z A displaced family from arrive at Fyash Kabour border crossing, northern | Photo credit: Nils Henrik © credit: | Photo northern Iraq crossing, border Kabour Fyash at Sinjar arrive from family A displaced

Demographics of the IDP crisis in Iraqi Report by Peter Henderson with the support of the Rise Foundation

Demographics of the IDP crisis in

31 August 2014

Peter Henderson * [email protected]

i Syrian Refugees

As a result of the conflict in Syria, the of Iraq (KRI) currently has around 217,192 Syrian refugees, 63.36% of whom are from al-Hassakah province in Syria’s northeast, with large number also from Aleppo province. At present, 56.79% of the refugees live in urban areas, and 43.21% are resident in camps, with Domiz camp in Dohuk governorate being the largest (UNHCR, 15 July 2014). Most of the refugees are ethnic which has aided their adjustment to life in the KRI, although many speak rather than Kurdish as their primary language as a result of former Syrian educational policies. Syrian refugees are permitted to work in the KRI, and many work for lower wages than local people. 97.06% of Syrian refugees in Iraq are in Kurdish controlled or partly Kurdish controlled areas: Syrian refugees locations in Iraq:

The Iraqi IDP Crisis

The current IDP crisis in Iraq, which has affected up to 1.5 million people, began with the expansion of radical Sunni groups in al-Anbar province at the start of the year (1), a result both of spillover from the Syrian conflict and from previous instability and anti- federal government animosities in the region. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, later the Islamic State or IS), a faction active in the Syrian conflict but with its origins in the anti-occupation insurgency and resistance to the Shi‘a led federal government, emerged as the leading forces within the radical Sunni alliance and gradually solidified its control, on occasion acting against local Sunni leaderships across its regions of control. In June the organization and allied factions, including former Ba’athist Sunni Arab nationalists, took control of large parts of Ninawa province including the capital, , as well as large parts of Salah al-Din, Diyala and provinces (2) – that is, much of Sunni Arab Iraq; with the Iraqi military being unsuccessful in attempts to retake areas. In July IS announced the imposition of a jizya tax on Christians in Mosul, resulting in the majority fleeing to Kurdish areas (3). In August IS forces attacked areas held by Kurdish forces, taking most of the al-Hamidania region of the Ninawa Plains 1 region of Ninawa province, Tel Kaif, and the Sinjar region in the west of Ninawa, as well as southern areas of governorate including Makhmur and Gwer (4). At present IS forces have been pushed back to the borders of the three Kurdish governorates, but remain in control of other areas.

The total number of displaced families as of 2014/8/18 is estimated at 1,310,610 people across Iraq (IOM, 21 August 2014). The number rose significantly (by almost 50%) in June 2014. Most IDPs are from the Ninawa, Salah al-Din and al-Anbar provinces. IDPs are staying in a variety of accommodation types; the average monthly household expenditure in the KRI is 2,557,352 IQD against 1,380,700 IQD in other areas of Iraq (FSC Humanitarian Needs Overview (draft), 25 August 2014), making the situation for IDPs in Kurdistan who are living off their savings even more difficult.

1 The al-Anbar IDPs the Christian town of , around 50,000 people, fled to Erbil following mortar strikes against the town by either An estimated 473,940 individuals (78,990 IS forces or by Arab Sunni tribes linked to families) have been displaced from al- IS. Following consolidation of Anbar province. Most are Sunni Arabs, control in the town and assurances of their although a much smaller number are safety by Kurdish military and Church minority groups such as Christians. authorities, most returned to Qaraqosh. 2 Generally speaking, Christian and Kurdish IDPs were able to enter the KRI IDPs from IS’s fairly easily under rules that prioritised expansion in northern residency for those with family links to the Iraq, June 2014 region; others, especially Shi’i Turkmen, found it harder to enter. An IDP camp was established on the Erbil/Ninawa border People from minority groups formed a large at Khazir to hold IDPs who were unable to proportion of the IDPs in June (a number enter the KRI. of Sunni IDPs were present in Mosul 3 but most returned to Mosul soon after; their primary fear was not IS rule but Christian IDPs from the prospect of IS/Iraqi federal forces Mosul, July 2014 conflict and aerial bombardment by the Iraqi air force). These included Shi’i Turkmen, from Tel Afar and other regions Following years of instability and sectarian (many of whom, more than 10,000, intimidation, the Christian population of have been flown to , and Mosul had shrunk, due to former Mosul for resettlement in Shi’i areas), Christians leaving to Kurdish areas and to Shabaks, Kaka’is, Yezidis, and Christians. other countries, to around 10,000 people. Notably, almost the entire population of Following IS’s declaration that they were 2 either to pay the jizya, convert to Islam regions of Syria as well as in the KRI. The or be killed, almost all left, many to the majority of the non-Sunni population of Ainkawa suburb of Erbil; many were al-Hamdania and Tel Kaif is thought to sheltered at the Syriac Orthodox church have fled,1 totalling very approximately of Umm al-Nur and with its congregation; 158,000 people plus a proportion of the others found shelter in the Christian 10,000 Christian IDPs from Mosul. IDPs at towns of al-Hamdania and Tel Kaif. The the Khazir camp were forced by fighting number of Christians left in Mosul is very to leave the area, with those who left low and is apparently mostly limited to going to Erbil city, the town of Khabat on those who were too old to travel. Many the Erbil-Mosul road, and other locations. arriving in Erbil reported that they had not been permitted to bring anything with them other than what they were wearing, with valuables, documents and other items being confiscated at IS checkpoints. 4 IDPs from Sinjar, the Ninawa Plains and other areas of IS/Kurdish conflict, August 2014

On August 2014 IS forces attacked Kurdish territory, in the south of at Makhmur and Gwer among other areas, and at Kurdish controlled regions such as at Peshmerga checkpoints on the Erbil-Mosul road where clashes took place around 25km from Erbil city, at the Mosul Dam north of Mosul city, and the Sinjar, al-Hamdania, and Tel Kaif districts of Ninawa province. This resulted in very large numbers of IDPs: on August 3, 1 This based on approximate population 31,146 Yezidi and 2,965 Christian families figures for the main towns in al-Hamdania were displaced. Around 21,156 Yezidi and Tel Kaif (the rural areas being predo- families are seeking refuge in minantly inhabited by Sunnis): Qaraqosh/ Baghdida 50,000; Batella 30,000; Bashiqa governorate, and 4,650 families are on the (unknown), Karamles 10,000; Tel Kaif town Duhok/Ninawa border (IOM, 21 August 40,000; al-Qosh 10,000; Tel Isqof 6,000; Sha- 2014). The higher figure of Yezidi IDPs is rafia 1,000. reported at around 200,000 people, some of whom have sought refuge in the Kurdish 3 Syrian refugees locations in Iraq:

Fully/partly Kurdish controlled areas:

In total 35.55% of the Kurdish controlled and partly controlled area’s IDPs are Dohuk governorate, 21.89% in Erbil Governorate, and 14% in governorate. IDP Accommodation

32% of IDPs live with host families, 20% rent accommodation. Other forms of accommodation include religious buildings, abandoned public buildings, school buildings and camps. Of those displaced in August 2014, 26% are staying in religious buildings, 22% with the host community, 21% in abandoned public buildings, 17% in school buildings, 7% in camps, 4% in rented houses and 1% in hotels and motels (IOM 21 August 2014). 4 Minority IDPs in the KRI

The KRI had hosted a large number of minority IDPs from other parts of Iraq before the current crisis, especially Iraqi Christians who left Baghdad, and Mosul among other places. This augmented the existing Christian population within Kurdistan, and resulted in the expansion of the Ainkawa suburb. In the current crisis, it is difficult to find data that disaggregates IDPs by ethnic or religious affiliation, as most relief organisations do not collect such information. However, it is possible to estimate the rough proportions of minority IDPs in the KRI through reference to the situation in their home provinces and al-Anbarthe position of IS towards minority groups.

The majority of people in province are Sunni Arabs. There was a very small number of non- Sunnis including Christians, some of whom are now in Erbil. In the 2009 provincial elections the main winners were Sunni Islamist and Sunni-led secular parties Generally though, the IDPs from al-Anbar cannot be expected to be members of Salahminority al-Din groups.

’s population are also primarily Sunni Arab, with a number of Kurdish and Turkmen (both Shi’i and Sunni). In the provincial elections of 2009, the Iraqi Turkoman Front took 4.9% of the votes, and the Kurdish bloc took 4.5%. Salah al-Din is the home province of a large number of the IDPs in Kurdistan, who we can reasonably expect to be mainly Kurds and a smaller number of (Shi’i) Turkmen, on the grounds that Arabs, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, would mostly have relocated to safer Arab regions of Iraq to the south of Salah al-Din. Most IDPs from Salah al-Din are in Kurdish controlled or partly Kurdish controlled areas, but this could reflect that non-Kurdish Sunnis have in many Diyalacases chosen not to leave their homes.

Province has a mixed population, with 43% being Shi‘i Arab, 29% being Sunni Arab, 26% being Kurdish, and 2% being Turkmen (both Sunni and Shi‘i) in 2003. In the 2009 elections Sunni Islamist parties took 15 of 29 seats in the provincial election with the rest being taken by Shi‘i, Kurdish and secular parties; the Kurdish bloc took 15% of the vote. Most of Diyala’s IDPs are displaced within the province with a smaller number in in the KRI. We can expect that the IDPs from Diyala would Kirkukbe primarily Kurdish with a smaller number of Shi‘i Turkmen.

’s population in 1997 was recorded as being 72% Arab, 21% Kurdish and 7% Turkmen (the 1997 census, like the 1977 census only permitted people to register as Arabs, Kurds or Turkmens and did not collect data on sectarian affiliation; Christians were recorded as being Arabs) (Anderson 2009, p43). This figure reflected a demographic switch between a majority Kurdish population to a majority Arab one between 1957 and 1997. Kirkuk has produced a relatively small number of IDPs with most finding shelter inside the province; this presumably reflects Kirkuk’s Kurds and Shi‘i Turkmen staying the Kurdish controlled parts of Kirkuk province.

5 Ninawa

province has long been home to many of Iraq’s minority groups. The Ninawa Plains area, including al-Hamdania, Tel-Kaif and Shaikhan, is traditionally home to many of Iraq’s Christians as well as Yezidis, Shabaks, Kaka’is, Turkmens and others. Tel Afar, west of Mosul, was historically a Shi‘i Turkmen town with large numbers of Sunni Turkmen living close by. The Mount Sinjar area near the Syrian border is a centre for Yezidis, with numbers of Christians and Turkmen also present. All these areas are also home to numbers of Sunni Arabs, and Mosul is primarily Sunni Arab. In the December 2005 provincial elections, Sunni-based parties took 57% of the votes, in the 2009 provincial elections they took 55.1% of the votes (although a number of Christians voted for the larger of the Sunni-based parties, al-Hadbaa’, in 2009).

2 Of Ninawa’s 78,626 IDP families (around 432,443 people or 13.22% of Ninawa’s population), most (54,046 families, 68.74%) are in Kurdish controlled or partly Kurdish controlled areas. Another 24,158 families (30.73%) have left to Iraq’s southern, Shi‘a majority provinces, mainly Najaf (9,555 families) and Kerbala (8,224 families). This reflects the departure of many of Ninawa’s Shi‘i Turkmen and Shabaks and is unlikely to be significantly reversed, with many of the Shi‘i Turkmen now in the south expressing a desire to stay there. Some 36,775 families (46.77%) from Ninawa are in Duhok, most can be assumed to be Yezidis (from Sinjar) or Christians (from Tel Kaif or Mosul), with some Turkmen and Kurds. Of the 4,289 families from Ninawa in Erbil governorate, many will be Christian with some Yezidis, Shabaks and Kaka’is, as most IDPs in Erbil come from al-Hamdania, which has larger proportions of Christians than Yezidis. Since in the most recent provincial election, 44.9% of voters chose non-Sunni parties, we can of expect that almost all of Ninawa’s IDPs, as noted above roughly 13.22% of the province’s3 population, would be Kurds or members of minority groups. As the Kurdish areas Ninawa, such as district, have been least affected by the conflict it is fair to assume that the vast majority of Ninawa IDPs are from minority groups.

Total Minority IDPs in the KRI

A very rough and unscientific estimate of the total numbers of minority IDPs in the KRI is 314,704.5 individuals or 57,219 families. This is the total number of IDPs for Ninawa, Diyala and Kirkuk provinces currently resident in Kurdish controlled or partly Kurdish controlled provinces, but excluding the IDPs from al-Anbar on the grounds that the vast majority of them are Sunni Arabs, and the IDPs from Salah al-Din as a way to discount the numbers of Kurdish and Arab IDPs present in the KRI. As around 1,550,000 (4.96%) are members of groups other than the Shi‘i Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds, this represents some 20% of Iraq’s minorities and 54.45% of the IDPs in the KRI. This is obviously an extremely rough estimate which is based on supposition and extrapolation, but it gives an idea of the scale of minority displacement in Iraq at present. Assuming an average of 5.5 individuals per family.

2 Kurdish meaning Sunni Kurds, and not including groups such as the Yezidis and Shabaks who are sometimes considered Kurds. 3

6 Return or Resettlement?

At this stage it is not possible to say when the areas from which the IDPs fled will be safe for them again. A focus by Kurdish forces on strategic areas has left many other places, which were home to large numbers of the IDPs, under IS control. In addition to this, many IDPs express a belief that returning would never be safe, a perspective that results from a history of persecution even before the arrival of IS. This feeling seems to be evenly spread among the different minority communities. There are reports that IS is attempting to resettle formerly Kaka’i areas with Sunnis, which would make returning difficult (UNHCR, 31 August 2014).Furthermore, many Christian IDPs report that while they were forced out by IS, and although their valuables and documents were taken by IS forces, local Sunni Arabs – their former neighbours – took the lead in emptying their houses of all their other possessions. The little trust there was before no longer exists. While most feel safe in the KRI at present, many would require a lot of reassurance from the Kurdish authorities that they will continue to be welcome in the future. Many Christians and Turkmens already emigrated, leaving those who remain very aware of the possibilities of starting new lives elsewhere.

Sources

UNHCR Registration Trends for Syrian Persons of Concern, 15 July 2014

IOM: Displacement Tracking Matrix – Interim Report – 21 August 2014

Food Security Cluster (FSC) Humanitarian Needs Overview (first draft), 25 August 2014

Anderson, Liam D.; Stansfield, Gareth R. V. (2009), Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise, University of Pennsylvania Press.

UNHCR Protection Cluster Iraq: Minority Rights and Displacement (draft), 31 August 2014

7 Demographics of the IDP crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan

31 August 2014