Political and Property Rights Change in Seventeenth-Century England
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Political and Property Rights Change in Seventeenth-Century England DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Economics by Kara Dimitruk Dissertation Committee: Associate Professor Dan Bogart, Chair Professor Gary Richardson Professor Stergios Skaperdas 2018 Portion of Chapter 1 c 2018 Oxford University Press All other materials c 2018 Kara Dimitruk DEDICATION For my grandparents and Meg Sullivan. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES v LIST OF TABLES vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii CURRICULUM VITAE viii ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION x 1 Political Barriers to Changing Property Rights 1 1.1 Introduction . .1 1.2 Changing Property Rights to Land: Background and Data . .5 1.2.1 Settlements and Estate Acts . .5 1.2.2 Data: Estate Bills . .8 1.3 Political Barriers in Seventeenth-Century England . .9 1.3.1 Background and Data . .9 1.3.2 Political Barriers: Empirical Analysis . 12 1.3.3 Mechanism: Sudden Closures of Sessions of Parliament . 14 1.4 Removing Political Barriers: Glorious Revolution Mitigates Effect of Political Conflict . 19 1.5 Conclusion . 26 1.6 Figures and Tables . 27 2 Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts 39 2.1 Introduction . 39 2.2 Background: Settlements and Estate Acts of Parliament . 44 2.2.1 Purposes and Forms of Settlements . 44 2.2.2 Amending and Breaking Settlements . 46 2.3 Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts . 47 2.3.1 Coding Estate Acts . 47 2.3.2 Types of Acts: Cluster Analysis . 49 2.3.3 Credit and Debt in Estate Acts . 55 2.4 Glorious Revolution and Rise of Strict Settlements . 58 2.5 Economic Implications . 64 iii 2.6 Conclusion . 68 2.7 Figures and Tables . 70 3 Political Support in the Commons: The Role of Occupations and Elections of Members of Parliament 79 3.1 Introduction . 79 3.2 Historical Background: Parliament and Development of Political Parties . 84 3.3 Political Support of Members of Parliament: Data and Methodology . 89 3.4 Court and Opposition . 96 3.4.1 Voting on Exclusion . 100 3.4.2 Building a Court and an Opposition: Discussion . 102 3.5 Political Support after the Glorious Revolution: Tories and Whigs . 105 3.6 Concluding Remarks . 109 3.7 Figures and Tables . 110 A Appendix: Chapter 1 127 A.1 Data Appendix . 127 A.1.1 Estate Bills: Sources and Coding . 127 A.1.2 Estate Bills: Summary Information . 130 A.1.3 Legislative Life-cycle Data . 130 A.1.4 Political Variables: Coding . 131 A.2 Structural Break Tests . 133 A.3 Appendix Figures and Tables . 134 B Appendix: Chapter 2 145 B.1 Data Appendix . 145 B.1.1 Coding Economic and Legal Functions . 145 B.1.2 Geography, Property Values, and Petitioners . 149 B.1.3 Random Sample of Estate Acts of Parliament . 157 B.2 Appendix Figures & Tables . 165 C Appendix: Chapter 3 172 C.1 Data Appendix . 172 C.1.1 Coding and Description of Main Variables . 172 C.1.2 Political Party from 1660 to 1689: Division Lists . 174 C.2 Appendix Figures and Tables . 175 iv LIST OF FIGURES Page 1.1 The Glorious Revolution Improved Reorganization of Property Rights to Land 27 1.2 Sudden Closures of Sessions of Parliament, 1660-1702 . 28 1.3 Evolution of Estate Bill Introduction after Glorious Revolution . 29 1.4 Parliament's Operation if Glorious Revolution Did Not Occur: Counterfactual Success Rate, 1689-1702 . 30 1.5 Legislative Process . 34 1.6 Legislative Life-cycle in Normally and Suddenly Closed Sessions of Parliament 34 2.1 Structure of an Estate Act . 70 2.2 Clusters of Clauses in Acts . 72 2.3 Geographic Distribution of Estate Acts: Importance of Middlesex and London 77 2.4 Estimated Increased in Returns from an Estate Act . 78 3.1 Political Party Affiliations . 113 3.2 Occupation and Predicted Political Support: 1660-1685 . 114 3.3 Elections and Predicted Political Support: 1660-1685 . 117 v LIST OF TABLES Page 1.1 Estate Bills: Success and Failure, 1660-1702 . 31 1.2 Conflict, Political, and Bill Variables . 32 1.3 The Effect of Political Conflict on Estate Bill Success, 1660-1685 . 33 1.4 Effects of Sudden Prorogation on Estate Bill Success: Probit and OLS Results 35 1.5 Conflict and Sudden Prorogation: OLS Estimates . 36 1.6 Glorious Revolution and Political Conflict, 1660-1702 . 37 1.7 Glorious Revolution Mitigated Effects of Political Conflict . 38 2.1 Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts, 1660-1702 . 71 2.2 Credit Transactions in Estate Acts . 73 2.3 Shift to New Types of Acts after 1688 . 74 2.4 Rise of the Lower Gentry after 1688 . 75 2.5 Economic Transactions Authorized By Estate Acts . 76 3.1 Parliamentary Meetings: 1660-1702 . 110 3.2 Members of Parliament: Political Affiliations, Occupations, and Elections . 111 3.3 Occupation and Political Support: Multinomial Estimates . 112 3.4 Political Support: Heterogeneity Across Commercial Interests . 115 3.5 Elections and Political Support: Multinomial Estimates . 116 3.6 Occupation and Voting on Exclusion . 118 3.7 Elections and Voting on Exclusion . 119 vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my advisors Dan Bogart, Gary Richardson, and Stergios Skaperdas for their guidance and support to pursue my research interests. Your ideas, questions, feedback, and conversations have been inspiring, encouraged my curiosity, and advanced my thinking. This dissertation has been challenging and fun to research and write. It would not be possible without the love, patience, and support of my parents, Mark and Priscilla, and siblings, Erik and Anna. You keep me grounded. I am incredibly grateful to Grace and Joe for our Monday dinners and Ginsberg and Wallace for their endless entertainment. Many conversations and much time with friends and colleagues helped write each chapter, made it less overwhelming, and sometimes even enjoyable. I am very lucky to have had good people with me throughout this journey, especially Sarah Brewster, Sarah Cross, Destinee Davis, Rita Fortner, Tommy Frasene, Cara Gubbins, Sebastian Hohmann, Katie La Bouff, Chris Letterii, Christianne Lopez, Alberto Lopez, Kim Makuch, Kilian Rieder, Schmidt, An- gela Terra, Marshall Urias, Vanessa Wall, Megan Wiard, Thales Zamberlain-Pereira, friends from SR, JVC, Fordham, UC Irvine, and family members. I am thankful for the THPE lunch workshop and research group, in particular Arpita Nepal, Pat Testa, Cole Williams, Zach Schaller, Nathan Cisneros, Mark Hup, for being vibrant, engaging scholars and good people to work with. Chapter 1 benefited from feedback from conference, seminar, and workshop participants at LSE Department of Economic History, SSHA 2017, UC Irvine, All-UC Economic History Graduate Student Workshop, EHES 2017 Conference, CAGE, EHES, & IAS Workshop at University of Warwick, FRESH workshop at Queens University Belfast, EREH Fast Track Meetings, Caltech, and UC Davis and many others. Russell Frankston, Meredith Anderson, and Anna Dimitruk provided excellent research assistance. Portions of Chapter 1 have been published in the European Review of Economic History to which the copyright belongs to Oxford University Press. Chapter 2 benefited from helpful conversations and correspondence with Nathan Cisneros, Julian Hoppit, Ann Carlos, Amy Erickson, Craig Palsson, and participants at the 2018 Cliometrics Society Conference. Chapter 3 would not be possible without many conversations with Nathan Cisneros and Arpita Nepal. I am also grateful to John Wallis and participants at the THPE workshop and WEHC 2018 for feedback. Aayush Koirala provided excellent research assistance. I thank the Department of Economics and Global Peace and Conflict Studies at University of California, Irvine as well as the All-UC Economic History Group for generous grant funding, which made data collection for this research possible. Thank you also for being vibrant, intellectually curious research communities. Thanks to the archivists and staff at the Parliamentary Archives, the National Archives, and the British Library for their assistance in data exploration and collection. vii CURRICULUM VITAE Kara Dimitruk EDUCATION Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 2018 University of California, Irvine Irvine, CA Master of Arts in Economics 2014 University of California, Irvine Irvine, CA Bachelor of Arts in International Political Economy 2011 Fordham University Bronx, NY FIELDS Economic History, Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics PUBLICATIONS AND WORKING PAPERS Dimitruk, Kara. 2018. \`I Intend therefore to Prorogue': The effects of Conflict in English Parliament" European Review of Economic History, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ereh/hex018. Dimitruk, Kara. August 2018. \Party and Elections in Seventeenth-Century England," Working Paper. Dimitruk, Kara. June 2018. \Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts, 1660-1702," Working Paper. Bogart, Dan, Kara Dimitruk, and Gary Richardson. June 2018. \Parliament, Property Rights, and London's Expansion: 1700-1830," Working Paper. GRANTS AND AWARDS 2018: WEHC Travel Grant 2017: Economics Merit Fellowship, Department of Economics, UCI; GPACS Research Grant; All-UC Economic History Research Grant; Summer Research Fellowship, Depart- ment of Economics, UCI 2016: Economics Merit Fellowship, Department of Economics, UCI; All-UC Economic His- tory Research Grant; Department of Economics Outstanding Teaching Assistant; Summer Research Fellowship, Department of Economics, UCI viii 2015: Summer Research Fellowship, Department of Economics, UCI; Associated Graduate Students Travel Grant; Workshop Fellowship, Ronald Coase Institute RELEVANT EXPERIENCE Research Assistant 2014 Associate Professor Dan Bogart Program Assistant & Volunteer