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ProfePsrosfieossnioanall DDeevevloepmloenpt ment RRiisskk && CCrriissiiss CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn Essential skills for today’s SH&E professional By Pamella Ferrante

THE TERM RISK was first Communication says that risk communication is a attributed to William Ruckelshaus, the first adminis - “science-based approach for communicating effective - trator of EPA in 1970, who marshaled the agency ly in high concern situations” (Covello, Peters, Tthrough its early years, establishing its role in pro - Wojtecki, et al., 2001). tecting the environment and assisting community The U.S. Department of Health and Human organizations (Covello, Peters & McCallum, 1997). In Services (2002) says: the 1980s, the Superfund program incorporated the Risk communication is an interactive process concept in its public participation process, and it also of exchange of and opinion appeared in the emergency planning and communi - among individuals, groups and institutions; ty right-to-know provisions of Title III of the often involves multiple messages about the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of nature of risk or expressing concerns, opinions 1986 (Covello, et al.). The theories and the roots of the or reactions to risk messages or to legal and risk communication process come primarily from the institutional arrangement for risk manage - environmental arena and from working with the ment (p. 4). public and other stakeholders. In recent years, how - ever, the concepts have been successfully According to National Research Council (1989), Pamela Ferrante, CSP, CHMM, used to deal with any type of hazardous risk communication “often involves multiple mes - is president of JC Safety & situation or disaster. sages about the nature or risk or expressing concerns, Environmental Inc. in Pittsburgh, PA. opinions or reactions to risk messages” (p. 322). She is a professional member of Key Definitions It is also important to note the subtle, yet critical ASSE’s Western Pennsylvania Several definitions provide a frame - difference between risk communication and crisis Chapter, of which she served as work for building common understand - communication, that is, when the communication president in 2006-07, and is the ing about key terms. Risk is defined as the occurs. Risk communication is an ongoing process Assistant Administrator of ASSE’s probability of undesired effects (or health that helps to define a problem and solicit involve - Consultants Practice Specialty. She outcomes) arising from exposure to a haz - ment and action before an emergency occurs. Crisis received the Safety Professional of ard. It is often expressed as an equation: communication encompasses those messages deliv - the Year Award from ASSE’s Risk = Probability x Consequences. ered to stakeholders during an emergency event that Consultants Practice Specialty in Manuele (2003) defines risk as “the poten - threatens them. According to Fearn-Banks (2007), 2006. Ferrante is chair of the tial for realization of unwanted, negative crisis communication “is concerned with transfer - Society’s Technical Publications consequences of an event” (p. 59). ring of information to significant persons (publics) to Advisory Committee, and a member According to Lundgren and McMakin either help avoid or prevent a crisis (or negative of the Leadership Conference Task (2004), risk communication is “the interac - occurrence), recover from a crisis, and maintain or Force and Student Activities tive process of exchange of information enhance ” (p. 2). Committee. A regular presenter at and opinions among individuals, groups safety conferences and a frequent and institutions concerning a risk or a Theoretical Foundations author, Ferrante holds a B.S. in potential risk to human health or the envi - Much of the applicability of risk communication Environmental Protection Science. ronment” (p. 438). The Center for Risk comes from understanding how the general public 38 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2010 www.asse.org 7) Certainty. Risks that are known to science are more readily acceptable. 8) Dread. Risks that are perceived to evoke limit - ed emotions such are fear, terror and anxiety are more readily acceptable. 9) Trust in institutions. Risks associated with institutions or organizations that have a high degree Abstract: Risk commu - of public trust are more readily acceptable. nication and its sister 10) Reversibility. Risks that are perceived to have process, crisis communi - reversible effects are more readily acceptable. cation, are essential 11) Personal stake. Risks perceived to have limited skills for SH&E profes - direct or personal threat are more readily acceptable. sionals. This article 12) Ethical/moral nature. Risks perceived to have examines several key limited ethical or moral concerns are more readily concepts, including acceptable. common theoretical 13) Human versus natural origin. Risks perceived foundations and defini - to be caused by “acts of God” are more readily tions; evaluation of acceptable. risk in various scenarios; 14) Victim identity. Risks that produce no or lim - goals for the process; ited human victims are more readily acceptable. development of a writ - 15) Catastrophic potential. Risks perceived to ten risk/crisis communi - have limited potential for catastrophe are more read - cation plan; and ily acceptable. common problems Each situation has a unique combination of these and pitfalls. 15 factors. They may be strong or weak, or may have no relevance. In addition, the varying strength of perceives risk. By understanding these perceptions, each factor combines to create a moving target for SH&E professionals can determine how to tailor risk SH&E professionals. Given all of these variables, messages. Numerous models have been proposed and because perceptions are typically highly indi - and they provide a framework for understanding vidualized, crafting risk and crisis messages requires how risk and crisis messages are perceived. a skilled communicator. Covello, et al. (2001), offer four theoretical models that help practitioners understand how information is Mental Noise Model processed, how perceptions are formed and how risk The mental noise model provides a means for decisions are made. By understanding these models understanding how the public processes information and how they apply in various situations, SH&E pro - in periods of high stress and anxiety (Covello, et al., fessionals can better prepare their messages and coor - 2001, p. 7). As the perceived threat rises, an individ - dinate their communication in high-risk situations. ual’s consequent ability to process information de- creases. The creation of mental noise effectively blocks Risk Perception Model the individual’s ability to hear the message and affects The risk perception model theorizes that the pub - his/her willingness and ability to process it. lic’s perception of risk comes from the strength of 15 Risks associated with a lack of control, which are different factors, each of which can alter perceptions perceived to be low in benefits or are thought to be in varying degrees of magnitude (Covello, et al., unfair, create the highest levels of mental noise. An 2001, p. 6). These factors determine the public’s level individual’s ability to engage in rational discourse of concern and elevate or decrease worries, anger, has substantial implications for SH&E professionals fear, hostility and outrage. Understanding the attempting to deliver a message dedicated to chang - strength or weakness of these levels affects the abili - ing attitudes and behaviors. ty to alter perception, change behavior and modify attitudes and factors based on the messages deliv - Negative Dominance Model ered. These factors are: The negative dominance model addresses how 1) Volunteerism. Risks that are perceived to be the public processes negative and positive informa - voluntary are more readily acceptable. tion in high-concern situations (Covello, et al., 2001, 2) Controllability. Risks under the control of the p. 7). The model suggests that the relationship be- individual are more readily acceptable. tween the two messages is asymmetrical; the nega - 3) Familiarity. Risks perceived to be familiar are tive messages receive substantially more weight more readily acceptable. than the positive ones. In other words, the public 4) Equity. Risks perceived to be evenly and equi - places more value on their losses than on their gains. tably distributed are more readily acceptable. This has implications on how the message is deliv - 5) Benefits. Risks with perceived benefits to the ered. It also reflects the importance of balancing pos - individual are more readily acceptable. itive messages with negative ones to counteract the 6) Understanding. Risks that are well understood intensity given to the negative messages. or self-explanatory are more readily acceptable. It also has implications for the message’s word - www.asse.org JUNE 2010 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 39 ing. Negative words (e.g., not, cannot, never, noth - munication. It can be a potential future event that the ing, none) are heard better, have a greater impact message is attempting to prepare a receiver for, or an and can effectively drown out positive messages actual event that is occurring or is about to occur. regardless of how well they are crafted. To counter - Hazards or hazardous events, therefore, can fall any - act this, the positive messages must provide a level where along the continuum from negligible to cata - of detail that highlights actionable activities to draw strophic. Getting the message receiver (usually the the audience’s attention. “More specifically, risk public or some stakeholder group) to understand the A commun- are most effective when they focus seriousness of the event is a significant determining on what is being done, rather than what is not being factor of the success of the message and the action the icator must done” (Covello, et al., 2001). message receiver takes as a result of hearing it. Outrage refers to the emotions and behaviors of Trust Determination Model craft a mes- message receivers given their perceptions of the haz - The trust determination model highlights the ard level presented to them. Like hazards, the level of sage that importance of establishing trust in all forms of risk outrage exists on a continuum from high to low. and crisis communications (Covello, et al., 2001). Combining the concepts of hazard and outrage, helps the Trust comes first in all messages, regardless of pur - Sandman (2003) poses the following framework of pose or content. Without it, success will be limited. the four kinds of risk communications. audience Further, the trust required to fully engage the public in the message is a long-term process. It requires High Hazard/Low Outrage develop or thoughtful processes and methods in addition to A high-hazard/low-outrage situation involves a sound communication skills. serious hazard, but an apathetic audience. Although enhance the Important factors in trust determination and the audience often will not object to the message, development are the perception of agreement even a skilled communicator may find it difficult to perception among experts; coordination among the various risk move the audience to a desired action. management organizations; sensitivity by risk man - As a result, the messenger may exaggerate the needed to agers to the need for effective dialogue and public hazard scenario in order to scare the audience into participation; a willingness to honestly acknowledge action. Although this can be effective, it also can be have the risks; a willingness to disclose or share information; risky and cause an overreaction by the audience, fol - and responsibility in fulfilling risk management lowed by distrust when the true nature of the hazard message requirements. is discovered . Since trust and credibility are vital, what factors The risk/crisis communicator must find a way to both heard can help a communicator determine whether trust convey the message that will predispose the audi - can be built and credibility can be achieved? How ence toward the desired goals. The message must be and acted can communicators use this information to craft risk short but effective at increasing the audience’s out - and crisis communications? rage in order to provoke action or at least attention. upon. The empathy factor is crucial in this respect; stud - This task is made easier by the apathy of the audi - ies (Covello, et al., 1997) have identified three key ence, who will listen to anything said without reser - factors: vations or objections. 1) perceptions of knowledge and expertise; An example of this scenario is the reflective view 2) perceptions of openness and honesty; of the crisis communication efforts preceding Hurri- 3) perceptions of concern and care. cane Katrina. Although many residents heeded the Therefore, a communicator must craft a message calls to evacuate, certain groups were unwilling do that helps the audience develop or enhance the per - so. Some of those who stayed, not because they ception needed to have the message both heard and could not leave but because they chose to stay, died acted upon. While the theoretical concepts reviewed because their outrage level was not sufficient to provide some assistance in helping one understand move them to a desired action (evacuation). the public’s risk perception, craft messages or advise others on message content, delivery of these mes - Medium Hazard/Medium Outrage sages also requires an understanding of a separate In a medium-hazard/medium-outrage situation, set of processes and skills (see “Crafting Risk and the audience is interested but not so emotional that Crisis Communication Messages” on p. 41 and internalizing the message is difficult. The message “Common Pitfalls in Message Delivery” on p. 42). sender can discuss the situation rationally and open - ly, and the discussion will likely generate audience Hazard + Outrage questions and rational concerns. Sandman (2003) has written extensively about This is the easiest communication environment. risk and crisis communications. His Risk = Hazard + The messenger must simply provide an open, hon - Outrage theory is widely quoted and deserves elab - est dialogue that explains the situation and allows oration in order to understand the theoretical foun - sufficient opportunity for audience response and dations of risk and crisis communications. He questions. The audience will likely respond to the suggests that the success of risk and crisis communi - request for action. cations rests on the communicator’s clarity of the Such scenarios often feature lengthy processes of theory and how to apply it to the situation at hand. dialogue and consensus decision making between Hazard is the actual event addressed by the com - the messenger and stakeholders. For example, the 40 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2010 www.asse.org Risk Messages: Good, Bad & Ugly Effective Message intended only to advise Americans to these remarks, vac - This message was delivered by Presi- avoid unnecessary air travel to and cine manufacturers dent Obama at a Cabinet meeting on from Mexico, and to avoid confined were promising only May 1, 2009. The quote was noted in a public spaces only if they were sick. 40 million doses by CNN.com article titled, “Confirmed (From article, “Biden: Stay Off Subways late October. In reali - Number of Global Swine Flu Cases: 367 During Swine Flu Panic,” retrieved ty, by early Novem- and Counting” (retrieved April 16, 2010, April 16, 2010, from http://www.nbc ber only 16.9 million from http://www.cnn.com/2009/ newyork.com/news/archive/Swine doses actually had HEALTH/05/01/swine.flu.outbreak ). -flu-0428.html .) been shipped. The message acknowledges the hazard The resulting con - and attempts to tell the public to be Inaccurate Messages troversy led to long worried but not alarmed, thus moving As the manufacture of the H1N1 lines and frustration, Developing and the outrage level from low to medium. vaccination was being fast-tracked by and contributed to maintaining trust It also focuses on the importance of all the U.S. and five major vaccine manu - an ongoing deterio - and credibility with parties working together to get through facturers, the number of vaccines that ration of trust in the the audience is a the crisis, treating the public as a part - were expected to be available changed messages delivered predominant factor ner while understanding the role of the frequently in remarks by various gov - by government offi - that determines government as the leader. ernment officials, particularly from the cials in general and the success of So I just want everybody to be Department of Health and Human in the midst of this the message. clear that this is why this is a Services and CDC. A rosier picture particular crisis. cause for concern, but not alarm. than what eventually transpired was On Nov. 3, 2009, National Public We are essentially assuring that, often represented by Health and Radio’s Steve Inskeep interviewed in the worst-case scenario, we Human Services Secretary Kathleen Michael Osterholm, director of the can manage this appropriately, Sebelius and others. On Sept. 15, 2009, Center for Infectious Disease Research government working with busi - before the House Committee on Energy and Policy at the University of Minne- nesses and individuals, the pri - and Commerce, Sebelius said: sota (transcript retrieved Nov. 3, 2009, vate sector, and containing an The federal government is also from http://www.npr.org/templates/ outbreak, and that we can, ulti - preparing for a voluntary nation - story/story.php?storyId=120044053 ). mately, get through this. al vaccination campaign for the Inskeep: Was there any substan - 2009 H1N1 virus starting in Inappropriate Message tive damage done by making it October. With unprecedented an over-optimistic prediction? This message was delivered by Vice speed, we have completed key President Joe Biden on April 30, 2009, steps in the vaccine development Osterholm: Well, I think there is, during an interview on NBC’s Today process. We have characterized show. At the time, President Obama in the sense that we still have a the virus, identified a candidate significant communication prob - and the public health community were strain, expedited manufacturing trying to provide information about the lem with the public. We now and performed clinical trials. The have about 30 million doses H1N1 virus and help the public under - speed of this vaccine develop - stand how the virus spreads. Those that have been made. However, ment was possible due to the even as of Friday, only 16.9 mil - messages were intended to educate investments made through and provide accurate information lion doses of that have been ASPR/BARDA over the past 6 shipped. . . . while avoiding panic. Biden’s com - years in advanced research and ments contradicted those messages: I think you are going to see a development and infrastructure collision course kind of scenario I would tell members of my fam - building. One-hundred ninety- here in the next 2 to 3 weeks as ily, and I have, I wouldn’t go five million doses of H1N1 vac - more and more Americans want anywhere in confined places cine have been purchased from the vaccine, have this perception now. It’s not that it’s going to five manufacturers by the U.S. because of the messaging that Mexico, it’s you’re in a confined government (retrieved Jan. 2, there’s a lot of it out there and aircraft when one person sneezes 2010, from http://energycom not be able to get it, and I think it goes all the way through the merce.house.gov/Press _111/2009 you’re going to see some real aircraft. That’s me. I would not 0915/sebelius _testimony.pdf ). angry people out there. And be, at this point, if they had Sebelius’s use of the word “pur - we’ve got to start to better com - another way of transportation chased” was likely overlooked by municate to them what the suggesting they ride the subway. many who later wondered where all issues are, how much is there His statements were clarified 2 hours the vaccines went when delivery and when they can really expect later by his office, which noted that he began. In addition, a short time after to get it. processes of community engagement stipulated in Low Hazard/High Outrage the Superfund program work well here because the The low-hazard/high-outrage situation is the most hazard is not immediately life threatening and time difficult scenario for a risk communicator. The audi - is available to develop consensus on site hazard and ence often does not trust any message and may be remediation decisions. The audience is easier to en- controlled by a small group of activists who have pur - gage because the hazards often affect their homes posely exaggerated the situation for varying motives, and families. or who truly believe that the situation is dire, even if www.asse.org JUNE 2010 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 41 the facts say otherwise or at least suggest that the sit - that will respond in a specific way to a hazard, all uation is not nearly as serious as some believe. communications must begin with this foundation. In this scenario, the communicator must reduce The public’s knowledge base may be minimal at the the outrage by sincerely listening, acknowledging time the communication process begins, but that and even apologizing, if that will move the audience knowledge can be increased enough so that the to a more realistic view of the seriousness of the haz - process can become a dialogue rather than a . ard. The advantage is that the messenger has the In Sandman’s (2003) theory of situations with high Having and audience’s attention and, with skillful messages, outrage, this process can be difficult since the public’s movement in a desired direction is possible. anxiety must be dealt with first, but accepting the portraying An example of this scenario occurred just after audience’s concerns as valid is an essential first step. the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, when a BP tanker 2) Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts. compassion spilled a much smaller amount of oil off the coast of Many factors influence the content of any risk or cri - California. Realizing that Exxon erred by not quick - sis message, including process goals, audiences, out - are essential ly providing timely information about the spill to the rage level, hazard level and setting. In addition, risk public, BP provided immediate, regular and timely messages are often very different from crisis mes - to any communications about the spill, its effects and the sages. The former take longer, as trust and credibili - clean-up efforts. Even though the spill was substan - ty must be developed. The latter’s success is situation, tially smaller than the Valde z incident (low hazard), primarily the result of the skill of the communicator the emotional state of the residents of California in the moment and whether the communicator has a especially as began as high outrage because of what was happen - history with the specific audience that has allowed ing in Alaska and the perception of being lied to and for some trust and credibility to develop. the level kept in the dark about the realities of the situation. Before the message is delivered, these factors must be considered. Following the message, results of outrage High Hazard/High Outrage of the effort must be evaluated and corrections or The audience in a situation of high hazard/high adjustments noted for the future. increases. outrage is not angry. It is fearful and scared. Because 3) Listen to the public’s specific concerns. The the hazard is serious, their position may be justified. concept of outrage (Sandman, 2003) plays a pivotal Without skillful management by the communicator, role. The process becomes a dialogue in which each the outrage can easily turn into terror or depression, side’s viewpoint is legitimate. Furthermore, the risk which are of limited use in getting the audience to communicator’s ability to develop trust and credi - take the desired action. bility often hinges on audience members’ recogni - The communicator must proceed carefully, allow - tion that their point of view is accepted as valid and ing for the audience’s legitimate fears, remain human deserving of time and effort to discuss. and empathetic, yet still be rational and demonstrate Audience members sometimes care as much true leadership. The advantage is that the audience’s about credibility, competence and empathy as they outrage is not typically directed at the communicator, do about risk levels, statistics and details. The savvy at least until after the crisis has passed. communicator understands and acknowledges this, Returning to the Hurricane Katrina case, the situ - and works with it to his/her advantage. ation quickly deteriorated into an example of this 4) Be honest, frank and open. Developing and scenario. Media reports showing desperate and maintaining trust and credibility with the audience dying citizens of a major metropolitan city created is a predominant factor that determines the success incredulous emotional states across the country and of the message in terms of how it is understood and prompted high outrage. Early efforts by government whether it prompts the audience to act in certain officials to rescue those in need and alleviate suffer - ways. If the message is not honest and open, trust is ing compounded the problem. However, the lost and it is difficult to regain. In some cases, it may appointment of Lt. General Russel Honoré to lead be permanently lost. the joint task force brought about the type of crisis 5) Coordinate and collaborate with other credi - communications needed at the time. Honoré was ble sources. When a risk or crisis message is dia - often praised for his brash leadership skills, clearly metrically opposed to one being communicated by communicating the situation’s gravity and the need another organization(s) or one organization’s com - for swift action, all the while demonstrating empa - municator appears to be overly critical of another, thy for the citizens of New Orleans. the public may have little choice but to pick sides or even to dismiss the messages of both parties. (Recall Crafting Risk & Crisis Messages the exchanges between elected officials and govern - SH&E professionals can use the models reviewed ment employees in various news conferences during to develop risk and crisis communication messages. the height of Hurricane Katrina.) Conflicting mes - Central to all of the models is an understanding of sages waste time and increase the public’s frustra - the audience and its stake in the process or situation tion, confusion and distrust. at hand. EPA has a list of seven cardinal rules that, In situations with many communicators, limiting although originally designed for environmental com - the conflicts helps all parties achieve their goals. The munications, apply to many hazard situations. ability to compromise with another communicator 1) Accept and involve the public as a legitimate in order to craft a consistent message can save time partner. If the goal is to produce an informed public as well because when the public hears essentially the 42 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2010 www.asse.org same message from multiple sources, their ability to tion has some responsibility for the situation, accept - respond and respect the message increases. ing it matter-of-factly and honestly can help build 6) Meet the needs of the media. This topic is com - trust and credibility. plex and goes beyond the scope of this article. Suffice •Focusing too much on money. Complaining it to say that the media will report on any situation it about lack of funds to solve a problem only increas - deems newsworthy. Getting out in front of the es audience members’ frustration since they often media’s needs and understanding the importance of have no ability to change the situation. Telling the meeting them can significantly improve the chances audience what benefits are being derived from the that the message which appears in the media will be funds available is more productive. the one the communicator wishes it to be. •Providing guarantees. Instead of guarantees, the In general, legitimate media sources are seeking communicator should offer likelihoods and empha - facts that can be presented succinctly and simply. size the progress being made. Risk communicators may need to develop a separate •Trying to be funny. This is usually only effective if message for the media as their needs are not always directing the laugh at oneself. Attempting to inject the same as those of the public. humor into a serious situation trivializes it. 7) Speak clearly and with compassion. The skill of •Rambling. Aim to limit presentations to 15 min - speaking clearly is not natural to everyone, particular - utes, while reserving plenty of time for questions. ly during high-stress situations in front of an angry or The latter can serve to effectively enhance and clari - terrorized public. Therefore, the risk communicator fy additional message points. must spend time before the communication situation •Using negative words and phrases. Negative practicing the text of the message and rehearsing var - messages override an audience’s ability to respond ious scenarios that may occur in order to prepare for and move away from high levels of emotionality. It how to address them comfortably. While a risk com - is best to avoid them if possible. municator need not possess the skills of a presidential •Thinking you are “off the record.” A risk/crisis spokesperson or prepare as if participating in a presi - communicator never is, and nothing said to anyone, dential debate, s/he must be able to speak with clari - particularly the media, is confidential. ty and often off the cuff. •Promising anything. This tactic will likely be re- Having and portraying compassion are essential to gretted if delivery is not certain. Making strong any situation, especially as the level of outrage in- assurances is a better tactic. creases. In addition, in situations where death and •Forgetting the visuals. Most people understand destruction may be imminent or have already messages delivered in more than one format. Slides, occurred, the audience must know that the organiza - handouts and other visuals can enhance what is tion being represented by the risk communicator cares being said and helps the audience process complicat - about it. The adage about faceless bureaucrats must be ed information after the formal presentation ends. proven wrong in these types of situations. •Overusing statistics. Statistics should be used to Common Pitfalls in Message Delivery enhance and support comments only. •Forgetting to define the message goals in Following the cardinal rules does not guarantee advance. Being unprepared in front of a large group success, even for the most skilled risk communicator. of people who may already be distrustful is a sure- For the message to succeed, the risk communicator fire path to disaster. must analyze each situation carefully and understand •Forgetting the role of the public. This is a part - the audience’s motivations, moods and outrage. nership. It is crucial to build trust and credibility by In addition, some common pitfalls can derail engaging in a dialogue. messages that appear fail-proof. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’s (2002) guidelines Ethics in Risk Communication Messages identify the most common pitfalls, several of which SH&E professionals play many roles in crafting are highlighted here. and delivering risk and crisis messages. In some sit - •Using abstractions. Risk communicators should uations, they are members of a team tasked with not assume a common understanding. Avoid jargon, engaging stakeholders about a particular risk; this acronyms and highly technical language. may involve attending and participating in public •Attacking the audience. Respond to issues, not meetings. In other cases, they may be asked to help people. Be careful to end debates by responding develop a message to be delivered by clearly and accurately. staff or corporate executives. In the simplest sense, •Sending negative nonverbal messages. A risk SH&E professionals regularly deliver risk and crisis communicator who loses his/her temper is in trou - messages to the workforce as formal safety training ble, but tense facial expressions and certain hand sessions and written communications as well as movements also can signal negativity and hostility informal comments and discussions that occur on the toward the audience. Practicing in front of a mirror manufacturing floor or on the construction site. or a colleague can help a communicator see what What should SH&E professionals do when situa - s/he may be saying nonverbally. tions are presented that appear to downplay the seri - •Blaming anyone. Assigning blame to another ousness of a risk or even suggest it does not exist? party is never helpful. It confuses the audience and What actions should SH&E professionals take if forces them to take sides. Similarly, if an organiza - asked to help craft deliberately deceptive messages? www.asse.org JUNE 2010 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 43 Plan Elements Authority •Applicable statutes •Internal documents Purpose One obvious answer is that that the organization has limited resources and •Define what the plan does, for the profession’s ethical founda - decides to focus on those risks deemed to be more and by whom tion always must be at the fore - significant and/or likely. Scope front of all actions. ASSE (2002) Resources will always be limited and employing •Define areas covered by the plan offers this fundamental canon in the concept of using them to the greatest good is not Situations & Assumptions its Code of Professional Con- only economical, it will also result in true and more •Circumstances under which an duct: “Inform the public, em- effective risk reduction. Each organization must emergency might arise ployers, employees, clients and determine its own levels of acceptable risk. This is a •How a problem is identified appropriate authorities when unique process based on acompany’s goals and mis - •When to activate the plan professional judgment indicates sion as well as the dictates of those currently in man - •Available resources that there is an unacceptable agerial roles. level of risk.” This canon offers •Special or unique situations Risk Matrixes primary guidance but it requires •When to notify the media At its simplest, a risk matrix uses two variables to Concept & Operations that the SH&E professional use his/her judgment, which is establish probabilities of an occurrence and help •General plan of action (main define those situations that require advance action body of the plan) often based on taking the time to understand the facts present - and planning (Figure 1). To complete a risk matrix, •Advance preparations an organization must list the various risk situations •Who, what, when, where, why ed by the situation. This neces - sarily involves understanding that may occur and determine which box they and how belong in. The matrix can be expanded to flesh out •Lines of authority the hazard presented as well as the risk assessment techniques the varying levels, but in the end its value is in help - •Media policies ing to identify the critical and high-risk situations Organization & Assignment that help categorize and quanti - fy the hazard. that should be addressed first. of Responsibilities To enhance the process, numerical ratings can be •Detailed delegation of tasks and Measuring Risk assigned to the different categories, then acceptable responsibilities With an understanding of risk can be defined as anything that falls under a cer - •Identification of spokesperson key terms, theoretical frame - tain number and becomes that which is planned for, •How to staff implementation of works and related factors, while those above the number are deemed to not the plan 24/7 SH&E professionals can better require advance planning. This is a helpful strategy •News dissemination systems evaluate their organizations’ when an organization has many hazards that have •Liaison with outside agencies risk and subsequent need for a low or very low risk. Numerical ratings also reduce and response organizations risk and crisis communications the subjectivity of the rankings. Table 1 presents an Plan Development plan. Most of the work in this example matrix (adapted from MIL-STD 882, 2000). & Maintenance discipline also had its begin - nings in the environmental Preliminary Hazard Analysis •How often to review In a preliminary hazard analysis, scenarios are •How changes are made and remediation movement, most notably related to Superfund developed to describe what is being analyzed and distributed evaluated. These scenarios encompass tasks, opera - Appendices projects. However, given to- day’s constant media attention tions, systems and products, as applicable. Exposures •Logistical details are analyzed and quantified in terms of people, facil - •Call down lists and message delivery through various technological sources, ity, product, equipment loss, downtime or environ - •Available materials mental damage. Once the analysis is complete, a plan •News conferences/media guide - the traditional foundations un- derlying risk and crisis commu - is developed to reduce or eliminate the hazard lines through preparation, processes and systems changes. •Equipment, supplies and services nications can be applied to any situation in which an organiza - What-If Analysis tion interacts with the public What-if analysis begins with brainstorming ses - before a potential emergency or during one. sions during which a group identifies hazards, devel - Risk is best assessed in a formal process that quan - ops hazard scenarios, and discusses incident tifies when possible, while recognizing that some development and probable consequences. All ques - aspects of the process are subjective. Many tools can tions and concepts are recorded for further investi- be used to accomplish this. Depending on the orga - gation, clarification and quantification. Upon nization’s needs and potential risk situations, exter - reconvening, the group uses the gathered data to nal consultation may be necessary, but, in general, a develop controls to remove or sufficiently reduce the simple risk matrix may be all that is needed. Some potential occurrence of the hazard situation. common risk assessment tools are reviewed and readers are encouraged to read additional informa - Failure Modes & Effects Analysis tion to best determine which tools are most applica - Failure modes and effects analysis is most often ble (Manuele, 2008; Hansen, 2008). used at the time of design or redesign of equipment Before elaborating on the various tools, the con - or processes. Common steps include the following: cept of acceptable risk should be discussed. In any risk 1) Identify the item or function to be analyzed. analysis process, an organization must recognize that 2) Define the failure modes. not all risks need to be planned for. It may be that the 3) Record the failure causes. potential of the occurrence of the risk is too small or 4) Determine the failure effects. 44 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2010 www.asse.org FiFgiguurree1 1 TaTabblee1 1 Risk Matrix Numerical Risk Matrix Threat level

High Medium High Cri d o o h i Medium Low Medium High Note. Adapted from “Standard Practice for System Safety (MIL-STD 882D and l e

k E),” by U.S. Department of Defense, 2000, Washington, DC: Author. i L

•procedures for coordinating response teams; At its simplest, a risk •after-hours contact list and contact information; matrix uses two Low Low Low Medium •signed mutual aid agreements; variables to estab - •procedures to secure resources such as space, lish probabilities of equipment, people and finances; an occurrence and Low Medium High •methods of disseminating information to stake - helps define those Impact holders. situations that The sidebar on p. 44 presents key plan elements. require advance 5) Enter a severity code and a probability code for action and planning. each effect. Conclusion To enhance the 6) Enter a risk code. SH&E professionals are being asked to provide process, numerical 7) Record the actions required to reduce the risk more technical advice and assistance to their organi - ratings can be to an acceptable level. zations and are expected to have comprehensive assigned to the dif - knowledge of the processes involved in emergency ferent categories. Developing a Risk/Crisis planning. One of these processes involves risk and cri - Communications Plan sis communications, and SH&E professionals should As with any planning process, the key point in have this skill at their disposal. Ⅲ developing a risk/crisis communications plan is to anticipate risks and crises and prevent them when References possible. In other words, never having to implement ASSE. (2002). Code of professional conduct. Des Plaines, IL: the plan is always best. Author. Retrieved Jan. 2, 2010, from http://www.asse.org/ about/conduct _code.php . Beyond that, the plan is designed to use risk com - Covello, V., Peters, R. & McCallum, D. (1997). The determi - munications to develop trust and credibility with the nants of trust and credibility in environmental risk communica - targeted audience before any crisis. Furthermore, the tion. Risk Analysis, 17 (1), 43-54. plan dictates the processes that will be followed Covello, V., Peters, R., Wojtecki, J., et al. (2001). Risk communi - cation, the West Nile Virus epidemic and bioterrorism: Responding when crisis communications are required. Most of to the communication challenges posed by the intentional or unin - the information in this section is derived from a tentional release of a pathogen in an urban setting. Journal of Urban planning tool developed by the Texas Department of Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 78 (2), 382-391. State Health Services. EPA. (2002, Sept.). Superfund community involvement tool kit: Risk communication. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved The plan must provide for timely, accurate and April 15, 2010, from http://www.epa.gov/superfund/commun helpful messages. All levels of management and ity/pdfs/37riskcom.pdf . operations must be involved in the process and par - Fearn-Banks, K. (2007). Crisis communications: A casebook ticipate on the working group. Sufficient authority approach (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. must be provided to the planning and implementa - Hansen, M.D. (2008). Applied science and engineering: Sys- tems and process safety. In J.M. Haight (Ed.), The safety professionals tions processes and include resources such as money handbook: Technical applications (pp. 37-69). Des Plaines, IL: ASSE. and time. Ideally, the planning process should be Lundgren, R. & McMakin, A. (2004). Risk communication. team focused and also may include external re- Columbus, OH: Battelle Press. sources and groups. Manuele, F.A. (2008). Advanced safety management. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Once the plan is developed, an implementation Manuele, F.A. (2003). On the practice of safety (3rd ed.). New team must be selected and trained. Most of the formal York: Wiley-Interscience. training will take place internally, but several team National Research Council. (1989). Improving risk communica - members, such as those who will deal with the media, tion. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Sandman, P.M. (2003, April). Four kinds of risk communica - may require external training. Drills are essential and tion. The Synergist, 26-27. Retrieved April 15, 2010, from http:// can range from tabletops that test the plan’s basics to www.petersandman.com/col/4kind-1.htm . full-scale exercises that test its significant details. Texas Department of Health and Human Services. a Key elements of the plan include: public health crisis and emergency risk communications plan. Austin, TX: Author. Retrieved April 15, 2010, from http://www •endorsement from top levels of management; .dshs.state.tx.us/riskcomm/documents/Risk _Communication •designated responsibilities for all levels of the _Plan.pdf . organization; U.S. Department of Defense. (2000). Standard practice for •identification of a spokesperson authorized to system safety [MIL-STD 882D and E]. Washington, DC: Author. speak for the organization; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2002). Communicating in a crisis: Risk communication guidelines for pub - •procedures for information clearance; lic officials. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved April 15, 2010, from •regional and local media contact list; http://www.hhs.gov/od/documents/RiskCommunication.pdf . www.asse.org JUNE 2010 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 45