MASTER’S THESIS M-992

MUGHISUDDIN, Mohammed. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE SOCIO­ POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY: 1908-1964.

The American University, M.A., 1966 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, M ichigan THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ™ SOCIO-POLITICAL

DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY ; 1908-1964

by

Mohammed Mughisuddin

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman : ithùÂ

Date:

^ May 16, 1966 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY The American University JUN 3 0 1966 Washington, B.C. Jfl^ASHlNGTON. D. C PREFACE

Scores of nations have become independent since the end of the Second World War in 1945. Both the new and older nations are engaged in socio-economic and political develop­ ments* The efforts of the newer nations are being hampered by several internal and external factors. Some of the reasons being the lack of know-how, trained administrators, articulate political leaders, development capital, entrepreneurs and, above all, political stability.

As rulers, military leaders have become a familiar phenomenon in the "developing" countries. Being the only organized and effective force, the military has stepped in, in scores of countries, ostensibly to stabilize the political and economic situation or to provide leadership for the in­ troduction of new ideas in the society,

Turkey had enjoyed civilian rule for almost forty years but the military coup of May I960 gave a clear indica­ tion that the Turkish military still considered itself the guardian of the reforms and revolution inaugurated under its auspices by Kemal in the 1920s, The role of the military establishment in Turkish politics is, indeed, not new. His­ torically, the military has been active in domestic politics for many centuries. Its role, however, has changed from being a reactionary to that of a liberal and progressive force.

ii To see the role of the military from an historical perspective, I have discussed, in the first chapter, the political and socio-economic environments of the Ottoman

Empire; the various power-systems that operated in it; and the main reasons for the failure of the 19th century Ottoman reformists in making basic changes in the socio-political fabric of the society.

The second chapter concentrates on the historical role and traditions of the military establishment; its mission, its self-image, and its characteristics. A brief discussion of U.S. aid to Turkey is also included in this chapter.

The final chapter is devoted to interpretation and analysis, with some concluding remarks, I regretfully acknow­ ledge the fact that not enough space has been devoted to the role of the military in the economic development. The dif­ ficulty lay in deciding between the direct and indirect role of the military in this field.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ...... i

CHAPTER ...... PAGE

I. ENVIRONMENTAL FA CTORS...... 1

Physical Environment...... 1

Economic Environment ...... 4

Political Environment...... 11

A. Internal...... 11

B. External...... 20

II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT...... 25

Historical Traditions ...... 25

Missions of the Military Establishment...... 69

Descriptive Characteristics...... 94

Social Composition and Basis for Recruitment, , 97

Level of Modernization...... 98

External Aid...... 98

U.S. A i d ...... 100

Training Programs and Career Policies...... 100

Estimate of Effectiveness...... 102

III. THE ANALYSIS...... 106

The Hypothesis...... 106

The Indices...... 106

Interpretation and Conclusions...... 106

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 118 If there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that set it on fire.,,«The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unknown persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions growing desperate; and whatsoever in offending people joinath and knitteth them in a common cause.

— Francis Bacon CHAPTER I

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Physical Environment. Present day Turkey is only a small fraction of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, at the height of its physical expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. After the second unsuccessful Ottoman seige of Vienna in 1683, the Empire not only ceased to expand but also started to lose its European possessions. Left to itself, the Ottoman Empire would have disintegrated long be­ fore its dissolution in the second decade of the twentieth century. The Great Power rivalries, however, prevented its demise and gave the Empire a longer lease on life. The con­ flicting interests of the European powers "symbolically known to history as the Drargnach Osten of Austria-Hungary, the * desire for warm waters’ of Russia, the protection of the Suez Canal and the route to India of England, the com­ mercial and investment interest of France" permitted the

Ottoman Empire to retain some of its European and Asian pos­ sessions even at the time when it could hardly claim to have effective control over its domain.

^Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities : Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey. New York; Macmillan,”l932, p. 6. 2 2 The Treaty of Berlin (July 18?8) left to the Ottoman

Empire some 65,000 square miles of territory in Thrace, Mace­

donia and Albania. About ê±x million people lived in this

area, the majority of whom were Christians. In Asia, the

Ottoman Empire had an area of 700,000 square miles, without

reckoning the suzerainty over the tribes of Arabia and of

Tripoli in Africa. The population of Asiatic Turkey was about

seventeen million. Of this, six million were Turks; the re­

mainder consisted of Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and 3 Jews.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman

Empire still maintained control, nominal though it was, over most of the European area left to it by the Treaty of Berlin.

It is estimated that in 1908 the total population of the Ot- 4 toman Empire was about 30 million. Of this 30 million, about

2 The Congress of Berlin was called to avert war between Russia on the one hand and England and Austria on the other. Russia had extracted many promises from the Ottomans who had been severely defeated at Andrianople in January 1878. The extension of Russian influence in southeastern Europe did not suit either Disraeli or Francis Joseph. They were ready to go to war if "Russia did not knuckle under" but efforts by Bis* marck averted a clash between the Russian forces stationed at the gates of Constantinople and the British fleet ready for action in the Sea of Marmara and the Dardenelles.

3 Walter Phelps Hall and William Stearns Davis, The Course of Europe Since Walterloo. (Second Edition). New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947, p. 488.

4 Richard D, Robinson, The First Turkish Republic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 196Ï, p. )26. 3 six per cent were of the Greek Orthodox faith, three per cent Gregorian, and two per cent Hebrew.*

In terms of natural and mineral resources, the Ottoman

Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century had a variety of sizeable deposits within its domain. Such basi minerals as iron, copper, lead, and coal had been extracted for several years but the quantity extracted was necessarily limited be­ cause of the locations of mines, lack of communication links and heavy investment needed to expand the operation. Coal and chroma are available in fairly large quantities; quali­ tatively the former is fully comparable to the best of British and German coal. In addition to the above named minerals, the Republic of Turkey has small deposits of zinc, gold, silver, antimony, alum, borax, asbestos, manganese, mercury, and sulphur^

The Ottoman administration did not pay sufficient at­ tention to agriculture, the major occupation of the people, but the Empire was usually self-sufficient in wheat and cereals. Although external pressures and internal revolts caused a sharp decline in the agricultural production of the country, it remained slightly above the country’s require-

* The racial breakdown of the Empire was manifested in the composition of the 275-member parliament elected in 1909. In it there were 142 Turks, 60 Arabs, 25 Albanians, 23 Grreks, 12 Armenians, 5 Jews, 4 Bulgarians, 3 Serbs, and 1 Walachian.

5 W. B. Fisher, The Middle East; A Physical. Social and Regional Geography. London; Methuen.““1961. PP. 341-345. 4 ments. Even today when the population has increased many fold and the area decreased considerably, Turkey does not face the problem of food deficit; it has trebled its agricultural pro- 6 duction since 1923.

Economic Environment. Long before the Ottoman Em­ pire started on its path of steady decline, and over a cen­ tury before the Turkish armies retreated from Vienna in

1683, a perceptive Turkish statesman endeavored to draw the

Sultan’s attention to the dangers inherent in inflationary policies, speculation, unnecessary growth of an increasingly 7 useless and wasteful army and an incompetent bureaucracy.

Similar warnings were given by several other Turkish statesmen in the following centuries. For example, Kochu Bey, who has been called the Turkish Montesquieu, wrote a memo­ randum to Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640), In this document, written in I63O, the Ottoman official attributes four prin­ cipal causes of the decay of the Empire, He specifically at­ tacked the tax system of the Empire and urged the elimination of abuses to which poor peasants and non-Muslims were sub­ jected. The treasury was empty, he informed the Sultan, and

&Ibid.. p. 329.

^Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Observons of Ottoman Decline," Islamic Studies. (Karachi, Pakistan), I (March 1962), p. 74. 5 the land was being wasted. He n<^ed that a certain tract in the east which previously brought an income of 48,000,400 aspers had "simply gone to rack and ruine...."

For almost four centuries, both Turkish and foreign financial experts wrote memoranda on the causes of, and re­ medies for, economic crises of the Ottoman Empire. However, very little was done to correct the situation until the mid­ dle of the nineteenth century. By then, in addition to its domestic economic problems, the industrial revolution added to the financial woes of the Ottoman Empire. The domestic industry received a heavy blow when markets were flooded with inexpensive goods produced by Europe’s new industrial com- 9 plexes. When the realization of the danger came, the Ottoman

Empire had become militarily and politically so weak that it could not institute effective reforms.

For the purposes of this study, one may list two major causes that made it difficult for the Ottomans to cope with the economic difficulties: their traditional attitude towards such occupations as trade, commerce, communications, and manufacturing; and the problems created by the grant of ex­

dlbid.. p. 77. Q ^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 196l, p. 45Ô. 6 10 traterritorial rights to foreign citizens. The Ottomans' low regard for these occupations left these fields open to the minorities— the Greeks, Armenians, and Hebrews. This does not mean that the Muslims were completely excluded from these occupations. There were, indeed, a considerable number of

Muslims engaged in these professions. But, by and large, the 11 minorities dominated these lucrative occupations.

This situation, inturn, had two detrimental effects on the economy and political evolution of the Ottoman Empire.

In the first place, it deprived the treasury of an important 12 source of income as thousabds of non-Muslim citizehs were brought under the umbrella of the Capitulations granted to foreign powers. The other comsequence of the Ottoman attitude towards business and commerce was that it hampered the growth of a politically-conscious middle class which would identify its interests with the welfare and strength of the State.

Originally granted to foreign national to exempt them from the Sheriat courts, the Capitulations were steadily ex-

Peter F. Sugar, "Economic and Political Modernization," Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. editors. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964, p.157.

^4 b i d . . p. 153. 12 Ibid.. p. 154. According to him, Austria alone, by the 1700*8, had extended the Capitulatory privileges to some 200,000 non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in Moldavia and to 60,000 in Vallachia. W' tended by foreign powers to many revenue-prodcing institu- 13 tion of the Ottoman Empire. This unilateral action on the part of the European powers only reflected the military weakness of the Ottoman Empire which found itself incapable of imposing its will on some of its citizens. This situation has been succinctly described as follows:

Coupling economic and extraterritorial privileges these treaties /C^apitulations/ transformed the economical­ ly active segment of the minorities into the porteges of foreign nations, who owned /siç2^ no loyalty to the govern­ ment of the empire and shared none of their economic knowledge and experience with it. In sum, Capitulations alienated whatever middle class had been developed in the Empire.14 Foreign powers, by no means, were solely responsible for some of the economic ills of the Empire. The Sultans themselves had taken steps which caused further economic dif­ ficulties. For example, to meet the cost of a new army, Sul­ tan Selim III (1789-1807) sold berat. extraterritorial pri­ vileges, to both Muslim and non-Muslim merchants, thereby further reducing the future state revenue. After the Crimean

13 For a flavor of the kind of provisions included in the Capitulatory treatiesj see the text of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty signed in 1675. This and other treaties appear in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. (Vol I), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1^56, pp. 23-32.

^^Sugar, Og. cit.. p. 155; Frank Edgar Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement:A Study in Anglo- furkish Relations. 1826-1833. Cambridge: harvarcTUniversity Press, l942, pp. 9-iO; for a comprehensive analysis of the situation see P.M. Brown, Foreigners in Turkey. Their Juridical Status. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914. 8 war the Ottoman Sultans began to borrow money from foreign sources. Within a period of twenty years, by 1878, the Ottoman

Empire had accumulated loans in the amount of 250,000,000 pound sterling. Most of this amount was used on unproductive 15 plans. This situation placed the Ottoman Empire under further

European domination, especially with regard to economic af­ fairs. Failing to receive payments on time, the foreign powers forced the Sublime Porte to set up the Council of Administra­ tion of the Ottoman Public Debt in 1881. This Council was given absolute control on the revenues from tobacco, salt, wines and spirits, commercial stamps, certain fisheries and 16 the silk-tithe in some provinces.

Despite efficient work by the Council, increased rates of customs revenues, and allocation of almost one-third of the national budget (30.7 per cent in 1911-1912) for the re­ payment of the public debt, the amount of debt increased steadily. The government had to borrow approximately thirteen million dollars yearly (during 1876-1912) for meeting the budgetary deficits. On the eve of the First World War, the 17 public debt stood^at $716,000,000.

Decisive as they were, the above mentioned causes and economic conditions were not the only elements tht plagued

^^Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey. New York: Charles Scribner, 1927, p. 235.

^^Ibid. ; for a comprehensive study of the subject, see D.C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire.New York: Columbia University Press,"T9i^T 9 the Ottoman Empire. Of equal importance, both economically and politically, was the system of collecting taxes. This method, known as tax-farming, deprived the treasury of valu­ able revenues, enriched the middle-raan, the tax-farmer, and put a heavy burden on the peasent and other tax-payers. It had become a practice to auction off to the highest bidder each category of taxes--land-tax, tolls, assessed taxes in towns, etc.; the tax-farmer paid the total amount to the gov­ ernment and received a sanad authorizing him to collect taxes.

It was left to his discretion to assess taxes on individuals.

Under ^normal" circumstances, the tax-farmer made a 300 per 18 cent profit on his investment. This system alienated from the Sultan the political support of the people. Parentheti­ cally, it might be added that because this enterprise re­ quired huge sums of capital, the minority communities, especially the Armenians and Greeks, served as the under- 19 writers of the tax-farmers. This fact when became known to the public created feelings of animosity towards the mino­ rities.

In discussing the economic environment, it is necessary to say a few words about the communication facilities in the

^^Sugar, clt.. p. 156.

^^Bailey, Op. cit.. pp. 16-19.

I^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal ; McGill University t^ress, 1964, p. 14T7 10

Ottoman Empire. Its long coast line had many good natural harbors in the Méditerranéen and the Black Sea, but modern light houses and other facilities were not built until after the middle of the nineteenth century. The first telegraphic connection between Constantinople and Paris-London was made 20 during the Crimean war in 1855. The railroad building did not start until the I860's when Sultan Abdulaziz made a trip 21 to Europe and became"victim of a veritable railroad fever,"

Concessions to build and operate railroads in the Empire were giveh to various foreign firms. They constructed 2,455 miles 22 of track during the next six decades, ending in the 1920*s.

It may be pointed out that military considerations came first and economic considerations second, in building the railroad 23 and telegraph lines. However, in the opinion of anti­ reformists the introduction of modern communication facili­ ties were wholly "un-Islamic." "Mechanical skill and invent­ ion," it has been observed, "sometimes aroused fear and were typically attributed to Satan..., Even road building appeared to many Turks not so mueh a useful economic device as a path for tax collectors, invading armies, foreign spies, or just

20 Roderick H. Davison, Reforms in the Ottoman Empire; I856-I876. Princeton: Princeton University'Press, 1963, p.6^.

21 B.H. Summer, Russia and the Balkans. 1870-1880. Oxford, 1937, p. 10 3 , as quoted in Davison. Ibid.. p. 238.

22 Sugar, Op. cit.. p. 158. 23 Toynbee, Op. cit..p.222. 11 24 an aid to Christian merchants."

Political Environment ; (A) Internal; (B) External

(A) Internal. In a letter to his government describing the decision-making process of the Ottoman Empire in 1784,

Choiseul Gouffier, the French Ambassador to Constantinople, said, inter alia ."This is not like France, where the king alone is master of decision. In Turkey, on the contrary, to get something done, one has to convince the jurists of the

Ulema and both the present and previous occupants of posi- 25 tion of power." It was a fairly good description of the

Ottoman court of the period. But to understand the later de­ velopments, one may add that the Ulema had ascended to that position only a few decades earlier. The Sultans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries consulted the Ulema only on religious matters. For example, Selim I (1512-1520) is re­ puted to have remonstrated Ali Cemali, the Shaikhul Islam, 26 for interferring in state affairs, In the Ottoman Empire tb# degree of power any group wielded was determined by many internal as well as external factors; no one person or a group, for long, held absolute power over all the others. It might be suggested that in the struggle for power and great­ er influence between the Sultan and the Ulema, the outcome

24- Davison, Op, cit.. p. 78. ^^Lewis, Emergence, p.437.

26 Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in Ward and Rustow, Op. cit.. pp. 43-44. 12 largely depended on the character of the ruler, the Sultan.

A conquering Mohammed II or Selim I would naturally increase the power and influence of the Sultans; on the other hand, a pious Murad II or Bayezid II tended to increase the power 27 and influence of the Ulema.

Traditionally, the Sultan was considered God's ap­ pointee, whose duty it was to maintain order in the society.

It was conceived that the Sultan, with the help of the ad­ ministrative, military, religious and judicial establish­ ments, was ordained to "maintain the order as an unalterable tradition by securing to each category of the ruled no less and no more than it deserved according to its function or 28 station. This was the meaning of justice."

Before discussing the various power-systems of the

Ottoman society, it would be appropriate to briefly state 29 some of the major postulates which governed it. The basic premise, of course, was that God created every particle of

social order for a specific purpose, therefore, every indi­ vidual should remain as God willed. The acceptance of this

principle, obviously, tended to generate conservatism in the

society.

Any deviation professor Berkes points o u ^ from the established tradition, whether or not it was derived from religious sources, was contrary to a supposed Ancient Law

27 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire In The Time of Suleiman the Magnifieent. Cambridge: Harvard’Tfniversity Press,1913, p. 233. 28 Berkes, Op. cit..p. 11. ^^Ibid.. pp. 10-17. 13 (Kanun-u Kadim), which the Seriat was invoked to sanctify. Many ordinary practices became not only lawful but also religiously sanctioned by becoming a part of the tradition. 30

From the first premise about the place of the indivi­ dual in the society, it followed that the various groups

(both professional and religious) should be "protected from influences which might upset the order. " The net result of this second principle was that the various non-Muslim mino­ rities, millets. were kept segregated from each other. This system whose foundations were laid in the middle of the 31 fifteenth century (approximately 1453, soon after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks) was organized into separate autonomous religious communities having rights, duties and privileges granted by the Sultan to whom they owed absolute loyalty. These communities were largely immune from Turkish laws.

Another important principle which ruled the Ottoman society was the belief that members of an administrative group and the military establishment should possess no root in society and should bear allegiance only to their ruler.

By this means, the Ottomans tried to solve the problem of the conflict of interest and of loyalty. It was claimed that both the administrative machinery and the military establish-

30 Ibid.. p. 11.

31 Toynbee, Op, cit.. p. 143. 14 ment worked efficiently until these groups admitted in their respective ranks 'common' people with divided loyalty. Both the imperial household and the corps of Janissaries, claims

Kochu Bey in his Risale. had been overrun with outsiders and interloppers, the former with "Turks, Gypsies, Jews, people without religion or faith, cutpurses and city riff-raffs," and the latter with "townsmen, Turks, Gypsies, Tats, Lazes, muleteers and camel-drivers, porters, fbotpads and cut- 32 purses."

Since preservation of order was the basic premise of this system, it called for maintaining a proportional dis­ tribution and a balance among the various status groups.

Professor Berkes says:

The modern concept of natural rights and equality of citizenship had no place in the medieval system since there was no idea of individual freedom or popular sovereignty. Since each order had its unique funtion and position, like the organs of a body, there was no equality among them. The relative status assigned to a particular category was dictated not by the utility of the funtion performed, but by the value of that func­ tion, that is, by the assumed proximity of the category God.33

And finally, prerogative were granted not to indivi­ duals or groups but to the position they held In the system.

An understanding of the above postulates should give the reader better perspeetive of the duties and privileges of the various power-blocs within the Ottoman society. It should also give him some idea of the difficulties these postulates creat-

■-d______

32 Lewis, "Ottoman Observers..." p. 76.

33 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 13. 15 ed for the reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth cen­ turies.

Politically, the Ottoman institutions may be divided into two broad categories--the Ruling Institution and the 34 Muslim Institution. The former was the amalgam of the rul­ ing dynasty, the court, the army, and the administrative machinery; and the latter stood as a single unit performing such educational, judiciary, and religious functions as had been traditionally accepted. The Sultan was the head of both institutions. He did not claim divine nature or any prophetic attribute. He was respected by the populace because he held the heighest position in the divine arrangement of the world.

It was not his position that was revered by the people. "The

Padiÿah /S^ultanjT had no personal charisma, and when he was 35 deposed...he simply did not exist socially."

The head of the Muslim Institution, who was appoint­ ed by the Sultan, was known as the Sheikhul Islam. Under him there were a host of judges of the Sheriat courts (kadis), jurisconsults (muftis) and the ministers of the religion

(imams). These religious functionaries were usually graduates of medreses; they were specialists in law and theology. In

34 Lybyer, Og. cit.. passim; these two general cate­ gories the author used to describe the Ottoman society under Suleiman the Magnificent continued to exist until 1922-23 when the Sultanate and Caliphate were abolished by the vic­ torious nationalists.

35 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 13. 16 addition to providing educational facilities for Muslim children and performing judicial and religious duties, the

Ulema interpreted the Sheriat when new cases arose. It was the power of interpretation, above all, which allowed them to exert influence and to play such an important role in the society— a role that delayed the country's progress towards modernization. Their prerogative to interpret the Sheriat allowed the Ulema to issue fetva, not only on religious mat­ ters but also on matters concerning peace and war, relations with non-Muslim states, taxation, and the introduction of in- 36 ventions such as the printing press. Their firm conviction in the superiority of Muslim law and traditions and their vested interest in maintaining the status quo made the Ulema a powerful and conservative force.

Because of the nature of their duties and functions, the Ulema came into closer contact with the public than did the ruling class. The educational facilities which the Ulema controlled gave them an effective means to instill their con­ servative ideas in the minds of young pupil. "Every new pri­ mary school, college, and law school,--and they were many in the days of glory,— strengthened the influence of the insti- 37 tution."

36 Ibid., p. 15.

37 Lybyer, 0£, cit. . p. 234 17 In contrast to the Muslim institution, the Ruling

Institution did not enjoy a close relationship with the pub­ lic; in fact the rulers were supposed to be separated from the rnled. The Muslim Institution had a further advantage in winning the respect of the Muslims. On many occasions the

Sultans themselves contributed towards enhancing the public's respect for the Muslim Institution. Some Sultans went out of their way to show their respect for the Ulema by endowing the

Muslim Institution with large estates and money gifts. These actions did not fail to impress the public.

Without going any further into the relationship bet­ ween, and the relative influence of, the Ruling Institution and the Muslim Institution, it would be appropriate to dis­ cuss the main features of the Ruling Institution, with special emphasis on the military. The Sultan was the master and owner of the Ruling Institution; the members of this institution obeyed him as slaves; they knew no power greater than the

Sultan. Directly under the Sultan was the Sadrazam, the Grand

Vizier of the Empire, who managed and advised the Sultan on civilian affairs. The activities of the government were co­ ordinated through the Divan. the Supreme Council of the Em­ pire, which consisted of the Grand Vizier, head of the civilian bureaucracy; the Reis Effendi, in charge of foreign affairs; the Seraskier, commander-in-chief of the army; the Capitan

Pasha, admiral of the fleet; and several defterdars, the chief 18 of whom was comparable to a secretary of the treasury, the 39 others managing finances, trade, and interior affairs.

Outside the capital, the a van, originally a group of

provincial administrative officials, started to wield great 40 political and military power in the eighteenth century. As

the central authority had become quite weak, the avan, who by

the early eighteenth century had become a semi-feudal aristo­

crat in the provinces, started to maintain private armies to

strengthen and perpetuate control over their respective do­

mains. This group, along with the Ulema, the Janissaries, and

other conservative groups, became a strong anti-progressive

element in the Empire. In the struggle for political power at

the center, the Janissaries and the ayan were often at odds

with each other; each tried to enlist support of the Ulema

for strengthening his claim to power.

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, and

especially since the Kemalist revolution of the 1920's, the

Turkish army has been associated with the progressive forces

who have been striving to transform the country into an eco­

nomically viable and a politically stable state. The Janissaries

and Spahis. (a feudal cavalry) the predecessors of the con­

temporary Turkish army, were ; bpwever, far from being progres-

39sailey, Op. cit.. p. 11

AOinalcik, Op. cit.. p. 45. 19 sive; they were reactionaries. Internally, it was their military power which frustrated reform efforts by the various

Sultans in the eighteenth and the first part of the nine­ teenth centuries. They power they wielded had been accumulat­

ed over the centuries when the Turkish armies were held in

great esteem. During the periods of conquest, Lybyer says,

...army and government were one. War was the external pur­ pose, governmentTthe internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men. On the military side, this institution carried on war abroad, repressed revolt at home, kept itself in power, and preserved sufficient or­ der in the empire to allow a busy and varied economic and social activity. On the governmental side, it supplied itself with funds, regulated its own workings,— which was no small task— kept the operations of the other institu­ tions of the empire in order, and enforced the law. The high officials of government held high command in war. The generals of the army had extensive administrative duties in regard to the affairs of the troops under them, the management of departments of state, or the government of provinces.^2 This dual role of the military started to come under

a heavy strain when the Ottoman armies began to suffer de­

feats in Europe. The weaknesses and inadequacies of the

Ottoman army, which had been apparent to many keen observers

for several decades, were quietly admitted by the government

in 1718. The Treaty of Passarovitz with Russia marks the be­

ginning of the Ottoman effort to adopt European military

methods and techniques which had already proved their supe- 42 riority in the Russian victory over the Ottomans. The mili­

tary defeats forced the Ottomans to adopt European military

41 Lybyer, Og. cit., p. 91. 4-2 Berkes, cit. ,p.30. 20 techniques and methods; in this way the Turkish military be­ came the primary channel through which Western ideas, both political and technical, were introduced in the country.

Before turning to the next topic, it is necessary to say a few words about the attitude of the people towards the empire. The problems and attitude of the minorities have al­ ready been noted above. Here it would suffice to say that under the Ottoman system an ordinary person did not identify himself with the national territory. He considered himself a member of a group distinct from other groups on the ground 43 of language or religion or both. The social and economic or­ ganization of the traditional village, where most of the po­ pulation lived, eliminated the role of the innovator in this unit of the society. The individual followed a set of rules and principles established for him by religion and tradition; 44 his own decisions outside this framework counted for little,

(B) External. Realizing the weaknesses of the Ottoman

Empire and the consequences of its fragmentation on the in­ ternational balance of power, the European states started to take active interest in its internal affairs. Some powers wanted to keep it weak but united; others wanted to divide

it up among themselves; and still others showed some interest

43üavid Lerner and Richard Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," World Politics. 13 (October I960), p. 32,

^^Richard D, Robinson, The First Turkish Republic:A Case Study in National Development. Cambridge: Harvard UnT- versity ?ress,196), p, 58, 21 in its internal reforms only as to maintain their own com­ mercial and strategic interests. Russia became more anxious to reach agreement with Britain regarding the future of the

Ottoman Empire when the Turkish army was badly defeated by the European equipped army of the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed

All, who was being supported by the French. Tsar Nicholas I visited England in May 1&44 where in his conversation with the British Prime Minister, the Emperor described Turkey as,

...a dying man; we can try to keep him alive, but he will and must die. I am afraid of no one about it except France, With so many tons of gunpowder close to the fire, how can we prevent the spark from catching? We should consider it reasonably, and try to get an upright and honest under­ standing.

After a lapse of several years and the exchange of many notes between St. Petersburg and London, in January

1053i Nicholas finally suggested lines of partition of the

Ottoman Empire. His plan did not suit England, and to block the Russian move towards Constantinople, the British and

French governments challenged the Russian occupation of the

Danubian provinces vdiich were tributaries to the Ottoman

Empire. The ensuing power struggle resulted in the Crimean war and withdrawal of Russian troops in 1Ô54.

If in the 1050*s the British and French saved the

Ottoman Empire from becoming a protectorate of Russia, these

^5sir Bernard Pares, A History of Russia. (Definitive Edition). New York: Alfred AT Knopf, l9?8, p. J52, 22 three European powers had helped the Greeks to become inde­ pendent from the Ottomans in the 1020*s. The important point to make here is that while the Ottoman government, from the time of Selim III (17Ô9-1Ô07), tried to emulate European methods and techniques, the European governments and states­ men, by their actions and statements, were inadvertently strengthening the authoritarian, anti-reformists, anti-West- erners, and conservative elements within the Ottoman Empire.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,

French literature had the greatest impact on the Ottoman in­ telligentsia; the French revolution and ideas stirred the imaginations of the young Ottomans. Unfortunately, however, the Ottoman reformists were exposed to violent attacks from the opposition which condemned them for accepting and propa­ gating the ideas of the enemies of Islam and of the Empire.

To prove their point, the anti-reformists pointed to the anti-Muslim and anti-Turk prejudices expressed by French thinkers such as Voltaire, publicists such as Volney, and even diplomatic envoys such as Choiseul-Gouffier. On the governmental level, France obtained from the Ottomans im­ portant concessions in the Holy Land and Lebanon. The Ottoman government formally recognized the right of the French govern­ ment to protect all Catholic orders, churches, and mission­ ary efforts to proselytize the GKbhodox Christians and to

46Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 52. 23 establish Catholic supremacy in these two provinces. Profes­ sor Berkes observes:

Such developments placed the francophile Ottoman reformists in an awkward position and gave a religious colouring to the anti-reform movement.,. .Thus a religiously oriented anti-Western movement became the second strand running across the whole history of the Turkish transformation,... 47 In summation, it may be observed that, badly battered by internal revolts and external wars, the Ottoman Empire emerged into the twentieth century with an empty treasury; foreign control over part of its revenues; burdened by the provisions of the Capitulations • the elite divided between

Islamists and Ottomanists, between liberals and centralists; several underground parties working for the overthrow of the

Sultan; and with an army which manifested a revolutionary spirit.

47ibid. 24

Without rebellion, mankind would stagnate and injustice would be irremediable. — Bertrand Russell

Revolutions are inevitable in the lifetime of nations. They may result in despotism, but they also launch nations on paths previously blocked to them. — Milovan Djilas 25

CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

^ Historical Traditions, After the Ottoman defeats by the Russians, once in 1716 and again in 1774, the Janissaries,

"once the terror of Europe, ceased to frighten anyone but 46 their own sovereigns and their own civil population.,.,"

In spite of their declining influence and power, the Janis­ saries were able to prevent the implementation of reforms which would adversely affect their vested interests. The

Janissaries continued their opposition to military reforms until this ancient military institution was destroyed in 1826.

The Janissaries (Yenicheri, new soldiers) were organiz- , 49 ed in 1362 as the elite force and the personal guard of the

Sultan, Over the years of their military triumphs, the Janis­ saries became so powerful that by their active support they could place on the throne the prince of their own choice.

This power they held until I6l7 when the Ottomans adopted 50 the principle of primogeniture. In the beginning, the Janis­ saries were recruited as children from the non-Muslim groups but this custom was abandoned in the late sixteenth century.

Lewis, Emergence, pp. 23-24.

49 Robinson, The First Turkish Republic. p. 58; W.H, McNeill, The Rise of thelfest. New ŸorktMentor. 1965, believes that the Janissaries were organized After 1436, p. 545*

50Lybyer, Og. cit.. p. 94. 26

Initially, they were neither allowed to marry nor to engage in any business enterprise. However, these restriction, too, were removed. It seems that once the territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire was stopped by superior foreign forces, the energetic Janissaries could not be contained or disciplin­ ed; they often rioted against authorities; some Janissaries even seized control of faraway provinces whenever the central government was weak. In the first quater of the seventeenth century, their power at Constantinople was so strong that for the first time in Ottoman history a former commander of the

Janissary corps was appointed Grand Visier. The Sheikhul Islam 51 supported the appointment.

The permission to marry and to engage in trade further weakened the discipline of and control over the Janissaries; henceforth they opposed both military and financial reforms.

Although there had been minor reforms prior to 1789, the position of the Janissaries was threatened when Selim III embarked upon primarily military, but also economic, reforms in the Empire. He was farsighted enough to realize that in order to successfully emulate European methods the tradition­ al Ottoman institutions would have to undergo drastic and 52 fundamental changes.

51 Inalcik, Og. cit.. p. 46.

52 One scholar contends that the main object of Selim's reforms was to regain lost territory and conquer new ones for the Muslim cause; "he sought to borrow military knowledge from the West only to turn it against the Occident." Sugar, Op. cit.. p. 150. 27 Selim moved to make basic changes in the military

establishment and tried to recover the economy of the Empire,

He wished to eliminate the Janissaries but because of their

entrenched position, the Sultan considered it prudent to

create a new military force, Nizam-i Cedid, New Order, and to

gradually transform the entire military force to new standards,

For this reason the Sultan concentrated his reform efforts in

expanding the old military schools and establishing new ones

under European instructors. The Ottoman ambassadors in Europe were instructed to recruit talented men for service $n the

new military schools. (Napoleon Bonaparte had applied but did 53 not go to train the new Turkish army).

Inspite of the Sultan's determination to rapidly

transform the Ottoman army into a new and effective force,

it took his several years to establish the first military 54 school of his reign— an artillery training school— in 1793.

It should be noted that prior to Selim*s reign there existed

two important military institutions; the School of Engineer­

ing, established in 1769; it was expanded in 1792 and again

in 1795; and the Naval School, established in 1773. Most of

the teaching in the Engineering School was done by Turks;

foreign teachers were mostly Frenchmen, but there were also

a few English and Swedish instructors. Two languages, Arabic

53Berkes, Op. cit., p. 75.

5^ This date has been suggested by Sydney Fisher; 28 and French, were compulsory for all students. During the four years work at the Engineering school the student was required to take the following courses: calligraphy, dic­ tion, drawing, geometry, arithunatic, Arabic, French, plane tbrigaometry, algebra, topography, geography, military history, conics, differential and integral calculus, dynamics, mines, 55 ballistics, fortifications, and astronomy.

It was the Sultan's military interest that also caused 56 him to encourage the translation of books from the French.

French treatises on fortifications were translated for wider use by the Ottoman army. Increasing use of French books, dictionaries, works on mathematics and military sciences was made by the military schools.

Prior to 1793, the Ottoman Sultans did not send per­ manent embassies abroad. In that year the first Turkish embassy was opened in London, followed by one each in Vienna,

Berlin, Paris, and Madrid. This step too was primarily necessitated by military considerations. Ambassadors were

Frederick W. Frey, "Arms and the Men in Turkish Politics," Land Reborn. Aug. I960, pp. 3-14, says that the Sultan opened military schools after 1795.

55 Berkes, Op. cit.. p.75.

56 In 1784, the School of Engineering was allowed to set up a printing press, the sole function of which was to publish translations of European military treatises. 29 asked to observe and report the military, financial and administrative systems of European countries. To each envoy

were assigned a number of young men who learned the language of the country and acquired other valuable knowledge and ex­ periences. It was on the report of Ebubekir Ratib, an Ottoman official who visited Vienna in 1791, that Sultan Selim ap­ pointed a special council of ten young men and charged them with the responsibility of implementing reforms based on

Ratib*s report on the military, financial, and political 57 systems of the Austrian Empire.

The new schools and closer contact with Europeans created a tiny group of secular intellectuals during the eighteen short years of Selim*s reign. One such secular in­ tellectual was Seyyid Mustafa, a graduate of the School of

Engineering. In a book which he wrote in French, Seyyid

Mustafa tells of the unfavorable and even hostile reaction of the Turkish people to the teaching in the school. The people did not believe, he wrote, that war could be waged more effectively with the knowledge of mathematics or geo­ metry. The people believed that strength and valor were the only necessary ingredients for the preparation of victorious war. Seyyid Mustafa praises Sultan Selim*s sense of mission

S^Berkes, Op. cit., p. 77. 30 and active interest which permitted the new army to apply 58 modern science to the art of war. Numerous other instances

can be cited to show that Sultan Selim* s desire to modernize

the Ottoman army gave impetus to reforms in other sectors 59 of the society.

Unfortunately, Selim*a enthusiamm was shared only by

a small number of intellectuals who had no effective means

of communicating their ideas to the population. The Sultan*s

government did not have any means by which it could explain

to the public the benefits that would accrue from the re­

forms. In contrast, the opponents of the reforms, the Janis- 60 saries, had a ggod ally, the Ulema, who controlled the educa­

tional, judicial, and religious institutions.

Through the net-work of these institutions, the Ulema

were able to incite the public against the reforms. The in­

terventionist French policies towards the Ottoman Empire pro­

vided the Ulema and the Janissaries with valuable propaganda

material. The Ulema and Janissaries might not have been so

successful in their anti-refrom propaganda had the popula­

tion in general and the residents of Constantinople in parti­

cular not been affected by a new tax schedule. To raise extra )i" ' g- y

58 Ibid.

59 Berkes points out that after the overthrow of Selim a number of secular intellectual escaped to Egypt to work for Mohammed Ali Pasha, p. 78.

60 In the initial stages some Ulema favored the reforms but they changed their views after learning that the Sultan wanted to remove their influence along with the Janissaries. 31 money for the new army, the Sultan increased tax on the so-

called "imperial diploma." The rich people who depended on

imperial diplomas for the recognition of their social status,

were alienated by the increase in the price..The business

group and the poor people were also affected by the new tax

regulations; they did not like the increase in taxation and

price control. The prospects of a new powerful army also

threatened the autonomous powers which the ayan (the provin- 6l cial noblemen) enjoyed.

In his enthusiasm for reforms, Sultan Selim overplayed

his hand and failed to take into consideration the psycholo­

gical effects his innovations produced on the minds of the

people, most of whom believed in the motto of the Ulema:

"meddle not with things established; borrow nothing from in- 62 fidels, for the law forbids it." The Sultan also failed to

recognize the necessity of keeping an alliance with at least

one of the powerful groups, until his new army was ready to

accept the combined challenge of the traditional forces.

By May 1807, the anti-reform forces could not be

contained any longer. The danger of a revolt against the

Sultan became quite clear to some of his ministers who

switched sides in time to save their necks. On May 29, the

Janissaries started a mutiny that resulted in great loss of

life and property. Simultaneously, the Sheikhul Islam issued

61 Inalcik, Op. cit.. p. $0. 62 M. A. Ubicini, Letters on Turkey. London, 1856, as quoted in Bailey, Op. cit.. p. È2. 32 a fetva declaring the Sultan, being under the control of 63 the Franks, unfit as the ruler and the defender of Islam,

Sultan Selim was arrested and later killed by the Janis­ saries when in 1808 their power was challenged by a strong combined force of the ayans and the imperial army of the

Danube. The ayans wanted to restore Selim to the throne not because they favored his reforms but because they did not want the Janissaries to control the capital and its policies.

The ayans defeated the Janissaries, but the murder of Selim, a few hours beforevvictory, forced the victors to accept 64 Mahmud II as a compromise candidate for the Sultanate.

In summing up Selim*s reforms, one may observe that the Empire*5 military necessities gave impetus to reforms

in several branches of the government, Selim*s reign of

eighteen years produced a number of reform-minded Turks who

continued the Sultan*s program first in Egypt and later on

in Turkey under Sultan Mahmud II. The revolt of the Janis­

saries was successful in delaying the process of reform but

it could not postpone it indefinitely; there was no turning

back.

Mahmud II accepted the Sultanate with limitations on

his powers; for several years he remained dormant in the

63Berkes, Og. cit., p. 82; Inalcik, Op. cit.. p. 51.

this occasion a document of historical importance was written which,ffor the first time in Ottoman history, limited the Sultan's powers; the conditions, ironically, were imposed by the reactionary Janissaries. See text in Berkes, Op. cit., p. 90. 33 power struggle. By remaining ’apparently inactive* the 65 Sultan was successful in breaking the *unholy alliance*

between the Janissaries and the Ulema. By 1826, the Sultan

had developed a good relationship with the Shaikhul Islam who issued a fetva declaring that the new military training

program was essential for the defense of Islam. The Janis­

saries found themselves in a very difficult situation; they

had lost much respect because of their failure to suppress

the Greek revolt; their lawlessness and failures in wars had

"wiped from the mind of the people the last vestiges of awe 67 and respect" for the Janissaries.

Under these circumstances, the Janissaries were forced

to accept temporarily the new fetva and made a public promise

to participate in the new military program. But soon they

turned back on their promise and started a rebellion which

was promptly condemned by the public and by the Ulema. The

new army had been steadily gaining strength and at this point

numbered about 10,000. The Sultan knew that the time had come

to get rid of the Janissaries once and for all. On June 15, 1826, eighteen years after Selim*s death at the hands of the

65Muri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow. New York; Praeger, 1963, p. 9,

66sailey, Op. cit..p. 33. 6?Berkes, Op. cit.. p.92. 34 Janissaries, Sultan Mahmud II ordered the artillery to bombard the Janissaries* barracks. On that day 20,000 68 Janissaries were killed in Constantinople alone. Thus with­ in a few hours a centuries-old instituion came to a violent end. Two days later, by an imperial firman the Sultan official* ly abolished the Corps of Janissaries. Among the lurks, June 69 15, 1826 is remembered as "the auspicious incident."

The new army was given the name of Asakir-i-Mansure-i

Muhammediye; its commander, Serasker, was also named minister of war. He inherited from the commander of the Janissaries the responsibilities for public security, police duties, and fire-fighting in the capital.

With the help of the new army, Mahmud II also destroy­ ed the power of the provincial noblemen who had become so powerful as to prevent the extension of administrative con­ trol by the center; he eliminated some of the more trouble­ some orders of the dervishes and ordered that the turban be replaced by the fez, a headdress considered un-Islamic at that time.

In spite of the numerous foreign and domestic prob­ lems: the Greek revolt, the French invasion of Algeria, the occupation of Edirne by the Russians and the revolt of Mbhamp med Ali of Egypt— the Sultan continued to expand military facilities. In 1826, the military medical school was opened;

68Eren, Op. cit., p. 10. 69Geoffrey L. Lewis, Turkey (2nd Edition). New York: Praeger, I960, p. 35. 35 and in 1834 the new army officers training school started to function.

It is from this time that the Turkish army started to recruit commoners who would become the torch-bearers of re­

forms and progress in Turkey. Commenting on Mahmud's major achievements, Professor Berkes says,

Mahmud found a new basis for the ottoman sovereignty; the people. He threw away his cloak of sacred power with all its trappings and made himself not the defender of the faithful but the enlightner of the Ottoman citizenery. He founded an absolute monarchy supported by a central­ ized bureaucracy and a state army recruited from among the commoners and formed with a new, secular, and progressive orientation. 70 From the time of Mahmud's death in 1839 to the forma­

tion of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1889, the military did not play a direct role in the political life of 71 the country. Another military school— the General Staff Col­

lege, established in 1849— was added to the existing number.

These schools continued their contribution in training and

educating young men in the military sciences and in the

humanities. The contact of these young students with European

literature fostered in them the urge for political changes in

70 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 92.

71 In 1859 an abortive attempt was made by a group of fifty Ulema and junior officers to overthrow Sultan Abulmecid. The plotters were apprehended and executed. Eren, Og. cit., p. 56. 36 the Empire. The cadets were also greatly influenced by the ideas of Namik Kemal and his associates known as the New 72 Ottomans.

The military schools in the Ottoman Empire became good breeding grounds for the revolutionaries. The reformist movement which later brought the Young Turks into power had its beginning in the Imperial Military Medical College in

Constantinople. Ibrahim Temo, a young Albanian medical stu­ dent at the military school, organized a secret society with the help of three school mates— Ishak Sukuti, Charkes Mehmet

Reshit, and Abdullah Jevdet. They named the organization the * Committee of Progress and Union; later to be popularly known 73 as the Committee for Union and Progress. It may be recalled here that the Committee of Union and Progress was formed ten years after Sultan Abdul Hamid II had prorogated the short­ lived parliament in 1878. The parliament was convened under the so-called "Midhat Constitution" promulgated by the Sultan on December 23, 1876. Although the military did not play any

72 Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks ; Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19$^. passim. Tne author gives an excellent treatment of the early history of the Young Turk movement; he h{»s heavily relied on personal interviews with, and letters from, the surviving members of the movement.

* "Society" would be a better translation of the Turk­ ish word Jemiyet.

73 Ibid.. pp. 14-15. 37 significant role in preparing the constitution, it did sup- 74 port the liberal element of the 28-member commission charged with preparing the document. Both the Chief of Staff, Mahmud

Mesud Pasha, and Aziz Pasha, Member Central War Council, sup­ ported Mihdet Pasha in his fight against the conservative 75 group. The failure of the parliament and the authoritarian rule of the Sultan must have convinced the young medical students of the dire need to meet with force the Sultan* s oppressive methods. The main purpose of the organization was to overthrow the Sultan; there was no indication that the members of the secret society wanted to eliminate the

Ottoman dynasty or the Sultanate itself.

From the Medical School the membership soon spread to other military, and later on to civilian schools. "Thus," a scholar points out, "the military schools, maintained at a comparatively high level in keeping with Ottoman military tradition, beceune, paradoxically enough, the Achilles* heel 76 of the ruler who wanted only to be protected," It was indeed the high standard of education that attracted the young in-

74 Originally the committee consisted of: 24 members; it was later expanded to 28.All members held official posi­ tions; they represented state and municipal governments, the military, the judicial, public works, foreign affairs, educa­ tion, and commercial and fiscan departments. Berkes, Op. cit*, p. 235. 75 Robert Devereux, The First OttomanConstitutlcnal Period;A Study of the MidhaFlTonstituion and Parli^ent. Baltimore: Jonns Hopkins Press, I963, pp. 4? and 2bO. 76 Ramsaur, Op. cit.. p. 18. 38 telligentsia to the military schools; for them the medressa, run by the Ulema, had no attraction.

As membership of the CUP increased and spread into some civilian schools, the leaders could not for long keep the Society secret. In 1892, its activities became known to the Sultan who tried to suppress the society by jailing some of its leaders. However, the Sultan*s efforts failed in this respect; the Society continued its activities and was able to enlist the help of Kazim Pasha, commandant of the First

Division-in Constantinople, and of Lieutenant Colonel Shefik

Bey, an official of the War Office. The Committee and the two officials decided to stage a coup in August 1896. It has been suggested that in this plan the conspirators had the 77 support of the Shaikhul Islam and a large number of Ulema.

The plot was discovered a few hours before the action was to be taken; the plotters were arrested; some were jailed and the other exiled. The failure of this attempt brought to a stand-still the activities of the Committee in the capital.

In spite of the increased police vigilence, the stu­ dents of the Herbiye. the Military Academy, and other military schools continued their efforts and kept the Committee alive.

The Committee found many sympathizers in the ranks and files 78 of the Third Army stationed at Salonika. The Committee also

77 Ibid.. pp. 30-31. 78 Hall, Op. cit.. p. 496. 39 developed a close relationship with the so-called Young Turks who were living in the various capitals of Europe. These

émigrés produced the anti-Sultan propaganda material and

smuggled it into the Empire through the protection of the

foreign post offices. The material was privately read by

the cadets at the military schools.

Since the Young Turks played significant part in the

making of new Turkey it might be beneficial to discuss their

political ideas. The Young Turks developed within themselves

a political division traces of which can still be found among

the Turkish intelligentsia and among the military elite. The

Young Turks disagreed on many Ideological issues. However,

the main obstacle to their unity was their inability to agree

on the means of achieving political goals.

Ahmed Riza, the leader of one faction, advocated that

the country should go through an evolutionary political process

to modernize its institutions; he strongly opposed the use of

force and shedding of blood in deposing the Sultan. Another 79 faction was led by Mehmud Murad. His literary accompolish-

ments and his devotion to Pan-Islamic ideas made Murad more

popular than Ahmed Riza among the Young Turks in Europe.

Ahmed Riza's popularity declined further when he associated

79 According to Ramsaur, Mehmud Murad was an im­ migrant from Daghestan and had received his education in St. Petersburg. Ramsaur, cit.. p. 27, According to an­ other source, Murad was eHucated in a Russian gymnasium at Stavrople. He is believed to have escaped to Turkey when he was sent to Moscow University in 1873. Berkes, Ojg. cit.. p. 307. 40 himself closely with the Positivists in Paris. Riza*a op­ ponents maintained that his association with the Positivists 80 would be detrimental to the interest of the Society.

Another group of the Young Turks in Europe was led by

Prince Sabahaddin who fled Turkey in 1899. He was a nephew

(sister’s son) of the Sultan. The prince*s entry into the

Young Turks movement brought it both strength and a new schism. Sabahaddin contended that the Hamidian tyranny was not the cause of Turkish grievances but a product of certain features bi the society. The remedy, he argued, was not to change the ruler but to "transform society from a collectiv- 81 istic formation to an individualistic order." How could this transformation be achieved? The Prince proposed a decentral­ ization of administration based on local-self government and a new educational program based on the Anglo-Saxon system.

The Anglo-Saxon education system, Sabahaddin contended, was geared for training youth with the spirit of initiative and enterprise. Only this system, according to the Prince* s 82 argument, would cure the Empire*s ills.

In the first year of the twentieth century the Young

Turks began to realize that their internal differences were

80 Ramsaur, Op. cit.. pp. 20-51, passim; Berkes, Op. cit.. pp. 305-356.

81 Berkes, 0£. cit. . pp. 309-312. 82 Ibid.. p. 312. 41 dissipating their energy and that these differences might be helping the Sultan to continue, unopposed, his repressive

policies. Their first and foremost concern, the Young Turks

realized, should be to get rid of the Sultan. The ideological differences, they conceded, should be postponed for a later

discussion. In an effort to find a common ground for action, the various factions of the Young Turks met in Paris on

February 4, 1902. The delegates argued the pros and cons of

inviting the military to actively participate in overthrow­

ing the Sultan. It was pointed out that although a great

number of army officers secretly opposed the Sultan’s poli­

cies the enlisted men still owed their allegiance to the

Padisha and the Caliph of Islam. Under these circumstances,

it was agreed, the Young Turks should not count on the sup­

port of the military.

The convention, instead of uniting the Young Turks,

proved to be a divisive factor. After the convention several

groups were organized in the Ottoman Empire, One such splinter

group called itself the "Private Initiative and Decentral­

ization"; another called itself Vatan (Fatherland). The latter

group, Vatan. was formed in Damascus in October 1906; next

year it opened two branches, one in Jerusalem and the other

in Jaffa. Major Mustafa Kemal, then serving with the Fifth

Anny Corps stationed near Damascus, became a "charter-member"

of Vatan. At the end of 1907 Vatan*s activities were transfer- 42 red to Salonika, a^blace where the Sultan's spies were less Ô3 effective.

The founding of Vatan was the first attempt, after

1896, to organize secret cells In the armed forces of the

Ottoman Empire, To enlist the support of army officers stationed in Salonika. MuAtafa Kemal followed Vatan to its 84 new headquarters. Major Kemal left his post at Damascus with­ out taking leavèiand on arriving in Salonika, his birthplace, he mahaged to get four months leave on health grounds. He spent this time in organizing and enlisting support for the society. By personal interviews, Kemal became aware of the political ideas of the personnel of the Third Army Corps.

He was gratified to discover that many officers shared his political views and that they were willing to stake their 85 careers and their lives on the common cause. It was at this time that the group decided to added the word Hurriyet to the society's name. Thus it came to be known as Vatan ve 86 Hurriyet. Fatherland and Liberty. His stay in Salonika con-

83 Ramsaur, Op. cit., pp. 95-96; Eren, Op. cit.. p. 57. He gives the date as December 1906.

84 For a comprehensive account of Kemal's activities during this period see Lord Kinross' Ataturk. New York: William Morrow, 1965, pp. 19-40. 85 Ramsaur, Op. cit.. pp. 98-99. He provides a list of officers who attended a meeting of Vatan called by Mustafa Kemal.

86 Ibid.. p. 99. 43 vinced Kemal that he ought to get himself transferred to the

Third Army Corps where^could pursue his political activities more easily. Soon after his return to the Levant, Kemal was 87 transferred to the General Staff at Salonika.

In the meantime the Youn^ Turks in Europe made another

endeavor to compose their differences. A second convention was convened in Paris in December 1907. The delegates wisely

decided to refrain from airing their differences. Instead, it

was decided to form a central executive committee for im­

plementing a unified program of action and to transfer the 88 headquarters of the central executive to Salonika. Under the 89 name Osmanll Hurriyet Jemiyete. Ottoman Society of Liberty,

this conspiratorial group was successful in enlisting the

support of officers of the Third Army Corps. The Society's

activities were organized around five-member cells among

serving officers.

On his return to Salonika, Kemal discovered that his

own limited Fatherland and Liberty Society had been out­

stripped by the growth of the Ottoman Society of Liberty.

On the initiative of Talat, a postal official and member of

87 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 33.

88 Eren, Op. cit.. pp. 57-58.

89 For details on how different Committees and Societ­ ies were merged, reorganized, and renamed, see Ramsaur, Op. cit.. passim. 44 the Ottoman Society of Liberty, the Fatherland and Freedom 90 Society was merged within the Society of Liberty, The amal­ gamated group became known as the Society of Union and Pro­ gress.

The Society of Union and Progress (also known as the

Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) began to extend its activities to all parts of European Turkey. Cells and branches were organized under such men as Major Niyazi,

Ismet Inonu, Majors Suleman Askeri and Eyup Sabri, Lieutenant

Colonel Galip Bey, Omar Fevzi Mardin, Kaizim Krabekir Pasha, 91 Seyfi Pasha, and Huseyn Kadri Bey. The above is only a par­ tial list of officers who participated in the secret activi­ ties of the Society. The extent of participation may be judg­ ed from the following observation. "Within a relatively short time it was difficult to find a Turkish officer in all Euro­ pean Turkey who was not pledged to overthrow the government 92 he seznred."

The Society did not confine its activities to European

Turkey, however, A net-work of conspiratorial cells was creat­

ed in most of the military units of the Ottoman Army. Paren­ thetically, it should be noted that after the establishment

of the Society in Salonika the Young Turks in Europe did not

90 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 35.

91 Ramsaur, Op. cit.. pp. 114-115.

92 Ibid.. p. 115. 45 play a direct role in the Society’s activities among the armed forces. However, none of the secret organizations seems to have had a time-table for starting a revolution against the Sultan. As lord Kinross suggests, The Revolution 93 was ripening but not yet entirely ripe."

What then precipitated the revolt among the army units in Macedonia on that fateful day in July 1906? One might sug­ gest that it was simply the logical outcome of the revolu­ tionary indoctrination that had been going on among the officers of the Third Array Corps. It would, indeed be a legi­ timate argument. However, there are other themes in the story.

Some scholars have suggested that the army decided to act because of some ominous external events. For example, the meeting between King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II was considered by some Turks as an unwelcome shift in British 94 policy towards Turkey.

Professor Robinson contends that the Turkish Army units revolted because they were not being paid their sala- 95 ries, they were underfed and they lacked modern equipment.

It is conceiveable that these deficiencies were used by the officers to win the support of the soldiery to their cause.

But the real purpose of the revolt, so it seems, was not merely to air and rectify these grievances. It was much more

93 Kinross, 0£. cit.. p. 36. 94 Kinross, Loc« cit.; Lewis, Emergence, p. 202, 95 Robinson, Op. cit.. p. 6. 46 serious and far-reaching, A new generation of army officers had grown up with new values and socio-political ideas. In the military academies and training schools, these officers had learned about liberty, freedom, independence, equality, democracy, and about other "prohibited ideas." As cadets they had become familiar with theories and concepts of parlia­ mentary government, independent judiciary, and the freedom of the press. Now as officers, with men and arms under their command, they wanted to test those theories and concepts and put into practice some democratic ideas, "They were members of a ruling elite, prepared by education to command and govern; their complaint was that they were not permitted to 96 do so effectively."

Commenting on the reason of the 1906 revolution, an­ other scholar observes:

The mainstay of the opposition/to Abdul Hamid’s rule/con­ sisted of young army officers, whose professional training brought them into contact with European ideas and tech­ nical development, and whose professional pride made them bitterly resentful of the debilitating influence of the Sultan’s autocratic rule.^,^

In addition to the reasons discussed above, mention may also be made of another external event which is believed to have encouraged the conspirators in Turkey. In the Russo-

Japanese war of 190$, the "oriental but constitutional Japan" 96 defeated a "European but autocratic Russia." The Russian de­ feat is considered to have brought about constitutional and

96 Lewis, Emergence, p. 201. 97 Lewis, Turkey. p. 43. 96 Lewis, Emergence, p. 202, 47 parliamentary reforms in the country. To the Turkish con­

spirators, Russia’s defeat was a direct result of the Tsar’s autocratic rule, not unlike that of the Turkish Sultan’s.

To save their country from a similar fate, the Turkish con­

spirators seem to have argued, it would be necessary to end the autocratic rule of the Sultan and introduce a constitu­

tional regime in the Empire,

Meanwhile the Sultan in Istanbul had been informed of

the unrest and mutinies in the Empire. His immediate reaction was to use force to eliminate the opposition. For this pur­

pose he sent two successive commissions to investigate and

punish the mutineers in Salonika. The situation might not

have deteriorated so quickly if the Sultan had not forced the issue by sending a high-level commission of inquiry under

General Semi Pasha. It provided the conspirators a good op­

portunity to show their contempt and defiance of the Sultan.

The first shot of revolt was fired by a young army officer, 99 LieutanÉrtArif Begali, who assassinated General Semi in

Manastir.

Simultaneously, the Sultan tried to bribe some of the

dissident officers. Among those, the Sultan attempted to lure,

was a young army major, Enver Bey. The Major was invited to

Istanbul to report on the situation and ’’to receive a pro-

99 Eren, Op. cit.. p. $6. 48 motion," Major Enver sensed the danger in proceeding to

Istanbul. He ignored the command from the headquarters and decided to disappear into the Resne hills. Three days before the murder of General Sami Pasha, another army officer.

Major Niazi, followed Enver Bey to the hills. Major Niazi did not go alone, however. He managed to take with him a contingent of men, stores of ammunition and a good amount of money. A day or so later, July 4-5, 1908, Ali Fuad (Cebesoy), a colleague of Major Niazi, and a member of the Society of

Union and Progess, took another detachmaht to Niazi’s help.

Ali Fuad is believed to have urged Major Niazi to proclaim 100 open revolt against the Sultan.

From the time of Major Niazi*s escape to the hills on

July 4, the revolt spread rapidly among the different units of the Third Army Corps in Macedonia and among the Second

Army Corps in Edirne. The Sultan tried to crush the revolt by sending reinforcements from Anatolia but the officers of the Anatolian forces too had been "inflicted by Young Turk 101 propaganda." Instead of fighting the rebels, the Anatolian

forces fraternized with them. The rebels also received sup­ port from the director of the Manastir Military Academy who, on July 10, denounced publicly the policies of the Sultan

100 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 36; Lewis, Emergence, p. 203

101 Lewis, Emergence, p. 204. 49 102 and called for "Constitution or Death."

After being assured of active support from important military units and from other sources, the rebels sent an ultimatum to the Sultan on July 21, 1908. (Meanwhile the

Society of Union and Progress came out into the open; adopt­ ed the rebels and strongly endorsed their demand for the 103 restoration of the Constitution.) The rebils, in their ulti­ matum, demanded the immediate restoration of the Constitution of 1876, If their demands were not met, the rebels warned the Sultan, the heir apparent would be proclaimed as Sultan in Rumelia and an army of 100,000 would march on the capital.

After two days’ hesitation and consultations the Sultan acceded to the rebels’ demand and restored the Constitution on July 24, 1908.

Without much bloodshed or disturbance of public order, the Turkish military succeded in achieving a limited politi­ cal goal. It made no attempt to get rid of the Sultan who had been the main target of the Young Turks in Europe.

It seems that the leaders of the revolt were under the illusion that the restoration of the Constitution would prove to be a panacea for the country’s numerous ills. It appears that they failed to realize that the Constitution promulgat­ ed in 1876 and prorogued since 1878 had placed the country 104 under a "constituional absolutism. " In the first place the

102 Eren, Op. cit. .p. $8. 103 Kinross, Op. cit. .p.36. 104 Berkes, Op. cit.« pp. 253-288. 50

Constitution had not been prepared by representatives of the people; it was prepared by a group of intellectuals who were not quite aware of the people's needs. Furthermore, the

Constitution had been granted by the Sultan whose supremacy was not reduced but confirmed by the document. Even a cur­ sory look at the Constitution would show that the document was void of the provisions which, in modern state, were necessary to ensure constitutional rule. For example, the

Constitution did not provide for the separation of the legis­ lative, executive and judicial powers; the national assembly was not empowered to make laws without obtaining the consent of the Sultan. Above all, the political doctrine upon which the Constitution had been based was not the idea of "sover­ eignty of the people" but on the conception that sovereignty 105 belonged to God and to His vice-regent, the Sultan.

It became clear from the events that unfolded in a rapid succession, after the restoration of the Constitution in July 1908, that neither the public nor the leaders of the revolt were prepared to play their respective roles in the newly-won "freedom." Major Niazi who had proclaimed the rebel­ lion returned from the hills with his followers beneath ban­ ners proclaiming "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Justice."

105 For a comprehensive analysis of the Constitution of 1876 see Devereux, Og. cit.. passism; Berkes, Op. cit., pp. 246-248. 51 He ended his role by returning to his array unit; not being familiar with the ways of the political machinery of the 106 Empire and having no desire to hold a civilian post. Enver

Bey, on the other hand, stole the show for a while and pro­ jected himself as the political hero of the hour. Standing on the balcony of the Olympos Hotel in Salonika, Enver "young and solemn and triumphant" announced, to the cheering crowd below, that "arbitrary rule was at an end and that henceforth all citizens, of whatever race or creed, were brothers, glory- 10? ing in being Ottomans together."

"Ottomanization" was indeed what Enver and some of his young compatriots wished to achieve in the polyglot Empire,

For this reason the Young Turks have been called "imperial­ ists" by some scholars. "Imperialists in essence," a British biographer of Ataturk observes, "blind to the new nationalists forces now at work in the modern world, the Young Turks aspir­ ed merely to conserve, if in a more liberal form, the Ottoman 108 Empire of their forefathers."

Whatever their real sentiments had been towards "Otto- manism" the minorities showed little sign of hostility to­ wards the new government immediately following the restora­ tion of the Constitution. For a brief period the public dis­ played great joy and enthusiasm for the newly-acclaimed free­ dom, equality and justice. Unprecedented demonstrations of

106 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 36. 107 Ibid.. pp. 36-37. 108 Ibid.. p. 38. 52 "brotherly love" and toleration were held in the principal cities of the Empire. The chronic animosities between dif­ ferent nationalities, that had contributed so much to the decline of the Empire, temporarily disappeared: Bulgarian priests publicly shook hand with Turkish officers, Greeks embraced Armenians, Muslim ho.jas and Jewish rabbis embraced one another, and the Macedonian bands of revolutionaries,

Komitad.jis. announced the end of their hostilities against 109 the government. Political prisoners were released and elect* ions to the Chamber of Deputies ordered ; most of the Young

Turks who had been living in a self-imposed exile or who had been bannished by the Sultan returned home.

The revolt of 1908 was so swift and unexpected that it caught the public by surprise. Being a secret organization, the Society of Union and Progress did not have time to elicit public support for its candidates in the elections that fol­ lowed. Nevertheless, a large number of the Society's members won the elections and formed majority in the Chamber. The main factor that contributed to its success was that the 110 Society "controlled the Army." The new parliament elected

Ahmed Riza, a moderate, as its president; it dismissed some

109 Lewis, Turkey (3rd ed.), p.44; Kinross, Op. cit.. py' 37. 110 Lewis. Turkey (3rd ed.), p. 47. Although SUP had publicly supported^the rebels, it remained in the background until its authority was challenged by a counter-revolution in April 1909. 53 of the most unpopular of the Sultan’s ministers and made the cabinet responsible to the legislature.

The new government had hardly taken over the reins of the country when it started to face serious internal revolts and external pressures. The equal status that the Constitu­ tion guranteed to the non-Muslim minorities did not, of course, satisfy their nationalistic aspirations. The same provisions equally angered the conservative Muslims of southern Anatolia and Tripolitania who "looked on the restoration of the Con­ stitution as a betrayal of Islam, involving as it did the 111 granting of equal rights to non-Muslims,"

The government managed to pacify the conservative Mus­ lims but it could not contain the reaction of the Christian minorities which was swifter and more effective. In a rapid succession, within a three months of the re-establishment of the Constitution, Bulgaria proclaimed her independence; with­ in the same week Austria annexed the Turkish provinces of

Bosnia and Herzegovnia, and Crete voted for hnion with

Greece. It is ironic that after "liberating" the country from the autocratic rule of the Sultan, the Turkish military fail­ ed to maintain effective control over the Empire’s posses­ sions. Once the military proved incapable of meeting aggres-

111 Ibid., p. 45. 54 sion from one quarter (Austria), the Turkish military would

soon face an Italian force in Libya (September 1911) and a

combined force of the Balkan States (October 1912).

While the minorities proclaimed their independence, the ideological differences that had hitherto remained dor­ mant, caused a serious split among the Young Turks. Revolts

of the Balkan dependencies and unrest among some Arab tribes

seriously weakened the position of the advocates of "decen­

tralization." These events also discredited the liberals who

tended to support some policies of the decentralists. The 112 Unionists^ on the other hand gained influence by advocating

stronger central control over the Empire. In a show of strength

the Unionists ousted the Grand Vezir, a liberal, and installed 113 one of their own.choice. As noted above, such ideological

issues as "Ottoraanism," "Westernism," and "Islamism" had

divided the Turks since the middle of the nineteenth century.

No one group seems to have emerged victorious during this

period. However, following the revolt of 1908 these ideolo­

gical divisions gave birth to two "political parties" in

opposition to the Unionists, OttomanistSr. Two opposition

112 Berkes, Op. cit. .pp. 329-333. He gives an excel­ lent account of the political philosophy of the Unionists and shows how the word "Unionists" changed its connotations.

113 The Unionists ousted Kamil Pasha’s government by a vote of non-confidence; they installed Husain Ali Pasha on February 13, 1909. 55 parties— the Party of Liberty and Conciliation, and the

Muhammadan Union--tried to enlist enough parliamentary sup­

port to oust the Unionists. Needless to say that because of

the reasons stated above the two parties failed in their en­

deavor*^ The Unionists remained in majority.

The Unionists, Ziya Gbkalp among them, spoke of the

fusion and amalgamation of races in the creation of Ottoman

nationality. "The Ottoman lands," GBkalp wrote, "will be the 114 free and progressive America of the East," The Liberals (the

Party of Liberty and Conciliation), on the other hand, advocat­

ed an ultra-liberal government "amounting to a nonentity as 115 a central political authority." Policies of the Liberals tend­

ed to support the nationalism of non-Muslims and encouraged

their separatist demands. Such policies, it is evident, were

not conducive with the political climate of the country; the

Liberal Party never received any military support. The third

party, the Muhammadan Union, wanted Islamic unity as the basis

of the Ottoman state. It would have liked to turn the clock

of progress back to the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen- 116 turies when the Sheriat ruled supreme in the Empire, Many

military officials supported the principles enunciated by the

Muhammadan Union, This party is believed to have inspired at

least two anti-Unibnist revolts within a brief period of two

114 Ibid.. p. 332. 115 Ibid.. p. 330. Il6c?lbid. .p.341. 56 years.

For a year, following the revolt, the Society of Union

and Progress remained in the background. Its policies were

carried out by its members in the Chamber and by some of the

Ministers who belonged or were sympathetic to the Unionists’

cause. Despite the Society’s efforts to remain in the back­

ground it was being publicly critised because "of the cavalier way in which, while remaining in the background, they mani- 117 pulated government appointments."The Society was also accused

of arranging political murders and of intimidating its op- 118 ponents. Opposition newspapers, led by those of the Muham­ madan Union, "adopted a tone of petulance and vituperation? 119 against the Society. The Society’s rule also came under fire 120 from some liberal members of the military hierarchy. It was under such circumstances that on April 12, 1909, the Society

of Union and Progress published a statement in the press de- 121 daring itself an ordinary political party.

117 Lewis, Emergence. p. 210. 118 Hasan Fehmi, the liberal editor of the Serbesti. was mysteriously murdered in Istanbul on April 7, 1909. The Society was accused of complicity in the murder. Ibid.. p. 211.

119 Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military," Political M odernization in Japan and Turkey.editors. Ward and Austow. "Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19o4,p. 362.

120 Mustafa Kemal was one of the army officers who openly criticised the Society’s policies. He was considered a nuisance and was sent to re-establish control over Tripoli. Kinross, 0£. cit.. p. 39.

121 Inspite of this statement, the Society remained 57 It seems that the situation in Istanbul had already become explosive by the time the Society made the press state­ ment on April 12, The reactionary press, led by the Volkan. an organ of the Muhammadan Union, attacked the government run by "men of no honor who blindly imitate the West" and the

"ignoramuses who are so proud of their three days’ education that they think they can look down on students of the sacred 122 law." Such statements fanned the anti-Soctety feelings har­ bored by the conservative element of the population and mili­ tary garrison of Istanbul. These feelings manifested them­ selves in an armed mutiny that broke out among soldiers of the First Army Corps, stationed in Istanbul, on the night of 123 April 12, 1909. The soldiers, mainly Albanians, bound, im­ prisoned, or shot their officers, swarmed across the Galata

Bridge and assembled in front of the Chamber of Deputies.

The mutineers met little resistance; they were also joined by some mullahs and theological students. The mutineers de­ manded: the restoration of the Sheriat, ejection of the pre­ sident of the Chamber of Deputies (Ali Riza, a known Positiv-

technically a private organization until 1913 ; during this period its parliamentary contingent was called the party. Even after 1913 the Central Committee of the Society maintain­ ed its secret nature. Arif T. Payaslioglu, "Political Leader­ ship and Political Parties," in Ward and Rustow, 0£. cit.. p. 416,

122 Lewis, Turkey (3rd ed.), p. 47.

123 Lewis, Emergence, p. 211. 58 ist), and a change of government that would guarantee and enforce the rights of Muslim citizens provided in the Con­ stitution, The demands were presented to the Sultan who over­ rating the strength of the reactionaries accepted all demands of the mutineers and promised amnesty to theip.

The news of the mutiny in Istanbul brought a swift re­ action from the headquarters of the Society of Union and Pro­ gress in Salonika, The Society decided to take immediate military action against the mutineers in the Capital, The

Commander of the Third, Army, Mahmud Sevket Pasha, was asked to head a substantial force and to "wipe out this stain on the honor of the Ottoman Army, with its six-century-long re- 124 cord of obedience." Geneeal Sevket was assisted by Mustafa

Kemal who had returned after a successful mission in Tripoli;

Enver Bey who rushed back from his assignment in Berlin; and

Ahmed Niazi, hero of the 1908 revolt. Within a week the Army 125 of Liberation reached Istanbul and, without much opposition, suporessed the rebellion, A number of ringleaders, including 126 Vahdeti, editor of the Volkan. were publicly hanged on the

124 Lewis, Log cit.

125 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 44. He contends that Kemal named the force. According to Lewis, Emergence. p. 212, this force is known as Hareket Ordusu. Mobile Army. Some writers have called it the Army of Deliverance; Rustow translates the term as "Action Army," Rustow, "The Military," p. 362.

126 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 341. 59 127 Galata Bridge. The officers of the Army of Liberation, as spokesmen of the Society, consulted with members of the Cham­ ber of Deputies and unanimously agreed to depose Sultan Abdul* hamid and to exile him to Salonika. The Sultan’s younger bro­ ther, Mehmed Reshed was proclaimed the Sultan and Caliph

Mehmed V. On the day of his accession the Sultan gave a pledge that no other Ottoman sovereign had considered neces­ sary. The Sultan said, inter alia. "I shall not swerve by one 128 iota from the will and aspirations of the nation."

The Society of Union and Progress now seemed firmly in the saddle. By a series of laws and proclamations it sought to reinforce its power to deal with internal revolts and sub­ versive activities. Now, more than ever before, the Society endeavored to extend the central government’s control. A new law (the Law of Association, August 16) prohibited the for­ mation of political associations based on or bearing the names of ethnic or national groups. This law empowered the government to close the Greek, Bulgarian, and other minority

clubs and societies in Rumelia. Another law (the Law for the

Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition, September 27), autho­

rized the formation of special "pursuit battalions’’ from the

127 Kinross, Op. cit., p. 45.

128 Lewis, Turkey. (3rd ed.), p. 4 8 . 60 army for the repression of the Komitadjis. Steps were also taken to conscript, for the first time, non-Muslims in the 129 armed forces.

Through such laws and support of the military the 130 Society of Union and Progress held unchallenged control of the country for about two years. Members of the Society held crucial portfolios in the cabinet and parliamentary commit­ tees. The Constitution was amended to bring all executive and 131 judicial powers under the legislature. However, these measures did not prove effective either in checking the anti-govern­ ment activities of the minorities or in containing the re­ actionary forces. Instead the centralist policies of the So­ ciety provoked serious opposition from dissident groups.

Initially these dissident groups tried to have their griev­ ances rectified through parliamentary procedures. But after having failed to get any concessions from the Society-dominat­

ed Chamber, some of the dissident groups resorted to more

drastic action.

For two years, following the mutiny of April 1909,

Istanbul remained under martial law. Although there were

visible signs of opposition and dissatisfaction toward the

129 Lewis, Emergence. pp. 213-214.

130 In July 1910, the government discovered a reac­ tionary plot for the overthrow of the Society's government. Ibid,. p. 215.

131 Rustow, "The Military," p. 362. 61 regime, the martial law impeded the development of any ef- 132 efective constitutional opposition. However, at the end of this period, a splinter group of the Unionists formed the

New Party, Hizb-i Cedid, under the leadership of Colonel

Sadik and Abdulaziz Mecdi Bey. The New Party made scathing criticism of the policies of the Society and proceeded to elicit support in the Chamber of Deputies. Having mustered enough strength among the Deputies, the New Party published a ten-point memorandum, setting forth its demands. Its de­ mands showed the New Party’s right-wing leanings; it sought to maintain and safeguard ’’the sacred rights of the Caliphate 133 and Sultanate."

The New Party, though not successful in procuring a change in government policies, provided encouragement to other dissident groups. The opposition to the Society grew steadily. Alarmed, the Society procured the dissolution of the parliament and ordered new elections. It captured 269 out of 275 seats. The Society, Professor Bernard Lewis ob­ serves, "had crushed the liberal parliamentary opposition by dissolving the old chamber and packing the new one through 134 a shamelessly dishonest election."

132 Lewis, Emergence, p. 215. 133 Ibid.. p. 216,

134 Ibid.. p. 218. 62

By thus eliminating the legal opposition from the

Chamber, the Society forced its opponents to adopt military and conspiratorial methods to achieve political goals. Once again military officers formed secret societies— one in Is­ tanbul and another in Ruraelia--for the purpose of overthrow-

in the Society's government thau had become, like its prede­

cessor, the Sultan, oppressive. Halaskar Zabitan, Savior Of­

ficers, as the group of new rebels called itself, was formed

in Istanbul. It apparently had a link with rebel officers in 135 Rumelia. The Savior Officers demanded the ouster of the So­

ciety from government, withdrawal of the army from politics, holding of general elections, and a return to constitutional

legality. To blunt the effect of some of the criticism of

the Savior Officers, the Minister of War, Sevket Pasha, re- 136 signed on July 14, 1912. His action, however, failed to ap­

pease the Savior Officers who demanded complete elimination

of the Society from government and the implememtation of

other reforms as set out in a memorandum circulated in the

press.

To Impress upon the government the seriousness of

their "ultimatum," the Savior Officers made conspicuous mili­

tary movements and preparation; the show of force brought

135 Lewis, Loc.clt.,In my research I have, unfor­ tunately, failed to find names of officers who belonged to this groups.

136 Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Commander of the Liberation Army of 1909. 63 quick results. The government, that had received an over­ whelming vote of confidence only twentyfour hour before, resigned on July 17.

The Savior Officers nominated Nazim and Kamil Pashas to cabinet Ministers; the former, specifically, as minister of War. The choice for the Grand Vezir was left to the Sul­ tan who nominated Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha for the post. The new government immediately proceeded to make necessary changes to meet the demands of the Savior Officers. To begin with, the Society-dominated parliament was dissolved and appointees of the Society removed from key government posts. The new government asked all serving officers to sign an oath to the effect that they would not interfere in politics. The oath read, "...I swear by God and guarantee by my honor that I will not enter any political society, secret or public, nor inter­ fere in any way whatsoever in the internal or external affairs 137 of the state."

For a while it appeared that the Society had lost the battle for power. They had, indeed, lost a battle. But as veteran soldiers and master tacticians the leaders of the

Society did not allow their forces to scatter. Their retreat from the political battle ground provided the Unionists an excellent opportunity to regroup their forces and strengthen

their defences for a bigger and more crucial engagement. The

137 Lewis, Emergence. p. 220. 64 Society, while out of power, made secret preparations in the army, the police, and the government offices and waited for the right moment to stage another "revolution."

For this opportunity, the Unionists did not have to wait long. In October 1912, the Balkan allies attacked the

Ottoman Empire. This aggression forced the Savior Officers to leave the capital. Some members of the Society in Istanbul availed themselves of the opportunity and, with the blessings of Sevket Pasha, staged a coup on January 23, 1913. A small group of array officers, led by Enver Bey, forced itself in the cabinet room at the Sublime Porte. They shot and killed

Nazim Pasha, Minister of War; and forced the Grand Vexir,

Kamil Pasha, to submit his resignation. Sevket Pasha was in­ stalled as Grand Vezir and Enver Bey as Minister of War,

Once in firm control, the Society began to eliminate all opposition. The murder of Sevket Pasha, on June 11, 1913, provided the Society the pretext for removing the "last shred 138 of freedom and democracy." For the next five years the Empire was ruled by a virtual military dictatorship dominated by three men— Enver, Talat, and Cemal.

Achievements of the Society of Union and Progress. The main events that brought the Turkish military directly into politics for the first time in the twentieth century have been discussed in the preceding pages. An analysis of the

138 Ibid.. p. 221. 65 the Society’s achievements follows. For a decade--1908 to

1918— the Empire was ruled by civil-military coalitions.

During this period, one of the most turbulant in the politi­ cal history of the Ottoman Empire, the country had twentyfour changes of cabinet; it fought four wars, the Turco-Italian, tv;o Balkans, and World War I ; it lost all its non-Turkish possessions and almost lost its independence.

Setting aside the obvious political and military mis­ takes of the Unionists, what were the achievements of the

Society’s rule? There have been several critical appraisals of the rule of the Unionists, some have been fairly objective and others unnecessarily one-sided. Recent studies indicate that in spite of the numerous internal and external problems of the country, the Unionists managed to take reformatory actions in the fields of education, land tenure, taxation, police organization, military training, religious institutions, 139 administration, and judiciary. Some of the reforms instituted by the Unionists were so effective that the Republican govern­ ment continued the steps taken by its predecessor. Further­ more, it has been suggested that the Unionists, by commission or ommission, prepared the public psychologically for the events that preceded and followed the establishment cf the 140 Turkish Republic. The Unionists, unwittingly, nurtured the

139 For a comprehensive treatment of the subject see Berkes, Op. cit..chapters 11-14; Lewis, Emergence, pp.206-233.

140 Lewis, Emergence. p. 223. 66 seeds of Turkish nationalism that came into full bloom after

Turkey’s defeat in World War I.

Professor Berkes, while conceding that the Unionists did accomplish tangible results in secularising the educa­ tional and religious systems, places far greater emphasis on the physchological effects the Revolution of 1908 had on the masses. "What the revolutionaries in exile failed to accomp­ lish for over a quarter of a century," Proféssor Berkes points out, "the Revolution of 1908 achieved in just a few months.

This bringing of a sense of community to the Turkish masses 141 was not one of its direct aims." And again he observes, "The

Revolution of 1908...will appear as less than even an or-

f dinary coup d’etat unless the psychological, later organiza­ tional, transformation it brought is recognized." "With the coming of the 1908 Revolution," Professor Berkes continues,

"something made itself felt for the first time: the Turkish 142 masses reacted politically rather than religiously."

Looking from a different perspective at the achieve­ ments or contributions of the Unionists, another scholar con­ tends that the emergence of the officer corps as the dominat­ ing factor in political affairs "broadened the range of po­ litical activity and concern far beyond the small circle of

141 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 328.

142 Ibid.. p. 326. 67 the palace and the Sublime Porte, with which they had previous- 143 ly remained." Although far from being democratic, the Union­ ist regimes provided the people the first opportunity to participate in political rallies and election campaigns; the press too, for a while, enjoyed an unprecedented freedom. All these changes and events helped to create a new attitude to­ wards politics among the Turks.

In the realm of politics the Unionists were obsessed with the idea of Ottomanism— an unattainable goal under the then existing conditions. They failed to achieve even a/Limit-

ed success in this respect. In the realm of economics and

finance they attained limited success. They formed a society to encourage the consumption of domestic products; enacted a law to encourage industry; established a national credit

bank in 1917; and initiated a consumers’ cooperative move­ ment in Istanbul. They Unionists also reformed the antiquat­

ed systems of inheritance, taxation, and land tenure. They tried but failed to abolish the capitulations.

In addition, the Unionists are credited with encourag­

ing a public discussion of Marxian socialist ideas. These

ideas were discussed in the press mainly by Alexander Helphand,

a leading Marxian socialist of the era, who lived in Turkey

during the years 1910-1914. Two ideas emerged from the dis­

cussions in the press and at the Unionists’ conventions held

143 Lewis, Emergence, p. 457. 68 in 1911, 1912, and 1913. Briefly, they were that the economic independence was an essential prerequaite to national inde­ pendence, and that economic independence could be achieved only through government activity and support. Although Help- hand ’d advice to end the capitulations could not be imple­ mented his writings "served much broader ends and influenced 144 the nationalist intellectuals considerably." It is evident that these debates and discussions made the public and its leaders more susceptible to Mustafa Kemal*a devletcilik, etatism.

The Unionists made their most important reforms in the fields of education and religious institutes. Most of the reforms in these spheres were recommended by Ziya GBkalp in a memorandum to the Party of Union and Progress, In these two areas the Unionists implemented reforms in I916. The Shaikh- ul Islam was eliminated from the cabinet ; the Sheriat courts were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Shaikhul Islam to the Ministry of Justice; the evakaf administration was re­ moved from the control of the Shaikhul Islam; all financial matters concerning the religious institutions were placed under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of Evkaf; and the medresses were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Shaikh- 145 ul Islam to that of the Ministry of Education, In this field, it may be pointed out, the Unionists prepared the ground for

144 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 337. 145 Ibid.. p. 416. 69 Ataturk to completiÿy divest religion of its influence in the affairs of the state.

The Unionists regimes created a new system of secular primary and secondary schools; set up teachers* training col­ leges and specialized institutes; extended educational op­ portunities for girls, first at the middle and secondary 146 levels and then at the university level.

The Unionists continued their predecessors* policies of engaging foreign military experts for training armed forces.

In 1913 the Unionists invited a German military mission, un­ der General O.V.K, Liman Von Sanders, to undertake a compre­ hensive reorganization of the armed forces of the Ottoman

Empire. The General arrived with a detachment of 42 officers and in five years its number increased to 646 officers and

6,686 men; German personnel attached to other parts of the 147 Ottoman forces brought the total to 25,400.

Missions of the Military Establishment. From the day of the revolution in July 1908 to the signing of the armistice at Mudros on October 30, 1918, the Turkish military was con­ tinuously involved in wars and campaigns against external enemies and internal revolts. Before the war of 1914-18, the

Turkish military was engaged on several fronts: against the

146 Lewis, 0£. cit.. p. 224.

147 Rustow, **The Military,*' p. 356. 70

Italians in Libya, the Bulgars in the Balkans, and some Arab tribes in the east. In 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the 148 war on the side of Germany. The armistice at Mudros brought the Turkish military a temporary respite. On every front, 149 except at Gallipoli, the Turkish armies had been defeated.

From the battle of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal emerged as the hero of Turkish nation, the public recognition of his leader­ ship came much later, however. Within a six months of the signing of the armistice, the Turkish army face the new challenge of aninvading army. With the help of British, 150 French, smd American naval units, Grekk forces landed at

Smyrna (now Izmir) on May 15, 1919. Although most of the Turk­ ish army had been disarmed under the provisions of the Armis­ tice, it responded to the Greek aggression with remarkable spirit. Under the leadership of Kemal, Inonu and others, the

Turkish army valiantly fought the Greek forces and in due

148 For a vivid account of some of the events preced­ ing Turkey*s entry into the war in 1914 see Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August. New York: Dell, 1963. Especially note- wortHy, for this paper, is her story of the part played by the German battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau in "winning* Turkey to the side of Germany, pp. I62ff.

149 For an excellent description of the campaign see Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli.New York: Ballantine, 1956.

150 For the American attitude towards Turkey during this period, see John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-19^9.Minneapolis : University o^ Minnesota Press, 1965, chapters 4 and 5. 71 course pushed the invading army back to the ships of the

Greek allies. The Greeks were not the only ones the Turkish array had to face; it had to defend Turkish territory from the Italians who landed in Anatolia on April 29, 1919. In addition to the foreign invading forces, the Turkish «rmy had to deal with the Armenians who wanted to set up an in­

dependent state of their own. In short, it was the first time

in Turkish history that the military was called upon to safe­

guard the very existence of the nation. It was also the first

that the Ottoman Empire had no powerful allies. Its tradi­

tional allies and enemies— Britain, France and Russ la--had,

by a series of secret treaties and agreements, pledged to divide the Empire among themselves. After the armistice their

troops, excluding Russia's, occupied Constantinople and other

areas in Anatolia.

Under these circumstances there was little hope for

the survival of the Turkish nation, but Mustafa Kemal's abil­

ity to rally the people and remnants of the army not only

saved the Turks from disintegration but also transformed them

into a modern nation. The task was by no means an easy one. 151 After taking over control of the Seventh Army Corps and the

telegraph system in central and eastern Anatolia, Mustafa

151 This was the only Turkish array corps that remained intact and disciplined after the armistice; the terms of ar­ mistice had called for a complete dismemberment of the Turk­ ish forces; it was ostensibly for this purpose that Mustafa Kemal was sent to central and eastern Anatolia--to demobilize the forces. Disregarding his orders, Kemal kept the forces in­ tact and organized them to meet and finally defeat the enemy. 72

Kemal and his fellow nationalists founded the Society for the Defense of National Rights. In the name of the Society,

Kemal and his friends issued a statement of national aims and objectives from Erzurum in July 1919. The control of the telegraph system allowed the nationalists to publicize their program in all parts of the country. Several years later

Mustafa Kemal summarized the July 1919 declaration in the following words:

The entire country within its national frontiers is an undivided whole.

In the event of the Ottoman Empire being split up, the nation will unanimously resist any attempt at occupation or interference by foreigner.

Should the government be incapable of preserving the independence of the nation and the integrity of the coun­ try, a provision Government shall be formed for the pur­ pose of safe-guarding these aims. This Government shall be elected by the national congress, and, if it should not be sitting at the time, the Executive Committee shall pro­ ceed to elect it.

The chief object is to consolidate the national forces into a ruling factor and to establish the will of the na­ tion as the sovereign power.

No privileges which could impair our political sove­ reignty or our social equilibrium shall be granted to Christian elements.

It is out of the question to accept a mandate or a protectorate. 73

Everything that is possible shall be done to secure the immediate meeting of the National Assembly and to establish its control over the proceedings of the Govern­ ment ....Perhaphs you will have observed already, or you will do so, that these principles and decisions, although they have been put forward in different forms, can be carried into effect without in any way losing their ori­ ginal character.

The Turkish struggle to remain independent started with an invasion by a foreign enemy, the Greeks, "insolent 153 and disloyal subjects for a century past." Although some pub­

lic meetings were held to show the populationSS anger at the unprovoked Greek attack on Izmir there was hardly any organiz­

ed civilian activity to stop the invading forces. "It was this defect which leadership by the army and its high-rank- 154 ing commanders was ideally equipped to remedy."

It would not be wrong to consider May 15, 1919, as the

birthday of Turkish nationalism. The dreams of the Pan-Islam-

ists and Ottomanists had been shattered by Turkey's defeat

in the war; the Westernists had been discredited because of

the attitute of the European powers towards Turkey--the four

152 Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927. Leipzigf K.P. Koehler, m T T p ' T W . ------

153 Kinross, Qg. cit. . p. 181,

154 Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Affairs, vol XI, No; 4, July 1959, p. 520. 74 secret agreements between Britain, France, Russia, and Italy had become known by their publication by the Bolsheviks. Now the field was wide open for the Turkists to consolidate their 155 hold over the masses*

On that ominous day when the Greek forces landed at

Izmir, a young Turkish girl, her face unveiled, addressed a gathering of 50,000 in front of the mosque of Sultan Ahmed in Istanbul. The depth of feelings she expressed,and about which she wrote later, might be considered as representative of the public feelings towards the Greek invasion. Address­ ing the crowd. Halide Edib, assured her audience that " when the night is darkest and seems eternal, the light of dawn is nearest." Later she wrote; ”

After I learned the details of the Smyrna occupation ...I hardly opened my mouth on any subject except when it concerned the sacred struggle which was to be. Turkey was to be cleared of murderers, the so-called civilizing Greek Armies....I suddenly ceased to exist as an individual. I worked, wrote and lived as a unit of that magnifiaient national madness.. 15o

If the Greek invasion galvanized the Turks to "that magnifiaient national madness" the fuel to sustain the new­ born nationalism was provided by Britain and France who forced

155 Berkes, Op. cit.. p. 431 ff.

156 Kinross, Op. cit.. p. 181. After the Nationalists had started to organize their resistance in Eastern Anatolia, Halide Edib and her husband Dr. Adnan escaped from Istanbul and joined Kemal at Angora. They stayed with the Nationalists throughout the struggle for independence but later parted company with Kemal because of his "authoritarian" policies. 75 the Sultan to accept humiliating conditions of the Treaty of 157 Sevres (August 10, 1920). The Nationalists not only rejected the conditions of the treaty but also condemned the Govern­ ment in Istanbul for accepting the treaty. The acceptance of the terms of the treaty by the Turkish government brought new followers to the Nationalists camp. Many bureaucrats and generals who had remained loyal to the Sultan switched their sympathies and started to work for the Nationalists. (By the time the struggle ended, twelve of the seventeen Turkish Army

Commanders had joined the nationalists cause; only two re­ mained loyal to the Sultan and the rest either retired or went abroad.)

In her Memoirs. and The Turkish Ordeal (London, 1926), Halide Edib has given a moving description of the trial and tribu­ lations of the nationalists.

157 For a text of the treaty see The Treaties of Peace. 1919-1923. Vol II. New York; Carnegie Endowment for "International Peace, 1924. Article 155 stipulated that Turkey would not maintain a force in access of 50,000 men and of­ ficers; article 154 provided the Sultan with a contingent of 700 officers and men as his personal guards. The Treaty for­ bade Turkey to manufacture arms and ammunition; disallowed her to purchase or manufacture airplanes ; her navy was re­ duced to the coast-guard level. All non-Turkish territories were to be stripped away; an independent Armenia was to be created; the Turkish Straits were to be internationalized; Thrace and the Aegean islands were to be given to Greece; Izmir and its hinterland were to be Greek-administered for a period of fice years after which a plebiscite would be held to determine its future. 76

The Sultan, however, still held a potent instrument against the nationalists; his control of the Shaikhul Islam in Constantinople. This weapon the Sultan tried to use to its fullest extent. On learning about Kemal*s activities„ the

Sultan tried to get Kemal back to the capital. The Sultan’s government, under pressure from the British High Commissioner, sought to prevent Kemal from holding the proposed Congress at

Erzurum. The Ministry of War urged Kemal to either resign or to go on leave. To these suggestions Kemal replied in the negative. Now it had become clear to Kemal ami his colleagues.

Ref et, Kiazira Karabekir, and Rauf, that his dismissal was imminent. His military friends urged Kemal to resign and as­ sured him their full support to his plans for national libe­ ration. Kemal is said to have hesitated but finally agreed to resign both his post and his commission in the army. He sent a telegram to the Sultan and another to the Ministry of

War informing them of his resignation. Kemal’s telegrams were crossed by another, from the Ministry of War, informing him 158 of his dismissal from both his current post and the array.

Simultaneously, the Shaikhul Islam declared Kemal a rebel against vthe Caliph of Islam. This fetva placed Kemal's life in jeopardy. It became the duty of every Turk to appre-

158 Kinross, Op. cit. . p. 205. 77 hend or kill the rebel. The nationalist, however, found a group of sympathetic Ulema who declared void the fetva of the Shaikhul Islam because, according to the interpretation of the Ulema, he was not a free agent, Constantinople being under foreign occupation.

The nationalists forces fought the Greeks for sixteen months (May 1919 to September 1922); during this period Soviet

Russia became one of the main foreign sources to supply arms 159 and cash to the nationalists, A well-placed Turkish source has provided exact figures on the Soviet aid to the national­ ists during their struggle for independence. The Bolsheviks, 160 according to the Turkish source, provided the nationalists

159 Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, p. 73. Ac­ cording to Louis Fischer, a well-known writer on Soviet Affairs, Kemal offered to the Soviets a treaty of military and poli­ tical alliance. In a letter of April 26, 1920, Kemal is said to have offered his readiness to make a common effort with the Bolsheviks against the imperialists who threatened both countries. Such an alliance, Fischer believes, would have re­ quired the Red Army to fight against the Greeks in Asia Minor. This and some polticàl considerations, the historian explains^ obliged Moscow to reject Kernel's offer of military alliance. On the subject of direct military aid to the national­ ists, Louis Fischer, received only a vague comment from Kara- khan who said to the author, "we helped Kemal with much cannon, money, arms, and military advice." Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs; A History of relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, 1917-1929. New York;Vintage, I960, pp. 286-87. For another view of the relations between Soviet Rus­ sia and the Turkish nationalists see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. 1917-1923. (Vol. III). New York;Macmillan, 1961, pp 229 ff., especially pp. 244-250.

160 General All Fuat Cebesoy, commander of the West­ ern forces of the Turkish revolutionaries in Anatolia, and first ambassador of the Turkish Republic to Soviet Russia, disclosed, for the first time in 1958, the above data in an interview with Dr. Ivar Spector. 78 with the following materiel:

ten million gold rubles, thirty thousand Russian rifles with one thousand rounds of ammunition for each rifle, thirty thousand bayonets, from two hundred fifty to three hundred machine guns with ten thousand cartridges for each gun, some cavalry swords, from twenty to twenty-five mountain cannons, and a large number of hand grenades. I6l

The Bolsheviks also deposited in Berlin one million

Russian rubles to the credit of the nationalists. With this money the nationalists were able to obtain spare parts and 162 replacements for German weapons then in use.

Before starting their struggle against the Greeks, the nationalists reached agreements , first with the French and

later with the Italians. for the evacuation of their res­ pective troops from Anatolia. The military and diplomatic

success of the nationalists encouraged Kemal to demand the

evacuation of all troops from Anatolia and Thrace up to the

Maritza River, including the Straits and Istanbul. At this

point (October 1922) an Anglo-Turkish war seemed imminent;

the nationalists and the British faced each other at Chanak-

kale on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles. The British

government appealed to its allies and to the Dominions for military help. The allies, France and Italy, refused; and

from among the dominions only Australia and New Zealand of­

fered some help. Under these circumstances Lloyd George’s

161 Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World— 1917-1958. Seattle;Universitv of Washington Press, pTTE. 162 Ibid. 79 government considered it prudent to seek peace with the na- 163 tionalists of Turkey. Kemal appointed Ismet Inonu, Commander-

in-Chief of the Western Armies, to head the nationalists de­

legation to the peace negotiations. Formally, the national­

ists* struggle ended with the signing of the Treaty of 164 Lausanne in 1923. From the above discussion it is evident that the Turk­

ish military saved the nation from losing its independence.

Traditionally, the military enjoyed à high respect in Turk­

ish society; these political and military victories further

increased its prestige. Unlike his predecessors who could not

or would not make basic changes in the social, political and

administrative institutions of the state, Kemal made a good

use of his popularity to eliminate some ancient religio-

political institutions which he thought had been responsible

for the backwardness of the Turks. On November 1, 1922, he

asked for and received the Grand Assembly’s approval for the

abolition of the Sultanate. It was by no means an easy job;

some of his associates and supporter were vehemently opposed

to Kemal’s resolution in the Assembly. However, as FitesfdSttt

163 Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, pp. 74-75. Lloyd George’s decision to accept the nationalists demand split the British cabinet and the prime minister had to re­ sign. It may be noted, parenthetically, that George was the second British statesman who suffered politically from Kemal’s military campaigns. Earlier, Churchill had to resign because of the debacle at Gallipoli. See Allan Moorehead, Gallipoli. 164 Text of the treaty may be found in several books; a convenient source is Hurewitz, Op. cit.. p. 119. 80 of the National Assembly and Commander-in-Chief of the Turk­ ish forces, Mustafa Kemal managed to elicit sufficient sup­ port to get the motion through the Assembly, According to his own account of the struggle in the Assembly, the motion to abolish the Sultanate was signed by "more than eighty com­ rades" and opposed by two deputies. Those opposed to the 165 motion were Colonel Selaheddin and Zia Hurshid.

In his speech before the Committee charged with the task of studying the motion for the abolition of the Sul­ tanate, Kemal said:

Gentlemen, neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule oter the Turkish na­ tion and to maintain their rule more than six centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against the usurpers, puts them in' their right place and actually carries on

165 In June 1926 Zia Hurshid was arrested, tried and convicted by a special court,and executed for being an ac­ complice in a plot to kill President Kemal Ataturk. The dis­ covery of the plot brought about arrests of scores of high- ranking military and civilian officials, including Kiazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad, Refet, and Colonel Arif--all heroesof the Revolution and former comrades-in-arm of Kemal. Colonel Arif was found guilty and executed; the generals were acquit- ed. Among the civilians arrested were 25 deputies; a former governor of Ankara, Adbulkadir; a former minister, Shukru; a former Union and Progress party boss, Kara Kemal; and two well-known leaders of the Union and Progress, Dr. Nazim and Javid. Shukru, Abdulkadir and eleven others were condemned to death; eight were sentenced to various periods of imprison­ ment and exile; Kara Kemal committed suicide; Dr. Nazim and Javid were committed for a subsequent trial at Ankara, At the Ankara trial both were found guilty and executed. Kinross, Op. cit., pp. 483-93. 81

their sovereignty. This is an actual fact.,,./Tt would be better for all concerned to recognize the accomplish­ ed fact, he warned^y Conversely, the reality will never­ theless be manifested in the necessary form, but in that event it is possible that some heads will be cut off. 166 Under the circumstances who could ignore such a warning? The

Grand Assembly adopted the motion by acclamation; only one

"nay" was heard. Within the fortnight, following the aboli­ tion of the Sultanate, Sultan Wahideddin boarded a British man-o-war and left Constantinople to live under the British protection.

In spite of his popularity, Kemal did not feel strong enough to abolish the Caliphate simultaneously with the Sul­ tanate, It took him another two years to undermine and abo­ lish this ancient religious institution. During this period he took steps to increase his influence among the people in the villages and towns. He took an intensive trip throughout the country and endeavored to explain the aims of the new government in Ankara, On December 7, 1922, Mustafa Kemal an­ nounced his intentions of forming a new party "on democratic 167 basis under the name of ’People's Party.’" On October 29,

1923, the Grand Assembly took another historic step by declar- 168 ing the country a republic and finally on March 3, 1924, it 169 abolished the Caliphate.

166 Ibid.. p. 578. l67 Ibid.. p. 598.

168 Article 40 of the 1923 Constitution placed the military under the Grand National Assembly and its represen- 82 As a young army officer, Kemal had secretly partici­ pated in political activities and had organized party-cells among military units. But after the 1908 revolution he open- 170 ly opposed the army’s involvement in partisan politics and 171 resigned from the Society of Union and Progress. After abo­ lishing the Sultanate and declaring Turkey a republic, Kemal actively sought to disengage the military from politics. In

1920 a large number (one sixth) of deputies were army of- 172 ficers. In informal conversations, Kemal expressed to his army colleagues his expectation that the military ought to be above politics. On one such occasion, he is reported to have said, "Army, you also, like me, will remain neutral; you will not intervene in the struggle of these two parties 173 /_the People’s and the Liberal Republican/.’’ On October 31,

1924 Kemal asked the military officers in the Grand National

Assembly to choose between their military careers and poli­ tics. A group of pro-Kemal officers resigned their legisla-

tative, the President of the Republic.

169 Some leading figures opposed this move; among them were; Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Adnan Adivar.

170 Kinross, Op. cit.. pp. 34-48.

171 Robinson, The First Turkish Republic. p. 20.

172 Rustow, "The Army.,.Turkish Republic," p. 550.

173 Frey, "Arms and Men.. .Politics,’’ p. 4. 83 tive seats but several important generals refused to comply with Kemal's wishes. Such heroes of the revolution as Kara­ bekir, Ali Fuat and Cafer Tayyar not only did not resign as deputies but also requested active military commands in ad- 174 dition to their duties as deputies. In November 1924, the 175 Chief of General Staff was excluded from the cabinet. Thus

in his effort to creat an apolitical military force, Kemal completed the break with the past.

Henceforth the Turkish military contributed only in­ directly towards the country’s socio-political development; after the Republic-was proclaimed in 1923, the control of the 176 state remained in the hands of the civilian authorities.

However, some examples may be cited to show the extent of

174 All of them were given command posts; however, they resigned from the People’s Party and founded the Prog­ ressive Republican Party,

175 Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares,’’ p. 20. 176 This does not mean that the military had com­ pletely disassociated itself from political activities. As the following data will indicate, men of military background continued to hold important offices in the Republic, Military men held one-sixth of parliamentary seats in 1920; one- eighth in 1943; and one-twentieth in 1950. All presidents, with the exception of Celal Bayar, have been former military officers. Military men have been prime ministers for about twenty years and have held other important cabinet posts since the republic was established. Military men held 32 per cent of top leadership in parliament in 1923-27; 29 per cent in 1927-31; 31 per cent in 1931-35; and 28 per cent in 1935-39. For a comparison between the military’s position and that of other professions see Frey, 0£. cit., p. 8. èk the military’s indirect contribution towards development.

In making major economic decisions ’’consideration of nation- 177 al security remained a constant subtheme." Military needs

also gave impetus to building a steel mill at Karabuk, a 178 179 railroad link from the east to the west, a sugar mill, and

a large cloth factory.

Between 1923 and 1946, Turkey remained under the con- 180 trol of a single party, the People’s Republican Party; in

1946 political parties were allowed to reorganize and to per­

form their normal functions— political parties had been sus- 181 pended during World War II. As far as the military was con­

cerned it diligently followed the path set for it by Kemal

Ataturk; it remained a neutral force in the country’s poli­

tics. The civilian supremacy of over twenty years, a scholar

points out, divested the military of its traditional role as

the instigator of social and political change in Turkey.

"The military hierarchy froze and went into suspended anima­

tion; the civilian hierarchy opened up and led the way to 182 innovation." The civilians continued to play this role more

177 Eren, Op. cit.. p. 230. 178 Toynbee, Op. cit.. p. 233

179 Eren, Loc, cit. 180 The word "republican" was added on November 1Ô, 192ii!.

181 Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 196O-I96I. Washington:Brookings Institution, 1963, p. 6.

182 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit.. p. 29. 85 or less for another fourteen years and during this time they started to lose their appeal to the intellectuals, techni­ cians, innovators and entrepreneurs.

As the civilian administration was becoming a closed society (with clique values more important than ability and achievement in pushing men ahead) , opportunities in the military establishment were increasingly becoming available to men of ability regardless of their origin, family, party, or age. The array’s dynamism was not match­ ed by the civilian sector. This tended to make the army’s programs dysfunctional; its satisfactions turned into frustrations. 183 It seems that within a short period, some time between

1950 and 1956, the civilian leadership lost its dynamism and allowed the military to surpass the civilian sector both in technology and in attracting more innovators than the mili­ tary. Some of the reasons for the military’s more rapid ad­ vancement will be discussed in the next chapter; suffice it to say that the frustrations of the military, the deteriorat­ ing economic conditions of the country, and the Menderes Gov­ ernment’s repressive measures against the opposition party, newspapers, university professors and students, forced the 184 military to take over political control of the country.

In may I960, the economic and political situation of the country had deteriorated to the point where tension erupt­ ed in street violence which could not be contained by civilian

183 Ibid.. p. 41.

184 For a comprehensive analysis see Weiker, Op. cit. 86 police. Despite traditional restrains on the military, they found it necessary to intervene at this point by arresting members of the cabinet, the President of the Republic and the Democratic members of the National Assembly. The military moved quickly to restore law and order and ostensibly began an endeavor to place the country back on the "six pillars" of Kemalism: secularism, nationalsim, republicanism, popul­

ism, etatism, and reformism.

Commenting on the difficult choice which faced the military officers before staging the coup in May I960, Rustow remarks :

Their professional training and their Kemalist tradi­ tion demanded obedience to civilian authority. But their civilian superiors were gradually undermining the ethos of the Ataturk reforms, violating the constitution which the soldiers were duty-bound to uphold— and were using the army as a tool in that enterprise. Gursel’s parting advice to the army in April I960 echoed Ataturk’s precept of military abstention from politics. But in fact the army by then had no choice. If it ebajrédbthèaopdért issu­ ing from Menderes, it would be in politics on his behalf; if it refused, it would be even more deeply in politics against him. Choosing the second alternative as the les­ ser evil, it could invoke the peroration of the Six-Day Speech in which Ataturk justified his fight against the Sultan*s government..., 185 Before discussing further the reforms instituted by

the military, a brief comment is in order on the social com­

position of the junta. 6f the 38 members of the Committee

which became the care-taker government, five were generals.

185 Rustow, "The Military," p. 370. 87 eight colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, two captains, three navy captains, one lientenant-commander, one naval lieutenant and one gendarmery captain. Most of these officers held important posts both at the headquarters and in the field. Some of them had been attaches in Turkey’s missions abroad. In addition to their shared experiences in the armed services, most of the members of the NUC had a not dissimilar pre-military background. A very few of the group came from Izmir, Ankara, or Istanbul; the vast majority were from towns or villages. ’’Several were sons of military men, most were from artisan or lower-middle-class families. All 186 were poor...."

One scholar surmises:

Perhaps because of their origins, but more likely be­ cause of their frequent and close contacts with villages and villagers, military officers experienced first-hand the wide chasm that existed and widened between the vil­ lage peasant and the educated, urbane, and sophisticated modern Turk of Ankara and Istanbul. Their societies were centuries apart. Turkish officers in leading of foreign cultures and the modern world and in seeing these for themselves in their foreign assignments were shocked and impatient when they contemplated conditions at home.^

It was fortunate for Turkey that the leadership of the coup remained in the hands of those who magnanimously interpreted the Kemalist traditions and principles which could

186 Sydney N. Fisher, editor. The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics. - Columbus’TOhio State University Press, 1963, pp. 30-31.

187 Ibid.. p. 31. 88 be invoked in support of authoritarian programs. Soon after the take-over of the country by the National Unity Committee

NUC, it became evident that serious differences existed bet­ ween its members on the question of the course of the revolu­ tion. The Committee became politically divided into two groups; one led by Colonel Alparslan Turkes and the other by General 188 Cemal Madanoglu. Colonel Turkes and his group of fourteen officers "were more socialistic than the others and more in­ sistent upon moving ahead rapidly without waiting for all the niceties of democratic action. They were agreed that the NUC should remain in power over an extended period until all re- 189 forms were accomplished."

The other group, under General Madanoglu, was finnly committed to the policy of an early restoration of a parlia­ mentary government in the country, and to disengage the mili­ tary, as soon as possible, from domestic politics. In the final show-down the group led by Turkes was removed from the governing body on November 13, I960. General Gursel, chair­ man of the NUC, announced that 14 of the 38-member Committee

188 In 1944, Colonel Turkes (then Captain) was tried for his alleged activities in the Pan-Turanist movement. He was convicted and sentenced. After servinf for a year or so, he was acquited and allowed to join his unit. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," The Middle East Journal. Fall, 1964, p. 62.

189 Fisher, Op. cit. , p. 34. s

89 had been dropped because of their political activities which 190 tended to "endanger the high interests of the country."A few months later, due to the NUC’s disagreement with the Air 191 Force, General Madanoglu, also, resigned from the Committee.

Although the junta had staged the coup with the soten-

sible intention of "restoring" constitutional government and

of protecting the basic rights of the citizens, it, like its

predecessor, did not hesitate to use its power to eliminate

its opponents. In August I960, the NUC forced into retire­

ment some 5,000 military officers as part of a "rejuvenation"

of the Turkish armed forces; in September it purged 14 mem­

bers of the Committee; in October, the Committee dismissed

147 university professors; and on October 14, it opened the 192 trial of 400 leaders of the Democratic party. And again dur­

ing the presidential election some leaders told Professor

Ali Fuad Bashgil, a rival candidate of army’s nominee. General

Gursel, that candidate Bashgil’s safety could not be guarante­

ed if he contested the election. The professor left "hurried- 193 ly for Istanbul."

The-National Union Committee appointed a 17-man cabinet

of professionals to study special problems in the fields of

economics, finance, foreign affairs, administration, indus-

190 Fisher, Loc. cit. 191 Weiker, 0£. cit.. p. 137.

192 Ibid.. p. 23. 193 "Fresh Start in Turkey?’’, Economist. (June 30, 1962) p. 1321. 90 tries, education, and health. In June I960, the cabinet in­ formed the NUC that there were fifteen major issues which re­ quired the urgent attention of the government. The issues listed were:

(1) establishing a planning board for investment; (2) reviewing investments which had not yet been implemented ; (3) fiscal reforms without raising taxes; (4) floating a •freedom* loan; (5) transferring the International Coope­ ration Bureau from the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Finance; (6) preparing the formula for taking declara­ tion of wealth of NUC and Cabinet members; (7) inserting into the Constitution a provision to deal with problems of afforestation on a non-partisan basis; (8) placing in the Constitution measures strictly prohibiting the ex­ ploitation of religion; (9) assuring that there be no re­ duction in newspaper circulation; (10) improving efforts of the Ministry of Monopolies for the import of coffee; (11) reviewing anew the decisions to build a second steel mill and other major projects; (12) easing the prohibition on Turks leaving the country; (13) allowing resumption of property transfer except for property belonging to per­ sons arrested by the NUC or to their families; (14) eas­ ing conditions of financial transactions by private citi­ zens; (15) speeding up consideration by the NUC of pro­ posed laws. 194 Some of the reforms recommended were inserted in the new constitution. But. one is constrained to conclude that the Committee did not take full advantage of the favorable political atmosphere to implement desirable reforms; these when left to the politicians, became targets of partisan at­ tacks and subject to compromises. The leaders of the coup concentrated their energies on getting a new constitution perhaps in the hope that it would prevent the misuse of power

194 Weiker, Op. cit.. pp. 21-22. 91 by future governments and would provide impetus to rapid in­

dustrialization through the establishment of a State Planning

Organization.

To draft a new constitution, the NUC appointed a spe­

cial committee comprising mainly university professors. Sid-

dik Sami Onar, Istanbul University Rector and professor of

Administrative-jLaw, was named chairman of the constitution

committee. Before the constitution committee started its de­

liberations, General Gursel, chairman NUC, announced that

the new constitution would seek to remedy some of the weak­

nesses of the previous constitution which were alleged to

have been exploited by the Menderes Government to keep itself

in power.

It is perhaps too early to assess objectively the

value of all the reforms undertaken by the NUC as the "care­

taker" government of Turkey for seventeen months--May 27,

i960 to October 1$, 1961. However, for our purpose, an

analysis of the new constitution should provide some degree

of understanding of the course the military junta has set

for Turkey. This analysis should indicate further the degree

of success the junta has had in promoting conditions which

would render future military intervention unnecessary. In

considering the provisions of the new constitution attention

will be focused on its relevant and salient features.

The new constitution provides a modified system of 92 checks and balances and a bicameral legislature (Article 195 63). The chairman and members of the NUC, and the former

Presidents of the Republic are ex officio members of the

Senate of the Republic (Article 70). The same article forbids the ex officio Senator from joining a political party.

Although the 165-member Senate does not have a wide * range of powers, the participation of the members of the NUC has given the armed forces a channel of communication for sounding off their opinions. In other words, while ensuring that the military will remain aloof from the political life of the country (Articles 68 and 70), the constitution has, to a limited extent, recognized the military’s interest in the political affairs of the Republic.

The National Assembly, lower house, though deprived of some of the powers it enjoyed under the previous consti­ tution, is still a very powerful branch of the government.

Unlike the Senate, the Assembly is elected on a system of proportional representation. This method eliminates the pos­ sibility of any one party possessing an overwhelming majority, as had been the case during the Democratic government.

The constitution has also strengthened the independence of the judiciary whose powers had been curtailed by the pre­ vious administration. The judiciary has been given the power

195 Turkish Constitution, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Turkish Press Attache, mimeograph^, 48pp, * i.e,, those whose names were listed under law 157, dated December 13, I960. 93 to review the constitutionality of laws and by-laws enacted by the Grand National Assembly (Article 147). The previous constitution had vested all powers with the Grand National

Assembly whose authority was supreme and unconteatable.

The Menderes government iiad, during its ten years tenure, encouraged religious practices with the view of win­ ning popular support among the rural population. Recongniz- ing the extent and depth of religious feelings in rural Turkey, the makers of the new constitution apparently considered it necessary to establish an office of religious affairs (Article

154) for strict governmental control. Article 153 reaffirms the constitutionality of religious reforms that were under­ taken during Ataturk's tenure of office.

In addition to some of the reform clauses discussed above, the NUC insisted upon the inclusion in the new con­ stitution of a clause for the establishment of a state plan­ ning organization. Article 129 established the State Plan­ ning Organization; it has been given the responsibility,

a) to assist the government in determining economic and social objectives and policies through full-scale collec­ tion and evaluation of data on all types of natural, human, and economic resources and potential in the coun­ try; b) to make recommendations to and act in consultative capacity with ministries to secure the coordination of economic policies; c) to prepare long and short terra plans concerning the organization and functioning of government offices to assure successful execution of plans; e) sic/ to follow up the implementation of the plan, evaluate it, and make revisions where necessary; f) to propose measures which will encourage and regulate the activities of priv­ ate sector in harmony with the goals and objectives of the plan.

196 Eren, Op. cit.. p. 139. 94 It should be noted here that the State Planning Organization was first established by the care-taker government on Septem­ ber 30, i960. A year later, the constitution gave permanency to the organization.

In closing the discussion of the new constitution, it should be pointed out that it contains fairly long sections on fundamental human rights. The new constitution, in contrast to the previous one, enumerates the previously unstated free­ doms of the citizen. Every Turk now has the right of equality before the law, immunity from unusual punishment, the privacy of the domicile, the inviolability of the person, freedom of communication, freedom of travel and residence, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, the freedom to learn, teach, 197 and publish information concerning the sciences and the arts, 198 and the freedom of association.

Descriptive Characteristics. In 1926, the Turkish mili­ tary forces were 700,000 strong and used up about 40 per cent of the national budget. Between 1930 and 1938, the military strength remained at the 1926 level but its expenditure was reduced to 28 per cent of the national budget. At the begin­ ning of the Second World War, Turkey mobilized and increased the strength of the military to 800,000; its defense budget jumped to 46 per cent of the national budget. A year later.

197 Turkish Constitution. Articles 10 to 21. 198 Ibid., Article 29. 95 in 1940, the per centage of the defense budget increased to

56 of the national budget. Turkey continued to spend more than half of its national budget on its military requirements during the war. In 1946, Turkey’s defense budget was brought 199 down to 33 per cent of the national budget; a further reduc­ tion of seven per cent was made over the years before level- 200 ing off at about 25 per cent of the national budget. The fol­ lowing figures show the annual national, defense, education, public works, and health budgets of Turkey since the 1954-

55 fiscal year (March-February), The amount is shown in Turk­ ish pounds. Nine Turkish pounds equal one U.S. dollar, (fc TOGO)

Year National Defense Education Pub works Health

1954-55 2,238,000 600,000 267,611 75,624 129,826 1955*56 2,940,000 725,100 356,556 116,400 151,415 1956-57 3,325,000 785,000 425,833 207,714 155,895 1957-58 4 ,095,645 1 ,047,070 507,531 242,734 189,549 1958-59 5,567,612 964,745 n.a n.a. n.a. 1959-60 6,247,603 1 ,146,173 613,006 394,232 252,240 1960-61 7 ,281,700 1 ,238,172 934,199 478,676 352,012 1961-62 8 ,678,700 2 ,113,900 1 ,298,400 435,800 393,000 1962-63 10,114,861 2,555,864 1,448,108 397,292 445,230 1963-64 12 ,102,000 3 ,000,000 (estimated) 201

199 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit.. p. 27.

200 S.H. Steinburg, editor, Statesman’s Year Book, 1963-64. New York:St. Martin’s Press, 1963, pp. 1494-1507.

201 Figures computed from relevant year-books on the Middle East by the Europa Publications, London. 96 It is difficult to get exact figures on the strength of the Turkish military forces; estimates vary from 350,000 to over 600,000. The U.S. Department of Defense gives an es- 202 timated strength of 400,000. According to another source, the 203 strength of Turkish forces is 500,000.

The Turkish army is divided into more than 20 infantry divisions. Militarily, the country is divided into three 204 armies and several subordinate corps areas. The Turkish array contains sixteen infantry, six armoured and three cavalry units; the land forces are divided into six army and nine array corps regions; the army units are largely equipped with

10.5cm howitzer guns. The cavalry units are equipped with 205 modern arms and are partly motorized.

Turkey’s navy is comparatively small. The personnel strength is estimated to be 31,000 men and 1,400 officers.

The navy comprises nine destroyers, ten submarines, three escort mine sweepers, five small mine layers, sixteen coastal mine sweepers, twenty coastal crafts, two repair ships, a large training ship, a submarine rescue ship, four oilers, 206 four boom defense vessels, and three tenders.

202 The Military Assistance Institute, Department of Defense, Turkey. Washington, D.C.(n.d.)

203 Weiker, Op. cit.. p. 1. 204 Turkey. Loc.cit.

205 Steinburg, Op. cit.. pp. 1494-1507.

206 Ibid., 97 The strength of the Turkish Air Force is estimated to be 30,000 men and officers. It has twelve bomber squadrons, each equipped with twenty-five F-lOO super-Sabres ; three in­ terceptor squadrons equipped with Canadian-built Sabres, and a reconnaissance squadron of RF-84-F Thunderflash aircraft.

Some squadrons are equipped with F-104-G Starfighters and

Fiat G-91 reconnaissance fighters. The transport units are equipped with C-54's, twin-engined 0-45's and 0-47’s. The training types include T-33-A jet trainers, T-6 Texan inter- 207 mediate and T-34 Mentor primary trainers.

Social Composition and Basis for Recruitment. The re­

cruitment to the military services is based on educational and health qualifications. The officers usually come from urban centers where better educational facilities are readily available; the recruits generally come from rural areas where

educational facilities are less accessable. Ethnic minorities are allowed to join the military forces; and in 1955 several 208 women cadets were admitted to the War Academy. The Turkish

Army operates its own secondary school system; most of the graduates from these schools are recruited as officers in the 209 array.

207 Ibid.. pp. 1461-1473. 208 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit., p. 34.

209 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New Nations, An Essay in Comparative Analysis. Chicago; TEe University o?^Chicago"?ress, 1964, p. 62. 98

Turkey has a universal conscript system under which every able-bodied man serves in the military for a period of one 210 and a half years; between I50,OOOamd 175,000 are inducted in the armed forces annually.

Level of Modernization. The level of modernization and performace of the Turkish military is fairly high; it has been highly praised for its effective role in the Korean

Conflict, The Turkish military successfully protected the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity agàint the

German threat during the Second World War and against the

Russian threat of encroachment at the end of hostilities in

1945. Qualified Americans contend that Turkey perhaps posses­ ses the most effective land force in Continental non-Soviet 211 Europe; it maintains the third biggest army in the non-Cora- 212 munist world.

External Aid. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Turkish forces have had training groups from many nations; French, German, Austrian, English, and Swedish,

After the revolt of the Young Turks, the Turkish military was primarily trained by the Germans. EVen before the 1908

210 Rustow, ’’The Military,” p. 385. The period of military duty was five years in the middle of the 19th cen­ tury; three years between 1942 and 1950; and two years from 1950 to 1955.

211 Robinson, Op. cit. , p. vil.

212 The Middle East. 1961. Europa Publication, p.336. 99 revolution, German influence was quite apparent, but there were also English instructors, especially in the navy. As allies ifi the First World War, the Turks received some mili­ tary aid from the Germans but the extent of it eould not be ascertained. During the nationalists’ struggle, the Russians 213 sent small amount of military supplies. In 1932, the Soviet

Union loaned Turkey eight million dollars for industrial de­ velopment; Britain loaned a sum of three million pounds ster- 214 ling in 1937 and sixteen million pounds in 1938. On October

19, 1939, Turkey signed the Treaty of Alliance with Great

Britain and France; it was to be valid for fifteen years and was accompanied by a financial agreement, according to which

Britain and France granted Turkey a credit of & 25,000,000 for the purchase of war materials, a loan of L 15,000,000 in gold, and an additional credit of L 3,500,000 to liquidate 215 British and French ’’frozen” commercial assets. From the begin­ ning of the Second World War in 1939 to 1956, the Turco-Soviet relations oscillated between ’’cool” and "hostile.” In July

1957, Turkey accepted a Soviet 5-year 10-million dollar cre­ dit for the construction of a glass-sheet factory and a caus-

213 Robinson, Op. cit.. p. 73. For details see page 77 above, especially Toot notes number 159 and l60.

214 Lewis, Turkey, pp. 112-113.

215 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs. IthacarCornell University Press, 1^62, pp. 1J7^8. 100 tic-soda plant. Since then more loan and trade agreements have been negotiated between the two countries,

U.S. Aid Program. Turkey became a recipient of U.S. lend-lease program on December 3, 1941. During the war, Turkey received a small quantity of military aid but soon after the cessation of hostilities in 1945, it began to receive large amounts under the Truman Doctrine proclaimed in 1947. From fiscal year 1946 through fiscal year 1964, Turkey has receiv­ ed about four billion dollars in U.S. military and economic 216 aid, and in loans. Of this approximately $2.5 billion has been in military aid. The military grants were $68.8 million in 1946-48; $235.9 million in 1949-52; $151.8 million in

1953; $238.2 million in 1954; $182.8 million in 1955; $191.3 million in 1956; $152.4 million in 1957; $249.4 million in 1958; $201.6 million in 1959; $100.5 million in I960; $85.9 217 million in 1961; and $156.4 million in 1962,

Training Programs and Career Policies. During the period when the Turkish military hierarchy "froze and went into suspended animation" its officers corps had developed a

"Prussian-like caste" system in the armed forces. The mili­ tary establishment had no personnel policy; rarely were men

216.ixw Agency for lux International xiioei liftuxuiietx Development, uevexupmeiio FY , r19 i 64 xyuxf OperationsLons Report. (Da(Data as of March 31, 1964) WasHington,D.C. , ?64, p p . 2, 5, and 8.

217 Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1,'1945-June )C) ,1962 , Sevised, Washington, D.C., April 24, l9o3, p. 23. 101 assigned to tasks on the basis of ability, "All high-school

and college graduates, other than members of certain ethnic minority groups, could become officers without difficulty, 218 but enlisted men, regardless of proven ability, could not."

These were the conditions in the Turkish military establish­

ment in 1948. The political changes in the country and the

arrival of American military aid awakened the leaders to the

need for drastic changes in the military. Turkish military

leaders soon came to realize the importance of modernizing

the forces if they were to meet the foreign challenges. The

technical level of the Turkish array was so poor that, for

example, within two years of receiving U.S. military aid,

eighty per cent of the trucks had become unusable. It took 219 another two years before necessary repairs could be made.

The Turkish armed forces call between 150,000 and

175,000 draftees annually. They are given a 7-week basic

literacy course in the country’s sixteen specially construct- 220 ed array education centers. The draftees are given lessons

in reading, writing, arithmetic, measurement, and elementary

social studies. This program of secular education by the

military has resulted in the general acceptance of secular

education by the villagers who even a few years ago resisted

218 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit., p. 29.

219 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 220 This program was started with U.S. cooperation in 102 221 the spread of non-religious education.

During 1948-52, some important changes took place in the personnel and in the general policies of the Turkish military establishment. Some of these were : a reduction in the strength of the military from 700,000 to 400,000; the 222 establishment of several service training schools; an in­ creased number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers were being sent abroad for training; duties were being assign­ ed on the basis of qualifications; personnel offices were attached to each major unit headquarter; a year’s troop duty became a prerequisite to admission to the Military Academy; qualified non-commissioned officers could become commissioned officers; soldiers were not being used as personal servants by officers; the enlisted men were enjoying much improved 223 living conditions.

Estimate of Effectiveness. For its role in the creat­ ion of the State Planning Board, it might be construed that the military has been indirectly responsible for the econo­ mic development of the country. In the field of education,

the military has played a direct and a successful rble in

1958. Frank K. Sloan, "The Role of tlje Military in Develop­ ment,’’ in William K. Polk, editor. Developmental Revolution. North Africa. Middle East, South Asia. Washington, D.C;Middle Eaat Institute, 1963, p. 111.

221 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit.. pp. 35-36.

222 Training schools in the fields of electronics. 103 the expansion of training and educational facilities. During the last sixteen years, the various military schools have turned out over four million technicians who, after complet­ ing their military obligations, have been absorbed in the private sector of the economy. In addition, the military makes good use of its raan-power to spread literacy among vil­ lagers. Officer cadets are assigned on literacy programs Jn the villages; and in lieu of their military duty, high school graduates are assigned to rural schools as civilian teachers.

In 1962, a thousand reserve officers and 15,000 high school 224 graduates were sent on educational assignments.

In the field of road-building, the military's contri­ bution has been considerable. A strategic highway was built from Iskenderum to Erzurum in the late 1940’s. Several other roads were built primarily for the use of the military.

Military factories in Turkey have been producing spare- 225 parts and tools for the civilian economy; in this way, too, the Turkish military has been quite effective. Above all, the military has been very successful in increasing social mobi-

ordnance and gunnery, signals, medicine, motor-transportation, army engineering, pilot training, radio communications, aero­ nautical mechanics, meterology, anti-aircraft defense, mine sweeping, submarine, and highway equipment,

223 Ibid.. pp. 32-33. 224 Sloan, Op. cit.. p. 115.

225 Lerner and Robinson, Op. cit.. p. 37. 104 lity in the society. Military officers and men get a chance to meet their country-men from other parts of Turkey; they come to know each other and become aware of each other's feelings and points of view about social and political prob­ lems of their country. 105

Those who have grasped the purpose of the Revolution will always be able to safeguard it. — Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 106

CHAPTER III

THE ANALYSIS

The Hypothesis. The ultimate success of a military re­ volution depends on the ability and willingness of the mem­ bers of the military establishment to promote the rise of effective civilian institutions which will render future military intervention unnecessary.

The Indices. What kind of relationship has the mili­ tary forged with the civilian government? Is the military supreme, subordinate, or equal to the civilian government?

Are political parties allowed to perform their legitimate functions? Is there is workable multi-party system which al­ lows peaceful means for effecting changes in government po­ licies? Has the military establishment taken steps to create or to strengthen an efficient and public-oriented bureau­ cracy? Has steps been taken for achieving sustained economic growth which would enlarge and strengthen the middle class?

Has the military contributed to the achievement of national cohesion and a sense of national identity?

Interpretation and Conclusions. Before the above in­ dices are applied to three Turkish military revolutions, it may be helpful to recapitulate what has been discussed above.

Historically, the Turkish military has always had great in­

fluence on both the internal and external policies of the 107 Ottoman Empire. The military establishment was a basic com­ ponent of the Ottoman hierarchy; it was an important part of the Ruling Institution that also included the ruling dy­ nasty, the court, and the administrative machinery. The Sul­ tan, as head of the Ruling Institution and of the Muslim In­ stitution, maintained control over the two arms of the gov­ ernment.

Up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, the

Ottoman society appears to be stable and showed self-confi­ dence in its military and other achievements. The people seemed content and lived in concord with, according td their traditional belief, the Divine arrangement of social order.

It was believed that God created every particle of social or­ der for a specific purpose, therefore, every individual should remain as God willed. Conservatism was the logical out come of such a belief.

The Turks tended to equate the higher military strength with a superior culture. The uninterepted Turkish military victories had inflated the ego of the Turk to the point that he considered his enemy "inferior" in all fields of human en­ deavor. And as long as the Ottoman Empire continued to ex­ pand there was no reason to think otherwise. They Turks were convinced that they had nothing to learn from the out side world, especially not from the Christian West.

This inflated pride and the false sense of superiority seem to have shaken after the second unsuccessful Ottoman 108 * seige of Vienna in 1683. Henceforth the Ottoman Empire not only ceased to expand but also started to lose territory.

Military defeats forced the Ottoman statesmen to indulge in agonizing self-appraisals. Reluctantly, they admitted the military superiority of the West but they were still not ready to acknowledge the superiority of the social and political systems of the West. The Ottoman rulers came to the mistaken conclusion that the Turkish military weaknesses could be cured by merely borrowing military and technical knowledge from the

West, They failed to realize the importance of the attitude of the people towards their rulers and vise-versa. Albeit, the Ottoman Sultans initiated military reforms based on the experiences of the West in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

As long as the borrowing of knowledge remained con­ fined to military techniques there was littlè opposition from either the Ulema or any other organized institution in the

Empire, However, it soon became apparent that the adoption of Western military techniques would bring in new ideas that would effect adversly the vested interests of some important segments of the civil-military hierarchy. The creation of a

* For a recent study of the historical event and its consequences see John Stoye, The Seige of Vienna, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19637 109 new military elite was construed, both by the Ulema and the

Janissaries, as a threat to their respective traditional privileges and influence in the society. No sooner had a Sul­ tan shown interest in introducing changes in the training and educational programs of the military establishment a power coalition of the Ulema and the Janissaries obliged him to postpone the implementation of reforms. The Sultans, power­ ful though they were, could not manage to continue their re­ forms till one element of the opposition--the Janissaries were destroyed in 1026. The destruction of the Janissaries left t the Ulema alone to fight against innovation and change.

In spite of the opposition of the Ulema, the Sultans succeeded in introducing new ideas both in the military and civilian spheres. These changes had far reaching effects on the social order. It split the society into two divergent groups; one a product of secular and scientific education and another a product of religious and traditional education.

It created a deep intellectual chasm in the once "conform­ ist" society. Even today the Turkish nation is "split" bet­ ween the so-called the extreme left and the extreme right, inheritors of the nineteenth century modernists and tradi­ tionalists. In the ensuing struggle betwmen the traditionalists and the modernists, the military played a decisive role in tipping the scale in favor of the modernists. It is true that 110 not all military leaders were or are progressive in their

political beliefs. Nevertheless, a large majority was and

has been wedded to the idea of progress and modernization.

By their active support to progressive forces, the military

leaders have been providing the essential thrust to the forces

of progress at critical moments in the history of moderniza­

tion in Turkey.

Between 1826 and 18?6 the Ottoman military leaders

gave their individual support to the forces of progress in

the country; there was hardly any organized political acti­

vity in the military establishment. However, soon after the

suspension of the short-lived Constitution in 1878, many

secret societies were formed by military officials who wanted

to establish constitutional regime based on secular principles,

These secret societies continued their underground activities

till 1908 when the military succeeded in forcing the Sultan

to restore the Constitution. It was the first major military

intervention since the Janissaries were destroyed in 1826.

For almost eighty years the military establishment re­

mained dormant in the political affairs of the country. But

since 1908 it has staged three major coups and has brought

about significant and basic changes in the social fabric. The

ostensible aim of each coup was to end the existing auto­

cratic regime and to restore the constitutional rights of

the people. The first military coup. 1908, achieved its stat­

ed purpose of restoring the constitution but the military Ill junta itself degenerated into a dictatorship. The triumvirate which ruled the country for ten years eliminated opposition by violence or by the threat of violence; it discouraged political activities; it manimulated elections; its economic policies proved unsuccessful; ànd it involved the Empire in a disasterous war that stripped her of all her possessions and nearly enslaved the nation to the victors.

In spite of all the political and military blunders committed by the leaders of the 1908 revolution, it may be suggested that the revolution accomplished more than it has been credited for by its critics. The revolution of 1908 usher­ ed in the era of nationalism in Turkey; it gave the Turks a sense of national identity— something the Turks had not known before. For the first time in history, the Turks became aware of their separate identity— a,n identity based not on religion but on territory, language and common aspirations.

The revolution of 1908, when compared w& Ataturk*s re­ volution, might be considered a probing action by a relative­ ly progressive force into the domain of the conservative. It sofetened the hold of, and to a considerable extent dislodged from their secure position, the forces of reaction in the country. This probing action made is easier for Mustafa Kemal to launch a devastating frontal attack against the enemy of progress. In the final analysis, it was Mustafa Kemal*s coup that brought about fundamental social and political changes 112 and set the country on the path to modernization* Being awarer of the intellectual chasm that existed in the society, Kemal resolutely went forward to remove, what he believed,to-be, the main divisive factors in the society. He abolished the

Sultanate and Caliphate in the name of the people--for the first time, in Turkish history the people became aware of their power in deciding their own poltical destinies. The tradition­ ally accepted idea that sovereignty belonged to God and to

His vice-regent, the Sultan?Caliph, was rejected and replaced by the concept of "democracy." Every citizen, the constitution declared, has equal rights before the law; there would be no privileged groups in the society, such as existed under the

Ottoman system of government.

Ataturk*s revolution secularized the educational system; it reformed the language; it introduced new civil codes; and it abolished all religious courts and religious orders. Realizing the dangers inherent in a civil-military coalition, Ataturk made concerted efforts to disengage the military from politics and to place the latter firmly under the civilian rule. Kemal soon discovered that it was easier to inspire military colleagues to join hands in a common struggle against the corrupt regime of the Sultan than to convince them to make a choice between the military and the political career. In this struggle Kemal was vehemently op­ posed by some of his earliest and closest conrades-in-arm.

However, his determined efforts prevailed; slowly byt surely, he coerced the military to accept a "subordinate" role in the political affairs of the state. Judging from its overall 113 effects on the society, the Keraalist revolution ought to be considered a success. The reforms it instituted would have made future military intervention unnecessary. But when some of these reforms were discarded the military's intervention became inevitable.

From the Aime of his death in 1938 to the beginning of 1950*s, Kemal successors adhered faithfully to his poli­ tical testament. On its part, the military establishment ac­ cepted gracefully its "subordinate" role as long as the civi­ lian authority did not deviate sharply from the six 'funda­ mental and unchanging principles' enunciated by Kemal Ataturk; republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and revolutionism.

Soon after coming into power in 1950, the Democratic administration of Adnan Menderes began to disregard and vio­ late some of the 'fundamental and unchanging principles' of

Kemal Ataturk. The exploitation of religion for political purposes had been declared a criminal act since the Kemal- ist revolution. The Menderes regime*disregarded the existing law and began to show more interest in religious affairs in the hope of maintaining and strengthening its political hold in the rural areas. It allocated public funds to build hun­ dreds of new mosques and made religious education part of the regular curriculum in public schools. In the same vein, the

Menderes administration disregarded other well-established principles and went ahead with leaking new laws that would 114 place restrictions on the press, the universities, and the opposition parties. Under a law passed in 1953, judges were

forced to retire after 25-year of service, opening many judge­

ships for political appointees. A year later the government acquired the right to oust civil servants without giving them the right to appeal. On more thanone occasion, the Democratic administra­ tion unsuccessfully tried to involve the military in domestic political affairs. It were these circumstances, to mention

only relevant ones, that obliged the military to overthrow the civilian government on May 27, I960. The military leaders had become convinced that the Menderes administration was

responsible for causing irreparable losses to the country's prestige and to its military, economic and political assets.

The Military establishment still considered itself as the

righful inheritor and the gardian of Ataturk*s revolution.

And as such its leaders believed it to be their .duty to put

the country back on ’the right path*— that is the path set

by Ataturk.

How successful was the revolution of I960? It is sub­ mitted that in terms of its long-range effects, the coup achieved limited success. It has failed to remove the major

causes that obliged the military to intervene in the civilian

affair. It by no means discouraged the military from taking

active interest in the political affairs of the country. Al­

though the new constitution forbids military personnel from 115 political activities (Articles 6# and 70), it also provides for military "representation" in the Senate, Can the military be considered separate from or subordinate to civilian autho­ rity? It is neither. The military seems to be equal to civi­ lian authority, at least in as much as major decisions are concerned.

The National Unity Committee allowed political parties, except for the defunct Democratic Party, to resume their legi- 226 timate activities within the NUC-prescribed limits. As the price for permission to participate in the election campaign, all political parties had to accept the restrictions imposed by the Declaration. For the alleged violation of the code of election campaign, the NUC detained several workers of the 227 Justice Party, the "successor" to the Democratic Party. One is constrained to conclude that, notwithstanding the existence of a multi-party system, the NUC did not guarantee peaceful means of effecting changes in government policies. That the military would not allow political bargaining by the parties was made clear by General Cevdet Sunay, Chief of General Staff, in 1961. (In the I96I elections no political party had suffi­ cient votes to form a government. It was, therefore, neces-

226 These limits were enunciated in the National Decla­ ration published on September 6 and 17, 1961. For a discus­ sion of the Declaration see Weiker, Gp. cit.. pp. 105-08.

227 Ibid. 116 -sary to form a coalition government.) Realizing that the Jus­ tice Party was reluctant to cooperate with the Republican Party, j General Sunay is alleged to have indicated "the possibility of the array’s reassuming its authority if the politicians could not resolve their feuds and allay their personal ambi- 228 tions." (It may be noted that General Sunay has since been elected President of the Republic. He succeeded the ailing

General Gursel).

The other indices show that the military did take positive steps to create conditions for sustained economic growth, and for a stronger and enlarged middle class. The establishment of the State Planning Organization was one of the most important steps in this direction. The NUC also ini­ tiated tax and agricultural reforms designed to increase re- 229 venue and productivity of the country.

Finally, did the military revolution of I960 have any discernable effect on the efficiency of the bureaucracy and on the people’s sense of national identity? Useful as thgy might generally be in evaluating the success of a military coup. these two indices could not be applied with much suc­ cess in the case of the Turkish military revolution of I960.

The reason is that Turkey has had a long tradition of public

228 Fisher, The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics, p. 37.

229 Weiker, Op.;cit., p. 153. 117 service which was reorganized and modified during the previous military revolutions. It is therefore difficult to say what the i960 revolution achieved in this sphere. Theoretically, at least, the I96O revolution has made the civil'servant more 230 secure in his job. Similarly, it may be suggested that the i960 revolution had little effect on the people’s sense of national identity; national consciousness was forged mainly under the regimes of the Young Turks and Ataturk. It is sub­ mitted that although the I960 revolution succeeded in insti­ tuting some necessary reforms, it cannot be considered a suc­ cess because it broke the growing tradition of "apolitical" nature of the military. In other words, whatever success the military have had it was achieved by sacrifying a cardinal principle.

230 Article 118. 118

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