A Thesis Submitted in Partial Satisfaction of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND URBAN POVERTY:

THE CASE OF TEHRAN, 1962-1978

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

Geography

Zahra Homa Mosleh

January 1983 The, Thesis of Zahra Homa Mosleh is approved:

Robert Hof fpau fr\

I-Shou Wang {7

Warren Bland, Thesis Chairman

California State University, Northridge

ii To My Family

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor Warren Bland for his continual interest and guidance during the course of this work. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Robert Hoffpauir and Professor I-Shou Wang who contributed many insightful suggestions and criticism on this study.

I am also indebted to, and wish to thank, Ali Kiani and Mable Mossman for the contribution of their time, assistance and moral support. My very sincere gratitude is extended to my entire family, especially my father, Professor Javad Mosleh, and my mother, Aghdas, for their constant encouragement and support, and my husband, Farhad Rostamian, whose patience and understanding helped me to pursue my studies.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION • • • iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS • e • • • • • • • • iv

LIST OF TABLES • • 0 • • . . . . vii LIST OF FIGURES viii ABSTRACT ix Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION • • • • 0 • • • • 1

Purpose and Scope • o e • • • • • • • 3

Justification . . o e • $ • o • • 4

Data • • • • • • • 0 • 0 • • • 4 Methodology ...... 5 Organization of Thesis • 5

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN • 7

Origin and Early Development Until 1900 • • • • • • • • 7 Development of the City from 1900 to the Late 1950's ••• 14 Tehran on the Eve of The White Revolution, 1962 • • • • • • 18 III. MIGRATION TO TEHRAN 22

The Role of Push and Pu~l Factors in Rural-Urban Migration 22

Village Life Pre-1962 25

Land Reform Program of 1962 30

The Lure of Tehran • • • • 40

IV. URBAN POVERTY AND THE HOUSING CRISIS TO 1978 • • • • • • • • . . . . 48 Squatter Settlements and Urban Slums, Physical and Locational Aspects 50 Socio-Economic Characteristics of Slums and Squatter Settlements • 57 Government Role in .. Solving Problem" 63

v. CONCLUSION 69

NOTES o • e • • • ~ • G o • • 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY 84

vi LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Number and Size of Village, 1966 • • .. . . 26 2. Land Ownership Before the Land Reform Program 28 3. Number of Households Affected by the Second Stage of Iranian Land Reform 35

4. Average Annual Wages from Different Industrial Activities in Iran, Central Province and other Provinces • • • 42

5. Opportunities for Male Employment in Urban Areas of Central Province and Other Provinces for Age Groups Over 10 years, 1972 •••••• 43 6. Distribution of Male Employment in Different Economic Activities in Rural and Urban Areas, 1972 • 44 7. Length of Establishment of Squatter Settlement Units in Tehran by Area 55 8. Occupations of Male Squatter Heads of Households in Tehran, 1972 • • • • 60 9. Occupations of Nonsquatter Migrants in. Tehran ...... 61

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. General Location Map ...... 2 2. Population Growth in Tehran, 1790-1990 • • • • • • • • • • 12 3. Tehran: Various Stages of Tehran's Growth and the Direction of Its Development • • • • • • • • • • 20 4. Size and Distribution of Squatter Settlements in Tehran, 1972 • • • • • 52 5. Magnitude and Direction of Low Income Groups Migrating from Various Provinces to Tehran 58 6. Tehran: Divisions of Residential Pattern of the City of Tehran, Based on Stratification of Residents According to Income . . . . 65

viii ABSTRACT

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND URBAN POVERTY:

THE CASE OF TEHRAN, 1962-1978

Zahra Homa Mos1eh

Master of Arts in Geography

This study focuses on the popu1ation growth of Tehran,

the capita1 of Iran, as it re1ates to the rura1-urban

migration during the past two decades. It investigates

the causes and effects of the migration by attempting to

answer such questions as who the poor migrants are, where

they came from, why they migrated, and what became of

them after migration.

In order to understand the socio-economic conditions

and the prob1ems of contemporary urban 1ife in Tehran, a

background is presented of the historica1 processes which

have contributed to the current situation.

The causes of migration are studied by ana1yzing the

socia1 and economic forces that have pushed the rura1

' ' ix population out of -their villages (push factors), and those which have attracted them to the cities in general, and

Tehran in particular, (pull factors).

It is argued that the deterioration which the Land

Reform Program of 1962 brought about in the socio economic structure of the villages fostered the prime push factor. The implementation of the Program not only de stroyed the old system of production, but it failed to establish a new working system. The resulting increased hardship, poverty, and lack of security constitut~d the basic push factor. On the other hand, hope for better living conditions and more employment opportunities in

Tehran were found to be the main pull factors for the migration.

Finally, it is shown how the rural-urban migration has affected the city of Tehran and the lives of the migrants themselves. The creation of squatter settlements brought social problems for the migrants which, in turn, has had a vast and serious socio-economic impact on the city of Tehran. The Shah's government did attempt to im prove these problems, but it failed because of lack of planning, and inadequate efforts.

X CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Tehran is the largest and one of the fastest growing cities in Iran. As the capital city, it is the political and economic focus of the life of the entire country.

The city of Tehran is situated at the eastern end of a fertile agricultural area that is located on an alluvial plain between two of the south-facing valleys of the central Alburz Mountains. The Karaj Valley lies to the west and Jajurd Valley to the East (Fig. 1). The area of the city is about 109 square miles, with an average alti tude of 4,000 feet above sea 1eve1.1

Tehran has grown rapidly, partly.due to its geographical location at the hub of major communication links with

Europe and the Far East, but mainly because of its being .• the capital city. When Tehran became the capital in the late eighteenth century, it was a small trading center with a population of less than 25,000.2 With the subsequent expansion it has reached a population of approximately 5 million in 1982. Governmental administration has become the city's major function, but other urban-industrial activities have also grown rapidly in recent decades. The existence of

1 L.

Figure 1. Location of Tehran and other major urban centers of Iran.

/-.r-\__ U.S. S.R. , ....._,. ~ ~ -- . ( ·~:~:···~t;-tt~-~~·~-~\~~· j~-,J/

.. . \ DASHT I • DESERT / \., (\\ ( I.UT '-, ', \ ' ( ··:·:::::::::::::·:·:':·:·...... KE~MAN DESERT I !.... "<---.. '>i_ \- ...·.· . · .··:tt:::tt~::;,~ \ ,t ':,.. _\____ _ '~ - - \ I t't, PAKISTAN ' \,~_ )'\'\::t_ _..,., ...\ ~-_., =ttttt:::::::r:::rr:=t:=====,:=====·

SAUDI ARABIA

0 100 500 MILES

0 500 1000 KMS. Source: R. Khavidi, "Low-Income Public Housing and Neighborhood Planning and .Development in the City of Tehran, Iran." Dissertation. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, p. 37. 3

employment opportunities in the city, coupled with the economic hardship and poverty in Iran's rural areas, has resulted in a massive rural to urban migration ever since the country's dependency on western agriculture and indus tries began in the 1960's. This process accelerated dramatically in the 1970's. By 1980, Tehran had 40 percent of the country's urban population. As a consequence of the large population concentration in Tehran, the city was confronted with severe housing shortages, accompanied by residential segregation based on income. This segregation of socio-economic classes, housing shortages, and- the emergence of slum dwellers became typical features of

Tehran during the last two decades.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this study is to research the popula tion growth of Tehran, the significance of rural-urban migration to Tehran, and the migration's socio-economic impact on Tehran's urban structure between 1962 and 1979.

I will investigate the following issues:

1. What were the causes and effects of rural-urban migration during the past twq decades?

2. What were the effects of the Land Reform Program of 1962, and the resulting new economic situation, on village life? 4

3. What has happened to the migrants who settled in

Tehran, and what impacts did they have on the capital city?

4. Finally, what was the role of government in creating and coping with the drastic cultural and geogra phic changes in Iran and Tehran in the 1960's and 1970's.

Justification

Tehran, as the capital of Iran, has gained unique importance in the country as the center of power. In spite of this, little previous research has been done on the changing urban structure of the city. Some systematic studies provide geographical description, historical back ground, social patterns, and general information about the city. But the causes and effects of the migration, the burgeoning housing crisis in Tehran, and the role of the government in dealing with urban problems have not yet been given much attention. Therefore it is felt that more extensive research is needed to fill the existing void.

Data

The major source materials for this study were found in periodical articles, books, and other scholarly publica tions found in the ~ibraries of UCLA, USC, UCB, UCSB, and the Central Library of the City of Los Angeles. Further insights were obtained through the writer's correspondence with scholars including Farhad Kazemi at the University of 5

New York, and Nikki Keddie at UCLA. other assistance was obtained from Middle Eastern Studies Association in New York, Institute of Development Studies at the Univer sity of Sussex (Brighton, England), and Gruen Associates in Los Angeles. The other important sources are Persian materials translated by the writer.

Methodology The study includes elements of historical, cultural, and urban-economic geography. The genetic approach to historical geography was chosen because it offers the best basis for understanding the geographical processes which led Tehran·, step by step, to its present urban crisis. The topics analyzed such as rural-urban migration, village life, land reform, urban land use, urban-industrial growth, and urban flight, were they to be studied exclusively in the present, would clearly fall into the sub-fields of urban, economic, and cultural geography.

Qrqanization of Thesis The thesis is broken down into five Chapters. Follow ing the introduction, the historical development of Tehran, from its early stages until the Land Reform Program of· 1962, is covered in chapter two. The third chapter describes migration to Tehran and the important factors of that migration. Analysis of the socio-economic changes, urban 6

poverty, and the housing crisis in the city is dealt with in chapter four. The final chapter presents a summary and conclusion of the thesis. CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN

Origin and Early Development Until 1900

In the Persian legends very little is noted of the

origin, settlement, and early history of Tehran. It is known that for many years the site had included a small

and insignificant settlement near the ancient flourishing city of Rhaga (Ray).l

Yakut Hamavi, a ninth century A.D. geographer, men tioned Tehran as an insignificant village in the district

of the city of Ray, and a few miles from it. According

to the book of Ajaeb-al Boldan (The Incredible Things in

the Cities), the early inhabitants of this village lived

in underground dwellings. This could have been for pro

tection either from hot weather or enemy attack. For this

reason they always stored enough food to survive during dangerous times. This is the reason Tehran used to be

pronounced "Tah-ran", which, in the Persian language, has

a meaning explaining the residential behavior and defense

tactics of early inhabitants.

In the first half of the Fourteenth Century, Hamdullah

Mustaufi, the well-known geographer and historian, des

cribed Tehran as a medium size town with a better climate

7 8

than Ray. Its inhabitants were largely economically dependent on agriculture. Istakhri, another famous Muslim geographer in the Tenth Century, also described Tehran as an agricultural area with large gardens and numerous trees of different fruits. In fact, most early historical evi dence indicates that Tehran was an agricultu~al area serv ing the then more important city (Ray). The significance of Ray derived from its location on major communications routes including Khorrasan Highway, which linked east and west in Persia, as well as being on the "Silk Route" to

China, which for many centuries was important to the entire known world. In 330 B.C., Alexander the Great defeated the Achamenian King Darius III along the "Silk Route".

Thirty years later Ray was rebuilt by Se1eucid, Alexander's successor, and thereafter the city reached its full deve lopment and enjoyed relatively uninterrupted prosperity in the 11th and 12th Centuries. During the Mongol Invasion of 1220 A.D., Ray was so totally destroyed that it never fully recovered. Many of the surviving population moved toward the north to the village of Tehran and settled there permanently. It may not be true to say that Tehran's development gained momentum since that time, however it would be correct to say that it changed to a rival rather than remaining merely a rural adjunct to Ray. In July 1404,

Don Ruy Ganzales de Clavijo, the Ambassador of King

Henry III, probably the first European visitor to Tehran, 9

indicated that although the town was a delightful expanded place, it was still unwalled.· However, during the period of Shah Tahmasb I of the Safavids, a wall was built around

Tehran and the bazaar. In 1553 this defense complex in c.luded 114 towers, four gates. According to Laurence

Lockhart, under the Safavi Shahs (1501-1722), Tehran did not play an important role as it never became one of their favorite cities. 2 However, archaeological evidence from religious monuments belonging to the Fifteenth Century,

A.D., clearly show that the rapid expansion of Tehran be gan even before it attracted Shah Tahmasb's attention.3

Although it is true that Shah Abbas always avoided

Tehran as a result of getting ill there in 1587, it is clear also that under the Safavid Dynasty Tehran emerged to a to~ worthy of attention, for in 1627 the English visitor Sir Thomas Herbert wrote:

Tehran is situated in the midst of a large level or plain, and houses are of white bricks hardened by the sun. The city has about 3,000 houses, of which the Duke's and Bazaar are the fairest - yet neither were to be admired. The market is divided into two, some parts thereof (sic) open, and other part arched. A rivulet in two branches streams through the town, serving withal both groves and gardens ••.• 4 At this time the town's economy was based mainly on small scale trading and gardening, and its population may be estimated at 25,000 to 30,000. 5 Another Safavid king, 10

Shah Sultan Hussayn, was sufficiently impressed with Tehran to hold his Court there during the winter months of 1720-

1721. The city's progress was, however, slowed as a result of its occupation by the Afghans. In fact, by the early decades of the 18th Century, Afghan invasion, together with epidemics and famines, caused Tehran to enter a period of decline. Tehran's political importance can be traced back only to the period of Karim Khan Zand who, while maintaining his capital at Shiraz, ordered the construction of a pavi lion-in Shemiran (now northern Tehran), which had much cooler weather. It seems evident that this action initia ted the segregated housing pattern of the city, with the northern parts containing housing of a progressively higher class, as well as numerous summer residences.

In 1786 Tehran was chosen as the capital by the first king of the Qajar Dynasty Agha Mohammad. This choice could be considered a major step in the development of

Tehran. In 1797 the Gulistan Palace was constructed and the city walls and the Arg were repaired. However, as

Oliver, a French visitor, mentioned in his notes, only half of the city was built up, and its population was estimated at the low figure of 15,000 as late as summer of 1796.6

On the other hand, the population of the city was reported as approximately 50,000 in the winter of 1807 by the French

Ambassador General Gardanne.7 The considerable discrepancy 11 in population estimates is probably a result of the seasonal population changes during winter and summer.8

In the first decade of the 19th Century changes in the city were few and only a small number of public buildings were constructed. In 1811, Tehran was reported to have six gates, thirty mosques and schools, 300 public baths and one square (Maidan).

Further improvements were made during the reign of

Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834). In fact, in this period the city began to take on a new shape by adopting some Europ= ean characteristics. It was divided into the five dis tricts of Oud-Lajan and Chal-e-Maidan in the east, the

Commercial district of Bazaar in the south, the royal residence and Administrative Center of Arg in the north, and the Western Section of the city, known as Sangalaj.

There was also an additional area outside the city wall where 11 percent of the population resided.

In the mid-19th Century, the population. increased to more than 60,000, causing serious water shortages. As a result, several new qanats and a canal from the Karaj

River were constructed in the city for irrigation purposes.

The population of Tehran continued to increase steadily (Fig. 2). In 1884 under Nasir-ed-Din Shah (1848-

1896) the first census of Tehran took place. The total population was reported to be 155,736, of which 8,480 were categorized as military personne1.9 The population was 12

Fig. 2. Popu~ation Growth of Tehran, 1790-1990

I I 8000 I Actual I' ---- !"rejected I 7000 -VI I -c c: I 10 I 6000 VI I ::;:s. I 0 .s;;;; I +> I 5000 s:: I ..... I I - 4000 % I 0 I -t- I cC I 3000 -1 I :=> c.. 0

Q.. 200()

1000

__../ ------1790 1830 1870 1910 1950 1990 Y E A R

Source: M. Hemmassi, Migration in Iran: A Quan titative Approach, (Shiraz: Pahlavi University Publication, 1974), p. 50. 13

relatively uniform religiously: 98 percent were Muslim and the remaining 2 percent were Christians, Jews, and

Zoroastrians.

During the Nasir-ed-Din Shah's reign, (1848-1898) further population increases led to a rapid expansion of

Tehran and the development of new built-up areas$ The old wall was pulled down and a new octagonal-shaped wall with twelve gates, modeled on the Paris fortifications, replaced it. The gates, like Los Angeles freeways, were named with reference to the direction they faced or led to. For example, Shemiran gate opened toward the region of Shemi ran.lO In the same era, roads were constructed from Tehran to Qazvin and Qum and a five-mile railway connecting Tehran to Ray was completed. By the end of the 19th century, the city gained some European aspects, such as the major edu cation center known as Dar-Al-Fonum, shops with glass windows and titles in the European mode, and avenues planted with trees.

Further development focused in the north of the city within the new district of Dowlat, which was outside the boundaries of the old city. It had a better climate, and was settled initially by Europeans and high class Tehranis.

In summary, the later Qajar period can be looked upon as the beginning of the era of division of the city into modern and old residential quarters. At the same time, the richer families began to move toward the north to reside in 14

the northern suburban areas and villages of Tajrish, Gul- hak, Zargendeh, and Yusefabad, creating these rich communi- ties' fine residential areas. In contrast, the most crowded, densely populated, and poor residential areas of

Tehran remained around the Bazaar in the south.

Development of the City from 1900 to the late 1950's

Throughout the 19th Century, Iran was a feudal society with several tribal groups having relative autonomy, and their own local or provincial leaders. These leaders had to make considerable contributions to the central power, namely the Shah, in order to maintain their political in- fluence and provincial or tribal power. The draining of provincial resources into the capital led to the concentration of a considerable proportion of the national income within Tehran, which fostered further development there.

(The turn of the century, which was followed by the

Constitutional Revolution on August 5, 1906, led the city and the country as a whole toward westernization and in- dustrialization. Migration from provincial areas in creased and Tehran grew in importance.fl By the early

20th Century the city, with a population of 250,000,was clearly the political and intellectual center of the country. This situation continued later during the reign of Reza Shah, who was brought to power by the British in 15

February, 1921. The British gave the Shah their support in order to turn the country into a consumer society on the scale that Britain desired and thus make it a strong market for British exports. All power was centralized in the hands of the British-backed Reza Shah to protect the

' interests of British capital in Iran.

During the twenty years from 1925 to 1941 Reza Shah

Pahlavi built a strong, stable government that changed the face of Persia. The former feudal leaders were removed and the bourgeois class replaced them. During Reza Shah's reign, a rapid increase in the urbanization of the country occurred. Municipal works and road construction quickly changed the image of Tehran. The city walls were com- pletely demolished. A new network of broad avenues and streets, together with several administrative buildings, typified the striking physical changes of the city in this I period. L~oon government activities and administrative functions became the most crucial of the city's functions, thereby increasing the number of government employees and civil servants. Looking for new residential space, this expanding economic group gradually developed a new buildup area and in so doing pushed the center of the city northward. This, in turn, expanded the city boundaries in the direction of the numerous summer resorts at the foot of the Alburz, and overwhelmed the suburban villages, such as

Tajrish, Gulhak and Shemiran, previously separated from 16

the city. This northward shift of the center of gravity of the city left the Bazaar somewhat off center towards the south. Not surprisingly, such dramatic economic, social and physical changes created new problems. A large number of people migrated from other parts of the country, especi ally from the northwestern Province of Azarbaijan, to the city. There was thus a tremendous need for new housing in the city of Tehran, whose population by this time had reached nearly half a million. Although a few housing projects were undertaken by the government, they were in-· adequate because of lack of fundamental economic planning and lack of balance between demand for housing and ability to pay for it.

Mohammad Reza Shah came to power in 1941 during World

War II when Iran, like many other countries, suffered acute political and economic crises.12 More important was the crisis in urban life and in the social structure in Iranian cities, especially Tehran which has been the scene of many major disturbances since World War II. But the economic problems of the urban areas are inseparable from those of rural areas. It was easy to pay low wages to industrial workers who came to the city to escape the hopeless vil lages• low living standards and rural poverty. At the same time, agricultural poverty and backwardness was another obstacle to Iran's post war modernization. 17

Beginning in the period of the 1950's and for the next

two decades, the Shah, who was developing a growing in

terest in modernizing the economy of the country, brought

substantial westernization to Iranian society. He, like his father, but on a much larger scale, increased econo mic dependency on Western countries, especially the United States.13

This increasing dependency on the West was opposed by some Iranian nationalists as early as the 1950's. In 1951-

1953, a conflict with Great Britain over operation of

Iran's growing petroleum industry, led to nationalization of the Anglo-Irani~n Oil Company by Iran. The western orientation of the country was quickly restored when the

Shah dismissed Dr. Mosaddeg, his nationalist Prime Mini ster, and replaced him with an individual more compliant with the Shah's plans. Predictably, Anglo-Iranian Oil was restored to British ownership.

The victory of the Shah over the nationalists was

followed in the 1950's by rapid growth of the Shah's governmental apparatus. This had many implications for

Tehran. The growing bureaucracy itself provided much

additional public sector employment, while the increasing income of government workers supported growth of the city's service and industrial activities. Industrial employment, for instance, increased to fifteen times its 1932 base by

1956. 14 But some effects of the Shah's program were less 18

fortunate. Rapid urban growth and high inter-urban migra-

tion added to Tehran's labor force, but also worsened the

city's housing crisis.

Tehran on the Eve of The White Revolution, 1962

During the late 1950's, as a result of the Second

Development Plan (1956-1962), most Iranian industrial

development concentrated in Tehran. As Bayne indicated,

70 percent of non-oil industries in Iran were in the

city.lS Another estimate suggests that two-thirds of the

country's GNP exclusive of oil was produced in Tehran.16

Because of the concentration of different industries and

related service activities in the city, its primacy among

Iranian cities was well established.

Industrial concentration in Tehran was further re-

fleeted in the service sector. One of the noticeable

effects of Tehran's economic change at this time was the

decline of the bazaar, which had served the city as a link between many important commercial, social, religious, and

even political functions.

In 1960, the total area of the city was 150 square miles, of which 98 square miles were unoccupied.17 By

1960, the northward expansion of the city was increasingly

evident. Rapid development of new upper class residential

areas occurred on the northern margin, and seasonal migration of upper classes from the city to the northern resort 19

areas increased substantially. More middle class people tended to live in the northern parts, and left the lower classes living mainly in the south (Fig. 3).

In the early 1960's, investment in fabricating indus tries, such as consumer goods assembly, began in the city.

The growth of such industries was followed by the advent of what the Shah himself termed 11 The White Revolution, 11 a

20-year program of economic and social reform, with the stated aims of transforming the predominantly feudal country into an industrialized capitalist nation. The first six programs of the White Revolution included land reform, nationalization of forest land, .sale of state-owned industrial enterprises to private interests, workers' profit-sharing in industry, the vote for women, and the establishment of the Educational Corps. By 1977 another thirteen programs had been added, including the establish ment of a Health Corps, administrative reforms, and the formation of local houses of justice.18

The most important part of the White Revolution was the Land Reform Program. It was the principal means through which the state encouraged the capitalist trans formation of the countryside.l9 The weakening of the feudalism and the development of capitalist relations in the villages induced more landowners into urban and indus trial projects. Meanwhile, city-based manufacturing acquired cheap labor in great quantities, and continued to ..

Fig. 3. Tehran. Various stages of Tehran's growth and the direction of its development. .. " ... ~ ~ ...,...... : ·.. .. / ~ .. ~

'· ~ · ~~ ...... ' ··.

~- ~ - ! ~ ~ ... ~ ~ • .. "'

,/ .,/ ' :. , '\ ·.-:-: . nn:~ ;; •:p ... , ' .. ./...... _,.,..,._.,..,.,. ..,... .., ..... w.w, ~...,..""<.... ·-...... _--..:...V, "'~",...._, ...... _,,.,{ .. >.• ~

. -.·- --,...._,- . ~ ...... _-r-.....-- ...... ,:.-..... ~ .. ·-j,'S· ~ ..-- · ' . t ,., ;'i, ...... < "''7''"1··tv , " ...) • ~-·-r ~ .Il._....,...... ~· ·· ..· "' '· '· #- ...... ~ -- ...... l-~, -~ ... --

~ :

MIN . ~ TEHRAN ,. x· '· .. ... < HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ~ ~ " ' ~ .. ,, 0 2 3M

0 2 3 4 s 10KM . 4. ' Source: R. Khavidi, 1978, p. 87.

N 0 21

attract people from rural and low income areas.

Through the socio-economic changes in the countryside, the Land Reform Program became the principal force behind rural-urban migration. Since some of the characteristic features of the city of Tehran, such as segregation of socio-economic classes, housing shortages, and various other changes, are the result of rural-urban migration, in the next two chapters more insight into the process of migration and its effects on Tehran will be provided. CHAPTER III

MIGRATION TO TEHRAN

The Role of Push and Pull Factors in Rural-Urban Migration The recent rapid growth of urban population in most middle eastern countries is related to the problem of

"over-urbanization."! The main reason for the migration from rural areas to the cities appears to be the increasing economic pressure on the people in the countryside.

The rural migrants go to the major cities in search of employment and relief from misery. In other words, the rural-urban migration is primarily the consequence of their being pushed from the countryside rather than their being - drawn to the cities by the urban labor market.

However, one should not downplay the effect of the transitional process that is taking place in the economic structure of developing countries, namely the transition from agrarian to industrial society. In such a process, a significant proportion of the population is transferred to non-agricultural employment. Since major industrial activities are concentrated in and around cities, urban areas become centers for absorption of migrants who leave agriculture to acquire better paid employment in the industries. As the International Labor Organization (ILO)

22 23

reports, "The main push factor causing workers to leave

agriculture is the lower level of income."2

The report goes on to point out that the process of moving to the cities in search of better pay is not unique to the developing countries. In more advanced societies

labor also leaves the land. However, there the reason is

growth in agricultural efficiency rather than the decreas ing role of agriculture in the economic structure of less developed countrieso3

Philip Hauser suggests that being pushed out from rural areas, -"due to the low level of rural living or con dition of physical insecurity, " is the dominant factor be hind rural-urban migration in Asia and other less developed

areas of the world, whereas in economically advanced coun tries, the pull factor (represented by job opportunities

and higher levels of living) is the significant one.4 .

It is not the purpose of this study to analyze in detail the concept of over-urbanization. The main point

is that Iran, like other developing countries, is facing

problems created by over-urbanization. This chapter will concentrate on the causes of migration to the city of

Tehran.

The population of Tehran grew very rapidly during the

last decades. Research done by the Institute of Social

Study of Tehran University indicates that in 1964 the number of immigrants in Tehran was 4.3 million, while 24

this number in 1959 was reported as only 2.1 million.

During eight years the number of immigrants doubled.5

Statistical reports indicate that 45 percent of the immi grants went from smaller villages to cities, and 34 percent went from larger villages to the cities. Therefore, 79 percent of all immigrants in the cities, most notably the capital city, were from rural areas. As a result, whereas the average annual rate of growth for the total population of Iran for the Census period 1956-1966 was 2.8 percent, the growth rate for the capital city of Tehran for the same period was over 7 percent.6

People were attracted both from other cities and from agricultural areas. In general, the migrants to Tehran can be categorized into three groups. The first group is those who migrated from other cities. These people, on the average, enjoyed a good financial position in their cities. They are attracted to Tehran mainly because the city, as the center of administrative and financial power, offered them better services in various aspects of their lives. Improvement in status and position, better health, education and other services were among the attractions of

Tehran for the residents of most other cities, and se!ved as prime motives for migration to the capital city.

Those who came from smaller cities and towns of the country form the second group. These migrants had suffi cient capital or skills, which allowed them to maintain a 25

low middle class standard of living in Tehran. 7

The above two groups, normally, do not have major difficulties adjusting to the city. Therefore, this thesis is more concerned with the third group of migrants who were pushed to the capital city due to unfavorable socio economic factors in the villages, and have much more dif ficulty in not only adjusting to city life, but also in finding stable positions in the economic structure of the city.

This third group which migrated to Tehran in increas ingly large numbers left their villages either because they remained landless after the Shah's Land Reform Program, or because the deterioration of Iran's agriculture left them unable to effectively and economically use the land given to them by the· government. For them the "pull" factor of the city of Tehran was the chance to change occupations and perhaps increase their incomes.

Village Life Pre-1962

Until the 1960's, Iran was predominantly an agricul tural country. Nearly eighty percent of the population was dependent upon agriculture, and the country was an exporter of agricultural products. But agricultural production has gradually declined over the years as the agricultural sec tor, which comprised 33 percent of the Gross National

Product around 1960, declined to 23 percent by 1968 and 26

9.4 percent by 1976.8 Today Iran does not produce enough to feed itself,9 and in recent years has had to import large quantities of food.10 This is an important consequence of the Land Reform Program under which agricultural production became unprofitable.

The severe environmental conditions of much of Iran make agriculture difficult. Only 12 percent of the total land area of 165 million hactars is permanently cultivated.

Half of this cultivated land has to be left fallow each agricultural year because of the persistance of tradi- tiona! farming methods, while about 85 percent is useless because of aridity or rough terrain.ll

Iran has a rural population of 17 million living in

66,756 villages. There is a nomadic population of about two million who do not live in fixed settlements. Village size varies between a dozen people and 5,000 (Table 1).12

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND SIZE OF VILLAGE 1966

Size by Number of Percent of Total PoJ2!!1ation Villages All Villages PoEulation 50 or less Inhabitants 21,624 32.4 484,140 51-250 27,367 41.0 3,595,785 251-500 10,140 15.0 3,588,185 501-1000 5, 170 7.7 3,561,320 1000-2000 1,862 2.9 2,511,150 2000-5000 593 0.9 1,708,290 Total 66,756 100.0 15,448,870 Source: Khusrou Khusrov-i, Jam'ehshinasi-i rusta-i Ix:an, (Tehran: Tehran University, (1972}, p. 9. 27

Before the land reform of 1962-1963, the feudal mode of production was dominant in the Iranian villages ex cept for a very few mechanized farms·. The majority of the peasants were tenants on small pieces of land called . I nasqh which belonged to the absentee landlords. The land lords did not farm their property and usually resided in the cities forming what Nikki Keddie has called 11 Gity

Feudalism."13 In general, the institutional setting of

Iranian agriculture was composed of different classes.

The top class were the large traditional landowners

(Umdih-malik) consisting of the members of the royal family (Crown), high government officials and top mili tary officers (khalisih,_ or state), the leaders of pastoral tribes (Khans), the religious groups (Wag£).

Controlling about 55 percent of all cultivated land, this land-owning class was limited to several hundred families, some of whom are reputed to have owned.as many as three hundred villages (Table 2). The largest of all landowners was Reza Shah who appropriated about 2,100 villages in the

1930's.

The lower class included small owners who owned less than one-sixth of a village (dang). These small owners were classified into three groups.14 The first group was

.. rich peasants" who utilized hired labor and also parti- cipated in farmwork. This. group included the village headmen (Kadkhuda), and the bailiffs (mubashir). The 28

TABLE 2

Land Ownership Before The Land Reform Program

Type of % of All Number of % of Conversion Land Owned Villages Villages

Large Proprietors 56.0 13,569 34.43

Small Proprietors 10-12 16,522 41.93

Royal. Domain 10-13 812 2.06

Rel.igious Endowment l-2 713 1.81

Tribal Holdings 13.0

Public Domain 3-4 1,444 3.67 Other Holdings 6,346 16.10

Source: Fred Halliday, Iran Dictatorship and Development, (Middlesex, England: Harmonds Worth, 1979), p. 98.

' ,; 29

headmen and bailiffs. who substituted for the landlords whenever they were out of the village, were responsible for the daily administrative duties of the landlords.

The second group consisted of independent owners, who cultivated their own land with the help of family labor.

The third group included the masses of poor peasants dependent upon absentee landlords for their livelihood.

These peasants cultivated the land that belonged, for the most part, to the absentee landlords. The majority_of

Iranian peasants, about 10 million out of 15.9 million rural population, belonged to this poorest group.l5 There were, however, two distinct groups of poor peasants, that is, the share croppers, and the agricultural proletariat.

The extent of the contribution of the sharecropping peasants to the five usual factors of agricultural produc tion in Iran--land, water, labor, seed, and plow animals- determined their share in the final distribution of the harvest crops.l6 The distribution of the crops was done according to the traditional formula. Usually the land lord owned the land, water, animals, and seed, while the peasant provided the labor power. The crops were, there fore, divided so that four-fifths belonged to the land lord and one-fifth to the peasant.l7

The agricultural proletariat, who were landless laborers, were hired to help out with the heavy agricul tural work during the peak farming seasons, and could only 30

survive by this seasonal employment doing farmwork and

related tasks. They lived in very difficult conditions.

Locusts and clover were the main food supply in a few

areas, and a majority were diseased. If they did not get work as agricultural laborers, they were often forced to migrate, either to other villages or to the cities.18

In summary, before Land Reform, thousands of villages of rural Iran were more or less self-sufficient socio

economic units. Although a majority of those units were small (more than 80 percent of such units had less than ten hactars of land·under agricultural use), most basic human needs were produced internally within each unit which then required minimum economic relations with the

local markets.19 The agricultural output not only was sufficient for domestic needs, but even formed a signifi cant portion of the national product.20 The Land Reform

Program of 1962, however, reduced agricultural production and was no help in dealing with the plight of the peasantry.

The Land Reform Program of 1962

With the rapid expansion of capitalist relations and accumulation of capital in Iran in the mid 1950's, it became abundantly clear that the remaining feudal remnants in the superstructure of Iranian society constituted barriers and obstacles to expansion of capitalism which 31

could no longer be tolerated. The joint "Comprador bour geoise and feudal rule" had to be shattered. In order to intensify the penetration of cap~tal into Iran and thus to further integrate the Iranian economy into the world capitalist system, western interests and international agencies such as the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund promoted 11 White Revolution" and development schemes which led to increased inequality throughout the nation~ 21 In 1962 the Shah launched "The Revolution of the Shah and People of Iran," hereafter referred to as the White

Revolution. The central aspect of the White Revolution was Land Reform, with the stated aims of better distri buting wealth, increasing production through an incentive system, increasing peasants' land ownership, and abolish ing the old feudal relationship in the countryside.

According to Ren~ Th~berge this had the following advan- tages: (1) it would contribute, to a great extent, to the internal stabilization of the political situation in Iran, solidifying the power of their ruling ally, the Shah, in the country, and (2) it would smooth the way for more and more capitalist-oriented development, extending the fields and possibilities of American Corporations investing in

Iran. 22 In fact, the Shah's major goal in the Program was to transform the country from a predominantly feudal system of production to a dependent capitalist state. In 32

this transformation, the Shah sought to defeat his historical rivals for power, the landlords, by means of under-

cutting their socio-economic base, that is land. His tech-

nique was to alter their social class by involving it in

the growing externally-oriented merchant and manufacturing class (the comprador bourgeoise).23 This process of inte grating the landowners into the urban bourgeoise was in-

tended to not only weaken their independence and role as a

leading class, but also to allow the Shah to bui~d an alli

ance with the peasantry, through the Land Reform Program.24 The Land Reform was carried out in several phases.

The first phase was in 1962-1963 during the premiership of

Ali Amini and at a time when Hassan Arsanjani was the

Minister of Agriculture: the second phase was proclaimed

in decrees and regulations in 1963-1964 and its implemen-

tation began in 1965.

Nikki Keddie has summarized the two phases in the

following manner:

In January 1962, the Shah and Arsanjani announced a new decree-law among whose main features were the following: (1) No one was allowed to own more than one village (or selected fractions total ing one village). Excluded were orchards, tea plantations, groves, homesteads, and mechanized areas worked by wage labourers. (2) The government was to indemnify landlords in ten years (later changed to fif teen on the basis of the taxes they had been paying); this sum plus 10 percent ad ministrative costs was to be paid over fifteen years by the purchasing peasants. {3) Only persons who were members of a 33

village cooperative were eligible for land, and the deeds were to remain with the Agri cultural Bank as security until all install ments had been paid. Another major feature of the reform was that peasants should be allotted the land they were actually farm ing and those providing more than labour received first priority. In practice this seems generally to have meant that the heads of the work-teams got land, while labourers who constituted 47.5 percent of the rural population did not. Landlords, having had fair warning (at least since the 1959-1960 bill) that a division of their land based on maximum holdings might be enacted, had two years to transfer ownership of their villages to their wives, children, and relatives, and this land was allowed to remain where it was.25

The second phase of the Land Reform covered most of the large majority of villages untouched by the first phase.

Landlords are allowed to retain a maxi mum of 30 to 150 hactares of non-mechanized lands, depending on the region, and must dispose of the rest in one of several ways, chosen by the landlord, who may: (1) rent the land to the peasants on the basis of the average net income of the past three years, the lease to be for thirty years and subject to five-year revisions; (2) sell the land to the peasants at a mutually agreed price; (3) divide the land with the peasant, retaining a section equal to the share of the crop he formerly received; (4) by mutual agreement set up a joint stock company with the peasants with the landlord share in the company equal to his former share of the crop; or (5) sell his share to the government to be resold to the peasants on terms equal to those of the first phase.26

The stated goal of Land Reform was to give the land to the peasantry. Land was to go only to those peasants 34

who were working on the master's land as tenants or share

croppers. In this way, all land on which only wage

earners worked or which was under mechanized cultivation was exempted from redistribution. As a result, vast lands,

including the extensive holdings of princes, princesses,

big-shot bureaucrats, and the entourage of the bureaucracy were not distributed, and thus, a considerable segment

of the peasantry remained landless. One should remember

that in the midst of, and prior to, the height of the Land

Reform, many landowners evicted the share-croppers and

farmed their land via large scale mechanized cultivation.

By doing so, or on this pretext, their land also remained

immune from redistribution. Several others had extensive

sections of their land exempted from redistribution by

granting their land to their off-spring and relatives.

In many areas where land was_ redistributed, land did

not fall into the possession of all the peasants because

not all the peasants had share-cropping or tenant con tracts. In other words, they were classified not as

peasants but wage earners. According to the government's

own statistics more than 40 percent of the Iranian

peasantry were thus deprived of land forever27 (see also

Table 3).

In any event, some land was redistributed. Some

landlords sold their land, and others rented it to the peasants. Not surprisingly, the best lands remained in 35

TABLE 3

Number of Households Affected by the Second Stage of Iranian Land Reform

1 2 (Up to (Up to September April 1971) 1972)

1. No. of households re 1,196,743 1,232,548 ceiving leases from land owners

2. No. of households re 135,751 ceiving leases from public endowments

3. No. of households receiv 35,805 leases from private endowments

4. Total No. of households 1,368,299 1,232,548 receiving leases

5. No. of households pri 57,226 57,226 vately purchasing land from landlords.

6. No. of households receiv 156,580 ing land through division according to the 'five input'

7. No. of households owning 110,126 shares in private agricul tural corporations*

8. Total No. of households 1,425,525 1,556,480 affected * Probably includes some of the leaseholders in column (1) who have subsequently set up corpora tions with landlords according to the 'third phase' of the reform.

Source: Ministry of Co-operation and Rural Affairs up to September, 1971, in, M. A. Katouzian, "Land Reform in Iran: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Social Engineering", Journal of Peasant Studies. January 1972, p. 230. 36

·the hands of the landlord and the worst lands were left

for the peasants. In some cases, feudalism itself was

preserved.28

New Ru~al Economic Relationships and Movement to the City

The situation in rural Iran turned dramatically after

Land Reform. The direct economic and social results of the different phases of the program may be stated sue-

cinctly. For those peasants who got land, the plots of

land were not large enough to sustain a household, and

generally these plots had inferior fertility, which meant

that many peasants simply could not maintain both the

annual payments and feed their families. Therefore, many

of the new small landowners who were ill-equipped or un-

prepared to work their land productively, were forced to sell their new holdings and became either farm laborers who received wages for their work, or they migrated to the cities.

All three major economic attempts to make the pro-

gram a success throughout the subsequent phases of the

land reform--rural cooperative societies, joint-stock corporations, and large agro-business farms--essentially failed to achieve their objectives.29 In fact, the major

function of the rural cooperative societies, which were to aid the new land holders in modernizing and improving their farming methods and output, has been to act as 37

collection agencies for the rental payments to landlords.

In other words, the cooperatives contributed to the growth of monetary relat·ions and markets through introducing new consumer goods and collecting the payment on, or the rent for, the land that had been sold or rented to the peasant.

As N. Keddie notes:

A peasant proprietor was almost always forced to borrow money for seeds, tools, livestock, and other current expenses. The tenant, paying exorbitant rents, was also forced to borrow in order to feed himself and his family. High interest rates and low peasant income made it difficult for the peasant ever to repay the principal on such loans. These high rates not only impover ished the peasants, but lured capital from productive ventures and directed it toward the economicallY parasitical field of money lending.30

The peasants were exploited in various ways through the Ministry of Land Reform, the cooperatives, the various banks and, later, the joint-stock corporations. Every year at harvest time, Land Reform agents appeared to col- lect the payment on, or rent of, the land that had been sold or rented to the peasants. Day by day the oppressed peasants, usually unable to remit the demanded amount, assumed a heavier burden of debts and loans with tremendous interest rates. Wherever the peasants showed cour- age and refrained from the remittance of their payments, they were immediately faced with the bayonets of the gen- darmes, the repossession of the land by the Ministry of

Land Reform, and other suppressive measures. Meanwhile, 38

the cooperatives continued to dispense loans, sell seeds, and pre-purchase the products of the peasants until the peasant's funds were exhausted.

Modernization not only destroyed the old feudal pat tern, but also affected the ancestral units of peasants' cooperation, the boneh. In the boneh every holder of

Nasagh had rights to the land and water, as well as obli gations towards the community.31 Thus, the old boneh framework could easily have ensured equal division of pro duction and a collective control of common services.

Creation of production cooperation, however, brought about elimination of the old structure and limitation of the land distribution to the holders of Nasagh. This clearly indicated that the agricultural policy was to deny power to peasants. In 1967, as part of the Fourth Development Plan

(1965-72), the joint stock corporation, and the farm cor poration were established. These organizations were in tended to increase the per capita income of the farmer, create widespread facilities for farm mechanizations, ac quaint the farmers with modern methods of agriculture, utilize the maximum manpower of the villages. Farmers be came shareholders in one or both of the corporations. The peasants' shares in the resources were dependent upon land value and other contributions to agricultural production, a practice benefiting the wealthier peasants and further 39

strengthening the divisions among the peasantry.32 In other words, every possible means was used to induce the small shareholder, whose average holding was less than five acres, to leave, and he had no alternative but to give up his share to those who remained and to seek salaried employment.33

Another aspect of the Land Reform Program was the establishment of large scale capitalistic farms, known as agro-business, in areas with fertile soils and irrigation water.34 These agro-business companies were owned by domestic and foreign private and public capital, applied modern technical inputs to farming, and operated entirely on the basis of wage labor.35

The establishment of such agro-industrial complexes did not help absorb the over-population of the rural . areas, but itself was a factor in creating unemployment for a great proportion of the peasants.

As M. A. Katouzian notes:

The peasant households lost their lands, their homes, their culture and socio logical entities, etc., by one stroke. They were to scratch a living by pro viding (part-time} wage labour for the company. The cost to the peasants can- . not be exaggerated, because, in addi tion to all the other material and psychological losses, they now had to purchase their means of subsistence in the market.36

The Dez River Irrigation Project provides a typical example of a project's negative impact on peasants.37 40

In this project, the best agricultural lands (1100 acres in fifty villages), that in the first and second phases of the land reform were sold to peasants,were taken back at low prices. Ayandegan (A Persian Newspaper) in 1968 noted:

Lands around the agro-business projects will be priced and bought by the govern ment, and for those peasants who would lose their jobs after the land is sold, it will consider for them some job oppor tunities.38

Now that more than 14 years has passed, it is apparent that the job opportunities offered by the government for the landless peasants were fanciful. In reality, the government offered nothing except migration to the cities, starvation, and living in a tragic plight in the urban slums.

The Lure of Tehran

The great migration to Tehran cannot be understood simply as a_reaction of rural residents to poor and de- teriorating conditions in the countryside. In fact, growing Iranian national income in the 1970's, fueled largely by great increases in oil revenues, stimulated rapid economic growth and substantial increases in employment in Iranian urban centers, especially in the capital, Tehran. Thus Tehran exerted a strong pull on rural Iranians. 41

One of the strongest "pull 11 forces was the higher

level of income in the city than in the rural areas. In

the 1960's, the ratio of urban to rural income per head

averaged 4.7 to 1.39 In absolute terms, whereas in 1970

the average income in Tehran was $1,075.00, the figure

for the entire country without Tehran was reported to be

only $228.00 per year. The average annual wages from

industrial activities in the central province (essen tially Tehran), other provinces, and Iran as a whole,

are shown in Table 4.

Another factor that attracted the rural migrants was

the job opportunities that the.city had to offer. 'l;'his was because in Iran the new industry concentrated in the

capital city.40 Table 5 summarizes job opportunities for males of the age group over ten years old, in the Central

and other provinces in 1972. According to the Table, the Central Province, with 20 percent of the total population

of the nation, had 40 percent of all job opportunities in

non-agricultural fields. In 1971, 74 percent of existing

job opportunities in the Central Province were located in

urban areas, particularly in Tehran. The distribution of

job opportunities for males in different economic sectors

of urban and rural areas of Iran in 1972 are shown in

Table 6. According to this Table, of each 100 existing

job opportunities in the Central Province, 74 percent were located in urban areas, whereas in other provinces 42

Table 4 Average Annual Wages From Different Industrial Activities in Iran Central Province and other Provinces

1966 1972 Central other Central other Industries Iran Province Provinces Iran Province Provinces (,i,o ~~ (aoa ~~ U.o ~~ '.i.n ~ l (.l.ll 2! '.i.D 2 Food 542.85 551.42 537.14 1,112.85 927.14 182.85

Beverage 1,398.57 1, 725.71 802.85 1,412.85 1,764.28 547.14

Tobacco 2,894.28 3,228.57 845.71 2,894.28 3,230.00 845.71 Rug Textile 440.00 492.85 435.71 558.57 690.00 500.00 other Textile 507.14 492.85 515.71 581.42 648.57 475.71

Wood 492.85 532.85 447.14 792.85 722.85 832.85 Paper 720.00 891.42 960.00 961.42 840.00

Printing 1,211.44 1,350.00 687.14 1, 074.28 1, lOS. 71 615.71 Rubber 747.14 645.71 1,437.14 727.14 830.00 550.00

Chemical 785.71 1, 128.57 384.28 758.57 731.42 618.57 Petroleum 1. 405.71 1,405.71 1. 431.42 1, 431.42

Minerals 598.57 657.14 551.42 721.42 708.57 738.57 Basic Metal 975.71 1,132.85 617.14 752.85 . 754.28 747.14

Metal Industry 607.14 692.85 471.42 1. 014.28 1,064.28 532.85 Non-electric Machinery 572.85 918.57 264.28 710.00 755.71 571.42

Electronic Machinery 625.71 800.00 318.57 614.28 658.57 404.28 Transportation 734.28 921.42 545.71 1,257.14 1, 254.28 1,314.28 other Industries 1, 081.42 1, 771.42 670.00 774.28 824.28 495.71

Source: Statistical Center of Iran, 1972. 43

TABLE 5

Opportunities for Male Employment in Urban Areas of Central Province and Other Provinces for Age Groups Over 10 Years

1972

Economic Activities Central Province Other Provinces

Agriculture 10.8% 89.02

Mining and 42.54 57.42 Quarrying

Construction 28.65 73.35

Public 45.98 54.20 Utilities

Commerce 39.15 60.85

Transportation and 40.62 59.38 Communications

Social Services 44.45 55.55

Other Activities 32.96 67.04

Non-Agriculture 40.29 59.71

Total Employment 38.23 61.77

Source: Statistical Center of Iran, 1972. 44

TABLE 6

Distribution for Male Employment iri Different Economic Activities in Rural and Urban Areas, 1972

Economic Iran Central Other Activl.ties Province Provinces

.Agriculture Urban 2.3% 1.5% 3.1% Rural 47.1 18.9 54.4

Mining and Urban 10.6 21.8 7.6 Quarrying Rural 3.5 2.3 3.8

Construction Urban 4.2 5.7 3.9 Rural 3.9 2.1 4.4

Public Urban 1.4 3.2 1.0 Utilities Rural 0.2 0.1 0.2

Commerce Urban 8.1 15.4 6.2 Rural 2.1 1.1 2.3

Transportation and Urban 3.5 6.9 2.6 Communications Rural 0.9 0.6 1.9

Services Urban 8.4 18.1 5.9 Rural 2.2 1.0 2.5

Other Activities Urban 0.7 1.2 0.6 Rural 0.5 0.1 0.5

% Employed 100.0 100.0 100.0

Total Employed 6,230,200 1,284,800 4,945,400

Total Urban Employment 39.8% 74.7% 30.9%

Total Rural Employment 60.2% 26.3% 69.1%

Source: Statistical Center of Iran, 1972. 45

of each 100 existing-jobs, 31 percent were located in urban areas. Also, according to the statistics of 1965-

1975, 22.5 percent of industrial workers and 17.3 percent of institutional employees were in Tehran. Of Iran's

5,066 largest businesses, almost 40 percent were in

Tehran (1969). These figures show the magnitude of economic activities and the centralization of economic and human resources in Tehran.

Among the different economic activities in the city. of Tehran, construction, including urban renewal, housing projects, and road building provided temporary employment for many unskilled rural migrants during the. mid-1970's.41

Another important factor which attracted villagers to the urban areas was the existence of a higher level of education in the cities, notably, Tehran. For instance, in the years 1971-1972 nearly 63 percent of all students in Iran were studying in Tehran. Although a compulsory education law was introduced throughout the whole country in 1943, as late as 1971 only 20.4 percent of Iran's rural population six years and older could read and write.42 Among those who received education, notably energetic, bright youths, there was a greater tendency to leave the land for the city in search of education. These people were the ones most readily assimilated into the rapidly modernizing urban way of life.

Although the statements that "many people in Iran are 46 leaving their ·old rural areas for the bright lights of

Tehran," or "its greater range of amenities and services it has to offer, u43 are not inaccurate for some migrants, it is clear that neither the bright lights of the city nor the amenities theory have been significant factors in the decision of poor peasants to migrate to the city.

In fact, the life style of many poor migrants to Tehran was not changed to any great degree. Those migrants living in the southern part of Tehran led a fairly circum scribed existence outside the mainstream of urban life.

Most migrants live in slum areas of the southern part of

Tehran: their standard of living is very low, and clearly lacking in "a~enities."44 The movement of villagers to Tehran has had a strong socio-economic impact on the city. Population growth in the city of Tehran outran the growth of productive forces and production of necessary goods, therefore the cost of living increased dramatically. The migrants who came to

Tehran from their villages were basically unskilled workers, and many were not able to find gainful employment in productive fields. Even the semi-skilled migrants could not be epsily absorbed by the job market, so in creasing unemployment in the city. Ultimately, the existence of an excessive production force resulted in the reduction of wages and detracteo from consumer buying power. 47

The intensive poverty accompanying unemployment affected negatively the city's urban residential areas. In fact, since the residential organization of the city was based more on income stratification than anything else, and since the migrants were incapable of paying the high cost of conventional housing, a new but rapidly growing category of urban settlement, namely, squatter settlements, emerged within the urban system of the city of Tehran. The next chapter will be devoted to this problem of "squatter settlements ... CHAPTER IV

URBAN POVERTY AND THE HOUSING CRISIS TO 1978

Housing shortages are among the most serious problems

afflicting many fast-growing cities of the Third World.

This long term problem is steadily worsening as the gap -

between the rapidly rising population, and housing avail

ability widens. Tehran provides an excellent case study

of a very fast-growing Third World city facing a serious

housing crisis.

Tehran has been described as the troubled city of the

Iranian urban system.l This city, with more than 4.5 mil

lion inhabitants (1976), has not been able to provide

adequate social services or living space for .its popula

tion. For the low-income groups, shortage of housing

units is a particularly serious problem. A survey of

dwelling units conducted in 1966 indicated that Tehran

needed more than60,000 units for the low-income class. 2 In the 1970's, as land speculation raised the price

of housing to very high levels, the situation became much

more severe. Only small minority groups in Tehran were

able to afford this expense, and the majority of middle

income and all lower income residents suffered housing

shortages. For those poor working classes with a migratory

• 0 48 49

background, the situation became even more critical. Be- cause economic distress had been the strongest motive for their rura1-urban migration, and since the majority of them were poorly paid unski11ed workers, or unemployed, their wages were inadequate to pay the high cost of living and housing. Therefore, many migrants searched for a parcel of public or private land c!ose to their work, or near a potentia! job site, and built a !ow cost shelter of their own. · Peter L!oyd describes we11 the condition of many migrants:

Too poor to purchase !and and build a house within a reasonable time, unwilling to continue to pay rent for decaying ac commodations or perhaps unable to find a room for his own family, the migrant is impe11ed towards the illegal occupation of !and, to become a squatter. Within the city, shacks constructed of waste materials--whatever is best suited to keep out rain or sun--are erected on any vacant lot. Individually of small ex tent, sites grow by slow accretion.3

In brief, the incapacity of the city to meet the needs of its people by providing land and housing needed to accom- modate the urban·newcomers, led to the development of "squatter• housing,4 as an alternative method to deal with housi~g problems.

For others of the migrant poor in the city, rented slum housing is all that could be afforded. Many landless migrants rented small low-income housing units in different parts of Tehran, particularly in its southern section. 50

With their slum-dwelling neighbors, they shared a marginal life of low income, insecure tenure, and inadequate or absent basic urban services.5 The major difference between the slum dwellers and the squatters was the fact that the slum dwellers, unlike the squatters, were employed and earned regular wages and, as John Turner said, had become

"consolidators. u6

Squatter Settlements and Urban Slums Physical and Locational Aspects

Squatter houses in Tehran in the 1960's and 1970's were remarkably V"aried in design and construction materi als. Tents (Chador) were V"ery popular, as were Basements

(Zirsamin) made of building materials and lower than surface level. Also common were Shacks (Alounack) consisting of only one room and made of different.materials, and

Single rooms (ottagh), made of sun-dried brick or kiln- fired brick. There were also Makeshift Rooms in the nonfunctioning and functioning brick kiln (Ghamir), in the southern section of the city; Burial sites (Maghbareh) in courtyards of the shrines; Huts (Kapar, Louk, Korgen) made of mat, sun-dried brick and other materials; and other makeshift shacks (Zagheh), which were built lower than surface level without any building materials.

According to the survey of squatter settlements in

1971, 55.1 percent of the squatter households were liV'ing in shacks, 32.9 percent in makeshift single rooms, 51

9.8 percent in tents, 1.5 percent in nonfunctioning brick kilns,· 0.3 percent in burial sites, and 0.3 percent in other makeshift shacks.? There were also squatter dwell ing units constructed from other materials such as metal scraps, empty oil barrels and mixtures of wood and brush.

In general, no matter what kind of materials the migrants used, their dwelling units attest to their poverty~ the best dwellings were very much like ordinary rural farm houses.

A survey of squatter settlements in Tehran, conducted in 1972 by the Institute for Social Research, indicated that there were 428 squatter settlement units in Tehran, consisting of 3,780 households. 8 These settlements were in the four major geographic areas of the city. The

Northwest (from east of Eisenhower Avenue to Shemiran

Avenue) had 1,373 households in 79 settlement units, while the Northeast (from Old Shemiran Avenue to east of Masan dran Road), had 239 households in 30 units. The Central

Area (limited by Shahreza and Eisenhower streets on the north and by the Railroad Station, Shosh and Khazaneh streets on the south) had 522 families in 56 settlement units, and the South (from south of the Central area, to the south with no limits), had 1,646 families in 263 units (Figure 4).

The highest concentration of the squatter settlements was in the far south of Tehran. This district accounted 52

Fig. 4. Size and Distribution of Squatter Settlements in Tehran, 1972.

SHEMIRAN

SHAH· ABAO

;'\. _- •··

nl.f'.>~a•• ..-"f, · '· ~:~::_ : ~ ~~- , ~~B~A"~ FARAHZAO ... , ___ __

.. '· ' ..i • ... • }· .... . • KAN ..:" ..

-'. .. '

·~ · ··

..... /

.\ ., ·· - .. \. '\ ' \ \ • \ \ ., , ... • '

/ . •. ., , ~ " • ... TEHRAN

FAMILIES I SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS - 1972 Circles Indicate. Rela tive Size and Location • 0 2 l """'-ES 600_ 200 10 ~ r'r~~~-=~~~~ 0 " :) fi{W

Source: Institute for Social Research of Tehran University, First Report, 1972. 53 for over 61 percent of the units, perhaps because the government wished to prevent formation of such settlements within the central part of the city. Thus the settlers had no alternative except to go south and to the far west along Karaj Road in the factory area. Squatters, by definition, do not hold legal title to the land on which they build their residences. Therefore a variety of extra-legal techniques came to be used to obtain use of land owned by others. To better understand the squatting phenomenon, the Institute for Social Research at the University of Tehran studied squatter areas of Teh ran, and defined five types of occupancy, based on the way in which squatters acquired use of the land.9

Occupancy type 1, where squatters seized the property and built shacks for themselves without permission from the landowner, was most common. It accounted for 68 per cent of squatter households in Tehran. Occupancy type 2, where the dwellers either owned their units or obtained permission from the owners to live there, accounted for another 26 percent. Approximately 4 percent of squatters were categorized under occupancy type 3 because they paid nominal {below market) rents to the owners. Occupancy type 4, with 2 percent of squatter households, consisted of squatter landlords living in the same complex and building several shacks either on the land they owned or on private or government land and, in most cases, renting 54 .

them to newcomers to the area. The fifth category in cluded the 2 percent of households who were profit makers.

In many cases, they sold the units in the free market and received a significant increase in money, and then moved on to another area to squat again.

The aforementioned 1972 study by the Institute for

Social Research implies strongly that the implementation of the Land Reform Program contributed to a substantial increase in squatter settlement in Tehran. Fully 65 per cent of squatter settlement units in the city were estab lished after the start of the program in 1963. Indeed, 20 percent of squatter residences were built in 1971 alone, when the full impact of the program was felt,lO (Table 7).

Housing also continued to present major problems for non-squatter migrant poor in Tehran. The dramatic rise in the price of housing in the city in the 1970•s brought a situation that, for most, prevented even the hope of pur chasing a single room. The majority of migrants resided in rented rooms. About 18 percent of the migrants owned their dwelling units, and the average occupance was three persons per room.ll The lack of basic services like piped water or electricity, and heavy debt on the purchased house,made such units almost impossible for migrants to live in. As Farhad Kazemi, in the report of his visit to two poor migrant compounds of Javadiyih in the southern section of Tehran in 1974-1975, notes: 55

Table 1 Length of Establishment of Squatter Settlement Units in Tehran by Area

Length of Northwest Northeast Central South Total Stay No. Percent Less than 1 Year 8 5 13 61 87 20.3

1-Less than 2 Years 3 3 21 27 6.3

2-Less than 3 Years 4 2 4 25 35 8.1

3-Less than 4 Years 1 4 3 25 33 7.7

4- Less than 5 Years 2 1 8 11 2.6

5-9 Years 20 4 6 37 67 15.7

10-14 Years 13 4 8 28 53 12.4

15-19 Years 14 3 6 19 42 9.8

20-29 Years 16 2. 10 16 44 10.3

30 Years or More 1 1 12 14 3.3

Unspecified 3 1 11 15 3.5

Total Units 79 30 56 263 428 100.0

Source: F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, 1980, p. 51 56

Each compound consisted of an old mud-brick caravansary that housed about 40 migrant households. The average household had six members in the one-room shelter. The first caravansary had no running water, no faucets, and no electricity. The few outhouses were shared by all inhabitants. Cooking was done inside the rooms, and water had to be brought in with buckets from a public spigot two blocks away. The second caravansary was less dilapidated and provided the residents with a communal water faucet and an electric light bulb in the yard. Although compared with the squatters these migrants have better living arrangements, they still suffer the worst urban ills. They face an untold number of problems in the areas of health, nutrition, employment, schooling and the like. The average length of stay for the households in these compounds was seven years. Clearly, the difficulty of moving out-of the compounds is immense: and the migrants are doomed, at least for the time being, to continue their subsistence life in the caravansaries.

The owner of the two compounds was a rapa cious business man who was making substantial profits from his operations. Bilking the migrant poor as part of entrepreneurial activity is not restricted to this particular owner. In my v-isits to other poor migrant areas of Tehran, similar patterns of profit making were detected. In one section of the city, several rooms were discovered with long cloths hanging from the ceiling to the floor for partitioning of the space. Upon questioning, it became apparent that each partitioned area was rented by the hour to individual, itinerant migrant laborers who had nowhere to sleep. By paying a nominal hourly fee, the migrants were able to find a few hours of unencumbered rest before their next attempt to search for employment. When these migrants find temporary employ ment in construction, they normally camp out at the site, either in tents or inside the partly completed buildings. The practice of sleeping at the construction site is a common and widely used means of shelter for the migrant laborers in Tehran and other Iranian cities.12 57

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Slums and Squatter Settlements

The urban migrants have come from all corners of the nation, but th~ preponderance of people in squatter areas are from the adjacent provinces. In general, about

35 percent of the residents came from rural areas or urban centers of the Central Province, whereas 18 percent, 12 percent, and close to 12 percent were from East Azarbayjan,

West Azarbayjan, and Hamadan Province, respectively.

Other places of origin of the migrants were Khorasan,

Gilan and Mazandran provinces (Fig. 5).13

Farokh Youness1 case study of one Tehran squatter settlement provides information regarding motives for migrating to the city. He reported that 77.1 percent came seeking jobs, that 9.8 percent came because they had lost their land and housing, that 6.6 percent came to join families, and that 0.8 percent were forced by drought to leave home. He counted 0.8 percent coming because of lack of basic services in the countryside, and 4.9 percent coming for other reasons.l4

The squatters who came from more traditional or rural areas, generally came to the city to find work and to improve their economic position, yet the city provided too few jobs. According to the 1972 survey, obtained by inter- viewing 480 heads of households, it is evident that there was practically no degree of employment security for the 58

Fig. 5. Magnitude and Direction of Low-Income Groups Migrating from Various Provinces to Tehran

U.S.S. R . ."'- ...... _, '-...... -, ' / ~·~.)~ I 5 \, I

\ AFGHANISTAN

IRAQ ) r· (. "<:~-...... '>i_ . \-;:;;~ '...__. \.~ ' ...... ' I l, ~ .. .)

SAUDI ARABIA

0 100 500 MILES

0 500 1000KMS.

I EAST AZERBAIJAN 5 KHORASAN 9 SEMNAN . 2 WEST AZERBAIJAN 6 KERMANSHAH 10 KHUZISTAN 3 HAMAOAN 7 ISFAHAN II ABAOAN

4 GILAN 8 BAKHTIARI

Source: R. Khavidi, 1978, p. 160. 59

very few who held occupations. The vast majority of them

(69.2 percent) were manual laborers, while 15.9 percent were self-employed (Table 8).15 In this survey, the female unemployment rate was high in all squatter areas of the city.l6 The majority of women were housewives: only a few found temporary or part-time jobs such as domestic work or housekeeping. This part-time and temporary employment was vital, however, in adding to the overall income of the family.

Life was somewhat less difficult for the non-squatting poor migrants because their economic condition, both occu pationally and in terms of their earned income, was better than that of the squatters. In the 1977 survey of the non squatter migrants in Tehran,l7 average wages amounted to

$225 per month which indicated a higher level of income and occupational attainment. This may be explained par tially by their higher level of education, because in the study about 66 percent of the non-squatting poor migrants could read and write.l8 Therefore, they were better quali fied to work in public agencies, capital-intensive private enterprises, and other governmental organizations, which offered greater security and economic stability (Table 9).

Even so, considering that every household had about four members, the average household income of $225 per month was not adequate to cover essential expenses in food, clothing, housing and medicine. 60

Table 8

Occupations of Male Squatter Heads of Households in Tehran, 1972

Occupation Number Percent

Total Respondents 480 100. oo.,<,

Semi-skilled and skilled laborer 169 35.2

Unskilled laborer 163 34.0

Salesman, Peddler, and Middleman 57 11.9

Tradesman and Peddling Tradesman 16 3.3

Agricultural laborer 14 2.9

Beggar and Darvish 10 2.1

Minor Office Employee 2 0.4

Keeper of Domes- ticated Animals 19 4.0

Unab-le to Work 4 0.8

Unemployed 26 5.4

Total Occupations 450 93.8

Source: Institute for Social Research of Tehran University, Squatter Settlement of Tehran, First Report, 1972, p. 19. 61

Table 9

Occupation of Nonsquatter Migrants in Tehran

Occupation Number Percent

F·oreman 2 0.9%

Independent Worker 38 17.0

Government or Public Agency Employee {Minor Civil Servant) 32 14.3 Government or Public Agency Worker/Laborer 27 12.1

Private Sector Wage Earner 108 48.2

Unemployed, Unable to Work 17 75.0

Total Respondents 224 100. 00,.(,

Source: Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, New York, 1980, p. 56. 62

Besides under employment/unemployment problems,there were others as·sociated with economic hardship in squatter settlements and slums of the city. Many migrant neighborhoods experienced increased crime, drug addiction, and prostitution among their people.l9 These degraded people, known in Marxist terminology as lumpenproletariat,20 were described by Kazemi in the following terms: At the southwest corner of Shush Square, an unpaved, dirty street leads to a pit, the first in an area known as the South City Pits. This enormous hollow measures three hectares wide and ten meters deep. Dumped city trash, discarded scrap metal, parts of destroyed machinery, o1d cardboards, bones, and rotted refuse lie in the middle. Out side the pit, a row of houses, loading areas, and tea-houses meet the eye. These tea-houses cater to mostly thieves, pick-pockets, drug pushers and smugglers. The area inside the pit appears uninhabitable. But in truth, cave-like dwellings have been dug into the surrounding walls. Used cardboard and paper cover the floors. The brightest corners have been set aside for addicts who come to pursue their habits undetected. Additional shacks for the addicts have been constructed in the pit out of discarded scrap metal. Nearby, similar pits and cave-like dwellings are the homes of many more people. In a separate section, another pit is geared to a different kind of business. Here dwell ings are constructed of discarded scrap metal and cardboard, or they have been dug into the ground itself and covered with the same materials. A steep path leads to the shacks' entrances, which are occasionally adorned with hanging cloths. Ownership of these shacks and holes is fiercely defended by a group of resident prostitutes. They receive their own "guests .. in these dwellings or rent their "rooms" to male customers for specified times • • • Half-way to Ray on the eastern side of the road, more prostitutes operate. Hiding behind the natural up and 63

down formations of the landscape, they make their availability known by displaying black cloths mounted high on sticks.21

This painful living condition had a high potential of development among squatters and non-squatter migrants in

Tehran.

Government Role in "Solving Problem ..

During the 1950's the city of Tehran began to suffer

from a housing shortage and problems of increasing housing demands, particularly for low and low-mid-income groups.

Several attempts were made by the government to solve this

problem from the mid-1950's onward. 22 It appears that none of the 1950's era housing assistance programs in- eluded the squatter population or self-employed poor

families of Tehran. The public housing policies were directed mostly to~ards government employees and better

income groups. Since most of the poor families were not state employees, they were left helpless. Many did not have reliable or fixed monthly incomes from their jobs.

They did not even have the considerable savings required to pay down-payments and also could not offer security to banks in order to get loans.

Apparently embarrassed by substantial growth of squatter settlements in several areas, particularly by those in public view along the major roads, the government constructed some public housing projects during the 64

1960's in order to relocate many of the unauthorized squatter settlements. In 1966, the government built the

first model neighborhood community known as Kuyinohom-i

Aban (Nohome Aban Community) in the south of the city.

The project was situated to the west of Aramgah Road

(about 1. 24 miles from the city of Ray), and about 6. 30 i miles from the major business district. /It occupied about

55 hactares of land formerly used for agriculture. It consisted of 3,608 housing units, provided to house dwellers from various parts of Tehran.23 During early

1967, the residents of major squatter settlements were removed from their original sites of Bahjat Abad, North

Rudaky, Hasir Abad, Jamshid Abad, Hashami, Use£ Abad,

Amjadayah, and those adjacent to the railroad station.

Later on, another settlement from the area close to Mehra- bad Airport was also relocated to the new project area (Fig. 6).

During the relocation process, which was carried out through cooperation of city officials and local military troops, about 4,221 families were transferred to the new housing site.24 After moving the families, the troops destroyed the shanties to prevent further occupation. In relocating the families, there was no consideration of life style, housing priorities, family income or places of employment; indeed, no specific study of the original environment or new location had been made. 65

Fig. 6. Tehran. Divisions of Residential Pattern of the City of Tehran, Based on Stratification of Residents According to Income

SHEMIRAN,,

·s.- AOABA~ (

FARA!aAD

.. ····· .. , .-···::r···

*KAN.'

)+,--· : ; ; /·.:· -· 8AGH~ei~F!~Z

·. '*:. _.. et .·NoHoM~' . :~:;·· ABAN

MN ., • PROJECTS TEHRAN

NEIGHBORHOODS & HOUSING PROJECTS

0 2 3M Source: R. Khavidi, 1978, p. 99. 0 2 3 4 5 10KM 66

The Nohome Aban Project cost the government 5.5 mil-· lion dollars (415 million Rials). Each unit in the first series was sold for about 1,200 dollars (90,000 Rials). 25

Due to increased building costs, the later series sold for

$1,680 (126,000 Rials).

Government financial arrangements made it possible for each family who wished to purchase a unit to pay only

$6.67 (500 Rials) down-payment. Installment payments in the same amount continued for fifteen years with no in terest charges. Considering the absence of regular wages and steady employment, and the fact that the average in come for the head of a household in 1966 prior to reloca tion was $1.33 (100 Rials) per day, many could not afford these payments.26 As a result, in violation of the housing contract whereby the government legally owned the units and the buyer did not have the right to sell his unit until he made the last payment, many occupants sold their houses, leased them or rente~ part of them to other families. In some cases, the houses were divided into two parts by the occupants for sharing living space in order to provide added income.27 Some also brought in as many relatives as possible to live with them to help pay the rent and other costs. Thus many fami1ies in the community not only received housing assistance from the government, but also managed to find other ways to increase their total income in order to continue living in the Project. 67

According to a survey of Nohome Aban Community, the

average residential density for the 218 families (includ

ing 1.2 families per housing unit), with a total popula

tion of 1,460, was about 8.1 persons per unit, or over four persons per room.28 Clearly, over-crowding of hous

ing units and lack of adequate community services for the

neighborhood was characteristic. The 1975 survey of the Nohome Aban Community indi

cated that although the project was originally meant to be

a replacement community for squatter settlements from dif

ferent parts of the city, in fact only about 47 percent of

occupants could be verified as having had that kind of

dwelling background.29 Another 40 percent had lived in

one-story housing units, over 10 percent in low-story housing, and close to 2 percent had lived in high rise

units. In terms of ownership, 15 percent had previously

lived in private units, 28 percent in tenement housing, while most of the remainder lived on illegal lands.

The occupational and income characteristics of re

settled squatters in Nohome Aban, as determined by the

surveys of the College of Social Work in Tehran, indi

cated that of 481 heads of households, 15 percent were unemployed and 56 percent held unskilled occupations.30

The study of Nohome Aban indicated also that among the

female spouse residents of the Project, there was a higher 68

rate of unemployment that was true for males. On the other hand, comparison of the 1966 survey of Nohome Aban with-the

1975 study showed substantial increases in av~rage family income over the 10 year period. 31 However, much of this increase was eroded by accelerating inflation of the .. general cost of living in Tehran during the same period.

Later, other low-income housing projects, such as the shoosh community, were built by the government. In the context of great increases in Iranian oil revenue in the

1970•s the governmental role in providing low income units and better living conditions for poor migrants appears, at best, a token effort. In fact, the government planners in charge of housing programs were more interested in removing a so-called 11 Urban [blight] symptom 11 than in trying to find a cure for the basic problems.

It is certainly true that the squatter settlements were unauthorized and that settlers were occupying land extra-legally and living in degraded conditions that needed remedy. It should not be forgotten though that these unfortunate people were virtually forced into an urban system even though most of them lacked the educational and occupational skills essential for services there. From this perspective, the failure of the government to deal adequately with their problems was a tragic error. CHAPTER V CONCWSION

Since the turn of the century, Tehran ~ike most other

major cities in Iran, has gone through significant changes.

It has become the center of po~itical power, industria~ism,

educationa~ and cultura~ services, employment opportuni

ties; and also numerous social activities.

A major change for Tehran has been its rapid increase

in population since it became the capita~ of the country

in 1786. The population of over ha~f a million at the

start of World War II reached ~.5~2,084 by the 1956 Census.

The rate of increase grew significant~y in years fo~~owing

the ear~y phases of imp~ementation of the Land Reform Pro

gram of 1962, when peasants began to migrate to the city

in increasingly large numbers. In ~966 Tehran had a popu

lation of 2.7 mi~lion, and a decade later, with a popula

tion of 4.5 million, it held more than 81 percent of the

tota~ urban population of the Central Province, and 28 per

cent of the urban popu~ation of the who~e country. The migration aggravated existing urban poverty and the housing

crisis, and contributed to the deve~opment of new problems in the city of Tehran.

This study has focused on the population growth of

69 70

Tehran as it relates to the rural-urban migration. It has attempted to explain the migration by analyzing the push and pull factors behind it.

The Shah's Land Reform Program went through differ ent phases and produced major crises for the peasants.

They were exploited in various ways by the government. Some peasants were not affected by the Program, and re mained landless. others were unable to effectively and economically use the land distributed to them by the government. With the deterioration of the old socio economic structure of the villages, the lack of economic security, and increasing hardships, many villagers found no alternative to migrating to the city. This consti tuted the basic push factor in the rural-urban migration.

On the other hand, most cities, especially Tehran, appealed to the peasants, particularly the younger people, who sought a better life and new employment opportunities.

City-based industry and commerce required cheap labor in large numbers, and attracted their work force from the rural and low income areas. This was the basic pull factor. An important conclusion of this study was that the push factor has been a much stronger force behind rural-urban migration than was the pull factor. In the city the unskilled and unemployed migrants found themselves unable to pay the high cost of living and housing. Therefore, the migrants searched for public or 71

private lands close to their work, and built shelters which served as low cost housing.

The migration has had, and continues to have, disast rous effects on the city, perhaps the most important of which was the emergence of squatter settlements and slum areas. Many landless and homeless migrants are living in shacks constructed of waste materials, or in rental units of very poor quality in different parts of the city, par ticularly in its southern section. There they continue to live a miserable existence.

The Shah's government attempted to ameliorate these problems but failed because of lack of planning, and in adequate efforts. Those who were in charge had not created a healthy environment in terms of economy, education, and health in the rural areas, so the villagers became dis couraged and migrated to the cities. Then, officials rushed in to build low income housing for the rural-urban migrant poor who had no jobs or skills needed in the urban labor market, and could not afford the required minimal housing payments.

The problem of migration, squatter settlements, and unemployment were dealt with differently by the Islamic government after the 1979 Revolution. The Halabi Abad

Settlement, one of many squatter settlements around Tehran, provides a useful example. There were 1,500 households living there in 1979 and government officials encouraged 72

900 families to return to their rural homes, and gav~ them

land to cultivate, with little or no payment required.

Those remaining at Halabi Abad were given free water,

electricity and some financial aid.

There were many good reasons to encourage the settlers

to return to their villages:

(1) the migrants had talents and skills in farming so

they were better off on the farms than sitting idle

in the city's shanty houses~

(2) a return home might contribute to a reduction of the

social diseases such as drug addiction, prostitution

and un~mployment, which had afflicted them in Tehran~ (3) it would boost agriculture and reduce the food short

age crisis;

(4) the country, by returning to more traditional ways,

would become less dependent on foreign goods~ ·

(5) and, finally, the housing shortage would be amelio

rated, because existing rural housing would be more

fully utilized.

In order to lure the migrants back to their farms and prevent development of more city problems, the govern

ment is planning to create better living conditions in

rural areas to meet the needs of the people for education, employment, health and recreation. ·~onstructive Crusades" have been recently created by the government. These are made up of all classes of people who go to the villages, 73

bringing their skills with them to help create a better

life for the less fortunate people who have been de

prived of human rights and opportunities for many years.

The ultimate success or failure of this plan, and

other programs of the Islamic government to improve the

quality of life of the poor people of Tehran and the rural

villages, remains to be seen. It is the view of the writer, however, that for the first time in decades the

government of Irari is on the right track. She is hopeful

that the future for the rural poor, and rural-urban mi

grants will be brighter than the recent past. 74

NOTES

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

1 " Fredrick c. Claff, "Tehran and Alburz1 The Geoqra':-. Phical Review, Vol. XX (1:930), p. 73; and H.· Riben, "The Geology of the Tehran Plain," American Journal of Science, Vol. 253 (1955), pp. 617-639.

2 Iran Plan Organization, Comprehensive Plan of Tehran, Abdulaziz Farmanfarmaian, and Gruen Associates 2nd ed., Vol. I, Part 3 (Tehran: GPO, 1971), pp. 21-38. 75

NarES

CHAPTER II - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN

1 Rahim Khavidi, "Low-Income Public Housing and Neighborhood Planning and Development in the City of Tehran, Iran, .. dissertation, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978), p. 43; and Laurence Lockhart, Persian Cities, (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960), p. 1.

2 Laurence Lockhart, p. 4.

3 Reza Kassaii, Mehrdad Bassiry, and Mohammad J. Banki, "Paydayesh-i Shahr-i Tehran Va Barasi-i Shahrsasi-i An Ta Sall-i 1300 Shamsi, " in Avalyn Seminare Maremat~ Banaha Va Shahrhaye Tarikhi, Voqoud Va Ayandey-ye Marakeze Maskooni Tarikhi, Daheshgah Tehran - Danes Kadey-ye Honar hay-ye Ziba, (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1350/ 1971), p. 5/7.

4 Tomas Herbert, Travels in Persia (England, n.p., 1960, pp. 194-195.

5 H. Bahrambeygui, "Tehran: An Urban Analysis," M.A. Thesis, Durham, 1972, p. 15.

6 Rahim Khavidi, p. 45.

7 Rahim Khavidi, p. 48; and H. Bahrambeygui, p. 17.

8 Rahim Khavidi, p. 48.

9 Mihdi Amani, "Avalyn Sarshumari-i Jamiyyat-i Tehran," Ulum-e Ejtemai, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1348/1970), p. 89. (In Persian).

10 Rahim Khavidi, p. 49, 61. During the early Qajar Period, the city had six major roads (Hamada, Shemiran, Yusufabad, Dushantape, Meishhad, and Isfahan), leading to some external areas. Later, Naser-Ed Din-Shah ordered the construction of new walls with twelve gates (Dow lat, Yusefabad, and Shemiran to the north; Khurasan (Meshhad), Dalab, Dushan Tape in the East; 76

Bagheshah, Ghazvin, Gomrok to the weat; Gharr, Rebat Karim, and Abdul-Azim to the south of Tehran).

11 Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution (New York: London: New York University Press, 1980), p. 19.

_ 12 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Inter pretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1981.), p. 87.

13 Nikki R. Keddie, p. 114.

14 Iran Plan Organization, Comprehensive Plan of Tehran, ed. Abdulaziz Farmanfarmain, and Gruen Associates 2nd ed., Vol. I, Part 3 (Tehran: GPO, 1971), p. 21.

15 E. A .. Bayne, "Changing Tehran," A.U.F.S. Reports, s. w. Asia Series, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1961), p. 2.

· l6 John Connell, Tehran: Urbanization and Develop ment, Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper, No. 32 (Brighton: University of Sussex Press, 1973), p. 3.

17 Iran Plan Organization, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 9.

18 Fred Halliday, Iran Dictatorship and Development, (Middlesex, England: Harmonds Worth, 1979), p. 44.

19 Fred Halliday, p. 103. 77

NOTES

CHAPTER III - MIGRATION TO TEHRAN

1 N.· V. Sovani, "The Analysis of 'over-urbanization/" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. XII, No. 2 (January 1964), p. 113 •

. 2 United Nations, International Labour Organization (ILO), Why Labor Leaves the Land: A Comparative Study of the Movement of Labor Out of Agriculture, Studies and Report, New Series No. 51 (Geneva: GPO, 1960), p. 209.

3 United Nations, International Labour Organization (ILO), p. 240.

4 F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 16.

5 N. Hill, Interprovincial Migration and Its Effects on Settlement Patterns in Iran for the Intercensus Period, 1956-1966, (Princeton, n.p., 1973), p. 10; and University of Tehran, Institute for Social Research, Squatter Settle ment of Tehran, Report No. 15714 {Tehran: University of Tehran Publication, 1972), p. 3. {In Persian).

6 R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power {New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.24.

7 Farhad Kazemi, p. 30.

8 Farhad Kazemi, p. 6.

9 J. Amuzegar, Iran, An Economic Profile, Washington, D.C., 1977}, p. 31. The author states, "During the ten year period from 1962-1972 agriculture had a growth rate of only 3.6 percent a year, and its share in the GDP fell from about 32 percent to 16 percent. In the first three years of the fifth plan {1973-76), the rate of growth in agricultural output accelerated to six percent--but it was still below the non-agricultural growth rate of 15 percent. In 1972-75 agriculture still accounted for the highest proportion of the employed population--3.5 million per sons, or about 35 percent of the economically active 78

population. In 1975-76, agricultural employment fell be low that of industry. "

10 J. Amuzegar, p. 32. The author states, "Ov'erall agricultural imports grew at an average annual rate of about 10 percent a year for most of the period, with animal product imports increasing at an annual rate of more than 19 percent. By 1976, most of the food imports consisted of wheat and flour, barley, rice and animal products--items in which Iran has been traditionally self-sufficient."

ll Fred Halliday, Iran Dictatorship and Development, (Middlesex, England: Harmonds Worth, 1979), p. 106.

12 Fred Halliday, p. 109.

13 Nikki R. Keddie, 10 5tratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Villages: Before and After Land Reform, " Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik (B~oomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 364.

14 Nikki R. Keddie, p. 365; and Farhad Kazemi, p. 32.

lS Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3 (July, 1968), p. 70.

16 Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform, " p. 69.

17 Eric Hoaglund, "The Koshneshin Population of Iran," Iranian Studies, Vol. VI, No. 4 (1973), pp. 33-36.

18 Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform, " pp. 70-71.

19 Parvin, Ghorayshi, "Capitalism in Rural Iran, " Merip Report, (July-August, 1981), p. 21; and M. Moham madi, Masaleh Arzi dar Iran Va Shiveh-e Hall-e Demo cratic-e An (Tehran: n.p., 1974), p. 13.

20 B. Jazani,An Introduction to the Contemporary History of Iran, (Tehran, n.p., n.d.), p. 91. 79

2l·Merip RePOrts, No. 18, "Iran: Ten Years After the White Revolution, " (June, 197 3), p. 8.

22 Merip Reports. No. 18, p. 11.

23 Merip Reports, No. 18, p. 9; Sazeman Cherik-haie Fadaie Khalgh Iran, Barresi-e Eslahat-e Arzi dar Iran, (Tehran: n.p., 1976), p. 12. (In Persian).

24 Nikki R. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in.Iranian Villages: Before and After Land Reform, " pp. 389-390. 25 Nikki R. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Village: Before and After Land Reform, " p. 392.

26 MeriP Reports, No. 18, p. 10. Farhad Kazemi, p. 37; "The cooperatives being widely scattered and suf fering from managerial shortcomings, have been less effec tive in raising production than in providing their members with welfare benefits. Marketing done through the co-ops is also still a small 10 percent of total output of members."

27 M. A. Katouzian, "Land Reform in Iran: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Social Engineering," Journal of Peasant Studies. Januar~ 1972, p. 230.

28 B. Jazani, P. 67.

29 Nikki R. Keddie, Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Village: Before and After Land Reform, " p. 376.

30 Merip Report, No. 18, p. 11. "Nasagh" is the division of village land into plow1and. "Boneh" are traditional peasant cooperatives of Nasagh Holders formed around a draft animal team.

31 Merip Reports, No. 71, "Agricultural Dependence," (October, 1978), p. 17; Farhad Kazemi, p. 38; and E. Hoag lund, "The Effects of Land Reform on Rural Iran 1962-72, " Dissertation. Johns Hopkin~ 1975, p. 179. 80

32 B. Jazani, The Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent Capitalist State, (Tehran, n.p., 1973), p. 63.

33 M. A. Katouzian, "Oil Versus Agriculture: A Case of Dual Resource Depletion in Iran, " Journal of Peasant Studies, V-5 (August, 1978), pp. 360.

34 ;;.;..;;;-=-::Mer~p...::..~_;;_..;;;.;.e;;;,o;;;p.;=o-=r-=s_,, R t No • 18 , p. 13 •

3S M. A. Katouzian, p. 361.

36 Amir Nikayiin, Dar Bareh-i Masaleh-i Arzi Va Jonbesh Dchghany Dar Iran, (Tehran: Organization of Democratic Youth and Students of Iran, 1359/1980), p. 13. (In Persian).

37 Avandegan, Aban 22, 1347/1968, p. 3. (In Persian}.

38 Farhad Kazemi, p. 42.

39 Iran, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, General Department of Statistics. A Study of Manpower of Iran, (Tehran: GPO, 1968), p.36. According to 1970 statistics, the average in come in Tehran was $1,075 and that of other areas was $228.

4 ° Farhad Kazemi, p. 42.

41 Farhad Kazemi, p. 43.

42 R. N. Hill, Interprovincial Migration and Its Effects on Settlement Patterns in Iran For the Inter census Period 1956-66, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 10; and M. H~mmasi, p. 37.

43 R. N. Hill, p. 5 .

44 Eric Hoaglund, "Rural Participation in the Revo lution," Merip Report. No. 87 (May, 1980), p. 3. 81

NarES

CHAPTER IV - URBAN POVERTY AND THE HOUSING CRISIS TO 1978

1 Mohammad Hemmasi, 11 Tehran in Transition: A Study in Comparative Factorial Ecology," in The Pooulation of Iran: A Selection of Readings, ed. J. A. Mameni (Honolulu, Shiraz: East-West Population Center, Pahlavi University Press, 1977), p. 363.

2 Mohammad Hemmasi, p. 363.

3 Peter Lloyd, =S~l~u~m~s=--.:::o~f:....-=H.:;.:o=-pe=..:..?--=S::..:h;.:.;a~n:..:..::t:..z;y--=T:...:o=-rw=n=s~o::.:f=--t.=.h=e Third World, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), p. 25.

4 Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, (Massachusetts M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 12. "Squatting, defined as "forcible preemption of land by landless and homeless people." United Nations, Conference on Human Settlements, Urban Slums and Squatter Settlements in the Third World, (A/CONF. 70/RPC/9, 1975), p. 3n. Many other terms such as "spontaneous," "marginal," "nonplanned, " "uncontrolled, " "transitional, ""unconvention al," and sub-integrated" have also been used for squatter settlement. In Iran, locally, they are known as Alounack, Zaghah, or Kappar.

5 Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 46.

6 Farhad Kazemi, p. 46 (from a quote by John C. Tur ner, "Uncontrolled urban settlement: Problems and Poli cies." The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization, ed. Gerald Breese, (Engle wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

7 University of Tehran, Institute for Social· Research, Squatter Settlement of Tehran Report No. 15714 (Tehran: University of Tehran Publication, 1972), p. 15. (In Persian).

8 University of Tehran, Institute for Social Re search, p. 9. 82

9 University of Tehran, Institute for Social Re search, p. 18.

1° Farhad Kazemi, p. 50; and University of Tehran, Institute for Social Re search, p. 11.

11 Farhad Kazemi, p. SO.

12 Farhad Kazemi, p. 50-51.

13 University of Tehran, Institute for Social Re search, p. 22.

14 Farokh Younessi, "The Squatter Settlement Near Tehran University," M.A. Thesis, Tehran 1355/1976, p. 26. (In Persian).

15 University of Tehran Institute for Social Re search p. 11

16 University of Tehran, Institute for Social Re search, p. 11.

17 Farhad Kazemi, p. 55.

18 Farhad Kazemi, p. 58.

19 Sattarih Farmanfarmaian, Piramun-i Ruspigari dar Shahr-i Tehran (Tehran: College of Social Work, 1349/ 1971), p. 23-24. (In Persian).

2° Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1955), p. 20. The lumpenprole tariat "forms a mass sharply differentiated from the Industrial Proletariat." Henry Winston, Strategy for a BlackAgenda, (n.p.: Int. Publishers, 1973), p. 13. "The lumpen elements are those so demoralized by the system that they are not only jobless, but to them a job is un thinkable. It is their declassed parasitical status and outlook that sharply distinguish them from the great mass of the unemployed who are searching for and demanding jobs and the opportunity for a decent life."

21 Farhad Kazemi, p. 55, (From a quote by Sattarih Farmanfarmaian, in Piramun-i Ruspigari dar Shshr-i Tehran, p. 23-24). 83

22 Rahim Khavidi, p. 122.

23 William H. Bartsch, "Unemployment in Less Deve- loped Countries: A Case Study of a Poor District of Tehran, " in The City in the Third World, ed. D. J. Dwyer (United Kingdom: The Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 161-162; College of Social Work, Tasviri as A.wza 1 -i I jtima 1 iyi Kuyi Nuhum Aban (Tehran: n.p., 1345/1966), p. 18. (In Persian).

24 William H. Bartsch, p. 161.

25 Rahim Khavidi, p. 136.

26 William H. Bartsch, p. 163; College of Social Work, p. 22.

27 This is from my personal observation of Nohome Aban Community when I was a student at National University of Iran, 1976. 28 Rahim Khavidi, pp. 137, 157.

29 Rahim Khavidi, p. 160.

30 Rahim Khavidi, p. 161.

31 William H. Bartsch, p. 163; Farhad Kazemi, p. 54. 84

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