Review No. 65

Review no. 65

Press Review 16—31 March 2014

Table of Contents Pages African Union - Le CPS de l'UA, en sa 425ème réunion tenue le 24 mars 2014, a adopté une décision sur la Revue stratégique des opérations de l'Opération hybride UA-Nations unies au Darfour (MINUAD) 4 - The PSC of the AU, at its 425th meeting held on 24 March 2014, adopted a decision on the Strategic Review of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) operations 7 - Le CPS de l'UA, en sa 425ème réunion, tenue le 24 mars 2014, a suivi des communications sur l’évolution de la situation en Somalie 9 - The PSC of the AU, at its 425th meeting, held on 24 March 2014, was briefed on the situation in Somalia 12 - La MISCA condamne vigoureusement les attaques injustifiées contre son personnel 14 - MISCA strongly condemns the murder of a peacekeeper in the northern CAR town of Boali 15 - AMISOM and Somali National Army capture Qoryooley 16 - Visite de travail du Chef de la MISAHEL S.E. Pierre Buyoya à la Mission de formation de l'Union Européenne au Mali (EUTM-Mali) 17 - 4th Meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic - Brazzaville, Republic of The Congo Friday, 21 March 2014 18 - 4ème Réunion du Groupe International de Contact sur la République Centrafricaine - Brazzaville, République du Congo 21 Mars 2014 24 - MISCA welcomes the change in the curfew time in Bangui and the rest of the Central African territory 31 - La MISCA se Félicite de la modification des horaires du couvre-feu à Bangui et sur l’étendue du Territoire centrafricain 32 - MISCA empowers CAR women to promote social cohesion, conflict resolution and a culture of peace 33

Terrorism in Africa - From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed 35

CAR - Will Central African Republic become a battleground for religious radicals? 53

Egypt - 529 Sentenced to Death in My Country 57

Libya - Op-Ed: Libya, facing possible civil war, asks for help against terrorism 60 - Libya seeks world help after bombings 62 - Tripoli vows to fight terrorist groups 63 - Libya mobilizes forces to fight 'terrorist groups' 64

Mali - Mali/touareg: un ex-cadre du MNLA crée un mouvement dissident 67 - Justice « en marche », mais des progrès à faire sur les crimes du Nord (ONG) 68

Niger - États-Unis : une coopération militaire soutenue 72

Nigeria - Boko Haram: 10 lessons from Biafra 78 - Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria 82

Rwanda - Murder Leads to Tension Between South Africa, Rwanda 93

Somalia - Are we just going to sit around and wait to be blown to bits by terrorists? 95

Sudan - KHARTOUM: REALLY OUT OF THE TERRORISM BUSINESS? – ANALYSIS 102

Tunisia - Tunisia, Arab Spring's birthplace, takes on militants 110

International organizations

UN - Combattre le «terrorisme nucléaire» 116

Terrorism in the World

France - Côte d'Azur : un attentat islamiste « probablement » déjoué 119

India - Arrests of Indian Mujahideen terrorists is the best answer to BJP's charges: Sushil Kumar Shinde 121

Syria - Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Base, U.S. Officials Say 123

UK - UK 'must do more' to tackle Sahel-Sahara terror threat 127 - MPs warn of Africa terrorism threat 130

USA - Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security 132 - How local and state cops fit into counterterrorism 136

African Union

Le C S de l UA en sa e r uni n tenue le ars a ad pt une d cisi n sur la Re ue strat gi ue des p ra ns de l p ra n ybride UA-Na ns unies au ar ur MINUA Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 425ème réunion te nue le 24 mars 2014, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la Revue stratégique des opé ra ons de l'Opéra on hybride UA-Na ons unies au Darfour (MINUAD):

Le C nseil de la mise à jour présentée par le Représentant spécial conjoint de l'UA et des Na ons unies pour le Darfour et chef de l'Opéra on hybride UA-Na ons unies au Darfour (MINUAD) sur la situa on au Darfour et la Revue de la MINUAD conduite conformément à la résolu on 2113 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, adoptée le 30 juillet 2013, et des observa ons formulées par le Com missaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité, ainsi que de la déclara on faite par le Représen tant de la République du Soudan. le communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD) adopté lors de sa 400ème réunion tenue le 17 octobre 2013, sur la situa on au Darfour, dans laquelle le Conseil a de mandé à la Commission de l'UA et au Secrétariat des Na ons unies de saisir l’occa sion de la prochaine Revue de la MINUAD, tel que demandé par la résolu on 2113 1 fondie les dé s auxquels la Mission est confrontée et iden er les voies et moyens de les surmonter, en vue de renforcer son e cacité, y compris les mesures à pren dre par toutes les par es prenantes pour assurer la sécurité de son personnel et appuyer la phase ini ale de redressement et le développement de la Revue, et prend n te de ses conclusions, y compris celles rela ves aux dé s majeurs entravant l'e cacité de la MINUAD dans l'exécu on des

principales composantes de son mandat. Le Conseil appelle le Gouvernement du Soudan à renforcer le dialogue et la coopéra on avec la MINUAD, conformément aux disposi ons de l'Accord qu’il a signé avec les Na ons unies et l'UA sur le statut de la MINUAD (l’«Accord sur le statut des forces») en utre à des e orts renouvelés dans les trois priorités stratégiques iden ées par l'équipe de la Revue, à savoir la média on entre le Gouvernement et les mouvements armés non-signataires sur la base du Document de Doha pour la paix au Darfour (DDPD), tout en tenant compte des évolu ons en cours au niveau na onal, la protec on des civils, la facilita on de l'acheminement de l'aide humani taire et la sécurité du personnel humanitaire et l'appui à la média on dans les con its communautaires F licite les pays contributeurs de troupes et de police, et les e rte à améliorer les capacités de leurs con ngents, y compris en remplissant les critères rela fs aux équipements appartenant aux con ngents, a n d'améliorer l'e cacité de leur rôle au sein de la MINUAD C n ient d'examiner régulièrement la situa on sur la base de mises à jour par la Commission et la MINUAD sur les mesures prises dans le cadre de la mise en uvre des recommanda ons du rapport de la Revue et à la lumière des développements ultérieurs. A cet égard, le Conseil e pri e sa disp nibilit de par ciper à l’évalua on, prévue dans douze mois, de la mise en uvre des conclusions de la revue, ayant à l'esprit la nécessité d’une implica on constante et d’une consulta on de l’UA tout au long du processus, conformément à la nature hybride de l'opéra on à la MINUAD, soulignant l'importance cruciale des e orts de la Mission en appui à la recherche d'une solu on durable à la situa on au Darfour et à la protec on de la popula on civile et, à cet égard, en appelle au Gouvernement du Soudan pour qu’il apporte toute la coopéra on nécessaire à la Mission les e orts con nus du Représentant spécial conjoint de la MINUAD et Mé diateur en chef conjoint, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, en vue de trouver un règle ment poli que entre le Gouvernement et les mouvements non-signataires son communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CD III), adoptée lors de sa ème réunion, tenue le 10 mars 2014, par lequel le Conseil s’est félicité de l'ini a ve prise par le Gouvernement du Soudan d’ini er un processus de dialogue na o nal global et de révision cons tu onnelle et a encouragé les par s poli ques, la société civile et l'opposi on armée à engager le dialogue pour relever les dé s de la paix, de la sécurité et de la démocra sa on, ainsi que ceux liés à l’élabora on d'une nouvelle cons tu on, aux réformes économiques et à la ges on de l'iden té et de la diversité. Le Conseil salue les e orts du Groupe de mise en uvre de haut niveau de l'UA et du Représentant spécial conjoint/Médiateur conjoint en chef, conformément à leurs mandats respec fs, en vue de faciliter le succès de l’ini a

ve prise par le Gouvernement du Soudan, et les enc urage à con nuer à travailler en étroite collabora on, en appui à la promo on durable de la paix, de la sécurité, de la stabilité et de la réconcilia on au Soudan de rester ac vement saisi de la ques on.

T e SC t e AU at its t ee ng eld n Marc ad pted a decisi n n t e Strategic Re iew t e AU-UN Hybrid p- era n in ar ur UNAMI pera ns The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 425th mee ng held on 24 March 2014, adopted the following decision on the Strategic Review of the AU-UN Hybrid Opera on in Darfur (UNAMID) opera ons:

C uncil Takes n te of the update provided by the Joint Special Representa ve of the AU and the United Na ons for Darfur and Head of the AU-UN Hybrid Opera on in Dar fur (UNAMID) on the situa on in Darfur and the Review of UNAMID undertaken in pursuance of UN Security Council resolu on 2113 (2013), adopted on 30 July 2013, and the remarks made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, as well as of the statement by the representa ve of the Republic of Sudan Recalls communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD) adopted at its 400th mee ng, held on 17 October 2013, on the situa on in Darfur, by which Council requested the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat to take advantage of the upcoming UNAMID review, as mandated by UN Security Council resolu on 2113 (2013), to consider in- depth the challenges facing the Mission and the ways in which these could be over come, with a view to enhancing the e ec veness of UNAMID, including the steps to be taken by all stakeholders to ensure the safety of its personnel and support to early recovery and development 3 Welc es the Review, and takes n te of its outcome, including the major chal lenges impeding the e ec veness of UNAMID in implemen ng its core mandate. Council calls up n the Government of Sudan to enhance dialogue and coopera on with UNAMID, in line with the provisions of the Agreement that it signed with the UN and the AU concerning the Status of UNAMID (the ‘Status of Forces Agree ment’)

Furt er calls for renewed e orts in the three strategic priori es as iden ed by the Review Team, namely the media on between the Government and non- signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Dar fur (DDPD), while taking into account ongoing transforma on at the na onal level the protec on of civilians, the facilita on of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and support to the media on rela ng to community con ict C ends the troop and police contribu ng countries (TCCs/PCCs) for the posi ve role they con nue to play and urges them to improve the capabili es of their con ngents, including mee ng the con ngent-owned equipment requirements, in order to enhance the e ec veness of their role within UNAMID Agrees to regularly review the situa on and receive from the Commission and UNAMID an update on the implementa on and steps taken in light of the recom menda ons of the Review report and subsequent developments. In this regard, Council e presses its readiness t take part in the assessment of UNAMID’s imple menta on of the review outcome after 12 months, bearing in mind the need for con nued involvement of, and consulta on with the AU throughout the process, in line with the hybrid nature of the opera on 7 Reiterates its str ng supp rt to UNAMID, bearing in mind the cri cal im portance of the e orts of the Mission in support of the search for a las ng solu on to the situa on in Darfur and the protec on of the civilian popula on and, in this respect, calls on the Government of Sudan (GoS) to con nue to extend maximum coopera on to the Mission 8 C ends the con nuous e orts by the Joint Special Representa ve for UNA MID and Joint Chief Mediator (JCM), Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, to nd a poli cal settlement between the Government and non-signatory movements 9 Recalls its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD III), adopted at its 423rd mee ng, held on 10 March 2014, welcoming the ini a ve by the GoS to open a process of holis c na onal dialogue and cons tu onal review and encouraging the poli cal par es, civil society and armed opposi on to engage in dialogue to address the challenges of peace, security and democra za on, the elabora on of a new cons tu on, economic reform and the management of iden ty and diversity. Coun cil c ends the e orts of the AU High-Level Implementa on Panel (AUHIP) and those of the JSR/JCM, in accordance with their respec ve mandates, to facilitate the success of this ini a ve by the GoS, and enc urages t e to con nue to work closely together, in support of the promo on of las ng peace, security, stability and reconcilia on in Sudan ecides to remain ac vely seized of the matter.

Le C S de l UA en sa e r uni n tenue le ars a sui i des c unica ns sur l’ lu n de la situa n en S alie

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 425ème réunion, tenue le 24 mars 2014, a suivi des communica ons sur l’évolu on de la situa on en Somalie faites par le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité et le Représentant spé cial de la Présidente de la Commission et chef de la Mission de l'UA en Somalie AMISOM . L g v f R tant spécial du Secrétaire général des Na ons unies, ainsi que par les représentants du Gouvernement fédéral de la Somalie (FGS), de l’Ethiopie, en sa qualité de Prési dent en exercice de l’Autorité intergouvernementale pour le Développement IGAD . L v Rw de la France, de la Fédéra on de Russie, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d’Amé rique, ainsi que de l’Italie et de l’Union européenne (UE). Le Conseil a rappelé son communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(CCC CI ) adopté lors de sa 99ème réunion tenue le 10 octobre 2013, ainsi que la résolu on 2124 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies du 12 novembre 2013, qui, entre autres, a autorisé un renforcement de l’e ec f de la Force de l’AMISOM à 22 126 personnel en uniforme, élargi le module de sou en logis que des Na ons unies et demandé au Bureau de sou en des Na ons unies à l’AMISOM (UNSOA) de soutenir les forces de l’Armée na onale somalienne (SNA) impliqués dans des opéra ons conjointes avec l’AMISOM, tel que formulé dans le Concept stratégique de l’AMISOM. Le Council a, en outre, rappelé son communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV) du 21 janvier

1 v O OPS v ’AMISOM. Le Conseil s'est félicité des mesures prises par la Commission, avec le sou en ac f des partenaires, y compris les Na ons unies, l’UE et d’autres acteurs interna o naux, dans la mise en uvre des disposi ons per nentes de la résolu on 2124 1 q PS /PR/ OMM. DXIV . En par culier, le Conseil a salué les opéra ons militaires conjointes conduites par la SNA et l'AMISOM, qui ont abou à la reprise des mains d'Al-Shabaab de localités stratégiques vitales. Le Conseil a rendu hommage aux composantes militaire et de police de l’AMISOM pour leur courage, et a, une fois encore, félicité le GFS et les pays contributeurs de troupes et de personnels de police (Burundi, de Djibou , de l'Ethiopie, du Kenya, de Sierra Leone, du Nigeria et de l'Ouganda) pour leur engage ment con nu en faveur de la promo on de la paix, de la sécurité, de la stabilité et de la réconcilia on en Somalie. Le Conseil a appelé à des e orts renouvelés a n que le sou en logis que apporté par l’UNSOA à l’AMISOM, en par culier en ce qui concerne le sou en à l’homme, les installa ons et le génie, réponde pleinement aux besoins opéra onnels de la Mission sur le terrain, ainsi qu’à la nature et au rythme spéci ques des opéra ons en cours contre Al-Shabaab. Le Conseil a également invité les États membres et les partenaires interna onaux à contribuer au Fonds d'a ecta on spéciale créé en ap plica on de la résolu on 2124 (2013), a n de soutenir la SNA dans la conduite d’opéra ons conjointes avec l'AMISOM, et a appelé à l'opéra onnalisa on rapide du Fonds. Le Conseil a appelé les Etats membres, en mesure de le faire, à mettre à la disposi on de l’AMISOM les hélicoptères nécessaires en appui aux opéra ons de la Mission en cours. Le Conseil a condamné la poursuite des attaques terroristes perpétrées par Al-Shabaab contre des civils somaliens innocents, le FGS et l'AMISOM. Le Conseil a présenté ses condoléances aux familles des vic mes de ces attaques, ainsi qu’à leurs Gouvernements respec fs. Le Conseil a encouragé le GFS à mettre en place des administra ons locales et à assurer la sécurité, ainsi que d'autres services de base pour les popula ons des ré gions reprises des mains d’Al Shabaab. Le Conseil s'est félicité des progrès enregistrés dans le processus poli que en So malie et a salué les e orts de I’IGAD à travers sa présidence en exercice, l'Éthiopie, de la Mission d'assistance des Na ons unies en Somalie (ONUSOM) et du Représen tant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission pour la Somalie, en appui aux e orts du FGS en vue de la promo on de la paix et de la réconcilia on, et les a exhortés à poursuivre les e orts. Le Conseil a, en outre, encouragé le FGS à élaborer une Feuille de route poli que qui facilitera la réconcilia on, le fédéralisme et le parachèvement du processus

d’élabora on de la cons tu on, de manière à ouvrir la voie à la tenue des élec ons générales conformément à la Vision 2016. Le Conseil a exhorté les Etats membres de l’UA, ainsi que la communauté interna onale, à apporter le sou en nancier nécessaire au FGS.

T e SC t e AU at its t ee ng eld n Marc was brie ed n t e situa n in S alia

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 425th mee ng, held on 24 March 2014, was briefed on the situa on in Somalia by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Com mission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Council was also briefed by the Special Representa ve of the United Na ons Secretary-General, as well as by the Representa ves of the Federal Gov ernment of Somalia (FGS) and Ethiopia, in its capacity as the Chair of the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Council further received the statements made by the Representa ves of Rwanda, France, Russian Federa on, United Kingdom and United States of America, as well as by Italy and the European Union. Council recalled its communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(CCC CI ) adopted at its 399th mee ng held on 10 October 2013, as well as UN Security Council resolu on 2124 (2013), of 12 November 2013, which, inter alia, authorized an increase in the AMISOM force strength to 22,126 uniformed personnel, expanded the UN logis cal support package, and requested the UN Support O ce to AMISOM (UNSOA) to support the elements of Somali Na onal Army (SNA) involved in joint opera ons with AMISOM as ar culated in AMISOM’s CONOPOS. Council further recalled com muniqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV) of 21 January 2014, endorsing the AMISOM re vised CONOPS.

Council welcomed the steps taken by the Commission, with the ac ve support of partners, including the United Na ons (UN), the European Union (EU) and others, in the implementa on of the relevant provisions of resolu on 2124 (2013) and communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV). In par cular, Council commended the joint Somali Na onal Army (SNA) and AMISOM military opera ons, which have resulted in the further recovery of key strategic loca ons from Al Shabaab. Council paid tribute to the AMISOM military and police component for their courage, and, once again, commended the Federal Government of Somalia, troop and police contribu ng countries (Burundi, Djibou , Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Uganda) for their con nued commit ment to the promo on of las ng peace, security, stability and reconcilia on in So malia. Council called for renewed e orts to ensure that the logis cal support especially with regard to vital life support, facili es and engineering, provided by UNSOA fully meets the opera onal needs of the Mission on the ground and the speci c nature and tempo of the current opera ons against Al-Shabaab. Council also called on Member States and interna onal partners to contribute to the Trust Fund estab lished in pursuance of resolu on 2124 (2013) to support the SNA in joint opera ons with AMISOM, and called for speedy opera onaliza on of the Fund. Council further called on those AU Members States, which can do so, to avail appropriate helicopters to support the on-going opera ons of AMISOM. Council condemned the con nuing terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab against innocent Somali civilians, the FGS and AMISOM. Council o ered its condo lences to the families of all the vic ms of these attacks and to their respec ve Gov ernments. Council encouraged the FGS to establish local administra ons and provide security and other essen al services to the popula ons in the areas recovered from Al Sha baab. Council welcomed progress being recorded in the poli cal process in Somalia and commended the e orts of the IGAD, through its Chair, Ethiopia, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia in suppor ng the FGS in its e orts towards peace and reconcilia on and urged them to con nue with their e orts. Council further encouraged the FGS to develop a poli cal roadmap which will facili tate reconcilia on, federalism and the comple on of the cons tu on making pro cess that will pave the way for general elec ons in line with Vision 2016. Council urged AU Member States and the larger interna onal community to provide the required nancial support to the FGS in this regard.

La MISCA c nda ne ig ureuse ent les atta ues injus fi es c ntre s n pers nnel Bangui, le 24 mars 2014: Le Représentant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA) et chef de la Mission interna onale de sou en à la Centra frique sous conduite afri caine (MISCA), le Général Jean-Marie Michel Moko ko, a exprimé son outrage et indigna on face à l'attaque injus ée perpé trée contre un véhicule clairement iden é de la Mission, transportant trois membres de son personnel. L'attaque, perpétrée par des assaillants armés non encore iden és, est survenue hier soir, vers 19h30, près du Carrefour de la Réconcilia on (Monument Ali Bongo) à Bangui, blessant grièvement un fonc onnaire chargé des nances et une in r mière de la MISCA. La troisième personne à bord du véhicule, un chirurgien de la MISCA, a été légèrement blessée. Le fonc onnaire chargé des nances et l’in r mière sont dans un état stable et ont été évacués à Brazzaville, en République du Congo. Dans un incident séparé, deux soldats de la paix de la MISCA chargés d'assu rer la sécurité à l'Hôpital de l'Ami é, à Bangui, ont échappé, hier, à un attentat à la grenade. Aucune blessure grave n'a été signalée. Le Représentant spécial condamne dans les termes les plus énergiques cette attaque totalement injus ée contre des soldats de la paix, et exhorte les autorités de la transi on en RCA à ne ménager aucun e ort pour arrêter et poursuivre les suspects. Il réitère l'aver ssement lancé le 21 mars 2014 par le Groupe interna o nal de contact sur la RCA (GIC-RCA), lors de sa 4ème réunion tenue à Brazzaville, sou lignant que tous les groupes et individus fauteurs de troubles en RCA seront tenus responsables de leurs actes. Il demande instamment à tous les groupes armés à remettre leurs armes et à se joindre au processus de dialogue et de réconcilia on lancé récemment par le Gouvernement de transi on. Le Représentant spécial souhaite un prompt rétablissement au personnel blessé, et demande à tout le personnel en uniforme et civil de la MISCA de rester vigilants et de con nuer à s’acquitter du mandat de la Mission avec le dévouement et l’enga gement exemplaires dont ils ont fait preuve jusqu’ici.

MISCA str ngly c nde ns t e urder a peacekeeper in t e n rt - ern CAR t wn B ali Bangui, 25 March 2014 -- The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Af rican Union Commission and Head of the African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), Gen. Jean Marie Michel Mokoko has learned with shock and sad ness of the death of a MISCA peacekeeper in Boali, about 80 kilometers north of Bangui, in the Central African Republic (CAR). The peacekeeper from the Republic of the Congo was killed at about 6:30 p.m. yesterday when the vehicle in which he was travelling with three other MISCA soldiers was attacked by a group of armed men. The MISCA troops returned re killing 12 assail ants who were later iden ed as an -Balaka mili a. The dead attackers included a well-known notorious an -Balaka Commander. Two other MISCA peacekeepers in the vehicle were slightly injured. In a separate incident yesterday in the district of Bimbo, in Bangui, a MISCA peacekeeper from the Democra c Republic of Congo (DRC) was wounded in an attack by yet uniden ed assailants. Both incidents oc curred a day after an attack on a MISCA vehicle at the Reconcilia on Roundabout in Bangui, in which three peacekeepers were injured, two seriously. The Special Representa ve strongly condemns these incidents and reiterates that there can be no jus ca on whatsoever for any individual or group to attack peacekeepers from fellow African countries deployed in the CAR to help Central Africans resolve their crises. He notes with regret that in the last few days, an - Balaka elements have systema cally targeted MISCA vehicles and personnel in vio la on of interna onal law, and by so doing iden ed themselves as spoilers and enemies of peace in the CAR. He stresses MISCA’s con nued determina on to fully implement its mandate, including by neutralizing all illegal armed groups. On behalf of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the Special Representa ve conveys his deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of the fallen peacekeeper and to the Government and people of the Republic of the Congo. He wishes a speedy and complete recovery to the injured peacekeepers. The Special Representa ve notes with deep regret that as of today, 21 MISCA peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty in the CAR.

AMIS M and S ali Na nal Ar y capture Q ry ley

Mogadishu 22nd March 2014: In an opera on early this morning, Somali Na onal Army backed by African Union forces overran Al Shabaab outposts to capture the key town of Qoryooley in Lower Shabelle. Located 120 kilometers Southwest of Mogadishu, Qoryooley has been under the brutal rule of the terrorists for ve years. In the last one month, many of the al Shabaab’s commanders have been eeing towards the town following a string of defeats by the SNA and AMISOM forces. The capture of Qoryooley is also cri cal for AMISOM future opera ons to liberate the port city of Baraawe, one of the remain ing sources of illicit revenue for extremist group. The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif congratulated Somali Na onal Army and AMISOM troops on the achievement no ng that this opera on demonstrates AMISOM’s con nuing determina on to support the people of Soma lia as they embark on a new path of renewal and reconstruc on. “AMISOM will con nue to bring security to more areas of Somalia so that local people can live their lives and pursue their livelihoods in freedom” The joint opera ons between the Somali Na onal Army and AMISOM which began this month have so far liberated the eight towns in the various regions around the country, the most recent being Qurunlow town in Middle Shabelle. Since the UN Security Council boosted AMISOM troop numbers to over 22,000, the forces who are working closely with Somali Na onal Army have been expanding to new areas and have helped the Somali government by providing a secure environ ment and recovering more territory, as well as ensuring law, order and jus ce.

Visite de tra ail du C e de la MISAHEL S E ierre Buy ya à la Missi n de r a n de l Uni n Eur p enne au Mali EUTM-Mali

Ba ak le ars – M. Pierre Buyoya, chef de la Mission de l’Union afri caine (UA) pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL) a e ectué ce samedi 22 mars courant une visite de travail à la Mission de forma on de l'Union européenne au Mali EUTM-M . tt v q g les partenaires opéra onnels au Mali, avait pour objec f de s’informer sur le travail accompli par l’EUTM auprès des Forces armées maliennes. «Cette visite est instructive car elle permet à la MISAHEL de mieux appréhender les domaines dans lesquels elle proposera son expérience et une expertise africaine aux autorités maliennes » a indiqué le Chef de la MISAHEL. Il a réitéré l’importance de la coordina on des e orts de la communauté interna onale pour accomplir l’ob jec f commun de la stabilisa on du Mali tout en rappelant aussi le caractère crucial de la coopéra on régionale a n de relever les dé s à la paix et à la sécurité dans le Sahel. M. Buyoya et le Général Bruno Guibert, commandant de l’EUTM, ont également échangé sur les réalisa ons de l’EUTM dans la forma on des bataillons des Forces armées maliennes mais ont aussi abordé les dé s qui restent à relever dans le cadre de la réforme de l’armée malienne.

t Mee ng t e Interna nal C ntact r up n t e Central A rican Republic - Bra a ille Republic T e C ng Friday Marc

C NCLUSI NS 1. The Interna onal Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR) held its fourth mee ng in Brazzaville, on Friday, 21 March 2014, under the co- chairmanship of Mr. Basile Ikouebe, Minister of Foreign A airs and Coopera on of the Republic of the Congo, and Ambassador Sma l Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union (AU). The list of countries and organiza ons that took part in the mee ng is indicated below . 2. The opening ceremony was graced by the presence of H.E. Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, who delivered the opening speech of the mee ng. His speech was preceded by statements made by the Prime Minister of the CAR transi onal Government, André Nzapayeke the AU Commis sioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui the ECCAS Secretary- General, Ambassador Amad Allam-Mi the Deputy Minister for Foreign A airs of the Republic of Chad, Madam Kassiré Isabelle Housnan as well as by the message of the UN Secretary-General read out by his Special Representa ve in the CAR, General Babacar Gaye. 3. Par cipants reviewed the evolu on of the situa on in the CAR since the 3rd mee ng of the ICG-CAR held in Bangui, on 8 November 2013, on the basis of the brie ng provided by the CAR Prime Minister, as well as interven ons by the in

terna onal actors involved in the management of the situa on in that country and the ensuing exchanges of views. n t e e lu n t e situa n in t e CAR 4. Par cipants, having noted the obstacles that have severely hampered the conduct of the transi on towards the end of 2013, welcomed the elec on of Mrs. Catherine Samba-Panza as Head of State and the appointment of Mr. André Nza payeke as Prime Minister, as well as the subsequent forma on of a new Govern ment, in line with the conclusions of the ECCAS 6th Extraordinary Summit held in N'Djamena on 9 and 10 January 2014. They noted that the changes at the top of the execu ve of the transi on create an environment conducive to more sustained and coherent na onal e orts for an early way out of the crisis, as well as to a great er mobiliza on of the interna onal community in favor of the CAR. 5. Recalling the serious incidents that took place in Bangui in early December 2013, with the attack launched by the an-Balaka group, the subsequent abuses and sectarian tensions, Par cipants acknowledged that the security situa on has signi cantly improved thanks to the ac on of the African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) and Opera on Sangaris. They noted, in this regard, the con nued reduc on of the level of violence, the gradual return to normal life in Bangui and elsewhere in the country and the beginning of the return of displaced popula ons. Par cipants stressed the need for con nued e orts to strengthen the trend towards an improved security situa on and the extension of State authority throughout the na onal territory. They strongly condemned the armed groups and elements that con nue to perpetrate criminal acts and attempt to undermine the e orts of the transi onal authori es.

6. Par cipants noted that, in spite of the improvement of the security envi ronment, the humanitarian situa on remains a source of concern. In this regard, they noted the massive displacement of civilian popula ons both within the CAR and towards the neighboring countries, and stressed the urgency of greater inter na onal mobiliza on to meet the needs of the a ected popula ons. 7. Par cipants welcomed the appointment of the seven members of the Na onal Elec ons Authority (NEA). They noted that the NEA members, with the sup port of the UN, the EU, France and MISCA, had already made several visits to the countryside, and that they had developed a metable for the electoral process spread over 12 months. At the same me, they recognized the daun ng challenges that lie ahead for the proper and mely conduct of the electoral process. n t e i ple enta n t e R ad ap r t e Transi n 8. Par cipants took note of the update provided by the CAR Prime Minister on the implementa on status of the Roadmap for the Transi on. They noted the announcement made by the Prime Minister on the presenta on of an implementa

on plan of the revised transi onal Roadmap to the Na onal Transi onal Council (NTC), in early April 2014. 9. Par cipants stressed the need for greater poli cal commitment on the part of the CAR stakeholders to help consolidate the security gains recorded thanks to the ac on of MISCA, with the support of the Sangaris opera on. They recalled the primary responsibility of the CAR stakeholders in resolving the serious crisis fac ing their country, stressing that the role of the interna onal community is to sup port na onal e orts and not replace them. In this context, Par cipants urged the CAR authori es to strengthen the measures aimed at isola ng and applying sanc ons against spoilers, especially the an -Balaka elements, and promo ng na onal reconcilia on in this respect, they encouraged countries that have undergone sim ilar processes to share their experiences with the CAR. They strongly recommended to the CAR Government to ini ate an inclusive dialogue among the various poli cal and social stakeholders in the CAR. They urged the Government to keep the mem bers of the ICG-CAR regularly informed of progress made in this regard, so as to facilitate the mobiliza on of interna onal support. 10. Par cipants also stressed the necessity and urgency of more sustained e orts regarding the reform of the defense and security sector and the programme for disarmament, demobiliza on and reintegra on (DDR). In this context, they urged the Government to quickly implement, in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council resolu on 2134 (2014), the DDR strategy it has adopted, taking into account all armed groups. They stressed the importance of developing a na onal vision on the defense and security sector reform and DDR, which is in line with the current capabili es of the State and takes into account the urgency of sta bilizing the situa on. Par cipants agreed that the Government would keep interna onal partners regularly informed of measures taken in this regard. 11. Par cipants welcomed the apologies presented by the CAR Prime Minis ter, on behalf of the CAR na on, to the neighboring countries whose na onals were vic ms of atroci es and other viola ons of human rights on the CAR territory. The Prime Minister noted that, in spite of these abuses, the countries concerned have con nued to ful ll their duty of o ering hospitality to the CAR ci zens.

n regi nal and interna nal e rts 12. Par cipants welcomed the ongoing e orts of the ECCAS leaders and acknowledged the crucial role of the region in the resolu on of the CAR crisis. They welcomed the decisions taken by the 6th ECCAS Extraordinary Summit and the nancial assistance that the region extends to the CAR to enable it meet some of its most pressing needs. They renewed their con dence and gra tude to Presidents Denis Sassou Nguesso, Mediator of ECCAS, and Idriss Deby Itno, Chairman of EC CAS, urging them to pursue and intensify their ac on in support of peace, security and stability in the CAR. They urged the interna onal community, including the UN

Security Council, to e ec vely support the con nued role of the region and to en sure that any interna onal ini a ve on CAR further this objec ve. 13. Par cipants welcomed the transforma on of MICOPA into MISCA and the measures taken by the AU to enable the Mission to quickly reach its authorized strength of 6,000 uniformed personnel. They paid tribute to MICOPA for the work it carried out in a challenging environment. 14. With reference to the donors’ conference for MISCA organized by the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, on 1 February 2014, Par cipants expressed their gra tude to the AU Member States that have made pledges or are already extending support to MISCA (ECCAS Member States, Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa). Similarly, they expressed deep apprecia on to the interna onal partners who provide nancial, logis cal and technical support for the deployment and opera ons of MISCA, including the U.S., the EU and its Mem ber States (France, Luxembourg and United Kingdom), Canada, Japan and Norway. They thanked the UN and France for availing exper se to MISCA. They commended MISCA for its outstanding work on the ground, in coordina on with Sangaris, whose strength was recently increased, no ng that this work has signi cantly im proved the security situa on in the CAR. They paid tribute to the soldiers and po lice o cers who fell in the line of duty and wished a speedy recovery to those in jured. 15. Par cipants welcomed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to authorize the deployment of addi onal police personnel and specialized capabili es to enhance the e ec veness of MISCA. In this context, they launched an urgent appeal to all interna onal partners to provide increased support to MIS CA, especially in terms of mobility, equipment and nancial resources. They agreed that the AU would submit, within a week, an updated list of MISCA’s needs to facili tate the rapid mobiliza on of the required resources. Similarly, they expressed the hope that, in order to ensure a smooth and e cient transi on between MISCA and a UN opera on, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 5 March 2014, the UN Security Council would authorize the establishment of a speci c and appropriate support package. Par cipants welcomed the EU decision to launch op era on EUFOR RCA to contribute to the consolida on of the gains recorded by MISCA with the support of the Sangaris opera on. They welcomed the ongoing e orts to strengthen coordina on between MISCA and the Regional Coopera on Ini a ve for the Elimina on of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA).

16. Having recalled that the objec ve of MISCA is to create, with the support of Sangaris, condi ons for a more sustained and sustainable interna onal engage ment in the CAR and noted that MISCA plans to complete the ini al stabiliza on phase of the situa on in the next six to nine months, Par cipants welcomed the prospect of the deployment of a UN peacekeeping opera on. They stressed the

need for the AU and the UN to spare no e orts in ensuring a successful transi on, drawing lessons from previous experiences. In this regard, they noted the relevant provisions of the communiqué adopted by the AU PSC at its 422nd mee ng held in Addis Ababa, on 7 March 2014, stressing that the success of MISCA is an essen al condi on for the success of the envisaged UN opera on. 17. Par cipants welcomed the holding in Brussels, on 20 January 2014, of the Interna onal High-Level Conference on the Humanitarian Situa on in the CAR. Re itera ng their deep concern at the scale of the humanitarian crisis in the CAR and no ng that only 21 percent of the required amount has been mobilized to date, they strongly urged all concerned donors to honor their commitments as soon as possible. They expressed gra tude to the countries of the region hos ng CAR refu gees. They commended MISCA for its support to humanitarian opera ons, includ ing escort of convoys from the Cameroon border to Bangui, protec on of IDP sites and of humanitarian actors. 18. Par cipants acknowledged the seriousness of the socio-economic prob lems faced by the CAR, stressing that the situa on calls for urgent ac on by the in terna onal partners and for the adjustment of the procedures governing interna onal assistance to t the peculiar situa on of the CAR. In this regard, they stressed the importance of the regular payment of salaries for civil servants and pensions of the re rees, as well as support for the reac va on of the state and ad ministra ve machinery. They welcomed the ECCAS decision to devote 50 out of the 100 million U.S. dollars pledged during the donors' conference held in Addis Ababa to economic and budgetary support to the CAR. They welcomed the reac va on by the World Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD) of their o ces in Ban gui. They encouraged the interna onal nancial ins tu ons, notably the World Bank and the Interna onal Monetary Fund, as well as the African Development Bank, to accelerate the resump on of their assistance to the CAR and to rapidly and e ec vely disburse the resources pledged. 19. As part of e orts to stabilize the situa on in the CAR, Par cipants stressed the need for the imposi on of sanc ons against all CAR individuals and en es attemp ng to hinder the transi on and the peace and reconcilia on process. They urged the UN Security Council, in line with resolu on 2127 (2013), to quickly desig nate individuals and en es to be sanc oned in order to send a clear message to the spoilers about its determina on to hold them accountable for their ac ons. In the same spirit, Par cipants welcomed the commencement of the work of the In terna onal Commission of Inquiry on the situa on of human rights in the CAR since 1 January 2013. They look forward to the review by the AU of its list of individuals under sanc on for acts that undermine peace e orts in the CAR. n t e strengt ening t e IC -CAR and ll w-up its c nclusi ns 20. Par cipants agreed on the need to strengthen the e ec veness of the ICG -CAR and its support to the transi on. Against this background, they requested the

co-Chairs of the ICG-CAR, namely the AU Commission and the Republic of the Con go, to establish, under their leadership, a small informal structure comprising EC CAS and key interna onal partners, as well as the CAR, to ensure the follow-up of the conclusions of the regular mee ngs of the ICG-CAR, facilitate the involvement of specialized experts and foster the mobiliza on of addi onal resources. The mo dus operandi of this structure, which will meet at least one month before every regular session of the ICG-CAR, will be determined by the co-Chairs in consulta on with the concerned partners. 21. Par cipants requested that the commitments made by the CAR Govern ment and the members of the ICG-CAR, as well as the recommenda ons concern ing them, be captured by the AU Commission in a matrix format and circulated to all the members of the Group. The latter will, in turn, inform the co-Chairs of the follow-up steps they have taken before every mee ng of the Group. Par cipants welcomed the par cipa on of the OIC for the rst me, as a member of the ICG- CAR, in the mee ng of the Group, and its desire to contribute to na onal reconcili a on, humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as to the reconstruc on of the CAR. Ne t ee ng t e IC -CAR 22. Par cipants agreed that the next mee ng of the ICG-CAR will be held in Addis Ababa, in June 2014, at a date to be determined through consulta ons. M n t anks 23. Par cipants expressed their gra tude to the Congolese authori es for the generous hospitality extended to all the delega ons that attended the mee ng, and for the excellent arrangements made for the successful holding of the mee ng

Centra ricaine - Bra a ille R publi ue du C ng Mars

C NCLUSI NS 1. L G R q f GI RCA) a tenu sa quatrième réunion, à Brazzaville, le vendredi 21 mars 2014, sous la coprésidence de M. Basile Ikouebe, Ministre des A aires étrangères et de la Coopé ra on de la République du Congo, et de l’Ambassadeur Sma l Chergui, Commis saire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA). La liste des pays et organisa ons qui ont pris part à la réunion gure en bas de page .

. L ’ v S.E.M. D Sassou Nguesso, Président de la République du Congo, qui a prononcé l’allocu on d’ouverture de la réunion. Celle-ci a été précédée par les discours prononcés par le Premier ministre du Gouvernement de Transi on de la RCA, M. André Nzapayéké le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité, l’Ambassadeur Sma l Chergui le Secrétaire général de la CEEAC, l’Ambassadeur Amad Allam-Mi la Secrétaire d’État aux A aires étrangères de la République du Tchad, Mme Kassiré Isabelle Housnan ainsi que par le message du Secrétaire général des Na ons unies lu par son Représen tant spécial en RCA, le Général Babacar Gaye.

. L v ’ v R A

puis la 3ème réunion du GIC-RCA tenue à Bangui, le 8 novembre 2013, et ce sur la base de la communica on faite par le Premier ministre de la RCA, ainsi que des in terven ons des di érents acteurs interna onaux impliqués dans la ges on de la situa on dans ce pays et des échanges qui s’en sont suivis.

Sur l’ lu n de la situa n en RCA

. L v v g q g v v la conduite de la transi on vers la n de l’année 2013, se sont félicités de l’élec on à la tête de l’État de Mme Catherine Samba-Panza et de la nomina on de M. André Nzapayéké comme Premier ministre, ainsi que de la forma on subséquente d’un nouveau Gouvernement, et ce dans le prolongement des conclusions du 6ème Sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC, tenu à N’Djamena les 9 et 10 janvier 2014. Ils ont noté que les changements intervenus à la tête de l’exécu f de la transi on créent un environnement propice à des e orts na onaux plus soutenus et cohé rents en vue d’une sor e de crise rapide, ainsi qu’à une plus grande mobilisa on de la communauté interna onale en faveur de la RCA.

. R g v v g cembre 2013, avec l’attaque lancée par le groupe an -balaka, les exac ons et ten sions intercommunautaires qui s’en sont suivis, les par cipants ont reconnu que la situa on sécuritaire s’est sensiblement améliorée, gr ce à l’ac on de la Mission interna onale de sou en à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) et de l’Opéra on Sangaris. Ils ont relevé, à cet égard, la réduc on con nue des actes de violence, le retour progressif à une vie normale à Bangui et ailleurs dans le pays et l’amorce d’un mouvement de retour des popula ons déplacées. Les par cipants ont souligné la nécessité d’e orts con nus pour renforcer la tendance à l’améliora on de la situa on sécuritaire et étendre l’autorité de l’État sur l’ensemble du terri toire na onal. Ils ont fermement condamné les groupes et éléments armés qui con nuent de perpétrer des actes criminels et de chercher à saper les e orts des auto rités de la transi on.

6. L q ’ ’ ’ v sécuritaire, la situa on humanitaire con nue d’être préoccupante. Ils ont, à cet égard, relevé les déplacements massifs de popula ons civiles tant à l’intérieur de la RCA qu’en direc on des pays voisins, ainsi que la nécessité d’une mobilisa on in terna onale beaucoup plus grande pour répondre aux besoins des popula ons a ectées.

. L f l’Autorité na onale des Élec ons (ANE). Ils ont noté que les membres de l’ANE, avec le sou en des Na ons unies, de l’UE, de la France et la MISCA, avaient déjà e ectué plusieurs visites en province, et qu’ils avaient élaboré le chronogramme du

processus électoral qui s’étale sur 12 mois. Ils ont, dans le même temps, reconnu l’ampleur des dé s qui restent à relever pour la bonne conduite du processus élec toral dans les délais impar s.

Sur la ise en u re de la Feuille de r ute de la transi n

8. L f f P nistre centrafricain sur l’état de mise en uvre de la Feuille de route de la transi on. Ils ont pris note de l’annonce faite par le Premier ministre sur la présenta on, au Conseil na onal de transi on (CNT), au début du mois d’avril 2014, d’un pro gramme de mise en uvre de la Feuille de route révisée de la transi on.

9. L g ’ g g q core plus soutenu de la part des acteurs centrafricains pour aider à consolider les acquis enregistrés sur le plan sécuritaire gr ce à l’ac on conduite par la MISCA, avec le sou en de l’opéra on Sangaris. Ils ont rappelé la responsabilité première qui incombe aux acteurs centrafricains dans le règlement de la grave crise que con na t le pays, soulignant que le rôle de la communauté interna onale est d’accom pagner les e orts na onaux et non de s’y subs tuer. Dans ce cadre, les par cipants ont exhorté les autorités centrafricaines à renforcer les mesures prises pour isoler et sanc onner les fauteurs de troubles, en par culier les an -balaka et promouvoir la réconcilia on na onale, exhortant les pays ayant connu des processus similaires à partager leurs expériences avec la RCA. Les par cipants ont fortement recom mandé au Gouvernement centrafricain d’ini er un dialogue inclusif entre les di é rents acteurs poli ques et sociaux centrafricains. Ils ont exhorté le Gouvernement à tenir les membres du GIC-RCA régulièrement informés de l’évolu on de ses e orts, de manière à faciliter l’accompagnement interna onal.

1 . L g ’ g ’ soutenus en ce qui concerne la réforme du secteur de la défense et de la sécurité, le programme de désarmement, de démobilisa on et de réinser on (DDR). Dans ce cadre, ils ont exhorté le Gouvernement à mettre en uvre rapidement, et en con formité avec les disposi ons de la résolu on 2134 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, la stratégie DDR qu’il a adoptée, en prenant en compte tous les groupes armés. Ils ont souligné l’importance que revêt l’élabora on d’une vision na onale de la réforme du secteur de la défense et de la sécurité et du DDR qui soit en lien avec les capacités actuelles de l’État et qui enne compte de l’urgence de la stabilisa on de la situa on. Les par cipants ont convenu que le Gouvernement endrait les partenaires interna onaux régulièrement informés des disposi ons prises à cet égard.

11. L v f de la na on centrafricaine, par le Premier ministre de la RCA à l’endroit des pays

voisins dont les ressor ssants ont sou ert des atrocités et d’autres viola ons des droits de l’homme sur le territoire centrafricain. Le Premier ministre a noté qu’en dépit de ces viola ons, ces pays ont con nué à remplir leur devoir d’hospitalité à l’égard des citoyens centrafricains.

Sur les e rts r gi nau et interna nau

1 . L g EEA et reconnu le rôle crucial de la région dans le règlement de la crise centrafricaine. Ils ont salué les décisions prises par le 6ème Sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC et l’assistance nancière que la région apporte à la RCA pour permettre à ce pays de faire face à certains de ses besoins les plus urgents. Ils ont renouvelé leur gra tude et con ance aux Présidents Denis Sassou Nguesso, Médiateur de la CEEAC, et Idriss Deby Itno, Président en exercice de la CEEAC, les exhortant à poursuivre et à inten si er l’ac on qui est la leur, en appui à la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité en RCA. Ils ont engagé la communauté interna onale, y compris le Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, à soutenir e ec vement le rôle con nu de la région et à s’assurer que toute ini a ve interna onale sur la RCA s’inscrive dans cette perspec ve.

1 . L v f f MI O PA en MISCA et les mesures prises par l’UA pour permettre à cette Mission d’atteindre rapidement son e ec f autorisé de 6 000 personnels en uniforme. Ils ont rendu hommage à la MICOPA pour le travail accompli dans des condi ons par culièrement di ciles.

1 . S f f ’ f MISCA organisée par la Commission de l’UA, à Addis Abéba, le 1er février 2014, ils ont exprimé leur gra tude aux États membres de l’UA qui ont annoncé ou déjà ap porté des contribu ons en appui à la MISCA (États membres de la CEEAC, Algérie, Afrique du Sud, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopie, Gambie, Namibie et Nigeria). De même ont- ils exprimé leur profonde apprécia on aux partenaires interna onaux qui appor tent un sou en nancier, logis que et technique au déploiement et aux opéra ons de la MISCA, notamment les États Unis, l’UE et ses États membres (France, Luxem bourg et Royaume Uni), Canada, Japon et Norvège. Ils ont remercié les Na ons unies et la France pour leur appui en exper se à la MISCA. Ils ont félicité la MISCA pour le travail remarquable accompli sur le terrain, en coordina on avec Sangaris, dont les e ec fs viennent d’être renforcés, travail qui a permis d’améliorer signi ca vement la situa on sécuritaire en RCA. Ils ont rendu hommage aux soldats et policiers qui sont tombés sur le champ d’honneur et souhaité un prompt rétablisse ment aux personnels blessés.

1 . L f curité (CPS) de l’UA d’autoriser le déploiement de personnels de police supplémen

taire et celui des capacités spécialisées, pour renforcer l’e cacité de la MISCA. Dans ce cadre, ils ont lancé un appel pressant à tous les partenaires interna onaux pour qu’ils apportent un sou en accru à la MISCA, notamment en termes de mobi lité, d’équipements et de ressources nancières. Ils sont convenus que l’UA sou mettra, dans un délai d’une semaine, une liste actualisée des besoins de la MISCA pour faciliter la mobilisa on accélérée des ressources requises. De même, ils ont exprimé l’espoir que le Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, dans la perspec ve d’un passage de témoin harmonieux et e cace entre la MISCA et une opéra on onusienne, tel que recommandé par le Secrétaire général dans son rapport du 5 mars 2014, autorisera la mise en place d’un disposi f spéci que et approprié à cet e et. Les par cipants ont salué la décision de l’UE de lancer l’opéra on «EUFOR- RCA», en vue de contribuer à la consolida on des acquis enregistrés par la MISCA avec le sou en de l’opéra on Sangaris. Ils se sont félicités des e orts en cours pour renforcer la coordina on entre la MISCA et l’Ini a ve de coopéra on régionale pour l’élimina on de l’Armée de résistance du seigneur (ICR-LRA).

16. A v q ’ f MIS A v ’ S g de créer les condi ons d’un engagement interna onal plus soutenu et plus durable en faveur de la RCA et pris note du fait que la MISCA envisage de parachever la phase ini ale de stabilisa on de la situa on dans les prochains six à neuf mois, les par cipants se sont félicités de la perspec ve de déploiement d’une opéra on de main en de la paix des Na ons unies. Ils ont souligné la nécessité pour l’UA et les Na ons unies de tout faire pour réussir cette transi on, en rant pleinement les le ons d’expériences antérieures. cet égard, ils ont pris note des disposi ons per nentes du communiqué adopté par le CPS de l’UA lors de sa 422ème réunion te nue à Addis Abéba, le 7 mars 2014, soulignant que le succès de la MISCA est une condi on essen elle à la réussite de l’opéra on envisagée des Na ons unies.

1 . L v 1 de la Conférence interna onale de haut niveau sur la situa on humanitaire. Réité rant leur profonde préoccupa on face à l’ampleur de la crise humanitaire en RCA et notant que seuls 21 pour cent des montants requis ont été mobilisés à ce jour, ils ont fortement exhorté tous les donateurs concernés à honorer leurs engage ments dans les meilleurs délais possibles. Ils ont exprimé leur reconnaissance aux pays de la région qui accueillent des réfugiés centrafricains. Ils ont félicité la MISCA pour le sou en apporté aux opéra ons humanitaires, y compris l’escorte de con vois de la fron ère camerounaise à Bangui, la protec on de sites de déplacés et celle d’acteurs humanitaires.

18. L g v q ciaux auxquels la RCA est confrontée, soulignant que la situa on appelle une ac on urgente de la part des partenaires interna onaux et une adapta on des procé dures d’aide interna onale à la situa on par culière de la RCA. cet égard, ils ont

insisté sur l’importance que revêt le paiement régulier des salaires des agents de la fonc on publique et des pensions des retraités et du sou en au redémarrage du fonc onnement de la machine éta que et administra ve. Ils ont salué la décision de la CEEAC de consacrer 50 des 100 millions de dollars américains annoncés lors de la Conférence de donateurs tenue à Addis Abéba à l’appui économique et bud gétaire à la RCA. Ils se sont félicités de la réac va on, par la Banque mondiale et l’Agence fran aise de développement (AFD), de leurs bureaux à Bangui. Ils ont en couragé les ins tu ons nancières interna onales, notamment la Banque mon diale et le Fonds monétaire interna onal, ainsi que la Banque africaine de dévelop pement, à accélérer la reprise de leur assistance à la RCA et à décaisser e ec ve ment et rapidement les fonds promis.

19. D R A pants ont souligné la nécessité de la prise de sanc ons contre tous les individus et en tés qui, en RCA, s’emploient à entraver la transi on et le processus de paix et de réconcilia on. Ils ont exhorté le Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, dans le cadre de sa résolu on 2127 (2013), à désigner rapidement les individus et en tés à sanc onner, de manière à envoyer un message clair aux fauteurs de troubles quant à sa détermina on à les tenir comptables de leurs actes. Dans le même esprit, les par cipants se sont félicités du commencement de travail de la Commission inter na onale d’enquête sur la situa on des droits de l’homme en RCA depuis le 1er janvier 2013. Ils attendent avec intérêt la révision prévue par l’UA de sa liste des individus sanc onnés pour actes de nature à saper les e orts de paix en RCA.

Sur le ren rce ent du IC-RCA et le sui i de ses c nclusi ns 20. Les par cipants sont convenus de la nécessité de renforcer l’e cacité du GIC-RCA et son accompagnement de la transi on. Dans cette perspec ve, ils ont demandé aux co-Présidents du GIC-RCA, à savoir la Commission de l’UA et la Répu blique du Congo, à mettre en place, sous leur direc on, une structure restreinte informelle comprenant la CEEAC et les principaux partenaires interna onaux con cernés et la RCA, pour assurer le suivi des conclusions des réunions régulières du GIC-RCA, faciliter l’implica on d’experts couvrant des domaines théma ques et favoriser la mobilisa on de ressources addi onnelles. Les modalités de fonc onne ment de cette structure, qui se réunira au moins un mois avant chaque session ré gulière du GIC-RCA, seront déterminées par les co-présidents en consulta on avec les partenaires concernés.

1. L q g g G v ment centrafricain et les membres du GIC-RCA, ainsi que les recommanda ons faites à leur inten on, soient reprises par la Commission de l’UA sous la forme d’une matrice et distribuée à tous les membres du Groupe. Ceux-ci doivent, à leur tour, informer les co-présidents des mesures par eux prises en termes de suivi avant chaque réunion du Groupe. Les par cipants se sont réjouis de la par cipa

on, pour la première fois, en qualité de membre, de l’OCI aux travaux du GIC-RCA, ainsi que de sa volonté de contribuer à la réconcilia on na onale, à l’assistance humanitaire aux déplacés et aux réfugiés, et à la reconstruc on de la RCA.

r c aine r uni n du IC-RCA . L v q GI -R A endra à Addis Abéba, en juin 2014, à une date qui sera déterminée par voie de consulta ons.

M n de re ercie ent . L g g l’hospitalité généreuse dont les déléga ons ayant pris part à la réunion ont été en tourées, ainsi que pour les excellentes disposi ons prises pour le succès de la réu nion.

MISCA welcomes the change in the curfew time in Bangui and the rest of the Central African territory

Bangui, 17 March 2014: The African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the Cen tral African Republic (MISCA) welcomes the signing, on 13 March 2014, by the Head of State of the Transi on, Mrs. Catherine Samba- Panza, of a decree rela ng to the change in the curfew me across the en re Central African territory, which now stands from 11 p. m to 5 a.m. The curfew was introduced after the tragic events of 5 December 2014 and the attendant security problems.

This change, the second of its kind, after the one on 13 February 2014 and which had already shortened the curfew hours, from 8.00 p.m. to 5.00 a. m instead of 6.00 p.m. to 6.00 a. m, bears evidence to the undeniable improvement in the secu rity situa on, thanks to the e orts made by MISCA and the French Sangaris opera on.

The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU) and Head of MISCA, General Jean -Marie Michel Mokoko, seizes this opportunity to urge the Central African people to redouble their vigilance to coun ter the nega ve ac on of the illegal armed groups and complete the actual restora on of the authority of the Central African State throughout the en re na onal ter ritory. He warns these groups and rea rms, once again, the strong commitment of the MISCA to implement its mandate, in a robust and impar al manner, and neu tralise all armed elements which try to undermine the process of restoring peace and the security and the promo on of na onal reconcilia on.

La MISCA se F licite de la difica n des raires du c u re- eu à Bangui et sur l’ tendue du Territ ire centra ricain

Bangui, le 17 Mars 2014 – La Mission Interna onale de Sou en à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) se félicite du Décret no. 14066 du 13 Février 2014 signé par la Présidente de la Transi on, Mme Catherine Samba Panza, portant mo di ca on des horaires du couvre-feu à Bangui et sur l’étendue du territoire centra fricain, de 20 heures à 05 heures et maintenant ramené de 23 heures à 05 heures. Suite à l’o ensive des an -balakas du 5 décembre 2013, un couvre-feu avait été décrété de 18 heures à 06 heures du ma n, allégé par la suite de 20 heures à 06 heures, gr ce aux e orts de stabilisa on de la MISCA. Cette nouvelle mesure d’allé gement du couvre-feu témoigne de l’améliora on de la situa on sécuritaire dans la ville de Bangui et dans le reste du pays, gr ce aux e orts de la MISCA, notamment aux derniers ac ons coup de poing dont la traque et l’arresta on de plusieurs lea ders du groupe des an -balakas, du désarmement et cantonnement des ex-salekas et des opéra ons de saisies d’armes et de muni ons. Cette améliora on visible de la situa on sécuritaire a conduit à la reprise des ac vités économiques, la réouver ture e ec ve des ins tu ons académiques, etc., pour abou r aujourd’hui à une certaine normalisa on de la vie dans la ville de Bangui et ses environs. Tout en réitérant la neutralité de la MISCA et sa ferme détermina on à exécu ter en toute impar alité son mandat, le Représentant Spécial de la Présidente de la Commission de l’Union africaine et chef de la MISCA, le Gal. Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, met en garde tous les éléments des groupes illégaux qui con nuent de commettre des exac ons auprès des popula ons civiles que les opéra ons d’éradi ca ons de criminels vont se poursuivre en s’intensi ant. Il appelle la popula on à plus de vigilance et de coopéra on a n de parachever la res tu on e ec ve de l’Autorité de l’Etat et le retour de la Centrafrique à la légi mité démocra que.

MISCA e p wers CAR w en t pr te s cial c esi n c nflict res lu n and a culture peace

Bangui, 17 March 2014: As the security situa on in the Central African Republic (CAR) con nues to improve, the African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the United Na ons Fund for Popula on Ac v i es (UNFPA) have launched an ini a ve to empower CAR women to promote so cial cohesion, con ict resolu on and a culture of peace. As part of the ini a ve, MISCA’s Human Rights Protec on and Gender Unit, under the auspices of CAR’s Minister of Health, Social A airs, Gender and Humanitarian Ac on, Dr. Marguerite Samba, co-organized with UNFPA a workshop for 50 leaders from 26 CAR women’s groups. The workshop, which took place at the Bangui Faculty of Evangelical Theol ogy, from 12 to 14 March 2014, aimed to build the capacity of CAR women and em power them to lead the post-con ict reconcilia on and reconstruc on e orts in the country. The MISCA Human Rights O cer for Gender explained to the women the funda mental tenets and principles of UN Resolu on 1325 and related African Union in struments, such as the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the economic and sociopoli cal dynamics of con icts in Africa, AU e orts to prevent, manage and resolve con icts, and progress and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa as informed by the experience of Liberian women. Par ci pants expressed apprecia on for the AU’s ongoing e orts to resolve the CAR crises and stressed the need for MISCA to con nue suppor ng CAR women in the di cult

post-con ict process of rebuilding their livelihoods and communi es. The women leaders also emphasized the need to create and support opportuni es for more women to par cipate in the governance of the country, adding that the history of the CAR might have been di erent had women been in charge. MISCA’s mandate includes a human rights component and the Mission currently has two Human Rights O cers for Gender. The Special Representa ve of the Chair person of the AU Commission to the CAR and Head of MISCA, Gen. Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, on the occasion of Interna onal Women’s Day, on 8 March 2014, commended CAR women for their resilience, and paid tribute to their important contribu on to interna onal e orts to resolve the country’s current crises.

Terrorism in Africa

Fr Trans r a n t Media n: T e Arab Spring Re ra ed MARCH 20, 2014 INTRODUCTION Even if the Arab Spring has not de ni vely run aground, the dominant Western pol icy narra ve surrounding it has fundamentally changed. What Western observers ini ally saw as a process in which reformist civil society pitted itself against authori tarian regimes today seems to be primarily about managing myriad levels of polari za on within socie es. A simple narra ve only of poli cal reform looks increasingly inadequate. Pervasive polariza on now de nes much domes c poli cal debate in the Middle East as well as the framework through which the European Union (EU) crafts its strategy in the region. Pervasive polariza on now de nes much domes c poli cal debate in the Middle East as well as the framework through which the European Union (EU) crafts its strategy in the region. As the focus has shifted toward building consensus in frag mented socie es, the EU has developed a more prominent focus on high-level dip loma c media on. While s ll running many tradi onal poli cal reform ini a ves, the EU gives greater priority to e orts that build inclusive dialogue. The EU o ers itself as a facilitator—a mediator between adversaries. The focus on media on to bring about consensus re ects a welcome recogni on that democra c transi ons are rarely sustainable when they are not underpinned by broad agreement on the poli cal “rules of the game.” But Europeans should avoid thinking that “inclusive forums” and na onal dialogue processes are a pana cea for the Middle East’s ills. One of the de ning ques ons for the Middle East’s future resides in the rela onship between the “media on lens” and the “reform lens.” This rela onship is more complicated than often assumed. Patterns of polari za on vary across di erent Middle Eastern states, and di erent types of reconcilia on processes are afoot. A mutually reinforcing balance between media on and reform that accounts for these complica ons must be sought. The EU’s current strategy runs a risk of being o balance. There are many strong points in the EU’s approach to dialogue and media on, and genera ng consensus is undoubtedly important. But the EU should not neglect targeted reform e orts that are needed to make media on work. Dangers lurk where a focus on consensus is taken to jus fy an apoli cal approach to change in the Middle East. Media on must not become a coda for passivity and hands-o neutrality. Successful media on is often the outcome of reform, not merely its antechamber. It should be pur sued as a complement not an alterna ve to support for poli cal liberaliza on. POLARIZED SOCIETIES

In the three years since the Tunisian revolu on, the momentum of Arab reform has stuttered. While the degree of social mobiliza on remains higher than it was be fore 2011 and democracy is s ll on the agenda, tangible democra c advances are becoming rare and the region’s social and poli cal context is increasingly brittle. In some countries, hard-won gains in democra c rights are in danger of being re versed. In others, regimes have comfortably contained pressures for reform. And in several, violent con ict increasingly predominates. Among the many reasons for such disappointment, the widening of internal divisions stands out as key. Democracy’s bumpy ride across the Arab world holds little surprise. Nobody who knew the region predicted that a rapid process of democra za on would seep smoothly across the Middle East in the wake of the ini al Tunisian and Egyp an popular uprisings. Indeed, all democra c transi ons take me. All are subject to reversals of greater or lesser longevity. All engender forces keen to limit reform. All open a Pandora’s box of rivalries between reform-minded fac ons. However, the Middle East’s acute degree of division is especially striking. Managing internal division is becoming the region’s de ning feature. The best transi ons move within a reasonable me span into a phase where more technical issues of reform predominate. But much of the Middle East has s ll to agree on some very basic rules of the game. Mi ga ng polariza on has become of almost existen al import. The region’s primordial afflic on is a lack of consensus on basic poli cal rules. As a result, debates are today not merely about speci c obstacles to par cular re forms. Rather, the whole analy cal prism through which the Middle East is viewed has gradually shifted to a broader framework. Zooming out from the intricate detail that dominates atten on in each individual country, a common pattern can be dis cerned: the emerging view is that the region’s primordial afflic on is a lack of con sensus on basic poli cal rules. Much analy cal coverage of the Middle East now has the feel and lexicon of wri ngs on con ict mi ga on, at least as much as it conforms to standard work on the tac cs of poli cal transi ons. The metric applied to the region is not merely or primarily how far states are along a path of democra c reform. Increasingly, its sali ent feature is the divisive nature of internal poli cs. Many domes c and external e orts are now focused on tempering polariza on— which in most states is reaching dangerous levels. Distrust between di erent poli cal actors con nues to intensify. The per nent ques ons are not simply about whether democracy is advancing or stalled, whether the Arab Spring is “alive” or “dead.” It is, more subtly, about the way that change is taking place—the type ofprocess through which it is facilitated and inhibited. The Middle East must be seen through this lens of fractured poli cs and social iden es—not merely that of how far democracy is progressing. A number of types of polariza on have intensi ed over the course of the Arab

Spring. Sectarian, secular-Islamist, regime–civil society, and regional tensions have all increased. Sharper sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia communi es now dominate domes c and regional poli cs. In par cular, the Syrian con ict, in which a ruling Alawite class is pitted against a mostly Sunni opposi on, has impacted sectarian tensions across the region. Sunni-Shia violence increasingly spread across Syria’s borders during 2012 and 2013. Tensions have intensi ed as Lebanon’s Hezbollah has extended its incursions into Syria, helping the regime of Syrian President Ba shar al-Assad gain an upper hand in the con ict. This, in turn, has left Sunni com muni es in many parts of the region more nervous. Sunni radicaliza on grows out of a fear of Shia asser veness. Sunni regimes across the region use the specter of a new Shia threat as jus ca on for delays to reform. In addi on to these sectarian tensions, the cleavage between secular liberals and Islamist movements breeds increasingly frac ous poli cs. In 2011, Islamists and secularists joined forces to confront authoritarian regimes across the region. That moment of apparent, if super cial, convergence has given way to divergent under standings of what type of reforms is most desirable. The emergence of such di er ences was not necessarily a surprise, but the vehemence with which these two camps today confront each other is striking—as is the extent to which this division now hinders stable coali on building in many Arab states. Many of the pre–Arab Spring attempts at building common platforms between Islamists and secularists now lie in tatters. A July 2013 coup that removed Egypt’s Islamist president has sharpened divisions across the region as regimes, secularists, and Islamists have all adopted more uncompromising posi ons in its tumultuous aftermath.1 Another divide has widened between the civil society and government spheres, including in rela vely reformist regimes. Prior to 2011, reformers within regimes at mes sought to engage with civil society actors to forge agreements on modest re form programs. This is a common dynamic that drives measured reform steps in many transi on processes across the world. But in the Middle East, the channels of trust and convergence between civil society and regime “soft-liners” appear to have narrowed not improved since 2011. Some regime structures themselves have become more malleable, but this has not helped with the construc on of broader cons tuencies of reform that include both “insiders” and “outsiders.” Alliances and coali ons have shifted across borders, too, as regional rivalries have sharpened. Sectarian- and iden ty-based cleavages play out alongside the rise of tradi onal sta st power projec on in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and even smaller players like Qatar have vied for regional in uence, and Turkey’s ac vist foreign policy adds another complica ng factor, as many observers see An kara’s approach as animated by a desire to shore up Sunni leadership in the region. Meanwhile, ethnic cleavages involving Berbers, Kurds, and others have sharpened, and these actors’ territorial divisions lie both across and within state boundaries. Looking in ner granularity, these complex dynamics of polariza on color debate in

two opposing ways. On the one hand, in many states internal division has worked against reform. Many actors across the Middle East hold to damagingly “absolu st” posi ons that pre clude compromise. This is true of di erent sectarian fac ons, of Islamists, and of liberal secularists. Hos li es often appear almost viscerally rooted in clashing iden es. Actors commonly hold to such absolu st posi ons in the name of progress, not in opposi on to change yet the result of stubborn discord is the derailment of reform e orts. Today, the need seems to be for preliminary dialogue on basic poli cal values not the ne-tuning of reforms that habitually characterizes the latter stages of poli cal liberaliza on. On the other hand, domes c poli cs in some states has been dominated by the search for consensus. In an attempt to mi gate centripetal trends, the focus has been on iden fying areas of agreement. Many actors genuinely concerned with advancing democra c reform hold that all-inclusive dialogue is now the most ur gent impera ve. The Arab Spring’s ini al illusions of democra c change and sys temic overhauls have taken several steps backward: today, the need seems to be for preliminary dialogue on basic poli cal values not the ne-tuning of reforms that habitually characterizes the latter stages of poli cal liberaliza on. These nega ve and posi ve dynamics are two sides of the same coin. The predomi nance of internal divisions puts a premium on consensus-seeking dialogue. In some states, fragmenta on is clearly ascendant dialogue and consensus are widely advo cated but have not taken root rmly. In others, e orts to embed formal na onal dialogue forums have advanced further and increasingly de ne domes c poli cs. In short, consensus seeking either dominates domes c poli cs or is the most strongly advocated route forward in those contexts where polariza on wreaks its most untrammeled havoc. Fragmenta on and polariza on are now prominent po li cal issues in nearly all Arab countries. DIFFERING RECONCILIATION EFFORTS Most countries a ected by the Arab Spring have ins gated some form of na onal dialogue—of greater or lesser formality—aimed at narrowing internal divisions. A small number of these dialogues have made some progress, and others have en countered formidable obstacles. Dialogue has varied with regard to type and grade. Di erences stem from both the depth of polariza on with which a country has to contend and the formality or strength of commitment to inclusive dialogue. There have clearly been cases where dialogue has led to reform. In a small number of states, dialogue-generated consensus has facilitated some degree of poli cal lib eraliza on. Even in these rela vely successful cases, reform has been delayed and diluted, internal divisions are wider today than at the start of the Arab Spring, and

consensus has been possible only on the most general principles of poli cal and cons tu onal change. Yemen and Tunisia t into this category. In Yemen, a high-level and formal process of na onal dialogue has generated some limited reform. After an uprising that led President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down in November 2011, a na onal unity government was sworn in. Elec ons in Febru ary 2012 con rmed the consensus candidate Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi as presi dent. The agreement transferring power from Saleh to the unity government s pulated that the new regime would hold a na onal dialogue. In March 2013, Hadi launched the Na onal Dialogue Conference to deliberate on detailed reform op ons. In the hopes of establishing a new, durable poli cal framework, these high-level talks brought together Yemen’s main poli cal forces—including powerful tribes, some southern separa sts, and Houthi rebels, members of a Shia minority from the north—as well as previously marginalized groups such as women, youth, and mi nori es. The dialogue formally concluded on January 21, 2014, with an agreement regarding the country’s future cons tu on. The agreement s pulates that un l elec ons take place later in 2014, Hadi must increase southern and Houthi representa on in the consulta ve upper house of parliament.2 Progress has been painfully slow, and unrest simmers. After the ini al unity agree ment was signed, it took two and a half years for the Na onal Dialogue Conference to begin in earnest. Saleh’s family s ll wields much power and retains control of the security forces, and it has frustrated attempts at deeper reform. The long me ruling party under Saleh, the General People’s Congress, remains dominant in the parliament. Not all fac ons of the Southern Movement, an umbrella organiza on for the country’s southern separa sts, par cipated in the conference, and the dia logue was beset by ongoing controversies over ques ons of representa on, boy cotts, and withdrawals.3 Yet it prevented the country from descending into out-and -out civil war and provided Saleh with a face-saving exit from power.4 Tunisia is the clearest example of a consensus-led reform process. After a revolu on in 2011 that ousted then president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians elected a widely inclusive coali on led by the Islamist Ennahda party. This coali on has worked to draw up a new, democra c cons tu on, a goal that was tested in 2013 as instability rocked Tunisia. In the span of a year, the country saw two poli cal as sassina ons, a suicide blast, and mul ple confronta ons between various poli cal fac ons. Through it all, the ruling coali on made a considerable e ort to maintain the inclu sive ethos of the country’s transi on. After the assassina on of a prominent leftist opposi on leader in February 2013, the government appointed a technocra c cabi net in order to keep opposi on forces engaged. In September 2013, Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh of Ennahda stepped down, bowing to pressure from the opposi on. Ennahda also called for new elec ons and created a formalized na onal dialogue to

engage all actors in nalizing the new cons tu on, which was passed on January 27, 2014. Consensus was aided in Tunisia by the fact that the ruling Islamists did not feel their party had the local strength or the roots to confront other actors in a zero- sum fashion. In par cular, Ennahda hesitated to disregard the country’s rela vely in uen al trade union movement. Rela ons between Islamists and secularists in Tunisia remain frac ous. And de bates s ll rage about the balance between universal human rights and Islamist val ues in the cons tu on—the document is ambivalent about how far the state’s role may extend in “protec ng the sacred.” However, the consensual model has taken Tunisia further down the road of democra c reform than other Arab states. Some in the current Libyan administra on are trying to emulate the Tunisian exam ple, albeit without tangible success so far. After the fall of long me Libyan leader Muammar Qadda in October 2011, the new regime envisaged the elec on of a broadly inclusive forum to draw up a new cons tu on. The aim to maintain such an inclusive process cons tutes the guiding tenet of Libyan domes c poli cs. But the country is facing rising tensions in the poli cal arena and a number of in creasingly autonomous mili as that threaten Libya’s democra c transi on. Elec ons in 2012 did not seem to provide the country’s legisla ve authority, the Gen eral Na onal Congress, with su cient legi macy to make progress on reform is sues. More radical Islamist forces have gradually gained power in the congress and have forced puni ve measures against “liberals” associated with the previous re gime. To address this increasingly unstable situa on, in August 2013 the interim govern ment launched plans for a formal na onal dialogue. This is currently in its prepara tory stages, and it is due to begin in April and last for six months on the basis of an agreed charter. Its prospects remain decidedly unclear as of this wri ng. In other states, it is clearer that dialogue has taken place without leading to any reform. Some countries have made a notable commitment to dialogue but have priori zed stability and consensus in a way that is to the detriment of poli cal re form. In these places, regimes sponsor dialogues but con nue to be very restric ve and authoritarian. Bahrain, for example, has priori zed holding a na onal dialogue but has not achieved the sort of reform seen in Tunisia or Yemen. The Bahraini regime con vened this dialogue after violent protests in 2011. Two of the main legal opposi on groups, the Shia al-Wefaq and the secular Waad, ini ally agreed to par cipate but later withdrew their support and accused the government of orchestra ng the dia logue as a public rela ons exercise without any inten on of reform. In February 2013, a renewed dialogue was ini ated, but debates have remained stuck on procedural ques ons.5 The government suspended the talks in early Janu

ary 2014 only to begin a new dialogue under a revised format. All major poli cal groups have agreed to resume the talks, hoping for discussion of further-reaching ins tu onal reforms.6 However, both opposi on actors and outside observers re main skep cal of the government’s willingness to reform and fear that hardliners within the regime are simply playing for me.7 Like the rulers in Bahrain, the Jordanian regime has also come under re for its e orts. The Islamist Ac on Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s poli cal party in Jor dan, as well as groups of Pales nian origin and tribal leaders have all been cri cal of Jordanian King Abdullah II’s attempts to forge a consensus on a reform program. In March 2011, the king established a Na onal Dialogue Committee comprising representa ves from various poli cal and civil society groups who were tasked with arriving at a consensus on legisla on concerning various poli cal reforms. These ac ons are now widely seen as disingenuous because reform promises re main unful lled. Here, too, social harmony has splintered since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Attempts at dialogue have produced little tangible impact in Saudi Arabia. The Sau di regime began an annual na onal dialogue in 2003, but these talks have not un locked reforms or prevented the country from su ering instability since the begin ning of the Arab Spring, par cularly in the form of rising sectarian tensions and calls for democra c change among the country’s youth. In Lebanon, the balance between polariza on and dialogue is precariously poised. On the one hand, instability and sporadic violence plague the country. Due in part to the destabilizing in uence of the ongoing civil war in neighboring Syria, Lebanon hovers in a state of virtual con ict. Low-level violence and bomb attacks have be come frequent. On the other hand, the poli cal elite has gone to notable lengths to retain consen sus—a commitment that has in some senses been striking given events in Leba non’s immediate neighborhood. The country has a Na onal Dialogue Committee that brings together representa ves from Lebanon’s main poli cal fac ons, uni ng parliamentarians from the Hezbollah-led March 8 coali on and the pro-Western March 14 coali on. The committee, however, has not met regularly since Septem ber 2012 because of the increasing poli cal tensions between these fac ons, which stand on opposite sides when it comes to major regional issues like the Syrian con ict.8 Lebanon’s apparent saving grace is that Sunni, Shia, and Chris ans share a consen sual aversion to taking the country back to civil war, having emerged from one in 1990. This aversion remains even as trust between the fac ons has frayed and there is little posi ve e ort to develop a common project for Lebanon’s future. In s ll other countries, dialogue has failed and authoritarianism has resurged. There are now more vociferous calls for dialogue and consensus in these countries, but di erences remain over the terms of any such dialogue and over what kind of poli cal reform, if any, is most desirable to mend current instability. Egypt, Iraq,

and Syria are examples of this trend. Here, the failure of dialogue has clearly held back democra za on and jus ed a return of authoritarian dynamics. Egypt seemed to be making signi cant headway on the path to reform. But today, the country’s main players—the army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the liberal secularists—are further apart on many issues than they were in 2011. A popular uprising led to the overthrow of strongman Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but na onwide elec ons for a new government took place before broad agreement was reached on a new cons tu on and democra c “rules of the game.” In May 2012, Egyp ans elected Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood–backed candi date, as president. The country’s poli cal divisions widened appreciably under Morsi’s rule, with secular groups and supporters of the military opposing the ruling Islamists. Ini ally, Morsi proposed an inclusive framework for preparing a new cons tu on, but this framework became increasingly exclusionary, a process that culminated in the president issuing a decree in November 2012 that a orded him greater power over the drafting process. Secular opposi on groups banded together to form the Na onal Salva on Front in response to this decree. The front orchestrated wide spread protests against the government, eventually leading to a military-backed coup that removed Morsi from power in July 2013. The army then repeated the same divisive process of pushing through a cons tu on that was drawn up by an exclusionary committee—in this case, the Muslim Brotherhood was excluded. Consensus was not crafted on the document, and many who spoke out against it were arrested. Its approval in a January 2014 referendum will likely aggravate tensions. The new government has banned religious-based po li cal ac vity, which is likely to perpetuate polariza on and result in the reappear ance of jihadist violence. Two par cularly drama c cases of violent polariza on are Syria and Iraq. In Syria, attempts have been made to reach a nego ated settlement to the country’s ongo ing civil war, as hopes have faded that Assad can be de ni vely pushed from pow er. The abrupt curtailment of the second round of the Geneva process, a dialogue between the government and the opposi on, raises doubts over whether this ap proach now has any future. Intersectarian tolerance has weakened even at a micro, communal level, while the regime has leaned even more heavily on its core sup porters in an increasingly narrow Alawite and non-Muslim cons tuency.9Tensions have grown between di erent opposi on groups, which now spend most of their me gh ng each other. The con ict is no longer a dichotomous one between re gime and an -regime forces, as the opposi on has splintered into a large and con fusingly uid number of groupings. The interna onal community has staked much on the leadership of the Free Syrian Army, once considered the main armed oppo si on force, as the vehicle for reaching some kind of nego ated settlement, but this group has lost standing within the constella on of Syrian forces. While, again,

the depth of authoritarian resilience has brought media on center stage, in Syria this is yet to gain any purchase. Iraq has remained largely outside the purview of the Arab Spring and subject to unique dynamics. After the U.S. invasion of the country in 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein, a process of dialogue to lay the groundwork for a democra c system was attempted in the form of the Iraqi Na onal Conference, held in August 2004. This conference gathered more than 1,100 representa ves of Iraq’s poli cal par es, regions, tribes, and civil society organiza ons who were tasked with se lec ng the members of a 100-seat na onal assembly to serve as the country’s interim legislature. They were also tasked with agreeing on ways to curb the in surgency that had begun after the U.S. invasion and to temper polariza on.10 Divisions were too wide for the conference to gain broad legi macy, and Sunni insurgents did not recognize the conference as legi mate.11 Several Sunni, Shia, and secularist par es opposing the U.S. occupa on of Iraq refused to take part. The conference remained under the control of a core group of poli cal par es without broader consulta ons or societal buy-in.12 Poli cal tensions con nued to plague the country through the U.S. withdrawal, which was complete at the end of 2011. In March 2012, Iraq’s main fac ons ten ta vely agreed to hold another na onal conference. This again failed, as Kurdish and Sunni opposi on groups were reluctant to accept that the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had any genuine intent of reversing its drift toward repressive authoritarianism.13 In sum, there is much varia on in patterns of na onal dialogue and, crucially, these do not relate in any straightforward fashion to countries’ di ering degrees of poli cal reform. The focus on dialogue and consensus adds a very di use varia ble to the analy cal framework of the Arab Spring. A clear typology of dialogue processes and reform is hard to discern. In poli cal science terminology, an eclec c mix now prevails: the Arab Spring’s ini al avor of civic-led “ruptured” transi ons has morphed into an elite- controlled “pacted” transi on dynamic. This is mixed with heavy doses of authori tarian resilience and con ict-management power sharing interspersed in di er ent combina ons across di erent parts of the region. EUROPEAN CONCERNS These trends in the internal poli cs of Arab states are re ected in the evolving approaches of some external actors. In par cular, European policies toward the Arab Spring have undergone a subtle change: a narra ve of narrowing polariza on is now superimposed on the original narra ve of tempering authoritarianism. The EU has increasingly, and in par cular, posi oned itself as a kind of impar al mediator. Diplomats rou nely cite this as the EU’s compara ve advantage in the region. The success that the current EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton,

had in brokering an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program in November 2013 is highlighted as the epitome and most convincing vindica on of this “neutral broker” approach. The EU has attached priority to suppor ng na onal dialogues in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, and Lebanon. It has exerted diploma c pressure to cajole reluctant governments to commit to such inclusive dialogue. It has used its democracy and human rights funds to support numerous dialogue forums aimed at bringing together di erent parts of the poli cal spectrum. The EU-orchestrated task forces held in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia in 2011 and 2012 are another key manifesta on of this “everyone inside the tent” approach: these roundtables gathered as broad a range of par cipants as possible to discuss very prac cal de velopment and investment goals for each country. The EU formalized its focus on media on and created a Media on Support Team within the European External Ac on Service, the EU’s foreign policy arm. This commits the EU to strengthening ins tu ons and mechanisms speci cally de signed to improve na onal capaci es for dialogue within con ict-prone states.14According to guidelines of the External Ac on Service, na onal dialogues are to be ac vely supported to the extent that they are locally legi mate, inclu sive in their composi on, e ec ve, and underpinned by democra c values. They are to be based on an analysis of the local context to ensure the dialogues are legi mate and e ec ve in prac ce. External EU support will take care not to un dermine local legi macy.15 As one of its rst ac vi es, the Media on Support Team conducted training ses sions on media on for diplomats and o cials working in Syria and Yemen. The unit has also been heavily involved in Lebanon and Libya. It has begun trying to carve out access points in Egypt as well, in coopera on with the EU special repre senta ve for the Southern Mediterranean region, who has developed a par cular niche focus on bridge-building dialogue. In Egypt since the July 2013 ouster of Mohamed Morsi, the EU has pushed strong ly for the Muslim Brotherhood to be included in a na onal dialogue. Diplomats argue that the e ort to make the Brotherhood part of an inclusive formal dia logue is a more accepted form of interna onal involvement than pushing for deeper democra za on to happen immediately. The EU has exerted negligible pressure on the interim administra on led by the Egyp an military to speed up democra c reforms. Most European government and External Ac on Service reac ons to Egypt’s January 2014 cons tu onal refer endum were posi ve and hopeful that the approval of the cons tu on would open possibili es for new dialogue. For instance, Ashton stated that: “The cons tu onal process—both before and following the referendum—could o er a chance for a new poli cal dialogue and interac on leading to democra c elec ons.”16 To that end, the EU has recently placed par cular priority on calling for

“the establishment of a higher commission for na onal reconcilia on,” and Ashton has made numerous trips to Cairo to facilitate dialogue between Egypt’s di erent fac ons.17 She is the only high-level interna onal gure to have engaged in this way with the full spectrum of Egyp an actors. Ashton has also fulsomely supported Bahrain’s na onal dialogue, sta ng that “the dialogue between the par es is the best way to rebuild trust and to achieve genu ine na onal reconcilia on by tackling outstanding issues and socioeconomic griev ances, thereby preparing the ground for sustainable reforms.”18 In Libya, the EU has—controversially—sought to ensure that former regime members are engaged in the transi on process. As the formal na onal dialogue atrophies, the local repre senta ves of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and the United Na ons (UN) have coordinated to maintain contacts with di erent Liby an fac ons in an e ort to en ce all players into some form of consulta on this fo cus has essen ally taken over from long-term ins tu on building, for which poli cal condi ons have not proven conducive. In Iraq, while the United States has fo cused on counterterrorism assistance for the Maliki government, the EU has pressed Baghdad to engage in more structured dialogue on consensual power shar ing. The EU has strongly supported the Na onal Dialogue Conference in Yemen. In 2012, the Council of Europe urged “all Yemeni stakeholders to support and par ci pate in this process in a construc ve manner and without precondi ons to ensure that it is fully inclusive, balanced, and transparent, adequately represen ng all strands of the Yemeni society and re ec ng the important role of youth and wom en.”19 Several EU member states are currently suppor ng the imposi on of UN sanc ons against those actors who undermine the next phase of Yemen’s dialogue- based reforms. In Syria, European governments have become more favorable toward some form of dialogue and media on between the regime and the opposi on. A variety of Euro pean funding has supported the respected organiza on Search for Common Ground in its attempts to mediate between di erent communi es at a local level. The Syrian regime reportedly asked the Dutch and Norwegian governments to sup port ini a ves aimed at intercommunal dialogue. In 2012, the French government backed a unity administra on to be headed by defectors from the regime. Europe an governments pushed for an incremental broadening of the opposi on alliance into the Na onal Coali on for Syrian Revolu onary and Opposi on Forces, formed in late 2012. The United Kingdom and France have stepped back from o ering such signi cant support to the rebels as those countries originally indicated they would provide. London and Paris are now more reluctant to link themselves so rmly to one fac on in the con ict. European ministers talk of sponsoring a “mutually agreed settlement” in Syria they s ll insist that this would entail Assad’s departure, but as prelude to an accord with other parts of the regime. The European aim has decidedly shifted to resuscita ng

a media on process sponsored by the UN. After the August 2013 chemical weap ons attacks near Damascus, Ashton responded by calling not for democracy but for media on and for the Geneva dialogue process to be reconvened. While Eu ropean rhetoric remains ercely cri cal of Assad, the pragma c policy focus is now on the kind of dialogue process that can be set up between regime and op posi on forces—and to what degree jihadist groups could and should be includ ed. BALANCING MEDIATION AND POLITICAL REFORM The European focus on media on, consensus building, and allevia ng polariza on would appear ins nc vely sensible in today’s Middle East. It is indeed necessary and unsurprising—ignoring such impera ves is hardly an op on in current cir cumstances. Cul va ng some sense of na onal ci zenship that prevails over comba ve sec tarian iden es is a prerequisite to sustainable poli cal reform. The case for media on is that consensus is a necessary precondi on for demo cra c reform. Indeed, e orts to support inclusive bargaining must take root be fore there is any hope for successful poli cal reform or economic improve ment.20 Many would concur that the painstaking and delicate crafting of a con sensual democracy is a path uniquely desirable in such a sect-riven region. Cul va ng some sense of na onal ci zenship that prevails over comba ve sectarian iden es is a prerequisite to sustainable poli cal reform. Yet there are important nuances to this argument. Dialogue and consensus are hardly controversial in themselves, par cularly where polariza on currently tears socie es apart. The nub of the matter is how the aim of tempering con ict and tension through media on relates to that of fostering democra c reform. The right balance between making pacts and popular mobiliza on is an issue that con nues to engender debate between the most prominent experts on demo cra c transi on.21 What advocacy of inclusive na onal dialogue some mes im plies is that poli cal reform should be limited or delayed un l dialogue forums reach more formal agreement on how to advance democra c transi ons. But consensus is not necessarily best achieved through forms of dialogue that heavily restrict poli cal reform. An overly primary focus on media on harbors risks. Where accorded too much centrality, media on can be an excuse for inac on. Interna onal actors that are primarily concerned with consensus building can slip into a conveniently comfort able passivity. They can develop a weak agnos cism about whether democra c reform is even a good thing. They can come close to a de facto preference for semi-democracy or managed reform—well-inten oned but out of tune with changing social dynamics across the region that press for more par cipa ve gov ernance not rebalanced elite deals. Media on is hardly ever as neutral or bal anced as it purports to be, and it habitually empowers gures that further down

the road act as inveterate spoilers to peace and liberal reform. Actors promo ng this approach can also fail to appreciate how some degree of poli cal liberaliza on is itself needed to set the condi ons for successful consen sus-building media on. Media on cannot be seen only as an apoli cal ground- clearing strategy. In fact, quite the opposite is the case—its prospects are them selves condi oned by poli cal structures. True democra c change needs some degree of prior consensus, but meaningful consensus also needs space and chan nels for the people to debate their poli cal op ons openly. The focus on media ng divisions must be kept within proper propor on, as one important but not overly dominant element of a rounded policy. For all these reasons, the focus on media ng divisions must be kept within proper propor on, as one important but not overly dominant element of a rounded poli cy. Media on without structural change is likely to be untenable. Some degree of liberaliza on of the poli cal system is necessary to ensure that all actors have a voice in the consensus-building media on process. In Egypt, for example, the EU has rightly striven to encourage dialogue, but most opposi on groups complain that the increasingly repressive condi ons exclude key forces and make it unlikely that talks can produce tangible results. Popular hos lity has grown toward the army because its heavy-handed tac cs have under cut the broad support it enjoyed after ous ng Morsi, but an pathy remains strong toward the Muslim Brotherhood among other parts of the opposi on. One thing the army and the Muslim Brotherhood appear to converge on is a penchant for repressive leadership styles. Many talk about the need for dialogue and consen sus, but all actors are not provided equal access to such dialogue. Some prior re form is needed to pave the way for a more inclusive process. In Syria, too, the tension between dialogue aims and the amount of poli cal space for opposing voices is increasingly problema c. The European focus has shifted from wholesale regime-exit to the sponsorship of a process that is at least par ally open-ended. But mutual mistrust and the lack of a structure that allows for open channels of communica on between all sides have hindered dialogue. Many Free Syrian Army members are held back in laying down their arms by the fact that they do not trust the regime to s ck to any promised amnesty accords. Nego a ng an agreement will rst require the regime to loosen its grip and reform to a degree. In Jordan, the Islamic Ac on Front has sharply cri cized the EU for pressing it to engage in a na onal dialogue that it dismisses as based on an en rely disingenu ous reform commitment from the king. This is an example of how opposi on forc es can often see in external actors’ support for impar al and generic dialogue a covert form of support for a regime’s stalling tac cs. For example, the EU jus es projects that support government-organized nongovernmental organiza ons in Jordan as part of its bridge-building approach, but local reformers commonly des

pise these groups. Rather than reducing fric on, external support to these organi za ons heightens local tension. To move forward, the EU will have to promote more genuine and tangible poli cal reform to ank and help sustain the process of na onal dialogue. To move forward, the EU will have to promote more genuine and tangible poli cal reform to ank and help sustain the process of na onal dialogue. Even in the rela ve success story of Tunisia, the EU’s altered approach now some mes attracts cri cism for dilu ng democra c reforms. For example, Tunisia’s con s tu on remains ambivalent on many issues of personal freedom. But rather than undertaking projects to promote these basic rights that would guarantee the kind of open debate needed to generate consensus, the EU has focused on celebra ng the inclusive process that produced the document. The cri cal responses from the region warn that the EU’s support for media on is becoming too much of an end in itself rather than one integral part of a holis c pol icy of democracy support. Indeed, o cials in the EU’s Media on Support Team acknowledge that they have eschewed any signi cant focus on democracy support and that democracy promo on is not in any way linked to their ac vi es. There is ongoing debate in the External Ac on Service over the compe ng merits of “media on” rela ve to “poli cal dialogue,” and whether the balance of e ort needs to shift toward the longer-term parameters implied by the latter concept. And a commissioned review of the Media on Support Team concluded that the EU’s approach is ad hoc rather than comprehensive and oriented to short-term en gagements in moments of acute crisis in a way that is poorly linked to more under lying and ongoing policy engagements.22 The EU tends to favor very formal media on at a track-one level over looser dia logue e orts that embrace more reform-oriented “track-three” civil society ac tors.23 This focus is in part a product of geopoli cs. To some extent, the EU now sees the challenge of dealing with a polarized Middle East as about keeping its Southern neighborhood at bay. It priori zes very tradi onal, old-style diploma c media on to achieve that aim. This is quite di erent from the early op mism of the Arab Spring, when the EU talked of democra za on opening the doors to deeper coopera on and even ins tu onalized integra on between European and Arab states. The risk is that the EU will come to expect too much of media on on its own. EU representa ves increasingly recognize the need for ne-tuning. They acknowledge that di erences have widened too much in Egypt for their dialogue e orts to gain trac on and that for now the aim needs to be to protect very basic rights in the country. EU o cials insist they are aware of the risks of rehabilita ng discredited elites through na onal dialogues. Dialogue is needed, they aver, but built on the founda ons of pluralism rather than regime-engineered parameters. So far, the Media on Support Team has focused on trying to bring together various

EU instruments so as to leverage poli cal in uence over dialogue processes— rather than actually leading media on per se. And another recognized challenge is to iron out inconsistencies, for example the widely held percep on that the EU has pressed to include insurgents in dialogue processes far more in Syria than it did in Iraq. This area of policy is in uid evolu on, as it seeks the right balances in each Middle Eastern state. GOING FORWARD: A BALANCED FRAMEWORK Democra c reform in the Middle East requires a balanced combina on of consen sual dialogue and pluralis c compe on. The focus on media ng division and gen era ng consensus is well-conceived. But, there are signs that the EU—collec vely and through member state governments’ na onal diplomacy—is pursuing it in an imbalanced fashion and that this is eclipsing necessary concerns about core re forms. The concept of inclusive processes of dialogue aimed at genera ng consensus on basic poli cal rules would appear to be uncontroversial. It is di cult to oppose such a reasonable no on. And it seems rather obvious that democra za on is un likely where major tensions persist over core ques ons of iden ty and statehood. Care must be taken that na onal dialogues do not become so entrenched that they turn into sources of policymaking that bypass representa ve bodies. However, opera onalizing that sensible principle is far from easy—and e orts to do so often engender new types of tension in their wake. What “inclusion” means in prac ce can frequently be less than straightforward. And where e orts are not rooted in ongoing processes of reform, na onal dialogues can inadvertent ly deepen polariza on if mutually sa sfactory win-win outcomes are not possi ble.24 Care must be taken that na onal dialogues do not become so entrenched that they turn into sources of policymaking that bypass representa ve bodies. Simply advoca ng “inclusive dialogue” does not in itself address the structural rea sons why a country lacks a normal, peaceable process of consulta on. Some struc tural issues make it impossible for actors to par cipate in dialogue on equal foo ng. In countries like Egypt, a ghtening of poli cal space clearly gives some actors more power than others. If those poli cal problems are not addressed, any media on process is unlikely to produce results that the whole of society can ac cept. Under these condi ons, dialogue cannot be a benignly neutral approach to policy. It has to be supplemented with e orts to balance underlying power rela ons. Often, a more level playing eld is required to make dialogue and consensus seek ing legi mate. More radical groups are again on the rise precisely because they feel shut out from formal ins tu onal avenues.25 Once again, it is, in part, the paucity of reform that is driving divergent and polarizing poli cal iden es. This is not to argue that the focus on tempering polariza on is mistaken. But the

interna onal community must do more than simply herd clashing fac ons into set- piece dialogues. It must also seek to understand and fashion the kind of condi ons that enable media on to result in sustainable convergence between adversarial poli cal actors. After all, if opinions were such that a little dialogue su ced to pro duce consensus, an e ort to engineer formal forums would almost by de ni on be super uous. The EU needs to be more than a provider of good o ces. European actors jus fy the focus on media on in pursuit of locally generated consensus as a kind of liberal neutrality, but if not combined with other elements of policy, it can cloak very illib eral outcomes. Liberal neutrality can easily become its own travesty. The current quasi-neutrality can, in at least some circumstances, look like adisplacement of proper strategy. It can re ect a reluctance to strategize, more than represen ng comprehensive strategy in itself. Some aspects of European governments’ policy now replicate the dire historical and colonial experiences of allying with local notables in places like Iraq, Algeria, and Syria—a startling inability to learn from a recent history that so blighted the European image across parts of the region. They risk conferring status on such g ures in a way that widens their disconnec on from local society. Attempts to engi neer fraught and precise power balances, rather than core poli cal principles, can easily seduce outside actors into extremely harmful forms of engagement. Pacted transi ons have many advantages, but the spirit of the Arab Spring was es sen ally about a s rring, fear-bus ng, civic-led ac vism. Too much elite-driven ne go a ng is likely to deviate too far from this ethos and reproduce the very factors that sparked the rst revolts in 2010 and 2011. A very ne and blurred line exists between admirable nego ated transi on and the kind of consensus that enables vested interests to su ocate reforms. Arguably, there are signs that the EU is insu ciently seized of the latter danger. The challenge is to nd a mutually sustaining equilibrium. There must be consensu al dialogue of a type that supports reform momentum but also enough reform mo mentum for the seeds of consensus to germinate. It is in this rela onship between media on and reform aims that a new framework for assessing external actors’ role in today’s divided Middle East is most required. NOTES 1 Anouar Boukhars, Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, Raphaël Lefèvre, Marwan Muasher, Frederic Wehrey, Katherine Wilkens, and Scott Williamson, “The Egypt E ect: Sharpened Tensions, Reshuffled Alliances,” Carnegie Endowment for Inter na onal Peace, February 2014,http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/13/egypt- e ect-sharpened-tensions-reshuffled-alliances/h0tb. 2 “Yemen’s Na onal Dialogue Conference Concludes With Agreement,” BBC News,

January 21, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25835721. 3 Stefan Wol , “Managing Expecta ons: Yemen’s Na onal Dialogue Confer ence,”World Politics Review, July 23, 2013,www.worldpoli csreview.com/ ar cles/13104/managing-expecta ons-yemen-s-na onal-dialogue-conference. 4 Tim O. Petschulat, “Poli cal Change With Pitfall: An Interim Report on the Yemeni Transi on Process,” Friedrich Ebert S ftung Yemen, September 2012,http:// library.fes.de/pdf- les/iez/09355.pdf. 5 Toby Matthiesen, “EU Foreign Policy Toward Bahrain in the Aftermath of the Up rising,” in The Gulf States and the Arab Uprisings, ed. Ana Echague (Madrid: FRIDE, 2013). 6 “Bahrain Na onal Dialogue Resumes—In Revamped Format,” Monitor Global Outlook, January 16, 2014, http://monitorfron ermarkets.com/news-story/bahrain -na onal-dialogue-resumes-in-revamped-format. 7 Bill Law, “Time Running Out as Bahrain Tries to Revive Na onal Dialogue,” BBC News, January 30, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25918628. 8 Peter Seeberg, “Lebanon, Dual Legi macy, and the Syrian Crisis,” Op-Med, Ger man Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2013. 9 S. Heyderman, “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democra- cy 24, no. 4 (October 2013): 61 and 65. 10 Roy McCarthy, “U.S. Opponents to Boycott Iraqi Na onal Conference,”Guardian, July 10, 2004,www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/10/iraq.rorymccarthy. 11 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Na onal Conference,” Council on Foreign Rela ons, August 17, 2004, www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-na onal-conference/p7638. 12 Ka a Papagianni, “Na onal Conferences in Transi onal Periods: The Case of Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 3 (2006). 13 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2013. 14 The EU Council in 2009 agreed on a “Concept on Strengthening EU Media on and Dialogue Capaci es,” Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 10, 2009 EEAS, “Strengthening Na onal Capaci es for Media on and Dialogue: Na onal Dialogue Platforms and Infrastructures for Peace,” European Union External Ac on, Factsheet—EEAS Media on Support Project: Knowledge Product, Novem ber 2012, 1. 15 EEAS, “Strengthening Na onal Capaci es for Media on and Dialogue,” 2. 16 “Statement by the EU High Representa ve Catherine Ashton on the Situa on in Egypt Ahead of the Cons tu onal Referendum,” European Union External Ac on, 140111/01, Brussels, January 11, 2014,http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/

docs/2014/140111_01_en.pdf. 17 EU General A airs council conclusions, February 10, 2014. 18 “Statement by EU High Representa ve Catherine Ashton on the Launch of Na onal Dialogue in Bahrain,” European Union External Ac on, A 75/13, Brussels, February 11, 2013,www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ EN/fora /135387.pdf. 19 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Yemen,” 3199th Foreign A airs Council Mee ng, Brussels, November 19, 2012,www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/fora /133570.pdf. 20 Michele Dunne, “Storms of the Arab Spring,” Current History 112, no. 758 (December 2013). 21 Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Donald L. Horowitz, and Marc F. Plattner, “Reconsidering the ‘Transi on Paradigm,’” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1 (January 2014): 86–100. 22 A. Sherri , V. Hauck, and C. Rocca, “Glass Half Full: Study on EU Lessons Learnt in Media on and Dialogue,” study submitted to the European External Ac on Ser vice by ECDPM through the AETS Consor um—Cardno (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2013). 23 V. Hauck and A. Sherri , “EEAS Media on Support Pilot Project Evaluatory Re view,” study submitted to EEAS by ECDPM through the AETS Consor um—Cardno (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2013). 24 “The Role of Poli cal Dialogue in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: An Interpreta on of Current Experience,” Working Paper 1, in The Road to the New Deal, 2010– 2011 Internal Dialogue Working Groups, Interna onal Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 10–11. 25 Anouar Boukhars, “North Africa: Back to the Future?” in Challenges for Europe- an Foreign Policy 2014: The EU’s Extended Neighbourhood, eds. G. Grevi and D. Keohane (Madrid: FRIDE, 2014), 29.

CAR

Will Central A rican Republic bec e a battlegr und r religi us radicals? T reat Central A rican Republic bec ing latest battlegr und r religi us radicals is increasing as c untry re ains di ided Mar 27 2014

MICHELLE SHEPHARD / TORONTO STAR Order this photo Muslim civilians taking shelter near a mosque in Bangui's PK12 neighourhood hold a noonday demonstra on earlier this month. Frustra on among some groups is growing toward the French troops who arrived in the Central African Republic in December. BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC—The threat of the Central African Repub lic becoming the latest battleground for religious radicals is increasing as the coun try remains divided and the security situa on precarious.

In a wide-ranging interview with the Toronto Star, the country’s top United Na ons representa ve warned that the con ict will spill beyond its borders if the country’s Muslim and Chris an popula ons do not reconcile and civilians remain fearful of returning home.

Al Qaeda-linked groups in nearby Mali and Nigeria are ci ng the plight of CAR’s Muslim popula on with increasing frequency and are encouraging attacks against

France, which sent troops here in December after gh ng left 1,000 dead in just two days.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) accuses the French of launching a “crusade against Islam,” and a leader with the Nigerian-based Boko Haram has re portedly vowed to avenge the deaths of the country’s Muslims. The Central African Republic is even cited by ghters purportedly in Syria — includ ing one bizarre, but slickly produced 18-minute video by German ex-rapper “Deso Dogg,” who calls for jihad.

Such hos le statements are being followed “very, very carefully,” said Lt. Gen. (re red) Babacar Gaye, the UN’s highest-ranking o cial in Bangui and special advis er to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

“I hope that we will be in a posi on to expedite whatever should be done in terms of reconcilia on in terms of the communi es. I think this is the best way to delay . . . any ac ons of these terrorist groups,” he said. “Not only will they not have rea sons to come, there will be no grievances that may serve the jus ca on.”

But CAR remains dangerously split — with Muslim residents occupying only two neighbourhoods in the capital Bangui, and the rest seeking refuge in the north or neighbouring countries.

The country was once mercilessly ruled by a mainly Muslim mili a known as the Seleka, which included ghters from Chad and Sudan. Vigilante squads known as an -balaka, which drew members from the majority Chris an popula on, clashed with the Seleka, promp ng the French and African Union forces to intervene. Sele ka-backed President Michel Djotodia was pushed from power in January and Cathe rine Samba-Panza, Bangui’s former mayor, was appointed interim president.

The roots of this con ict, which has killed thousands and threatens to permanently divide this small landlocked country, are complicated and not about religion. The Seleka did not call for a state governed by Islamic law, nor did they espouse the ideology favoured by groups such as AQIM. Just a year ago there was religious har mony in CAR — mosques and churches are only blocks apart in the capital, commu ni es mixed and intermarriage between faiths is common.

But in retribu on for months of Seleka killings, sexual violence and loo ng, the an -balaka blindly targeted all Muslims. Women and children are among the dead. At a recent demonstra on in PK12, a makeshift camp of Muslim women and chil dren, cri cism was directed at the French for not ensuring the security of Muslim residents. Ibrahim Alawad, the 52-year-old self-appointed leader of the camp and a former member of the Sudan People’s Libera on Army who organized the small march, will list a litany of alleged crimes of the French troops sta oned nearby to visi ng reporters.

The ques on is whether the cycle of killings will con nue as the Seleka regroups in the north and seeks outside help. Of par cular concern to intelligence and security services is the largely remote northern Vakaga province, which shares a border with Sudan’s Darfur region. The whereabouts of Seleka leader Noureddine Adam and reports that he has travelled to Nigeria fuel specula on of future Boko Haram involvement. For now, the extremist calls for jihad are just rhetoric. And Islamic militant groups opera ng in Africa would face signi cant logis cal hurdles, including CAR’s unfamil iar terrain. “Their familiarity with often harsh and inhospitable desert condi ons have given them the edge over regional and/or interna onal forces tasked with up roo ng them from such areas,” wrote security analyst Ryan Cummings recently in Think African Press. “However, these desert plains of North and West Africa di er considerably with the jungle and savannah bushes which comprise much of the CAR.”

But Gaye said the extremist threats are not being taken lightly and without addi onal peacekeepers and increased interna onal funding, the interim government under Samba-Panza is des ned to fail. “Today the reality is very simple,” he said. “Without interna onal community support, it won’t be possible for this new gov ernment — upon which we put a lot of expecta ons — it will not be possible for them to deliver.” Ban’s call for a UN peacekeeping mission of 12,000 troops and police to join the 2,000-strong French force and 6,000 African Union peacekeepers here is being de bated by the Security Council. Gaye welcomed news that Canadian senator and re red Gen. Romeo Dallaire is urging Canada to join the mission if approved.

Also a veteran peacekeeper, Gaye said he served alongside Canadian forces during his rst mission in Sinai, in 1974. “We had excellent rela ons, probably because of the French-speaking proximity but also because they are very professional and ex perienced in peacekeeping,” he said. “We are expec ng the return of Canada to peacekeeping.”

Beyond the gates of the UN compound where we sat during the recent interview, there was a decep ve calm in Bangui. Life is slowly returning to the downtown streets, where just a couple months ago res burned and discarded bodies lay un claimed.

Stores owned by Chris an merchants have reopened and students have returned to school, although the numbers are small as most parents are s ll too frightened to leave their children alone. Later that evening, before the nightly curfew, the setting sun casts a warm glow over roadside pa os where men and women unwind over large bottles of the local Mocaf beer.

But that calm is easily shattered by evening gun re and attacks in the two remain ing Muslim neighbourhoods of PK5 and PK12, and the French and AU tanks that

patrol the streets are a reminder of what is needed to ensure security in a city that lacks a func oning police force, army or court system.

Since Saturday, the violence spiked again. The Red Cross has recorded 15 civilian deaths and Médecins Sans Fron ères reports that it has treated 38 people for life -threatening wounds.

http://www.thestar.com/

Egypt

9 Sentenced t eat in My C untry March 27, 2014 Egypt’s criminal court in El-Minya recommends death penalty sentences for Mus lim Brotherhood opera ves. The writer ponders the interna onal response to this decision. Ashraf Ramelah, founder and president of Voice of the Copts, has recently given tes mony to the Canadian Parliament on the revolu on taking place in Egypt. Please visit www.voiceofthecopts.org to read more. Egypt’s criminal court in El-Minya recommends death penalty sentences for Mus lim Brotherhood opera ves On Monday March 24, Egypt’s criminal court sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood members to death. In less than 48 hours, Judge Saeed Yosef of the court of El- Minya, south of Cairo, weighed the evidence in accusa on documents presented to the court and recommended the death penalty for 529 individuals of the 1229 defendants (all Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members involved in Muhammed Morsi’s rise to power and administra on). Only the 147 defendants in custody appeared in court. Many of the sentenced (398 persons) are in hiding and therefore absent from court. Seventeen names were found innocent. According to Egyp an law, procedure calls for the court’s recommenda on to de pend on nal approval by the Grand Mufti of Cairo, an iden tyseparate from Egypt’s government and the highest religious Islamic posi on to issue legal edits (fatwas) by interpre ng the Quran who must seal any death sentence by the civil courts with a fatwa. Once the Grand Mufti approves or denies the court’s verdict, a nal verdict will be issued by Judge Yosef in another court hearing set for April 28. The remaining 683 defendants are scheduled for trial on April 28 as well. Among those to appear for the next trial date are such notables as MB spiritual leader, Mohammed Badee, and former president of the Egyp an parliament, Moham med El Katatani. Evidence documents presented to court showed defendants responsible for crimes of upheaval and chaos against the state The defendants were arrested for violence and riots in the streets of El Minya up on Muhammed Morsi’s removal last July. These riots were related to the Al- Adawia and Al-Nahda sit-ins that the world saw in falsi ed pictures by Al- Jazeera presen ng a vic mized MB and tou ng peaceful protesters. Some of the charges include assault by rocks, Molotov cocktails and gun re on the Matay po

lice sta on, the death of a colonel deputy police sheri , the attempt to murder a second police o cer, setting re to the police sta on and police vehicles after seiz ing police weapons, and invading the public health center to kidnap and mu late the Colonel’s body. Courts around the country are busy with trials concerning similar incidents. In addi on to the convic ons of the El Minya trial, Egyp an courts in many other locales are busy holding MB members on trial for terror ac vi es: In Cairo, Judge Mustafa Al Feeky who heads the court inside the Cairo Police Acade my con nued a case against 104 members of the MB charged with Al Zaher (area in Cairo) clashes resul ng in the killing and injury of ci zens, damaging public and pri vate buildings and acts of in mida on against ci zens opposed to Islamist control of their streets. The Misdemeanor Court of Alexandria in Al Dekhela sentenced four MB members to ve years in jail with forced labor for February 2014 crimes involving violence during one or more unauthorized gatherings or demonstra ons in that neighbor hood. In the city called the Tenth of Ramadan in El Sharkia province, nine MB members were arrested and held in prison for 15 days pending an inves ga on requested by the public prosecutor. A 14 year-old student under arrest was placed in custody in a juvenile home. Their charges include belonging to a terrorist group, par cipa ng in unauthorized marches, chan ng slogans against the army and police and attacking people. At the me of their arrests, they possessed a large stash of illegal rearms. Reac n t Egypt’s guilty erdicts A statement issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan condemns the El Minya court verdict. The statement considers the verdict a poli cal one and the MB vic ms of military repression since the 529 persons sentenced are ghters for Allah and “democracy.” Meanwhile in various Egyp an universi es supporters of the banned Muslim Broth erhood are protes ng the verdicts. Catherine Ashton, Minister of Foreign A airs of the European Union, normally silent on human rights viola ons in Egypt, voiced concern over the death sentences as incommensurate with interna onal human rights standards. Apparently seeing it as too harsh a sentence for terrorists working for decades to overturn the state and undermining a wave of secularism with criminal ac vi es, she noted that Washing ton viewed theevidence and the tes mony with skep cism as to fairness. C nclusi n The United States is shocked by the number of sentenced people, spokeswoman for State department Marie Har “is sure to raise this issue with Egyp an government”, adding “ and it is logical that the trial of the sheer number in two days , this is con

trary to logic and interna onal standards. Har , in her one-way pro-Muslim Brotherhood ignored what Egyp ans su ered from brutal Islamists over the last three years and how US never condemned killing of innocents or the destruc on of churches, businesses and government buildings. The Egyp an Foreign Ministry in a statement commen ng on the verdict, said it was issued by an independent court, and after careful considera on of the issue and that the defendants can appeal the ruling to the Court of Cassa on. Is this a travesty or will it be known as the day of terror-control and a turning point for jus ce and law and order? http://www.israelna onalnews.com/Ar cles/Ar cle.aspx/14743#.UzQyyPldWSo

Libya

p-Ed: Libya acing p ssible ci il war asks r elp against terr ris MAR 20, 2014

Benghazi - The Libyan government has asked both the UN and the interna onal community to help it ght what it calls a war on terrorism as the country appears to be facing growing instability and chaos. The government faces growing protests as well as escala ng con ict with the semi-autonomous eastern area of Cyre naica. There a powerful mili a that sup ports the autonomy movement has block aded several oil ports including Es Sider and Tobruk and tried to sell and ship oil independently of the central government. On March 17 a blast killed 11 cadets in a Benghazi bombing targe ng a gradua on at a military academy. O cials of the central government are frequent targets in the area. The bodies of two armoured car guards kidnapped in the city of Derna were found. There were also clashes between pro-government forces and rebel mili as in Sirte in central Libya. A statement on a government website said: Libya's interim government asks the interna onal community and especially the United Na ons to provide assistance to uproot terrorism, The government con rms that it wants this war on terror and its crimes to start as soon as possible. The government did not specify what help it wanted but western, Arab, and other countries have been training thousands of LIbyan to form an army and police force. The US has been clandes nely involved in Libya for some me through the CIA and Special Forces and most recently by use of Navy Seals to seize a boat, the Morning Glory, that had been loaded with oil by rebels at the port of El Sider. The boat had escaped Libyan forces and was seized o the coast of Cyprus. It is being guided to a Libyan port under control of the central government. Ibrahim Jathran, the leader of the group, controlling several ports since last sum mer responded with anger to the US seizure accusing the U.S. of piracy: We will con nue our ght for our right to dream of a better tomorrow for our children and families, said Jathran, calling for the United Na ons and Arab League to intervene to help the people of eastern Libya. We urge the United States government to re frain from siding with the extremists currently holding power in Tripoli, After the oil tanker escaped from Libya parliament red prime minister Ari Zeidan who ed to Europe fearing charges against him as well. The country seems to be

dividing up into compe ng groups of mili as often based upon tribal loyal es and also into compe ng geographical areas based upon the tradi onal division into Cyr enaica in the east Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan to the south. Some further descrip ons of the mili a and their leaders can be found here and here. US involvement in Libya is increasing as it commits more personnel to training Libyan security forces:A small team of soldiers will go into Libya in the coming weeks to begin prepara ons for a larger U.S. mission to train Libyan troops in Bulgaria, a senior Army o cial said Wednesday Security is so bad in Libya that training is taking place in Bulgaria. Libyan mili as and others may not look upon foreign-trained troops as ac ng in the interests of Libya but of the countries that trained them. The U,S. has already alienated Cyrena ica and in e ect has taken sides against it in what could be a developing civil war.

Read more: http://www.digitaljournal.com/

Libya seeks w rld elp after b bings 19 March 2014 Libya called on the United Na ons and interna onal community to help ght what it called a war on terrorism, the government said on Wednesday, struggling to stop the major oil producer sliding into widening chaos and instability. The appeal came after a wave of bombings and assassina ons in the eastern city of Benghazi and clashes between pro-government forces and a rebel mili a control ling major oil ports in Sirte in central Libya. The violence is part of turmoil in the North African country where the government in unable to control mili as that helped overthrow Muammar Gadda in 2011 but kept their weapons to grab oil wealth and power. Terrorist groups had declared war on Benghazi, Sirte and other ci es, the govern ment said. A powerful car bomb targe ng an army academy killed at least eight people in Benghazi on Monday. Libya's interim government asks the interna onal community and especially the United Na ons to provide assistance to uproot terrorism, the government said in a statement posted on its website. The government con rms that it wants this war on terror and its crimes to start as soon as possible, it said. The weak central government did not say what kind of help it expected. Western, Arab and African countries have been training thousands of Libyans to build up an army and police but progress has been slow. Major oil facili es are out of control of the Tripoli government since armed groups and tribesmen seized them, knocking down oil exports, the country's lifeline, to a trickle.

The government has said it will end, if necessary by force, a blockage of major ports in the oil-rich east by a rebel group demanding regional autonomy and more oil revenues. But analysts are scep cal the nascent army can confront the group.

The rebel mili a group managed earlier this month to load oil for export onto a tanker but U.S. Navy Seals stormed the vessel o the Cyprus coast on Sunday. - Reuters

Source: http://www.tradearabia.com/news/

Trip li ws t fig t terr rist gr ups 21 March 2014 The Libyan government yesterday vowed to ght terrorism, in its rst acknowl edgement that “terrorist groups” were behind dozens of attacks against security services and Westerners. Three years after a revolu on toppled former Libyan leader Muammar Qadda and left the country awash with guns, near-daily attacks con nue unchecked across the na on. “The na on nds itself in a confronta on with terrorist groups, and it falls upon the government to mobilize its military and security forces to ght this scourge,” the government said in a statement on its Web site. “There will be no place for terrorism in Libya ... and Libyans must be prepared for such a battle in terms of cau on, awareness and sacri ce,” the statement said. Eastern Libya has become a bas on of Islamist extremists, with authori es avoid ing a full-blown confronta on with heavily armed former rebels pending the for ma on of a regular army and police force. The government indicated it would turn to “the na onal military force as it is of now” in its ght against terrorism, alluding to pro-government mili as that battled Qadda ’s regime in the 2011 uprising. The statement was published after a Cabinet mee ng held in the southern town of Ghat, two days after a car bomb at a military academy in the eastern city of Ben ghazi left at least seven soldiers dead. It also comes after parliament on Tuesday ousted former Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan over his failure to bring law and order to the country. The government said “the ci es of Benghazi, Derna and Sirte and others are facing a terrorist war carried out by Libyan and foreign elements with hos le inten ons.” Libyan authori es did not men on any par cular group, but these ci es are strongholds of extremists such as the jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia, placed on the US’ terror list in January. Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of waging attacks against judges and security forces, but also of being behind attacks on Western interests such as an assault on the US mission in 2012 that killed the ambassador and three other Americans. There have also been a string of attacks and kidnappings targe ng foreigners in the North African na on in recent months. Source: http://www.taipei mes.com/

Libya bili es rces t fig t terr rist gr ups 20 March 2014

Boys, carrying ags, sit on a tank in Benghazi, March 19, 2014, during the third anniversary of an attack by pro-Gadha forces on Benghazi. REUTERS/Esam Omran Al-Fetori

TRIPOLI: Libya's government announced Thursday it was mobilizing its security forces after acknowledging for the rst me that terrorist groups were behind dozens of attacks against security services and Westerners. Three years after a revolu on toppled long- me dictator Moamer Kadha and left the country awash with guns, near-daily attacks con nue unchecked across Libya. An overnight government statement called on the interna onal community and in par cular the United Na ons to provide the necessary support to eradicate terror ism in Libyan ci es . The na on nds itself in a confronta on with terrorist groups, and it falls upon the government to mobilise its military and security forces to ght this scourge, said the statement, published on the government's website. There will be no place for terrorism in Libya... and Libyans must be prepared for such a battle in terms of cau on, awareness and sacri ce, said the statement. Eastern Libya has become a bas on of Islamist extremists, with authori es un l now avoiding a full-blown confronta on with heavily armed former rebels pending the forma on of a regular army and police force.

The government indicated it would turn to the na onal military force as it is of now in its ght against terrorism, alluding to pro-government mili as that battled Kadha 's regime in the 2011 uprising. While welcoming the o cial change of stance by the central authori es, analysts ques oned whether they had the means at their disposal to carry through with their threats. The language of the government statement is the strongest yet since the death of Moamer Kadha in October 2011, said Libyan security expert Abdelmoneim al- Akuri. But the government did not specify who are the terrorists it intends to confront nor how they intend to do so. Poli cal analyst Salem al-Allagui cau oned that the call for interna onal help should not be interpreted as foreign interven on, which could transform the coun try into a land of jihadists to which extremists will ock to ght Western powers. Allagui said the government faced an uphill battle as militants who have un l now mainly targeted the security forces and Westerners could swing their sights on civil ians and public places. The government statement was published after a cabinet mee ng held in the southern town of Ghat, two days after a car bomb at a military academy in the res ve eastern city of Benghazi left at least seven soldiers dead. It also comes after parliament last week ousted prime minister Ali Zeidan over his failure to bring law and order to the country. The government said the ci es of Benghazi, Derna and Sirte and others are facing a terrorist war carried out by Libyan and foreign elements with hos le inten ons. Libyan authori es did not men on any par cular group, but these ci es are strong holds of extremists such as the jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia, which was placed on the US terror list in January. - Ansar al-Sharia suspected - Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of waging attacks against judges and security forces, but also of being behind attacks on Western interests such as a 2012 assault on the US consulate in Benghazi that killed the ambassador and three other Americans. There have also been a string of attacks and kidnappings targe ng foreigners in the North African na on. A French engineer was shot dead in Benghazi on March 2 and a Bri sh man and a New Zealand woman were also found shot dead on a beach southwest of the capi tal in January. In December, an American teacher was killed in Benghazi, and two French guards

were wounded in a car bombing outside France's embassy in Tripoli last April 23. Three years after the uprising, the government has come under increasing cri cism from Libyans who accuse it of corrup on and failing to provide security. Criminals roam the streets, and rival tribes shoot it out to settle long-standing dis putes, while many ex-rebels have formed powerful mili as rather than integra ng into the regular armed forces and police.

Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/.

Mali

Mali/t uareg: un e -cadre du MNLA cr e un u e ent dissident / / 1 OUAGADOUGOU, 20 mars 2014 (AFP) - La Coali on du peuple pour l'Azawad (CPA), une nouvelle organisa on regroupant toutes les communautés du nord du Mali , a été créée cette semaine par un ex-cadre du Mouvement na onal de libéra on de l'Azawad (MNLA, touareg), a annoncé jeudi son fondateur. La CPA, mise en place mardi, est consacrée à la défense des droits légi mes du peuple de l'Azawad (nord du Mali) dans le processus de négocia ons prévues avec Bamako, a indiqué son président Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, ancien haut cadre du MNLA. Elle mène le même combat poli que que le MNLA, mais dans un esprit moins va -t-en guerre , a observé M. Assaleh. Plusieurs membres du Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) et du Haut conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), deux autres organisa ons arabe et touareg, ont déjà rallié la CPA, ainsi que la grande majorité des militaires du MNLA, soit 8.000 hommes, a-t-il assuré. " ê nous battrons sur la base des accords du 18 juin 2013 , a-t-il indiqué lors d'une con férence de presse. L'Azawad, un vaste territoire dans le nord du Mali, est considéré comme le berceau des touareg, dont des représentants rebelles réclament l'autodétermina on. " v v ' O g gou et nous voulons regrouper tous les mouvements de l'Azawad pour qu'en semble nous parlions le même langage , a insisté M. Assaleh, qui est considéré comme un modéré. Le gouvernement malien a signé le 18 juin les accords de Ouagadougou avec les groupes armés du nord du Mali, qui ont permis l'organisa on de l'élec on prési den elle sur tout le territoire, mais qui tardent à être appliqués. Les rebelles touareg ont été des alliés des islamistes armés qui ont occupé le nord du Mali pendant plusieurs mois en 2012, avant qu'une interven on interna onale, dirigée par la France et toujours en cours, ne chasse les jihadistes des grandes villes de cette par e du pays. http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/malitouareg-un-ex-cadre-du-mnla-cr-e-un- mouvement-dissident

Mali: jus ce « en arc e » ais des pr gr s à aire sur les cri es du N rd N

Mohamed A Bathily, ministre de la Jus ce, Garde des sceaux AKAR La jus ce est « en arc e » au Mali en par culier c ntre les auteurs du putsc de , g à N , de deu N de d ense des dr its de l’H e

Dans ce rapport publié jeudi in tulé « Mali: la jus ce en marche », la Fédéra on interna onale de défense des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) et l’Associa on malienne de défense des droits de l’Homme (AMDH) soulignent que »la volonté de faire avancer la jus ce pour juger les auteurs des crimes commis lors de la crise malienne est manifeste ».

Elles se félicitent en par culier de « l’ouverture d’une instruc on judiciaire, le 14 mars, sur la mu nerie du 30 septembre 2013″ à Ka , quar er général des putschistes près de Bamako, menée par des hommes excédés par les avantages alors accordés à l’auteur du coup d’Etat du 22 mars 1 A S g q ê ê v 1 . L cette mu nerie avait fait au moins six morts.

Sanogo est également inculpé dans l’a aire dite des « bérets rouges », des militaires dèles au président renversé Amadou Toumani Touré, dont une vingtaine de corps avaient été retrouvés dans des charniers près de Bamako en décembre 2013.

Ces di érentes poursuites cons tuent « une avancée importante contre l’impunité au Mali », se réjouissent la FIDH et l’AMDH, qui notent cependant que « beaucoup reste à faire, en par culier dans le dossier des crimes du Nord qui regroupe des dizaines de procédures judiciaires dis nctes ». Ces organisa ons « appellent à renforcer les enquêtes sur le terrain ainsi qu’à une plus grande par cipa on des vic mes qui, ne sont à ce jour qu’une quinzaine à s’être cons tuées par es civiles ».

Le rapport souligne en par culier que diverses exac ons attribuées aux forces armées maliennes en 2013 « contre des civils ou de présumés jihadistes » dans le Nord semblent à ce jour n’avoir fait l’objet d’aucune « condamna on judiciaire ».

Le putsch mené en mars 2012 par Sanogo , alors un obscur capitaine ensuite promu gé néral avant de tomber en disgr ce n 2013 après l’entrée en fonc on du nouveau prési dent élu Ibrahim Boubacar Ke ta, avait précipité la chute du nord du Mali aux mains de groupes islamistes armés.

Ces groupes ont occupé cette région pendant plus de neuf mois avant d’en être en par e chassés par une interven on militaire interna onale lancée à l’ini a ve de la France le 11 v 1 ’ . stb/aub

Communiqué commun FIDH / AMDH La Fédéra on interna onale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) et l’Associa on malienne des droits de l’Homme (AMDH) publient aujourd’hui un rapport in tulé « Mali : la jus ce en marche » qui analyse les avancées de la jus ce ma lienne dans les procédures judiciaires à l’encontre des responsables présumés des crimes perpétrés pendant la crise malienne de 2012-2013. Nos organisa ons se félicitent que l’une de leurs principales recommanda ons vient d’être mise en uvre, à savoir l’ouverture d’une instruc on judiciaire, le 14 mars 2014, sur la « mu nerie du 30 septembre 2013 » à la suite d’une plainte dé posée par la FIDH et l’AMDH. L’inculpa on de 28 militaires dont 4 généraux dans l’a aire dite des « bérets rouges disparus » cons tue également une avancée im portante contre l’impunité au Mali.

Cependant, beaucoup reste à faire, en par culier dans le dossier des « crimes du Nord » qui regroupe des dizaines de procédures judiciaires dis nctes. Nos organi sa ons appellent à renforcer les enquêtes sur le terrain ainsi qu’à une plus grande par cipa on des vic mes qui, ne sont à ce jour, qu’une quinzaine à s’être cons tuées par es civiles dans ces procédures accompagnées dans leurs quête de jus ce par l’AMDH et la FIDH.

« La volonté de faire avancer la justice pour juger les auteurs des crimes commis lors de la crise malienne est manifeste mais devrait inclure d’avantage de victimes du Nord qui ont été les premiers témoins de ces crimes » a déclaré Me Moctar Mariko, président de l’AMDH et avocat des vic mes.

Un an après le déclenchement des premières enquêtes, ce rapport est l’occasion de faire un bilan d’étape de la lutte contre l’impunité menée par les autorités ma liennes et par la Cour pénale interna onale, sur les crimes commis au cours de la crise malienne en 2012 et 2013, tant par les groupes armés qui ont occupés le Nord du Mali, que par certains militaires des Forces armées maliennes en 2013, et les hommes d’Haya Sanogo, l’ex-chef de la junte du CNDRE.

Sur les crimes de la junte, nos organisa ons se félicitent de l’ouverture, le 14 mars 2014 d’une informa on judiciaire dans l’a aire dite de la « mu nerie du 30 septembre 2013 » pour « assassinat, enlèvement, séquestra ons et torture » contre des proches du général Haya Sanogo et qui fait suite à la plainte déposée par la FIDH et l’AMDH et au nom des 8 familles de vic mes, qu’elles représentent dans cette a aire. L’ouverture de cette instruc on était l’une des principales re

commanda ons de ce rapport et une demande réitérée de la FIDH et de l’AMDH en par culier depuis la découverte en février et mars 2014 de 6 corps dans 3 fosses communesde Ka qui s’avéreraient être selon nos informa ons des mili taires exécutés par les proches du général Aya Sanogo à la suite de la mu nerie du 1 .

Dans l’a aire dite « des Bérets rouges disparus » au cours de la tenta ve de contre-coup d’État d’avril 2012, le juge d’instruc on a procédé à l’inculpa on pour « assassinat et complicité d’assassinat », de 28 personnes dont 4 généraux parmi lesquels Aya Sanogo. Six d’entre eux ont été placés sous contrôle judiciaire dont le dernier en date, le général Dahirou Dembélé, ex-chef d’État major des Ar més, a été entendu et inculpé le 14 mars 2014. L’AMDH et la FIDH sont par es civiles et accompagnent 23 familles de vic mes dans cette a aire.

« La justice malienne a accompli dans les six derniers mois des actes positifs et hautement symboliques qui constituent les signaux d’une réelle volonté poli- tique de ne pas laisser les auteurs de ces crime impunis » a déclaré Karim Lahidji, président de la FIDH.

Concernant les dossiers des « crimes du Nord » au moins 201 personnes sont au jourd’hui inculpées . Les récentes arresta ons d’importantes gures des groupes armés djihadistes au Nord1 démontrent l’actualité et la per nence de ces dos siers. Pourtant l’ac on de la jus ce malienne sur les crimes du Nord demeure ca ractérisée par un très grand nombre de procédures judiciaires dis nctes, dont cer taines sont déjà clôturées, et par la faible par cipa on des vic mes à ces procé dures à l’excep on d’une quinzaine de vic mes cons tuées par es civiles et re présentées par le pool d’avocats du Groupe d’ac on judiciaire de la FIDH et de l’AMDH depuis novembre 2013.

Compte tenu du nombre d’informa ons judiciaires ouvertes sur ces faits, la FIDH et l’AMDH recommandent à la jus ce malienne, d’une part d’approfondir les en quêtes de terrain et d’autre part de renforcer la communica on autour de ces dossiers a n de favoriser la percep on de l’ac on de la jus ce malienne ainsi que la par cipa on des vic mes dans ces procédures. En n, nous déplorons que mal gré les annonces de sanc ons, d’enquête et d’ouverture d’instruc ons judiciaires par le parquet militaire en 2013, aucune instruc on judiciaire ne semble avoir été e ec vement diligenter à ce jour contre les auteurs présumés d’exac ons au sein des Forces armés maliennes (FAMA).

« La volonté de lutter contre l’impunité manifestée ces derniers mois devrait guider les autorités maliennes à réaliser des progrès dans les dossiers des crimes du Nord, notamment en créant les conditions d’une réelle participation des victimes aux procédures judiciaires, et en engageant des poursuites contre les militaires qui se seraient rendus responsables d’exactions pendant le conflit. Autant

d’actions nécessaires à la tenue d’un véritable processus de réconciliation natio- nale basé sur une justice impartiale », a déclaré a déclaré Me Patrick Baudouin, coordinateur du Groupe d’ac on judiciaire (GAJ) de la FIDH et avocat des vic mes.

Nos organisa ons appellent également le Bureau du Procureur de la CPI à renfor cer sa coopéra on avec les autorités judiciaires maliennes et à lancer ses pour suites à l’égard des plus hauts responsables des crimes les plus graves qui ne se raient pas poursuivi au niveau na onal, dans les meilleurs délais. http://www.maliweb.net/

Niger

Niger - tats-Unis : une c p ra n ilitaire s utenue 6/ / 1

Un con ngent de soldats nigériens.a AFP Cette semaine Laurent Touchard revient sur plusieurs décennies de coopéra on entre le Niger et les États-Unis. toire militaire. Il a collaboré à plusieurs ouvrages et certains de ses travaux sont uti- lisés par l université Johns-Hopkins, aux tats-Unis. Les débuts de l'aide militaire américaine au Niger en ma ère de sécurité datent d'un accord du 14 juin 1962. En vertu de celui-ci, Washington fournit des équipe ments et des services à Niamey a n d'aider à assurer sa sécurité et son indépen dance . Dix-huit ans plus tard, le 9 juin 1980, un autre accord est signé. Il donne le droit au Niger d'accéder au programme Interna onal Military Educa on an Training I . L'I f gers, y compris dans les centres et académies aux États-Unis. l'instar d'autres pays du con nent africain, les membres des Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) nigériennes en béné cient tout au long des années 1990. Aide à laquelle viennent s'ajouter d'autres projets d'assistance militaire qui se mettent en place dans le cou rant des années 2000. L'intérêt de Washington pour l'Afrique se réveille alors. Discuté avec le Mali, la Mauritanie, le Tchad et le Niger, en octobre 2002, la Pan Sahel Ini a ve (PSI) est mise sur pied en novembre 2002. Un an après les attentats de New York, la PSI s'inscrit dans la logique de guerre totale contre le terrorisme voulue par l'administra on Bush. Elle implique un vaste spectre d'organismes gou

vernementaux américains. Néanmoins, les objec fs sont modestes. Avec un bud get d'environ 8 millions de dollars, est prévu d'organiser une compagnie an terro riste dans chacun des pays concernés tandis que des unités régulières et paramili taires sont entra nées à l'u lisa on des armes légères, à la tac que des pe tes uni tés, aux transmissions, à la naviga on dans le désert... La PSI comprend également un volet opéra onnel, via l'Opera on Enduring Freddom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), contre Al-Qa da en Afrique. Volet qui concerne de fait le Groupe sala ste pour la prédica on et le combat (GSPC) qui, depuis 2003, se fait de plus en plus remarquer dans le Sahara. Si l'implica on américaine est discrète, elle n'en est pas moins réelle. Un violent a rontement, le 9 mars 2004, l'illustre. Des jihadistes du GSPC se heurtent à des militaires nigériens et tchadiens, dans la zone frontalière entre les deux pays. Au cours de la bataille, les terrobandits perdent au moins 43 hommes. Nigériens et Tchadiens béné cient de l'appui américain, en par culier d'éléments du 10e Special Force Group (Airborne) et d'un avion P3 Orion qui e ectue des missions ISR g v A q fran ais dont nous avons parlé précédemment. L'Orion opère alors depuis... l'Algé rie Plus précisément, à par r de la base de Tamanrasset. g En 2005, la Trans-Saharan Couter Terrorism Ini a ve (TSCTI) succède à la PSI. La liste des pays soutenus s'allonge. Évidemment, le Niger y gure toujours l'aide nancière et l'assistance militaire de Washington ne s'interrompt donc pas, bien au contraire. En 2006, les préroga ves de la TSCTI sont transférées au Trans- Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Le TSCTP ne succède pas à la TSCTI. Il s'agit d'une extension de cette dernière, concernant davantage de pays : l'Al gérie, le Mali, le Maroc, la Mauritanie, le Nigeria, le Sénégal, la Tunisie et toujours le Niger. Le Burkina Faso est intégré en 2009. L'OEF-TS con nue d'exister, mais est renommée par la suite Opera on Juniper Shield dont la ges on et l'exécu on re viennent à l'Africom. Schéma quement, le TSCTI/TSCTP représente donc le pro gramme dans sa globalité tandis que l'OEF-TS en cons tue le volet opéra onnel spéci quement an terroriste. L'Africom, c'est cette autre expression de l'évolu on de la poli que sécuritaire américaine en Afrique. Commandement régional créé le 7 février 2007, totalement opéra onnel en octobre 2008, il englobe l'essen el du con nent (à l'excep on de l'Égypte). Con nent qui auparavant était morcelé en trois zones de responsabilité, chacune a ectée à un commandement (Eucom, Centcom et Pacom). Washington se dote ainsi d'une structure militaire panafricaine, dans la logique du concept de soft power . Moins agressive, cette poli que a pour ambi on de contraster avec celle menée en Afghanistan et en Irak. Cette structure se dis ngue donc, a priori, des autres commandements de par une caractéris que très par culière : son fonc onnement et ses missions se veulent teintés de l'esprit approche globale (que

nous avons explicitée dans un billet précédent). Malgré tout, les États africains ne sont pas franchement enthousiastes de cette créa on. En 2007, l'ennemi principal visé par toutes ces mesures s'émancipe. En e et, le GSPC devient Al-Qa da au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi). Il s'e orce alors de mul plier les ac ons visibles , pour exister dans la région et pour prouver que le mouve ment est digne du label Al-Qa da. Le Niger n'est pas épargné tandis qu'une nou velle rébellion nomade (la précédente date de 1990) éclate. Dans ce contexte, les ac vités criminelles se développent. La di culté à contrôler les vastes étendues du désert et d'interminables fron ères favorisent malheureusement les in ltra ons de terrobandits. L'augmenta on du budget du TSCTP, cette même année 2007, traduit bien que Washington a conscience des menaces et des risques qu'ils font peser sur la stabilité. Ainsi, plus de 168 millions de dollars (dollars constants 2014) sont octroyés à l'ensemble des services et agences impliqués dans le programme. Mener une poli que interna onale dite des 3D pour e acer l'image héritée des années Bush. En novembre 2008, Barack Obama est élu président des États-Unis. Il choisit Hillary Clinton comme Secrétaire d'État. Celle-ci plaide en faveur du principe de la smart power que l'on pourrait traduire par puissance sub le . L'idée est simple : s'ap puyer sur l'ensemble des moyens dont disposent les États-Unis a n de mener une poli que interna onale dite des 3D : diploma e, développement et défense. Idée simple, mais enjeu de taille : il s'agit d'e acer l'image qui colle désormais à l'Amérique, héritée des années Bush . Une Amérique brutale, hégémonique, im périaliste... Et de remplacer cette image par la convic on que le pays de la Liberté est un partenaire respectueux des droits, des cultures. Quant à l'ensemble des moyens dont disposent les Etats-Unis, ils relèvent de la puissance douce ou de la puissance dure . Le principe n'est pas nouveau : le président Theodore Roose velt en est à l'origine avec sa poli que étrangère du gros b ton (et, implicite ment, de la carotte ). Il est ensuite cul vé tout au long de la Guerre froide, avec des fortunes diverses en Asie du Sud-est (au Laos, en Tha lande) et surtout, en Amérique Centrale et en Amérique du Sud tout au long des années 1970 et 1980. En dépit de ce changement de mentalité , des observateurs soulignent qu'au moins jusqu'en 2010-2011, le TSCTI/TSCTP reste par trop focalisé sur la dimension militaire. Les ques ons de développement économique, d'éduca on, de santé sont mal considérées. Il faut attendre 2012 pour que les choses s'équilibrent véri tablement et que l'on puisse davantage parler d'approche globale dans le cadre d'une diploma e de smart power . Les objec fs du TSCTP sont résumés dans un document o ciel américain : Renforcer les capacités an terroristes régionales Améliorer la coopéra on entre les forces de sécurité du Sahel Promouvoir les régimes démocra ques

Discréditer l'idéologie terroriste Renforcer les liens militaires avec les États-Unis. Mais là encore, tout comme pour les programmes européens, le manque de coopé ra on entre les organismes gouvernementaux impliqués dans les projets conjugués à un défaut de concerta on nuisent à l'e cacité générale. Autre programme qui béné cie au Niger comme à d'autres pays d'Afrique, l'African Con ngency Opera ons Training and Assistance Program (Acota). L'origine de celui -ci remonte à l'ère Clinton. Son administra on souhaite alors créer une force d'ac on rapide africaine qu'organiseraient et entra neraient les États-Unis. Le con nent ne l'accueille pas favorablement. A n de préserver les suscep bilités souverainistes " " f tenu mais sous une forme moins ambi euse et surtout, plus anodine, désigné Afri can Crisis Response Ini a ve (Acri). En 2002, l'Acri devient l'Acota. Il encadre l'en tra nement des militaires africains aux opéra ons de main en de la paix. En 2004, l'Acota dépend de la Global Peace Opera ons Ini a ve (GPOI). La GPOI reste cen trée sur la prépara on aux missions de main en de la paix. Depuis leur créa on, l'Acri puis l'Acota ont permis d'instruire 154 500 hommes de 20 na ons africaines. Au Niger, ce sont ainsi deux bataillons qui en béné cient. Le Niger à d aut du Mali Le 19 ao t 2009, les dérives autocra ques du président Tandja conduisent les États -Unis à stopper temporairement tous les programmes d'assistance militaire au pro t du Niger. Toutefois, cette parenthèse est de courte durée. par r du 25 février 1 q q ' q v Tandja (le 18 février ), des discussions sont discrètement entamées à propos d'une éventuelle implanta on américaine dans le pays. l'instar de Paris, la Maison Blanche et le département d'État cherchent à installer une base au c ur du Sahel. Le refus du Mali conduit naturellement Washington – là aussi, tout comme Paris – à jouer la carte du Niger. Les soldats occidentaux déployés à l'étranger suscitent un rejet croissant des socié tés locales à mesure qu'augmente la durée de leur présence. Néanmoins, il faut encore attendre plusieurs mois avant que ce projet n'abou sse. Certes, en 2012, les États-Unis sont autorisés à u liser Agadez pour le ravitaille ment de leurs Pilatus PC-12. Désignés U-28A dans l'Armée de l'Air américaine, ils mènent des missions ISR au-dessus du Sahel depuis 2007. Au milieu de l'immensité de la région, disposer d'un point d'escale à Agadez est appréciable. Reste que l'Afrique est globalement hos le à une ostensible présence américaine. Les di cul tés de Washington pour trouver o installer sur le con nent le quar er-général de l'Africom en témoignent. En dehors du Liberia et de rumeurs infondées quant à la Tunisie ' v . I v q ' -U ê v ' v contre cette installa on. commencer par l'ex-ambassadeur Bob Houdek, pour qui, un complexe comme le QG de l'Africom, avec toutes les contraintes en ma ère

de logement et de sécurité des personnels, ne provoqueraient l'impression d'un " " . A q v D v spécialiste de la probléma que de la contre-insurrec on. Selon ses travaux, les sol dats occidentaux déployés à l'étranger suscitent un rejet croissant des sociétés tra di onnelles locales à mesure qu'augmente la durée de la dite-présence. g Avec le déclenchement de l'opéra on Serval f sol ont un besoin crucial en renseignements tac ques. Pour éradiquer progressive ment les terrobandits qui occupaient le nord du Mali, elles doivent d'abord les loca liser précisément. Dans un premier temps, Washington semble déployer au moins un drone MQ-1 Predator. Lui succèdent deux MQ-9 Reaper. L'US Air Force compte alors environ 200 hommes au Niger (auxquels s'ajoutent évidemment les person nels de la CIA en poste à Niamey et suscep bles de rayonner dans l'ensemble du pays). Parmi eux, des éléments de sécurité, armés, assurent la protec on des hommes et du matériel. La Maison Blanche con rme leur présence le 22 février 2013, même si elle ne re conna t qu'une centaine d'hommes. Ils opèrent à la fois en appui des Fran ais, mais aussi pour les besoins propres des autorités américaines. Par rapport aux avions U- 8A R v g . T ' q ' ' g d'aéronefs pilotés à distance (RPV), si l'un d'eux vient à s'écraser, aucun équipage ne risque d'être tué ou pire , capturé par des jihadistes. Ensuite, les Reaper dispo sent d'une endurance beaucoup plus grande que le Pilatus, tout en emportant des capteurs plus performants. Revers de la médaille, les unités de drones nécessitent des e ec fs plus importants pour leur mise en oeuvre. Ainsi, alors qu'une pe te trentaine d'hommes - pilotes compris – su t à faire voler quelques U-28A, il en faut jusqu'à dix fois plus pour une unité de Predator... En outre, contrairement à ce qui prévaut avec les Pilatus, le personnel des unités de drones ne se compose pas de la même propor on de contractors , ces personnels civils sous contrats, d'em ploi plus souple à l'étranger... Le 9 avril, un Reaper s'écrase dans le nord du Mali, suite à une panne. Les missions ne s'interrompent pas pour autant. ce moment-là, Washington prévoit d'envoyer environ 300 hommes au Niger. Fin 2013, certaines sources évoquent le chi re d'en viron 1 000 Américains en majeure par e sur la Base Aérienne 101 (BA 101). Si les Reaper ne sont des nés aux opéra ons directement o ensives, en septembre 1 M A g q q apprécierait des drones armés... Déclara on qui ouvre des portes à l'administra on et aux militaires de Washington. D'autant que les drones armés sont des acces soires majeurs de la stratégie de l'empreinte légère . Manière de mener la guerre avec une e cacité op male sans s'impliquer massivement est dans la logique de la " w ". Si les matériels ont évolué, que la technologie a pris le pas sur l'humain, les Reaper du Sahel ne sont nalement pas si éloignés des avions américains de la Civil Air

Transport (CAT) qui soutenaient les Fran ais au Laos dans le cadre de l'opéra on Squaw à par r de mai 1953, puis avec Air America toujours au Laos de 1954 à 1974. L'on songera également aux missions au-dessus du Tibet, de la Chine communiste, au-dessus du Nicaragua pour livrer des armes aux Contras... La stratégie de " ' g " v -U ' q ' menter à maintes reprises aux quatre coins du monde... propos de cette " v " l'excellent travail de Maya Kandel. Outre les RPV sur la BA 101, les Américains contribuent de concert avec la France au renforcement du poten el des FDS. En juillet 2013 sont fournis 2 Cessna 208 Grand Caravan, d'une valeur de 11 millions de dollars (incluant la forma on des pilotes, l'entre en des appareils). Dix Toyota sont livrés dans le même temps, pré cédant un lot de camions citernes (carburant et eau), valant au total 4,2 millions de dollars. Ces camions améliorent sensiblement les capacités logis ques des FDS. Ils permettent d'assurer le ravitaillement des patrouilles motorisées loin des casernes, autorisant ainsi des raids beaucoup plus longs. Un prochain billet présentera en dé tails les matériels et l'organisa on des FDS. l'été 2013, l'ambassadrice des États-Unis au Niger, Bisa Williams, annonce la li vraison d'autres équipements a n d'aider les FDS à accomplir leurs missions, en par culier au sein de la Minusma (Mission mul dimensionnelle intégrée des Na ons unies pour la stabilisa on au Mali). En e et, un bataillon nigérien de 850 hommes est alors sur le point d'intégrer le disposi f interna onal. En n, l'exercice Flintlock 2014 commence le 19 février. Prévu jusqu'au 9 mars, il se déroule pour l'essen el au Niger dans les zones d'Agadez, de Di a et de Tahoua. Y par cipent plus de 1 000 hommes de 18 pays d'Afrique et d'Europe (dont la France et les Pays- Bas), aux côtés des États-Unis. l'évidence, l'entente est excellente entre Niamey et Washington. Bonne entente que facilite paradoxalement la crispa on discrète des rela ons avec Paris : dossier Areva v ' v f L ... D f cristallise un certain mécontentement qu'augmente sa présence militaire non négli geable, détournant ainsi l'atten on des Américains.

Source: http://www.jeuneafrique.com

Nigeria

B k Hara : less ns r Bia ra on March 21, 2014

NIGERIANS have con nued to be inundated with the ever chilly tales of the deaths of scores of innocent ci zens on daily basis in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents in the North-East.

The way out of this trouble has obviously become the pre-occupa on of many hav ing realized that it is better to think and pro er solu ons than fold arms and blame the government in newspaper publica ons, demonstra ons and public statements. The Buni Yadi massacre of FGC students left so much bad taste in the mouth and evoked in me memories of the Nigeria civil war which started when I was barely 10 years old. In those 30 months of my boyhood marred by war which I luckily sur vived, there are experiences to be shared for the bene t of the children and par ents living in the northeastern part of Nigeria now trauma zed by Boko Haram.

There are also memories that can bene t the military leaders gh ng Boko Haram insurgency even when it has come from an ordinary civilian who experienced war as a boy. Yes, Nigeria fought a civil war for 30 months at the end of which the se cession of the former Eastern Region (Biafra) was brutally stopped. The objec ve was to keep the country one and the end jus ed all the means employed.

In rela on to the current insurgency which now has all the trappirigs of real war, the rst lesson to be drawn from the civil war was the Federal Government’s galva niza on of the en re ci zenry against the people of Biafra with a slogan devoid of ethnic or religious coloura on…To keep Nigeria one.’ To defeat Biafra, therefore, became a movement keyed in to by all Nigerians other than those on the side of secessionist Biafra. This na onal consciousness was the most lethal weapon in the hands of Gen. Yakubu Gowon and his military. In the current war against terror, na onal consciousness against Boko Haram is yet to emerge despite the unending bloodshed. It is probably because some Nigerians seem to see the problem as Goodluck Jonathan’s challenge and which they pray becomes the albatross that will make him abandon power. Others who are saddened by the deaths of fellow Nige rian ci zens in the Northeast look forward to seeing a non par san and humanitari an movement against the insurgency that will draw them in and add strength and grassroots appeal to what the residency is doing.

Crus ing entu With the two posi ons, it means the level of na onal consciousness needed to con front and defeat Boko Haram is not yet crystallized. Even as I commend the current achievements of the Chief of Army Sta (COAS) Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minimah who has since relocated to Bornu State, we need from all Nigerians a heart that will gener

ate a consciousness with crushing momentum against Boko Haram.

The second lesson from the civil war is the seeming poor awareness of the civilian popula on in the Boko Haram a ected zone of the monumental dangers they face. This was unlike the situa on in Biafra where internal propaganda sensi zed every one of the imminence of death in the hands of “vandals”. The popular radio jingle s ll engraved in my brain was: a me of genocide is a me for vigilance Biafra be vigilant Consequent upon this, people were engaged in dog sleep (i.e. with one eye open). Even as a primary ve pupil in 1967, we were taught how to dive for cover, how to shield from bullet and how to craw to safety in the face of attack from land or air. We were clearly tutored to understand that to run was to DIE. Our mothers were taught not to look for their children but save their lives rst. Family bunkers where members hid during air raids were constructed. With these, we survived many bomb attacks.

It is doubtful if our ci zens facing the wrath of Boko Haram in the northeast villages have been exposed to some current trainings considering how they react to attacks and the consequen al death tolls. They should be trained to expect sudden attack and advised on how to respond whenever it happens.

Apparent injury The third lesson is the evacua on of people in danger of apparent injury to safety. As a boy in 1968, I lived with people who were evacuated from war endangered communi es of Biafra including people from Udi and Nsukka in the present day Enugu state and Ogoni from the present day Rivers State.

One therefore wonders why people in border communi es of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states being massacred by Boko Haram daily cannot be evacuated to safe ref ugee camps. If Biafra could do it in 1967, obviously Nigeria can in 2014. Besides se curing the endangered people, it a ords the military and intelligence organs the opportunity of appropriately execu ng their o ensive without fear of unnecessary casual es.

The fourth lesson is the protec on of school children as much as prac cable from disasters consequent upon war strife or civil commo on. This is necessary because the children are the future who will grow to rebuild the city destroyed by wars fought by parents. When air raids on Biafra territory became too severe in 1968, schools were closed to protect the children of Biafra and when they were reopened in 1969 children and their teachers studied under tree shades instead of the highly exposed school premises. The emphasis was the protec on of the children. With the vicious Boko Haram opera ng in the north east of the country and focusing on soft targets, schools should be closed and children relocated to areas where safety , may be guaranteed un l normalcy returns.

The fth lesson bothers on military strategy. In our boy soldiering, we were thought to blow the bridge of disaster and I want to believe this is a long tested opera onal pattern in warfare. With Boko Haram opera ng from along our borders with Chad and Cameroun Republics, the borders should be closed. This cuts o the enemy’s supply line and weakens the opera onal capacity of members within the na onal boundaries.

The sixth lesson is the need for the military to leverage on na ve intelligence. Intel ligence by the na ves of various communi es was the cornerstone of Biafran mili tary intelligence. In every community, the good and the bad are well known by the people. Indigenes and strangers can be di eren ated and movements interpreted. With careful inves ga on, it may be that communi es severely attacked by Boko Haram in the North-East have bad leadership which led their youth into deviant behavior of joining the insurgent group. The attack may well represent a puni ve payback on such community leaders.

THE seventh lesson is the special role the sacri ce made by indigenes of communi es in military service played in the survival of such communi es during the civil war. Biafran soldiers were allowed the priviledge of elec ng to lead the defence of their towns and villages in the face of enemy invasion. The local communi es usu ally collaborated e ec vely with their sons who would do everything to save their kith and kin from calamity. I con nue to wonder how a soldier who hails from one of the Borno State villages a ected by the Boko Haram attacks and serving in Lagos would feel hearing that not less than a hundred of his kinsmen perhaps including his parents, brothers and sisters have been massacred. He certainly would have loved to play a role in saving them given the opportunity.

The eighth lesson is the necessity of seeking the collabora on and support of for eign powers. To defeat Biafra, Nigeria got the support of such countries as Britain, USSR (Russian) and USA. The propaganda oozing out of this global support helped to bring Biafra to its knees. In the face of Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria may seek the support and collabora on of countries that have economic es with it. The nineth lesson is the possibility of hiring foreign experts (war mercenaries) to assist our military in certain areas of special need. Most of the military pilots that ew ghter jets during the civil war were expatriates and since we are now faced with a special kind of enemy, people with special skills may be recruited from out side the shores of Nigeria.

The tenth lesson is the necessity of keeping discussion and nego a on with the enemy ongoing. Nigeria never abandoned any opportunity of dialoging with Biafra much as her military was on an assault mission. As faceless as Boko Haram is, the

government of Nigeria should con nue to seek its face. Hopefully, it would be found someday.

The above lessons from Biafra are for the authori es to consider in line with cur rent and peculiar trends in the Boko Haram insurgency. Beyond this expecta on, ordinary Nigerians together with non-governmental, faith-based and corporate or ganiza ons should address the humanitarian fallouts of the terrorism challenge. Counter terrorism in this regard means na onal solidarity with vic ms of Boko Ha ram insurgency devoid of unnecessary poli ciza on and driven by freewill gifts of cash, food, clothing and shelter. To show such concern will no doubt strengthen our na onhood which Boko Haram seeks to destroy. Meanwhile, the world is watching our behavior.

- See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/boko-haram-10-lessons- biafra/#sthash.qjTHEtmZ.dpuf

B k Hara : H w a Militant Isla ist r up E erged in Nigeria

March 27, 2014

The Western in uence of Bri sh colonialists caused a division among the people of Northern Nigeria, who were once united by Islam. This division saw, on one side, the so-called civilized -- by Western standards -- elite who were used by the Bri sh as agents of coloniza on and on the other side, the commoners, who vehe mently resisted Western in uence in the region. Dissa sfac on with Western in uence also led to an emergence of Islamist funda mentalists among people of the Northeastern region of Nigeria. The reason Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corrup on by linking it to Western in uence in governance. What developments might have triggered the emergence of violent Islamist group Boko Haram during the last decade in Nigeria? According to Umar Mamodu 1 -- a scholar and key Boko Haram historian -- its incep on in 2002 resulted from a clash between the moderate Islamic teachings of the prominent Sheikh Jafaar Adam at the Mahammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri-Borno State in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, and the more militant interpreta on of the Qur'an by his disciple, Mo hammed Yusuf. 2

According to Mamodu 3 , Yusuf believed in the crea on of a new order in which the wretched should inherit the earth, and for his extremist views, was expelled in 2002 from the Ndimi Mosque Committee. 4 Later that year Yusuf built a mosque in the northeast Nigeria to serve as a magnet for primary and secondary school pu pils who, in response to his teachings, would abandon Westernized schools in the belief that Western educa on Boko is a sin Haram hence the name Boko Ha ram. 5

The group's o cial name, according to its manifesto, is Jamaiatu Ahlis Sunna Lid- da awata Wal-Jihad, 6 which translates as Associa on of Sunnis for the Propaga on of Islam and Jihad. 7 Abul Qaqa, the o cial spokesman of the group, stated categorically, in an interview reported by Reporters Without Borders, that Boko Haram's objec ve is the applica on of Sharia law throughout Nigeria … t hrough kidnappings, bombings and suicide attacks aimed at the United Na ons, churches and symbols of the federal government such as police sta ons. 8

Ideologically, Boko Haram opposes not only Western educa on but also Western culture and science -- a posi on Mohammed Yusuf revealed in an interview con ducted by the BBC, when he stated that the belief that the earth is spherical in shape is a sharp contradic on to Islamic thought and therefore should be rejected along with Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by

the sun. 9 Ironically, Nigerian academic Hussain Zakaria told BBC News that Yusuf is graduate educated and very pro cient in English . 10

Violence linked to Boko Haram's ac vi es is reported to have resulted in an es mated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2013. 11 Since 2012 alone, according to an Amnesty Interna onal report that details Boko Haram's ac vi es in Nigeria, at least 70 teachers and over 100 schoolchildren and students have been killed or wounded. At least 50 schools have either been burned or seriously damaged and more than 60 others have been forced to close. Thousands of children have been forced out of schools across communi es in Yobe, Kaduna, Adamawa and Borno states. 12

Abubakar Shekau, leader of the Nigerian Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, appears in a video communiqué claiming responsibility for an October 24, 2013 attack that killed 35 people.

Boko Haram is considered a threat to not only Nigeria but also the en re world. In 2012, then-Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham, voiced concerns about the intent of terrorist groups such as Somalia's Al- Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM and Boko Haram to collaborate and synchronize their e orts. After the 2011 Christmas Day bombings of churches in Nigeria, General Ham said that he remained greatly concerned about Boko Ha ram's stated intent to connect with Al-Qaeda's senior leadership. 13

Socio-poli cal state of Northern Nigeria: Maitatsine Nigeria was created in 1914 from an amalgama on of the north and south region by Bri sh colonial authori es. Northern Nigeria consists mainly of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, who are predominantly Muslim, while Southern Nigeria con sists of the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups, who are Chris ans and animist worship pers.

The history of Northern Nigeria has been profoundly in uenced by religion and pol i cs. Since the Borno Sultanate and the Sokoto Caliphate -- which ruled parts of what is now Northern Nigeria, the Republic of Niger and southern Cameroon -- fell under Bri sh control in 1903, there has been strong resistance to Western educa on among the Muslims of the area. 14

In the Northern part of Nigeria, religion has long been used as a uni ng tool. The Fulani Jihads of 1804-1808, through conquest and conversion, superimposed Islam on the Hausa iden ty, crea ng a central poli cal and religious authority on the fragmented Hausa states of present day Northwestern Nigeria, and fusing them into one poli cal and linguis c unit. 15 As historian John Phillips stated, to be Hau sa gradually came to mean that one was a Muslim, even though not all Muslims in the region were Hausa and not all Hausa were Muslims. 16

The unity seen among Northerners strongly contrasts to the Southern region of Ni geria, which is made up of various scattered ethnic groups, languages, poli cal or ganiza ons and religions. Bri sh control and the subsequent coloniza on of the region, however, evidently did not sit well with the indigenous people of Northern Nigeria. 17 Opposi on to Western in uence followed, largely due to the circumstance that the Hausa elite -- the traders, scribes and clerks used by the Bri sh as agents to colonize the region -- led lives that were physically, attitudinally and materially removed from their hosts'. 18 An account of the indirect rule adopted by Bri sh colonial authori es states: Like the white colonialist, these black imperialists would not live amongst and mix with the people. They stayed on their own. They had their own quarters just as the Whiteman had his own Government Reserva on Area... 19 Although this account refers to the Igede area of central Nigeria, in his examina on of the account, Moses Ochonu, Associate Professor of African History at Vanderbilt Uni versity, observed that, in many ways, the Hausa auxiliaries too were vic ms of a colonial administra ve policy shaped by the racist no on of the more civilized na ves helping to civilize the less civilized ones. 20

Added to the Western in uence in government and administra on, was the suspi cion of the spread of Chris anity in a Northern Nigeria dominated by Islam. As Fa rouk Chothia commented in a BBC report, O wing to ac vi es of early Chris an missionaries who used Western educa on as a tool for evangelism, it is viewed with suspicion by the local Northern popula on. 21

Northern Nigeria the system was also seen as a cheap and an ine ec ve coloniza on project. 22

In the years leading to Nigeria's independence in 1960, there was a popular move ment among Northern Nigerians known as the Talakawas 23 -- headed by Aminu Kano, a socialist poli cian who led an Islamic uprising against Bri sh colonialists in the 1940s. Talakawas had as its driving force a distaste for Western in uence, and planned to use poli cs and religion to create a Northern Nigerian Society of Social Jus ce, Economic Prosperity and Fairness . A study on the government of Northern Nigeria from 1350-1950 shows that many Talakawas(commoners) in Kano State supported that message to demonstrate disapproval with what they perceived as an unrepresenta ve government composed of a selected few. 24

Dissa sfac on with Western in uence also led to an emergence of Islamist funda mentalists among people of the Northeastern region of Nigeria. Prominent among them was Mohammed Marwa, a radical preacher also known as Maitatsine the one who curses , notorious for his violent ac vi es during the 1970s and 1980s. 25 Marwa denounced Western in uence and technology, and also mainstream Muslim teachers. The riots and armed clashes he ins gated, which pitted his fol lowers against police and the army, resulted in the deaths of thousands of people in the country. 26 A BBC report quotes a witness who saw hundreds of people summarily executed, as the Nigerian authori es tried to crush a week-long uprising in December 1980, speaking of the horri c nature Maitatsine's attacks:

They were extrajudicial killings everywhere. …. There were hundreds of them, in nocent people. 27 The report went on to say, Here cal seems to be the only word to describe him Maitatsine … he had millennial ideas of the end of me. … There was a certain fana cism by Maitatsine s rebels which overwhelmed the attempt to deal with them… I saw a lot of dead bodies everywhere. Everywhere was lled with dead bodies. Road blocks were mounted… everybody was living in absolutely fear. People were living with their hearts in their mouth . 28 In the aftermath of the uprising, it was reported that, It took the police three days to get the bodies o the street. An es mated 4,000 people were killed in the week-long uprising. 29

Analyst Tony Johnson views Boko Haram as a spawn of the Maitatsine riots. 30

This disenfranchisement of commoners in the Northern part of Nigeria seems to have been used as an opportunity by the commoners to carry out uprisings for so cial jus ce, an Islamic mode of governing and economic prosperity against the establishment. The reason Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram, according to accounts of Umar Mamodu - an Arabic scholar and Boko Haram historian, appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corrup on by linking it

to Western in uence in governance. 31 Yusuf, according to Mamodu's account, wanted to gather young impressionable minds that had never gotten a fair deal from government he was fascinated with the idea of destroying the social, poli cal and religious order to create a new order in which the wretched would inherit the earth. 32 This no on has prompted Chris Kwaja, a Nigerian researcher on religion, to assert that religious dimensions of the con ict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. 33 Another Nigerian researcher wrote, A psycho-analysis of the ad herents of the sect shows that their major belief is in the full implementa on of Sharia law in their respec ve states. With Sharia fully implemented, there will be social jus ce, economic prosperity, equality and fairness… Western educa on is not really there problem…Maladministra on is the remote cause. 34

A look at the membership of Boko Haram will also reveal the role that bad govern ance and disenfranchisement of commoners in Northern Nigerian states have played in the group's emergence. According to gures extrapolated from a 2001 ar cle by Tony Johnson for the Council of Foreign Rela ons, the sect's hundreds of followers, mostly Northerners, known also as usu ya, consisted largely of impov erished Islamic students and clerics, as well as university students and profession als, many of whom were unemployed. 35 Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told IRIN News that Yusuf successfully attracted followers by speaking out against police and poli cal corrup on on behalf of the country's vast num bers of unemployed youth who he was able to tap into for recruits . 36 He also went on to suggest that the emergence of Boko Haram is largely due to corrup on and poor governance. 37

Nigeria: North-South Divide Since the amalgama on of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, it has been ar gued that Nigeria has favored the elites of the North at the expense of inhabitants of the Southern region. At Nigeria's 100-year anniversary, cons tu onal lawyer Fred Agbaje suggested that the amalgama on by the Bri sh was a self-serving alli ance. The amalgama on, he wrote, put the poli cal administra on of Nigeria in the hands of some people instead of an equitable distribu on of power. 38

After Nigeria's Independence in 1960, the North-South division led to discrimina on against Southerners. Between 1963 and 1998, Nigeria saw a near-unbroken chain of rulers from the North. 39 During this period, there were 16 Police Com missioners in charge of Lagos State (a Southern State). Out of this number, eight were Northerners. In the Northern state of Kaduna, with the same number of Com missioners, only one, Joseph Adeola was a Southerner the remaining 15 were all Northerners. 40 This dispropor onate distribu on of posi ons of power not only existed in the police, but also in most Northern-led military juntas -- in which gover nors of Southern States were mostly Northerners. 41

In the banking sector, Southerners were not spared the discrimina on of a Nigeria dominated by Northerners. The display of uneven treatment reached its peak dur ing General Sani Abacha's regime, which was dominated by Northerners. The cen tral government passed the Failed Banks decree, ostensibly to clean up corrup on in the banking sector of Nigeria and sani ze it, however, this was actually used to persecute Southerners 42 by deliberately targe ng and arres ng former bankers who were General Sani Abacha's poli cal and personal enemies 43 and who were members of Southern states, all the while shielding the Northerners. An example of the preferen al treatment of Northerners is the case of a high-pro le Northerner who had a company that was in debt for 300 million naira to one of the distressed banks. 44 He was not charged before any tribunal -- in contrast to many Southern bank directors and company owners who were kept in deten on inde nitely. 45

The disbursement of proceeds from Nigeria's Petroleum Trust Fund PTF also seems to discriminate against Southerners. Although the oil-producing states are situated in the Southern region of the country, these states have bene ted the least from the oil wealth. 46 Before Olusegun Obasanjo became the rst President of Nigeria's third republic in 1999, the PTF generated more than 70 of its revenue in the South, while disbursing less than 40 of the money in the South.

To compound the unfair treatment of Southerners, there was a worrisome transfer of federal public ins tu ons to Abuja, a state dominated by Northern Hausa- speaking people, after the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria was moved there from Lagos, a state in the Southern region: In par cular, there was the economical ly and logis cally imprac cal decision to have the Nigerian Ports Authority NPA and Nigerian Mari me Authority NMA relocate to Abuja, when the major ports are in Lagos and other coastal states in the South. 47

Terrorism against the Nigerian State After the elec on of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Chris an Southerner, as the Presi dent of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2010, there was an increase in violent ac vi es by the Boko Haram sect, who began to wage war on the new government led by President Jonathan, who has often been cri cized for indulging in ethnic fac onalism and favoring the Ijaw ethnic group situated in Southern Nigeria. 48

Before the bombing of the United Na ons building in Nigeria's capital of Abuja on August 16th 2011, the most daring ac vity of Boko Haram had been the group's June 7, 2011 bombing of Abuja's police headquarters. That attack appeared to be speci cally targeted the Inspector General of Police, Ha z Ringim. 49

On July 10, 2011, a Chris an Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State, in the Middle Belt part of Nigeria, was bombed. The next day the University of Maidu guri, in the Northern part of Nigeria, closed on the order of the University Authori ty, ci ng security concerns. 50

Boko Haram has made it known by way of public announcements, 51 backed by terrorist ac ons, that its strategy is to undermine Nigerian governmental authority. Boko Haram's video clips -- which can be viewed on YouTube -- featuring the group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, stress disdain for the Southern-dominated gov ernment. 52 Apart from video footage, the Shekau, has underlined his an - government posi on in o cial statements. 53

Apart from countless attacks on civilians, other attacks have been carried out that show direct opposi on to the Nigerian government. In September 7, 2010 attack, members of Boko Haram set free over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State. 54 In Borno State, Boko Haram's violence has killed approximately 800 people, including rela ves of high-ranking state o cials. 55

In 2013, Boko Haram took control of the local governments of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala, in Borno State, chasing out government o cials, taken over government buildings and im posing Sharia law. 56

Though the insurgency carried out by Boko Haram has not been limited to any geo graphical area to denote a North-South dispute, an examina on of the aforemen oned attacks shows a systema c assault on symbolic en es of the Nigerian State. Boko Haram – A Genuinely Islamic Group? Since the beginning of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria, there is no doubt that religious tension has been on the rise. It may however be overstated to conclude that the Islam-Chris anity dispute solely led to the group's emergence. Looking back at Boko Haram's history, which is marred by Muslim vs. Muslim con ict, it can be seen that the intra-religious dispute adherents of Islam played a key role in Boko Haram's crea on. Not only are most of the group's ac vi es speci cal ly located in the Muslim-populated Northern region of Nigeria, evidence also shows that the majority of Nigeria's Muslim popula on do not support the ac vi es of Boko Haram, and it has been reported that the members of Boko Haram do not interact with the local Muslim popula ons. 57 Also, several prominent Muslim g ures such as the governor of Niger State, 58 the Sultan of Sokoto 59 and the Coa li on of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria CMCN 60 have publicly denounced the group.

Nigerians have been caught up in an imbroglio in dis nguishing the poli cally- driven Islamist movement from a faith-driven Islam. This has caused a religious ten sion between Chris ans and Muslims since the onset of the insurgency led by Boko Haram. Boko Haram falls primarily under the category of a poli cal group consis ng funda mentally of Islamists who, by using religious obscuran sm, hide under the cloak of the faith-based Islam. Conclusion

Evidence shows that the origin of Boko Haram is linked to the poverty and lack of development in Northern states of Nigeria in the era of colonialism. Boko Haram, which perceives the West as a corrup ng in uence on the governance of Northern States, emerged as an armed revolt against a widening regional economic disparity. Although the elec on of Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan -- a Southern Chris an -- provoked many Northerners and coincided with an increase in Boko Haram's violent ac vi es, there is no evidence indica ng conclusively that Boko Haram emerged solely in response to North-South tensions in Nigeria. Also, a lack of vio lence ac vi es by the group in the South further disproves the no on that Boko Haram's emerged primarily due to the North-South divide. Lastly, in the di eren a on of Islam and Islamism, faith-based Islam does not play the paramount role in inspiring Boko Haram's ac vi es. Instead, poli cally driven Islamism was adopted as a doctrine to wage war on all, including Muslims who adopt Westerniza on. The religious face used by Boko Haram is a decep ve cloak to deceive Nigerians that share Islamic sen ments. But there is no evidence that Muslims generally endorse or condone ac vi es of Boko Haram. The speci c attacks on Islamic States in the North, such as the mosque bombing in Borno State, indicate further that this violent group is primarily an ideologically driven poli cal organiza on trying to weaken the in uence of moderate Islam in Northern Nigeria, which they deem as Westernized. Femi wolade is a Law LLB graduate of ingston University London. He currently lives in Nigeria and serve as a Legal Assistant to the DLD Director of Legal Dra ing of wara State s Ministry of Justice.

Notes 1 Umar Mamodu, Boko Haram - The Beginning Lagos 2011 . Umar Mamodu is an Arabic Scholar in the Northern part of Nigeria, Kano (Northern State of Nigeria). He has debated on matters rela ng to Islam in Nigeria and is well versed in the His tory of Boko Haram. He has also been a source for Nigerian newspapers. In 2009, he had a conversa on on Boko Haram with Niyi Owolade, a former Attorney Gen eral and Commissioner for Jus ce of Osun State (southwest Nigeria) and A rene Wilson, a lawyer from South Nigeria. 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Ibid 5 Ibid 6 Reporters without Borders, Innermost thoughts of the Islamist Group Boko Ha ram, Reporters without Borders Paris 2012 7 Samuel A. Ekanem, Jacob A. Dada and Bassey J. Ejue, BOKO HARAM AND AM NESTY: A PHILO-LEGAL APPRAISAL , Interna onal Journal of Humani es and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 4 New York Feb 2012 8 Reporters without Borders, Innermost thoughts of the Islamist Group Boko Ha

ram, Reporters without Borders Paris 2012 9 Joe Boyle, Nigeria's Taliban Enigma , BBC News, London 31 July 2009 10 Ibid 11 John Allen, The Catholic Church: What Everyone Needs To Know , Oxford Uni versity Press London 2013 P 166-167 12 Amnesty Interna onal, Keep away from Schools or we ll kill you: Educa on under attack in Nigeria , 13 Mark Doyle, Africa's Islamist Militants Co-ordinate E orts BBC News, London June 26 2012 14 Ibid 15 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008 16 J. Philips, Spurious Arabic: Hausa and Colonial northern Nigeria , African Stud ies Center, Madison 2000 17 Ira Marvin Lapidus, Islam in West Africa , Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002 P 405 18 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008 19 A.P. Anyebe, Man of Courage and Character: The Ogbuluko War in Colonial Idomaland Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu 2002 20 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008 21 Farouk Chothia, Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? , BBC News, Lon don 11 January 2012 22 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008 23 M.G Smith Government in Kano, 1350-1950 , Westview Press Boulder 1997 . The term Talakawa is used to denote a commoner from the Northern part of Nige ria. 24 Ibid 25 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Relations, New York 31, August 2011 26 Ibid 27 BBC Witness Maitatsine . 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Relations, New York 31, August 2011 31 Umar Mamodu, Boko Haram-The Beginning Lagos 2011 . 32 Ibid

33 Chris Kwaja, Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Con ict , Africa Security Brief (Africa Center for Strategic Studies) Washington, DC 2011 34 Temidayo, A. Boko Haram: The Way Out , the Nation Lagos 2011 p. 13. 35 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Rela ons, New York 31, August 2011 36 IRIN News, Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals , IRIN News, Nairobi, 18 July 2011 37 Ibid 38 Prominent Nigerians react over Amalgama on of 1914 , The Daily Sun Lagos, 1st January, 2014. 39 Abraham Adesanya Afeniferi: Yoruba Na on Endangered, Abeokuta 1998 . Text of the maiden conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the Afenifere Socio-Cultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya. 40 Ibid 41 Ibid 42 Ibid 43 Banji Ayiloge, Abacha defends non-exis ng integrity Soc.culture.nigeria La gos 1997 44 Afenifere, oruba Nation Endangered Abeokuta 1998 . Text of the maiden conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the Afenifere Socio- Cultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya. 45 Ibid 46 O. Douglas and others, il and Militancy in the Niger Delta: Terrorist Threat or Another Columbia -- a paper presented during a peace rally, Ins tute of Interna onal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, USA. 2004 47 Abraham Adesanya Afeniferi: Struggle for democracy, Abeokuta 1998 . Text of the maiden conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the Afe nifere Socio-Cultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya. 48 Eric Osagie, Obasanjo's letter bomb , Daily Sun, Lagos, December 16 2013, p 61 49 The Nation, Lagos, June 18 2011, pp 1-2 50 Daily Sun Newspaper Editorials, Lagos, June 28 2011, p 4 51 YouTube, 30 December 2013 52 Ibid 53 Aislinn Laing, Boko Haram Leader taunts US over Bounty , 54 Samuel A. Ekanem, Jacob A. Dada and Bassey J. Ejue, BOKO HARAM AND AM NESTY: A PHILO-LEGAL APPRAISAL International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 4, New York Feb 2012 55 The Nation Newspaper Editorial, Lagos, July 3, 2011, p 13 56 Integrated Regional Informa on Networks, Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram , Irin NewsNairobi May 2013 57 Dozens killed in Nigeria clashes BBC News, London, July 26 2009 58 Jimmoh Abbas, Boko Haram not represen ng Islam- Governor Aliyu , Sunday Trust, Abuja, June 13 2011.

59 Bayo Oladeji and George Agba, Smoke out Boko Haram Sponsors, Jonathan Orders Security Chiefs , All Africa, December 30 2011 60 Gallup Poll, Nigerian Muslims Overwhelming Oppose Boko Haram , Islam To- day, February 20 2012

Rwanda

Murder Leads t Tensi n Between S ut A rica Rwanda

FILE - Rwandan president Paul Kagame during a conference in Nairobi, Kenya. March 20, 2014 JOHANNESBURG — It has not been a good few months for diploma c rela ons be tween South Africa and Rwanda. Two high-pro le Rwandans who'd sought asylum in South Africa were attacked. A former Rwandan intelligence chief, Patrick Kareyega, was found strangled to death in his Johannesburg hotel room on New Year's Day. Then, in early March, armed men broke into the safe house of former Rwandan military chief Faus n Nyamwasa. The South African government said it was an attempt on his life. Kareyega and Nyamwasa had a lot in common. Both had a falling out with Rwan dan President Paul Kagame both sought refuge in South Africa and both were among former top army o cers who started an exiled opposi on party. South Africa accused four Rwandan diplomats of playing a part in the attack on Nyamwasa's home, and expelled them. In return, Rwanda - which has denied any link to either case - kicked out six South African diplomats. Ko Kouakou, an Africa analyst at the University of Witswatersand School of Gov ernance in Johannesburg, said the recent developments show that South Africa cannot protect asylum seekers. In fact, South Africa is quite kind and very meek to a large degree. South Africa is very weak in its response to what’s been happening on its own territorial integrity - - where you have people viola ng it, assassina ng other people. So there's a grave

issue of security. But also, most important, insecurity in South Africa. So any body can walk into the territory of South Africa and do whatever they want to do and then just leave. And that is sending a wrong signal, said Kouakou. Rwandan o cials have long maintained that some of the an -Kagame dissidents living abroad -- including those in South Africa - have planned or carried out gre nade attacks against Rwandans. Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo posted a series of tweets in March, accus ing South Africa of protec ng terrorists while expelling law-abiding diplomats. Meanwhile, Rwanda has denied all allega ons that it targets poli cal opponents at home or abroad. But at the same me, President Kagame also seems intent on sending a message to his former allies. In the weeks after Kareyega's murder, he said: You cannot betray Rwanda and get away with it. There are consequences for betraying your country. With tensions so public, what is the next step for South Africa and Rwanda Westen Shilaho, a research fellow of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg, said while tensions have escalated, it seems that both countries have left room for nego a on, with neither government expelling the heads of their respec ve diploma c missions. He noted Rwanda is an important player and ally in Africa's Great Lakes region, and South Africa is very important for Rwanda, as it helped the country rebuild after the genocide and has given Rwandans cheap educa on in South Africa. I don't think they will fall out en rely… My take is that they will nd a way of mee ng each other and resolve this matter and try and bring the diploma c situ a on back to where it was before now, Shilaho said. In the mean me, South Africa's Department of Interna onal Rela ons has issued a stern warning that ac on will be taken against any individual or group that abuses the human rights laws of the country. http://www.voanews.com/

Somalia

Are we just g ing t sit ar und and wait t be bl wn t bits by terr r- ists? Print

A pipe bomb tted in the dashboard of this vehicle is among the explosives recov ered by the police in Mombasa, March 19, 2014. The cache of weapons that were recovered is the kind Al-Shabaab has been employing to devasta ng e ect in Mog adishu. PHOTO | LABAN WALLOGA In Summary It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children.

I have learnt to recognise the frozen, blazing eyes of the killer the unblinking, rep lian stare of those who had crossed the line from human to monster.

I fear that soon I will begin to sound like a broken, right wing record. But I am a man with fears which I believe to be real and I am frustrated that no one seems to share them.

It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children.

They declared war on us and we thought it was a small matter that some guy in

government was going to take care of. We were wrong.

This week, police have tracked down two bomb wagons and recovered a cache of weapons. My colleague who is more conversant with arms than myself has regaled me with the horrors that this kind of arsenal can cause. He says these are weapons Al-Shabaab has been employing to devasta ng e ect in Mogadishu.

First, the bombs are very powerful. They are made from C4, which is military grade explosive material. Apparently, they are harves ng the explosive from landmines and ar llery shells, which are plenty in Somalia.

Secondly, the bombs are many. So far police have recovered eight which had been sewn into vehicles the way beads are sewn into a kiondo.

Third, the type of attack, described as a “complex” attack against buildings, is just evil. It is like Westgate and the US Embassy attack rolled into one.

The plan is to blow up a building, then open re and slaughter survivors and other shocked people around.

What kind of person dreams of killing people they have never met, who have done them no harm, just to make some point?

Archbishop Desmond Tutu recently said that he would not worship a homophobic God. Would God command us to indiscriminately slaughter men, women and chil dren? Would the taking of innocent life really please God?

For years, it has been my job to sit here at my desk and look at the pictures of many events, some of them atroci es, others not so. I look at the eyes of people and I can tell what kind of human beings they are.

I have learnt to recognise the frozen, blazing eyes of the killer the unblinking, rep lian stare of those who had crossed the line from human to monster. And I see it often in those who have been arrested on suspicion of terrorism.

Apart from the combatants, the killers have a rich catchment of support among us. I remember once seeing a picture of women whose faces were wreathed in smiles gawping at the brains of a young AP who had been shot at close quarters with a high-calibre ri e by suspected Al Shabaab.

MANA E IMMI RATI N Do we or don’t we have the right to protect the innocent and all of us from an un

fair death? Do we or don’t we have the right to stop guys from driving across the border to knock down our towns?

If we do, let’s get down to work then. First, we stop that stupid corrup on at bor der points, registra on centres and Immigra on. Those who allow terrorists into the country, or give them papers, for 30 pieces of silver should share in the terror ists’ guilt.

Secondly, we should up our security game. I am horri ed at the mess in the Police Service. As technical-borne terrorists are pouring across the border, they are gh ng over who should transfer o cers.

I know it would be totally wrong and out of order for anyone to suggest that these police bosses should be locked in the same room with the explosive tubes –and for someone to call the attached cell phone. But the Commander-in-Chief should get back the job of hiring and ring police bosses and Parliament to approve or disap prove.

All countries must manage immigra on. Many Western countries, which sit in judg ment of the world, are very rough with immigrants. Australia holds them in horrible camps in Papua New Guinea.

We, on the other hand, have welcomed them into our ci es and sold them our property. But generosity has public safety limits. A thorough audit of Somali immi grants must be done and op ons for repatria on vigorously debated.

The presence of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia is not su ciently degrading the capacity of Al Shabaab to attack us. Actually, the terror group appears to have re grouped and retaken the ini a ve.

There needs to be a strong military response to these atroci es. We are at war. Let’s start shoo ng.

Source: http://www.na on.co.ke/-

Al-S abab and t e party ball n e ect As a result decades e pl ita n t e S ali pe ple are sick and red always being t e e pendable pawn 19 Mar 2014

From the outset, let me make one thing clear: Al-Shabab and its extremist world view is neither construc ve nor sustainable. This extremist neo-Islamist group rep resents one of two nihilis c worldviews that dominated the 21st century poli cal discourse - global (dysfunc onal) jihadism and global war on terrorism. Both, due to their applied mantra - with hammer, all problems are solvable - are des ned to self-destruct. What has been happening in Somalia is not en rely de void of that mindset that jus ed senseless violence across the globe in recent years. In recent weeks, Ethiopian-led AMISOM , together with the Somali government forces have captured several strategic towns previously ruled by al-Shabab. There was not much resistance there and that is hardly surprising since, in the past few years, that has been al-Shabab's favourite tac c - melt or move, depending on geo graphic and clan dynamic. T e c ase is n Though it is too early to forecast how the current military odyssey might turn out, I would venture to say, contrary to the declared objec ve of eradica ng al-Shabab, it would cause more poli cal, security and humanitarian problems, simply because

the necessary environment for such success has not been cul vated. Granted, al-Shabab could not have been more vulnerable as a host of mainly inter nal issues have divided the group. Defea ng them would require a grand strategy made of thoroughly coordinated poli cal, humanitarian, military and economic plans in order to e ec vely prevent any vacuum or post libera on zero-sum poli cking that seldom bene ts Somalia. This, while crea ng space for dialogue. In theory, there is such coordina on in reality there is no such thing for these fac tors. On the internal side, mainly due to a fundamental misjudgment of priori es that puts genuine reconcilia on on the back burner, the federal government, and by extension AMISOM, are viewed by some key poli cal en es and actors as an intrusive partnership. On the external side, the interests of the de facto twin engine that propel AMISOM - Ethiopia and Kenya - and the other twin engine that propel the interna onal com munity which pays the bills - US and UK - are at odds. While there is a facade of ci vility between these four key actors, there exists among them a poli cal passive aggression that underscores the impending collision. On the peripheral side, there are shadowy elements who apparently view manageable insecurity as a good business. Not even the Somali government knows to whom most are accountable. Hearts and inds As ever, compe on for the hearts and minds of the masses is in full swing. In a recent statement aired by the Voice of America - Somali language program, al- Shabab's leader, Ahmed Godane, describes the current military campaign as a proxy war in which US, after it was defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq, uses Ethiopia for the second me (to advance its interests) . The rst objec ve, according to him, is to Divide what's left of Somalia between Ethiopia and Kenya in ways masqueraded as regional administra ons . He urged Somalis to wage Jihad against Ethiopia, AMISOM, the Somali government and US. On their part, the AMISOM spokesperson has beenon many key media outlets try ing to shake o their recently earned image of parasi cal laziness intended to pro long their lucra ve engagement. Concurrently, AMISOM has launched a relentless campaign on social media. Anyone who deviates from the o cial line gets PAS-ed (called Pro al-Shabab). S ll none could be more e ec ve than Ethiopia's percep on management. Though nothing has changed as far as its policy toward Somalia is concerned, it ap parently has rebranded its image. So e ec ve has its rebranding been that it dra ma cally increased the number of its Somali poli cal clientele.

Much of the credit goes to the diploma c nesse of its foreign minister, Tedros Ad hanom, whose style I call njera Diplomacy. In era is a spongy Ethiopian atbread served with a variety of meat and vegetable stews. With it one can easily scoop much of the stew one bite after another without dirtying one's hand. Make no mistake Ethiopia is the hegemon of The Horn. As such, it is on a constant quest to expand its sphere of in uence, and, in the case of Somalia, its subdivision of subjuga on. T e ubbaland ini a e k The highlight of Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom's In era Diplomacy was the bro kering of what's known as the Addis or Jubbaland Peace Agreement or between the federal government and the advocates of establishing yet another region that could further Balkanise the na on in its inevitable demand for autonomy. The so-called peace agreement, delivered on an IGAD silver plate, was full of holes that would not only make it unsustainable but, one may argue, was engineered to lure the central government into a deep poli cal ditch. Though neither the government nor the Jubbaland leadership have sought a two- year interim agreement, in hindsight, that conspicuously short span was convenient for the architects (Ethiopia and Kenya) as it expires during the busiest and indeed most poli cally charged period - one year before the end of the current govern ment's term. By the same token, it would embolden other clan-based en es to mimic the Jub baland blueprint for breakaway. This, needless to say, would compel the govern ment to beg for yet another reconcilia on x as it has before the New Deal confer ence. The whole thing was a PR sham and an entrapment. From its incep on, the Jubba land ini a ve has been nothing more than a shotgun wedding that would not solve any problem. Hardly a few days have passed before the Jubbaland breakaway model was being implemented. In the city of Baidao alone, two parallel conferences have produced two di erent presidents with overlapping authori es, cons tuencies and territorial claims. Both inter and intra-clan bloodshed is looming. Guess who is going to come to the rescue? Ethiopia, of course. Strategy sel -anni ila n Over the years, al-Shabab has made a number of strategic errors that caused death and destruc on. They are on course to repeat history once again. Godane is fundamentally wrong in his assessment. Going back to the aforemen oned two couples (Ethiopia and Kenya) and (US and UK), while they all are on the same page in defea ng al-Shabab, they do not have the same geopoli cal and geo- economic interest or strategy.

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Ironically, the African couple see it's in their strategic best interest to permanently bury the Somali state and nurture the mushrooming clan-based paper ger para- states that pose dangers only to themselves. On the other hand, though they have made their respec ve contribu ons to fur ther complicate issues, by and large, the Western couple have been trying to resus citate the Somali state for their own strategic purposes. While counter-terrorism, piracy, and geopoli cs make headlines, it was the relent less lobbying e ort of a few major oil companies, eager to reclaim their old con tracts (now in highly contested areas), and interna onal ins tu ons such as Inter na onal Monetary Fund and World Bank, eager to reclaim their old loans and fat interests, that made it happen. It is important to note that this par cular coali on which has considerable in u ence on the interna onal community is growing very impa ent. Meanwhile, the federal government and all regional or autonomous para-states have been on a dizzying signature frenzy that produced nothing more than colour ful and indeed highly contested contracts, agreements, and trea es that further complicate the issue. W at t en? Though the majority of Somali adults s ll lament their collec ve failure to mi gate the raw (clan-s rred) emo ons that ul mately destroyed the state, and along with it law and order, we are bound to repeat those mistakes. Failing to ask what then? has opened the gates of chaos and famine and the rest is a seemingly endless dark history. So, what is the strategy when the party balloon e ect changes the reality on the ground? Common sense dictates by squeezing an in ated party balloon from one side, you would force the inside air to swiftly migrate to the other side. So sooner or later, al-Shabab would be forced to migrate and take their show elsewhere (Puntland, Somaliland, etc.), then what? Meanwhile, under the current poli cal calculus and on-going military cam paign, the Somali government is shackled into submission, and thus has zero lever age to impact any change that could be considered good for Somalia. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed must embrace the reality that the only viable leverage they have is to cul vate trust within the Somali people, who, as a result of decades of exploita on, are sick and red of always being the expendable pawn. Analysis by Ambassador Abu ar Arman is the former omalia special envoy to the nited tates and a foreign policy analyst. http://www.aljazeera.com/

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Sudan

KHART UM: REALL UT F THE TERR RISM BUSINESS? – ANAL SIS

MARCH 21, 2014 PAMBAZUKA NEWS LEAVE A COMMENT Given the U.S. intelligence community’s eager rela onship with Khartoum, it would be convenient if the Na onal Islamic Front/Na onal Congress Party regime were no longer in the business of suppor ng interna onal terrorism and no longer on the State Department list of state sponsors of interna onal terrorism. Of course, the domes c terrorism wrought in Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Abyei, and among those who would resist the regime’s brutal tyranny seems of little concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and other of the myriad intelligence-gathering agencies dealing with the very real and ongoing threat of interna onal terrorism. Indeed, there seems to have been a general loss of moral balance in how the intel ligence community thinks and operates, even as its in uence in domes c and for eign policy con nues to grow rapidly. For example, so eager was the CIA to improve rela ons with the Khartoum regime that in 2005 the agency decided to y to Langley, Virginia (CIA headquarters)—on execu ve jet—Major-General Saleh Gosh, then head of Khartoum’s intelligence services and, cri cally, minder of Osama bin Laden during his me in Khartoum: 1992 – 1996, forma ve years for al-Qaeda. It mattered little that Gosh’s hands were covered with the blood of poli cal detainees and any perceived opponents of the regime. And it mattered little that Gosh was instrumental in carrying out the genocidal counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, then at its height. He had infor ma on the CIA wanted, and the price to be paid was a trip to Washington.

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An extraordinary piece of inves ga ve journalism by the Los Angeles Times re vealed the attitude of the U.S. intelligence community during the Bush administra on. For despite President Bush’s 2005 reitera on of the genocide nding against Khartoum for its ac ons in Darfur, rst announced in September 2004 by former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the CIA ‘proudly’ ew Gosh to Washington. In an unusually detailed depic on of the controversy over this visit within the Bush ad ministra on, the Los Angeles Times reported on June 17, 2005: ‘The CIA and Mukhabarat Khartoum's intelligence and security services o cials have met regularly over the last few years, but Gosh had been seeking an invita on to Washington in recogni on of his government’s e orts, sources told The Times. The CIA, hoping to seal the partnership, extended the invita on. ‘The agency’s view was that the Sudanese are helping us on terrorism and it was proud to bring him over,’ said a government source with knowledge of Gosh’s visit. ‘They didn’t care about the poli cal implica ons.’ The cynicism re ected in this attitude—the ‘pride’ in bringing a known génocidaire to the United States—almost beggars belief. The ‘poli cal implica ons,’ of course, included Khartoum’s canny understanding of the signi cance of Washington’s willingness to invite a man not only complicit in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Darfuris but a regime o cial directly re sponsible for many tens of thousands of ‘disappearances,’ extrajudicial execu ons, instances of brutal torture, poli cal arrests, and other viola ons of human rights. These have been regularly chronicled for many years by Human Rights Watch, Am nesty Interna onal, and the African Center for Jus ce and Peace Studies (UK), among others. As the Los Angeles Times dispatch con nued: ‘An internal debate erupted after word of the invita on to Gosh spread to other government agencies. Their concern stemmed in part from a 2004 letter that 11 members of Congress sent to Bush, which accused Gosh of being a chief architect of the violence in Darfur. The letter said Sudan had engaged in a ‘scorched-earth policy against innocent civilians in Darfur.’ It iden ed 21 Sudanese government, military and mili a leaders as responsible and called on the administra on to freeze their assets and ban them from coming to the U.S. Gosh was No. 2 on the list.’ Several sources, including a State Department o cial, said the ques on of the pro priety of the visit provoked sharp divisions at that agency. Similar opposi on emerged at the Jus ce Department, where o cials discussed arres ng Gosh, ac cording to two sources. Ted Dagne, a Sudan specialist with the Congressional Research Service, said State Department o cials believed Gosh’s trip would ‘send a poli cal signal to the Sudanese government that Darfur would not prevent Sudan from winning sup

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port in Washington.’ This painfully cynical attitude toward Khartoum as a valued partner in the ‘war on terrorism’ is just as prevalent in the Obama administra on as in the Bush admin istra on. Indeed, in terms of decep on and disingenuousness, the Obama admin istra on may have an edge. The most glaring example was provided by former spe cial envoy to Sudan Scott Gra on, a man singularly without diploma c skills, region al knowledge, relevant languages—or common sense. Tes fying before the Senate Foreign Rela ons Committee shortly after being appointed to this most challenging diploma c undertaking, he was asked speci cally about Sudan and support for in terna onal terrorism. His reply was an example of shocking mendacity, or igno rance: ‘There’s no evidence in our intelligence community that supports Sudan being on the state sponsors of terrorism. It’s a poli cal decision,’ Gra on said.’ (Tes mony to the Senate Foreign Rela ons Committee, Washington, DC, July 31, 2009) Let’s ex amine this claim more deeply than the Senate did, and see just what the historical record suggests about Khartoum’s support for interna onal terrorism. Most recently, with considerable interna onal atten on, the Israeli Defence Forces reported that on March 5, 2014 they seized a Panamanian- agged freighter, with a Turkish captain, as it was approaching Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The ship was Ira nian, the Klos-C. In the cargo-hold, under bags of cement, were dozens of Syrian M- 302 rockets—not, evidently, the most advanced version of this rocket system, but with a very large warhead and a range of approximately 100 kilometers (a number of photographs have been publicly released). The rockets—originally from Syria and delivered to Iran—were to be transported overland from Port Sudan through Egypt and on to Gaza and presumably Hamas (with which Iran is trying to repair rela ons) or Islamic Jihad (Iran’s proxy in Gaza). Both are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. The rockets would bring a tre mendous number of Israeli ci zens within range of these powerful rockets. Nota bly, Hamas con nues to have an o ce in Khartoum—as it did when Gra on made his claim that the designa on of Khartoum as a sponsor of terrorism was merely “poli cal.” Beyond this most recent episode, there is a good deal of evidence that Khartoum has been complicit in attempts to smuggle weapons to Gaza through Egypt for a number of years. But if we look back further, to the years after bin Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan, there is also a good deal of revealing detail about Khartoum’s on going support for terrorism. A good deal of this informa on has come from ‘Wikileaked’ U.S. diploma c cable tra c, which is candid because it has been as sumed to be completely secure. We should note rst that the August 2010 State Department assessment of inter na onal terrorism found that ‘al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements as well as ele ments of the Pales nian Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, remained in Sudan in 2009’—

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the very year in which Gra on tes ed. Khartoum was of course aware of and ac quiesced in this presence. Moreover, U.S. intelligence knew that as recently as March 2009 Sudan had a role in supplying Iranian arms for Hamas in Gaza. The Guardian (UK) reported in December 2010 on ‘Wikileaked’ State Department cables from both January and March 2009: ‘State department cables released by WikiLeaks show that Sudan was warned by the U.S. in January 2009 not to allow the delivery of unspeci ed Iranian arms that were expected to be passed to Hamas in the Gaza Strip around the me of Israel’s Cast Lead o ensive, in which 1,400 Pales nians were killed.’ (December 6, 2010) U.S. diplomats were instructed to express ‘excep onal concern’ to Khartoum o cials, but those warnings evidently went unheeded. The Guardian goes on to re port: In March 2009, Jordan and Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to ship a cargo of ‘lethal military equipment’ to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan and then to Hamas. The cables don’t specify what the disposi on of this ‘lethal military equipment’ was. But Hamas is considered a terrorist organiza on not only by the U.S. but Cana da, the European Union, and Japan. So what to make of Gra on’s claim of July 2009 that there is ‘no evidence in our intelligence community’ that Khartoum supports terrorism’? Perhaps he came to regret the misrepresenta on. For shortly after his Senate tes mony, Gra on would shamelessly lie to Darfuris in a Radio Dabanga in terview, claiming he’d never suggested that Sudan be removed from the State De partment list of interna onal sponsors of terrorism, as if there were no obvious syl logism in his claim that Khartoum’s presence on the list was not because of support for terrorism, but merely for (domes c) ‘poli cal’ reasons. Obama’s intelligence community seems to have made a convert of the President himself. In April 2008 candidate Obama expressed ‘deep concern’ that the Bush administra on was making an unseemly deal with the Khartoum regime as a means to bolster the edgling but already failing UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): ‘This reckless and cynical ini a ve would reward a regime in Khartoum that has a record of failing to live up to its commitments. First, no country should be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism for any reason other than the existence of veri able proof that the government in ques on does not support terrorist or ganiza ons.’ The disparity between this strenuous rhetoric and the reality of the past ve years has been striking, something I have explored at length previously. But what happens if we look further back? Do these more recent ac ons follow a previous pattern? In the days following September 11, 2001, a number of revealing reports quickly emerged, demonstra ng that bin Laden’s departure for Afghanistan

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did not end his rela onship with the Khartoum regime. For example, the Boston Globe, CNN, and Reuters all reported on the con nuing role of al-Shamal Bank in nancing Osama bin Laden’s campaign of terror against the United States. Unsur prisingly, al-Shamal Bank is in Khartoum. Moreover, the Na onal Islamic Front (as it was known during bin Laden’s sojourn) also gave bin Laden many lucra ve oppor tuni es not only in banking, but in agriculture and construc on. And as the al- Shamal Bank example suggested, bin Laden con nued to derive extensive support from Khartoum well after his departure for Afghanistan. The Boston Globe o ered a par cularly telling example: ‘Bin Laden could be using the al- Shamal bank to gain access to US banks,’ Senator Carl Levin said, calling for new laws that would prevent such access. Levin cited an instance in which 250,000 was wired from al- Shamal Bank to a bin Laden associ ate in Texas, who used the money to buy a plane for bin Laden.’ According to CNN (September 26, 2001), bin Laden had provided 50 million in start-up capital for the al-Shamal Bank. It’s simply not credible that the Khartoum regime wasn’t fully aware of such a large nancial presence in its banking system. And as the Boston Globe also notes in repor ng on the years in which bin Laden was actually in Sudan: ‘U.S. o cials said bin Laden controlled some of the largest commercial enterprises in Sudan, genera ng both pro ts and a cover for terrorist ac vi es.’ In yet another revealing moment in the Boston Globe report, we learn that: ‘ Bin Laden's businesses were not just focused on the bottom line, U.S. prosecu tors in the Tanzania and Kenya embassies bombing trial say. In one transac on, a bin Laden company sent sugar from Sudan to Afghanistan. But on its return ight, the rented Sudan Airways cargo plane was loaded with Milan rockets and S nger missiles.’ Moreover, al-Qaeda never fully left Khartoum and Sudan, even after bin Laden’s departure. The April 2001 State Department report on state sponsors of terrorism declared empha cally: ‘ In 2000 Sudan con nued to be used as a safe haven by members of various groups, including associates of Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida or ganiza on.’ The broadest and most authorita ve picture was provided by Africa Con den al, and much of what was said over a decade ago remains true today: ‘The N a onal I slamic F ront poli cal and security apparatus is intact, as are the NIF’s and the interna onal Islamists’ control of the economy. Many of those run ning terrorist training are s ll in security and ministerial jobs. So, well informed Su danese doubt that the NIF will hand much of value to U.S. inves gators. The NIF is as Islamist as its friends Usama and the Taliban. This regime believes in what it does. Any concession is intended only to protect the greater cause. Secondly, any major betrayal would be suicidal, just as dangerous as holding free elec ons.’ (Africa Con den al, Volume 42, No. 19, September 28, 2001)

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Bri sh Prime Minister at the me, Tony Blair, disclosed in the wake of 9/11 that: ‘…these bin Laden companies were key assets in the al-Qaeda terrorist campaign. Since 1989, Osama bin Laden has established a series of (Sudanese) businesses to provide income for al-Qaeda, and to provide cover for the procurement of explo sives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of al-Qaeda opera ves,’ said a re port tabled in the Bri sh parliament. (The Ci zen Ottawa , October 12, 2001) In the same account The Ci zen reported (along with many others): ‘The FBI has con rmed that Mohamed Atta, who piloted one of the commercial jet liners into the World Trade Center, “wired money to Mr. bin Laden’s former pay master in Sudan, Shaykh Sai’id el Masry, also known as Mustafa Muhammad Ah mad, on the eve of the terrorist attacks…. Shaykh Sai’id Mustafa Muhammad Ah mad controlled the bin Laden nancial network in Sudan through a company called Taba Investments, and used pro ts from related Sudanese banks and busi nesses to nance and cloak terrorist training.’ The Associated Press reported that Ali Mohamed, who pled guilty to conspiracy in the 1998 east African embassy bombings, said ‘he Mohamed arranged security for a mee ng in the Sudan between Hezbollah’s chief and bin Laden. Hezbollah provided explosives training for al-Qaida and Islamic Jihad, Mohamed said, while Iran supplied Egyp an Jihad with weapons and used Hezbollah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks,’ (Associated Press, October 12, 2001) The Washington Post, on October 11, 2001 reported that ‘Tens of millions of the 100 million provided by bin Laden to the Taliban since he arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996 has been directly traced to bin Laden en es through banking and other transfers.’ These transfers would certainly have involved the Taba Invest ments Company and al-Shamal Bank in Khartoum, which received 50 million in start-up capital from bin Laden when he was in Sudan. The Post had earlier reported: ‘Aldy el-Attar, a 53-year-old surgeon who had a prac ce in the city of Neu-Ulm in the state of Bavaria, met separately both with alleged hijacker Mohamed Atta and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an alleged nancier for Osa ma bin Laden’s al Qaeda network, the sources said. El-Attar traveled frequently in Europe and between Germany and Sudan’ (October 9, 2001). The Los Angeles Times reported on October 7, 2001 that a unit of Islamic moujahe deen in Bosnia had been nanced by bin Laden ‘by means of small convoys of re cruits from the Arab world through his businesses in Sudan, according to Mideast sources.’ And The Guardian of October 1, 2001 reported in detail on the nancial back ground of bin Laden and al-Qaeda: ‘United States inves gators believe they have found the ‘smoking gun’ linking Osa

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ma bin Laden to the September 11 terrorist attacks, with the discovery of nancial evidence showing money transfers between the hijackers and a bin Laden aide in the United Arab Emirates.’ The man at the centre of the nancial web is believed to be Sheikh Saeed, also known as Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, who worked as a nancial manager for bin Laden when the Saudi exile was based in Sudan, and is s ll a trusted paymaster in bin Laden’s al-Qaida organisa on. Perhaps the most chilling and explicit report was that of September 28, 2001, from the Na onal Post (Canada). Ci ng documents from the Canadian Security Intelli gence Service, the Na onal Post reported on two disturbing developments: 1 Sudanese leaders agreed in 1998 to use their embassy sta in New York, Lon don and Rome to raise funds for Osama bin Laden, according to documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). 2 The documents, led in Federal Court, also claim the Sudanese agreed to ar range for diploma c creden als for bin Laden followers, allowing them unfettered travel around the world. The alleged agreement was struck between bin Laden’s top aide, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri, and ‘Sudanese Islamic leaders,’ the CSIS brief said. This report found its counterpart in the Hindustan Times (New Delhi) of September 20, 2001: ‘According to a senior police o cial, fresh evidence gathered by them has revealed that Ismail, the rst secretary in the Sudanese embassy, was not only opera ng as a conduit of Osama bin Laden in the Capital New Delhi but was also trying to recruit more opera ves for subversive ac vi es.’ See also my overview account of the banking, investment, and commercial inter twining of the Khartoum regime and bin Laden and al-Qaeda at: ‘Osama bin Lad en’s Ongoing Commercial and Financial Connec ons to Khartoum’, September 19, 2001 and ‘Khartoum and a ' nancial war on terrorism': connec ng the dots,’ No vember 2, 2001, http://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/22/khartoum-and-a- nancial- war-on-terrorism-connec ng-the-dots-november-2-2001/ See also transcripts of the 1998 embassy bombings trial, which had recently con cluded. The trial for these acts of terrorism clearly indicated the responsibility of bin Laden and his terrorist network al-Qaeda. Companies such as Talisman Energy and the Government of Canada must certainly have had considerable knowledge of bin Laden's, and thus Sudan's, role in the embassy bombings when Talisman o cially entered Sudan in October 1998. For transcripts of the trial, revealing much about bin Laden’s nancial and commercial connec ons to Sudan, see the analysis of those transcripts by the Center for Nonprolifera on Studies of the Monterey In s tute of Interna onal Studies: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm.

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Has K art u really c anged? And just who is the man and the organiza on that Khartoum chose to have as such a close ally and business partner? Bin Laden makes little dis nc on between American civilians and soldiers. ‘You say I am gh ng against the American civilians,’ he told one interviewer. ‘My enemy is every American man who is gh ng against me, even by paying taxes.’ (Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2001) The same attitude prevails in many powerful quarters in Khartoum, as suggested by the willingness to assist in the transfer of powerful rockets to Gaza, where their on ly targets can be Israeli civilians, taxpaying and otherwise. General Gra on’s claim that only domes c ‘poli cs’ keeps Sudan on the State Department list of state sponsors of interna onal terrorism re ects either disabling ignorance or cynical mendacity in his case it’s a tough call to make. But the U.S. intelligence community knows full well all that I report here—and s ll chooses to attempt to de ne U.S. Sudan policy through the lens of counter-terrorism ‘coopera on’ with Khartoum. http://www.eurasiareview.com/21032014-khartoum-really-out-of-the-terrorism- business-analysis/

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Tunisia

Tunisia Arab Spring s birt place takes n ilitants

Mar. 23, 2014

A w an lds a flag wit t e ace pp si n leader C kri Belaid at a Febru- ary rally c e ra ng is assassina n T e Tunisian g ern ent bla es An- sar al-S aria w ic Tunisian aut ri es and t e US g ern ent c nsider a ter- r rist gr up being be ind Belaid s urder / Sara Lync r USA T A ADVERTISEMENT Sara Lync Special r USA T A 10:40 a.m. EDT March 2 , 2014 TUNIS, Tunisia — Islamist militants across North Africa have been gh ng govern ments in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Mali for not imposing harsh sharia law, launching terror attacks and even full blown military o ensives against them. Tunisia is pushing back. The rst to cast o a dictator and herald the Arab Spring uprisings elsewhere, Tuni sia has been dealing with poli cal unrest and terrorism from those who hoped to take advantage of the uncertain mes to establish a Muslim theocracy. But Tunisia seems intent on not letting go of the edgling democracy that came out of its Jasmine Revolu on, to date perhaps the most successful of the Arab Spring. The protest movement that began with a simple act — a desperate fruit vendor set himself on re in December 2010 — and gave rise to uprisings across the country that led to the ouster of long me dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.

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The country has developed signi cant counterterrorism forces that have been giv en the means to ght back, say analysts. And the government is in ltra ng the once-sacrosanct haven of the mosque to root out imams accused of inci ng vio lence. I would describe the overall sweep as a stunning success for the rst phase of the crackdown, said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Founda on for Defense of Democracies. There are many caveats coming. But if you're just looking at their e ec veness in terms of what you might expect, they've been far more e ec ve than what I would have thought. Places like Benghazi and the Egyp an North Sinai are under widespread militant sway, and Mali needed a French invasion force to turn back a 2013 Islamist insur gency. Mili as roam Libya ush with weapons liberated from the stores of the deceased dictator Moammar Gadha , and in some ci es control major governing func ons. The northern Sinai is a nearly lawless zone where weapons tra cking is rampant. Al -Qaeda has in ltrated Western Iraq and has resisted Baghdad military e orts to force it out. Tunisian authori es have faced billowing security threats as well. In August, security forces launched heavy air and ar llery strikes on militant hideouts in the Mount Chaambi area near the Algerian border and have attacked repeatedly there for months. More than 20 members of Tunisia's security forces were killed last year during opera ons against Islamist militants in the western por on of the country. In 2013, two well-known secular poli cal gures who opposed overt religious in u ence in the government were assassinated. Just last month Islamist militants ambushed Tunisia security forces in the west of the country, killing three policemen. Earlier in February police killed seven militants armed with suicide bomb vests and explosives in a raid just north of the capital. Gen. Carter Ham, who headed the U.S. Army's Africa Command, warned last year that al-Qaeda was trying to get a foothold in Tunisia. THE FFENSIVE Tunisia's response has been forceful. The Interior ministry created crisis cells to gather intelligence on terrorist ac vity and act on it. Last year 1,343 defendants were prosecuted in connec on to terrorism, according to Tunisia Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou. Weapons caches were also seized, in cluding 250 rockets, more than 200 homemade bombs and over 350 guns. In a recent visit, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry heralded Tunisia's security oper a ons as well carried out, well planned and well executed. He also announced

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that the U.S. would give the na on a mobile crime lab for police forensics inves ga ons and a high-tech mobile command post vehicle for conduc ng terrorism inves ga ons. Militancy in the Arab world is often fueled by repressive poli cal policies many ex perts say Tunisia is wisely steering away from despo c edicts that have rocked Arab Spring movements in Egypt and Libya. More than three years after its 2010 revolu on, the country is moving toward elec ons based on a new cons tu on passed with broad support among compe ng par es. Tunisian poli cians and the poli cal system in general have just graduated from elementary school to middle school — where you always squabble and you're not too mature … to now having a bit of a structure, more knowledge and a bit more experience, said Firas BenAchour, president and founding member of Tunisian American Young Professionals, a Washington-based associa on. We're moving from the self-serving poli cians, or their poli cal par es, to actually mee ng the needs of the people or the country. Things looked bleak in July when massive protests were going on against the gov ernment because of the assassina on of a popular poli cal rival to the ruling Islam ist Ennahda Party. The party, which won elec ons in 2010, blamed the murder on radical adherents of harsh Islamic law known as Sala sts. In response, Ennahda entered into nego a ons with rival par es to make long- delayed reforms to the poli cal system. The Na onal Cons tuent Assembly ap proved a new cons tu on endorsed by 200 of 217 members of the body that wrote the draft. And in January, Ennahda stepped down from power to allow an appointed govern ment to preside over new elec ons in a peaceful relinquishing of power not seen elsewhere in the region from elected Islamist par es. Ennahda's party leader, Ra chid Ghannouhchi, said at the me that, Tunisia will not follow the Egyp an sce nario. We will hold on. THE RI HT CLIMATE It was a matter of everyone needing to get through this process and get to the next step, said Mahmoud Baroudi, a member of the na onal assembly. Noureddine Arbaoui, a member of Ennahda's execu ve bureau, said the party chose to compromise to serve the country's collec ve interests. Among the ve countries of the Arab Spring — Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Egypt — Tunisia has reached the right poli cal climate and a certain stability, he said. The passing of the cons tu on proves Tunisians left their clashes and di er ences behind and they now coexist and live together peacefully. Tunisia may have had an easier me transi oning to democracy because it has as

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sets other countries don't, analysts said. The popula on is wealthier and more educated than other countries in the region and women are more emancipated, said Michele Dunne, a senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for Interna onal Peace. And while the military backed the revolu on, it made space for civilian rule and did not involve itself in poli cs — vastly di erent from Egypt where the military gov erned after Hosni Mubarak's fall and then forced then-President Mohamed Morsi out of power last summer. Tunisia now has set the stage for greater poli cal stability, Dunne said. Poor economies have also fed instability in the Middle East, and Tunisia is not im mune to that danger. Unemployment, a driving force behind the country's 2010 revolu on, remains high. Last year's economic recovery slowed and in a on steadily increased, according to the World Bank. Analysts said the government is expanding public spending to an unsustainable level. Prices of food have increased and things got expensive, said Lamia Bouthour, a housewife in Tunis. But s ll, the overall situa on is better than it was right after the revolu on. Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamdi is seeking to strengthen economic es with European countries. We must ensure that Tunisia is a success story because if it doesn't then no other Arab country will succeed, Hamdi told Reuters last month while in Paris. By far most here believe the greatest challenge now to a peaceful future is the de feat of militant ideology. About 400 Tunisians have returned from gh ng in Syria's civil war while 8,000 were prevented from traveling to ght in the con ict, Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou says. The broader region, sweeping horizontally across the Mediterranean coast, is plagued by jihadist violence that can easily transit borders. At the end of the day, democracy thrives in a stable, economically vibrant society and region as well, BenAchour said. What happens in Algeria will a ect Tunisia. What happens in Egypt will somehow a ect Tunisia. Tunisia's security crackdown has focused on Ansar al-Sharia, a U.S.-designated ter rorist group with es to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The Tunisian government blames the group for assassina ons and its leader, Abou Iyadh, was accused of or chestra ng a September 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. Security analyst Gartenstein-Ross said the Tunisian government has a decent chance at eviscera ng and marginalizing the power of Ansar al-Sharia because it is not a deep organiza on that is able to regenerate.

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A lot of the members are young people who see it as a protest movement and don't have the same sort of overarching passion for the jihadist cause that you get within some other organiza ons, he said. A EE ER BATTLE Tunisia's e orts against militancy face challenges, analysts said. Ansar al-Sharia can easily recruit disa ected young men who view Islam as the so lu on to problems that have plagued Tunisia for decades, allowing the group to grow faster than security forces can ght it, said Scott Stewart, vice president of analysis at Stratfor, an intelligence rm. You have a physical problem that the government is facing as far as some militant attacks and assassina ons, but you also have a deeper ideological battle right now, which is really what's giving rise to the physical, Stewart said. That battle is being fought also in mosques, where government sanc oned houses of prayer exist alongside unsanc oned ones where militancy is some mes preached. Two weeks ago, imam Khamis El Mejri was arrested in a city north of the capital Tunis for preaching without a permit, Mongi Belaress, spokesperson for the rst court of Bizerte, told Arab news outlet Al Jazeera. El Mejri, who referred to a suspect in the assassina on of secular leader Chokri Belaid as a martyr, is the latest imam to be detained by the government for ap parently for views seen as extremist. Despite their successes, Tunisian security forces are not always equipped or trained to their best abili es, analysts said. And some ci zens lack respect for the police and are skep cal of the security network's inten ons.

Cyber ac vist So ane Belhaj accuses the Ministry of Interior — which oversees the police — of conduc ng security opera ons only for poli cal gain and of lying to the public. No one trusts the police ... or the informa on they give, Belhaj said. (Police) only react when they want to react, he added. They only react when they want media buzz, not because an issue is a na onal security matter. Cri cs say a February police raid on suspects in the assassina on of Belaid was med to happen a few days before the rst anniversary of Belaid's death to con vince the public of the government's success in gh ng terrorism. Others, however, praise police e orts and point to palpable security gains. Security has improved compared to a few months ago, said Lamia Bouthour, a housewife. Now we can go out in the streets and hang out, and go around the country safely. We feel secure. We don't feel threats like we used to.

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Cyber ac ist S fiane Bel aj accuses t e Interi r Ministry w ic ersees t e p lice carrying ut security pera ns r p li cal gain and lying t t e public Photo: Sarah Lynch for USA T DA

There's a whole image in society that Sala sts are violent, radical, said Yahya bin Abdallah, who belongs to a student union comprised of numerous Islamists. I have friends from Ansar al-Sharia who are in jail now and who say that the jails are full of Sala sts. http://www.usatoday.com/news/

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International Organizations

C battre le «terr ris e nucl aire»

L initiative a été lancée par les tats-Unis, les Pays-Bas et la Corée du Sud, puis signée par 2 autres pays. Photo Robin Van Lonkhui sen / AFP - - 1 LA HAYE - Une cinquantaine de chefs d'État et de gouvernement ont renforcé mar di à La Haye les mesures des nées à empêcher des groupes terroristes de s'empa rer de matériaux nucléaires qui leur permettraient de construire des armes ato miques ou des bombes «sales». Intervenant lors de la conférence de presse nale concluant la troisième édi on du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire (NSS), Barack Obama a salué les e orts accomplis et réinvité les dirigeants du monde à coopérer étroitement pour contrer la menace du terrorisme nucléaire, qu'il quali e de «menace la plus immédiate et la plus ex trême pour la sécurité mondiale.» «Il est essen el que nous ne nous rel chions pas mais plutôt que nous accélérions nos e orts sur les deux prochaines années, que nous maintenions l'élan a n de nir en beauté en 2016», lors de la prochaine édi on du sommet à Washington, a déclaré le président des États-unis. «Au vu des conséquences catastrophiques qu'auraient une seule et unique attaque, nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre de nous complaire dans l'auto-sa sfac on», a -t-il ajouté.

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Selon le Premier ministre néerlandais Mark Rutte, des «mesures importantes» ont été adoptées en regard des trois objec fs du sommet : réduire le nombre de maté riaux nucléaires dangereux, améliorer la sécurité de ces matériaux et améliorer la coopéra on interna onale. Certains États ont néanmoins voulu aller plus vite que les autres, à l'image des 35 qui se sont engagés à appliquer des standards interna onaux plus stricts que ceux adoptés dans le communiqué nal, et à renforcer leur coopéra on. Cette ini a ve a été lancée par les États-Unis, les Pays-Bas et la Corée du Sud, puis signée par 32 autres pays, dont la France, la Turquie, l'Ukraine et Israël. Elle représente «l'avancée la plus importante du sommet», a commenté Miles Pomper, un expert au centre James Mar n pour les Études sur la non-proliféra on. Mais «il serait nécessaire que la totalité des pays qui par cipent au sommet signent également ce texte, surtout la Russie.» Selon le Groupe sur les matériaux ssiles, un groupe d'experts sur le nucléaire, «l'absence de la Russie, de la Chine, du Pakistan et de l'Inde, tous des pays dispo sant de l'arme nucléaire et d'un stock fourni de matériaux nucléaires, a aibli l'im pact de ce texte.» L'autre annonce importante du sommet a été l'engagement du Japon à renvoyer aux États-Unis plus de 300 kilos de plutonium et près de 200 kilos d'uranium haute ment enrichi qui lui avaient été fournis à des ns de recherche pendant la Guerre froide. Ces matériaux sont actuellement stockés dans des b ments à 140 kilomètres au nord-est de Tokyo, une cible facile pour des terroristes, selon les experts. «En cédant ces matériaux nucléaires, nous pouvons réduire le risque de terrorisme nucléaire», a déclaré le conseiller spécial du Japon sur le nucléaire, Yosuke Isozaki. NOUVEAU SOMMET EN 2016 La lutte contre la menace terroriste nucléaire est au coeur de l'héritage poli que que souhaite laisser le président américain Barack Obama, qui avait lancé le pre mier Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire en 2010 et devrait accueillir la 4e édi on en 16 W g . L'enjeu est de taille car «il y a presque 2 000 tonnes de matériel, prêt à être u lisé dans une arme, en circula on dans le monde», avait rappelé le Premier ministre néerlandais Mark Rutte lors de la cérémonie d'ouverture lundi. Dans le communiqué nal, les dirigeants recommandent de con nuer à réduire les stocks d'uranium hautement enrichi et de plutonium, en les transformant en ura nium faiblement enrichi, notamment. Barack Obama a assuré que les dirigeants envisageraient de transformer le format actuel de sommets en une organisa on plus permanente dirigée au niveau ministé

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riel a n de «synchroniser le NSS avec des ins tu ons existantes comme l'AIEA et Interpol.» Alors que la première journée avait été dominée par l'Ukraine, les débats ont éga lement porté sur la di culté à faire respecter les accords existants dans le nu cléaire, comme l'illustre la crise ukrainienne. Après son indépendance en 1991, l'Ukraine avait accepté en 1994 de se débarras ser de son arsenal nucléaire en échange de la garan e que son intégrité territoriale ne serait pas violée. «Dans le cas de l'Ukraine, l'assurance de la sécurité (territoriale, ndlr) était une con di on essen elle à son accession au traité sur la non-proliféra on nucléaire», a dé claré lundi le secrétaire général des Na ons unies Ban Ki-moon. Mais ces assu rances ont été «sérieusement minées par les événements récents», a-t-il ajouté, en faisant allusion au rattachement de la Crimée à la Russie. http://fr.canoe.ca/infos/interna onal/archives/2014/03/20140325-152621.html

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Terrorism in the World

France

Analyse Côte d A ur : un attentat isla iste « pr bable ent » d j u 1

Les 900 g d'explosifs ont été découverts dans l'un des appartements de cet im meuble situé près de Cannes. (Photo AFP) Il est encore trop tôt pour savoir si la DCRI a réellement empêché un attentat d'ori gine islamiste sur la Côte d'Azur, mais c'est le sens des informa ons di usées, hier, après l'arresta on en février d'un homme de 23 ans - Ibrahim B. - revenant du jihad

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en Syrie, o il était par en septembre 2012. Selon l'AFP citant uniquement une « source proche du dossier », les enquêteurs de la DCRI auraient acquis la cer tude que les 900 grammes d'explosif TATP découverts le 17 février dans un immeuble de Mandelieu-la-Napoule (Alpes-Mari mes), près de Cannes, lors d'une perquisi on dans un logement occupé par le suspect arrêté au même endroit, auraient pu servir à commettre un attentat. L'homme avait été repéré le 3 janvier en Grèce, rentrant de Syrie. Il appar endrait au réseau appelé « cellule de Cannes-Torcy », dont le dé mantèlement a entra né à ce jour vingt-et-une mises en examen. L'existence de ce réseau fran ais autonome, sans a lia on proclamée avec une organisa on criminelle interna onale, avait été découverte en septembre 2012, après l'attaque à la grenade d'un magasin de Sarcelles (Val d'Oise), tenu par un commer ant de religion juive. L'explosion de la grenade avait blessé une cliente. Un des leaders de cette cellule, Jérémie Louis-Sidney avait été abattu par la police lors de son interpella on à Strasbourg, après qu'il avait ré sur elle. Lors du démantèle ment de la cellule, plusieurs de ses membres, dont Ibrahim B. et Abdelkader T., au raient rejoint en Syrie le front al-Nosra, une des composantes islamistes radicales de la résistance à Bachar el-Assad. Abdelkader T. avait été arrêté en Italie en jan vier, mais son acolyte courait toujours. es e pl i s tr s instables Le TATP ou peroxyde d'azote - condi onné dans ce cas dans ces canettes de bois son couvertes de clous - est un explosif puissant, que n'importe qui peut bricoler dans sa cuisine avec des composants disponibles dans le commerce. Il est extrême ment instable, donc très dangereux pour ses manipulateurs et n'est pas u lisé par des terroristes professionnels, pour cette raison. Il n'empêche qu'il est par culière ment destructeur et qu'il a déjà servi à commettre des attentats meurtriers, notam ment à Marrakech (Maroc), en 2011. Le code pénal permet l'arresta on et la mise en examen de personnes soup onnées de par ciper à une « associa on de malfai teurs en rela on avec une entreprise terroriste », sans qu'il soit nécessaire que l'acte ait été commis. La DCRI suivrait environ 700 jihadistes fran ais, dont une cen taine de femmes, par s en Syrie ou soup onnés de vouloir s'y rendre. http://www.letelegramme.fr/

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India

Arrests Indian Muja ideen terr rists is t e best answer t B s c arges: Sus il Ku ar S inde

28 Mar, 2014

40 comments |Post a Comment NEW DELHI: The success in netting all top four Indian Muja hedeen (IM) terrorists in the last six months is the 'best answer' that the UPA government has given to the BJP's charge that the government was weakkneed against terror, Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde has said. Speaking to ET, Shinde said the arrest of IM's current chief Tehseen Akhtar on Tues day was a 'major success' for The success in netting all top four Indian Mujahedeen the country's intelligence and (IM) terrorists in the last six months is the ‘best answer’ that the UPA government has given to the BJP’s charge security agencies. that the government was weakkneed against terror, Un ion Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde has said.

We rst got Yasin Bhatkal and Asadullah Akhtar last August. But we chose not to rest ll we got the other two major terrorists too - Waqas and Tehseen Akhtar. The BJP in the past has hurled all sorts of accusa ons at us for not tackling terror. This is the best answer to those charges, Shinde said.

Based on Tehseen's disclosures, two more Pakistani terrorists planning to attack poli cal rallies were apprehended near Gorakhpur on Thursday. This comes even as BJP President Rajnath Singh on Thursday said the UPA had no comprehensive plan to tackle terror. At a lecture in Chennai last October, BJP's Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi had said India's approach against terrorism had been weak of late .

After the Hyderabad blasts last February in which the involvement of IM was found, BJP leader Sushma Swaraj termed the government's response to the blasts as 'rou ne' and ques oned the alertness levels of the government to such strikes.

But the recent spate of top IM arrests, with close co-opera on from Nepal, has em boldened the government. When asked if the IM had been e ec vely decimated

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with these arrests, Shinde said he cannot conclusively say so.

Whether the back of the IM has been broken—this I cannot say. But yes, their ma jor men are now behind bars. The credit goes to the Intelligence Bureau and securi ty agencies, the Home Minister said. To buttress his case of UPA's resolve to act against terrorists, Shinde also pointed out that the execu ons of the Mumbai 26/11 accused Ajmal Kasab and the Parliament attack accused Mohammad Afzal were carried out in his tenure.

The home minister had, however, earlier admitted to ET that it was a mistake on his ministry's part that Afzal's family wasn't informed well in advance before the execu on. O cials in IB as well as the Home Ministry meanwhile give credit to the 'systems' put in place by former Home Minister P Chidambaram for the present re sults.

Source: http://economic mes.india mes.com/

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Syria

Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Base U S fficials Say MARCH 25, 2014

Fighters from Al Qaeda’s main a liate in Syria, the Nusra Front, last April near Aleppo.CreditGuillaume Briquet/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images WASHINGTON — Dozens of seasoned militant ghters, including some midlevel planners, have traveled to Syria from Pakistan in recent months in what American intelligence and counterterrorism o cials fear is an e ort to lay the founda on for future strikes against Europe and the United States. “We are concerned about the use of Syrian territory by the Al Qaeda organiza on to recruit individuals and develop the capability to be able not just to carry out attacks inside of Syria, but also to use Syria as a launching pad,” John O. Brennan, the C.I.A. director, told a House panel recently. The extremists who concern Mr. Brennan are part of a group of Qaeda opera ves in Pakistan that has been severely depleted in recent years by a decade of Ameri can drone strikes. But the ghters s ll bring a wide range of skills to the battle eld, such as bomb-building, small-arms tac cs, logis cs, religious indoctrina on and planning, though they are not believed to have experience in launching attacks in the West.

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Syria is an appealing base for these opera ves because it o ers them the rela ve sanctuary of extremist-held havens — away from drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan — as well as ready access to about 1,200 American and European Muslims who have gone there to ght and could be poten al recruits to carry out attacks when they return home. Senior counterterrorism o cials have voiced fears in recent months that these Western ghters could be radicalized by the country’s civil war. New classi ed intelligence assessments based on informa on from electronic intercepts, informers and social media posts conclude that Al Qaeda’s Abu Khalid al- senior leadership in Pakistan, including Ayman al- SuriCreditAgence France- Zawahri, is developing a much more systema c, Presse — Getty Images long-term plan than was previously known to cre ate speci c cells in Syria that would iden fy, re cruit and train these Westerners. Al Qaeda has in the past blessed the crea on of local branches in places like Yem en, where an a liate has tried to strike the United States. But the e ort in Syria would signify the rst me that senior Qaeda leaders had set up a wing of their own outside Pakistan dedicated to conduc ng attacks against the West, counter terrorism o cials said. It also has the poten al to rejuvenate Al Qaeda’s central command, which President Obama has described as being greatly diminished. The assessment by the United States, however, has some detractors among even its staunchest counterterrorism partners, which also see an increase in Pakistan- based veterans of Al Qaeda among Syrian rebel groups but which disagree over whether they are involved in a coordinated plan to attack the West. “At this stage, it’s a lot less organized than a directed plan,” said one Western secu rity o cial. “Some ghters are going to Syria, but they’re going on an ad hoc basis, not at an organized level.” Most of the opera ves iden ed by intelligence o cials are now focused on attacking Syrian government troops and occasionally rival rebel fac ons. But the fact that these kinds of opera ves are showing up in Syria indicates to American o cials that Mr. Zawahri is also playing a long game — coun ng on easy access to Iraq and Qaeda support networks there, as well as on the United States’ reluctance to carry out drone strikes or other military opera ons against targets in Syria. “A key ques on, however, is how using Syria as a launching pad to strike the West ts into Zawahri’s overall strategy, and if he’s soft-pedaling now, hoping to consoli date Al Qaeda’s posi on for the future,” said one American counterterrorism o

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cial. “Clearly, there is going to be push and pull between local opera ves and Al Qaeda central on attack planning. How fast the pendulum will swing toward trying something isn’t clear right now.” The new assessment is not likely to change American policy toward Syria any me soon, but it puts pressure on the Obama administra on and its allies because it raises the possibility that Syria could become the next Afghanistan. Top o cials at the F.B.I., the Na onal Counterterrorism Center and the Depart ment of Homeland Security say they are working closely with European allies to track Westerners returning from Syria. There are perhaps “a few dozen” Qaeda veterans of gh ng in Afghanistan and Pa kistan in Syria, two top counterterrorism o cials said. “What we’ve seen is a coa lescence in Syria of Al Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as extremists from other hot spots such as Libya and Iraq,” Matthew G. Olsen, the di rector of the Na onal Counterterrorism Center, told a Senate panel in March. “From a terrorism perspec ve, the most concerning development is that Al Qaeda has declared Syria its most cri cal front.” In his rst speech as secretary of Homeland Security in February, Jeh C. Johnson put it even more bluntly. “Syria has become a matter of homeland security,” he said. The Qaeda veterans have mul ple missions and mo va ons, counterterrorism o cials say. Like thousands of other foreign ghters, many have been drawn on their own to Syria to ght the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Many others, like Abu Khalid al-Suri, a Syrian-born veteran of Al Qaeda, were sent by the terrorist group’s central command in Pakistan rst to ght Mr. Assad, but also to begin laying the groundwork to use enclaves in Syria to launch attacks against the West, American o cials said. Mr. Suri, who is believed to have been close to Osama bin Laden and to have fought against American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, was sent to mediate con icts between Al Qaeda’s main a liate in Syria, the Nusra Front, and another ex tremist fac on, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which Al Qaeda has disavowed. He was killed in a suicide attack in February by the rival group. There are believed to be hundreds, if not thousands, of groups gh ng in Syria. These opposi on groups are gh ng the Assad regime, but recently turned on each other with increased ferocity. Many of the Qaeda planners and opera ves from Afghanistan and Pakistan have clustered in the east and northwest sec ons of Syria, in territory controlled or heavily in uenced by the Nusra Front, intelligence o cials said. Sana al-Nasr, a Saudi-born extremist who is on his country’s list of most wanted terrorists, traveled to Syria from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region late last year and emerged as one of the Nusra Front’s top strategists. Jihadi forums report

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ed that he was killed in gh ng last week, but American counterterrorism o cials said those reports could not be con rmed. “Al Qaeda veterans could have a cri cal impact on recruitment and training,” said Laith Alkhouri, a senior analyst at Flashpoint Global Partners, a security consul ng rm that tracks militant websites. “They would be lionized, at least within the ranks, as experienced mujahedeen.” While these senior Qaeda envoys have been involved in the immediate ght against Syrian forces, American counterterrorism o cials said they also had broad er, longer-term ambi ons. Without naming Mr. Nasr, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of na onal intelligence, told a Senate panel in February that a “small nucleus” of Qaeda veterans from Af ghanistan and Pakistan in Syria who are “separate from al-Nusra harbor designs on attacks in Europe and the homeland.” Charles Lister, a visi ng fellow at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, agreed, say ing, “The large majority of Al Qaeda-linked commanders now in Syria are there due to the poten al for Syria to be the next jihadist safe haven.” Hassan Abu Hanieh, a Jordanian expert on Islamist movements, said that launching attacks on Western targets did not appear to be a priority for the Nusra Front now. However, the group’s ideology, or a belief that it was under direct threat, could lead it to attack the West eventually, he said. “As soon as they get targeted, they will move the battle outside,” Mr. Hanieh said.

Source: http://www.ny mes.com/

LA VI E

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United Kingdom

UK ust d re t tackle Sa el-Sa ara terr r t reat 21 March 2014

MPs said little had been achieved since last year's Algerian gas plant siege, in which six Britons were killed T e UK needs a "bigger tprint" in Mali and t er Sa el-Sa aran c untries t fig t e tre is a c ittee M s as said The Foreign A airs Committee pointed to a mismatch between the UK's vision of a secure western Sahel-Sahara region and its very light diploma c work. It said jihadists had put down roots in the region, which was a new frontline of violent extremism . The government welcomed the report and said it was working in the region. The Sahel runs along the south of the Sahara Desert, and the western Sahel-Sahara region includes Mali and Mauritania. wer ul t reat T e Sa ara ay be a depart ental barrier wit in t e F reign ffice but it is n t ne r terr rists” Sir Richard OttawayForeign A airs Committee chairman T e c ittee said concerted interna onal ac on was needed to tackle the caus es of instability and stop the contagion of extremism from spreading further . Extremists had capitalised on poor economies, weak state security and anger at corrupt governing elites , it said.

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Committee chairman Sir Richard Ottaway said the UK should help build indigenous security capacity . The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan provides an opportunity to increase the number of Bri sh military training missions in the region, he said. A powerful threat from extremism remains throughout the region with no sign yet that African countries would be able to deal with future crises on their own. Sir Richard told the BBC little had been achieved following the prime minister's promise to tackle insecurity in the Sahara in the wake of last year's Algerian gas plant siege, in which six Britons were killed. The MPs cri cised the lack of UK diploma c ac vity in Sahel states

Economic ac vity is often des perately low, organised crime is rife, and armed gangs of mili tants seem able to move almost unchecked across porous na on al borders, he said. The committee also found: the UK was right to o er prac cal support for the French-led military interven on in Mali, which helped put the country on a path back to sta bility the young, angry and jobless in western Sahel-Sahara are dispropor onately at risk of being lured into criminality or religious extremism the region's popula on is growing more rapidly than anywhere else in the world there is growing evidence of young people in the region going to desperate lengths to leave, with Europe the most popular des na on. The committee said the EU lacked a clear policy on how to deal with this The ndings come after a year-long inquiry, during which members visited the re gion. ept kn wledge Sir Richard said the committee had uncovered a worrying pattern of unsightedness on the part of the UK and others about events there. The Sahara may be a departmental barrier within the Foreign O ce but it is not one for terrorists, he said. The UK's diploma c presence in the whole area is extremely small rela ve to oth er parts of the world.

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We would urge the UK government to look at expanding its presence and depth of knowledge in rela on to the whole region, in view of the foreign policy challenges that lie ahead. Malian soldiers were supported by France as they fought to regain control of areas held by rebels last year The committee said the UK and its allies had been caught out by recent crises in Mali, Libya, the Central African Republic and elsewhere. The Foreign O ce said the committee's report agreed with its analysis that disengagement from this region would carry long-term risks for the UK .

That is why we have been working in the region both bi laterally and with key partners including the French, the US, EU, UN and African Union, a spokesman said. He said other UK work in the region included 27 UK troops and a civilian trainer who were helping the EU training mission to help Mali's armed forces, and the appointment of Stephen O'Brien MP as Special Envoy for the Sahel in 2012.

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26668665

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M s warn A rica terr ris t reat 21 March 2014 T e UK and t er Western p wers ailed t sp t t e warning signs instability in Mali and t e Central A rican Republic un l it was t late M s a e said as t ey urged t e ern ent t step up e rts t engage wit pr ble s in t e regi n

The Foreign A airs Committee cri cised the scant resources allocated to the Western Sahel- Sahara and said there had been a costly error in failing to an cipate the e ects of the col lapse of Muammar Gadda 's regime in Libya on its neigh bouring countries. The report warned there were signi cant gaps in infor ma on about terrorist groups opera ng in the region and said improving the quality of intelli gence should be a priority for the UK and its allies. The MPs said: A new front line of violent extremism has opened up in the West ern Sahel-Sahara region of Africa. Jihadists have put down roots in remote or marginalised areas, taking advantage of weak or non-existent state and security ins tu ons, lucra ve local criminal net works, and public disillusionment and anger with the corrup on and mis- governance of poli cal elites.

In Libya, Mali and Nigeria the threat is currently greatest, but all countries in the region are at risk. Concerted interna onal co-opera on is required to address this threat: there need to be robust security responses, but also large-scale poli cal and economic interven ons to address the underlying causes of instability. The UK Government has set out a bold vision to increase its poli cal, security and economic engagement with the region. But the MPs said the mismatch between the Government's ambi ons and its scant diploma c resources in the region is vast and irreconcilable. The Government should consider enhancing its diploma c presence in the West ern Sahel and the Maghreb, within the ght nancial constraints that the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth o ce) is currently forced to operate in.

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It should also avoid in ated rhetoric and be realis c in its aims, focussing on what the UK does best. The MPs said the West seemed to turn a blind eye to events in Mail failing to spot the warning signs un l it was too late and the pattern was repeated in the Central African Republic. The UK and its allies need to examine their early warning systems for the region, the committee said. There was also a failure by the UK Government to an cipate the full e ects of the Gadda regime's collapse on its Saharan neighbours, and therefore to try to mi gate them. This has been a costly error. The report said it was s omewhat troubling to acknowledge that there are some signi cant gaps in informa on about the region, par cularly in rela on to the ter rorist groups opera ng there. We s ll know little about the insurgency's leaders: in some cases we do not know for certain if they are living or dead. We know rela vely little about how groups are organised, how strong or well- armed they are what their income is, and who their external supporters are. We do know that they t end to thrive on the remote peripheries of the region, which makes them hard to monitor and track, and we have learned that gathering evidence about the groups by in ltra ng them is very di cult. The Government has itself acknowledged that it is s ll learning about the region's complex dynamics and that there are gaps in its knowledge. Committee chairman Sir Richard Ottaway said: Overall, our committee has uncov ered a worrying pattern of unsightedness on the part of the UK and others in rela on to events in and around the Western Sahel region. A common thread appears to be a weakness of analysis in rela on to crises that straddle both North and West Africa. The Sahara may be a departmental barrier within the Foreign O ce but it is not one for terrorists. The UK's diploma c presence in the whole area is extremely small rela ve to oth er parts of the world. We would urge the UK Government to look at expanding its presence and depth of knowledge in rela on to the whole region, in view of the foreign policy challeng es that lie ahead. Copyright (c) Press Associa on Ltd. 2014, All Rights Reserved. http://www.hartlepoolmail.co.uk/

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USA

int State ent n t e C ntribu ns t e l bal Ini a e t C - bat Nuclear Terr ris ICNT t En ancing Nuclear Security 22 March 2014 The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the Unit ed States of America, Russia, Spain, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Australia, and the Kingdom of Morocco on the occasion of the contribu ons of the Global Ini a ve to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to enhancing nuclear security. Begin Text: The Global Ini a ve to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) has made valuable con tribu ons in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nu clear terrorism. To date, the 85 partner na ons have completed more than 60 ac vi es under the auspices of the GICNT aimed at building partners’ capabili es in this area. We, the Co-Chairs of the GICNT (Russia and the United States), the past and present Implementa on and Assessment Group (IAG) Coordinators (Spain and Republic of Korea), and leaders of the three IAG Working Groups (the Kingdom of Morocco, the Netherlands and Australia) wish to inform the states in attendance at the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear Security Summit of the ac vi es of the GICNT since the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the Republic of Korea in Seoul in March 2012. Over 250 representa ves of GICNT partner na ons and representa ves from all four GICNT o cial observers (the Interna onal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), the United Na ons O ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Interna onal Criminal Police Organiza on (INTERPOL)) par cipated in the eighth GICNT Plenary Mee ng, hosted by Mexico in Mexico City on May 24, 2013. This robust par cipa on demonstrates the vital importance that GICNT partner na ons place on enhancing nuclear security and underscores their desire to work co opera vely to further this goal. At the Plenary mee ng, GICNT partners recognized the valuable contribu on of the IAG mechanism created at the June 2010 GICNT Plenary mee ng in Abu Dhabi. The U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs further recognized the contribu ons of Spain in serving as the IAG Coordinator for three years, includ ing organizing and chairing the Implementa on and Assessment Group mee ngs in Arona and Ispra, Italy, in October 2012 and in Madrid, Spain, in February 2013. Through its leadership, Spain brought strong focus and coordina on to GICNT ac v i es. At the 2013 Plenary, the Republic of Korea was endorsed as the new IAG Co ordinator. The collabora ve e orts fostered by the GICNT are especially signi cant in light of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and the 2014 The Hague Nuclear Security Summit. Already, GICNT collabo ra on has produced important results that complement the Nuclear Security Sum

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mit process and help advance cri cal elements addressed in the Summit: The Nuclear Detec on Working Group (NDWG), chaired by the Netherlands, is nalizing the Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture series of documents fol lowing the publica on of Volume I, Model Guidelines Document for Nuclear Detec- tion Architectures, in 2009. Volume II in the series, Guidelines for Awareness, Train- ing, and Exercises, and Volume III, Guidelines for Planning and rganization, focused on issues inherent to successful implementa on and enhancement of nuclear detec on architectures. Ukraine hosted a mee ng of the NDWG in Lviv in November 2012 to further the development of the third document in the series. Volumes II and III in the founda onal series were approved at the May 2013 GICNT Plenary mee ng. At a workshop hosted by Greece in Athens in October 2013, the NDWG con nued work on Volume IV, Guidelines for Detection Within a State’s In- terior, the nal best prac ces guide in the series. Also during the Athens workshop, the NDWG began e orts to develop a tabletop exercise “playbook,” a compendium of detec on-related exercise scenarios available to all GICNT partner na ons. The United Kingdom hosted the GICNT’s 2nd Symposium on Enhanced Detec on of Special Nuclear Material in November 2012, to take stock of current advancements in detec on technologies, drawing widely on the experiences of other GICNT part ner na ons. In September 2012, Russia conducted an exercise on nuclear detec on, “Guardian 2012.” During the exercise, Russia used a realis c scenario and real me ac vity to demonstrate the di erent aspects of Russia’s na onal system for detec ng nuclear threats, thereby further raising awareness of best prac ces for the prac cal imple menta on of basic principles of nuclear detec on architectures in the framework of the GICNT. In February 2014, Mexico hosted a eld training exercise under the auspices of the NDWG, during which the par cipants had the opportunity to observe implementa on of a radia on detec on alarm adjudica on process and interagency communi ca ons protocol in response to realis c nuclear detec on scenarios at the Port of Manzanillo. This exercise highlighted na onal best prac ces in detec on systems and in coordina on of a domes c interagency response to a nuclear terrorism event. The Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG), chaired by Australia, completed a document en tled, Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision Makers, which was endorsed at the GICNT Plenary Mee ng in May 2013. This docu ment is intended to raise policy maker and decision maker awareness of nuclear forensics as a tool to enhance nuclear material security and to prevent illicit uses of nuclear and other radioac ve material. In May 2012, Australia hosted “Iron Koala,” a nuclear forensics seminar and tabletop exercise, which examined the importance of informa on sharing partnerships, both na onally and interna onally, to e ec vely respond to cases related to nuclear smuggling. This exercise iden ed an in terest amongst GICNT partners in further study of the topic of informa on sharing

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in the nuclear forensics eld. Thus the working group has commenced develop ment of a document seeking to frame the issues related to sharing nuclear foren sics informa on in the response to and inves ga on of a nuclear terrorism-related event, currently tled Sharing Nuclear Forensics Information: Benefits, Resources, and Challenges. Also under the auspices of the NFWG, the United Kingdom hosted in January 2014 the “Nuclear Forensics Workshop and Exercise – Exploring the Nuclear Forensics Chain of Custody: Guidance on the Development of Legally Compliant Nuclear Fo rensics Capabili es and Systems.” The workshop incorporated a tabletop exercise “Blue Beagle” that demonstrated the Bri sh system for control and use of forensics evidence from a crime scene through its development and presenta on as evi dence in a courtroom and to its disposal. The workshop and exercise presented best prac ces for inves ga ng a crime scene contaminated with radioac ve mate rial and showcased the cri cal steps needed to successfully introduce the evidence into legal proceedings. Addi onally, awareness-building informa on modules based on the GICNT Global Ini a ve Informa on Portal (GIIP) are in development. Currently, the NFWG is tes ng a Na onal Nuclear Forensics Library module that provides policy-makers an outline of the na onal nuclear forensics library concept and iden es key re sources for partner na ons interested in further informa on on this subject. The Response and Mi ga on Working Group (RMWG), chaired by the Kingdom of Morocco, is working collabora vely to develop the Response and Mitigation Frame- work Document, a collec on of key considera ons that a country with limited capa bili es should consider when ini alizing its na onal nuclear/radiological emergency response system. This document includes substan al input from the Moroccan ex perience in setting up its response capabili es. TheFramework Document is intend ed as a living document, meant to be rou nely updated and improved through fol low-on prac cal ac vi es and further input from partner na ons. In its capacity as RMWG Chair, Morocco con nues to work on an ac on plan for future ac vi es aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabili es in responding to a nuclear ter rorism event. Morocco con nues to work on an ac on plan for future RMWG ac v i es aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabili es in responding to a nuclear terrorism incident. Under the auspices of the RMWG, Canada hosted the RADE exercise in May 2012 in Toronto, to provide an overview of Canada’s emergency management and na onal security authori es and demonstrate its response to a terrorist attack. Spain and Morocco jointly hosted the REME -2013 exercise, in Madrid, Spain, in April 2013. This exercise helped to test the na onal capabili es of both countries and their coopera on on responding to and mi ga ng simultaneous terrorist attacks involving radioac ve substances. In October 2012, the RMWG and NWFG met jointly in Ispra, Italy, to address the intersec ons of the two working groups in responding to nuclear and radiological

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events. Based on the success of this joint ac vity, in February 2014, the NFWG and RMWG jointly held a workshop incorpora ng the tabletop exercise “Tiger Reef” focused on interagency coordina on and training that highlighted best prac ces and key resources for integra ng cross-disciplinary training into na onal response frameworks. “Tiger Reef” was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur and was sup ported by Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Looking to the future, the GICNT Co-Chairs, the IAG Coordinator and the Working Group Leaders remain committed to working with GICNT partner na ons to pursue focused e orts and ac vi es that foster nuclear security collabora on and advance nuclear security goals. Moving forward, the GICNT leadership will seek to engage partner na ons in prac cal exercises and workshops that enable them to prepare for and prac ce responding to nuclear security events. Such ac vi es will focus on encouraging interagency, regional, and interna onal coopera on and communica on, in accordance with the proposals for GICNT work endorsed by the partners at the 2013 Plenary mee ng in Mexico City. By enhancing partner na ons’ capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, GICNT will con nue to strength en nuclear security capabili es globally through e orts that complement and sup port the objec ves of the Nuclear Security Summit. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223761.htm

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H w l cal and state c ps fit int c unterterr ris While we will always need to train to respond to an attack, we will be much more e ec ve by conduc ng proac ve inves ga ons — inves ga ons which begin with learning the pre-attack indicators of terrorists Edit r’s N te: This week’s PoliceOne First Person essay is from PoliceOne Member Matt Ernst, who encourages all o cers to begin their counterterrorism e orts by learning the non-criminal indicators of terrorism. In PoliceOne First Person es says, our Members and Columnists candidly share their own unique view of the world. This is a platform from which individual o cers can share their own person al insights on issues confron ng cops today, as well as opinions, observa ons, and advice on living life behind the thin blue line. If you want to share your own per spec ve with other P1 Members, simply send us an email with your story. By Matt Ernst, PoliceOne Member If you’re like most cops, comba ng terrorism is not one of your daily concerns — and understandably so. Unless you’re assigned to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), you spend the great majority of your shifts dealing with drunks, domes cs, car accidents, assaults, mental illness, drugs, etc. Given the law of averages, you are simply much more likely to deal with those types of incidents than a terrorism in ves ga on. I have found that many cops think only ci es like New York City and Los Angeles have to worry about terrorists. While our high-pro le ci es will always be the pop ular targets, we need to recognize that terrorists are living all over the U.S. and they can be plotting an attack against a target even while living several states away. Terrorists are mobile and travel the na on’s highways in order to recruit, raise funds, purchase resources, conduct surveillance, and ul mately carry-out an attack. Thus, as law enforcement o cers, we need to focus our training not only on re sponding to an attack, but on learning the non-criminal indicators of terrorism. It is these indicators that we are much more likely to encounter on tra c stops or while handling those everyday calls. In 2010, the FBI con rmedhttp://cis.org/kephart/update-most-terrorist-incidents- past- ve-years-committed-foreign-bornthat 4,876 alleged terrorists had contacts with U.S. law enforcement, usually for reasons not related to terrorism. i It has also been es matedhttps://www.cis.org/administra ve-amnesty-and-terrorists that 20,000 - 30,000 known terrorists who are on the Terrorist Watchlist are in the U.S. at any given me. ii Based on my research, 36 U.S. states have either been the in tended target of a terrorist plot, or have been the loca on where terrorists have been arrested, lived, attended college, etc. iii The quickest way to visualize this is through this interac ve maphttp://www.inves ga veproject.org/maps/terrorism- map.php. There are two key points that street cops should understand:

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Ad erents t a radical Isla ic ide l gy are all er t e U S t ey’re n t li ing in just N C r L A The recent arrest of Terry Loewenhttp:// www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/jus ce/wichita-terrorism-arrest/index.html? iref=allsearch, who plotted to bomb the airport in Wichita, KS is a perfect example of this. iv Perhaps the best example of having an entrenched network all across the U.S. is the Somali terror group Al-Shabaab, which has had supporters arrested in California, Alabama, Minnesota, Seattle (Wash.), Columbus (Ohio), Maryland, Vir ginina, Chicago, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Wyo ming. v T e radicali a n pr cess terr rist financing and training ac i es ay n t take place in t e sa e l ca n as t e intended target an attack Perhaps the best example of this is Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to attack the NYC subway sys tem while living in Aurora (Colo.). Zazi purchased bomb-making chemicals in Den ver and then drove a rental car from Denver to NYC. Thankfully, Zazi was ul mately arrested and the plot foiled. vi But forgotten in the analysis of this case is how many poten al terrorist targets ex ist between Denver and NYC. Zazi would have passed through eight states during his travels and could’ve very easily changed his intended target to somewhere oth er than NYC. Let’s consider other cases http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf with simi lar circumstances: Seven people from the Miami, FL area developed a plot in which one of their tar gets was the Willis Tower in Chicago. vii Rezwan Ferdaus, from Ashland, Massachusetts, planned to attack the Pentagon in Washington D.C. viii Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed, residents of Atlanta, plotted to attack buildings in Washington, DC. ix Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, living in Lubbock, Texas was plotting attacks against various targets, some of which were thought to be in Colorado and California. x Iyman Faris, living in Columbus, OH, plotted to attack the Brooklyn Bridge in NYC. xi Eight residents of North Carolina were arrested after plotting attacks in Virginia. xii Naser Abdo, a U.S. military member sta oned in Kentucky, plotted to attack the Ft. Hood military base in Texas. xiii Aside from these examples, there have been countless other examples of people who have left the U.S., including from low-pro le ci es such as Cary, NC http:// www.inves ga veproject.org/4211/north-carolina-man-charged-with-support-to- al xiv and Flint, MI http://freebeacon.com/american-european-jihadists-in-syria- raise-new-domes c-terror-fears/?print=1 xv , to join terrorist groups overseas.

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There is also the example of two New Orleanshttp://www.inves ga veproject.org/ documents/case_docs/1232.pdf residents who sold State of Mississippi drivers li censes, birth cer cates, and social security cards to members of the Phillipines- based terrorist group, Abu Saayaf. xvi Not only are Islamic-inspired terrorists living all over the U.S. but they are going through the radicaliza on process right here in our ci es and towns. Radical Islamic mosques exist all over the U.S. Using this interac ve map once again, you can see that these mosques are in loca ons we normally wouldn’t think of as being incuba tors for terrorism — loca ons such as Spring eld (Mo.) and Rome (Ga.). The Columbus, OH mosque Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattabhttp:// www.inves ga veproject.org/maps/terrorism-map.php has contributed to the rad icaliza on of at least four separate terrorists. Terrorism nancing is occurring all over the U.S. as well. Terrorist groups are pro ng from a wide variety of street crimes — crimes that local o cers inves gate -- and then sending that money overseas to radical Islamic terrorist groups. For a perfect example of this, we can once again look to Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has been using pro ts from Khat http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf (an illegal narco c common in eastern Africa) sales, to send back to fund jihadists in Somalia. xvii So if you are street cop, and you contact someone in possession of khat, there is a very good possibility that there is a lot of intel that you can acquire from that person. If that same person is in possession of a large amount of cash, a real possibility exists for that money to end up back in Somalia. The San Diego Police Department has gured this out and developed an impressive intelligence collec on system to in ltrate Al-Shabaab. http://www.gwumc.edu/ hspi/policy/issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf There have also been numerous exampleshttp://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2014/02/treasury_adds_afghan.php of drug tra ckers in Afghanistan that are using hawalas in the U.S. to help move and hide the pro ts -- pro ts which are ul mately being used to fund the Taliban. xviii T e F cus Terr ris Training Needs t C ange Since 9/11 there has been constant discussion of the need for local law enforce ment o cers to be involved in the domes c counterterrorism e orts. A lot of em phasis has been placed on responding to an attack. But not enough emphasis has been placed on recognizing the indicators of terrorism. Now we need to start equipping o cers with the knowledge of how to iden fy ter rorists and conduct inves ga ons. Street cops should begin attemp ng to answer these types of ques ons: Do we know what a hawala is? Do we know what khat is? Do we know where the

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closest radical mosques are to our jurisdic on? Do we know which U.S ci es have large popula ons of Somali-Americans with known es to Al-Shabaab? How much do we know about the refugee popula ons in our jurisdic on? Have we ever taken the me to check someone’s interna onal travel history through the El Paso Intelli gence Center (EPIC)? Do we even have an EPIC account so that we can further in ves gate such matters? One thing we have learned is that terrorism and fake iden ca on documents go hand in hand. xix Could we iden fy a fake passport? How often do we ngerprint people who we are suspicious about? Is your agency moving towards using biomet rics as a way to verify someone’s iden ty? In 2007, the NYPD released Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threathttp://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/N PD_Report- Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf, which is an excellent guide for learning the charac teris cs of someone going through the radicaliza on process. Some of the common characteris cs include:  Males between the ages of 15 - 35  Begins growing a beard  Recent convert to Islam, which could include a name change  Withdrawal from his normal mosque or begins attending a Salafi mosque  Travel abroad to attend a training camp in a war-torn na on  Chemical odors coming from the house or apartment Trains in rearms, mar al arts, and par cipates in paintball games or other rearm exercises xx Rolling up the pants legs xxi Adop ng customs of the Prophet Muhammad, such as chewing miswak, a s ck used for cleaning one‘s teeth.[xxii] While we will always need to train to respond to an attack, we will be much more e ec ve by conduc ng proac ve inves ga ons — inves ga ons which begin with learning the pre-attack indicators of terrorists. i Update: Most Terrorist Incidents in the Past Five ears Committed by Foreign- Born Individuals. Janice Kephart. Center for Immigra on Studies. April 19, 2013. http://cis.org/kephart/update-most-terrorist-incidents-past- ve-years- committed-foreign-born (Accessed January 30, 2014). ii Connecting the Dots. Janice Kephart. Center for Immigra on Studies. December 2011.https://www.cis.org/administra ve-amnesty-and-terrorists (Accessed January 31, 2014). iii The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Colorado, Con

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nec cut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Hawaii, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Washington DC, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Sources include: the IPT Map, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.Jerome P. Bjelopera. Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd, 2013, Appendix A, The untold story of Hasanville s shadowy past: Part 2 . Lee Berthiaume. ttawa Citizen. May 4, 2002 and my personal knowledge of terrorism inves ga ons. iv Local man planned suicide attack at Wichita, ansas, airport, feds say. Elliot McLaughlin. CNN.com. December 13, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/ jus ce/wichita-terrorism-arrest/index.html?iref=allsearch (Accessed January 31, 2014). v Al Shabaab’s American Recruits. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE. October, 2013.http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american- recruits.pdf Accessed February 4, 2014). Two Indicted in Missouri on Charges of Providing Material Support to a Terrorist rganization A Third Defendant is Charged with Structuring Violations. Department of Jus ce. Press Release. Novem ber 3, 2010. http://www.fbi.gov/stlouis/press-releases/2010/ sl110310.htm (Accessed February 4, 2014) vi American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Jerome P. Bjelopera. Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd, 2013.Pg. 95. http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/terror/R41416.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2014) vii Ibid, Pg. 112, viii Ibid, Pg. 68. ix Ibid, Pg. 113. x Texas Resident Arrested on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass De- struction. Department of Jus ce Press Release. February 24, 2011. http:// www.jus ce.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-nsd-235.html (Accessed February 3, 2014). xi American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Jerome P. Bjelopera. Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd, 2013.Pg. 120. http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/terror/R41416.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2014) xii Ibid. Pg. 100. xiii Naser Abdo, an AW L soldier, accused of plotting Fort Hood attack. Peter Finn and Jason Ukman. THE WASHINGTON POST. July 28, 2011. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/na onal-security/awol-soldier-accused-of- plotting-fort-hood-attack/2011/07/28/gIQAvml1fI_story.html (Accessed February 3, 2014)

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xiv North Carolina Man Charged with Support to Al- aida in Iraq. Abha Shankar. INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM BLOG. November 13, 2013. http:// www.inves ga veproject.org/4211/north-carolina-man-charged-with-support-to- al (Accessed February 3, 2014). xv American, European Jihadists in Syria Raise New Domestic Terror Fears. Bill Gertz. WASHINGTON FREE BEACON. August. 20, 2013. http://freebeacon.com/ american-european-jihadists-in-syria-raise-new-domes c-terror-fears/? print=1 (Accessed February 3, 2014). xvi U.S. vs. Ranson & Carpenter. Criminal Complaint. Dunn Lampton, U.S. Attorney. Feb. 18, 2005. http://www.inves ga veproject.org/documents/case_docs/1232.pdf (Accessed February 3, 2014). xvii Running a Three-Legged Race: The San Diego Police Department, The Intelli- gence Community, and Counterterrorism. Andrew G. Mills and Joseph R.Clark. THE HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE. August 1, 2011. http://www.gwumc.edu/ hspi/policy/issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2014). xviii Treasury adds Afghan heroin tra cker to narcotics kingpin list. Bill Roggio. THE LONG WAR JOURNAL. Feb. 12, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2014/02/treasury_adds_afghan.php(Accessed Feb. 13, 2014). xix This has been learned from extensive analysis of terrorism inves ga ons. A few examples include: 1. U.S. vs. Ranson & Carpenter. Criminal Complaint. Dunn Lampton, U.S. Attorney. Feb. 18, 2005. http://www.inves ga veproject.org/documents/case_docs/1232.pdf (Accessed February 13, 2014). 2. Al Qaeda had an o ce of passports in the Khandar airport that altered passports, visas, and iden ca on cards. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the Na- tional Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. Norton and Company. July 22, 2004. Pg. 169.http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/ report/911Report_Ch5.pdf (Accessed Nov. 18, 2013) 3. AQ-a liated groups in Syria are collec ng European passports and re- distribu ng them to similar-looking Jihadists. Return of Jihadists Threatens Eu- rope. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Siobhan Gorman, Cassell Bryan-Low, Maria Abi- Habib. Dec. 4, 2013. (Accessed Dec. 7, 2013). http://online.wsj.com/news/ar cles/ SB20001424052702303722104579238542737904868 4. And Israeli intelligence recently uncovered a plot by Al Qaeda to attack Israel through the use of foreign ghters who were going to be brought into Israel by us ing fake Russian passports. Zawahiri s Servant in Gaza rchestrated Plots for Mega Terror Attacks. Special to IPT News. Yaakov Lappin. January 28, 2014. http://

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www.inves ga veproject.org/4277/zawahiri-servant-in-gaza-orchestrated-plots- for (Accessed January 30, 2014). 5. A DEA inves ga on revealed that the Dino Bouterse, counterterrorism com mander in Suriname, had plotted with Hezbollah to bring Hezbollah opera ves to Suriname. Once in Suriname, these opera ves would conduct attacks against U.S. targets, and provide protec on for Bouterse. In exchange, Bouterse would supply false passports to the opera ves for the purpose of entering the U.S. 6. Enemies at the gate. Richard Greenberg, Adam Ciralsky, Stone Phillips. DATELINE NBC. Dec. 28, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22419963/ (Accessed Feb. 13, 2014). xx Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt. New York Police Department, Intelligence Division, 2007. Pgs. 23, 31, 43http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report- Radicaliza on_in_the_West.pdf(Accessed Feb. 13, 2014). xxi Abdulhakim Mu ahid Muhammad Carlos Bledsoe : A Case Study in Lone Wolf Terrorism. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. JIHADOLOGY.NET. Dec. 23, 2013. http:// jihadology.net/2013/12/23/guest-post-abdulhakim-mujahid-muhammad-carlos- bledsoe-a-case-study-in-lone-wolf-terrorism/ (Accessed Feb. 13, 2014). xxii Ibid. http://www.policeone.com/

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