APPRO\|EO FOR

P|lBLIC RETEASE

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USAF MANPOWF,R TRENDS

rg60-r963 (u)

by

George F. Lemmer

USAF Historical Division ti.aison Office

I,Iarch 1955 K 168.01-3 . r :?1irr i.!-ri, r, . ,.r q.i1 , :: I i. -; ..r1-r" I

Mten this Study ls no longer needed, please retrrrn it to the IISAF Hi-storical Divisi-on Liaison Office. r0R${onD

U-rSAF SFneower lbenls. LW-L9!2, is an account of Air Force@offi requlrenrents for a high quality iechnical and professj_onal force and to tbe ever-growing demands from the Adninistration and Congress for greater eeonon{r in the use of rnanpo},er. continujng technological developments and changes in national military strategr dietatLd the recruiting and holding of better trained people, shifts in personnel asiignnents, and rnodifications jn the mission of ntatty Air Force u:its. Perhaps most irmediately significant were preparations to meet the Berlin and cuban of 1951 a"a f9ee and to counter the Comnunist threat to"rlsus wage thrars of nati-onal liberation. tr Ttre author has approached the various subjects discussed in this study from tLL viewpoint of the higlrest echelons of the Air Force--Head- quarters USAF and the 0ffice of the Secretary--attenpting to_ i:plgin how they met new problems and conditions, particularly troi they adjustla to the denands of the Adninistration and Congress. Prepared as part of a larger $istorv gf Heggggglters. USAF'' Fiseal yLal 1o63r- the study is being issued separately to nake ItlGiAFavffiible in a convenient and useful form. It also serves as a follow-on study to Ibg Chaneing Clraracter of Air Foree l{gpoggr,, U€-1qq9. issued in Aprl1 1961.

..\",a4 n^r..^"1^-^ uAJ( nosffi{Emc Y Acting Chief USAF Eistorical Division Liai-son Office CONT$NTS

FORE1IOND I. G$IERAL TRENDS . . . . . ' ' o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 ManPower Strengths ...... '''''' ? Rising Cogts ...... '''''' t'' ) 1I. MANPOI/'JERADJUS1trffi'1TS.... ' " " " ' 6 Congressional and White House Pressures' ' I 05D and USAF Resporls€s ...... '''' 15 III. MILITARYMANPOWffi,' . . . . " ' ' t ' ' ' ' 25 Officers...... t . t' t t t' t t 27 Aimgn...... t t tt " t " 36 IV. CIVILIANMANPOhIER . .. . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' A2 AdrainistrationandTrainlng .... ' ' ' lr3 Controls and P.eductions. . . .'''''' /+O Equal Opportwti-ty. r . .. o. " " " 50 V. TI{E AIR RESERI/E F0RCES' . .'''''''' Ilann5-ng ...... '' t t' Support of the Active Sstablishment. . . . 58 Approaching Difficulties ...... '' 6L

6l+ NOTES...... o . o t "'' "' STOSSARY. . r . . . . . t . . . .' t t t' "' 73 usAF I,IANPoHER TRB{DS, r96o-t963

I. Gfi{MAI TEENDS

I\lo contradictory pressures influenced USAF manpower from 1960 to 19632 the recurring shortages of trained people, par- ticularly people with trainlng in science and engineering; and the persistent demands of Congress and the White House for reductions in nanpor,rer strengths and eosts, or at least no increase Ln them' The first pressure nade it diffieult to satisfy the secoad. the contj-nuing lncrease in the technical complexity of ueapons and equipment demanded a larger number of well-trajned people to develop, man, and naintain them. And higher pay scales rlere needed to obtain and hold these people. There nere other r€asons why it was difflcult to hold a line on manporrer costs. Bocause of the scarcity and high cost of trained manponer, a general pay raise was granted civilian enployees in 1962

and pilitary personnel in Lg63. T?re gror+ing eryerience of Departnent of Defense (0OO) workers also inevitably raised grades and cost. EVen enllsted men, wttose turnover rate was relatively hlgh and therefore

costly, uere now generally older and had more dependents. This raj-sed costg for fanlIy housing, education, medical carer and other e)penseg

associated with military dependents. lhe onJ.y way to cut nanpouer costs, or even hold them in check, uas to substantially reduce the

nrnber of people on DOD payrolls, and there r'ras a general donnward 2

trend j.n numbers, fron 1955 through most of fiscal year 1961. But trm developments tenrporarily reversed the trend: the Berrin crlsis in the fall of r95r and the Kennedy Adninistrationrs decigion to prepare to meet Corylrrnist threats of ttrrrars of liberationr in wrder- developed regions. As a resurt, DoD nanpower rose i-n .I'ne 1952 to a new six-year high. usAF growth was not comparable, but its nil_ itary personnel strength reached its highest point slnce ]|g51. Civil_ ian enplolment increased by only a few thousand, however, and by fiscal year 1963 it dropped back below the total of two years earlier.l

Manporrer Strengths Betr,rcen 3O June 1959 and 3O June Lg63, total_ DoD manporrer increased by 1661954--fron 3r5gzrlgg Lo 3rTLgrhA2. This portrayed only a part of the change, houever, for menpolrer totars had increased from a low of 3r523,5i5 in 1950 to a high of 318771362 in L962, an addition of 353 r8o7. Actr"nrly, nearly aD of the growbh had taken place betrryeen 30 Jr:ne l-961 anO 3O Jwe Lg62. Air Force military strength grew fron gl-.l+r752 on JO June 1960 to gg4rO25 on 30 June 1962. A11 the services e:cperienced a steady decline in the n,mber of civili'an enployees w'ith only a .qurall jr:np in the sunmer of 1962. For D'D, the deeline was from lrOfgrl'g in June ,.959 La tr,lrgr?65 in June L963. For the Air Force, i.t uas fron JlJ, t66 to 29619g2, the lorresr in a dozen years and a loss of l6rLgt+ since ]ig{ig.2 The ilcreases in military manpower were folr-owed by a rather sharp reduction in fiscal year 1963, when DOD miLitary personnel 3 strength fel1 from 2r8}7rgJ-} Lo 2166)1677 ana USAF strength fron 88LrA25 lo 869rb3l. ltris took place despite the crisis eaused by the Soviet placerrent of strategic missiles in Cuba in the fa1I of 1962. The cutback stenmed partly from a ttbudget crisistt produced by the mushrooming costs of several new projects launched by the

Kennedy Adminj.stration, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Adnlnistrationrs drive to put a nan on the moon by L97Ot the strength- ening of the airborne alert, the civilian pay raise, and neasures to stirnulate the national economy and fessen unemplo;mnnt. Conditioni,ng the r*role defense budget problem rias the unfavorable i.:nternational balance of palnients, wtrich threatened to deplete U.S. gold reserves.

Whenever i-t seemed necessary to restrict costs, Congress exa.nined manporder totals rrith an exceedingly critical .y".3

Rising Costs In exarnining defense budgets, Congress, particularly the House

Subcomnlttee on l4anpower Utllizatlon, became increasingly critical of the upr*ard trend of the grade level-. the trend r*as strongly supported, however, by Roger W. Jones, Chairman of the Civil Service Conmission. Appearing before the subconmittee in December 1959, he naj-ntained that the ttgrade creeprf was inevitable and fuIly justified. Jones ciLed a nwrber of reasons for the rise in pay grades and for a 1ikeIy continu- ation of the upward trend.. One was the impact of the technological revoLution on the charaeter of the work force, partlcularly the increase j-n scientific, technieal, and managerial personnel. hhile overall government eryloyrnent had increased 12.3 percent, its increase

in the biologlcal scj.ences had been 77 percent, in engineering l+2 percent, and ln the physical sciences 76 percent. Another irnportant factor was the decentralization and delegation of authority, l*tich called for more administrators and supervisors with htgher grades. A third reason that Jones listed was the autonation and mechanization of work wtrich eliminated nany low-paid eryloyees, raising the average pay grade of those rernalning.

Jones also remj-nded Congress that pay for professional civil servants lagged considerably behind pay for comparable workers j-n the civilian economy despite attempts in recent years to correet the disparity. Therefore Congress r,rould have to authorize higher salaries

in the future to enable the government to keep competent people, and this would further increase manpouer costs. His prediction was borne out by passage of the Federal Salary Reform Aet of L962, wtrich not only ralsed salaries but provlded for a periodic reassessnent of their adeqrracy.4 The Air Force also urged the necessity of offering attractive positions to highly corpetent people, particularly for work.rn aero- nautj-caI research, development, iest, and evah.ration. It uanted to raise the nr.uober and salaries of super grades (CS-fg through e'S-18) and P.L. 313 positions. In October 196l Congress approved a slight

increase in the number of DOD high-level positions, bringi-ng the total

Lo l+O7 super grades and 530 P.L, 3L3 positlons. Air Force super grade

positions rose from 83 to 86; P.L. 313 positions from W6 to LU+. 5

Then, in 1963, the nrmber of USAF sqPer grades increased to 98' ln addition, the salary reform act of gctober 1952 raised the pay ceiling of super grade positions frorn $18r50O per year to $2OIOOO' grade establj.shing a salary range of $16,0OO to $2Or@O. The average in for Air Force civillans rose fron G,5-6.6 in Jr.rne 1960 to GS-7'1 June 1963, the everage pay from &51528 x6 51693 p"" y"t"'5 nan- creneral pay increases did not add to the cost of urilitary proportion poHer wrtil the fall of I963t but the denand for a higher the sane of ue11-traj-r:ed people created similar problems and aroused for concern as with ci-vilian employees. Proficiency pay was required

more airnen with special qualiflcatlons, and nanpower costs s*plled with the rising percentage of officers with college degrees, the science greater nr:mber afforded wrdergradgate and gradrrate training in

and engineerlng, and the technical traSning provided approximately

10Or00O airnen Per Year. of The first nilitary pay bill slnce L958, wtrich passed the House DoD Bepresentatives in May 1963 and the Senate i-n August, also raised years nanpower eosts. Pay for nilitary personnel w"ith more than tno of service rose from 5 to more than 31 percent, depending on rank and e:peri- length of service. By encouraging individuals w'ith training and eli'minate ence to follow a mi-Iitary careerr the lar* 1as deslgned to help

much of the very erpensive trainlng of replac"*""tg'5 II. }{ANPOWER ADJUSIMENTS

One uuajor difficulty ln national defense pranning was that

of keeping nanpor{,er costs w'ithin the limits deemed reasonable by

the congressional cormittees that controil_ed appropriations, Ttre

over-ridiag consideratlon affecting nanpower controls in the defense

establishnent was the size of the budget. DOD eryenditures rose

betrryeen fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1963 from a little more

than {i41 billion to about $53 Uiffion, and nanpower costs accounted

for nearly /aO percent of these totals. USAF eryendltures rose from

approxi:rnteLy $1"8 billion to about ,*zo.L billion, lrith uranpower costs accorrnting for 30 to 31 percent.l

For several years prior to 1963, Congress, the president, and the Eueau of the Budget (nog) repeatedly criticized the management by the services of nilltary personnel approprj.ations and related rnan- Power programs, partlcularly the signiflcant appropri-ation deficiencies i.n fiscal years 1956, 1957, 1958, Ig59, and 1961.* The services were unable to detertine the current status of, or predict rrith reasonable aceuracy, the future requirements for nilitary funds. And nwrerous inaccwate estlmates of the personner costs of approved prograns had caused considerable errbarrassarent and reprog*"orirrg.2 Many of the difficulties arose from payroll procedures that had originated during world lfar rr in order to speed up operations and xIn 1961r honever, the Air Force had erred in the opposite direction, over-estlqating its nilitary personnel costs by $87 million. allow prompt paynent of the fighting men on the battle fronts. Too r,any of these procedures continued during peacetime. Although some changes had occurred since the war, they had not been of great sig- nificance from the standpoint of financial control. Meanwtrile, the corys of skilled nilitary professionals had been eryanded by the addition of new entitlements and incentives. Qbviouslyr a larget uorldwide force of this kind created new and extremely difficult manponel fiallagement problems, particularly jn cost accounti:rg' The continued failure of the services to rnaster them brought strong criti- clsms and raised doubts in Congress as to the ability of the nilitary to do so. Thls critieism stimulated the Qffice of the Secretary of Defense (OSO) and the serv1ces to renewed efforts to reshape and ? improve nranpouer controls.' During L962 and 1963, the servj-ces exerted great effort to over- come deficiencies in manponer management. Although they did not entirely succeed, for some problems could not be solved wj"thout new legislatlon, they made sound progress jn improvlng the management of personnel fqnds and the use of Inanpovter. By June 1963 the Air Force had become widely recognized as a leader anong goverrutrent agencj-es in this ende&vor. It elj.rninated a nunber of units and redueed personnel overseas, eli-rnj-nated rnany internediate headqr:arters both overseas and in the lJnited States, set up a new system for evalr'nting personnel tnanagement at subordinate headquarters, inj.tiated a prograrn for retrain- ing enployees wttose skills had been made obsolete by technological change, and established valld standards of performance for nilitary I and civilian personnel. These successes drew praise from the Civil

Servj-ce Conurission and OSD and attracted hlghly favorabl_e attenti.on from government agencies in the united states, canada, and the th:ited []-ngqom../,

Colgressional and hltrite Ho.use Pressures To some r:ndeterminable degree, the substantial improvement in the use of their nanpower by the services eorrld be attributed to the constant pressure for greater econonJr exerted by congress and the White House. Probab\y the most constant and inslstent congressional critic uas the House of Bepresentatives Subconmittee on llanpor,rcr tlbill- zation, headed before Janr:ary l-?63 by Representative James C. Davis of Georgia, and after that date by Representative David lJ. Henderson of North Carolina.

The corunittee kept a sharp eye out for any evidence of nranpower uraste or duplication, and it required frequent reports on service efforts to improve controls and efficiency. Davis, in particular, opposed any evasion of civiU.an strength ceilings by substituting nil- itary personnel or by using contract enplo;rees v*ren government enploy- ees could do the work. Since he believed that a reduced work force wou1d contribute to efficiency, Davis rrranted only the most ilportant jobs filled wtren they becane vacant, and he charged in March 1961 that there r*as much drrplieation of effort and overlapping of frxrctions in the Department of Defense.

.A't the sarne time, members of Davisr cormrittee and other congress- men criticized the services for periodically discharging so manJr people 9 that there uas a widespread i-nseergity anong employees that resulted in a great loss of skilled vorkers, as well as decreased productivlty' And Davis thought the Air Force shotrld have been able to do more ballistic rn-issile work instead of contracti-ng out most of 1t, even though this would have kept rnany add.itional ni11tary and civilian scientists and engineers on the payroll.5 These not entirely consistent demands of Congress often placed the Departnent of Defense between the two horns of a dilenmna. In January and February 195O, both Charles C. Finucane, Asslstant Secre- tary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserves (MrPr&R), sd

Lewis S. Thompson, Speci-al Assj-stant to the Secretary of the Air

Force for lulanpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces (tUrnrARf), recog- nj-zed that the effort to obtain the strongest defense at the lowest cost, in the face of annr:al, fluctuating budgets, often worked injustiees on--individuafs. Finucane stated that efficient operation eonstituted the overridlng consideration, but he wanted the services to follow enlightened and fair procedures ln handling people and to keep a stable uork force'

Thonpson repl|ed that the Air Force was dolng the best that could be e>pected, since it dealt with factors beyond its control, such as annual budget changes and new technological developments. He clajmed that the Air Force gave pri.rnary consideration to careful nanpower management, followed correct and fair procedures i:r reductj-ons in force, and eUmj.rnated l-ow priorlty jobs first. The conflict between demands for econony and for stable employ- ment renained a perple:cing issue. The frequency with wtrich the 10

secretary of the Air Force had to e>plai.n reductlons in erplolnnent

in congressional districts graphically pointed up this problem. A

congressnants enthusiasm for reductj-ons il enployment seldom applied to hi.s own district.5

Much of the anmunition for congressional charges of inefficiency and waste ca,me from reports of the General Accounti-ng offiee (GAo). rn April 1953 Joseph canpbelI, conptroller General of the united States, appearing before the House Subcorrnittee on Manpower Utiliza- tion, pointed out nrmerous instances in the last five or six years of ineffective use of nanpower in nai.ntenanee work and 1n the handling of personnel records.T

Cartpbell asserted that if USAF and Anny vehicle naintenance was as efficient as that of the Nar,ry and the comercial fleets, the Air

Force could have reduced i-ts maintenanee staff by 1oro0o men and saved $55 nr:tllion a year, the Aruy 2r@0 men md $to million. Neither service, he said, had adequate malntenance controls or a reasonable basis for evaluatj-ng its effi-ciency. After revlewing activj-ties at installations in ,Iapan, the GAO also concluded that none of the three services knew how nany people they needed to maintain facilities or operate utilities. Local officiars had not applied the management practices e:gected of conpetent admj-nistrators and, consequent\r, the installations in that country were overstaffed by about lrgoo eqployees at an annrral cost of appro:ci:nately $2,? milllon. canpbell also stated that dwing fiscal years l957-61, servlee- rnen had received over one million overpayments totaling more than $I00 11 rnillien, of wtrich about 18 pereent, or $18 nillionr could not be recovered. He esti-nrated that about 50Or0OO underpayments, comi-ng to about $22 nillion had also been made. Because personnel records had not been screened properly, the senrices in one five-year period rnade about $10 rni'l1-ion in erroneous reenl-lstnent bonus payments and

about $16 nillion that had to be recoq>ed from servicemen wtro failed to courplete their reenlistments.

According to GAO, these errors resulted nainly fron the high turnover rate and lack of qualifieations of the admi.nistrators. Most of them r+ere nilitary persorurel who did not have formal training

in disbursing funds or keepJ-ng personnel records. Ttre GAO found that

ci-vllians ui'ro administered this work made far feuer ""to"".8 Campbell attrlbuted inefficiency and waste to ueaknesses on the part of heads of agencies and their top administrators and to the assigrrment of untrained rnilitary persoru:el. Strong admini-stratorg

used manpower effectivety; weak ones permi-tted or caused unnecessary work, duplicating fr:nctions, dj-ffusion of responsibility, and eostly procedures. Faj-lures could be corrected only by continuity of assign- ment and proper traini-ng, Carrpbell asserted that, because of the tremendous complerity of their operations, the subdivision of functions, and the consequent fragnrentatj-on of individual responsibili-ty, the

servj.ces had come to rely on rtnanagement by exception,rt whereby indi- viduals were presrmied to be performing adequately except when the con- trary could be demonstrated. As a result, incompetent people were 9 retained in a great variety of positions. L2

when Joseph s. rmirie, Assistant secretary of the Air Force (Materiel), asked members of his offi-ce and the Air staff to coment on campbellts statement, most of them denied that the GAO had given a fair descri-ption of cunent conditions in the A,ir Force or Depart- ment of Defense. Pointing out that Carrpbell had eonstructed his case from GAO reports going back as much as six years, staff agencies declared that in the past two years the Air Force had conducted a vigorous carnpaign to improve managenent, cutting out nearly 4rooo jobs in maintenance alone. rhey freely adnitted failures, mainly because of the ueaknesses of individuals and the size of the system, but they thought the uastes cited by C.AO represented only a very snall percentage of the overall operation. Nevertheless, Aaron J. Racusin, Inj-riets deputy for procurement ltanagement, asserted that Carrpbellrs strictures l,ere highly pertinent. He thought that the Aj-r Force had been neglectj-ng its most valuable asset--its people--and relying too heavi-ry on written procedures, guidelines, and regulations. Racusin thought the Air Force should jmprove efficiency by attracting corpetent people, pronoting those already in the system, and placing its best talent in responsible positions.lo

Meanuhile, congress had gone considerabry beyond criticisn and cajolery in its effort to inprove the nilitary use of manpoter. Legis- lation in JuIy and August 1950 specifically limited the number of nili- tary persorurel and civilians, the number of railitary officers on duty in each headquarters of the arned servlces, and the dollars spent for headquarters administration. rn addition, congress placed a rlmit on T3 the nunber of officers on flying status. Although Secretary of the Alr Force D.rdley C, Sharp e:pressed grave concern lest too rigid a l-initation on headquarters personnel ha,unper management of advanced weapon systems, his successor, Er.r.gene M. Zuckert, stated that he usually fowrd it possible to operate under the ceilings without undue difficulty,Il In August 1951 Congress threatened additional severe restrictions on the use of nanpolrer. In its report on the DQD Appropriations Bill of L962, the House Com'idttee on Approprj-ations noted the continu-lng rise in manpower costs d.espite large reductions in nunbers, and it

repeated with ner^r vigor the old charge that there must be something drasti-ca]}y wrong with the nnj-litary systen of nanpower management' trunaccept- The contaj-ttee warned that personnel eosts vtould soon reach an able leveln if the services did not nake basic and far-reaching lmprove- raents. Carlile P. hrnge, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), thoqght that the report portended great danger for defense prograrns unless the services furnished convincing and comprehensive rejoinders' In reply, the Air Force pointed out that rising personnel costs were a direct reflecti.on of the growing denands for higher quality' It argued convincingly that an honest effort had been nade to control costs, demonstrating that nanpol,er costs uere not consr:ming any larger share of the budget than in for"roer years. l,levertheless, as eryendi- tures ro5e, the presSrrres for nanpower ec6nomies grew strol$€ro In

May L963 Zuckert and his staff faced a new and thorough examination

by the llanpor,er Utilization Subconmittee, ntrich asked for information 1l+ and {rn e}Planation of almost every phase of military and civilian nan- pouer rarrag"*"rrt.u

Congressional insi-stence on greater economy in the use of manpower uas reinforced by similar sentjments from the Idhite House, especially after the Kennedy Administration carne to power in January 1961. USAF efforts to obtain relief from what it considered unreasonable man- power ceilings were frequently den-ied on the ground that strength totars were so closely supervised by the white House, through the Bureau of the Budget, that OSD could increase manpouer for one function on\y by taking lt arnay from another. Consequently, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNanara had to make nany difficult deci.sj-ons as to wtrich function had the greater priority. T?re decisions became increasingly difficult, of course, when President John F. Kennedy created several nelr projects, aI1 of wtrich required tnanpower. Pressure from the !{hite House becane especially persistent after Congress passed the Federal Salary Refomr Act of October 1962. In con- formity with prornises he had nade to congress, president Kennedy instructed each government agency to keep the nrrrber of j_ts employees to an absolute minimtm. the BOB, the Civil Servlce Counnj-ssion, and the heads of all departments and agencies were directed to rrndertake system- atic manporcr inspections and revlews. B0B, rdrich uras primarily respon- sible for seeing that the directive was carried out, scrutinized. anew all procedures for insuring econony. President Kennedy rnas especially concerned about the use of sci-entists and eng5-neers, oince in this field the governnent was conpeting for skills that were very searce. v

At the end of October, B0B j-sgued Circular A'l+l+t wtrieh stressed, as had President Kennedy, the necessity for keepj-ng rr,anponer at a bare m:inimr-m. In addition, i-t required defense agencies to submit statements describing in detail their prograns for i"urproving nan- polr€r eontrols. 0n 3 December QSD di.rected the armed services to make replles covering both nilitary and civilian personh€I. Narrati"ve materials .uere due on 21 December, 18 days later, u'ith a conplete schedule of speci"fic actions being taken or pianned due by 15 March 'l? 1963.-- The difftculty and r:ncertainty imposed on approved prograns by such directives r^ras illustrated by their effect on the Aj-r Forcets attenrpt to strengthen its laboratorles. Shortly before President

Kennedy lssued his directive, Brockr"ray McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Foree (n&n), and his Speci-al Assistant for Laboratori-est

Edward M. Glass, had received taeit QSD approval for a plan to nearly double professional staffs in the laboratories. Slnce ltihite House di-recti.ves often tended to rtsnow-balil and transform constraints into inflexible restrictions, Glass feared that he would not be able to carry out the laboratory program Htlich he considered essential for the

Air Force Systems Com'nand (AfSC) and the 0ffiee of Aerospace Research lOAn). He feared that centralized control of scarce nanpoterr lengthy justifications, detailed leviews and inspections, and mountains of papertrork would smother the project before it rsas under uay. After urging lIcMillan to discuss thig problem with Zuckert and Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and bngineering (nnnee), 15

Glass taLked to ldaj. Gen. Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr,, Di.rector of Man- pol'rer and Organization, wtro e:prained that seeoingJy contradictory directives r*re co,'''non and that officials had to use nature judge- ment in acti,g on them. Glass agreed, but he stated that matr:re judgenent r"las often lacking at rrrniddre qtanagement and base level,rl He nade a final prea to DDn&g to insure that the apprication of BB circular A-44 would not disrupt the nanning of the raboratories. In April 1963 Grass was still as to 'ncertain the effect of the manpower squeeze. He was stirl wrabre to obtai-rr spaces or exercise frexlbility in asslgnment and reassignment, and two AFSg laboratories had been notified that substantiar cuts rdere forthcoming. At the same time, however, cen. lllillian F. McKee, vice chief of staff, assured Dr' McMiILan that AFSC and OAR had been directed to adnini-ster thelr reduetions r,rithout adverse\r affecting the l-aboratories. At least through the renainder of fiscar year 1963, this seened to have been accomplished.14

OSD and USAF Responses For more than two years before the Kcnnedy directive of October 1962, the Force Air had been naking strenuous efforts to economi ze on the use of manpower. Headqrrarters USAF exerclsed constant surveillance over the use of personnel at alr echerons of the Air Force, strictly eontrolled space authorizations by fr:nction, and conducted periodic surveys to deterrine nranpor,rcr requi.renents and cheek on econony meas- ur€sr Drring this perlod, the Air staff rapidly reduced noneombat T7 mi ssion support flying, as rrell as the nrrmber of aircraft assigned to this activity. In January 1960 the Alr Force began consolidating pl1ot trairring by providing a student with all phases of his under- graduate trai-ning at one base, saving ebout JOO spaces and $1.6 m:lllj-on. These economies raised questions in the Chief of Staffts Offiee as to whether the Air Force htould have enouglt people to carry out its missions, particularly after the hmitations of thc fiscal year 1961 brrdget becane evid.ent. In Jr:ne 1951 e,en. &mnett 0rDonnell, Comander- in-Chief, Pacific Alr Forces (paClf), told Zuckert that the increased workload irrFoscd by the Comr:nist threat to Iaos and South Vietnam nade it imperative that he be given the authority to hire more raainten-

ance people. Before the end of December, OSD raised the ceiLing slightlyt tightened the manpouer but i-n the neantine the Berlin crisis had "q,r""r".15 In March 1962 Secretary Zuckert directed the Air Staff to e:plore evory

possible avenue for decreasing the nunber of USAF personnel in E\rope. This action, taken in large part to dimi-nish the flow of gold from the tfrrited States, resulted in closing or redueing activities around

london, eliminating rnany units in the Urrited States Air Forces in Europe (USAfg), transferring work to the tkrited States, and moving certain Military Air Transport Service (Uarc) misslons from Europe to the Llnlted

States. Ttre Strategic Alr Con1grand (SAC) cut about 5rO@ iobs ln hitain and Spain by e:,panding use of the reflex concept--assigning B-47 squadrons to E\rrope for short perj.ods instead of stationing wj-ngs there on long

assignments. In June 1963 l"lcNantara obtained the consent of President Kennedy to a further reduction of SAC forces in Europe. By reducing 18

and consolidating reflex forces in Britain and spain, OsD planned to

returnj two bases to Great Britain and transfer functions of the ?th

Air Division in that country to the 16th Aj-r Force i-n spain. Ttrj-s 1A plan was scheduled to go into effect on 1 JuJ.y !96l*.'" Dete:srined that organizational adjustnents rrithin the services

should not increase manponer, OSD insj-sted that all proposed declsions on organi-zation, reorganization, consolidatj-on, or transfer of frrnc- tions contain detailed staffing plans, both of the old and the new organization. OsD r.roul-d furni-sh guidance, set manpor,rer ceilings, and nake the firral decision. These tight controls and McNa:nara?s reluctance to approve increases often created serious problems w"ithin the .{,1r Force.

In l"Iay 1962, after llcNamera had turned doun an urgent USAF request for addltlonal nanpower spaces, Zuckert told chief of staff cwtj-s E. Iel4ay that this appeared to be a foreruner of the ttattitude dorvnstairsrD$ tor.rard USAF personnel requirements and that tt...there is just going to be no give in nlanpoller ceilings, even for very important items.rl Zuckert belleved that the Air Force roould have to review its fi-rrctions and nake painful decisions concerning activiti.es that could be elirninated or cut back. He r*anted the Chief of Staff ts vlews on rvtrat measures should be taken.l7

Acting for the chief of staff, General McKee agreed thalthe Air

Force would have to re-exanjne its activitj-es and ellminale, o1- reduee those of lowest priority. Adrnittedly, this would bring the Air Foree face to face lrith painful decisions, but the other alternative was to have usAF managernent directed by OsD, McKee proposed to set up, a board tEOsD r*as located on the floor below OsAF in the pentagon. I9 of generel officers to conduct a thorough study and then reeomend elinjnatlon or reduction of thosc fwrctions, organizatione, or lnstalla- tions not absolutely necessary to the USAF mission' also About the time McKee received Zuckertrs memorandtm, he had of received McNamarats FroJect 29, vrtrich required a detailed review general support forces and their substantial reduction, and Projeet J!' whlch called for reduction in headqr.rarters staffs, military and civlliant and ln the nr.mber of internedlate headqrrarters--those between Headquarters usAF and the basic troop units. McKee thought these comprehensive he studj-es l*ould result in a substantial cut back in nanpower, but and then r,nelted a stjJ.l broader strrdy that uould examine each function set priorities that rrere related to the amor.rrt of nroney the Air Force expected to obtaln.18 prepared A ll,anpower Posture Improvement Board was established, wtrich of a report 1n September. Its reception i]l the office of the Secretary Assist- the Air Force uas not aeclai.ned. BenJa,rrin w. Fbidger 0sAF special ant for Manporrer, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, asserted that the not board had fall-ed to abide by l'lcKeets lnstructj'ons. It had declded extrene to recononend abandonnent or transfer of m:iesions, drarnatic or under aetions, or arur action not rrithin the capacity of the Air Force pre- its cupent budget and nanpouer ceiling. Sj-nce these li'uritations eluded the i.naginati-ve thinking utrich McKee had requested, the board mail recormended manpor'rer cuts in suclt conparatively minor items as Fridge and records, inforrnationu and }eg5-slative liaison services'

sharpJ-y criticized the board because it failed' to make reconmendations 20

coneerning cotrmand and control or research and development--areas wtrich most needed improvement.l9

rn his advice to Zuckert, Fridge enurnerated sj-x alternatlves: (1) accept the boardrs report and the snall improvements it recormended; (2) disregard the report and set up a new board, wtrich night not do any better, tthr.u:ran relations in the nilitary being wtrat they are;' (3) j-n phce the project the hands of civilian e>rperts, wtro uould have to be educated in military parlance, probably prohlbitive in cost and tfure; (4) set up a snall worki-ng group of officers ix the offlce of Secretary the to serve ov€r a long tern and attack each fqnction as a separate problern; (5) i.ssue an order to the chief of staff, specifying required actions; or (6) rraintain the status q!ro, and eventr:alJy osD uould evaluate USAF roissions and tell the Air Force r*rat to do. Fridge advlsed zuckert to adopt the forrth of these arternatives, and the Secretary appeared to have agreed ui.th hin.2o

In Decenber 1962 Zuckert convi.nced OSD, at least temporarily, that the Air Force needed more rnanpower, mainly because of increased airborne alert trainlng and preparations for speeial warfare in Southeast Asia.

McNamara assr.red zuckert that, during the nexb flve months, r,henever oSD approved a change ln the Air Force progran that required additional peopler he uorrld add them to the current strength cei-Iing. Before the end of the five months, houever, Zuckert would have to rr,..coeplete and review u:lth ne a thorough analysis of the Air Force strength requlrements and ". relate such requirements to the approved force structure and to the support program, including bases associated hr:ith that force strrlcture.rr 2T

This seemed to reinforce Flj-dgers uarnlng that the Ai-r Force ndght lose all flexibility in nanaging its manpower if it dld not soon

come up with irnagtnative plans for more economical use of lts per9onnel._21 It should not be assmed, however, that the Air Force failed to nalte progress in econoni-zing on maltpower, or that OSD r'ras generallJr

dissatisfied with USAF accorplishments. In sone respectsr the Air Force rns doing a better management iob than the other services and nlnning wide acclaim for j-ts achievements. In May 1962 Jases N. Davist Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Produetion llanageurent), declared

that OSD t{as very favorably impressed with the management of rnaintenance

personnel on USAF bases, that Air Force maintenance was i:nprovlng greatly, and that the Air Force had the nrost effective audit and control systen in the Defense Deparfunent. Davis uondered if the Alr Force planned to exert the sane scruti.ny and control over other base personnel. He

said OSD was rgetting in the habit of l-ooking to the Air Force for leadershi.p in such nnatters.ft Fbidge replied that the Alr Force had nade encouraging progress in manpower utilizatlon in arany fields. Manageraent of naj-ntenance llorkers

r"ras merely the furthest aIong, but there were also effective controls in sr.pply, civil engS-neering, comptroller, and comunications' Fridge e:cplained that the Air Force enployed the Manpower Validatj-on Progran, inaugurated in July 1960, to analyze m€rnpovrer requirements. l?tis pro- graln, derived from standards generaLly accepted by industry, work sanpling, hlstorical e>perience, and manpower surveysr was used to 22

detetmine the nan-hours required to do a speclfic Job. After suffici- ent date nere acctmulated and validated, they uere eruployed in setting standards w*rich r*ere turned over to supervisors as aids in rnanagenent. l*ten sufficiently tested, the stardards uere used as one factor in distributing nanpower resources. r?re validation progran paid rich

dividends, the Alr tr'orce estimating that by May 1962 it had saved

about 4r00o spaces for transfer to nore essentiar work, and by June f963 rnore than 5, joo.22

The manporrer validati-on program attracted wide attention and enulation throughout the U.S. Goverrunent and abroad during 1962 and.

1963. In Febrrrayy 11962 the Bureau of the E:dget becane interested and a few months later published an article on the subject in the nFB

Management Bulletin.n In June 1963, BOB asked General Davis, Director of l"Ianpower and Organization, to lecture on the progran before inter- depart',rmental conferences and the Society for Personnel Adnjnistratlon. The Federar Aviation Agency asked for tllo usAF officers to help put the system into effeet in that agency. Ttre Roya1 Canadian Air Force (nCAf1 and the Roya1 Aj-r Force sent representatives to study the system, and in Jrrne 1953, the RCAF began putting a sjm:ilar progran into opera- 23 t'10n.

To perfect manpouer controls, vice chief of staff McKee in Jr:ne 1963 advised the Force Estimates Board that he believed it needed to pay more attention to nanporrcr needs and costs wtrile developing Air Force progranF. Before giving its approval, the board should demonstrate that the program could be carried out rrith eurrently authorlzed manpor^ier. 23

Otherw:ise the board should be able to erylain to OSD how additional manpower night be justifiud.2A

By Janr.rary 1963 the Air Foree had roell--organized and effectively functioning nachinery for controlling the use of n .11power. In the 0ffice of the Secretary, the nachinery was controlled by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Urfranf), Mr. Fridge; at Headquarters USAFT by the Director of Manpower and Qrganization, General Davis. Head- quarters allocated authorizatj-ons to the major comrands and separate agencies to support approved prograrns to the extent possible lrithin

OSD-imposed ceil-ings. Requirements that could not be net within the ceiling were deferred rrrttil nore people became available' The comnands and separate agencies apportioned thej-r manpower and then prepared urdt- narutj-ng doeurnents that reflected the nrmbers and kj-nds of people needed to carry out each mission. The total numbers and grades within a comnand or agency eould not exceed the strength and grades authorized for that conmand or agency by Headquarters USAF. ?he Air Force divided its total task into honogeneous groupings of about 7O task groups or functions, each described and ldentified by a fi.urctlonal reporting code. T?ris code, the for.rndation of the USAF nan- power control system, applied to both nilitary and civilian personnel' Air Force Manual (AfM) 26-1 delineated broad gUidance on integration of manpower and jobs to be done, detennination of rated officer require- ments, control of officer grad.esr control of airrnan Srades and skillst officer-airnan distributj-on, uti-llzation of ci-vilianst standard rnan-hour requirements, and justification of increased reguiirem€nts. Ttre Air 2l+

Force also studied specific functions or individrral r:nits, organiza-

tions, and oversea deplo;aent. these studies led to economies when- ever possibler such as the consolidation of support activities in the )E' Tokyo a,r€8.o/

Dring the spring of 1963, the Air Forcets studies of manpower requirements and its arlrnitted success in achieving economy continued to receive plarrdits, rn Jrrne L963, &rs c. Lee, osD Director of Man- poner requirements and Utllizatlon, told General Darris that the latest study of Air Force rnnpower requirements and nanagement was excellent, that lt greatly increased OSD understanding of Air Force requirenents, and that the Air Force would benefit from this better understanding.25 Nevertheless, the Air Force often felt overburdened by the r.relter of reports, studies, and reviews requested by 0sD. After a request for a neu report on the USAF program for inproving productivity and rnan- power controls, Davis comented that the Alr Force had already sub- nitted a qrrarterly report on this subject wtrich had furnished mueh of the sane lnforuation. He thought it r.rorrld be in the intprest of economsr to e:pand the fonnat of the existlng report rather than prepare a new report. James P. Goode, 0SAF Deputy for Manpower, Personnel, and

Organi-zation, also conplained about the duplication of reports. Si.nce the Alr Force had an unusually heavy brrden of rmrk and too few people to do lt, he needed more tj-ne than OsD alIorred to prepare nanponer pro- grams. Moreover, both Coode and Davi.s seerned to agree that w|en the

Aj-r Force saved nanpordcr spaces j.n one function or area, OSD frequently cut the l,ir Force ceiling instead of allow:ing the spaees to be used where they nere desparately needed.27 25

III. MILITARY I'{ANPO!{ER

usAF ndlitary nanpower difficrrlties during th" t95ote lrere frequently those of earlier years, rendered more acute by the passage of ti-ne and the advance of technolory. New problens, horacver, also arose fron new issues or crises that monopolized effort and resources' In April lt96J', for exarnple, the Air Foree inaugurated a specific pro- gran to train forces for cowrterinsurgency operations in r:nderdeveloped countries, especially in Southeast Asia.* In the officer corPs, the rnaior difficulties were the shortage of general officers, the removal of older men fron flying status and the training of yowg ones to replace them, the attraction and retention of scientists and engineers, and relief from grade limitations in the field grad.es. With airmen, the old difficrrlty of the retention of trained people still seemed to defy a satisfactory solutj-on. Other important problems were administration of proficiency payr shortages in certain skills and grades, restrictions on nonconmissioned officer (UCO) grades, and the general trainisg of technj.cians' lfomen in the Air Force (Waf) presented no particu-lar problems except that of recrult- ing, wtrich could be attributed chiefly to the exceptionally high stand- ards the Air Force denanded of its female contingent. 0n occasj-on, the general question of the morafe and physical con- dition of U.S. rni'iitary people attracted the attention of the highest

-r.For a discussion of this progran, see Charles H. Hll-dreth, Cogt-ef- -U94F pp 6-18' ffi;F4ffiinsurqency Doctri-nes ana capaiil:.Lies. y/4.'L962, AFCHOT Feb 5i+, 26

councils of govermaent. rn Febrrraw Lg6o, c,ordon Gray, special Assistant to the Presj.dent for Nationar security .affairs, asked the secretary of Defense for a report on this question, stating that the

National Security Council Planning Board had becone concerned. about the morale, motivation, and physical condition of draftees. Based on studies conducted by the three services, osD replied

that general attitudes toward military service, disciprine, and willingness to undergo hardehip v,'ere a rittle more favorable than during past peacetjme periods. Absences w'ithout leave and the nmber

of pri-soners had declined signifieantly u:ithin the services betrrcen 1957 arfl 1960. I?re Air Force had e:perienced a drop of one-third in serious offenses and prisoner poprrlation durlng these years. Itre ch1ef adverse effects on morale seened to derlve from the beliefs of serrrice- men that there were relatively abundant econonic opportr:nities in civ- illan llfe and the public held a low opinion of nilitary service. ?he servlces courd find no evldence that the physical eondltion

of men of draft age was deterioratixg. Perhaps they had bccome softer because of the fewer physical denands of modern riving, but noneffective- ness ratee for nedical causes were lower in June 1950 ttran ever before.

For ttre Air Force, this rvas stirl true in June 1953. ltre Air Force believed that its uren could develop strong endrrrance and stanina in a short time when necess&ry. Most of lts Jobs, however, required

relatively little hearry exercise. It should be noted that since 1957 only the Arny had been conpelred to draft men. rhe other services accepted on\r volunteers.l 27

0ffice$r

The shortage of field-grade officer positions caused by the Officer Grade l;jmitation Act of L954 has haarpered the Air Force sjnce Lg59." Recognizing the tnequity of the law, in June 1959

Congress pernr:j-tted the Air Force to exceed temporarily the legaI cei-ling for najors by J'OOo, but it provided no permancnt relief. Six uronths later Secretary Strar? declared that without relief by the end of June 1961, wfien the tenrporary authori-zation e:pired, the Air Force would have to curtail teuporary promotions to grades above captain. In September 1961 Congress favored the Air Force agaj-n by authorizing, bhrorrgh Jr:ne 1963, 4rOOO new lieutenant colonel positi-ons' Meanr*hile, il January L96l- a special OSD cosrittee, headed by Lt' Gen. Charles L. Bolte, USA (Ret'), recowtended a unifor"ro field-grade authorization table and a single selection system for the three serv- ices. The Aj-r Force supported legislation to put these recorrnendations into effect since they would have provided most of the positions the

Air Foree needed. OSD did not transmit a legislative proposal to

Congress until March 1963, however, and at the end of L963, it was 2 stalled in a legislative 1og jam. The Air Force received authority, hor.rever, to fill its quota of regrrlar officers. In 1956, Congress had passed the Ilegular 0fficers Augnentation Act, w?rich authorj-zed the Air Force to increase its regular officer strength from 2Jr500 to 69rh25. At the sarire time, hoilever,

+EFor an e:planation of this situation, see George F. Lemterr.Shg Chaneing Cftggg"t of Air Force Manpgr^rer. VbA52, pp 22-.26' ", 28

President Dr,,right D. Ej-senhower, on the reconmendation of 0sD, set an interfur ceiling of 55t5t+O to be reached during 1963 Jn order to

insure an order\r buildup and high qrrality. By March 1961 the .q,ir

Force was approaching the interim ceiling and had increased the edu-

cati-onal lever and career potential of its regular officers. To encourage naxi-mrm professional_ism u:ithin the officer corps, zuckert

asked McNarnara to obtain removal of the interim ceiling and allow the Air Force to continue its orderly buildup to the statutory cej-Iing. McNamara agreed and persrraded President Kerrnedy to remove the interim ceiling.-?

Joint, combiaed, and osD staffs appreciably increased during the Kennedy adninistration end aroused concern udthin the Air staff. ry Decenber 1951 the Air Force had suppried from its severely limited

resourees more than Zr@O spaces to joint actj-vities, and some USAF

officials beU-eved that the drain threatened. to reduce combat effective- ness. By May L962 the figur"e had grown to 10ro@, including 10J general offi-cers, appro:d.natery 2l+ percent of the Air Forcers total. Head- quarters insisted that the Air Force was already considerably short of general officers and that i-ts o'n workload had increased..

The Ai-r staff was equally concerned, horrcver, that the Air Force have sufficient representation in OSD and joint agencies. gfficials ln both the Air Staff and the Secretaryrs office felt that the other nilitary services had controlled positions that exerted substantial influcnce on thc USAF role in national defensc. lhese officials recog- nized that the future of the Air Force depended on decisions by the 29 joint agencies and by QSD, since they eontrolled USAF cornbat commands, resources, ed to a large extent, supporting forces. since this centraU-zation of control l.Jas liJ

) solution,*

Ttre Air Force made a nrmrber of important adjustments in the manage- nent of its rated personnel--pilots and navigators. EVer since the Korean War, Congress had strongly criticized the Air Force for spending large sr:ns of money to maintain the proficiency of flying officers actually Surplus to its need.s. ltre Air Force clearly recognized the necessj-ty of reducing the nunber of flying officers after the rrer l*ten its conbat aircraft units were reduced and emphasi.s shifted to strategic nissiles, It also saw that it had to fi.rrd sone means of cutting the cost of tlroficiency flying.rr On the other hand, the Air Force needed to provide an incentive to new pilots and navigators by protecting their future careers and i-ncome. 30

In Febnrary 1959 the Air Forcc proposcd an tfaccrualrt pay system, and in 1960 the Bureau of the Erdget suggested rrrequitalr pay to eom- pensate men removed from flying status trfor the convcnience of the Government.tt Both systems would havc entitlcd thcse men to a certain pcrecntage of thelr flight pay cvcn though they did no flying. Ilnder thc accrual p1an, men with 2O or more years of Itrated servicett rould have received 100 percent of thei-r flight pay. Neither plan ever cl-eared congress, and in 1953 ttre Air Force asked that they be held in abeyance,S

Meanwtrile, in March r95r, the Air Force reported to OsD that the eli-nination of approximateb T rLAO surplus rated officers r,loul-d probably save {124.2 rni-llion the next year, including reductions in flight pay and operation and naintenance costs. Reqrrital pay for men removed fron flying would have decreased the savi-nS by $l miJ.lion. To help the Air Force cut these costs, Congress authorlzed the waiver of flying requirements for officers r,{:ith 20 or more years of rated serrice. In the fiscal year 1t61 appropriation aet, Congress ljmited the nr:nber of avi-ators in the Department of Defense wtlo wor:ld actrrally fIy. As pressure increased, the Air Force ruaj-ved flying reguirements for officers rated more than 20 years, renoved certain mon from flying status, and reduced proficiency flying. utj-rizing a provision of the 1962 appropri- ations act, the Ai-r Force excused about 3rgoo pilots and navigators with more than 15 years of flying e>cperience from proficiency flying, effective 1Jul.y 1962. Begirueing 1Jirly 1963, it excused fromn flyine most officers who uere {J years old and had conrpleLed, 22 years of flying 31 service. Between 1960 and 1963, about 61000 pilots nure withdrarnr frora mission-support flying.

These moves just about balanced the nr.mber of rated officers and current requi-rements. But this was no clear-cut issue. Srttressing the USAF argrment that it was dangerous to cut back too far, the Ber1i-n crisis in the fall of 1961 brought a temporary reversal of emqlhasis. Because of this cri-sis and eoncurrent prcparatlons for possible local

conflicts, McNa:aara aeked Congress to remove the statutory ceiling on the nrrmber of officers on active flying status. During this crisis the Air Forcets reguiremcnt for rated officers rose from about 62t3@

to about 691930.o Soon after the Berlin crlsls, the Air Force had to shift ite attention from the rated-officer surplus to the threat of pilot short- age, since the need for pilots inereased steadily and substantially. Despite the surplus in the older-age groupe the Air Force faced a rapidly growing shortage of yor:ng pilots. About half of the older pilots had been trained during World War II and uould not be available

for conbat much longer. In August 1962 OSD agreed to increase tho pilot

training rate by 1966 to 2'OOO per year for the active establishment,

plus 22l+ for military assistance and the Air National 6rard. Qy the

fal-I of 1962, Headquarters USAF could see that this increase would be

i-nsuffiej.ent. On 19 June 1953, it proposed a rate of 3rl*OO, to be reached in 1968, even though this v,nuld require far-reaching curriculurt changes or a crash e:pansi-on of training bases. QSD did not approve 32

this new proposaf- and at the end of Jwre 1953 had not released enough construetlon funds to insure that the 2r@0-per-year rate could be achieved.T

The Air Force also e:gerienced a pressing and growing need for

eryeri.enced officers trained in science, engineering, and managenent. si-nce 1961 ceneral LeMay has proclajmed this as the most critj-cal need of the modern Alr Force. rn December 1961 only rgrL52 of the 30r37O officers in positions that required sci.entific or engineering training had degrees in these fields. Fifty-six percent of the majors ed 45 pereent of the captains fi].ling jobs that called for this educa-

tion did not have college d.egrees. Of the 55rgOO officers in the grade

of najor and below without corlege degrees, more than 1Jr!J0 r.lere regular offlcers. Iet a,unong these men hrere the future leaders of the Air Force.

Dtiring 1951 and Ig62 Lhe Air Force estirnated the number of officers

trained in science and engj.neering that it rryould need through 1!Zo, as well as its likelihood of obtaining them. The conclusions rere far from encowaging: no less than 95 pereent of its new officers should possess college degrees and there would be a shortage of at least 101000 in officers &,rith graduate training. In trying to fulfirl these needs, the Eklucational Requirements Board at Air l.irriversity encountered varying degrees of reslstance. A considerable nurber of officers were reluetant to apply for schooling in the Air Force rnstitute of *Irr^O"tober Lg63 OSD_did approve gradually increasing the rate to 2r7OO per year by 1t58. 33

Technology (lf'tf)r*' as well as other prograns, because they feared that prolonged absence from their assigned conmands worrld jeopardize their careers. I\rrther"more, until procedures were changed in ldovember 1951, their applications often uere delayed unreasonably a uhen processed throrrgh channels to Headquarters USAF." Authoritative sources of inforsation, including the Erreau of l,abor Statistics, Nati-onal Science Foundation, and S:gineers Manpouer Council, anticipated a crj-tical, shortage of trained nanpower during the decade of the 196Ors. In the federal government alone, demand

for engineers rllas e>qpected to inerease by 77 rO@ or 44 percent, for

scientists by 86160O or 82 percent. lhe cj.vilian econony would need

an additional- combj.ned j-ncrease of about 1r0O0r00O persons trained

j-n these di-scipliles. Head.quarters USAF believed that the Air Force

r,rrould require at least l1rOOO new officers trained for jobs dlrectly related to science and englneerlng, The futr:re prospects of the United States for gradr:ating these specialists appeared inauspicious, especially uhen compared to prospects of the Soviet tlnion, its chief conrpetitor in the cold war. In 1961

the Unj-ted States graduated 901000 scientists and engineers, the Soviet llnion reportedly l9OrOOO. W I97O, the Soviei Union r*as eryected to graduate 2!0,OOO scientists and engineers per yearr the llnited States no more than $8r@O before 1965. Adnuittedly these ca1cuJ'ations !'ere rough estirnates that had to be viewed with skepticism. Iess open to

*AFIT, a division of Air LlnJ-versity, trained most of its students through contracts with civilian universi-ties. A few hundred a year (about 20 percent) studied at the Besi-dent College, Wright-Patterson AFB, 0hio. 2t. questionr however, was the conclusion that in the united states, between 195o and 1970, there would be an annual deficit of about

281860 scientists and 36rLl+O engineers. ?here r,ouLd obvj.ously be sharp conpetition anong eroployers for these men. with niuch justlfl- cation, the Air Force feLt that lt would be difficult to obtain the trained people it needed.9

Under l€Mayts aegis, higher education for USAF officers became the subject of a eoncerted drive. After 1961 tire Air Force nade every effort to insure that no less than 95 percent of its new officers possessed a college degree. It planned to increase AFITts educational progran drastj-cally, and it e:panded the Offieers lbaining Sehool (OtS), uirich enrolled only college graduates, wrtil by fiscal year 1963 0TS graduated more officers than the Air Force Reserve Offieers Tra5nlng corps (nrnogc) in the co11eges. flre Aj-r Force also entered into an agreement with George Wash5ngton Uni.versity whereby the l"atter offered wrdergradrrate and gradr.nte work to students of the Air comoand and staff corlege and Air lfar corlege. Off-duty (Bootstrap) educatlon was j-ncreased at cj.vilj-an colleges and r:niversi.ties, lncluding a pro- gran for lawrch-control offj-cers at Minuteman b."u".10

The Air Force algo reforsred AFROTC, now obsolescent because so fer* basie students becane advanced students and offi-cers. A proposal, originating at Air university in August 1960 and soon accepted by the

Aj-r Force Council, recowtended that the four-year course be abandoned jn favor of a tr*o-year merit scholarships for career offi-cer training. under thi-s proposal, college students wtro accepted seholarships, and 35 upon graduation rpre tendered comtissions, would serve four years on actlve duty, It took r111til JuIy 1952 to devise legislation aeceptable to the other serviees and OSD. A proposed bil_t sent to the Bnreau of the Budget in Septenbet 1962 proved unacceptable, and a new one wae subrnltted in Jr.rre 1963. If passed by Congress, i-t would pernrit the rnilitary departurents to operate two-year ROTC pro- trams, w'ith scholarships, instead of or in addition to eurrent prograJns. It Despite the grow'ing need for college-trained offj-cersr at the end of Jr:ne 1963 it appeared that the near future vtould witness a con- traction, rather than an eryansion, of educational pro$rams.* OSD cut back sharply the Air Forcets plan to e:pand AFITts student body to t+r5@ in fiscal year 1964 and w:ithheld fwrds for erpansion of the resident school at llright-Patterson AFB. OSD also- ljmited tuition funds for offleers ettending elvlJ-lan colleges to about $e.9 nittlon in figcel year 196&. Headquarters USAF considered this figrrre about {i775r0OO short of the requirement. Because of the chronlc shortage of fundst the Air Staff set up a cowrittee to exardrre all offlcer educatj-on and training courses and elirninate those not absolutely essential. ltre comnittee deleted 18 short eollege courses for fiscal year 195i+ and

xThe Ait Force did achieve a consj-derable gain in college-traj-ned officers during fiscal- year L963. At the end^ of Jr:ne 1952, out of a total of 134r9Og ofticers, 651513 (about 49 percent) fraa bachelor or higlrer degrees. A year later there were '751260 bachelor or higher degrees (iUout 56 percent) out of a total of 1331763. 0f those with couege degrees aLthe end of June 1963, about L3r57o had taken them in science or engineering. Of these, L64 had earned doctorates; 21080, masters; and the renrainddr, bachelori. (Inforqation furnished by USAF Data Services Center, 10 Feb 64.) 36

planned to cut spaces in others by 20 percent. Although these meas- ures were necessary to stay rrithin budget restrictlons, they did not conceal an acute shortage of trained people that night seriously li:'':it the Air Forcers ability to perform its rrission.l2

Airmen The Air Force continued to confront the old problem of obtaining and holding enough skilled and erperj.enced aimren to sustain operations

and combat capability, rn the 195ors the faih:re to hold these men

became more serious because of the increasing cornplexity of equipurent

and the greater variety of missions. rn the sumer of 195o, Head- quarters USAF decided that !J percent of the airmen should have career status (tour or more years of service). Actuarly, j-n some of the highly technical fields, such as electronics and mechanical mainten- ance, the desired proportion r,ras 5o percent or hi_gher. To nreet this objective, the Ai-r Force needed to enlist airr:nen wiro could absorb a high degree of technical training and then be selective in inducing a large nrurber of them to reenIi"t,l3

Beginning in l-950 both the percentage of career airnen on duty and the rate of reenlistnent dropped severely. Fbom Jr:ne 1959 to June 1961 the percentage fell from close to 6o to uelL below the desired 55 and the first-term reenlistment rate from about l*5 percent to about 24. The Air Force attributed these losses to the r*ithdrawal of reenlistment benefits, such as six-year enlistnents, bonuses, travel pay, and special assj.gruoent considerations, and Low incentives as corpared to opportunj-ties in industry. 37

Although the situation inproved substantially tn 1962, the Air Force contj.nued to fa1l short of its retention goals. In fiscal year

1963 it needed to retaln aLnost ?O percent of its trained aj'ruen but reenlisted only lJ percent of its first-term eirnen and not enough of the remainder of its erperienced men. For fiscal year 1961t it erpected to retain only about 8J percent of the nen it needed.* I?rj-s meant that the Air Force had littte chance during the foreseeable future of holding enough high-caliber, tralned, and eryerienced men.14 This failure caused grow'ing concern in the late sululer of 1960. In August of that year, Headquarters USAF sstiYnFted that SAC rqas short about 5r7@ trained airtten and the Air Force as a whole about 20r0OO. The loss of e4erienced nen plus a slurrp i-n recrrriting occr:ned during the activation of several new mj-ssi-Ie units, Tttis occasioned a sharp rise in technical training requirements, further heightening the shortage in combat corrnand,s, especially SAC. In addition, measures taken during the rrilitary crises of 1951 and, 1962 to improve conbat readi.ness, such as the retention of medir:m bornber and fighter unj-ts previously sched- uled for deactivation and an augnented alert, increased personnel requirements by several thousand. Since the Air Force was already plagued by airnran shortages, these measures aggravated the problem of achievi-ng combat readiness. There was also an i-nevitabte drop in quality, diffi- cult to neasure accurately but neverthel""u t"a1.15 xActually, first-term reenlistnents for fiscal year L961, reached only 29.5 percent of those eligible--about 60 percent of the stated require- ment.- (Statenent fron, USAF Military Persbnnel Center, I Feb 65.) 38

In March 1961 OSAF concluded that the high turnover among enlisted personnel could be reduced on].y by affording more opportrrnities for promotion--increasing the proporti-on of men in the top six grades--

airnran first class (E-4) through chief Master sergeant (E-9). About 35 ratr: almen w"ith more than forr years of serviee llere stagnating at

the E-3 level. During one l8-month period, appro:rimately SrJOO air"rnen--

f0 percent of them in the lower grades--left the Air Force because, lrith their nrm.ber of dependents and 1ow pay, they r.ere sufferisg hard- ships"

OSAF reconnnended raising the proportion of alrten in the top six grades to 60 percent and promoting approximately IO'OOO E-3rs. It believed that prornotions of more good men fairly early in their first term of service would encc/urage rnany of them to reen]-ist. Lack of funds prevented thls, but OsAF declared that if only 1r@o skilled men could

be held during fiscal years 1961 and 1962, the e:qpense of these promo- tions would be more than recouped by the saving 1n training costs. OSD was not easily persuaded, however. rts nanpolrer progran for fi-scal years 1963 and 1964 stilt held the Air Forcets proportion of airmen in grades 3-4 and above to well below the 60-percent *.k.16 ?o hold trajned airrnen, the alr Force relied chiefly on the pro- ficiency pay plan, first put into effect in November 195g. under this scheme, aj-rrnen in the nost critical skirls could, by araintaining high proficiency, qrlalify for extra pay--$30 per month in step p-l and $60 per month in P-2, The law provided for a third step and higher rates, but until October L963, OSD did not pernit these to go into effect. 39

Although the Air Force hoped to give 15 percent of lts airmen pro- ficiency pay by June 1962, OSD never allowed nore than 11.J percent. After 1950, the Air Force tho.ght that the rates for P-1 and P-2 were too low and ought to be raised to $50 and $100r respectively, and that

P-3 owht to be established at $150. OSD agreed to snraller raises, effective in October L963, and authorized the P-3 rating at $1O0 per month. Ert OSD denied additional fi:nds, and the Air Force could not apply the new rates w'ithout removing nany skil]ed, erperienced techni- cians from profi-clency pay status. Since the removal of so important an incentive night have had a deleterious effect on morale, and possibly in perforuance, the Air Force obtained OSDts permission to continue a larger percentage of airrnen on proficiency pay at the o1d, lor*er rates through fiseal year 1964 within the constraints of a s35.7 million LT1ry cel-J-t ng.

Ttre greatest penalty for the jnability to hold skilled technicians bns the lnordj-nate effort and e:pense of train:ing replacements. In the 1950rs an average of more than 1@rO@ airmen per year graduated front formal technical training courses. Ttris figure did not lnclude fhe several hundred thousand l*ro received on-the-job traini-ng. lhe Air Force devoted about 18 percent of its nanpol',er to trairing in one fonn or anottrer, and as technologr advancedr training tLne and elpense eontinued to increase. Most yorrng enlistees ilere high school graduates who needed technical skills before they eorrld perfom usefully. According to Lt'

Gen. Janes E. higgs, Conmrander of Air Training Comnand (AtC) fronr August ]:g59 ta July 1953, it usually took fj"ve months of schoollng in basic 40

electronics to prepare a recruit for intensive lnstruction in this field. Ordinarily, it required two years--half his first enlistment-- to make hjm a skilled electronic techni-cian. Few jobs requlred this much training, but man;' demanded as much as one /€&ro The governnent obvlously lost tjme, effort, and money when a trained airman left the Air Force at the end of his first enlistnaent.lS

The chief benefactors of the huge nilitary training effort, aslde from the recipients, was Amerj-can industry. Lt. Gen. Robert W. Burns, Brlggst successor at ATC, declared that the skills acquired in Air

Force service were almost wholly applicabJ-e to jobs in industry, and he suggested that the nationts benefits included the hundreds of thou- sands of USAF-trained technicians r^*ro were now civil-ian workers. He stated that the Air Force, through ATC, was turning out the largest share of this countryts ilaerospace age technicj-ans.tt

Tttis judgernent took on added national significance when the com- bined efforts of the nilitary services lrere assessed. In Noverrber 1963, Norrnan s. Paul, Assistent secretary of Defense (Manpor^rer), told the

Senate Subcornmittee on Tlnployrnent and l"Ianpower that more than l_.5 mil- lion of the 1.9 n:iI1ion enl-isted men and women discharged in the past six years had acquired skills with civilian counterparts. Among them were 403r000 mechanics, 32010O0 electronic technicians and equipnent operators, 79rooo nedical and dental technicians, and 4?rooo construc- tion craftsmen. Obviously, the services uere providing a large part of the cor:ntryts technical education, and some observers averred that it entaj-l-ed a burden that the nr-ilitary services should not have to bear. l-1

Since the nation refused to assune a legitimate responsibility for educating its citizens, they jmplied that it paj-d for much of this educatlon txrder the heading of national defen"e.f9 lr2

IV. CIVITIAN MA]JPOI{ER

The most significant problems relating to civilian manpower

Srew out of the requirement for a greater proportion of well-educated and e:qperieneed people, the changing firnctions and missions of the

Air Force, and the i-ncessant drive of Congress and the Administration for economy. Changes i-n functions and nissions frequently resulted in a lessening of lrcrk in one function or location and a heavier workload in another. Rapid teehnological changes, the Derlin and

Cuban crises, and preparation for loea1 war or insumections made such shj-fting frequent during I96O-L963. But rigid controls and justification procedures often delayed the shj-ft i-n manpower to the function or area r*iere activity had j-ncreased. ltre reigning political cUmate also favored reducing empl-oyment v,trenever possible. Because of Congressj-onal pressure, in fiscal- year IJ63 OSD directed a careful revielr of every vacancy at grade G5-11- o" rbo.ru.l Therefore it was more i:nportant than ever for the Air Force to obtain flexibil,ity in using its civil,ians, Sven before 1960 it had wanted to be free to nove higher-rankj-ng employees from one station to another within the tlnited States. This required compensating them properly for e:penses connected r^r-ith these noves. It rranted to insure that all qualified ernployees would be consjdered in fiJ-ling vacancies in grades GS-15 and above. By June 1"963, USAF procedures made thi-s mandatory. The Air Force also ranted to set up an orderly interchange of career employees between the tinited States and oversea installations. L3

In most cases these procedures required new legislation or changes in civi.l service regulati-ons. At the end of JUne 1953 the Air Force had not yet achj-eved all of these ai.:os.2

Adninistr-atiog and Training Althougb Air Force agency heads had lega1 authori.ty to move employees fron one geographical area to another, they seldon exercised it aga5nst the eryloyees I wiLl because the moves usr:alIy cost far more than the snrall government allouance. A Civil service comission study of errployees wtto accepted geographical reassignment durjng fiscal year 1952 shor,pd that four out of five lost moneyi 17 percent lost more than agreed $1'OOO each. Sr AWust 1952 high-ranklng civilians generally to move where they were most needed, but Congress did not authorize a relocation allouance, probably because a GAO report of September 1962 charged that NASA contractors had rBsted nearly $1 ni]-lion by pqving these allolrances to employees Y*to stayed on the Job less than a year after they were hired. GAQ estimated that eontractors spent millions nore in this fashion and that ultjmately the government paid the bi11.3 The Air Force frequently needed to fill oversea positions u'ith employees familiar with stateside operations and, conversely, state- side positions with entployees wtro had gained eryerience overseas. Since the best people were reluctant to accept foreign assigruments without a guarantee of reenplo;rment uhen they returned, the Air Force wanted to afford such return rights at an equal or hj"gher grade' This requ:lred new legislation and changes in civj-I gervice regulations' The legislati-on and regulation changes were obtained by October 1950' t+4

By June 1953 the Air Force was working on regulations that rnrould require civilians to return to the United states from oversea jobs

periodically. seeretary Zuckert told Representative Tom Hurray, Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Conmittee, that

in the near future it nuight be necessary for a conmand to get the approval of Headquarters usAF to keep an employee in an oversea job more than five years. Because of complaints from some errployees and the need for giving ernployees a.nple time to prepare to move, the Air

Force r*as moving slowly in this directlon. rt appeared likely, how- ever, that such a requirement would soon go into effect. Itost professional civilian employees had good educational back-

grounds before they were hired, but nany stlll needed traj-ning. r?ris included nanagement courses for supervisors and nethods and standards

courses for many other workers. Some eivilians attended the Industrial

corlege of the Armed Forees and Air Force rnstitute of Technology, and a few went to ruriversities for full-time graduate study. D0S/Personnel of Headquarters USAF tried to insure that eivilians r*ere trained to meet exlsting needs or retraj:ned to meet new needs. Because of the scarci-ty of scientists and engineers, the Aj-r Force constantly sought new ways to use them more effectively. It freed some laboratories from rigid, centralized nanpower contrors to pernit them to reassign their people to meet changing professional needs. During 1963 the Air Force tried to work out a reciproci-ty arrangement u"ith civilian universitles whereby USAF scientists and engineers could work toward advanced degrees in the universiti.es and do research j-n thej-r laboratories, 45 w?rile universi-ty people uorked in Air Force laboratories. At the same tlne, OSD supported legislation to permit more training of government sci.entists and engineers in colleges and universiti"".5 In early 1953 the Civil Service Comission assessed USAF person- ne1 management as, on balance, tthighly effectivertt but it did find ueak spots that needed attention. In some areas, nei-ther supervisors nor employees had a clear understanding of pronrotion policj-es. A sizeable nurber of enployees refused to believe that promotions uere adruinistered fairly, ID developing policies, officials apparently had not made enough effort to obtain the views of employees. And overly rigid procedures had ad,verse effects on claesifyilg Jobs and recruiting new employees. one of the r'rcrst situations occurred in 1961-1962 in Air Force

Logistics Corynand (nf'lC), the largest USAF civilian employer, where the nr-naber of positions, rather than the ttrpe of work perforted, appeared to deternine grades. In some instances AFT,C had upgraded positions after classification review but had not raised grades. Under current regulations nanagenent was reqr.r-i-red to classify positions in aceordance with Civi-l- Service Conoarission standards onee it had deternined the duties to be perforured in these positions. AFLC refused, houever, arguing that grade ceilings and iob freezes had restricted the nr:.nber of available higher grades. Although employees perforned duties at one grade, ttrey held and received pay for a lower graden

One reason for this problen was apparently the lack of flexibility irrtrerent j-n a large, centralized. organizati.on. Managers of research l+6

and developnent unj-ts also complained that this inflexibility dld not pertit then to get enough people to do the work or to use properly

those they had. ltrey wanted freedom to make comnitnents early enough

to obtain high-caliber college graduates as r.nrl as to offer rnore people fulltime graduate training.6

rn December 1951 John l{. Macy, Jr., chair:nan of the civil service Comtissi-on, stated that the key to a better civil service 1ay in recruit-

ing capable yo*ng people, especially college graduates. He did not

believe that the government effort 1n this direction had been a good one. Federal agencies had not planned co11.ege recruiti.ng properly,

and their representatives ruere often medj.ocre people u*ro discouraged

applicants by creati-ng a bad impression. These people r"rere probabry chosen because they could be spared for recrulting. But the greaiest

failure resulted from the fact that agencies did not have funds to h1re the students wtren they r,vere avai.l-able. Macy asked Zuckert, as head of one of the large goverrunent enrploying agencies, for assistance, and the Secretaryrs office pledged fu11 cooperation. But 1962_1963 r^ere not favorable years for recruiting.T

Controls and Reguctions

Constant pressure from Congress and the Adninistration to cut the eost and nmber of enployees on government payro11s, coupled with changes in technology and attendant shifts of enrphasis fron one func- tion to another, often resurted j.n substantial layoffs of employees.

These reductions in force (Rlrrs) often r,sorked undeserved hardship on individuals, danaged morale, and gave rj-se to unjustified rumors. hl

During fiscat years 1958 through 1953e nearly 4Or90O people were separated or resigned as a result of RlFrs, and mariy other positions were abolished.x By far the largest reduction occured in the logistic support area, where about 3O,O0O eryloyees were dropped between July

1958 and october Lg62. The training function also lost a significant portion of its civilians. Not all of these employees tdere separated involuntarily, of course, but nost RIFrs occuryed in these fi:nctionst and from these cOgKlands cane most of the eomplaints and "t*ot"'8 As early as llovember 1950, secretary sharp voiced alarsr lest RlFrs and attendant rumors reduce morale and perfonnance and cause an r:ndue loss of the best trained and most e4erienced civilians. He stated that these employees provided the essential continuity of knowledge RlFrs in almost all USAF aetivities, that previous losses due partly to had already danaged important progra,ms, md that iob insecurity night

cause many competent civilians to seek emplo;rnent elsewhere' To the

numerous complaints that flowed into the Pentagon, usually through eon-

gressional and white House channels, 0sAF could only reply that the reduetlons were caused by adjustments to technological changes, new

?,,eapon developments, restrictions on ngnpower and money, and efforts to achieve an appropriate balance betueen effectiveness and economy' The Air Force promised, in conjunction r'rith the Civil Serry-ice Comnissiont to try to soften the i-urpact of RIFrs on ernployees and protect those with long tenure.'^

ttApproxirnate fi-gures for theqq fiscal X!ar9 reI"i 1958 (Ig.rl7})t 1959 G',Ztl;'1ieo-itpii>-,-isii- G,roo);- pei Q,t9*) r Td re63,(z,oetn)' (116lrr;;'i"p'spec isst'io SAF (u,prao"e), to a3oo(t{)r 14 Mar 61, subj: Backup Material for Davj-s Subcomitteen OSAF .fil-e 7-61, V9t^ 11. con- versation with Mrs. Rrth Miller, Office of n/Ctv Pers, 4 feb 64.) 48

Although RrFrs continued and corplaints, especially from employee organizations, grew more nlmerous and vociferous, the Alr Force gained in government and in the public press a reputation for doing an excel- lent job of nininizi-ng the bad effects of reduetions. It achieved this reputati.on by naking caref\rI preparatlons, such as instituting hiring

freezes before the job cuts becane effective and finding new posltions

for people wtrose jobs were abolished. I?re Civil Service Coumission

stated that dtrrilg fi.seal year 1952 the Air Force held the nr.mber of

people rvtro becane unenployed to a minimrn by earefirl placenent and

retraini-ng. Irr April L953, Robert F. Steadmane 0SDts Economic Adjust- nent Advisor, congraturated the Air Force fe3 ainirnizing the bad

effects of RlFrs and for naking proper use of its eryloyees. rn May

the civi-l serrrlce colrrnnists ln Washington, D.C. ts metropolitan news- papers prai.sed the Air Force for softening the effeets of a five-percent ruF 1t had been directed to make.lo One reason for the greater effort to protect individrrals affected by RlFts 5n L962 and 1963 was the increasing pressure exerted by OSD and the Civdl Service Comd-ssion. Undoubtedly this uas closely related to the Kennedy Adn,inistrationls effort to lessen nationwide unemploy- a.ent. OsD inforned the armed servlces that it eryected them to give every possible assistance to enployees wtro had to find new jobs, and it r\rrnished a representative to coordirate the effort. OsD also issued a new set of instructi-ons wtrich included longer advanced r*arning and the p].acement of employees on furlough drile they looked for new posi.tlons. l+9

In March L963, when substantial cut backs uere pending at several insta[atj-ons in the southeastern United States, OSDts Assistant Secre- tary Paul stated that hardships to indi-viduals coul-d be allevlated by placing them in other DQD installations in the aree. At his instiga- tion, representatives of OSD, Army, Nary, and Air Force, Cir:it Serviee

Comission, and 40 DOD installati-ons in the Southeast met at l{axrcll AFB, AIa. , on 29 }darch. In addition to matching as many as possible of the persons to be 1et out with J.ikely vacancies at other installa- tions in the Southeast, the conferees agreed to: (1) provide DOD fturds for moving expenses, (2) give more attention to seniority in decidlng wtro wou-ld be 1ai-d off, (3) give three months advance notlce, and (4) put pressure on installation corrnanders to assist employees. Local personnel officials, surprised and pleased that these repre- sentatives attached such importance to thei-r problemsr agreed that most of the disptraced employees could be relocated in other jobs. lhis was very difficult, partlcularly at l{obile Air Materie} Area, A1a., Chennault AFB, Ia., Donaldson AFB, S.C.e and at Meraphi-s, Ten:e., ild progress in finding new jobs was s1ow. Ert this effort was a landnark in DOD con-

cern for i"ts civili-ans, particularly since OSD insisted on a continuing check on the resrrLts of the Maxwell "onf"""r,"".I1 Despite these efforts, civilj-an enployrnent opportunlties within the Department of Defense during the foreseeable future did not look bright.

In April 1953 McNamara directed his Conptroller to write into the next five-year budget progran a cumulative reducti"on of $ percent per year in civilian persorurel. He believed reductions of this nagnj-tude could 50 be made as a result of galns ln productivity. ltris cut uould begin in fiscal year 1965, but the Air Foree had already taken or planned its reductlons for fiscal years 1964 and 1965 and would not be affected rrntil 1966, rshen the cut would be 4r52L. For 1967 the cunu- lative total would rise to $rg7gi for 1968r to L3r379. It was not clear uhether this plan encompassed the cuts announced by P:resident Iyndon B. Johnson in January ]:J6tn.n

Equal Opportunlty

The Kennedy Adlninistration also broke new ground in launching an intensive effort to insure eqr:al enployment and pronotion opportunities for members of ninority groups, especialSy Negroes. In March 1961 bcecutive Order IO925 provided for nondisqriniqglion and set up the Presidentrs Comittee on Eqr:al Opportunity, headed by Viee President Johnson. In the Defense Department this progran was slryported for

McNamara by Deputy secretary Bosl'rerl L. Gilpatrlc. rn May 1961 chair- rnan Macy of the civil service comission rem:inded zuckert that the new admi:listratlon stressed equal opportunity and that the comission would review carefirlly all government hiring and pronotion practices. He r"ranted the Air Force to revlew its regulations, standards, md grrides to insure conpliance with the Fresidentts poli"y.*I3

-v'fn liiarch 1953 hesident Keru:edy also instituted a progran to prevent discrj:nination against enployees on account of age, since, as he said, older people constituted a growing portion of the nationts work force. see memo, Keruredy to Heads of sxecutive Departments and Agencles, l/a I{ar 6), subj: Policy on Utilizing 01der Workers jn the Federal Serviee, oSAF file 186-63, Vo1 1. 5t

Theoretically, the Presidentrs program portended no change of policy for the Air Force. As Zuckert e:plajIed to Macy, siace its creation in Lgl+7, the Air Force had adhered to a poli-cy of nondiscrim- i-nation on account of race, age, sex, color, national origin, physical handicap (:-f tire individual could do the work), narital statusr or lanful poli.tical afflliation. Zuckert assured Macy that no regula- tions needed to be changed and that the Air Force r'roufd continue to hire and promote uorkers solery on the basis of nerit.l& Although the other amred services could probably repeat this

assurance, McNanara and Gilpatric uere not satisfied. Ttrey believed that the nllitary departments were holding nany Negro civilian enploy- ees at grades significantly below their capacity and that this was a great uaste. ltre Arny reported in April 1963 that a recent survey had tfr:nder-utilizedtt found many employees wtro thought they were beinS and that a signifi-gant, number had been placed in higher-level jobs. ostensibly encouraged by the Arrqy survey, Gilpatric directed the services to survey workers at grades C.5-6 and below (GS-IL and below at the service headquarters) and discover how mar4r could uork at a higher grade. He wanted the sqrvey completed by 1 Septenber 1963 and

a report nade to OSD by 15 November. He also deuanded a follow-up report il Septenrber 1p54, stipulating the nunber of under-utilizeci

people wtro had been promoted or transferred to more challenging positions.l5 In early June 1963, Gilpatric focused attention more directly on the lrlegro worker in the 5outh. He directed the servj-ces to dispatch policy officers to thej-r maior employment centers in the South to make 52

on-the-spot surveys of employment patterns, by oecupation and grade, and to correct restrj-cted or unfair use of minority-group uorkers. He wanted the services to exanine recrui-ting techniques and sources, placement, and promotion and training practices. Early j-n Jr:ne President Kennedy let it be known that he l,as personalry interested in seeing more Negroes employed at eertain installations j-n loui-siana,

Mississippj-, Alaba:na, South Caroli-na, and Georgia. By early July the Air Force had completed its survey of minori-ty- group employmenL at 5l+ installations in 14 states, and j.ts report, covering the situation through May, showed a very low rate of Negro employment at southern bases. At lfa:rurell AFB, A1a., for example, only

285 out of 21221 civilians were Negroes, and of these only zf had grades equivalent to C"5-5 or above. Most Negroes at I'iaxrre1l were Wage

Board (paid by the hour) workers, and the highest grade held by a

Negro uas L-10, equivalent to Between a GS-6 and a GS-7, On 30 June

1962 there lrere Er462 Negro workers aL 5L A,j-r Force j-nstallations, 9 percent of the total. By 31 laay l.963 these figures had dropped to

7 r93L and 8.6, respectively. At no tjme r,vere as rnany as J percent of the classifieatlon Act (r*rite col]ar) workers Negroes. Most of the Negroes nade less than tip5rOoo per year. only 0.1 percent of the classi- fied workers held Gs-12 grades or above, and only 0.2 percent of the

Wage Eoard r.rorkers nade $BTOOO per year or rot".15

Betr+een June 1952 and May 1953 civilian eriplo;ment at the bases surveyed dropped by about 11633. More than 530, nearly one-third, of this number had been I'legroes, although they made up only p percent of 53 total civilian employarent in June 1962, this disparlty resulted in large part from the fact that tenporary uorkers, who nere predominantly Negroes, were the first to go during reductions. Under the piactice of Itlast hired, first firedrtr the Negro usually had the least retention T7 rl_gnEs.

Probably as a result of Presidentj-at and OSD pressure, eouthern

Ai-r Force bases did some successful recruiting of Negroes at high schools and colleges, despite the opinion of some cormanders that they had no such responsibility. About 10 percent of the students at Negro colleges were interested in Federal enployment, rather higlt for arSr recruiting canrpaign. With Civil Servlce Comission assistance, it appeared that the services would hire more Negroes while staying w'ithin regulations that favored the best qrralified applicant. Although the Negro might look fonrard to someuhat e:panded opportr:nities within the military departments, he could not e:pect great gains ln the near firture, houever, slnce clvilian emplo;aeent in the services uas tending downr*ard. 5t,

V. THE AIR RESERI'IE FORCES

In February 1950 the Air Force Couneil and Chief of Staff LeMay approved a concept for future development and emplo;ment of the Air

Reserve Forces (Annes), a planned force stnrcture for the decade 1960-1970, ed a new plan of management. Ttris plan, under study since December 1958, provided for r:nits to reinforce USAF conbat strength in uar or emergencles, base support and recovery uni-ts to help alleviate the consequences of nuclear attacks, and other units for certain subsidiary peacetime functions, The counci-l deei-ded that the Air Force Reserve Houl-d nraintain 15 r*ings ldth 50 squadrons, and the Air National Grard (aUC) 2{ wings with 92 squadrons. Inditridual trai:ring wouJ-d be reoriented, with the individuals formed into sup- port and recovery uits as quickly as practicable. In February 1960 the Air Force decided to transfer supervision of training and inspec- tion of AFRes r:ni-ts from the Continental Air Comand (ConlC) to the eombat comnands (flC, ADC, and MATS) rvtrich would control them in war or ernergency. Headqr:arter" USAF, throrrgh the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, assr.med tighter control over the AFRes than here- 'l tofore.- During 1960 tfre Air Staff worked out a concept, approved by the Force Estisates Board (run; in December, that established recovery planning as an integral part of USAF war planning and made ConAC responsible for regrouping and reconsti-tuting residual forces after a 55 nuclear attack. TLre FEB calculated that the recovery units should include 82 recovery group headquarters, 2O0 recovery sqr.radrons, 95 air base groups, 1I8 base srrpport squadrons, 2t+ aitcraft najntenance sqriadrons, 24 nedical service wj-ngs, 45 evacr:ati-on squadrons, 82 radiological survey squadrons, 5 corutunication groups, and 7 comuni- cation sqr:adrons.2

This somewhat anrbiti-ous plan never cane to fruition. Since

McNanara doubted its utility and money and manpolfer were lackingt 0SDt in January 1;962, li.nited the recovery program to 292 units established by that date. Ihese included 82 recovery groups ldi,th 20O squadronst 6 base support groupe, 1 air base group headqr:arters, 1 air base squadron, 1 evaluation squadron, and 1 radiological survey squadron.

These units, scheduled to continue on a provisional basis through

Jr.rne 1964, were restricted to 2O,OO0 paid drill spaces and $11 ni-lIion per year. Ttre 20'OOO men could be paid for only 24 drill periods per year instead of the 48 the Air Force had requested. The Air Force protested that at least 22r5OO nen and 48 paid drill periods per year a were necessary, but the protest went urfieeded.'

Sclnlle Betweel the eld of June 1960 and the end of June 1963, ready reserve strength declined from 273)26 (7Or820 in the AI'IG and,2O2t5O6 jx in the AFPles ) Lo 2]+2.,7OL QLr325 in the ANG and 168rJ82 the AFRes).

Duri:rg the sa.me years, sLandby reserve strength (a11 in the AFRes)

dropped from jOJr6iT Lo ]15187&. All AJ'IG members renained in the ready category dw'ing this period.A The nr:mber of Aj.r Force reservists who could be paid for partici-

pating in training was l.in:ited to 135rooo--Tzrooo for the AItrG and 631000 for the AFRes. ltris severely handicapped the reserve prograln throrrghout the period, especially the AFReg. rn septenber 1960, Iirl,e

s. Garlock, Assistant secretary of the air Foree (ru), warned OsD

that the new recovery role assigned the Air Force in Febnrery 1950 coul-d not be effectively carried out under this nanpor,rer ceiling.

He requested 142r0oo pald positlons for fiscal year L962, about 15?ro@ for 1953, and 17115@ for 196l+, declaring that this r,ns the mininun needed to inswe a really effective progran. Arthough the 1JJr0@

litrtit would provide less than half the nmber needed to nan recovery

units, OSD refused to grant a substantia] nr:mber of nevr paid positions, ostensibly because of the tight budget.5 By June 1962 Lhe reserve forces faced a severe shortage of offieers. E'ven i"n 1961 the AFBes roas not attracting enough young offi-cers, and the situation promised to becorp progressive\r r"rorse becawe the najority of reserve officers, wtro had received comissions during World War II, would retire during Lg6g-1973. In June 196l the 0ffice of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces estimated that the reserves needed at

Least 900 new Lieutenants each year and about rr35o after 1959. sj.nce the officer education program (ots and AFROTC) could not supply the denands of the active estabh-shment, the outlook for the reserve forces appeared gloory.5

AFRes also faced a serious pilot shortage, based on e:perlence to date and estimated projections in early 1963. AFRes pilots r,rere men who 57 had been separated from the active establishment. Recruiting barely kept pace with losses, and, because of the age and length of service of the pilots, losses would soon far exceed gains. Establishrrent of an AFBes pilot training progran appeared the only solution, but the Air Force encountered difficulties in eryanding active pilot trai-ningt J-et alone reserve training.T i}efore the end of Jr:ne 1962, a critical shortage of skilled airnen hAd also occllrl€do the best source of trained airmen for the reserves were the thousands separated each year fron the active force. Ert relatively few of these iolned the reserve forces, apparently because there uere not enough incentives to do so. The scarcity of paid drill I periods no doubt contributed to thej-r reluctartce.

Had it not been for the six-year nilitary obligation of men w'ithout military service, the Air Force would have been uriable to nan its reserve

writs. IrJhen the House Arsned Services Corunittee inquired in July 1962 as to the effect of lowering the obligation to four yearsr the Air Force stated that this r+ould cut j-ts aru:ual reserve enlistments about 75IAOO by 1p68, and that by 1970 the unpaid reservists woul.d be eliminated entire\r. To replace the loss wj-th men in paid positions r*ou1d have o cost approximately :,:4.7 million per fe&r.' The Berlin crisis, r,*rich required the call--up and deplotrment to Europe of a large nunber of tactieal reserve squadronsr revealed a lack of rapport between the Air Force and its newly recalled reserves that seriously threatened morale. Some men and their wives wrote the Presi- dent, congressmen, or high-ranking Air Force officials, complaining 58

about deplorable living condltions at hastily readied stations and

bases, both ln the united states and overseas. Few conpraints cane from nembers of recarled rrnlts, but sone of the rfflllersrrr caIIed to brlng urits up to l\r11 strength, resented the call to actirre duty in

peacetime. They apparent]y had thought that they would never be calIed except ln an extrene energency.

This episode aroused a feeling of uneasiness at Headquarters

USAF and within the JCS, because sone of the men Eeemed not to under- stand the nature of deterrence. Ttrey did not appear to wrderstand that the presence of conbat-ready forces in an area of possible agres- sion constituted a deteryent to r*ar. T?re Air Force and Jcs agreed that co'nrnanders should have nade a greater effort to e:p1ain thls con- cept when the uen rlere called to duty, or preferably before. si-nee citizens ought to know wfiy they prepare to fight, it seemed clear that a better lnfortation progran to condition them for occasional nilitary servj.ce rmas badJy ,r""d"d.10

Suoport of the Active EstabLishmeg-t During 1950 and 1961 ttre combat effecti-veness of reserve units inproved rapidly. Ey the end of June 1950 tno-thirds of the tactlcal reconnalssanee writs, nearly half of the tactical fighter r:nits, and more than three-fourths of the troop carrier r:n:its available to TAC in an energeney belonged to the ANG and the AFRes. Also a significant portion of USAF interceptor units were in the ANG. ff June 1961 several

ANG units ?rere convertlng from fighter planes to four-engine C-9Zrs and transport rnissionsr others to century-series jet fighters, l*ri1e a 59 nLmber of AFRes squadrons were exchanging two-engine C-119ts for four-engine C-12{15. All ANG and AFRes units not in the nidst of these conversions were rated combat-re.dy.11 The Berlin crisls and the Cuban crisis afforded the reserve forces two opportr:nities within two years to denonstrate their readj'- ness. In October and November l:96l-, a taetical control ErouPr 36 tLy- ing squadrons,-I reather flights, ild support elements for the flying unj-ts rr,ere,ordered to active duty, thereby increasing active strength of troop carrier uni.ts by 17 percent, healry transport writg by 28 per- cent, tactlcal reeonnaissance units by 28 percent, and tactical fighter r:ni.ts by 37 percent. In November, seven AIiG fighter sqr:adrons, the tactical control Eroqr and one tactical reconnaissence squadron were p-8[Fls; deployed to l\]rope. the squadrons flew about 2OO F-85Hr5,

and RF-8AFtg across the Atlantie in the largest single oversea f1i8ht

of jet fighters i.n. history. ltre deplo;ment uas conpleted without accident. The airsraft of three AI{G F-104 sqtradrons lrerc dismantled

and flown to Europe in I'{ATS cargo planes, and the sguadrons were

changed from interceptor to tactical fighter unj-ts. Despite nany logisti-ca] and other problens, these qnits were quickly incorporated into the united States Air Forces in E\rrope and beca'ne a part of the U.S. contribution to the North Atlantie Treaty Organization' In late

December General l,e$ay comented, rWever before has the United States

Air Force depended so heerrily upon the abillty of the ANG and the AFRes to respond so quickly and effectively. Never before have the Alr Reserve 1t Forces met a challenge with such speed and efficiency.rt* 6a

Recal-led units that renained in the Unj.ted States performed other fuportant misslons and lntenslfied their tralning. Fighter and recon- naissance units assigned to TAC participated in Strike Cormrand exer- cises and joint exercises with the Anrly and the lilaly. Five AFRes troop carrier squadrons completed transition frorn C_ll9rs to C_I2l+rs and began flying airlift missions for the Air Force and the Na.qr. ANG heaqp transport units, recently eonverted frorn jet fighters to c-9zrs beeame part a of I'IATS and flew strategic airlift missions to Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Elsewi.r".".t3 0n the night of 2T 0etober Lg62, at the height of the erisis caused by the presence of Soviet strategie missi.les in Cuba, president Kermedy ordered eight AFtses troop camier v,rjngs (24 sqr:aOrons) and six AFRes aerial port squadrons to report for duty the nexL nrorning. More than percent 93 of the men reported r*ithi.n 24 hours, and JJ percent of their aircraft were ready for operati-on that day. Even before recalr_, AFRes troop camj'er squadrons had been flying supplies and equipraent into bases i'n the southeastern united states. A-trlG hea'iy transport squadrons assisted MATS in flying eargo to bases i-n many countries of the world. on their ovenrater training flights, they flew missions that l,iATS could not ful- fill because its aircraft were perforuing missions di.rectly related to the emergency alert. Beginning on 23 October, reservists from approximately 30 recovery units volunteered to assist in Air Force dispersal activi-ties and Arrqr deploSnrent to the southeastern states. Betrrpen 23 October and 6 December they worked about 5rooo man-days for sAC, ADc, and several Arrqr 61 unite, assisting in transportatj-on, fire and crash rescuer refuellngt and aircraft najntenance. More than 25 ANG and AFBes beses supported dispersal operations of the USAF combat comands. ftre diligence of reservists was praised. by Zuekert, C'eneral Thonas S. Potner, SAC con- rnander-i-n-chief, and other Air Force and Arrny officials i-nvolved in the emergency. McNamara stated that he r'nas tttremendously iropressedtt by the resenre r,urits during the Cuban crisis, termlng their quick reaction a nfantastic perforrnance."fA

Apprgaglr jne Dif f icultie s

The Reserve Forces undoubtedly provided inportant peacetime stpport to the active Air Force dr:ring the period 1960-196j, eonLtibuting sig- nificantJry to national security during periods of stress and crisis.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the ANG and AFRes also improved dr:ring 1962 and L963, But problems remained which, if not soon solved,

could badly da,rnage the reserve forcesr effectiv€rl€es.

Personnel losses became especially serious, for many men refused to voh.rnteer for further service after conpletl:lg their periods of military obllgation. Many highly skilled airsren dropped out of the reserves beeause they feared recurring recalJ.s. After the Ber1in call- Wr I growing nunber of employers lrere reluetent to hi-re reservists or to approve their employees? continued reserve acti-vity' The publlct as nell as lranJr reservists themselves, seened to have only a theoretical corrrnitnent to the value of nilitary por€r in regerve; a conmitnent that

often grew rrreak r*tren personal sacrifices becane necessary. And the 62

natlonts eomnitnent to a reserve force someti.nes did not exLend to approving a large enough budget to nake it reaIly effective. Shortage of equi-pment, especially aircraft, conti-nued to handi- cap the reserve forces and no doubt worrld continue to do so for several years. After the Berlin crisis, the Air Force kept nost of the AIIG F-84ts and the AFRes C-124ts in the active inventory. There- fore nany squadrons had far too few planes of recent nodels to nain-

tain combat effectiveness or adequate crew readj.r:ess. The AFRes

rernained too dependent on the old C-119. Meubers of AFRes also con- plained that their equipment and facilities were inferior to those in the ANG.* Deficiencies corrld not be corrected, of eourse, until the Air Force obtained nore new aircraft and turned a large nunber of the current mode].s over to the reserv"".l5 In the sumner of 1963 the Ai-r Force needed to take certai:r impor- tant steps to i.mprove the effectlveness of the reserve forces. If i-t wished to attract high-calj-ber nen, it would have to offer at }east enough conpensation so that these men would not need to make financial sacrifices i-n order to serve. Some form of reenlistment bonus seemed appropriate to persuade men to serve beyond their period of nilitary obligation. The Air Force r*ou-ld have to provide sufficient aircraft of relatively recent models, for the contj.nued use of obsolete or

'r-Captaj-n D.0. Priddy, AFRes, Blanket, Tex., declared in Janr:ary 196l+, for example, that the only nay for a reservist to get to fly a decent plane was to join the ANG. He naintained that equipnent in the AFRes was so bad he lras surprised it had any pilots. Maj. Alf 01sen, Fargo, I'1.D.1 agreed, listing lack of adequate eQu-i-pm.ent and facilities a$long the important reasons for vrhat he considered a lreak AFRes progrdnr 63 obsolescent aircraft and other equipnent wouJ.d prevent achievement of acceptable operational effectiveD€sso During the Keru:edy Adn-inistra- tion, with its emphasis on general purpose forces, the reserves seemed destined to pJ-ay a more important role in railitary stratery than at any t5-ne since the Korean conflict. Nevertheless, it appeared obvious that they !,ouJ-d need stronger support fron OSD if they were to nake their naJcinLm contribution. Not a]-l of the doubts and crlticisras of the 1958-1959 period had been dj-ssipated by Jrure ]1953.16 6l+ Notes to pages I-J

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Cieorge F. Lerurcr, The Abeqgang -CbCIacteI 9! 41r Force Manpouer, t25g-rqq9, AFcHo; If6'r, #5; !gly- of !g&4e9., rY a955; A!!!el Reports of !be. Secretary of Defensg, l9?9-1q61-(ffi;@-S taures in tire appendixes); riemo, Dep ASOD(M) to U:nder Secys of Arr4y, NarT, Air Force, and Admin Asst to SOD, 2l Aug 51, subj: Interim Direct Hire Civilian Ceiling for Fy 62, OSAF file 7-6I, Vol 2; memo, SAF Zuckert to ASOD(M) 5 Aug 61, subJ: Manpower Plan for Force Build- W, w/2 incls, OSAF file 31-51. 2. Ann l Reports gI SOD, D22-I963, tables i-:r Appendixes; Telecon with lltr. Sa,uruel A. Tucker, Hist Ofc, OSD, 18 Nov 63. 3. Anpual Report of SOD, W-L292, tables in Appendixes; memo, Pres John F. Kennedy to Heads of Departraents and Agencies, 11 Oct 52, subj: TnFroving Manpower Controls and Utilization i-n the Execu- tive &anch, OSAF file 106-62, VoI 2; memo, Zuckert to SOD, 2 Apr 62, subj: AF Manporm Reductions in E\.rrope, OSAF file 573-62. b. Ltr, John A. Watts, D/Cw Pers, to Spec Asst to SAF, M, P, & RF, 3 Mar 50, subj: Position of Chnn of U.S. Civil Service Corrnission on Upward trend in Civll Service Crrades, w/tnct (Jones Presenta- tion); ltq B.W. Jones, Chnn CSC, to SAF-Dudley C. Sharp, 26 Y,ay 50, both in oSAF file 8o-50, VoI l; Arurual Beport of Sbb, Fy 1963, 38-l+o.

5. DAF Report of Compllance with Sec 1310(d) PL 253, 82d Cong., for FT 61, 2 AW 61, osAF file ?-61, Vo]- 2; Ckrief of Staffts Policy Book 1963, Item lt+-25i Annu8]- Repolt of SOD, ty 1953, p 263i Telecon with Madeliene lt trtt&ard" I-dmin bft fl6i-" Persr-27 Nov 63.

6. Ltr, Cen Curtis E. LeMay, VC/S, to SAF, 2ty Apr 6I, subj: AF Parti-cipation i-n Ftigher ftlucatj-on, OSAF file 28-61, Vo1 1; Air Forcg lirof,t"s. Oct p, 1963, pp l and J; Telecon with CoI Walter V. Cook, D/Pers Planning, 27 Nov 53; Statenent by tt Gen Robert W. Burns, Ondr ATC, in Air Fgf_ce l4lsmratigg Policy Letter For @- nandeis, vol xtEI, n6le6iE 6?f-Zt-- Notes to pages 5-11 AC

CHAPTER II 1. Annual Reportg of the Secretarv of Dgfensg, FY A&L2!2r__tab1_es in 6pdA:.xes; teiecon wiffi- l,tr. sanuetA. rucker, Hist Ofc, OSDr 18 Nov 53.

2. Memo, Dep SOD Gilpatric, to SA, $I, and SAF, 4 Apr 62, subj:. Improvenent in the Managiment of Military Personnel Appropriations anC Related Personnel Prograns, rv/atchr OSAF file 186-62, VoJ- 2.

1 Beport of the DQD Working Group on llanagement }nprovenrent of Military Personnel Appropriations and Related Manpower/Personnel Prograni, sep 62, nn':-el 9-10, 15-16, and, 23-27'- gsAF fl1e 186-52 (eu&y).

l+. fot, Evaluation of Civilian Personnel Management in Dept of AF, W 62, by Ereau of Inspections, U.S. Civil Service Conmissiont n.d.e-bul about ltar 6Jr- oSAF fiie LS6-63 (Bult€/); memo, B.W. rbidge, spec Asst to slF (turercnr), to AS0D (ral)' 23 l{av 62, subj: Base Manpouer Utilization, OSAF file 29L-62t Vol 1; memot Zuckert to SOD, 2 Apr 627 Ortline of hiefing for Mr. Zuckert, 8 May 52, osAF fi-re 29I-62; Vo1 1; Itr, coI L.a. Walker, Jr., Actg D/M8o, to sAF, 17 Jan 53, osAF fj.Le 95-63.

Memo, ASOD (MrPr@), to ASA (urrrcnr), AsN (peeF)' spec Asst to SAF (MrPr&nF), 12 Jan 50, subj: Personnel Effects of Programing Decisions, OSAF file 3-60, Vol 1; ltr, Cong Janes C. Davis, Chnnt House Manporarcr Utilization Subemte, to SOD' 21 !{ar 61, oSAF file 7-61, Vol 1.

l"iemo, ASOD (I{rPr@), to ASA (urtranr'), AsN (panr), and Spec Asst to SAF (UrfrARf), 12 Jan 5O; memo, Lewis S. Ttrompson, Spec Asst to sAF (urtraRr) b ASoD (ItrP,cR), 9 Feb 60. subi: Personnel Effects of Programoring Deelslons, OSAF flle 3-6Ot Vol 1; ltrst l artin Hovlard, Pres, Local 689, Natt Federation of Fed &ployeest Harni-Iton AFB, Calif,r Z l4ay 60, & George R. C'oertzr San Rafael, Calif., 16 Oct 50, to h.es of U.S.e with copies to Vice Pres Ei.:ron and Sen Kennedy, OSAF file 80-60, Vo1 2; ltrs, Rep Joel T. Broyhill to Zuekert, 6 Feb 61, osAF file ?-51, Vol 1; Zuckert to Sen Frank Carlson, 23 Ntar 63, OSlf file 166-53; and Zuckert to Rep Garner E. schriver, 23 lLar 63, oslr file 186-53.

7, I{emo, Robert C. Unkrich, AS0D (fat), to Asst SA (I&t), Asst SIi.(fea), and ASAF (t't),29 Apr 6J, subj: Statement of Joseph Calrpbell, flalch, OSAF file 95-63. B. Ibid.

9, Ibid. 6b Notes to pages J2-i7 l-0. Ltr, l;aj Gen 1tr.0. Senter, Asst DCS/S&I,, to ASAF (t'l), fg .]rul (3t subj: Statement of Joseph Campbell; memo, Aaron J. i',acusin to }ir. }:r:irie, n.d.e but Jun or Ju1 61, OSAF file 9i-63. l.l-. l,iemo, Spec Asst to SAF (UrnraRf), to ASOD, 6 JuI 60, subj: Ceiling on DOD rated/deslgnated 0fficer Strength; memo, ASOD (MrPr&x')to ASA, ASN and Spec Asst to SAF (t"irlrenf')r 21 Sep 60, sane subj, both in OSAF file 370-60, Vol 1; memo, Mcliamara to SA, SN, sAF, sane subjr 30 Oct 61, OSAF file 370-611 memo, ASOD (MrP.gf,,) to Spec Asst to SAF (UrfraRf), 19 Jul- 60, subj: Reduction of Mil & Civ Pers in Dep Hq & Major Field Hq, OSAF file 3-50, Vol 2; memo, SAF to SOD, 21 Nov 60, sane subj and file; ltrs, Zuckert to Speaker of House of Rep and to the Prest 20 Jul 61, oSAF file 28-61, Vo]- 1.

1.2. Ileno, C.P. hrnge, ASOD (U), to Lhrder SA, SN, SAF, 7 Aug 51, subj: l.Lilitary Career Plannfug and Personnel Costs, 0SAF file 28-51, Vol 2; meno, B.W. Fridge, $pec Asst to SAF (MrPrp.cRF) to ASOD, 10 Oct 51, same subj and flIe; Itr, Cong. D.N. Henderson, Chmnt House Subcmte on Manpower Utilization, to Zuckert, 2A apr 63; 1tr, Zuckert to Henderson, 7 l{ay 63, Aoth in OSAF tile 186-63. L3. Memo, Zuckert to Rrrnge, 5 Ju1 62, no subj; memo, S.S. Jackson, oep ASOD (M), to Zuckert, 25 Jul 62, no subj, both in OSAF file 291-62, Vo1 2; memo, Pres Kennedy to Heads of AIL Depts and Agencies, IL Oct 62, subj: rnrproving Controls and Utilization in the Executive Branch, OSAF file 106-62, Vo1 2; B0B Circular #A-44 (Rev), 31 Oct 62, same subj and file; meno, Norrman S. Pau-l, ASOD (l{), to Secys/Mil Depts, As0D?s, * *1, J Dec 62, sane subj, OSAF file 29I-62, Vol 2. I/+. Memo, E.M. Glass, Spec Asst for labs, to Dr. IlcMillan, 3Q QcL 62, no subj, OSAF file 106-62, Vol 2; memo, Glass to Wil1is B. Fosterr. Exec Dir, Task 97, DDR&S, 16 Nov 62, subj: BOB Circular #A-Llr (Rev) same file; Carl Berger, ftre S!rene!be4:!g_of Atr [qrSe In-S-olfqg Iaboratorie s, 12 6blg 62, Tcffi SFrd'a-D'oi,mil@ Progress Report No. 5 on ProbJ-ems and Aetions Associated w"ith AF In-House laboratories, by E.M. G1ass, Spec Asst for labs, OSAF, 15 Apr 63, b AFcHo files.

15. Chief of Staffts Policy Book, 196A, Iten 380; DOD Manpower Utiliza- tion Progress Report, J0 Jr:n-30 Sep 60, dtd IIov 60, osaf file J-60, Vo1 2; memo, SAF to S0D, 5 Jun 51, subj: Direct-Hire Cilrllian nhsrloyurent, 0SAF file ?-61; memor-S.S, Jackson, Dep AS0D (t',t)r to AS0D (Compt), sAF, Jcs, et gt 14 Dec 61, subJ: Monthly Beport of Change in Authorlzed Strengths, 0SAF file 35-6L, YoL 2. Iloteg to pagps )3-24 67

16. l{eno, Zuckert to SOD, 2 Apr 52; Out}tne of hleflng for Mr. Zuckert, S Mqy 62, OSAF gifc e9f-62rYol1; Hist, D/ops, Jan-.Iun 63, pp 89-9I. L7. Meuo, B.w. trlidge, spec to asAF (urrrear), to AsoD (M), 11 Apr 62, subj: Seasonal Requirenents; Draftr DQD Instructlons on Man- poiter Inplicationg ofbrganizational Changes, 12 Apr 62r.ASSS by ll/Cen B.O, Davls, Jr. , D/M@, 2l Feb 62r subj: USAF Ff 63 Man- poser Grldance; memo, Zuekert to C/5, 2lby 52, no subJ, aIL in 05AF fILe 29I-62, Vol 1. 18. Ltr, Cicn W.F. MeKee, YC/S, to Zuckert, 10 Ju-l 62r subJ: l{anporer Posiure Improvemcnt;'meno, Zuckert to McKee, no subJ, 12 JuI 52t both in OSAF flLe 291-62, VoL L. 19. Meno, Frldge to Zuskert, 7 Jan 6J, subJ: Manpowcr Posture lryrove- mcnt Board Beport of 6 Sep 62, OSAF ftle 95-63. 20. IbLd. 2L. Meno, McNanara to ZuckerL, ? Dec 62, no subj, OSAF fl1e L86-62t VoI 3.

22. Meno, J.N. Davis, D9p ASOD (Prod Mgnt)r to Df{6Or 3 blay .62i, memo, Fridge to ASoD (iell; 4 W 52; both tn osAF file 291-62, vo]- !. 23. Ltr, D/NB to Secy McNanara, 8 Apr 6), no. subj, OSil,F file 186-63, Vo1-1; ltr Col L.A, wal-ker, Jr., Actg D/Mso, to SAF, 17 lwt 63, subJ: AF Manpower Validation Progran (UW), OSAF file 95-63.

2l+. Hist, D/P1ans, Jan-Jrrn 1962, p 3o7.

25. $rt, DOD Program for Inproving-63, ... Manporer Controls and UtILLze- tlon, by AsoD (u), .lan oslr fLLe 186-63 (Erlrg). 26. Ltr, !y'Cen B.O. Davis, Jr. , D/Mw, to SAF, 5 Jun.63, subJ: stu{y of Air Force D1anporer Requirements, OSAF fLIe 95-63.

27. ASSS by u/C"t B.o. Davls, Jr., D/M@, 23May 53, subJ: Progra,n to Increase Productivity and Inprove Manpouer Controls and UtiJlza- tion; memo, J.P. Goode, Dep/vIrPrso, osAF; to Dep ASOD (M)r 5 Sep 6J, subj: Revised Forsat for $ervice Manpor.rer Progran, both j.n OSAF fILe 9543. 6e Notes to pages 253tr

CHAPTER ITI

1. {*ol Cordon Gray, Spec Asst to the pres for NSA, to SOD, lg Feb 60, subJ: Morire- and physical condition of u.s. Mililary Personnel; ]tl, Charles C. Finucane, ASOD (Urfr&n), to Grayl I iul 60, rnith incl DOD study on sane subJ, both in OSAF file 370-60, VoI 1; Annual Eep& es Sop, ry IiOZ, pp zlr_?2. 2. Menlr SAF Sharp to S0D, p2 Dec 60, subj: Revieu of officer grade structrre, OS.AF file 3?O-50, VoI Zi C/S policy Book, J99+, Iten 14-8i. c/s policy Bookr'tg6z, it io il,-gt b/s Policy Book, L963, Iten 14-5; Annual Report of 56O, Fy 1963, p 261.

3. C/-S Po+gy Fgkl _Lg6L, Iten t4-3I; memo, Zuckert to SOD, g Mar 61, subj: Ref AF 0fficer statutory Authorlzation and rnterim Prcsidential Ceiling; memo, McNanara to pres, 13 Mar 51r /approval of trJFKtt-at botlom, both ir! osAF lil" ag-eir'vot t.

4. D/Plans, .JuI-Dec 51, pp 226-Z7i memo, Spec Asst to SAF Tl"t,(MrPr&RF) to !/Cien B.L. Waldron, Asst DCS/P.- 9 Feb 62. OSAF flf-e fS!-52, YoJ- 1; nemo for record by L/io1 J.M. HoJm, D/M@, 1o May 62, subJ: sunmary of presentation on General Officer Bequirements Outside the Air Force, osAF file 196-62, voj- 3. 5. C/S-foticy Boolr ]:96],r lten t4-6i C/S policy,Book, 1962, Item 14-1; conversation with t/cot R.J.-sterr, D/pers'plngr'rT Jerrt 64.

A U9ryor,J.P. Coode, Dep gec Asst SAF (Mrprg0rg), to I{r. l,ee {q09 (u), 4 }dar 61, suu;: Development-oi coJi-oata, OSAF file 28-6I, Vo1 1; nemo i{cNa,nara to sA; sN, & sAF, 30 oci 5r, subj: Aeronauti-ca] Ratedr/Designated Officer-strengih, W 62, OSgf iife 3_7,1-6\3gnor Goode to SOD,.16 Nov 5.1, same-suU; A fiie; ltr, L/c'en E.J. Timberlake, Dcs/p, to e/s-, 10 Apr 6i, subJ:'rnplemen- tatlon of Rated Officer career Board lctlons (secono Ftta""), OSAF file L8642, Vol 2; llurual Report of SOD, ry IgbL p 16Oi Conversation rrrith CoI Steri, 12 .lanTl-. 7. 4ry""1 Rep_ort of SO!, LI2fi-, pp 260-61 , 261+i Conversation w:ith Col Sterr, 12 Jan 6L.

8. Ltr, Cten C.E LeMay, VCf S, to SAF, 2le Apr 51, subJ: AF partici- pation in iti-gher &lucation, osAF file 2g-51, irol 1; c/s policy Pgkr !26I, Item 14-60; c/S roricy Book, tg6z, Ite6, tL-27; C/S Po1icy Book, 1953, Iten I4_I?. 9. C/S loticy Book, 1963, Iten 14-U. 10. leMay to SAF, 24 4!I 6f; Annual Repgft of SOD. FY 1q62, pp 315-16; Annual Egpgl!. of SOD, FY \963. pp 266-66. - - Notes to pages 35-l+3 69

11. c/s eoltcy Book, L963, Item 14-16; Annual Rgrort of SOD, FY L963, p 266. l-.2. Annual Report of SOD, F'f 1953. pp 266-68. 13. c/s Poticy Book, 196l-, Iten 14-33. 14. Lerrner, I?re Chaneine tharac-ter of Air Force Manpower. PP 9-L2i Annual-effi,@ F-z6I; OfForicy sook,- 1963, Iten 14-13.

L5, Ltr, DCS/P to c/S, 4 Aug 60, subJ: Airman Permanent P.a1ty Manning, osAr fiJ-; 37o-6o, Vol 1; msno, sAF to ASOD (M)' 5 A3g 61, suUi: Manpor.rcr Lna Persorunel Plans- for Force arildup, u/2 incls, OSAF file 3I-6ti C/S toticy Book, 1963r Iten 14-13. L6. Memo, Goode to SOD, 15 Mar 61, subj: Increase to &rlisted Grade Ceiling, OSAF fiLe'28-6I, Vol-l; mimo, AsoD (M) to ASAF (urPranr), 25 Jan 63, subj: FY 64 Manpouer Program, 0SAF file 9543. 17. Lem,er, TLre Chaneing Characler of &ir Force Manpower, pp 2O-21; c/s Poiicy @mlerlcertef so!, II-r2fr-' p 261; Conversation with Maj W. H.Millere D/Pers Plng, 29 JEn 6l+. 18. Annual Report of SOD, FY 1462. p 3l2i 4*t?1 Eeport of SOD' FI 1963, p 265i L/Cien J. E. Brlggs, USAF (Ret)r ttlplts Bring Educa- tion into the'Space Agertt Air Force and Space Digest. Dee 6J, pp 56-69, 19. Ai-r Force Infornation lgligX letter for Cqqlrlanders, Vol XVIIT IIo. 20, 15 Oct 63; Alr Foree Tjmes, TNI"W.

CHAPTER IV 1. Rpt, Eva}:atlon of Civilian Personnel I'Ianagement in Dept of AFr. FI 1962, by Bureau of Inspections, CSC, 0SAF fil.e 186-63 (gulry); &t, DOD Progran for Improving Civilian }ianporrer Controls and Uliiization, by ASOD (II), Jan 63, OSAF file 186-53 (ar-uy).

2. Lermner, ltre Changine Character of Air Force Flanpower, I958-L952, pp 324)+, t+3-l+Li A.,ngpf Repgi! ol SQD, II 1963, pp 262-63.

3. ASSS by CoI R. W. IaP1ante, Dep D/Proe llgnrt, 31 Oct 62, subJ: . GAO Report on Relocation Costs by Contractors, OSAF file 106-52, Vo1 1; ASSS by J. A. lfatts, D/Cw Pers, 3 Jun 5J, subj: Support of Legislation for Enployee Movi-ng Dgenses, .OSAF file 186-63t Vol 1j memo, B.'y'{. f'rioge, Spec Asst to SAF (iurfrenn), to ASOD (U), Z Aug 6J, same subj & file. 70 Notes to pages L4-5O

4. Lenmer, pp _33-31+; c/s Poticy Book, 1960, Item LO?; Annual lepgl! € S9r ry ry62, p 263; note from D. t"t. Pruittl-Jp n/civ Pers, 5 Feb 65; lLr) Zuekert to Rep Tom Lfurray, Chmnr'Llou-se Onte on Post Office;and Civil Ser,,i"ice. 18 Jun 53. OSan f:te 185-63, Vo1 1; Hist, n/civ pers, Jut-bec 63, W t2-14" 5. ryt, DOD Progran for rmprovlng civilian l{anpouer controls and UtiLization, by ASOD (M) Jan 6), ix OSAF file l-96-53 (AUky); Rpt, USAF Manpower program, Fy 196[, 22 Feb 63, Ay D/USO, OSAF file 95-63 (Bulky).

6. fut, Evaluation of civirian Persorurel Management in Dept of Air Force, by Bureau of Inspections, USCSC, Fy 1962, ,r.d., but early tg63r osAF file 186_63 (Erjky).

7. Ltr, John.trj, Macy, Jr, Chmn CSC, to Zuckert, ? Dee 6I; J-tr, J.V. charyk, U/sAF to t':acy, 2 Jan 6[, aotn:_n 0sAF file 7-i1 vh e.

8. Memo, $ugh Witt, Ofc of ASAF (M), to J. S. I-nirie, ASAF (M), I Mar 63r sulj: Reduction in Civitian &nplo)rraent in Logistic Area, OSAF file LB5-63, Vol 1.

9. {eno, SAF Dudley C. Sharp to C/Sr 30 Nov 60; ltr, George R. fu"113, 1103 Lincol-n Ave., San Rafael, Calif., to pres, w/cyt Lo V/P R. Ii. lljxon and Sen J. F. Kennedy, 11 Oct 60; 1lr, Lewis S. Thompson, Spec Asst to SAF (Mrpr&RF), to Coertz, 5 Jan 51, all in OSAF file 80-50, Vol 2.-

10. llemo, R. F. steadnran, osD Econ Adjustnent Advisor, to DCS/pers, 17 Apr 6J, no subj; memo, J. A. ulatts, n/Civ pers, to A&r Asst !o SAF, 9 May 63r_w/3 Atch, i-.€.p articles by Jerry l0utz, Wash &€!,, 7 liay 63, John cramer, The Ner^rs, 7l4ay 63, *d Joseph Young, Evening Star, I May 5:; npt, Sr:rnnary Evaiuation of pers Management in Dept of AF, Fy. 62, aIL in 0SAF file 196-5J, Vo1 1 (E11ky).

11. l"lemo, N. S. Paul to ltrrder Secy of Anrryr, Nalyr & AF, & D/DSA, 15 B" 63; ltr, D. II. Prui-tt, Oep D/Ciir feri, to Spec Asst to SAF (l,trPr&R), 2.2 Apr 6j, subj: OSD-sponsored Meeti_ng at ... I{a:o{ell AFB, v/atch; 1tr, DCS/pers to rnaj cnds, et at 3 Apr- 63, suUj: Minimizing Advirse Impact of ntf; aSSdTy-5-. U. Pruitt, Dep D/Civ Pers, 10 May 6J, subj: Report of Enploy:nent of DOD Personnel Being Released Due to Base closures or RlF. all in OSAF file 95-63.

J2. Memo, McNamara to AS0D (Conpt), no subj, JO Apr 6J; memo, B. W. Ibidge !o SAF, .6 May 5j, subj: Civilian Reductlons, both in OSAF file L86-63, Vol I; Bal-timorg Sr:n, 22 Jan 6tri Air Forcg Infgp?tion Polic:{_Letter for Comanders. Supplement. J enEi, PP 23-21,' Notes to pages 50-57 7t

L3. Annual Beport of S0D, ry 1962, nn.J9-!+-O; ltr, Macy to Zuckert, no subj, 17 May 611 OSAF file 35-61' Vor 1. 14. Ltr, Zuckert to Macy, no subj, 3 Jun 51, OSAF tIIe 35-61, Vo1 1. !5. Memo, SA to SOD, 19 Apr 52, subj: utilization of skilIs of Civilian Personnel; *e*o, Gilpitric-to sAr sNr sAF, et aI, ?4 Y?y flr sub!: Utilization of Sf.iffi of &ployees Serving at Levels Significantly Eelow Tlreir Capabilities, b-oth in 0SAF file I86-6J, Vol 1. 16. Memo, Gilpatric to SA, SN, and SAF' I Jun 53, subj:-E*] rrnf'lor- ment Opportun:.ty; meno, g. W. Fridge, Spec-Asst to SAFt to Zuckert, 1S Jtrrr'63, no uoitr in SSAF file 786-63, Vol ]; T"*g.F*idge to Zuckert, I?"itUi; Jul'63, subj: Negro &rplopnent 1n the southern States, /t inct, oSAF file 186-63, Vo1 2. L7. Memo, Fridge to Zuckertt t7 JuI 63.

18. Memog Fridge to Zuckert, 18 Jun 63 and 17 Jul 63.

CHAPTER V

1. Lemmer, pp l+S-53; JCS I8l+g/29O, 25 Fe.\ 50, noles and Missions of Hi.st, the Reserve Forcls , n/itarrs iii" in (60) 65, sec 2i ^O/Plans, Jan-Jr.rn 6O, pp tZ.it i Annual Report of SOD, fY L950. p 3l+2' 2. Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64 pp 44-48. 3. Hist, AC/S for Res Forces, Jul-Dec 51, pP 44-46; Jan-Jun 62t PP D-r5i c/s Policy Book, 1963, rten 5-11. Renort of 4'4. Annnal Report 9g gQ., 8J 1960, pp 3t/-t3; _$nnual .!.Q-Q.' reffi- 3r7-t8; Ann,al d6"i-oi'90D" ffi-,ffi-e?o' 5. lIemo, ASAF(${) to AS0D (MrPrAR), 25 Sep 50, subj: fnerease in Air Beserve Forcei Drill eay beifing, OSAF file 3-60, Vol 1; memot ASOD(M) to Spec Asst to SAF (M,P;&RF), 3 Ja6r 61, subj: FI 52 Man- power Progran, OSAF file 35-6L, Vol 1.

6. Hist, AC/S for Res Forces, JuI-Dec 61, pP 32-331 Jan-Jun 62, PP 8-10.

7. Hist, AC/S for Res Forces, Jan-Jtm 63, P 11 & atch 3r P 10. 8. Hj.st, AC/S for Bes Forces, Jan-Jun 63, pp 11-13t Arul:al Beport of Q, $ L?E, P318' 72 Notes to pages 57-63

{ 9. {d, s. s. -Jaekson, Dep AS0D (u) to llnder sA, sN, & sAF, 23 gq 62, subj: -Military Service 0bligation, OSef tj.Le tg6-62, V91 3; rnemgt-J: +. Leng, Jr., Dep for Res'& RoTc Affairs, 0SAF, to ASOD (M), I tug 52, sanl subj & fi1e. 10. Hist, D/Plans, Jr:I-Dec 61, pp 223-2t+; .Ian-Jr:n 62, pp 233-35.

11. gel_neeorg_gs €a0r Fr 1g6g pp 3A2_t+5; Annuat Rgnort of sop, rr-126+t pp 311-14; Hist,-n rbr Res ror6?ffi3 6'ntro1 and Policy Chapts, Jan-Jun 60 to Jan-Jr:n 61. W. Royce E. Eckwrightf {*I llgtio!?,I ft"Td Deplo.rEre+t to USArE.Area, +96r-62,_usAFE Hist DTF,@ ffi-ffi nt"t, a-7s-' for Bes Forces, Jul-Dec 61, pp Z-Zhi Jan-jun 62r'pp 5-gl rr'Back- grgmd: 1951 ttSAF Reserve ltoUitizationrn n.d., i lict sheet by AC/S for Res Forces.

J3. Flt, Ac/s.for n1g_Forees, Jul-Dec 6r, pp z-zei Arurr:al Eeport of sO!, Fy \962, p 3L7.

14. Hist, AC/S.for Res-!,9rces, Ju1-Dec 62, pp 6-7, Atch 1; Annual. Lepglt ol S+ II +42, pp 269-?0; neiro,-A. sylvesrerj l365-(ru), to Ofc of rnfo, OSAF, 3r Dec 51, subJ: Request for pernission to @ote Secretary McNamara.

L5. I1"!, Ac/s for Res Forces, Jul-Dec 62, pp 1o-16; Jan=hur 63, pp 1o-15r alc}. 2, _pp-3-l+,6, atch 3r pp l--5i a"""ai Report grggb; W 1963, pp 268-fO. 15. T:ry:t, _0,hansine character of Air Force Manpower. L2bL252, pp L7-t+8r 53. n?

GLOSSARY ac/s Assistant Chief of Staff Actg Acting ASA Assistant SecretarY of the ArnY ASA (MrerAnr) Assistant Secretary of the Anry (Manpower, Person- ne1, and Reserve Forces) nslr (ru) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Managenent) asar (u) Assi-stant Seeretary of the Ai-r Force (Materiel) asRr (urrrcRn) Assistant Secretary of the Air.Force (Manpower, Personnel, md Reserve Forces) ASN Assistant SecretarY of the NavY aml (pann) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces) ASOD Assistant SecretarY of Defense ASOD (conpt) Assistant Secretar! of Defense (Conrptroller) ASOD (re*; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Insta3_lations and Iogistics) (I'tanpower) ASOD (M) Assistant Secretary of Defense - ASOD (urrraR) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personrrel, and ileserves) ASOD (pa) Assistant Secretary of Defense (zuU]ic Affairs) ASSS Air Staff SrmnarY Sheet .dsst Assistant Asst sa (rea) Assistant SecretarY of the Army (Installations and logistics) Asst SN (faa1 Asslstant SecretarY of the NaW (Installations and Logistics) ATC Air Training Corunand

BOB Bureau of the Erdget

Chnln Chai-rnan &ote Comroittee cls Chief of Staff csc Civil Service Con'mission

DAF Department of the Air Force D/EOB Director of the Bureau of &dget D/civ Pers Director(ate) of Civilian Personnel Dcs/P Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel DCS/SS{, Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics DDN&E Director of Defense Research and ftrgineering D/ilsA Director of Defense SUPP1Y AgencY Dep Deputy Dep ASOD(M) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Uanpower) Dep ASOD (Proa Ment) Oeiuty Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production M,anagenent) 7l+

Dep D/Civ Pers Deputy Director(ate) of Civilian Personnel Dep D/Proc }Igmt Deputy Director of ProcureJrient Management Dep Spec Asst sAF (MrPrW"e) Deputy Special Assistant Secretary of Air Force (fuanioGr, Personnel, and 0rganization) Dep SOD Deputy Secretary of Defense D/Mso Director(ate) of Manpower and Organization DOD Deparfunent of Defense n/@s Di-rector(ate) of @erations D/Pers Plng Direetor(ate) of Personnel Planning o/Plans Director(ate) of P1ans

Econ Eeonony E>cec Dir E:recutive Director

C'40 C'eneral Accountirg Office

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff n. d. No Date NSA National Security Agency

OSAF Office, Seeretary of the Ai-r Force OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

Pers Personnel

Res Forces Regerve Forces Ret Retired RIF Reduetion 1n Force ROTC Reserve Officers ?raining CorPs

SA Secretary of the Amy SAF Secretary of the Air Foree DI\l Secretary of the Naqy SOD Secretary of Defense Subcmte Subcousnittee

u/sAr Ur:der Secretary of the Air Force USAF United States Ai.r Force USAFE United States Air Forcee in E\rroPe vc/s Vice Chlef of Staff v/P Vice President