the worst labour market outcomes when compared with the Canadian-born white population, etc. (Skuterud, 2010). The same ethnic groups have different experiences in different Canadian communities. For instance, people of South Asia and Chinese descent were found to be better off in Vancouver but the worst off in Montreal (Pendakur and Pendakur, 2011); the Chinese were reported to be less discriminated against in Vancouver than in Toronto (Oreopoulos and Dechief, 2011); and Canadian-born visible minorities in Ontario were found to have higher earning disparities than those of Western Canada (Pendakur and Pendakur, 2011). xviii Haq (2008) argues that while visible minorities compose more than 42% of the GTA’s population, they are under-represented in the political arena and in positions of power, in general. DiverseCity is a partnership between the Maytree Foundation and CivicAction (formerly TCSA), which aims to address this gap. xix So far, TRIEC has not established any mid/long terms outcomes and/or targets that might help to assess the success of this MSC at the systemic level. Unlike TRIEC, the US-based Strive Partnership managed to establish and report on tangible short-mid-long term outcomes showcasing the collective impact efforts, i.e. “By September 2011, 70% of children will enter kindergarten prepraed, as measure by the DIAL-3; … By May 21, 2013, increase the number of mentors to meet the needs of youth who need and/or want a moentor; … By December 31, 2015, increase the academic success of students served by 8%” (Strive Partnership website). xx In their 2011 study, Oreopoulos and Dechief found that recruiters did not want to discuss their or other HR managers’ hiring decisions which favored certain names: “Of note was the dearth of respondents to the email questionnaires; few people were interested in discussing their experiences of making selections from resumes for interviews, including the significance of names in hiring practices. Of the many managers and recruiters who were contacted, few were willing to discuss the potential reasons for the study’s quantitative findings, either in person, or via email. This is the case even though participants were guaranteed anonymity” (ibid: 34). xxii A good example of systemic change in the area of foreign credentials can be illustrated through the work of the Association of International Medical Doctors of BC (AIMD BC). As a result of their advocacy and collaborative efforts with hospitals, post-secondary institutions, regulatory bodies and government, a training project for IMGs was introduced by the provincial government in 2005 and has been run out of St. Paul Hospital for the last seven years. More importantly, because of the political pressure that AIMD BC was able to generate, by 2005, the government had tripled the number of IMG residency positions (from 6 to 18). While these steps did not solve the problem of hundreds of IMGs seeking residency positions in BC, these developments were seen as signs of systemic change in the process of accreditation because all parties that had to be at the table were involved and committed to instigating change.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Developmental Stages and Structures of Collaborations

Four chronological developmental stages of multi-stakeholder collaborations were identified. In general, MSCs go through “formation, implementation, maintenance, and accomplishing goals or outcomes” stages (Kreuter et al., 2000: 52). Even before the formation stage, key players might conduct a needs assessment, identify a host agency (who will receive funding and administer the collaborative efforts), and brainstorm who potential members of the coalition will be. Very rarely funding is available at this stage. During the formation phase, once funding is received, mission, guiding principals and objectives are clarified as well as active recruitment of members occurs. In the next stage, implementation, MSCs move into designing and implementing programs aimed to achieve their goals. These programs may vary from advocacy and raising awareness campaigns on the issue to development and implementation of social programs or/and the redesign of existing ones. In the next stage, maintenance, activities are “continued, refined, and possibly expanded” (Kreuter et al., 2000: 54). Lastly, in the final stage, collaborations are expected to report results and, hopefully, demonstrate how their efforts contributed/caused any significant changes.

Backer (2003) proposed a two-dimensional differentiation between partnering groups. Thus, two critical dimensions are (1) “the degree of formality or informality” of agencies and (2) their level of “mutual accountability versus separate accountability in how the organizational members relate to each other” (Backer, 2003: 4). As can be seen from Figure A.1, organizations involved in collaborations have more structural and contractual relationships than Coalitions, Committees and Informal Networks but might not be legally binding as Strategic Alliances. Collaborating organizations are moving towards shared accountability but still maintaining their own responsibilities and liabilities. In terms of the structure, they might be informally and formally- organized.

The structures of multi-stakeholder collaboration could be somewhat diverse. They range from restricted partnerships to several stakeholders in one or two sectors, to collaborations between many players representing varied sectors including non-profit agencies, businesses, health authorities, educational institutions, neighborhood committees and community organizations, public agencies, governments, etc. Operationally, collaborative initiatives are frequently led by a leading/host agency which is, often, a contract holder, if funding is provided. The agency assumes an administration and facilitation role of the collaborative efforts as well as reporting the results to government and, hopefully, to the public. It might also take on the responsibility of implementing programs designed

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to bring about change. Additionally, a Governing Committee/ Leadership Council is usually established from the representatives of all invited stakeholders. This group agrees on guiding principle, missions and objectives of the collaborations and brainstorms solutions to address the problem. In some cases, Working Groups are set up to work on specific tasks and/or initiate broader engagement from stakeholders.

Figure A.1 Types of Collaborations, Backer, 2003

Source: Springer Publishing Company (Backer, 2003), reprinted by permission.

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Appendix B: Systemic Problem Analysis Model

Using a strong problem analysis framework helps in identifying the scope of the problem, its causes and potential consequences, as well as the boundaries of system change efforts. I attempted to define potential system boundaries for the issue of immigrant labour market integration using a problem analysis framework. Kreger et al. (2007) in his research on systems change initiatives utilized Blum’s (1981) framework for examining systems. This model assists in determining where the interventions should occur, given existing resources and timelines. The framework investigates the issue by breaking down the problem in terms of its precursors and consequences. By adopting this type of analysis, Table B.1 illustrates the complexity of immigrant labour market integration. As can be seen, direct inputs (precursors) into the systemic problem of poor immigrant economic integration varies from the historic development of the Canadian society and immigrant personal characteristics, to Canada’s current economic conditions, to employer hiring practices. As Kreger et al. (2007) suggested, both positive and negative inputs can create a snowball effect at several or all components of the larger system and its subsystems. For example, immigrants from an Asian, South American or African country, with minimum exposure to English language and westernized workplace culture, might encounter significant barriers in navigating the Canadian labour market. However, coming to Canada in bad economic times and/or settling in a CMA as opposed to a small town will, most likely, impact both Asian and Caucasian immigrant’s chances of finding professional jobs (FCM 2009). Additionally, immigrant employment outcomes might be influenced by the state and level of integration programs offered (Stasilius 2011). In terms of consequences, poor immigrant labour market outcomes might result in immigrants’ lower self-esteem and loss of identify (Laroche and Rutherford, 2007; Shirpak, Maticka-Tyndale and Chinichian, 2011), which beyond deskilling, might lead to deteriorating general health for the immigrant population (De Maio and Kemp, 2010) as well as their mental wellbeing (Chen, Smith and Mustard, 2010). Lower immigrant income rates might translate into increased poverty rates in immigrant-populated neighborhoods (Haq, 2009; Murdie, 2008), which in turn, might generate a new wave of stereotypical perceptions about immigrants, and at the societal level, might be translated into another layer of racial discrimination.178

178Almost certainly, it will not be possible to address all the causes of poor immigrant employment outcomes in Canada. Furthermore, it is very unlikely that any one systems change initiative will be able to solve even the most important problems, as they are so multifaceted. The detailed analysis of the problem provides an opportunity for those interested in designing systems change efforts to initiate the systems thinking process (Kreger et al. 2007: 303).

212 Table B.1 Analysis of Immigrant Labour Market Integration with Precursors and Consequences (Adapted from Blum, 1981 and Kreger et al., 2007)

Tertiary and More Secondary Precursors Direct Precursors Problem Direct Secondary Tertiary and Remote Precursors Consequences Consequences More Remote Consequences • Immigration source • Immigrant source country: • Immigrant personal • Higher immigrant • Poverty rates in • Rise of country economic Western Europe vs. Asia, characteristics (language, soft unemployment immigrant ethnic/immigrant conditions North America vs. South skills, education, experience, rate communities increased poor America, Africa amount of money etc.) • Lower immigrant • Increase in neighourhoods

• Immigration source • Inadequate funding of the • Immigrant place of income rates stereotypical country’s educational settlement sector settlement (small town vs. • Immigrant de- perception of • Potential racial infrastructure • Employer hiring and CMA) skillization immigrant capabilities tensions and promotion policies • Immigrant limited access to • Lower immigrant • High divorce rates for conflicts • Immigrant source • Employer diversity professional networks self-esteem immigrant families country history and policies/training • Unfair hiring practices • Less taxes are paid • Immigrant population • Increase in racial current state of affairs • Employer previous • Limited access to regulated • Less innovations health deteriorates discrimination (war etc.) experience with immigrant professions are developed • First generation visible applicants/employees • Current economic • Less trade minority Canadians • Less skilled • History of • Employer upbringing conditions in Canada opportunities with experience significant immigrants come immigration to (tolerance to differences) • Systemic discrimination immigrations job search problems to Canada Canada • Employer exposure to the based on race source countries • Immigrant children

multi-cultural • Education level of Canadian- derutilization companies come back to their • Canadian • Provincial policies environment born job seekers has • High immigrant parent home countries economy is (settlement funding, • HR and Management increased depression rates • Stereotypes linking struggling as there regulatory bodies etc) courses curriculums • Demand for profession is • More small ethnic minorities and is not enough • Current state of the global low businesses opened crime skilled workforce economy • Union regulations prevent by immigrants • Higher high school • Federal policies (who • Media coverage which immigrants from accessing who were not able drop out rate for • Canada has lower is allowed to come) influences societal attitudes stable, well-paid jobs to utilize their immigrant children GDP as well as • Professional standards for • Inadequate job search skills • Canadian companies social community • History of Canada practicing in regulated support • Immigrants leave are less competitive in indicators occupations • Not sufficiently effective Canada the global market • State of ethnic networks in coordination of settlement • Lost of identify Canada/province/city services • Dissatisfaction Immigrant un • Social hierarchy of the • Immigrant limited access to with social status immigrant profession in advanced English classes the source country (CLB 8 and above) • Limited number of bridging programs

213 Appendix C: Challenges and Outcomes of Collaborations

While change efforts through multi-stakeholder collaborations have been increasingly used to address compound social problems, several scholars raise concerns about the potential utility of these groups (Bäckstran, 2006; Berkowitz and Wolff, 2000; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a; Kreger et al., 2007; Longoria, 2005; Roussos and Fawcett, 2000). Collaborations aim to address system-level social problems. However, often, the nature and characteristics of social systems are not well understood by collaborations. Forrester (1995), who studied the field of system dynamics argued “until we reach a much better public undertstanding of social systems, attempts to develop corrective programs for social troubles will continue to be disappointing” (ibid: 1). He identified three major reasons as to why government-funded programs might have not been effective in addressing social problems: (1) the vast majority of efforts are aimed to address the symptoms, not the causes of the problem; (2) efforts which are focused on short-term solutions might have created new, ‘unanticipated’ long-term problems; (3) as noted before, systemic change is not a linear function and, sometimes, actions to solve one complex problem can trigger the creation of another serious problem in the system. Forrester (1995: 12) concludes that: “ Many problems being faced today are the cumulative result of short-run measures taken in prior decades”. Ramsey, (2010: 48) in her dissertation about collaborative efforts, identified additional challenges specific to collaborations: “conflict, commitment and implementation, including roles and accountability … and impacts whether a solution will be fully achieved.” Kreuter and colleagues (2000) also pointed out that collaborations’ failure to establish specific outcomes and ‘cause-and-effects chains’ negatively impacts the success rates of collaborations and contributes to the credibility of this approach to solve systemic problems. Finally, Green (2000: 64,65) identified five ‘caveats’ of multi-partner coalitions: (1) “Most organizations will resist giving up resources, credit, visibility, or autonomy. (2) Not everyone insists on being the coordinator, but nobody wishes to be the coordinatee. (3) So much goes into maintaining a coalition that little remains for the program. (4) Who comes to the coalition meetings? (5) Those who were good at initiating coalitions and getting broad agreement on goals are not necessarily those best at implementing programs”.

In essence, any evaluation aims to systemically assess “the operations and/or the outcomes of a program or policy, compared to a set of explicit or implicit standards, as a means of contributing the improvement of the program or policy” (Weiss, 1998: 4). Besides this, the evaluation of multi- stakeholder collaborations may inform and improve future “program implementation; provide accountability to funders, community and others; increase community support for initiatives;

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contribute to the scientific base for community … interventions; and inform policy decisions. (Capwell, Butterfoss, and Francisco, 2000: 15) As can be seen, it is challenging to evaluate community initiatives due to the high complexity of issues they are aiming to address, but also because multi-stakeholder efforts are often concerned with long-term, societal level changes, which are quite difficult to quantify and/or qualify, in some cases. However, “this complexity is also the reason why evaluation is critical to these enterprises…[as it] provides us with valuable lessons and assists in the development of methodologies appropriate to this field” (Kreger et al., 2007: 302).

As mentioned in the previous sections, while community collaborations have surfaced “as a prominent vehicle for fostering a more coordinated community response to complex issues” (Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011: 193), the effectiveness of community collaboration has been under scrutiny for some time. According to Backer (2003: 2), “the total amount of resources, including dollars and time, invested in collaborative efforts is extensive. Yet, the evaluation of these entities remains sporadic at best and the results unclear”. Very few researchers were able to present systemically collected evidence of successful collaborative efforts. For example, Florin et al. (1993), examined the working plans of 35 substance abuse prevention collaborative groups, which revealed that only 3% of their activities could be classified as systems change efforts, i.e. changing policies or regulations. Clark et al. (2010) reported that out of 200 existing asthma coalitions in the United States, only 11 studies showed the effectiveness of these groups in bringing about systemic changes and only four provided empirical data. Further, another recent study, which reviewed the literature on success factors for collaboration efforts to improve population health outcomes, reported that out of 26 studies which met the study’s rigorous selection criteria, 73% of papers identified ‘indicators of coalition functioning’ and only seven or 27% reported ‘indicators of community-level change…[with] only two indicators measured reported changed in individual risky behaviors, as examined by three studies, while the other five external indicators were measured by community leaders’ perceptions of community-wide changes” (Zakocs and Edwards, 2006: 356). Kreuter et al. (2000), in their review of 68 published descriptions of consortia/coalitions were able to identify only six documented successful collaborations. Examples of the reported system-level change in the selected studies were as following: “African American infant mortality declined 50% in program area 1990-1992; blood lead test required for all children older than 6 months during medical visits; injury risk reduction of 44% among children 5 to 16 years in program area etc.” (Kreuter et al. 2000: 51, emphasis supplied to illustrate outcomes). While many of the above-mentioned examples

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are based on the literature on community health initiatives, they are a good reflection of the overall trend in the collaborative efforts across many disciplines.

Robert Afranoff, in his recent book Managing Within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations, declared: “ We should not be impressed by the idea of collaboration per se, but only if it produces better organizational performance or lower costs than its alternatives” (Afranoff, 2007: 156). A recent research by Clarke and Fuller (2010) is probably one of a very few studies which utilized a comprehensive evaluation framework for collaborative activities in their assessment of the efforts among six US Allies Against Asthma, where the baseline for the condition was established; the controlling group was identified and engagement of members was evaluated at multiple levels179. This study provided illuminating evidence that focused interventions and active participation of core members is more crucial for collaboration success than the representativeness or a size of a coalition and that “targeting policy and system changes and focusing on specific health indicators through collaborative community-wide work can bring about needed change … [and] resulted in significant symptom improvements” (Clarke and Fuller, 2010: 910). However, elegant studies with comprehensive empirical evaluation frameworks are rather exceptions than the norm in the systems change field. Kreuter et al. (2000: 52) proposed three major explanations with respect to a limited number of published examples of collaborative efforts that resulted in significant systems change outcomes: “(1) Collaborative mechanisms are inefficient and/or insufficient mechanisms for carrying out planning and implementation tasks; (2) Expectations of health status/health systems change outcomes are unrealistic; (3) Health status/health systems change may occur but may go undetected because it is difficult to demonstrate”. Consequently, as the expectations are too high, is it possible

179 Firstly, the baseline for the condition or, “health outcomes for children with asthma” was established before evaluating the impact of coalitions and their activities (one year later). Additionally, the controlling group for assessing health and quality-of-life outcomes was identified as “reported by the parents” to compare the outcomes for areas with greater presence of coalition activities to those with weaker presence. Furthermore, engagement of coalition members was examined at multiple levels, i.e. the diversity of stakeholders, their committeemen, their numbers etc. The results of systems and policy changes were presented as follows: (1) clinical practice; (2) coordination/standardization; (3) environmental conditions; (4) efforts to improve asthma management by families, etc. In total, close to 90 system-level changes were identified, including specially-designed training for nurses and parents, telephone-based community-wide care coordination system, city by-laws banning smoking in restaurants, legislation prohibiting idling of diesel trucks, legislation to protect a child’s right to take asthma medication at school, educational days etc (Clark & Fuller 2010 p. 907). Additionally, the numbers of symptom days were compared between control and intervention groups as well as score changes on quality-of-life items. Both showed significant improvements in the intervention group. Finally, when comparing the site with the highest number of changes to the one with the least changes, it was revealed that in the former 40% of alliance members were ‘core or ongoing partners’ and only 19% representatives of community organizations/individuals. However, in the latter, fewer partners were core participants with 50% representation from the community member/organizations.

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that in assessing the success of collaborations, we use the wrong evaluation mechanisms and ask the wrong questions. How else can collaborations contribute to positive changes in our communities?

A growing number of scholars draw our attention to the intermediate outcomes from collaborative efforts as opposed to systemic level impacts. Thus, increasingly, improved community capacity or their internal effectiveness has been recognized as an intermediate but still important outcome of multi-stakeholder collaborations (Allen et al., 2008; Javdani and Allen, 2001; Kegler et al., 2007; Lasker and Weiss, 2003; Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011; Tseng et al., 2011). In a very recent study, Tseng et al. (2011: 799) in their literature review on successful collaborative efforts in human services identified a number of positive community capacity results: “growth of interagency linkages, more diverse interagency activities, an increased sense of collective power among members, positive attitudes, and increased information and referral exchange”. Authors argued that these types of outcomes could directly and/or indirectly influence the system. Allen and colleagues (2008) identified collaborations as ‘backdrops for change’, where collaborative activities influence the system through increased knowledge of members about the issue, improved relationships between them, both individual and organizational, and by initiating institutionalized change. In other words: “part of what is valuable about coalitions is what they make possible outside of the immediate collaborative setting” (Allen et al., 2008: 70). Nowel and Foster-Fishman (2011), in their examination of 51 multi-sector Midwestern collaborations aimed to improve communities’ capacity to address domestic violence, also focused their research on intermediate as opposed to systemic change outcomes. They found that by participating in multi-stakeholder efforts, agencies improved their organizational capacities, i.e. became more knowledgeable and aware about the issue, increased their social capital (i.e. increased respect and credibility of their organization), as well as enhanced their opportunities for impact and resource acquisition (Nowell and Foster-Fishman, 2011: 204). Stressing the impact of proximal outcomes on systemic change, Javdani and Allen (2011) studied 21 Family Violence Coordinating Councils in one U.S. state. The study illustrated how two proximal outcomes, such as expanded social capital (improved knowledge on the topic by participating members and enhanced relationships between them) as well as institutionalized change (creating new positions, protocols and policies etc.), are positively linked with systemic changes “survivor safety, … batterer accountability …and public education” (Javdani and Allen, 2001: 17). The authors asserted that the success of collaborative efforts is better understood when evaluating their achieved proximal outcomes, which, with time, lead to realizing distant goals.

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This section provides an introductory overview of the literature on successful outcomes of collaboration efforts in the social arena. It was revealed that two major types of outcomes were identified by scholars. The first one pertains to systemic changes, including significant/desirable improvements in the issue of concern (decrease in infant mortality, better employment outcomes for people with disabilities, neighbourhood regeneration, etc.) and/or substantial policy changes that modify the system itself and/or interactions between its components in a sustainable way (by-laws prohibiting smoking, legislation against discrimination, changes in certification curriculums for HR managers designed to expand their knowledge and understanding of the immigrant employment issue, etc.). The second type of result is concerned with proximal or intermediate outcomes (better collaboration between agencies, better knowledge about the issue, expanded, new programs and services, etc.). One major conclusion was that scholars were more successful in examining proximal or intermediate outcomes of collaborative efforts as opposed to systemic change results. Consequently, collaborations are either not the most effective forms of tackling the systemic issues and/or the conventional evaluation methods are not able to correctly detect the results of collaborative efforts. Finally, a number of challenges in the evaluation of collaborative efforts were identified (Allen et al., 2008; Berkowitz, 2001; Tseng et al., 2011 Zakocs and Edwards, 2006):

1. unrealistic expectations for collaborations by their members and funders; 2. their unspecific and grand goals, which are difficult to evaluate (i.e. no specific geographic area of concern is identified; no time line is specified etc.) 3. difficulties in making causal relationships between collaborative activities and their desirable outcomes and/or long-term impacts; 4. difficulties in designing a full-scale empirical evaluation, which includes control groups and issues baselines; 5. difficulties in identification of and control over ‘extraneous variables’ as well as interactions between them; 6. difficulties in selecting dependent variables or ‘outcomes’, especially for multi-issue coalitions; 7. difficulties in including other factors that might have significant impacts on the results, such as political climate, for example; 8. difficulties in evaluating the sustainability of reported results over a long period of time; 9. difficulties in obtaining funding for a full-scale evaluation; 10. validity of results (many evaluations used snowball sampling methods and are based on self- reported surveys by targeted populations and/or collaboration members).

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Appendix D: Success Factor Frameworks

Given the focus of this thesis, several studies that attempted to develop a conceptual success factors framework command special attention. One of the most cited success factor frameworks for collaborations was developed by Mattessich and Monsey (1992) 180 in the publication, Collaboration: What Makes it Work, which identified twenty factors influencing the success of collaborations. The research was based on the initial review of 133 articles and other publications, which was narrowed down to eighteen relevant studies that met the criteria. All factors are distributed between six major groups: environment, membership characteristics, process and structure, communication, purpose, and resources. Later on, this evaluation framework became the base for the Wilder Collaboration Factor Inventory (Mattessich, Murrray-Close and Monsey, 2001) where each factor is verified by two statements and evaluation participants are invited to specify the degree to which they agree or disagree with each of the statements. In another frequently cited publication, researchers who reviewed 80 articles, chapters and other publications aimed to “ develop an integrative framework that captures the core competencies and processes needed within collaborative bodies to facilitate their success” (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001: 242). Based on carefully defined selection criteria, fifteen publications were chosen for analysis. As a result, a four-level collaborative capacity framework was developed, including member, relational, organizational and programmatic capacity. In another study, Zakocs and Edwards (2006) reviewed 1,168 abstracts of articles published from 1980 to 2004 and 145 ‘unique’ articles were identified for full review which resulted in 26 studies that met their rigorous selection criteria. They identified 55 ‘coalition-building factors’ and reported them under three groups: six factors were found in more than five studies; fifteen other factors were found in at least two to four studies and, 34 factors were mentioned in at least one study. They found that the most frequently reported success factors were: formalization of rules/procedures; leadership style; member participation; member diversity; agency collaboration; and group cohesion. Kreuter and colleagues (2000), in their review of 68 published descriptions of health coalitions, identified six successful initiatives. They applied the Coalition Developmental Stages Framework to investigate which factors influenced efficacy of initiatives at each stage (Table D.1). So, in the Formation stage, one of the most important factors is the coalition’s ability to achieve the right balance between its mission and member representation: “The match of mission and

180 Google Scholar found 469 citations of studies by Mattessich and Monsey 1992/ Mattessich et al. 2001; 248 citations of Foster-Fishman et al. 2001 and 83 citations of Zakocs and Edwards (2006).

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membership is critical to a coalition’s long-term survival. Many coalitions have struggled to achieve substantive representation, in which members are selected by and are accountable to different interests in a community, as opposed to descriptive representation, in which they may mirror social or demographic profiles but have little accountability to those groups” (Kreuter et al., 2000: 53). Seitanidi (2010) utilized a similar framework for the analysis of partnerships and examined the three stages of collaborations for two case studies. This framework allowed for an in-depth examination of collaborative processes and revealed important findings, i.e. that partnerships provided “insufficient opportunities for the expression of divergent opinions that would lead to fundamental changes” (ibid: 150).

Table D.1 Success Factors by Developmental Stages of Coalitions, Kreuter et al., 2000

Pre-formation stage Formation stage Implementation and Reporting Outcomes Maintenance stage stage - Funding in pre- - Clearly defined roles - Leader/members skills in - Establishing causal formation stage and expectations fundraising/ facilitating relationships between for members community meeting/ activities-outcomes- - Written goals and creating policy desired changes objectives, and - The ability of coalitions memoranda to provide benefits of understanding among - Setting realistic and (solidarity, appreciation, participating measurable outcomes evidence of impact) organizations Paid staff - The match of mission and membership - Leaders who practice democratic decision making style

Additionally, the leader’s ability to resolve the conflict and establish trust between members of newly formed groups is emphasized. However, when coalitions move into the Implementation and Maintenance stages, in order to sustain commitment from members, collaborations need to show benefits to member organizations, such as public recognition of member efforts, proof of results, etc. Antelo and Henderson’s (1990) review of school/business partnerships proposed another approach. They argued that effective partnerships are built on two pillars: those of strategy and operations. Thus, from a strategic point of view, successful collaborations should have a clear mission, policies, goals or “shared outcomes”, strategies, and resources, including “financial, material and human” (Antelo and Henderson, 1990: 13). While the strategic pillars provide a long-term decision

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making framework for MSCs, the operational pillars are focused on implementation efforts. These include the structure of collaboration, level of leadership, implementation of the program(s), and evaluation processes. In a recent publication, Tseng, Liu and Wang (2011) suggested that the literature on collaboration success factors is more explanatory than analytical. Therefore, they propose their analytical evaluation framework, which aims to assess how certain factors impact change: (1) the scope of the impact, (2) its duration, and (3) the developmental stage of collaboration. In terms of the scope, they recognize operational and structural changes, whereby the former is concerned with more functional process outcomes and the latter is geared towards more systemic change. With respect to the duration, they see change as either a lasting phenomenon or temporal. One of the main benefits of this approach is that by using this conceptual framework, the practitioners and funders could weigh factors impacting successful outcomes and identify critical success conditions for their particular collaboration, for a particular stage.

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Appendix E: Success Factors Identified in the Literature

To inform this research, a broader literature review of success factors for multi-stakeholder collaborations in the social arena was conducted. This chapter does not provide a systemic overview of all reported collaboration success factors. Therefore, while the selection criteria for inclusion in the literature review were identified,181 the goal of this section was rather to develop a deeper understanding of the trends in the literature as opposed to advance any findings, develop any frameworks or make any significant conclusions. Publications were reviewed through online research using the following words/phrases or their combinations: multi-stakeholder, multi-agency, collaboration, success factors, conditions, evaluation, success, systems change, etc. The following databases were utilized: Social Science Citations, Urban Studies Abstract, Google Scholar, Sociological Abstract, CBCA and UBC’s online library’s general research engine. In total, only twenty-three studies were included in the review. In aggregate, articles and dissertations included in the review reported on the success factors for over 350 collaboration groups, and over 170 individual success factors were identified and categorized into 23 success factor groups. A summary of all identified success factors per study and per factor group is presented in Table E.1. Not surprisingly, in sixteen papers, Strong Leadership was indentified as a condition of critical value for the efficacy of multi-stakeholder collaborations / systems change efforts. McNamara (2007) reported that key informants identified skilled leadership as a major influencing factor for the success of collaborations. Other authors also pointed out on the importance of having influential champions or a visionary (Reast et al., 2001), who “have a good grasp of managing large-scale scale organizational change” (Padgett et al. 2004: 256), who is skilled to practice democratic decision- making style (Kreuter et al., 2000), and who is pragmatic but still charismatic (Kreger et al., 2007). Researchers emphasized not only the individual leadership characteristics but also the role of change agent or broker organizations, which is to “identify community leaders and work with them to

181 The following criteria for the inclusion in the literature review was adopted: (1) studies, aimed to identify success factors for multi-stakeholder collaborations (MSC); (2) studies conducted in the last 20 years; (3) studies that focused on social planning and other related issues as opposed to physical infrastructure and/or environmental issues, with exception of a few research papers that included multiple studies, including MSC addressing environmental and/or physical planning issues; (4) preference was given to multi-stakeholder collaboration studies but in some cases authors did not distinguish between MSC and other forms of collaborations (partnerships etc.) and/or refer to MSC as to coalitions, councils, networks etc; (5) articles with three types of analysis were included: integrative framework studies, conceptual or 'wisdom' pieces describing successful collaborations and research papers with original data results but the preference was given to the latter; (6) only peer-reviewed articles, books and/or dissertations/thesis were reviewed; (7) studies, with non-mutually exclusive references; (8) excluding international-scale collaborations; (9) studies with most explicit descriptions of MSC success factors: (10) studies that were most explicit in linking MSCs to systems change.

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increase decision-making capacity” (Selsky, 1991: 106) and to arrange for high quality networking and sharing opportunities for members (Johnson et al., 2003). A recent study focusing on leadership in multi-sector alliances concluded that “the most effective alliance leadership will recognize the need for an appropriate balance between power sharing and control, between process and results, between continuity and change, and between interpersonal trust and formalized procedures. The ability of partnership leaders to walk these ﬁne lines will often distinguish truly effective alliance leadership from mere management” (Alexander, Hearld and Mittler, 2011: 358). Having Trustworthy Relationships among stakeholder members were recognized as one of the major pre-conditions for successful collaborations. It was found that having strong social ties (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007b), regular networking events (Witherbee, 2008; Conway et al., 2007), developing personal connections (Golden, 1991) and caring relationships among stakeholders (Ramsey, 2010) creates a sense of solidarity and improves the outcomes of collaborative efforts. Building trust among stakeholders is an interesting phenomenon. In some cases, ‘building trust’ is an outcome of collaboration or its pre-condition of success or both, depending on the goals of multi- stakeholder groups. Bryson argued that “trust in practice must be built, which means there must be enough trust for collaborators to take a risk and do something together, and then if it turns out the trust was justified, more can be done together” (Bryson, 2004: 379). The Common Language and Shared Values factor group was found in more than ten studies. Authors found that having ‘overlapping’ missions and shared visions (Antelo and Henderson, 1990; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Golden, 1991; Mattessich, 2003; Padgett et al., 2004), formalized procedures, rules and clearly defined roles and expectations (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Kreuter et al., 2003; Mattessich, 2003; Ramsey, 2010; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), shared underlying stakeholder assumptions, shared system norms, i.e. ‘attitudes, values and beliefs’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a; Golden, 1991; Perrault et al., 2011), clear program objectives and strategies (Foster- Fishman et al., 2001; Reast et al., 2011) and shared but unique purpose (Mattessich, 2003) contributed to the success of collaborations. Many studies highlighted the importance of having Representative and Inclusive Collaboration Membership, including ‘key partners’ (Kreger et al. 2007), ‘representation from the groups’ (Mattessich, 2003), different agency types and sectors represented (Zakocs and Edwards, 2006; Padgett et al., 2004). Representative membership is believed to enhance broader institutional support, including connections with private and public agencies (Thompson et al., 2003) and to

223 Table E.1 Success Factors by Publication and by Success Factor Groups

and

Fuller and and

FACTOR (n=# of studies per 2004 al. t lius and Fishman et et Fishman et Fishman et Fishman 2010 2003 - - - factor group) group .al. 2001 al. 2007a al. al. 2007b al. Antelo Antelo Zakocs Zakocs Selsky 1991 Selsky Nowell 2009 Nowell Golden 1991 Golden Ramsey 2010 Ramsey

2010 Wallace Corne Edwards 2006 Edwards # factors /factor /factor factors # Witherbee 2008 Witherbee Thompson et al. al. et Thompson Mattessich 2003 Mattessich Reast et al. 2011 al. et Reast Henderson 1990 Henderson McNamara 2007 McNamara Clarke Clarke Kreger et al. 2007 al. et Kreger Foster Foster Foster Perrault et al 2011 al et Perrault Padgett e Padgett Kreuter et al. 2000 al. et Kreuter Johnson2003 etal. Conway et al. 2007 al. et Conway 2007 al. et Emshoff

1. Strong Leadership ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 18 (n=16) ! ! 2. Trust and Personal ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 16 Relationships (n=14) ! !

3. Common ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 16 language/Shared Values ! ! ! (n=11) ! 4. Broad group ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 12 membership/ public ! engagement (n=10) ! 5. Adequate Resources / ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! 12 Use of resources (n=9) ! !

6. Specialized expertise ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 11 (n=9) ! ! 7. Measurable and ! ! ! !! ! ! ! 9 achievable outcomes (n=7) !

8. Local Focus/History ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 9 (n=7) ! ! 9. Communication (n=7) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 8 !

10.Shared responsibility / ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 7 decision making (n=7)

11. Strong member !! ! ! ! ! ! 8 commitment (n=6) !

12. Culture of ! !! ! ! ! 7 collaboration (n=5) !

224

2004

Wallace FACTOR (n=# of studies per Edwards nd

Henderson, Fuller 2010 factor group) a 1990 2010 2001 2006 and 2007a 2007b Fishman et al. al. et Fishman al. et Fishman Fishman et .al. .al. et Fishman - - and and

- Selsky 1991 Selsky Nowell 2009 Nowell Golden 1991 Golden 2010 Ramsey Witherbee 2008 Witherbee Mattessich 2003 Mattessich Reast et al. 2011 al. et Reast McNamara 2007 McNamara Kreger et al. 2007 al. et Kreger Perrault et al 2011 al et Perrault Padgett et al. al. et Padgett Kreuter et al. 2000 al. et Kreuter Johnson2003 etal. Conway et al. 2007 al. et Conway Emshoff et al. 2007 al. et Emshoff Zakocs Zakocs Foster Foster

Foster # factors /factor group /factor factors # Thompson et al. 2003 al. et Thompson Cornelius Cornelius Clarke Clarke Antelo 13. Diverse and Innovative ! ! ! ! ! ! 6 programs across sectors (n=6) 14. Benefits to members ! ! ! ! ! ! 6 (n=6)

15. Accountability to the !! ! ! ! ! 6 public (n=5)

16. Efficient conflict ! ! ! ! ! 5 resolution technique (n=5)

17. Urgency / Visibility of ! ! ! ! 4 the problem (n=4)

18. Flexible organizational ! ! ! ! 4 structure (n=4)

19. Proximity to funding ! ! ! 3 /political power (n=3)

20. Recognize ! ! 3 collaboration stages (n=2) !

21.Task oriented (n=2) ! ! 2

22. Credibility and expert ! ! 2 role in the community (n=2) 23. Maturity of ! 1 collaborations (n=1)

# of factors per 7 4 1 4 6 16 5 4 8 5 7 10 20 6 2 10 7 4 7 6 6 8 20 174 article/dissertation

225 boost ‘the collective capacity for action’ (Selsky, 1991). Reast et al. (2011) called attention to the early engagement of the broader public in collaborative efforts. Golden (1991) and Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) stressed the importance of involvement of target groups, i.e. family, residents, etc. affected by the issue and the broad public, in general. Cornelius and Wallace (2010: 82) concluded in their research that “the poor/disadvantaged should be placed at the centre of the design, control, oversight and evaluation of the development projects that affect them”. Collaborations are an expensive enterprise (Mattessich, 2003). Although some of them operate on rather small budgets and/or are driven by volunteers, research has shown that those collaborations that had Adequate Financial Funding, including materials and human resources (Antelo and Henderson, 1990) were more successful than others in achieving their stated goals. Besides sufficient funding (Emshoff et al., 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Mattessich, 2003), scholars argued that other resource-related factors contributed to successful collaboration outcomes, including more tenured chairs of coalitions (Emshoff et al., 2007), paid staff and the amount of time they devoted to the collaboration activities (Kreuter et al. 2000; Padgett et al. 2004; Zakocs and Edwards 2006), additional funding in early collaborative stages (Kreuter et .al. 2000), access to resources to fund the development of ‘out of box’ solutions (Witherbee 2008) and, finally, efficient use of resources (Zakocs and Edward 2006). Not surprisingly, research has shown that collaborations, whose members / leaders / staff exhibited Specialized Expertise, required in the collaborative efforts, are more likely to succeed. The following special expertise was mentioned: service providers’ understanding of the issue (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a), individual member skills and knowledge (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001), member skills in fundraising, facilitating meetings, creating policy (Kreuter et al., 2000), effective administration skills (Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), building on member strengths (Antelo and Henderson, 1990; Perrault et al., 2011), training and technical assistance (Zakocs and Edwards 2006) and technical evaluation and strategic planning skills (Kreger et al. 2007). Several publications accentuated Measurable and Achievable Outcomes and Evaluations among other success factors. Collaborations need to be ‘outcome and improvement oriented’ (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001) have to establish significant, yet sensible, as well as immediate and doable goals (Forster-Fishman et al., 2001; Mattessich, 2003; Padgett et al. 2004), set realistic outcomes with established causal relationships between interventions and desired results (Kreuter et al., 2000). Finally, the effectiveness of the program should be established through evaluation (Antelo and Hendrson, 1990) or as Clarke and Fuller (2010: 97) concluded “… a structured monitoring system for the

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collaborative strategy makes the outcomes much easier to assess and, therefore, likely arrive at better decisions around process adaptations needed”. As stakeholders come together in an attempt to solve a community problem, the Context of Community cannot be overemphasized. Scholars argued that such community characteristics such as an existing rich history of collaboration (Mattessich, 2003; McNamara, 2007), community readiness for change (Foster-Fishman et al. 2007b), a positive political and social climate (Mattessich, 2003) and the scope and size of communities (Witherbee, 2008), impacted collaborative systems change efforts. Studies showed that without effective Communication Strategies, collaboration groups are less likely to succeed. Collaborations will benefit from sophisticated communication infrastructure (Reast et al., 2011), establishing informal and formal communication links (Mattessich, 2003), and frequent meetings and updates to members (Johnson et al., 2003). Scholars found that those collaborations, which are built on the premises of Shared Responsibility and Decision Making processes are more successful than others (Perrault et al., 2011). Efficient collaborations were associated with collective or shared power (Conway et al., 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Selsky, 1991; Witherbee, 2008), shared responsibilities (Antelo and Henderson, 1990) and participatory decision making models (Zakocs and Edwards 2006). Finally, there are a number of other factors that were found to be correlated with the success of collaboration groups, including strong member commitment (Emshoff et al., 2007, Golden, 1991; Johnson et al., 2003; Mattessich, 2003; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006; Witherbee, 2008), a sound culture of collaboration (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Mattessich, 2003; Reast et al. 2011; Witherbee, 2008), diversity and innovation of programs (Emshoff et al. 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Kreger et al,. 2007; Selsky, 1991; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), benefits to members (Kreuter et al., 2000; Mattessich, 2003; Perrault et al., 2011, Reast et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2003; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), accountability to the public and partners (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Golden, 1991; Kreuter et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2003), efficient conflict resolution techniques (Golden, 1991; Johnson et al., 2003; Mattessich et al., 2001; Ramsey, 2010; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), urgency or visibility of the problem (Cornelius and Wallace, 2010; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007b; McNamara, 2007; Thompson et al., 2003), flexible organizational structure (Kreger et al., 2007; Mattessich, 2003; Padgett et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2003), proximity to funding/political power (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007a; Nowell, 2009; Thompson et al., 2003), a task oriented group (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Zakocs and Edwards, 2006), group credibility in the community, i.e.

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developing expert roles (Mattessich, 2003; Selsky, 1991), and maturity of collaborations (Emshoff et al., 2007). The level of analysis in this section and all possible conclusions derived from it should be taken into consideration with caution. First of all, broad selection criteria for the literature review of collaboration success factors were utilized. Secondly, many studies included in this section did not specify the degree to which collaboration groups were successful. Additionally, the correlation between each identified individual success factor and the perceived effectiveness of collaborations was not established in most of the studies. Rather, most of the cases elaborated on a certain set of conditions that potentially contributed to a certain set of outcomes (Allen et al., 2008). Finally, in some cases, even when studies investigated the same outcomes and success factors, contradictory results surfaced (Zakocs and Edwards, 2006). Finally, it is unrealistic to expect that any collaborative group will satisfy all of these criteria and it was not my intention to argue that. However, the results of this literature review might assist MSCs in their activities, strategies and/or outcomes evaluations as well as in their problem analysis and environmental scans.

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Appendix F: List of Semi-structural Interview Key Informants182

No Quote Reference Interview Date

CATEGORY A – TRIEC/MAYTREE/ALLIES STAFF 1 Anonymous, Interview #3 July 12, 2010 2 Anonymous, Interview #7 July 13, 2010 3 Anonymous, Interview #9 July 15, 2010 CATEGORY B – TRIEC BOARD/COUNCIL MEMBERS 4 Julia Deans, former CEO, Greater Toronto CivicAction Alliance, Interview #4 July 12, 2010 5 Daniele Zanotti, Executive Director, United Way of York Region, Interview #6 July 13, 2010 6 Anonymous, Interview #8 July 14, 2010 7 Anonymous, Interview #10 July 22, 2010 8 Jeffrey Reitz, Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto and TRIEC Council July 26, 2010 Member, Interview #12 CATEGORY C – EXPERTS/CIVIC LEADERS 9 Karen Fong, Author of "Overcoming structural racial discrimination: An analysis of the July 6, 2010 Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council’s approach to improving skilled immigrant labour market integration", Interview #1 10 Anonymous, Key Informant A, Interview #5 July 12, 2010

11 Anonymous, Key Informant B, Interview #5 July 12, 2010

12 Paul Lewkowicz, Author of Institutional Innovation for Better Skilled Immigrant January 27, Labour Market Integration: A STUDY OF THE TORONTO REGION 2011 IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL (TRIEC), Interview #21 CATEGORY D – IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL (IEC) STAFF 13 Kelly Pollack, Executive Director, Immigrant Employment Council of BC, Interview #2 July 6, 2010 14 Dianne Fehr, Executive Director, Immigrant Access Fund July 26, 2010 Chair, Calgary Region Immigrant Employment Council, Interview #11 15 Anonymous, Interview #13 July 28, 2010 CATEGORY E – TRIEC FUNDERS/SPONSORS 16 Anonymous, Interview #14 January 5, 2011 17 Shelley White, President and CEO, United Way of Peel Region, Interview #15 (Shelley January 10, White is a Board member as well) 2011 18 Anonymous, Interview #18 January 21, 2011 19 Anonymous, Interview #20 January 26, 2011 20 Anonymous, Interview #22 February 1, 2011 21 Askin, Taner, Senior Program Advisor, Global Experience Ontario February 15, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, Interview #27 2011 22 Anonymous, Interview #28 March 4, 2011

182 Questionnaire Key Informants are all analyzed as ‘Anonymous’. Questionnaires (Interviews # 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, and 26) were conducted in January-March, 2011. 229

Appendix G: TRIEC Funders and Sponsors as of November 24, 2010

Funder/Sponsor Type of agency

1. Citizenship and Immigration Canada Federal Government http://www.cic.gc.ca/

2. Employment Ontario, Ministry of Training, Colleges and Ontario Government University http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/tcu/etlanding.html Individual/Corporation 3. Staff of Earnst and Young Corporation 4. Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP http://www.fmc-law.com/ Individual

5. Friends of the Rotman CCC Federal Government 6. HRSDC, FCRP http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/cs/comm/hrsd/news/2005/050425bb.shtml Corporation 7. Manulife Financial http://www.manulife.ca/canada/canada1.nsf/public/homepage Community 8. Maytree Foundation Foundation http://maytree.com/ Individual 9. Mike Lipkin http://www.mikelipkin.com/index.php Ontario Government 10. Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration http://www.citizenship.gov.on.ca/english/contact/index.shtml Corporation 11. RBC Financial Group http://www.rbc.com/diversity/index.html Regional Government 12. Region of Peel http://www.peelregion.ca/ Federal Government 13. Service Canada http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/common/contactus/index.shtml Corporation 14. TD Bank Financial Group http://www.tdcanadatrust.com/newtocanada/southasian/about/community- giving-partnerships.html Community Foundation 15. United Way of Peel http://www.unitedwaypeel.org/

230 Appendix H: Interview Questions (Categorized by Key Informant) A=Maytree/TRIEC/ALLIES Staff; B=TRIEC Board/Council members; C=Experts/Civic Leaders/Researchers; D=IEC Staff; E=Funders/Sponsors Interview Questions A B C D E 1. Please state your name, title and how your role is related to TRIEC/IEC? ! ! ! ! ! 2. Why did you decide to get involved in TRIEC/IEC? ! ! ! ! 3. What are the main objectives of TRIEC? ! ! ! ! 4. What philosophical approach did TRIEC/IEC take? Has it changed over time? How? ! ! ! ! a) What was/is the structure of TRIEC/IEC? (Council, Board, Working Groups) ! ! ! ! b) What are the roles of TRIEC/IEC Champions? What are the most important attributes of the ! ! ! ! leaders? c) Why produce Annual Reports? What is transparency? How transparent should an IEC be? ! ! ! ! d) Why promote ‘business case’ in hiring immigrants vs. raising awareness on systemic barriers – ! ! ! ! ! racial discrimination? e) How should IEC celebrate their achievements? What is the role of Communication and PR ! ! ! ! ! campaigns? f) What should IEC do in the first two years? ! ! ! ! ! g) What was the role of the City of Toronto and what should be the role of municipalities in ! ! ! ! IECs? 5. How do you define ultimate success for TRIEC/IEC? ! ! ! ! ! 6. How do you measure outputs and/or outcomes? How does TRIEC /IEC measure them? ! ! ! ! ! 7. What does systemic change mean to you? What kind of systemic change would you like to see? ! ! ! ! ! 8. How does incremental change contribute to systemic change? How do TRIEC’s activities ! ! ! ! ! contribute to fundamental change? 9. What are systemic barriers? ! ! ! 10. Is TRIEC successful? How do you know? What contributed to its success? ! ! ! ! ! 11. What is missing? What could TRIEC be doing differently? ! ! ! ! 12. Please rate the effectiveness of TRIEC’s communication mechanisms !

231 Appendix I: Immigrant Employment Council (IEC) Questionnaire

Name of the IEC Name and title of the respondent:______Date: ______

Section One Please state if the following statements are ‘True’ or ‘False’

Statement True/False Example: 1.1.1 Our goals are clearly stated in the public domain: - on the IEC’s website - in IEC’s flyers - others

1.2.1 IEC meeting minutes are on IEC website 1.2.2 Council board members names are on the website 1.2.3 All Council/Board members participate in our programs 1.2.4 We produced annual reports featuring IEC’s work, outcomes and finance 1.2.5 We conducted evaluation of IEC’s work and it is publicly accessible 1.2.6 We have information about our outcomes on our website 1.2.7 Our hosting organization include info about IEC’s work and outcomes in its annual reports 1.2.8 At the onset, we identified long term impacts we would like to make in our province/region/city 1.2.9 At the onset, we identified our annual/2-3 year short term objectives 1.2.10 We identified outcome indicators for long and short term objectives 1.2.11We identified indicator benchmarks for all our activities

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1.2.12 We keep track of our inputs and outputs 1.2.13 We keep track of qualitative outcomes 1.2.14 We keep track of quantitative outcomes 1.2.15 We keep track of individual/organizational/societal changes we make 1.2.16 Info about IEC’s funding is in public domain 1.2.17 Info about IEC’s funding is in our annual reports (publicly accessible) 1.2.18 We have a history about why and how IEC came into existence in public domain (website) 1.2.19 Board, Council and Working Groups terms of references are in public domain 1.2.20 All the research IEC conducted is in public domain (website)

Section Two. Please answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the following statements: Statement Yes/No If ‘Yes, please provide an example to support the answer (short statement) 2.1 ED/President of our hosting agency launches IEC programs/events 2.2 Info about logo/link to IEC is on our hosting agency’s website (under programs or partners) 2.3 Info about logo/link to IEC is on our hosting agency’s website (main page) 2.4 Info about IEC is in hosting agency annual reports/publications 2.5 Board members of our hosting agency are involved in IEC 2.6 Our hosting agency has a history of being a strong advocate on immigrant issues (conducted research, organized events, lobbied government) 2.7 The Chair of IEC is a business leader 2.8 We receive sponsorship from our employer Council members (in-kind/$) 2.9 We have at least three different champions who launched our programs at public events

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2.10 At least 10 of our Council/Board members participated in our pilot project 2.11 We have at least one corporate partner which features info about/link to IEC or its initiatives 2.12 Mayor of a local municipality launched IEC and/or its pilots 2.13 Municipality is an employer partner in our pilots 2.14 City’s staff participates in IEC’s Council/Working Groups

Section Three. Please state “Yes’ or ‘No’ to the following statements: Statement Yes/No If ‘Yes, please provide an example to support the answer (short statement) 3.1 We have a full-time Communication Coordinator at IEC 3.2 We send monthly updates to our stakeholders and distribution list subscribers 3.3 From time to time (quarterly etc.) we send updates to our stakeholders and distribution list subscribers 3.4 We produce annual reports for general public 3.5 Our Champions write open letters to government officials related to immigration policy 3.6 Our IEC and/or hosting agency produces immigration policy briefs on a regular basis (different from research papers) 3.7 IEC organizes events with employers (networking, recognition, learning) 3.8 IEC initiated Employer Award to recognize best immigrant hiring practices 3.9 There were a number of articles about our work and our initiatives in the last year 3.10 We have a monthly column/annual edition in a mainstream newspaper 3.11 We appeared in several radio/TV programs during the last year

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Section Four. Please answer the following questions

Question Answer 4.1 Which area do you serve? (CMA, city, several cities, region, province) 4.2 What is the population of the area you serve? 4.3 What is the percentage of immigrants in your area? What is the unemployment rate for immigrants in your area? 4.4 When was the IEC launched officially? 4.5 When was the first attempt to bring an immigrant employment multi-stakeholder group to your area? 4.6 In your opinion, why did it/did it not succeed? 4.7 Was there a Federal-provincial Immigration Agreement before IEC was created? 4.8 Do you have a large number of HQ in your area? 4.9 Do you have a strong presence of a particular business sector in your area? If yes, which one? 4.10 What was the state of the economy when IEC was launched? 4.11 Was there a civic, city-wide forum initiated by employers, which identified immigrant employment issues as one of the priorities issues for the city and/or one of the barriers for city’s growth? 4.12 Did an employer forum lead to the creation of IEC? If yes, which one?

Section Five. Please state if the following statements are ‘True’ or ‘False’ Statement True/False If ‘True’, please provide an example to support the answer (short statement) 5.1 We have strong support from our partner municipality 5.2 Our partner municipality has a history of having strong multicultural and immigrant policies before IEC was created (adopted Multicultural Strategy, Immigration Strategy) 5.3 The Mayor/Council of our partner municipality showed support for immigrant

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issues before IEC was created 5.4 There is a Diversity/EEO/Multicultural Unit at our partner municipality 5.5 Our partner municipality had programs/initiatives to support immigrant economic integration before IEC was created

Section Six. Please state ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the following statements Statement Yes/No Example (optional) 6.1 We initiated our first program/pilot in the first 12 months after IEC’s inception 6.2 We reported our first results in the first 24 months after IEC’s inception 6.3 We initiated the following programs: - Mentoring - Internship - Connector (enhance immigrant networking) -Cross-cultural workshops for employers - Online resources for employers - Online resources for immigrants - Immigrant Hiring Practices Assessment - Public Awareness campaign - Employer Award - Initiated events/forums/conferences 6.4 At least 10 employers were engaged on the Council/Board in the first year 6.5 At least 20 employers are engaged on the Council/programs in the 2nd year 6.6 We had at least 70% increase in a number of employers engaged in Council/Working Groups/Program 6.7 Stakeholder Consensus is a foundation for success of IEC in our area 6.8 Idea generation and fast results is a foundation for success of IEC in our area 6.9 Our hosting agency has a formal governance structure

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6.10 Our hosting agency has a flexible governance structure

Section Seven. Please state ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the following statements Statement Yes/No Examples/Notes (optional) 7.1 Our primary target group is employers 7.2 Our primary target group is immigrants 7.3 Both immigrants and employers are our target groups 7.4 Our board of directors is mostly composed of employers (2/3) 7.5 Our Council is mostly composed of employers 7.6 Our hosting agency is a business organization 7.7 Our hosting agency is a … organization (please provide answer in the third column) 7.8 At least 2/3rds of our Council employer members participated in our first pilot 7.9 At least 2/3rds of our Council employer members participated in our second program 7.10 We have links to all our Council/Board employer members/partners from our website to their companies 7.11 We recognize our Council/Board employer members/partners in articles about IEC and our programs 7.12 Our Council/Board employer members/partners are recognized as Canadian Top Diversity/Newcomer employers

Section Eight – Outcomes - Optional Question Answer 8.1 How many immigrants participated in your programs last year? 8.2 How many employers participated in your programs last year? 8.3 How many immigrants reported finding jobs during/within three months after the program? 8.4 How many immigrants reported benefiting from your program? (better knowledge of…, more networking opportunities, gained employment, better job, better confidence, etc)

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8.5 How many employers reported benefiting from your program? (gained awareness about …, changed their hiring policies, etc.) 8.6 How many employers reported hiring more immigrants as a result of their participation on your programs? 8.7 What other impacts did your organization make in the area of immigrant integration?

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Appendix J: List of Canadian Immigrant Employment Councils, as of January 1, 2011

Immigrant Employment Council Region 1. Alliés Montréal by La Conférence régionale des élus (CRE) de Montreal, Quebec Montréal

2. Calgary Region Immigrant Employment Council Calgary, Alberta www.criec.ca

3. Edmonton Region Immigrant Employment Council Edmonton, Alberta www.eriec.ca 4. The Employment Sector Council London-Middlesex London, Ontario www.lmiec.ca

5. The Immigrant Employment Council of BC Vancouver, BC www.iecbc.ca

6. Immigration Works for Halifax by the Greater Halifax Halifax, Nova Scotia Partnership www.immigrationworksinhalifax.ca www.greaterhalifax.com

7. Hire Immigrants Ottawa Ottawa, Ontario http://www.hireimmigrantsottawa.ca/

8. The New Brunswick Multicultural Council Fredericton and Moncton, www.nb-mc.ca New Brunswick

9. The Niagara Immigrant Employment Council Niagara, Ontario www.niec.ca

10. The North Bay Employers’ Council by the North Bay and North Bay, Ontario District Multicultural Centre www.nbdmc.ca

11. Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council Toronto, Ontario www.triec.ca

12. Waterloo Region Immigrant Employment Network Waterloo, Ontario www.wrien.com

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Appendix K: Letter of Initial Contact – Semi-structured Interviews

Examining Successful Multi--stakeholder Collaboration for Immigrant Economic Integration in Canada: The Case of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council

Research Team Principal Investigator Dr. Leonora C. Angeles, Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning Ph: 604-822-9312; e-mail: [email protected]

Co-Investigator Ms. Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning

To Whom It May Concern, I am writing to request your consideration to participate in a study on the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC). This is an independent study that is being conducted as part of the requirements for a graduate degree in planning at UBC’s School of Community and Regional Planning. I greatly appreciate your willingness to take a few moments to read this letter before advising me of your response. The purpose of this study is to examine critical factors that contributed to successes of TRIEC in the process of bringing about systems-level change. The factors that I am hoping to identify as being instrumental to TRIEC’s success can inform the design and implementation of other multi-agency efforts. Additionally, by exploring this innovative model of collaboration, this research will provide guidelines for other immigrant employment councils’ evaluation and assist in the development of suggested funding criteria for government agencies. This study involves secondary literature review, a focus group, in-person interviews and online questionnaire. The online questionnaire will be distributed to members of Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs) across Canada and to government funders and corporate sponsors which have participated in / contributed to IECs. Along with this, a number of interviews will be conducted with TRIEC’s key stakeholders to gain a more detailed understanding on the subject. Finally, a focus group with immigrants who participated in TRIEC’s programs will be conducted to expand the concepts of ‘systemic change’ and ‘success’ from immigrants’ point of view. I hope you will consider participating in an interview to share your experiences and perspectives. The interview will be conducted in person (or over the telephone, if necessary) by the co-investigator at a time and location convenient to you. It will last approximately 60 to 90 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be tape–recorded and transcribed. The interview will consist of a series of oral questions on the topic described above. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and even if you decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time. The information gained from this research will contribute to the project report and will be kept entirely confidential. As a study participant, you may request copies of this publication. Please contact me by phone: ______or email: ______to request additional information and/or to arrange to participate in the research. Your time and interest in this study are much appreciated. Warm regards, Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning University of British Columbia

240

Appendix L: Letter of Initial Contact – Immigrant Employment Councils

Examining Successful Multi--stakeholder Collaboration for Immigrant Economic Integration in Canada: The Case of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council

Research Team Principal Investigator Dr. Leonora C. Angeles, Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning Ph: 604-822-9312; e-mail: [email protected]

Co-Investigator Ms. Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing to request your consideration to participate in a study on the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC). This is an independent study that is being conducted as part of the requirements for a graduate degree in planning at UBC’s School of Community and Regional Planning. I greatly appreciate your willingness to take a few moments to read this letter before advising me of your response. The purpose of this study is to examine critical factors that contributed to successes of TRIEC in the process of bringing about systems-level change. The factors that I am hoping to identify as being instrumental to TRIEC’s success can inform the design and implementation of other multi-agency efforts. Additionally, by exploring this innovative model of collaboration, this research will provide guidelines for other immigrant employment councils’ evaluation and assist in the development of suggested funding criteria for government agencies. This study involves secondary literature review, in-person interviews and IECs questionnaire. The questionnaire is distributed to Chairs/EDs of Immigrant Employment Councils (IECs) across Canada. Along with this, a number of interviews will be conducted with TRIEC’s key stakeholders and funders to gain a more detailed understanding on the subject. I hope you will consider participating in a questionnaire to share your knowledge, experiences and perspectives. The questionnaire is partially filled out by the co-investigator based on publicly accessible information and interviews. It might take you 15-30 minutes depending on your familiarity with questions explored in the questionnaire. Most of the questions require ‘yes’ or ‘no’ type of answers. The questionnaire will consist of a series of written questions on the topic described above. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and even if you decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time. The information gained from this research will contribute to the project report and will be kept entirely confidential. As a study participant, you may request copies of this publication. Please contact me by phone: ______or email: ______to request additional information and/or to arrange to participate in the research. Your time and interest in this study are much appreciated.

Warm regards,

Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia

241

Appendix M: Consent for Semi-structured Interview Participants

Examining Successful Multi--stakeholder Collaboration for Immigrant Economic Integration in Canada: The Case of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council

Principal Investigator Dr. Leonora C. Angeles, Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning Ph: 604-822-9312; e-mail: [email protected]

Co-Investigator Ms. Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning

The rights of Research Participants:

If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research participant, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail to [email protected]. Or you may mail:

The University of British Columbia Behavioural Research Ethics Board Office of Research Services Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3

Purpose

Your participation is being sought in a research project undertaken by a graduate student from the School of Community and Regional Planning. The research project will examine the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council’s (TRIEC) collaboration model of multiple stakeholders. This group was formed in 2003 to bring about real, system-level change in immigrant labour market integration in the Toronto area. Your participation will add to an enhanced understanding of critical factors that contributed to the unique success of TRIEC. The research will provide guidelines for other Immigrant Employment Council evaluation and assist in the development of suggested funding criteria for government agencies.

Invitation to Participate in an Interview

Your participation is being sought to participate in the one-hour interview to learn about your experience as one of the TRIEC key stakeholders. Your answers will help identify and examine in detail critical factors that contributed to successes of TRIEC.

Confidentiality

Your contributions will not be used for any purpose other than thesis and/or publications. This thesis will be shared with TRIEC http://www.triec.ca, IEC of BC http://www.iecbc.ca, ALLIES

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http://www.maytree.com/integration/allies and the general public. Thesis and/or excerpts from the thesis might be published in academic and/or mainstream magazines. Data, including interview recordings, transcripts and field notes, will be retained for two years after the project finishes in a locked cabinet in the co-investigator’s office, as required by University ethics regulations. After two years the data will be destroyed.

Benefits

By participating in this research, you will contribute to the development of critical success factors, which could be used by multi-stakeholder collaborations to bring about real social change. More specifically this model will, hopefully, enhance multi-agency abilities to bring about system level change in the area of immigrant economic integration. As result of Immigrant Employment Council success across Canada, thousands of immigrants will benefit from programs developed by these multi-level collaborations. Ultimately, our country will benefit from immigrants being employed in jobs that are commensurate with their level of education and experiences.

Risks

You may feel fatigued from participating. This is the only known risk at this time. Your participation will take no more than one to one and a half hours.

Consent

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the project at any time. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions or stop the interview or your participation while it is in process.

If you choose to withdraw later, the researcher can stop utilizing the materials you contributed, but may be at a stage of thesis writing and analysis where it is impossible to separate your specific contribution from the collective learning.

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records.

Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

Any further questions may be directed to the contacts provided on the cover sheet.

______(Participant) Date

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Appendix N: Consent for Participants (Immigrant Employment Councils’ staff)

Examining Successful Multi--stakeholder Collaboration for Immigrant Economic Integration in Canada: The Case of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council

Principal Investigator Dr. Leonora C. Angeles, Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning Ph: 604-822-9312; e-mail: [email protected]

Co-Investigator Ms. Olga Shcherbyna, M.Sc. (Planning) Candidate, School of Community and Regional Planning

The rights of Research Participants:

The University of British Columbia Behavioural Research Ethics Board Office of Research Services Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3

Purpose

Your participation is being sought in a research project undertaken by a graduate student from the School of Community and Regional Planning. The research project will examine the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council’s (TRIEC) collaboration model of multiple stakeholders. This group was formed in 2003 to bring about system-level change in immigrant labour market integration in the Toronto area. Your participation will add to an enhanced understanding of critical factors that contributed to the unique success of TRIEC.

Invitation to Participate in an Interview

Your participation is being sought to participate in the one-hour structured interview to learn about IEC’s activities and strategies. Once the study is finished and the thesis is defended –individual analysis summaries of each IECs will be shared with respondents who participated in the second phase of this study. This type of comparative analysis would provide an opportunity for all participating IECs to reflect on potential gaps / barriers they might face in their work, which were identified in the independent comparative analysis of their activities and outcomes.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality means that the information you share will not be reported or used in a way that would identify you. Although anonymity cannot be guaranteed, your identity will not be revealed in any reports or public documents and this will help maintain public anonymity. Your answers will help identify and examine in detail critical factors that contributed to successes of TRIEC. Due to the sensitive nature of this study, the names of the IECs are kept

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confidential as well. However, it is possible to recognize which IECs participated in the study, as there are only twelve IECs in existence. While the intention of this study is to report on the aggregated data, in some cases indicator specifications might be sufficient to recognize one or another IEC. Efforts will be made to emphasize and specify only those IECs which scored highly.

Your contributions will not be used for any purpose other than thesis and/or publications. This thesis will be shared with TRIEC http://www.triec.ca, IEC of BC http://www.iecbc.ca, ALLIES http://www.maytree.com/integration/allies and the general public. Thesis and/or excerpts from the thesis might be published in academic and/or mainstream magazines. Data, including interview recordings, transcripts and field notes, will be retained for two years after the project finishes in a locked cabinet in the co-investigator’s office, as required by University ethics regulations. After two years the data will be destroyed.

Benefits

Risks

You may feel fatigued from participating. This is the only known risk at this time. Your participation will take no more than one to one and a half hours.

Consent

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records.

Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

Any further questions may be directed to the contacts provided on the cover sheet.

______(Participant) Date

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Appendix O: Four Waves of Canadian Immigration

British and French speaking colonists who immigrated to North America several hundred years ago identified themselves as the ‘founding members of this country’ (Dewing and Leman, 2006). The first European immigrants to Canada were the French traders in the early 1500s. (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg , 2009). European immigration in this first stage was quite slow and picked up with a wave of British loyalists fleeing after the American Revolution. After the War of 1812, the second immigration wave began with British and Scottish army solders who were encouraged by colonial governors to stay in Canada in order to establish more English-speaking communities and to counter the French influence from Quebec. Additionally, the Irish potato famine in the middle of 1800s, brought thousands of Irish people, and while a significant portion of them eventually moved to the United States, many stayed in Canada. Also, tens of thousands of Chinese men were brought to Canada in 1870s and 1880s to build the Canadian Pacific Railway, and despite the head tax that Canadian government imposed on Chinese immigrants in 1885, more and more of them arrived to reunite with their families (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg and , 2009). The third wave was influenced by the 1910 Immigration Act, which created the first version of Canadian citizenship and introduced the first legal framework for the Canadian government to pick and choose who was and who was not allowed to enter the country. Section 38 of the Act prohibited the entry of immigrants “belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or immigrants of any specified class, occupation, or character” (Day, 2002: 141). In 1923, the government introduced new restrictions for immigrants from Eastern Europe or “non-preferred countries” which allowed them to enter Canada only as agriculturalists, farm workers, female domestic servants, and sponsored family members. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of Canadian immigrants came from Europe and the bulk of them entered the labour market as manual labour in the agricultural sector and city factories as well as in mining and lumbering resource industries (Troper, 2003). Furthermore, as Canada suffered from the Great Depression, immigration rates significantly dropped. Canada accepted very few Jewish refugees before and during the war in comparison to other countries and the number of deportations rose. By the middle of the century and after World War II, the immigration policy started to shift. In 1947, Prime Minister MacKenzie King announced in his Labour Day speech that the discriminatory nature of earlier immigration legislation ‘should be removed’. According to Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009), this speech initiated the changes towards a more liberalized Canadian immigration policy. At the same time, the Canadian government started to feel pressure and demands for human rights reform from the middle class and, by that time, well-integrated immigrants and their children. Additionally, the Cold War, anti-communist propaganda and “some guilt about Canada’s failure to accept Jewish immigrants fleeing Nazi Germany before the war” (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009: 387) resulted in the development of the first Canadian refugee policy, allowing refugees from communist Eastern Europe, previously ‘non- preferable’ countries, to come to Canada. After WW II, Canada, along with the rest of the developed

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world, experienced postwar economic recovery and faced labor shortages in manufacturing and construction sectors (Troper, 2003). By the 1950s-1960s, Europe’s booming economy, along with its developed social welfare system, resulted in a decrease of European migration to North America. These and other changes in the global arena led to the introduction of the point-based immigration system in Canada in the late 1960s (Hiebert, 2006). Therefore, the earlier discriminatory exclusion of skilled immigrants from non-European countries was gradually eliminated and Economic Class immigrants were admitted to Canada based on the quality of their human capital, assessed in points for education, experience, age, facility in one of the official languages, and personal adaptability, instead of their ethnic origin.

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Appendix P: Overview of the Federal Skilled Immigrant Category

Currently, in order to be accepted to Canada as a skilled worker, an immigrant has to pass an official language proficiency test, have at least one year of continuous and paid work experience obtained within the last 10 years in one of the professions listed on the Occupation list or pass the official language test(s) and have a valid offer of arranged employment (CIC. Skilled workers and professions: Who can apply – Six selection factors and passing mark). These are the minimum requirements for an application to be processed. Principal applicants can bring their spouses and children under the age of 18. The selection process is based on six factors: the principal applicant’s education, language ability, work experience, age, arranged employment, and adaptability. Each factor is rated on a points system with a passing mark of 67 points (Table P.1). Finally, each applicant is required to prove that he/she has enough money to support themselves and their dependents in the first months of their arrival to Canada.183 Applicants with an arranged employment offer are waived from the last requirement.

Table P.1 Federal Skilled Worker Category Selection Factors

Factor Maximum Points

1. Education Maximum: You have a master’s degree or PhD and at least 17 years of full-time or full- 25 time equivalent study (25 points). Minimum: You completed high school. (5 points) 2. Proficiency in English or French Maximum: High proficiency: You can communicate effectively in most social and work 24 situations (Speaking, Listening, Reading, Writing) for the first official language 16 points maximum; for the second – 8. 3. Work Experience 21 4 years and above (21) with minimum of 1 year (15 points) 4. Age 10 21-49 maximum of 10 points and minus 2 points for each year up or down 5. Arranged Employment 10 6. Adaptability Spouse or common-law partner’s level of education (3-5points); Previous work in 10 Canada (5 points); Previous study in Canada (5 points); Arranged employment in Canada (5 points); Relatives in Canada (5 points) Total (pass mark – 67 points) 100 Source: CIC. Skilled workers and professions: Who can apply – Six selection factors and passing mark.

183 $11,115 is required for one person and up to $29,414 for a family of 7 or more. 248

Changes in the Points System and Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Category The point system was modified several times over the last ten years. On December 15, 2001 the most significant changes were made such as modifications in the General Occupation list and an increase in the passing score with more points being assigned for work experience in Canada, having studied in Canada for two years or having an offer of employment in Canada. The new rules with some changes were adopted in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in June 2002. A major change was introduced in the language assessment process. In the past, evaluation of an immigrant’s language abilities was done by the immigration officer in a personal interview. Starting from June 2002, immigrants had to take an approved English and/or French language test and submit the results as proof of their language abilities. Since 2002, a number of other changes in the immigration policy were introduced by the Canadian government. These policy shifts and implications for FSW class will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. In August 2010, CIC published its Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker program which looked at the relevance of the program, its new design, implementation, cost-effectiveness, impacts and unintended outcomes (CIC, 2010f). A total of 53 interviews were conducted with key informants. Additionally, a telephone survey with 1,500 FSWs who landed between 2002 and 2008 was conducted, as well as with 53 employers who had previously made an Arranged Employment Offer (AEO). Evaluators visited five Canadian Visa Offices abroad and conducted a detailed analysis of secondary data. The evaluation found that “89% of FSWs were employed or self-employed three years after landing”, “For the 2004 cohort, for example, employment earnings increased from $40,100 in the first year after landing to $47,500 a year later, while average employment earnings for pre-IRPA FSWs increased from $24,300 to $31,300 for the same time period.” Finally, while concerns were raised with respect to the legitimacy of some AEOs, “IMDB data show[ed] that the average employment earnings for FSWs with an AEO were $79,200 three years after landing, compared to $44,200 for those without” (ibid: 2-3). While the evaluation findings are mostly quite positive and promising, and suggest that the changes made in 2002 might be responsible for the improved economic outcomes of the skilled immigrants entering through FSW program after 2002, it is important to point to some concerns and limitation of this evaluation: • While the letters were sent to a randomly-selected group of 30,000 FSW, those who agreed to participate were self-selected and, as the report pointed out, they might have had different characteristics than those who chose not to participate, i.e. the sampling was not representative of the total sample (a larger proportion of British than the general population of FSWs and much smaller Chinese and Indian

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representation; 29% of participating FSWs had English as a mother tongue in comparison with 19% of total sample; participating FSWs were, on average, younger and much more likely to stay in the first place of their settlement); • Employers who were interviewed might have had a vested interest in the program as they’d rather support and take advantage of the program they used; • Finally, according to the report, “the sample of employers was developed based on referrals from FSWs … who are more likely to provide referrals to employers with whom they have a positive relationship” (ibid: 18); • There were challenges “with the design and data collection system” as for 80% of all approved applicants (those who were not asked to attend interviews) the selection points were reset to ‘0’ and this data had to be retrieved from paper applications. It was reported that when selection decision data (by CIC officers) was compared to paper screening (self-reported) points, there were some noteworthy variations (ibid: 18); • While CIC has acknowledged that the evaluation was conducted with the assistance of the third party (a consulting company) it is not clear whether the report provides an independent opinion and to what extent CIC staff was involved in finding interpretations.

Since July 1, 2012, the Federal Skilled Worker program has been frozen in an attempt to limit a growing backlog of FSW applications. The government will start accepting applications again no earlier than January 2013, when the revised FSWP selection criteria is expected to be finalized and new legislation is implemented. It is believed that the future FSW program will be significantly different from what we have seen before. From 2011 to 2012, CIC initiated nation-wide consultations and sought input from stakeholders on the proposed changes to the FSW. Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney has recently announced that the FSW program would undergo transformational changes (Friesen, 2012). These will include: • A new economic stream for trades professionals; • Higher language fluency benchmarks for language intensive fields (doctors, lawyers, etc.) and stricter language testing in general; • A pre-assessment process to evaluate the credentials of immigrants before they come to Canada, similar to credential evaluation processes in Australia; • Expression-of-interest system where employers are given more important roles in the selection of skills and talents and will be able to “hand-pick” the best and the brightest; • More emphasis on younger immigrants.

These policy shifts mirror similar changes in immigration processes earlier implemented in Australia. According to Skuterud, labour market outcomes for Australian immigrants, when compared to

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Canadian newcomers, “did not improve after testing was mandated” (ibid, emphasis supplied). While the average age of Australian newcomers went down, however, mandatory language testing also changed the mosaic of Australian immigrants “shifting immigration away from non-English speaking countries, China particularly” (ibid). The changes proposed to the FSW assessment criteria are summarized in Table P.2.

Table P.2 Changes Proposed to FSW Program as of October 2011

Factor Changes Justification Proposed Existing Maximum Maximum Points Points 1. Education - Reduce the number of years of education “Skilled tradespersons and 25 25 required to claim points for a trade or non- technicians who have a university post-secondary credential credential in their selected trade, but not the required years of education are disadvantaged and lose points” 2. Proficiency - Increase maximum points for the first 2005 Statistics Canada 28 24 in English or official language from 16 to 20 points study found that French - Introduce minimum language requirements immigrants with higher based on occupation English/French fluency have higher employment rates. 3. Work - Decrease the points allotted to work Research has shown that 15 21 Experience experience from 21 to 15 points experience outside of - Allows points to be redirected to language Canada is a weak predictor proficiency and age of success in the Canadian - Increase the range within which points are labour market allotted - Ensures that applicants have more experience in order to earn maximum points 4. Age - Award maximum points until age 35, with Research has shown that 12 10 a sequential levelling off to 49 – no age younger (20-30 year old) points awarded after age 50 immigrants have higher - Encourages younger immigrants to apply employment rates early to get maximum points – older applicants can still qualify, but will need high points in other factors - Increase weight of age on the grid from 10 to 12 points 5. Arranged - Strengthen regulatory provisions and The evaluation found that 10 10 Employment definitions to support a more rigorous up- some AOE were fraudulent front assessment of the employer and job - Enhance the authority for visa officers to assess the validity of the job offer and the applicant’s ability and likelihood to perform that employment 6. Adaptability No changes proposed. 10 10 10

Total 100 100 100 Source: CIC, 2011d.

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Appendix Q: Most Frequently Cited Reasons for High-level Immigration to Canada

This section provides a detailed overview of the five most cited reasons for high levels of immigration to Canada and offers some counter-arguments which question our government policy directions in this area.

1. DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS The working population is aging, the first cohort of baby boomers will be retiring in the next ten years. A prominent sociologist, Peter Li (2002), in his book, Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues, made a rather strong case in favour of increased immigration levels based on his analytical examination of existing academic literature and empirical data. Among other reasons, he called attention to Canadian demographic trends, whereby without high-influx of immigration, the Canadian population would progressively decrease. While the book is called ‘thought-provoking and enlightening” (Wong, 2003, online text), the lack of critical analysis of the anti-immigration discourse literature is one of its major drawbacks. In fact, while the media, social discipline scholars and public officials frequently refer to immigration as a solution to our demographic problems, there are other opinions with respect to the role of immigration in resolving Canadian demographic ‘crisis’ (Nadeau, 2011). To name a few, Roderic Beaujot of the Population Studies Centre at the University of Western Ontario, while recognizing immigration’s favourable impact in ‘increasing the cultural richness of Canada,’ pointed out that immigration “cannot stop demographic aging, … [and] accentuates the inequality in population distribution” (Beaujot, 2003: 16). The Canadian Chamber of Commerce (2009: 12) in its recent publication acknowledges that “immigration can raise population numbers; however, it will not slow the aging of the population”. Banerjee and Robson of C.D. Howe Institute also concluded in their 2009 report that “more and younger immigrants cannot, on their own, offset the impact of low past fertility on Canadian workforce growth, old-age dependency, and incomes per person. Later retirement, higher fertility, and faster productivity growth are more powerful tools to ease the stress of demographic change on Canadian living standards” (Banerjee and Robson, 2009, title page). Finally, even the Canadian government recognizes that “while immigration has a significant effect on the growth and diversity of Canada’s population and contributes towards meeting many of the country’s emerging labour requirements, its impact on population aging appears to be minor” (Martel and Caron-Malenfant, 2007). Thus, there is a consensus between scholars and policy makers that immigration on its own cannot reverse the aging process that has already begun in Canada.

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2. SKILL SHORTAGES It is difficult ‘to define and measure’ the skills imbalance as there is no ‘unambiguous single measure’ of this phenomenon and there are many different perspectives on the effect of government policies aimed to overcome labour shortages (Shah and Burke, 2005). Before delving into further examination of how immigration contributes to addressing skill shortages, it is necessary to understand whether there is a broad-based skill shortage in the country. Opinions are divided on this subject as well. A number of studies have shown that there is/will be a shortage of skilled workers across many sectors in Canada, as well as in other developed countries. In 2010, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce published its most recent report on skill shortages in Canada, which concluded that Canada would not have adequate human resources to meet the demands of its growing economy. According to the study, besides an aging population and high retirement rates, Canada’s workforce needs will be influenced by economic and communication globalization as well as technological advances which will change skill requirements and nature of work in many industries (The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2010). The study calls for an expansion of Canada’s labour force. However, a number of other scholars do not agree with this position. The study by McMullin and Cooke (2004), after analyzing the data from four sectors, such as nursing, information technology, skilled trades in manufacturing, and the biotechnology, concluded that while skill shortages will likely affect specific sectors and geographic locations “ it is unlikely that labour force ageing will generate widespread skill shortages [and] ‘hot-spots’ … are unlikely to create problems of crisis proportions” (McMullin and Cooke, 2004: i). Likewise, Bruce Stokes, the senior transatlantic fellow for economics at the German Marshal Fund of the United States, recently questioned the conventional wisdom of having looming skill shortages in the United States. He argued that there are many highly qualified Americans to meet current labour market demand and employers push ‘for higher-skilled immigration just to get cheaper labour” (Stokes, 2011). This view is shared by a Canadian economics professor, David Green, who argues that natural market responses to skill shortages, such as an increase in wages, can be hindered when the demand for workers is continuously satisfied via the influxes of immigrants (Green, 2011). Additionally, Shah and Burke while agreeing that immigration can be utilized as one of the policy instruments to address labour shortages, pointed out that “the arrival of migrants, with appropriate skills, often lag by a considerable time the actual occurrence of the shortage. Sometimes the market has already corrected itself by the time the migrants arrive. … Another problem is that migrants generally prefer settling in large metropolitan areas while the shortages are often in regional or remote areas” (Shah and Burke, 2005: 67). Finally, the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity recently published a brief stating that “at a national level, there

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is little evidence to support the existence of a secular trades-person shortage” (Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity website). As the older/younger worker ratio has not changed in Canadian trades since 1992, the unemployment rate for skilled trades was similar to all other occupations and “the growth in compensation has been slower among skilled trades than among all other occupations” (ibid).

3. ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION In 1995, the economic research firm DRI-McGraw Hill Inc. was one of the first most prominent studies in favor of high immigration rate. It suggested that while there is a cost associated with immigration in the short term, immigration will make significant positive economic impact in the long term (Beauchesne, 1995). From a macroeconomic perspective, if immigrants have more advanced skills than local workers and their qualifications are fully recognized by Canadian employers, then immigration will increase “productivity and therefore GDP per capita in the long run” (Nadeau, 2011). Furthermore, immigrants contribute to the economy by buying houses and goods, borrowing money and paying interest, opening businesses, etc. (ibid). Not surprisingly, the Canadian corporate world is also in favor of boosting immigration rates. For example, in 2005, the Royal Bank called for a 30% increase in the immigration rate to 400,000 annually (Keung, 2005). This position is understandable given that more immigrants mean more business for Canadian banks. The debate on whether immigration benefits the economy, or not, is not the central point of this thesis; however, it is important to highlight that a large body of researchers believe that the impact of mass immigration on a country’s economy is either fairly small or equals zero / negative economic gains (Borjas, 1999; Green and Green, 2004; Grubel, 2008; Macdonald, 1985). Recently, Irvin Studin, a scholar with the School of Public Policy and Governance, argued in his provocative essay, “Canada – Population 100 Million” (2010), for a dramatic increase in Canadian immigration rates if Canada is to become a nation of 100 million people. He argues that this is necessary for a country to rise as an international and economic power in the world. Part of Studin’s argument is guided by a notion that population growth is necessary for a country to ensure economic well-being. However, Don McRae of BC Statistics conducted a thorough examination on this subject and concluded that: “Based on research carried out at the national level, there is very little evidence to suggest that population growth is a major factor in determining economic wellbeing in an open economy. It is not so much population size that influences per capita output, but rather how that resource is utilized, or, in effect, the productivity of the population” (McRay, n.d.: 1)184.

184 Paper was accessed from BC Stats website. Based on bibliography used in MacRae’s paper, titled “Some Economic Issues Surrounding Population Change”, the paper was written in the late 1990s. 254

4. COMPETING GLOBALLY WITH INNOVATION Over 50 years ago, Jacobs (1961, 1969) pioneered the idea that the more diverse cities are, the more innovative and prosperous they are. In the global knowledge-based economy, Canada is competing for human capital with other developed countries, while experiencing the same demographic and labor shortage problems (Chambers et al. 1998; Bever, Stephenson and Tanner, 2005; Mahroum, 2001). As international markets become more and more competitive and technology oriented, people with unique skill sets are hard to come by. Not only does Canada compete with other countries such as New Zealand and Australia, which have established skilled worker immigration programs, it also competes for high-level human expertise with other developed countries which are introducing new incentives, procedures, legislation and labour market programs to attract skilled labour (McLaughlan and Salt, 2002; Mahroum, 2002; Diez Guardia and Pichelmann, 2006; Hercog, 2008). The Bridging the Gap study by SEO Economic Research estimated a potential employment gap of 35 million people in the European Union by 2050 and identified skill shortages, i.e. a qualitative employment gap, in Europe (Berkhout and van den Berg, 2010). Canada will be in tough competition with European countries for talent. Additionally, many studies have shown that immigrants boost innovation and competitiveness as migrants are by definition ‘seekers of a better way’ (Downie, 2010, online text). The Conference Board of Canada’s recent report examined different dimensions of innovation from research to business and global commerce sectors and concluded that immigrants make significant impacts on innovation performance in Canada (Downie, 2010). Similarly, a recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute emphasized the role immigrants play in boosting the competitiveness of American multinational companies (McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010). One common way to measure the presence of innovation is by the number of patents registered in a given area. This technique was used by Partridge and Furtan (2008), who found that skilled immigrants, particularly those from Western Europe and North America, boost patenting across Canada and, consequently create more entrepreneurial communities. Yet, another study that investigated how immigrants boost innovation in Europe, found that “the regions with relatively many immigrants do not have a positive or negative impact on the production of a higher number of patent applications”; however the multiplicity of immigrant skills and abilities as well as “the diversity of the immigrant communities beyond critical point” do advance the creation of new ideas which subsequently leads to an increased number of patents being registered as well as economic growth (Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2011: Abstract page; 18). Finally, Leon Bouvier, in his book Peaceful Invasions: Immigration and Changing America, argued that easy access to immigrant workers was one of the reasons why the American economy in the 1980s

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became more labour-intensive, in other words “if workers are readily available, firms are discouraged from buying machinery that can raise productivity” (Bouvier, 1992: 94).

5. NATION BUILDING In his latest speech at the Economic Club of Canada, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney described the driving factors behind the government’s strong stand on mass immigration to Canada: “We all know that within a few years, 100 percent of Canada’s labour market growth will be attributable to immigration rather than natural growth in our population. We also know that, with an aging population, we need newcomers to ensure that we have the workers and indeed taxpayers, but more importantly, citizens of the future. And we also recognize that Canada has deeply grounded in its history this tradition of diversity, of pluralism that is part of the reason for the dynamism of this country” (CIC, 2010g, emphasis supplied).

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Appendix R: Selected Fees for Ontario’s Self-regulated Professions

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Source: Ontario College of Teachers, 2011.

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Appendix S: List of TRIEC Staff, 2004-2010 185

Position/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1.Executive Director (2004-2006), Board Chair (2007- ! ! In- 2010) transition 2. Manager (2004), Director of Operations (2005-06), ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Executive Director (2007-2010) 3. Research and Information Coordinator (2004) ! ! ! ! ! Webmaster (2005-06), IT Coordinator (2007), IT Systems Analyst 4. Administrative Coordinator/Assistant (2004-09), ! ! ! ! ! ! Executive Assistant and Project Coordinator (2010) 5. Communications Coordinator (2004), Communications ! ! ! ! On On ! Consultant (2005-06), Manager, Communications (2007), leave leave on leave (2008), Manager, Operations-on leave (2009), Manager, Operations (2010) 6. Project Development Coordinator (2004-07), on leave ! ! ! ! On (2008) leave 7. The Mentoring Partnership Project Manager (2004-07), ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Manager, Corporate Partnerships (2008-2010) 8. The Mentoring Partnership Communications ! ! ! ! ! ! Coordinator, Manager Communications – (2008-2009) 9. The Mentoring Partnership PD and Training ! ! ! Coordinator 10. Hireimmigrants.ca Project Manager ! ! ! 11. Hireimmigrants.ca Communications Coordinator, ! ! ! (2005-06), Communications and Program Specialist (2007 12. Communications Consultant (2006), Communications ! ! ! ! Coordinator (2007, 2009-10) 13. Manager, Corporate and Stakeholder Relationships ! ! ! ! (York) 14. The Mentoring Partnership, Agency Liaison (2007-08), ! ! ! Training and Quality Assurance Specialist 15. Project Manager, Employer Roadmap ! 16. Manager, Corporate and Stakeholder Relations, ! ! ! ! Toronto (2007-09), Manager, Program Development 17. Manager, Policy ! 18. Program Manager, HR Workshops, The Change ! ! ! ! School, Ryerson University (2007), Manager, Training and Workshop Development, Employer Initiatives (2008-10) 19. Director, Operations/ Director of Programs ! ! ! 20. Manager, Corporate and Stakeholder Relations, Peel ! ! ! and Halton 21. PD Coordinator-acting (2008) ! 22. The Mentoring Partnership, Database Administrator ! ! (2008), IT Systems Coordinator (2009 23. Program Manager, Employer Initiatives ! 24. Media Relations and Communications Specialist ! ! 25. Manager, BUILD York I.T. ! ! 26. The Mentoring Partnership, Events Coordinator ! ! ! (2008), Program Support Coordinator (2009), Coordinator, Program Delivery (2010) 27. The Mentoring Partnership, Manager, Program ! ! Delivery 28. Director of Programs ! ! 29. Recruitment Network Manager ! 30. Employer Initiatives, Program Coordinator ! ! 31. Research and Curriculum Developer ! 32. Program Administrative Assistant ! Total by year 7 10 11 17 17 18 18

185 Job categories are colour-coded as follows: Grey-Administration; Green-Communications; Blue-Mentoring; Orange-Employer tools; Yellow-Employer Outreach. 259 Appendix T: TRIEC Project Milestones and Impacts 2003-2010

MILESTONES IMPACTS

2003-2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 OUTPUTS OUTCOMES B Launched - Another 120 - 500th intern was - 780 interns since the - over 220 new - 1,000 paid - 300 new internships -1,300 - 75-80% found employment

in 2003 interns placed placed launch of the program internships internships since internships in their fields - 225 - 130 GTA - 112 new host the launch of the - 350 interns employer hosts organizations joined program employers RIDGE

CAREER CAREER BRIDGE placed hosted interns Launched - 548 immigrants - 870 new matches, - 1,150 new matches - 1,100 new - 1,000 new - 600 new matches - 5,600 -75-80% found employment in 2004 registered 550 found full time - three new community matches matches matches in their field - 250 - 543 new employment partners - 800 new - First law firm - 12 - 98% of mentees gained a matches matches made - 40 corporate - 11 new corporate mentors joined and a hospital as community better understanding of

-224 found full partners in the MP partners - Operation is corporate partners partners relevant professional skills time employment - Jun ’06 – launched - Awarded the expanded to - TRIEC receives - close to 50 Systemic change: Mentor/Mentee of Canadian Institute Peel, Halton the Canadian corporate - mentors change their the Year Awards 2007 Urban and York Centre for partners recruitment behaviours Leadership Award for Diversity’s Legacy - Created a corporate culture of

THE MENTORINGTHE PARTERSHIP City Initiatives Award for the MP mentoring immigrants in GTA Launched in June - 48,000 unique Jan ’07 – Job - Jan ’08 – in - Developed - 2 webinars are delivered - 275,000 - Example of change: Worked ‘05 visitors; Developers Network is partnership cultural - Guides for cultural unique visitors with local HR professional - Nov ’05 - over 7,000 established through with Ryerson competency competency videos are - 11,000 users organization to embed How-to - weekly e-tips downloads of CASIP agencies – University videos developed viewed cultural competency - a discussion workshops and shared 275 job leads launched How- - 6 webinars TRIEC’s workshops into organization’s forum tools; -5 webinars to HR cultural PD schedule. No follow-up

- development of - 650 online workshops for competence information about the results HR workshops / subscribers employers videos was found. teleseminars - 136 participants of - Website is - 350 - market research tele-seminars revamped participants with SME - 3 webinars - Since 2005 – attended 225,000 TRIEC’s Ho- unique visitors To HR - 7 webinars workshops

HIREIMMIGRANTS.CA - Letter to - Jan 2005 – - Jan ‘06 – HRSDC - Jan ’07 - Award - Aug ‘08 CBC - Integrating - Fifth Annual IS Awards – - 100 requests - Example of change: the issue PM Immigrant and RBC fund the winning public Toronto joins Talent videos 4 categories to show of immigrant integration written by Success Award IS program awareness campaign is HR Reporter launched TRIEC tv ads received more attention from TRIEC’s framework is - Jun ‘06 – first IS launched and Toronto - 100 media the public and all important Chair developed Awards presented - Second Toronto Star Star as a media stories stakeholders. However, the - Immigrant May-Jun – ‘World special edition on partner on the - 11 ‘20 emphasis of the educational Success Award of Experience’ immigrants IS Award Journey campaign was on promoting

launched in 2005 Week: 20 journeys - 20 Journey exhibition exhibits’ the business case only. launched; first - TV ads - 4 New Toronto Star special - Subway ads Worker, New edition on - hireimmigrant videos Skills special immigrants - Best Employer for sections in New Canadians is Toronto Star launched read by 4,000,000 readers

PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGNAWARENESS PUBLIC

260

MILESTONES IMPACTS

2003-2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-2011 OUTPUTS OUTCOMES - Dominic - IGR - worked with - TRIEC is - Dec ’08 - BUILD - 450 jobs posting shared -30 employers joined Example of policy change: D’Alessandro, Committee CASIP incorporated York is launched through CASIP Council TRIEC and partners Manulife as produced agencies – - Board of recruitment (Job - 50 employers joined the contributed to the re-design of TRIEC’s Chair study: To promoted Directors is Developer) network MP the training and employment - Engaged 250 Employment Skills selected -New TRIEC’s Chair- - 42 employers referred services – new Labour Market citizens on the - over 100 International among Gordon M. Nixon, RBC by TRIEC to the CASIP Development Agreement in Council employers database active recruitment network 2007 - Created Inter are on board - delivered participants - 3,000 HR professional Government through sector-specific on Council reached through industry Relations various job fairs events

STAKEHOLDER/EMPLOYE COLLABORATIONS R Committee projects - Jun ’07 – ALLIES provided - TRIEC receives the - ALLIES hosts - 500 leaders attended Example of change: TRIEC Learning funds to Halifax, Government of Ontario’s Learning Exchange, ALLIES national showed how the benefits of Exchange Montreal, Newcomer Champion “Putting Ideas into conferences multi-stakeholder approach Conference Saskatoon, Award Action” in 2010 - 10 immigrant works to funders and other – ALLIES Edmonton and - 2nd ALLIES employment councils groups. launched Vancouver to Conference established in Canada - Attended establish local multi- ALLIES holds “Leading - 6 mentoring programs by 130 stakeholder with Ideas” Learning started in regions participants collaborations using Exchange - 5 national employer from 18 TRIEC’s approach partnerships established

SHARINGKNOWLEDGE regions - Living the - Jan ’07 - Aug ’08 – partnered - Scan of existing -Scotiabank - 600 immigrants made Examples of change: Dream full Supporting with OCASI to set immigrant networks – announced its connections through - TRIEC engaged private day seminar CAMP – up profession- online directory sponsorship of the multiple networking corporation to fund the - Attended immigrant specific discussions - Launch of Professional Immigrant events capacity building project for by 500 professional on Settelement.org Immigrant Network Networks - 20 immigrant networks Immigrant Professional immigrants organization Nov ’08 – “The - Network Leaders -Feb ’10- Hosted representing 10,000 Networks Power Of Roundtable is convened the first Learning immigrants, benefited - TRIEC builds better

Networking” event Exchange from sharing common connections between attended by 500 - Launch of conference, 20 challenges and success at immigrant professional groups; immigrants - Achieving Success in the network leaders TRIEC hosted events enhances their capacity to Workplace -90-day shared their advocate for themselves support for working practices newcomers - Hosted 4 training sessions for network leaders - May ’10 supported the development of group mentoring proposal – a collaboration of 5 PINs and local community agency

WORKING DIRECTLY WITH IMMIGRANTS WITH DIRECTLY WORKING

261 Appendix U: TRIEC’s Factors, Sub-Factors and Indicators At-Glance

High Standard Practices Action-oriented Strong Leaders Employer-focused Communicative Local

oriented -

oriented oriented -

Clear Goals the about Reporting results Outcome in is info Funding the public domain IEC is an expert in the area Action philosophy programs Multiple Results Tangible Hosting Organization Leaders Business Municipality Local support Representation Recognition Participation Communication Capacity Awarenes Raising Demographics, Immigration Civic Policies, movement Economy Local Municipality Capacity

driven 10 -

yr. st time -

blic Awareness Awareness blic At least 9 least At employers engaged in 1 multicult. Strong and immigr. Polic. Goals are on the the on are Goals website with Report Annual results and Objectives impacts identified $ with Reports Annual IEC produced briefs etc. results Fast Mentoring Pu Campaign the in program 1st first 12 months HO launches EDof programs is IEC of Chair leader business launches Mayor events/pilot programs IEC’s are Employers clients web IEC’s from Links to employers Full Communication specialist Events Organizing IEC is in 500,000 plus CMA/region of presence Strong specific sectors

in -

ed with

yr.

y nd

Corporate Corporate sponsorship over 20% or > Goals are on on are Goals materials other Public independent evaluation Indicators identified shar is $ the public Champions open wrote letters a has HO flexible structure Internship Employer forums are Results reported in first years 2 Info about IEC is on HO website a is Municipality pilot in partner programs BODare The mostl employers are Employers featured in articles 20 least At employers the 2 updates Monthly to members/public Employer Awards % immigr. Large - 200,000 of number Large HQs Mayor Strong support

mber

Prov. Prov.

re on - since

cultural

At least 50 least At empl. IEC started Leader names are are names Leader web the on a Results the web Benchmarks identified Intergovernment al Committee Cross for workshops employers programs Other 100 least At immigrants benefited Info about IEC is in HO’s reports bus. 3 least At leaders are prog. Champ. staff Municipal is IEC me are Council mostly employers Employers receive presti award gious Quarterly to updates public about Articles IECs Fed NO Immigration Agreement cicle Economy’s Diversity EEO, Departments

business business

since

EC started EC History is on the the on is History we are Results shared at IEC Summit Outcomes, inputs and ident. outputs Employer Awards 200 least At immigrants benefited members Board are involved in IEC from Links employer to IEC’s website a is HO organization 100 least At empl. I reports Annual about activities local in Column newspaper Issues are raised business by leaders Immigr. Empl. Program(s) IEC an before

change

as result of - least 300 Group terms of of terms Group reference are on the web o Levels identified resources Online for employers At benefited HO of History involved being in the issue a is Chair leaders business Twitter/blog/ne to accessible ws public on Presence TV/Radio IEC employer forum Municipality role in the devel. IEC of

web IEC’s research is on the Online resources for immigrants

IEC is an expert in the area

262 Appendix V: Developing Success Factor Comparative Framework

As seen in Table V.1, the success factors identified by key informants served as a baseline for the development of the comparative framework. At least eleven of TRIEC’s key informants mentioned ‘trust and personal relationships’ as one of the pre-conditions of TRIEC’s succces. As mentioned before, my research methodology did allow examining trust and personal relation factors for the reasons explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.8 (Sampling and Limitations of the study). However, even if “Trust and Personal Relationship” responses were not included in the HSP factor group, the latter would still remain the most important factor group, based on other related answers in this category.186 The study included two major phases whereby the first phase aimed to identify major success factor categories based on common themes found in key stakeholder interviews. Then, critical success factors/indicators were discovered by comparing activities and approaches (indicators) between other IECs and TRIEC. The second phase was done through structured interviews with representatives of IECs across Canada. The study’s second phase was guided by the following principle: (1) The structured interviews were introduced to obtain the data which could be analyzed using simple quantitative methods. Structured interview questions were mostly the polar questions which required yes/no or true/false answers in order to determine if certain activities/approaches were taken (equals ‘1’) or not (equals ‘0’). This strategy precludes perception calls by interviewees and benefits from the answers based on facts that could be verified; (2) Additionally, only one representative from each IEC was interviewed; (3) Moreover, all indicator data with respect to TRIEC was retrieved from preliminary interviews and no follow up interviews with TRIEC stakeholders were required, given the proposed design of the study. However, further investigation and comparative analysis of ‘building relationship’ processes between TRIEC stakeholders and among those involved in other IECs would have required collecting data in additional open-ended interviews. Secondly, the data won’t be validated if only one representative per IEC provides his/her perceptions about the processes of building trust and relationships. Thus, a further investigation and interviewing of TRIEC stakeholders would have been required to identify TRIEC’s internal trust and relationship building processes for comparative analysis. This type of research design is out of the scope of this study and, therefore, no separate sub-factor/indicator was developed for this category.

186 Currently, the HSP factor reflects 33 key informant responses. If eleven ‘trust and personal relationship’ responses were subtracted, then, the remaining 22 responses would still make HSP the most important success factor followed by Action-oriented approach factor (21 responses).

263

Table V.1 TRIEC’s Key Informant Success Factor Responses by Factors and Sub-factors

Examples of Sub-factors in CSFF TRIEC Success Factors in semi-structural interviews, n=98 HIGH STANDARD PRACTICES - Good management of relationships and building the right partnerships/ willing to All sub-factors in HSP listen to stakeholders / innovative and responsive to change (n=11) - Created respect among stakeholders about their work / became central resource- HSP5: TRIEC is an expert in the expert (n=9) field - Everyone bought into the vision/Cohesion among stakeholders/Engaging groups HSP1: Clear Directions, Governance that could make a difference vs. those that have to be around politically (n=4) HSP2: Consistent Reporting to the public - Quality of work/running the organization as a business (n=3) HSP3: Outcome-oriented - Collecting and reporting metrics (n=3) HSP4: Funding info is in the public domain (website, etc.) - Clearly articulated goals (n=3) HSP1: Clear Directions, Governance Total Responses n=(33) Sub-factors (5) Indicators (21) ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH - Action-oriented: Actions vs. consultations/Actions first-governance second/Action All A sub-factors on solutions vs. problem; Direct actions to impact immigrants in the first 2 years of TRIEC existence/Successful innovative pilot programs (n=15) - Scale up successful innovative projects (n=4) A2: Tangible Results are Generated - Did not ask for permission/risk taker (n=2) A1: Action-oriented philosophy Total Responses (n=21) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (16) STRONG LEADERSHIP MODEL (SL) - Unique Leaders on both staff and Board (n=8) SL2: Employer Leadership SL3: Municipal Leadership - Host agency/Unique structure of host agency/Existing body of knowledge SL1: Leadership from Host developed by the organization/Existing relationships with the City of T/Career Organization Bridge (n=6) Total Responses (n=14) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (12) EMPLOYER-DRIVEN and -FOCUSED COUNCIL (E) - Employer driven / Corporate engagement/Access to employers through TCSA E3: Employers participate (n=6) increasingly … - Employer-focused/speaking employer language (n=5) E1: Employers are well represented… - Creating business opportunities for employers (n=2) E1. Employers are well represented Total Responses (n=13) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (11) COMMUNICATION STRATEGY (C) - Strong and variety of communication mechanisms/raising public awareness/honest All sub-factors marketing / professional communication products (n=8) Total Responses (n=8) Sub-factors (2) Indicators (10) UNIQUE LOCATION 5. Unique location (number of immigrants, economy, # of HQ, civic movement- All sub-factors TCSA, City of Toronto Mentoring Program/immigrant policies, No Federal- Provincial Agreement) (n=7) Total Responses (n=7) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (13) OTHER - Level of funding (n=2) – Category C and E respondents Not included Total Responses (n=2) Sub-factors (3) Indicators (13) Total Responses (n=98) Sub-factors (19) Indicators (83)

264

Appendix W: Developing Indicators and Sub-factors

HIGH STANDARD PRACTICES FACTOR

In total, 21 indicators and five sub-factors were developed for the High Standard Practices (HSP) factor (Table W.1). Participants provided a number of examples of TRIEC activities/actions that showcased TRIEC’s high standard operating practices (clear directions, annual reports, outcome oriented, expert in the field etc.). Indicators are intended to dig deeper in the abstract concepts. Thus, for the majority of indicators, TRIEC received perfect scores as most of the indicators were drawn on examples about TRIEC. Additionally, some indicators came about as a result of key informant definitions of phenomena discovered in in-depth discussions on the subject. For example, one of the offered definitions of transparency is ‘how the decisions are made’. Key informants felt that a publicly-funded organization, such as TRIEC, has to be transparent about its operations by default. Thus, having Board/Council meeting notes publicly accessible is one way of sharing information about how certain decisions were made. If an IEC went through an independent evaluation, this would be another example of its accountability to the public. For the above- mentioned example (independent evaluation), TRIEC received a value of ‘0’ on the corresponding indicators as there was no independent evaluation of TRIEC which is accessible to the public and no notes from Board / Council meetings were made public. Thus, while TRIEC served as a benchmark for success for the 81 out of 84 indicators, in very few occasions, indicators didn’t reflect ‘perfect’ or 100% performance for TRIEC but rather reflected logical conclusions from interview responses and/or literature review.

It is worth mentioning that where it was possible, all sub-factor indicators were verified. However, five indicators that belong to the ‘Outcome-oriented’ sub-factor were not verified. This type of information is not publicly available for most of the IECs as many of them do not report on their outcomes. In general, IECs provided examples of how different types of outcomes were identified and what they were.

Table W.1 High Standard Practices Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factors Indicators 1.1 Goals are on the website 1. Clear directions and governance 1.2 Goals are on other promotional materials 1.3 Board/Council/Working Group Meeting Notes are on the website 1.4 Council/Board member names are on the website/Annual Reports 1.5 History of why and how an IEC was created is on the website 1.6 Terms of reference for WG and Council are on the website 1.7 Research of IEC is on the website 2.1 Publicly accessible Annual Report 2. Consistent reporting to the public about the 2.2 Publicly accessible independent evaluation result 2.3 Results of the program/IEC work are on the website

265

Sub-factors Indicators 2.4 Results are shared at the IEC Annual Summits187 3.1 Long-term impacts and short-term objectives are identified 3. Outcome-oriented approach 3.2 Outcome indicators are identified 3.3 Indicator benchmarks are identified 3.4 Qualitative, quantitative outcomes and inputs and outputs are identified 188 3.5 Individual /organizational/societal changes are identified 4. Funding financial information is in the 4.1 Annual Reports with financial statement are on the website public domain (amount of funding and 4.2 Financial information is easily accessible through other channels spending) (Hosting agency reports, articles, sponsor website etc.) 5. IEC is an expert / go-to resource in the area 5.1 IEC produced briefs / responses to government actions/policies; of immigrant integration research in the area of immigrant integration 5.2 Champions wrote open letters to public officials 5.3 IEC brought together three levels of government into the Inter Governmental Committee189

ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH Eighteen indicators and three sub-factors were identified for the Action-oriented Approach or ‘A’ factor (Table W.2). Similarly to the ‘HSP’ factor, sub-factors and indicators for ‘A’ factor were developed based on the responses from key informants. For example, the Action-oriented philosophy sub-factor was informed by statements about TRIEC’s ‘quick wins and risk-taking philosophy’ as well as a suggestions about Maytree’s unique flexible governance structure which definitely contributed to TRIEC’s ability to move quickly in the early days. Additionally, key informants mentioned TRIEC’s capacity to initiate not one but a number of successful programs. It is reflected in the second sub-factor – Multiple Programs, which include nine indicators reflecting different programs. All indicators for Sub-factor 2 ‘Multiple programs are initiated’ were verified. The rest of the answers were reflected based on IEC’s responses.

Table W.2 Action-oriented Approach Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factors Indicators 1.1 Idea generation and fast results is the foundation for IEC success 1. Action-oriented philosophy 1.2 IEC’s HO has a flexible governance structure 2.1 Mentoring 2. Multiple programs are initiated 2.2 Internships 2.3 Cross-cultural workshops for employers 2.4 Employer Awards 2.5 Online resources for employers

187 A question, informing this indicator was not included in the original questionnaire which was distributed to all IECs. An indicator was added as at least two key informants suggested the importance of information. All IECs / their publically accessible materials were followed up to collect information. 188 Initially, separate indicators were developed for three dimensions, i.e. “We keep track of (1) qualitative outcomes; (2) quantitative outcomes; (3) our inputs and outputs. However, as all but one IEC responded either with all ‘yes’ or all ‘no’ answers to all three questions, three indicators were combined into one and the wording was changed to : “... were identified” vs. “keep track of …” as one of IECs reported that they identified all three dimensions but did not keep track of inputs and outputs. 189 A question, informing this indicator was not included in the original questionnaire which was distributed to all IECs. See previous notes for further explanation. 266

Sub-factors Indicators 2.6 Online resources for immigrants 2. Multiple programs are initiated 2.7 Public Awareness campaigns 2.8 Employer Forums/Events 2.9 Other – Speed Networking, Connector, Loans, Immigrant Forums, Hiring Practices Assessments 3.1 First program is generated in the first 12 months of IEC’s work 3. Tangible results are generated 3.2 Tangible results are reported to the public in the first 24 months of IEC’s work 3.3 At least 100 immigrants participated/benefited from programs 3.4 At least 200 immigrants participated/benefited from programs 3.5 At least 300 immigrants participated/benefited from programs

STRONG LEADERSHIP MODEL Three sub-factors and twelve indicators were developed for the Strong Leadership Model (L) factor (Table W.3). Indicators for this factor are intended to investigate whether three levels of leadership that were noted in TRIEC’s case were present for other IECs and at what level. In this study, it is proposed that TRIEC’s strong leadership had three major pillars – Host organization’s (HO) stewardship, Business leaders’ support, and Local municipal leadership in the area of immigrant integration. However, ‘sub- factors’ are still intangible unless they are defined by actions and facts. For example, to show the level of leadership support from an HO, I looked at the following facts: whether the HO’s Executive Directors/Presidents launched the IEC’s programs; whether information/logo/link about the IEC was on the HOs’ websites; whether Board members of HOs were involved, etc. The vast majority of all indicators for this factor were verified and/or respondents were asked to provide examples supporting their answers.

Table W.3 Strong Leadership Model Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factors Indicators 1. Strong leadership support from the Host Organization 1.1 ED/President of HO launches IEC programs (HO) 1.2 Info/logo/link about IEC is on the HO’s website 1.3 Info about IEC is in HO reports 1.4 Board members of HO are involved in the IEC 1.5 HO has a history of being a strong advocate in the area of immigrant integration (sponsor, research, events, programs) 2. Strong leadership support from prominent business leaders 2.1 Chair/Champion of IEC are employers 2.2 Employers act as corporate sponsors ($ and in-kind) 2.3 At least 3 Council/Board member launches events/Champion of the program 2.4 Link to/info about IEC from employer website 3. Strong leadership support from local government 3.1 Mayor launches events/pilot programs 3.2 Municipality is a partner in pilot programs 3.3 Municipal Staff is a Council/Working Group member

267

EMPLOYER-DRIVEN AND -FOCUSED COUNCIL There are three sub-factors and fourteen indicators in the Employer-driven and -focused Council factor (Table W.4). Several key informants suggested that the uniqueness of TRIEC’s approach in addressing immigrant employment challenges was rooted in its ability to engage the broad business community. Employer-driven initiative was quite a different approach from most of the previous efforts by not-for-profit organizations, which focus mainly on immigrant deficiencies and needs. This meant that they concentrated their efforts on assisting immigrants to become more ‘employable’ by providing language training, general job search and other basic settlement services. TRIEC’s strategy was to find solutions that would not only assist skilled immigrants to find jobs and employers to find qualified workers but, arguably, to change business community perceptions about the value of immigrant skilled labour. Thus, TRIEC managed to engage employers in such a way that businesses looked at it as their project. As a result, there was a greater ‘buy-in’ from the corporate partners. In other words, while TRIEC’s eventual goal is to assist immigrants, it does so by addressing employers’ needs and, ultimately, the focus of TRIEC, at least in the first five years, was on employers as their main ‘clients’ / ’customers’/ ’champions’. Therefore, one of the indicators for this factor looked at the philosophical approach of IECs, i.e. ‘who their major clients are?’ Other indicators showed whether Board/Councils are composed of employers and whether an IEC’s hosting organization is a business organization.

Table W.4 Employer-driven and -focused Council Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factor Indicator 1.1. IEC’s philosophical approach “Our clients are mostly 1. Employer représentation employers” 1.2 The Board of Directors is composed mostly of employers 1.3 The Council /Champion Circle is composed mostly of employers 1.4 HO is a business organization 2.1 Links from IEC’s website to Board/Council employer 2. Employer recognition members 2.2 Board/Council employer members are mentioned in articles written about IEC’s work/programs 2.3 Board/Council employer members are recognized as either Canadian Best Diversity Employers and/or Best Employers for New Canadians 3.1 At least 9-10 employers are engaged on Council/programs 3. Employer participation in the first year 3.2 At least 20 employers are engaged on Council/programs in the second year 3.3 At least 50 employers/hiring managers participated in programs since an IEC was formed 3.4 At least 100 employers/hiring managers participated in programs since an IEC was formed

268

The latter is another indicator, which was introduced based on key informant suggestions. Although TRIEC was hosted by the Maytree Foundation, a number of interviewees suggested that for other IECs, having business organizations as their hosting agencies would be beneficial since other communities might not have as strong support from business communities as TRIEC did through the TCSA/Civic Action. Thus, this indicator reflects key informant suggestions with regards to the role of hosting business organization. Key informants advised that it was important for employers to get recognized for their efforts. Thus, one of the sub-factors explored different ways in how an IEC recognizes its employer members, i.e. whether there are links from IEC’s website to employer partners, whether employer-members are mentioned in articles etc. Another sub-factor looked at the level of employer engagement that IECs were able to initiate, sustain and grow (number of employers engaged in the first/second years). Yet another indicator looked at whether IECs were able to engage high profile employers, which received Canada’s Best Diversity/New Canadian Employer Awards, etc. While it is recognized that not all regions might have head quarters of employers which have won such prestigious awards, the vast majority of larger financial and accounting/audit firms such as RBC, BMO Financial Group, TDBank Financial Group as well as Deloitte and Touche LLP, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PWC have their branches across Canada. Besides, there are close to 80 federal and provincial agencies, crown corporations, municipalities, universities and private companies which received these awards and which are located in different regions across Canada.190

COMMUNICATION AND AWARENESS RAISING STRATEGIES Two sub-factors and ten indicators were developed to investigate Communication and Awareness Raising strategies (Table W.5). The first sub-factor looked at the communication capacities of IECs and TRIEC. Many key informants stressed the importance of having professional communication staff to advance IEC’s objectives. Thus, the study investigated how many IECs had Communication Coordinators/professionals on staff. Additionally, key stakeholders talked about the unique ability of TRIEC to keep their partners and the general public informed. Therefore, it was investigated whether other IECs used certain tactics to inform their stakeholders about the progress and keep the general public informed about the challenges immigrants experience and the successes of IEC programs. All indicators for this factor were verified.

190 The financial institutions and accounting & audit companies, which were mentioned, received either of one Canadian Employer Awards (Diversity/Tope Employers for New Canadians). List of companies is retrieved from Canada’s Top 100 Employers website. 269

Table W.5 Communication and Public Awareness Strategy Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factor Indicator 1. Communication capacity 1.1 IEC has a full-time Communication Coordinator 1.2 Monthly updates are sent to stakeholder about its progress / activities / current development in the area of immigrant integration 1.3 Quarterly updates are sent to stakeholders 1.4 Annual Reports about IEC activities are published 1.5 General public could subscribe to IEC’s newsletter/twitter/blog191 2. Raising awareness campaign 2.1 Events, conferences are organized for employers / immigrants192 2.2 Employer Awards are initiated193 2.3 Articles about IEC and its programs are in the mainstream newspapers throughout the year (at least two articles) 2.4 IEC partnered with mainstream newspapers to have monthly/annual special editions about immigrant challenges/successes 2.5 IEC’s story/program/successes are discussed on TV/Radio

UNIQUE LOCATION There are three sub-factors and thirteen indicators for the Unique Location (UL) factor (Table W.6). Other researchers, as well as key informants for this study, identified a number of unique factors that contributed to the success of TRIEC. The first Unique Location sub-factor looked at the demographics of regions where IECs are located. It also explored the state of immigration policies in the provinces where IECs are located, i.e. whether Federal-Provincial Immigration Agreements were in place before IECs were formed.

As was mentioned before, key informants and other researchers suggested that because there was no such an agreement in Ontario by the time TRIEC was formed, there was little coordination between immigrant settlement services and the funding in this sector was poorly coordinated and distributed. It was argued that TRIEC was established at the right time, when there was a need for this type of multi- stakeholder collaboration at the vertical and horizontal levels. On another note, Good (2010) as well as many participants of this study, argued that TRIEC’s connection with the TCSA/CivicAction allowed it to access the employer community in a way no other advocacy and/or service organization was able to do before. Thus, two indicators look at whether there were similar civic movements in other jurisdictions and

191 A question, informing this indicator was not included in the original questionnaire which was distributed to all IECs. 192 Data for this indicator was included in ‘A’ factor, Sub-factor 2: Multiple Programs but it was divided between two indicators: 2.8 Employer Forums/Events and 2.9 Other Programs (immigrant forums). 193 This indicator was included in ‘A’ factors, Sub-factor 2: Multiple Programs where it was counted as one of the programs and in ‘CS’ factor it reflects the PR strategy. 270

if any of the IECs were created as a result of an employer/civic leaders forum. Furthermore, the state of the economy was investigated as well as the state and history of multicultural and immigration policies in local municipalities. While Sub-factor 3: Leadership from the Local Government in the Strong Leadership Model factor looked at actual support that municipalities provided to IECs, Sub-factor Three in the Unique Location factor looked at the capacity of municipalities to provide this support. As it was argued before, the City of Toronto had a unique capacity to support and provide leadership for TRIEC and Sub- factor 3 provides an opportunity to compare whether other cities enjoyed somewhat similar support from their respected municipalities/regions.

Table W.6 Unique Location Sub-factors and Indicators

Sub-factor Indicator 1. Demographics, immigration policies and civic movement 1.1 IEC is located in 500,000+ city/CMA/region 1.2 Large immigrant population (over 20% or over 200,000) 1.3 NO Federal-Provincial Immigration Agreement before IEC was launched 1.4 Immigrant challenges are identified at business forum(s) as a barrier for city’s growth 1.5 IEC was created as a result of employer / civic leader forum 2. Local economy 2.1 Strong presence of selected business sector(s) 2.2 Strong presence of HQs 2.3 When IEC was formed the economy was in a in state of growth 3. State and history of multicultural and immigration policies 3.1 Strong history of multicultural and immigrant policies in in local municipalities the city 3.2 Strong Mayor/Council support of immigrant/multicultural issues before IEC was formed 3.3 The City has departments dedicated to diversity/racial/immigrant issues (Diversity/EEO Departments) 3.4 The City introduced programs to support immigrant economic integration before IEC was launched 3.5 Municipality played a role in the development / launch of an IEC194

Finally, while the vast majority of indicators, included in the comparative analysis are verifiable, it is important to keep in mind that responses by IEC representatives in this section are subjective. For example, while demographics are easily verifiable, opinions provided regarding the state of the economy are subjective as IECs were launched in different years and different regions have distinctive economic conditions. What this indicator showed is whether IEC’s leaders thought that their groups were created in favourable times or not.

194 A question, informing this indicator was not included in the original questionnaire which was distributed to all IECs. See previous notes for further explanation. 271

Appendix X: Issues identified in “Fulfilling the Promise” white paper, 2002 versus TRIEC’s actions by 2012

Cited Reason for Immigrant Issue affecting immigrant integration Issue TRIEC’s Poor Employment Outcomes identified actions by in 2002 2012

Composition of - Levels of education and existing supporting systems are No Advocacy, immigrants entering different for different immigrant classes, i.e. temporary workers Policy briefs country are not eligible for many services

Fluency in the official - Immigrants do not have sufficient level of English/French Yes Report on the language fluency for certain professions/occupations research - Limited scope and breadth of profession-specific language Yes Info on website training for immigrants TTRIBUTES

A - Limited access to funds for training by immigrants Yes Info on website Lack of social networks - Over 80% of jobs are filled in through referrals and word of Yes Mentoring mouth Partnership

ERSONAL - Without professional and personal connections, immigrants (MP) P do not have access to this fragment of the labour market Fluctuations in economy - Employers are not expanding or freezing their hiring No Not known - ‘Business case’ for hiring immigrants does not apply as much during these times Increased number of - More competition from Canadian-born workers No Not known

EVELOPMEN educated Canadian-born

OCIETAL OCIETAL S D workersT Foreign credential - In regulated professions Yes Not known recognition process - In regulated trades No Not known - In non-regulated professions: challenges with no Yes Raising standardization of FCE processes across provinces Awareness Campaign (RA) Canadian work - Employers do not want to hire somebody who might not be Yes Career Bridge experience familiar with “… [occupational] code of ethics, Canadian (CB) legislated requirement, knowledge of occupational health and safety legislations, confidentiality expectations, organizational structures, and protocols for communication”195 Employer discriminatory - Employers are not familiar with foreign credentials, etc. Yes RA, MP, etc.

ALIZED BARRIERS ALIZED practices - Employers discriminate against immigrants because of the No Not known public stigma, i.e. ‘refugees are uneducated’ - Employers discriminate against immigrants because of the No Not known historic development of Canadian society, i.e. ‘visible minority immigrants are not as efficient as Canadian-born workers or NSTITUTION I those from Western Europe etc. ‘ Union protectionism - Preference in hiring - to union workers even if they meet only No Not known minimal requirements for jobs Lack of coordination - Duplication of services and competition vs. collaboration Yes Collaborations: between local settlement MP, CB agencies - Difficulties for immigrants to access information Yes Blogs, website Lack of coordination - Duplication of funding Yes Inter-

between three levels of - Limited role of municipalities to participate in policy governmental government/funders development work Committee - Different agendas for different government agencies: EASONS

R economic, multiculturalism, etc. Capacity and - Settlement workers do not necessarily have adequate No MP – employer

THER qualifications of knowledge on specific professions or occupations/limited relations by O settlement sector workers experience working with the employer community, etc. TRIEC

195 Alboim & Maytree Foundation, 2002: 31. 272