The Balkans A Study of a Discourse
Silva Kantareva Silva Kantareva is studying History and Political Science at the American University in Bulgaria; International Exchange Scholar, Union College, New York
ABSTRACT: For more than a decade the Balkans were a bloody arena of mon- strosities, the memory of which has still not subsided. Many heated discussions have been devoted to understanding the underlying logic and causes of the Bal- kan conflicts. Those futile “attempts,” however, have given rise to “balkaniza- tion”— a discourse that capitalized on the “Balkan essence” and diagnosed that the region is caught up in a vortex of ancient hatreds. Presenting a frozen image of the Balkans, such a discourse gradually gained autonomy that allows no dy- namism and has the potential to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. With this paper I will examine four theories explaining the emergence of the Balkan discourse. By utilizing a post-modernist approach to look into the specif- ics of Balkanism, I will investigate the signifier “Balkan” which has come to designate the geographical region as a cultural entity and inspect if such usage is justified. Providing a historical study, I will compare nationalisms in the Balkans with nationalisms elsewhere in Europe and investigate what, if anything makes Balkan nationalism qualitatively different.
The unusual cruelties of the Balkan reiterated further the “Balkan” image wars in the beginning and the end of of chaos, backwardness, and national- the twentieth century came as a vio- istic zeal. The Balkan wars have come lent shock to the rest of Europe. The to occupy public attention to such an motivations of the Balkan actors never extent that “Balkan” has become a became clear to Western scholars. To dirty word, a synonym of anarchy that the West, the causes of those wars many scholars refer to in a markedly seemed irrational. They were seen as derogatory tone. the wild outrage of underdeveloped Interestingly, the events that befell and bloodthirsty nations.1 “When the Yugoslavia in the 90’s are usually re- wars…first began, the US responded ferred to as the wars in ex-Yugoslavia as if leaders in the Balkans were irra- or the war in Bosnia and Kosovo re- tionally motivated by primordial ha- spectively. It is predominantly in US tred,” Julie Mertus—a specialist on and Western European literature that the region—argues.2 Each conflict re- they are referred to as the Balkan sulted in further fragmentations that wars.3 In fact, Yugoslavia was not la- beled “Balkan” country prior to the Bosnian war. Rather, “[it] was the 1 See Report of the International Commission to shining star of Eastern Europe” and Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the the West, least of all, wanted to recog- Balkan Wars. Washington D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, 1993. 2 Julie Mertus. “Serbia: Remaining Europe’s 3 Maria Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. Outlaw Nation.” Journal of International Oxford University Press. New York Oxford, Affairs. Spring 2001, Vol. 54 Issue 2, p 489. 1997, p 186.
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nize its Balkan belonging. All this encounters with the Balkans, Kaplan, serves to show that “Balkan” was a like many, did exactly the opposite of made-up, instrumental attribute that what he was aiming with his book — was for the West to allocate. a simplified image of the region. Kap- Along those lines, it is interesting to lan and Kennan are by no means alone examine who has been awarded the in their views. The emergence of the status “Balkan.” While some attempt Balkan discourse, a phenomena much to dissociate themselves from this more alarming than the diminutive us- “disgraceful” group, the Western list age of the word, was thus facilitated of “Balkan” states includes Albania, by analogous attitude in scholarships Bulgaria, Romania, and the republics on ethnic studies. of former Yugoslavia with the possi- There exist two main approaches in ble exception of Slovenia. The posi- ethnic conflict scholarship. The pri- tions of Turkey and Greece in this dis- mordialist school rationalizes national- course are more intricate. While both ism as an inborn need that is an essen- countries are overtly excluded from tial part of human identity. It describes the Balkan group, there are certain as- ethnicity as “inherited and inescap- pects in which European reactions to able.”5 Constructivists, on the other the Balkans and Turkey can be paral- hand, put greater emphasis on the eco- leled. nomic, political, ideological, and in- The Balkans are often looked down ternational dimensions of conflict. Put upon as primitive and underdeveloped. in another way, constructivism “relies Balkanization as a term has come to on the existence of fluid and somehow symbolize chaos, disorder, barbarity, instrumental identities that allow opt- tribalism, and the disintegration of out.”6 states. In a book that was designed to The discourse on ethnic conflicts has throw light on the complexities of the undergone many changes that have Balkans, Robert Kaplan went so far as marked a significant conversion from to claim that the peoples in the region primordialism to constructivism. are stuck in a vortex of atavistic in- While constructivism is now the main- stincts and tribal sentiments. Despite stream in scholarship, primordialism the attempts of the enlightened West has become a matter of political incor- to intervene, the Balkans are highly rectness. Likewise, the discourses on susceptible to ethnic wars and appall- Northern Ireland and the Basques ing massacres, further argued Kap- marked a transition from primordial- lan—“[h]ere [in the Balkans] men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate.” The same line of thought runs in George Kennan’s report on the Bal- For Todorova’s reactions, see Imagining the Balkans, p.5 kans that aroused much of Maria To- 5 Robert Hislope. “Between a Bad peace and a dorova’s invective in Imagining the Good War: Insights and Lessons From the Balkans.4 Thus, despite his authentic Almost-War in Macedonia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies. Jan. 2003, Vol. 26, Issue 1. p.4 6 Robert Hislope. “Between a Bad peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons From the 4 Kennan wrote an introduction to the 1993’s Almost-War in Macedonia.” Ethnic and Racial edition of the Carnegie Report on the Balkans. Studies. Jan. 2003, Vol. 26, Issue 1. p. 4.
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ism to constructivism.7 The same, terrible events in European history however, does not count for the Bal- such as the genocide during WWII. It kans. Even though as an approach it is interesting to examine some of the has lost grounds, primordialism is still theories that have been put forward to focused on the Balkan area.8 This is provide rationale for the Holocaust, even more paradoxical considering the thereby to ensure Germany’s peaceful claim authors such as Misha Glenny transition from the post-WWII period. make of Balkan identities. The fero- Hannah Arendt brought about the idea cious passion of Balkan pride, argues of “the banality of evil.” The cause of Glenny, is not the result of hardened Nazism, she argued, lay in the willing and inescapable identities; rather, it is obedience and abstention from critical a reaction to their excessive fluctua- thinking. Most famous for her book tions with the emergence and breakup Eichmann in Jerusalem, she estab- of states.9 This introduces some of the lished that Hitler’s executioners, rather paradoxical aspects of the Balkan dis- than being sadists, were overcome by course. a widespread, therefore banal, ten- All in all, dichotomies such as primor- dency to renounce their personal dialism-instrumentalism are useless judgment.11 Stanley Milgram summa- and both approaches fall short of ex- rized the Holocaust as an “obedience plaining the complexities of ethnic experiment” in 1974 under the title conflicts. Distinct political scientists Obedience to Authority: An Experi- attempt to “frame ethnic identities as mental View.12 However, the “banality amalgamations of both perennial and of evil” and the “obedience experi- modern values, ideas, and disposi- ment” were never evoked in discus- tions?”10 So far, however, this has sions of the Balkans. done little to correct the prejudice that There are diverging opinions as to exists against the Balkans. whether particular Nazi practices were The above-mentioned bias is evident a consequence of German irrationality not only in the literature devoted to or, rather, a consequence of their very ethnic conflicts, but also in a broader modernity and rationalism. If one ex- range of academic writing. While cas- plores the German self-image of being tigating the “brutal” Balkans, Western a Kulturnazion, granted special rights academia has been pliable enough to and obligations, scholars argued, it no provide euphemisms even for the most longer seems so surprising that cul- tured and educated people can fall prey to demagoguery. Because of, and 7 This argument was also raised by scholars such as Juan Linz, and Edward A. Tiryakian. not despite, citizen dissociation and 8 For more information see Simic in “Nationalism as a Folk Ideology,” Gil-White in “How Thick is Blood,” Report of the 11 See Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. International Commission to Inquire into the Chicago University Press, 1958. Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. 12 Milgram examined the clash between 9 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : Nationalism, obedience to authority and personal ethics. War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New During the Nuremberg War Criminal trials York : Viking, 2000,. p 158. Milgram focused on the self-justifying 10 Robert Hislope. “Between a Bad peace and a statements made by individuals indicted for acts Good War: Insights and Lessons From the of genocide. Stanley Milgram. Obedience to Almost-War in Macedonia.” Ethnic and Racial Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Studies. Jan. 2003, Vol. 26, Issue 1. p 7. Harper & Row, 1973.
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modernization, Germans were able to The Balkans societies, Western schol- reach those heights of violence. The ars claim, are still patriarchic, mainly evocation of primordial past to meet rural, with a marked affinity to vio- Nazi “pseudo-scientific” ends has lence and guns.15 Are the Balkans been interpreted as a testimony of really this uniform and barbarous mass modernism. It would be, therefore, in- that they are often depicted as? Many correct, theorists argue, to ascribe Na- have engaged in defining the distinct zism to endemic German barbarism or Balkan essence, relying on the as- to “marked enthusiasm” on the side of sumption that there is such thing as an ordinary Germans. Germans commit- essence, be it Slavic, Anglo-Saxon, or ted barbarous crimes but that did not Mediterranean. While there exist cer- render them barbarous people. The tain mental and attitudinal structures Holocaust was not considered incom- typical of the Balkans, the list of sup- patible with their sophistication and posedly obvious similarities can be acculturation. Such rationale was easily paralleled by a list of dissimi- evoked to defend the ordinary German larities. “It is true that “60% of Alba- from being castigated as a barbarian, nian men between ages 18-24 declared but no similar theories have been even that violence was an acceptable in- thought of in the Balkan case. strument for political aims” and that Even though the Holocaust has been certain Albanian tribes have a cult for referred to as a “Revolt against Civili- guns and engage in bloody feuds.16 zation,” there appeared scholarship However, the inclination to violence that sought to explain it. Even authors should be seen as a human, rather than that accused the German people en Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, or masse, as Daniel Goldhagen in Hit- whatever feature. Placing every Bal- ler’s Willing Executioners, pointed kan nation under a common denomi- that “prejudice is a manifestation of nator means to disregard centuries of people’s (individual and collective) civilizational achievements in the Bal- search for meaning.”13 Michael Bur- kans. In fact, “the comparing figure leigh pointed to the Ontological crisis [of the above-mentioned survey] for as the cause for Nazism.14 No such Macedonian young men was 16%.”17 search for meaning or ontological cri- “The interaction of differences and sis could be granted to the Balkans. similarities neither begins nor ends at Such theories could not be applied to the borders of the area so-called ‘the the Balkan conflicts. Rather, they were Balkans,’” concludes Bulgarian easily categorized as resulting from scholar Alexander Kiossev by arguing bestial and tribal animalistic instincts. True, the Balkan conflicts were often- times vicious, but why the double 15 For more information see Gerhard Gossman. standard after all? “Der Paristaera Balkaner.” Slavusche Rundschau, 1933, p. 1-16 16 Rober Hislope. “Between a Bad peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons From the Almost-War in Macedonia.” Ethnic and Racial 13 Daniel Goldhagen. Hitler’s Willing Studies, Jan. 2003, Vol. 26, Issue 1. p. 22. Executioners.New York: Vintage Books, 1997. 17 Robert Hislope. “Between a Bad peace and a p.39. Good War: Insights and Lessons From the 14 See Michael Burleigh. The Third Reich. UK: Almost-War in Macedonia.” Ethnic and Racial Pan Books, 2001. Studies, Jan. 2003, Vol. 26, Issue 1. p. 22.
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that, likewise, one can engage in significant “Other.” There are still cross-comparative studies to examine other possible conjectures that point to the similarities between Albanians and the pervasiveness of media and the Italians or Thracian culture and Anato- political frustration of the West in the lian.18 context of its incapacity to intervene The complexities of the Balkan peo- effectively. ple have been often diminished. In a book designed as a fierce rejec- Robert Kaplan sought to explain Ser- tion of the derogatory usage of the bian identity only through their his- term Balkans, Maria Todorova adopts torical animosity for Muslim Albani- the idea of the ego discourse. While ans.19 Perhaps he thought this is as she often alludes to Edward Said’s much as there is to know of Serbs. The Orientalism, Todorova makes it clear same scholar went at great lengths in that Balkanism is more than just Ori- his judgments for Bulgaria. However, entalism applied to the Balkans. Kaplan’s encounter with the country “Unlike Orientalism which is a dis- was based solely on single experiences course about an imputed opposition, with a Bulgarian acquaintance. This Balkanism is a discourse of the im- must have been a solid base for pro- puted ambiguity.”21 It is the Balkans’ found examination. All in all, the di- in-between-ness and their “transitory verse historical and cultural lives of a character” that makes them the in- number of human groups in the Bal- complete self rather than the incom- kans have ended up being substituted plete other. The Balkans, thus, are the by a simplified identity that is seen as incomplete self, the failing Europe, the their essence by the West. “The coun- alter ego. Given the West’s expecta- tries may be different but [their] civi- tions, this point gains even more lization is one and the same.”20This ground in the context of the Balkans’ rhetoric raises the overwhelming ques- political and social failures. The Bal- tion: To what then should this ten- kan countries did not manage their na- dency for essentialism be attributed? tion-building successfully. They never Why the Balkans, after all? succeeded implementing the concept There are several ways to explain the of the melting pot—a value held high emergence of the Balkan discourse. by the Western scholars. The overall Borrowing extensively from the field attitude of the West is one of a benign of psychology, two such theories have indifference that is usually compen- emerged, based, respectively, on the sated by the encouragement of a pet ego-discourse and on the idea of the country. Such a pet country was Yugoslavia. It is, therefore, ironic, that Serbia—Yugoslavia’s legitimate 18 Alexander Kiossev. “The Dark Intimacy: heir—should carry the brunt of the Maps, Identities, Acts of Identifications, post-war burden. In fact, both Croatia accessed at http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-05-19- and Greece can rival and even surpass kiossev-en.html Serbia’s violent nationalism. It is pre- 19 Robert Kaplan. Balkan ghosts: a Journey cisely because of the high expectations Through History. New York: Vintage books. 1994, Intro. Xiv. 20 Robert Kaplan. Balkan ghosts: a Journey 21 Maria Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. Through History. New York: Vintage books. Oxford University Press. New York Oxford, 1994, p. 283. 1997, 17
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that have been laid on Serbia that it modes of repression and subjection. was easily transformed into Europe’s Foucault has thoroughly examined the “outlaw nation.” The same is valid for power-knowledge relationship be- the Balkans overall. tween subject and object that ensues The Balkans, Todorova argues, have from such “evaluations.” The position ended up carrying the West’s political of an “evaluator,” Foucault demon- frustrations.22 This argument is further strates, creates an immediate psycho- supported by Larry Wolf—a political logical superiority over the subject of scientist on the Balkans—who claims examination. Along those lines, that “the symbolic geography of knowledge or the claim to know and Europe [during the Enlightenment] evaluate is the most sophisticated key was reshaped and the backwardness for domination. Where does this ardor and “barbarism” of the North was pro- for judgment come from? The answer, jected over the South-East.”23 At- to put it in Foucault’s terms, is the tempting to trace how much of what is need to assess oneself as opposed to labeled Balkan corresponds to reality the “Other.” Such antagonisms maxi- and how much has been invented, To- mize one’s virtues. The “Other,” dorova argues the origins of Balkan- therefore, even if not existent, needs to ism as a discourse are to be found in be constructed, which introduces the European inventive “discovery” of the second theory for the emergence of Balkans.24 the Balkan discourse. Even though In fact, any “discovery” is more or Todorova often makes allusions to the less doomed to be inventive. By elabo- above-mentioned post-modernist phe- rating on the basics of the human mind nomena, the idea of the significant and perception, post-modern philoso- “Other” presents a perspective that is phy offers a key on this phenomenon. somehow different from her theory of Michel Foucault presents brilliant the incomplete self. analyses of psychiatric, political, and For Europe, the Balkans were the carceral modes of subjection in the “Other” against which it could juxta- context of which the mechanisms of pose and maximize its achievements. power and domination can be better The belief that the Occident—the understood.25 As a post-modernist, West—has the authority to assess and Foucault examines a myriad of elusive examine the Balkans created an im- mediate superiority over the object of analysis—the Balkans. An elusive 22 Maria Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. sense of domination was thus estab- Oxford University Press. New York Oxford, 1997, 1997,181. lished when Western Europe started 23 Alexander Kiossev. “The Dark Intimacy: exploring the Balkans. Traveler ac- Maps, Identities, Acts of Identifications.” p. 12, counts became the first source based accessed at on which the Balkans became the http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-05-19- kiossev-en.html “Other” for the West. Since a text has 24 Maria Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. a life of its own once out of the au- Oxford University Press. New York Oxford, thor’s hand, accuracy is not even the 1997, 1997 main concern when considering the 25 See Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization: A history of Insanity in the Age of impact of travelers’ accounts on the Reason, trans. Richard Howard. London: emergence of the Balkan discourse. Tavistock, 1967.
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Roland Barthes first established that people through all the years. Such at- an author’s intentions in creating a tempt is further aggravated by the pe- text are irrelevant in the ensuing inter- culiar Balkan geography that was con- pretations of the text since human per- ducive to the formation of sub- ceptions of things and events are national groupings and micro-cultures formed far in advance of the authentic that allow no simplification.29 The act of perception.26 Likewise, travelers categorization of the Balkans, how- often had their “Balkan” perceptions ever, is a fact. far in advance to their authentic en- A purely energy-saving mechanism counters. For them even the prosaic that brings order into our minds, the was often a fertile ground that easily “us vs. them” categorization holds true became exotic and came to satisfy for the attitudes of Europe for the Bal- their expectations for the extraordi- kans just as much as it is valid for the nary. The next logical step was the attitudes the Balkans have for Europe. creation of category in which to frame In fact, it holds true of any human be- the newly-acquired “knowledge.” ing. The trouble is when categoriza- Categorization in itself is always a fu- tions in books such as Balkan Ghosts tile attempt. People often treat identi- motivate political action as it occurred ties as if they are concrete and stable during the Bosnia crisis.30 Another concepts when, in fact, they are rather problem is when such constructions fluid and fluctuate through the years start a life of their own as a dis- so much so that “no man presently course—Balkanism—and present a knows what is a Greco-Roman, a Celt, stagnant picture of the Balkan peo- a Teuton or a Slav.”27 Moreover, lin- ples—“[t]he whole peninsula has en- guistic similarities are by no means a tered a cataclysmic period that will solid base on which to establish a last for many years.”31 It is obvious blood relationship between any two categories and constructions cannot be groups. “The movements of peoples, done away with. The question, how- the origins of races, the transitions ever, is how and the extent to which from type to type or the persistence of we can consciously wrestle with them. type”—all these are mysterious factors Can we minimize the impacts of the that remain unaccounted for.28 It is Balkan discourse? futile endeavor, therefore, to attempt A third perspective on the emergence to establish a temporal and spatial re- of the Balkan discourse relates to mass lation between peoples separated culture. An interesting subject to con- through the ages. This is even more so sider beforehand, however, is the fre- in the Balkan case when attempting to quency of ethnic warfare. Research establish a pattern that can be general- ized and that encompasses all Balkan 29 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning Curve.” in European History Quarterly. Vol 31, 26 See Roland Barthes. The Death of the Author. page 142. trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 1977. 30 President Clinton’s decision to intervene is 27 W. M. Sloane. “Turkey in Europe.” Political said to have been influenced by Kaplan’s book. Science Quarterly. Vol. 23, No. 2. (Jun., 1908), This fact is mentioned in the introduction of p. 307 Balkan Ghosts. 28 W. M. Sloane. “Turkey in Europe.” Political 31 Robert Kaplan. Balkan ghosts: a Journey Science Quarterly. Vol. 23, No. 2. (Jun., 1908), Through History. New York: Vintage books. p 307 1994, p. 287.
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conducted by Ted Gurr published in part of the necessity for the shocking Foreign Affairs asserts that ethnic con- and the sensational. flict in the twentieth century is on the The end of the cold war caused a shift wane.32 To what then shall we attrib- in public attention; the nuclear threat ute the public anxiety, if not obses- was no longer a major concern. The sion, in the West with the Balkans new priority list of concerns in the during the last decade? One key is the West brought the Balkans to the spot- growing popularity of media—a major light. Media is now forming the politi- opinion builder. cal priorities. It has managed to con- Media has become a key political nect with human emotions and touch player with the potential to distort pri- upon men’s most deep-felt sentiments orities and concepts. Often responsible and values, reaching “not only peo- for the formation of a specific context ple’s homes, but also their minds, that places limits and guidelines for shaping their thoughts and sometimes the political responses of other institu- their behavior.”34 Even though the tions, media has demonstrated its Bosnian war made the top ten list of power when it turned public attitudes the decade’s most deadly conflicts it regarding the war in Vietnam. After 5 was less lethal than any of the African years of relative support, people de- conflicts.35 Nevertheless, the above- manded immediate retreat. The emo- mentioned pervasiveness of mass me- tionally intense broadcast of the deaths dia helped perpetuate a lurid image of of 18 U.S. soldiers caused the with- the region—one of underdeveloped drawal from Rwanda in 1994. TV peoples whose animalistic drives can- broadcasting of revolutions around not be restrained. Clearly, “image pro- Europe produced a domino effect that voked bursts of public compassion or helped topple communist regimes in a anger” have started dictating politics, number of countries such as Romania argues James Hoze, a scientist devoted and East Germany. Politicians have on the influence of media.36 The same every right to be wary of such a loss of goes on to explain that if pervasive- control that has often led to unpredict- ness of media is the illness, reason and able results. People and politics have political dialogue is the cure. If media become vulnerable to a newly- propagates a frozen discourse of the modified style of journalism that relies Balkans, it is vital that such an alarm- on sensations, immediacy, and perva- ing pattern be tackled. siveness, often at the expense of These three theories on the emergence analysis.33 The new rules of journal- of Balkanism, however, do not ex- ism have imposed a constant demand haust all the possibilities. Another ex- for scandalous “headlines.” Thus, me- planation to the emergence of the Bal- dia, in a way, demanded the emer- kan discourse is Western incapacity to gence of the Balkan discourse. It was successfully intervene in the region and/or unwillingness to bear the costs
32 Ted Gurr. “Ethnic Conflict on the Wane.” 34 Ibid. Foreign Affairs. May/Jun2000, Vol. 79 Issue 3, 35 Ivo H. Daalder. “Unlearning the Lessons of p52, Kosovo.” in Foreign Policy, Fall 116, p 128. 33 James Hoze Jr. Foreign Affairs. The 36 James Hoze Jr., “The Pervasiveness of pervasiveness of media. Media.” in Foreign Affairs 2001.
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of intervention. Thus, the claim that comfortable excuse for the historical the Balkans are irrational and primi- inaction and indifference on behalf of tive can be as well taken for a self- the West.39 serving justification in the context of The tribalism and underdevelopment the West’s frustration for its political of the Balkans justified the application failures in the Balkans. However, this of an unusual criterion when judging argument loses ground considering the their policies. While the public atten- usual political practices of great pow- tion is constantly focused on the “un- ers on the Balkans. It is contestable heard-of” atrocities in the Balkans, a whether their intervention was genu- quiet carnage is taking place in other inely humanitarian act that could have places of “civilized” Europe such as caused any frustration. In fact, histori- Northern Ireland and the Basque re- cally, the only straightforward calls gion in Spain. Curiously, those spots for involvement came during the late do not make it so often to the head- nineteenth century from distinct intel- lines and if they do, they are referred lectuals such as William Gladstone, to as “independence fights” with the Victor Hugo, Charles Darwin, Oscar means of terror. The “irrational” Bal- Wilde, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. kan wars, however, are simply the re- Overall, however, the interventions of sult of inherent animalistic drives. the Great Powers in the region were True, the Balkan conflicts were brutal. dictated only by their personal gains In this context, however, an interesting so much so that when they were subject to consider is the means “faced with a situation in which no through which homogeneity in West- Western power had a direct interest, ern societies was reached. The nation governments, nongovernmental or- building process of Western nations ganizations, and multilateral institu- has been no less brutal, only it has tions turned to the desiccated vocabu- taken place at a different time. Events lary of conflict resolution in order to like the night of Bartholomew clearly stake out noncommittal positions.”37 demonstrate that point and might In fact, the first time the Western prove useful reminders of history. powers intervened with no perceived While it is true that every attempt to economic or strategic interest, but for reach Great Bulgaria, Serbia, or humanitarian reasons, was the Bosnian Greece has had tragic consequences, conflict.38 Along those lines, the “con- this is equally true of the British at- viction” that the conflict was an ex- tempts to establish Pax Britannica not ample of “atavistic behavior [that] so long ago. Only those tragedies, could not be changed through rea- unlike the ones in the Balkans, were son…an entirely “natural” course of often at the expense of someone else, historic animosities” was definitely a mainly the colonies. Clearly, national- ism and imperialist ambitions are not exclusive attributes; Western Europe 37 Carl Cavanagh Hodge. “Woodrow Wilson in and the Balkans have been equally fer- Our Time: NATO’s Goals in Kosovo.” in tile grounds for their rise. Parameters: US Army War College, Spring, 2001, Vol. 31. Issue 1, p 125. 38 Misha Glenny. The Balkans: nationalism, 39 Misha Glenny. The Balkans: nationalism, war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New York : Viking, 2000, p. 638-639. York : Viking, 2000, p. 489.
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The key for understanding national- The Balkans are “…at world’s end, at isms in the Balkans, and elsewhere, is a place whose very collapse gave the the inherent universal human need to twentieth century its horrific direc- stereotype—a mechanism that brings tion,” argues Kaplan.43 His rhetoric order and logic to reality. Self-images has gone so far as to trace the causes identity, by all means, have an enor- of the Holocaust in the Balkans. If mous appeal to people and that does scholars such as Kaplan ascribe the not apply to the Balkan peoples exclu- WWI and WWII to the Balkans, it is sively. If figures are to be trusted, it clear they cannot distinguish between becomes obvious that it is in contem- the real cause of a conflict and the porary Europe as a whole that nation- event that merely triggers it. There alism is on the rise. “In the most were numerous trigger points that members states of the EU a hard core could have substituted Sarajevo. In ranging from 12 to 18 percent of the fact, WWI was on the verge of erup- electorate harbors resentful, xenopho- tion in 1912 as Russia and Austria bic sentiments, particularly against struggled over the distribution of Al- immigrants.”40 Such sentiments are banian speaking lands.44 True, Franz more easily discernible in the rise to Ferdinand’s assassination in Belgrade power of politicians like Paul Fortrein, prompted it but, in fact, WWI had its Jorg Heider, Jacques LePin and others. causes somewhere else. However, it is not only the Nether- The profound tensions between the lands, Austria, and France that fall un- Habsburgs and the Serbs over Bosnia der this pattern. Rather, a thorough and over the wider South Slav ques- scrutiny in the European picture is re- tion which triggered the war had little quired. Clearly, “illiberal democracy to do with the almighty destructive [has become] fashionable as never be- force unleashed over Europe…The fore.”41 Populist demagogues, many of Balkans was not the powder keg but them elected, cultivate ethnic resent- merely one of a number of devices ment and ride it to power.42 Again, which might have acted as detona- this might be comfortably labeled as tor…The First World War started in different type of nationalism and the Balkans and devastated the region packed into another category that but it was a European war and not a would better serve the interests of the Balkan war.45 West. It would have been convenient However, the reverse argument can be if right-wing European movements, more accurate. Instead of tracing the too, could be traced in a Kaplan-ian causes of the world wars in the Bal- fashion in the Balkans. kans, the Balkan conflicts could be traced in European dealings and influ-
40 Tony Judt. Tale from Vienna Woods. Sept 43 Robert Kaplan. Balkan ghosts: a Journey 28, 2000 accessed at Through History. New York: Vintage books. http://nybooks.com/articles/174 1994, p. 287. 41 Tony Judt. Tale from Vienna Woods. Sept 44 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning 28, 2000 accessed at Curve” in European History Quarterly, Vol. 31, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/174 p. 147. 42Farred Zakaria. “The Rise of Illeberal 45 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : nationalism, Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, 76 November- war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New December 1997, 22-43. York : Viking, 2000, p. 463.
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ence. Even thought the Balkan wars in “escapism” led to tragic antagonisms the twentieth century are “widely be- and fervent differentiation among lieved to offer definitive proof of Bal- Balkan nations in a search for the au- kan madness,” they were not a result thentic national “self.” of Balkan nationalism per se.46 Misha Are there any injustices inflicted on Glenny’s goes on to trace the brutality the Balkans? This is a question that of Balkan nationalism in post- seldom occurs in Western scholarly enlightenment Western ideology, writing. The Balkans were often rather than in domestic traditions and looked down upon as no more than affinities for violence. He argues: tribal societies. This attitude can be Balkan nationalism and militarism, as demonstrated by Sir Austen Chamber- expressed in the Balkan wars, were in lain’s benevolent approval of Musso- fact much more closely related to the lini’s ambitions to “represent Alba- practices and morality of great power nia’s interests (without consulting the imperialism than to local traditions. Albanians).”49 It is probably worth From the specific examples of Italy noting that Chamberlain was a Nobel and Germany, and from logic learnt Prize laureate. In 1941, another exem- from the behavior of all Great Powers, plary Englishman, Sir Alexander the small circle of Balkan state build- Cadogan, the head of the British For- ers learned one central lesson—force eign Office, confided to his diary that determines history. And force means a “All these Balkan peoples are trash.50 strong state which means centraliza- In fact, the Balkans have often de- tion and a powerful army.47 served more credit than they had been The West has set the world standards historically granted. both for nation building and for war- Although it poses a positive example fare. Not surprisingly, the nation- of ethnic tolerance and integration in building process in the Balkans was the very heart of the Balkans—the equally brutal and vicious. However, gunpowder keg of Europe—Bulgaria the Balkan nations were trapped be- was labeled an “irrational country.”51 tween the “modern imperatives of the Bulgarian society has traditionally historical duties of the nation [per se]” been one of tolerance and diversity. and their own irrelevance in Great Bulgaria accepted a large number of Powers’ politics. The result was inter- Armenian refugees during the Arme- nalization of the stigma “Balkan,” nian Holocaust in 1915, who have in- which partially explains the passionate tegrated successfully and formed a nationalism and hyperbolic pride to be prosperous minority group; likewise, (Serb, Bulgarian, Albanian) as an “es- Bulgarians, under the leadership of cape in the opposite direction.”48 This Boris III, did not allow the deportation
46 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : nationalism, 49 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New Curve” in European History Quarterly, Vol. 31, York : Viking, 2000, p. 457. p. 148. 47 Ibid. p.3. 50 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning 48 Alexander Kiossev. “The Dark Intimacy: Curve” in European History Quarterly, Vol. 31, Maps, Identities, Acts of Identifications, p. 151. accessed at 51 Robert Kaplan. Balkan ghosts: a Journey http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-05-19- Through History. New York: Vintage books. kiossev-en.html 1994, p. 207.
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of their Jewish populations to Nazi nika upon the overthrow of Abdul- concentration camps during World hamid II by the Young Turks in 1908. War II, “an example more ‘civilized’ Muslim and Armenians jointly paid countries chose not to follow.”52 Right homage to the 1896 genocide victims. after this fact is mentioned, however, It was Austro-Hungary’s decision to Western scholars cannot resist but say annex Bosnia that antagonized Salo- that Bulgarians, nevertheless, prose- nika to the Russian Tsar. In fact, “the cuted Jews in Macedonia. Whenever a decisive aspects of inter-war Balkan Balkan country is being praised there diplomacy were the Balkan policies of is an immediate necessity to bedraggle the great powers rather than the rela- it. After only a few years of democ- tions among the Balkan states.”54 The ratic rule, the damage done by com- frequent, untimely, and maladroit in- munist repression against the Turkish terference in the Balkans on behalf of minority in Bulgaria has been re- the Great Powers such as the Berlin deemed and ethnic Turks were al- congress and Yalta have repeatedly lowed to participate in the Bulgarian complicated matters. democratic government. However, The compulsion…to grab new terri- most of the Balkan multi-ethnic suc- tory, with scant regard to the facts of cesses are repeatedly overlooked. demography or history, merely re- Macedonia, too, deserves acknowl- flected the practices of their great edgment for the sustenance of peace, neighbors whose arbitrary and fool- albeit fragile, in what are potentially hardy decisions at the Congress of volatile and combustible circum- Berlin had ensured that there was stances. Macedonia is the only Yugo- plenty of territory to dispute.55 slav republic that managed to dissoci- In fact, a great deal of the bloodshed ate itself from the federation without in the region might have been avoided war. In a commendable example of if the formation of a large Slavic state ethnic tolerance, Macedonian leader- in 1878 had met less resistance from ship, at their own free will, have of- the Great Powers.56 They, however, fered executive positions in the gov- had different objectives to pursue. The ernment to Albanians after the disinte- aim of the 1878 Berlin Congress was gration of the Yugoslav federation. to sustain the balance of power and Overall, most minorities in the Bal- thereby prevent the emergence of kans such as the Bosnian Muslims in Anti-German alliance by cutting up Yugoslavia, and the Hungarians in the majority of the Balkan states. This Romania used peaceful means to at- cost the legitimacy of the Western tain rights for the preservation and continuation of their traditions and identities.53 Another remarkable dis- 54 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning play of religious tolerance was Salo- Curve” in European History Quarterly, Vol. 31, 150. 55 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : nationalism, war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New 52 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : nationalism, York : Viking, 2000, p 452 war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New 56 Gallagher explains that Bulgaria had the York : Viking, 2000, p 452. economic and socio-cultural potential to 53 Tom Gallagher. “A Balkan History Learning progress in state-building and act as a magnet to Curve” in European History Quarterly, Vol.31, Serbia. The Berlin Congress spurned those 151. chances. P 145
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democracies as objective mediators in cultural unity of Europe. This, how- the Balkan affairs. ever, poses considerable problems Another significant flaw in the politics since it does not allow the rejection of of the Great Powers in the region is the Balkan Peninsula from Europe in their inadequate revision of the politi- purely geographic terms. It is an ardu- cal map of the region. While recogniz- ous task to establish whether Turkey ing certain borders, they denied ac- does or does not belong to the Balkans knowledgment of others. Evoking and Europe. What is more important, Croatia’s claims of cultural affinity however, is to establish if the Balkan with the European family, Franjo Tud- parameters apply to Turkey. jman managed to win the favors of the In relation to its application for mem- German Foreign Minister at the bership the EU, a hot debate sur- time—Hans Friedrich Genschner. rounded Turkey’s geographical exclu- Genschner became a staunch apologist sion/inclusion from Europe. Curi- for the Croatian cause and ensured a ously, the same argument was not hasty recognition of both Croatia and raised when Malta’s candidacy was Slovenia. Soon, however, it became considered. Malta has long been a clear that this threatened to turn into a stepping stone between North Africa quagmire the exodus from which will and Europe, just like Turkey has been be painful for all involved. Thus, the a stepping stone between Europe and West still does not want to recognize Asia. However, Malta’s cultural dif- the autonomous status of Kosovo. It is ference was not evoked as it is often clear to all, however, that Kosovo’s done with Turkey. In fact, both recognition is not a question of Malta’s traditional music and folklore whether, but rather a question of point to their African heritage much when. To what then shall we attribute more than to their European prox- the West obvious unwillingness to imity.57 Perhaps Malta’s history as a grant Kosovo autonomy? One possible British colony or the fact its popula- answer is that such recognition might tion is largely Catholic was enough to prove a slippery slope and might trig- render it culturally compatible with ger cessations elsewhere, an outcome Europe. Clearly, geographical inclu- the West wants to avoid at all costs. sion and cultural compatibility are Thus, the Western powers have en- useful and often used tools that pro- gaged in something they do not have vide valuable space for Western poli- the courage, knowledge or legitimacy ticians and scholars to maneuver. This to do—define the political boundaries is all too reminiscent of the Balkan of states in the Balkans and grant rec- discourse and the treatment of the ognitions exclusively. It is uncertain Balkans. Aren’t such comments con- whether the political or the cultural cerning geography the equivalent of borders that the West has redrawn is a how Tony Blair referred to Kosovo?58 more alarming pattern. In this relation, it is interesting to con- sider the status of Greece in the Bal- 57 For more information on Maltese folklore see kan discourse. A member of the EU http://www.rootsworld.com/reviews/etnika.shtm l since 1981, Greece is undoubtedly 58 Misha Glenny. The Balkans : nationalism, considered part of the geographic and war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New York : Viking, 2000, p 432.
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I will allow myself to diverge in order Europe in regard to Turkey’s acces- examine this point more thoroughly so sion and Turkey per se. Giscard that it does not seem unsubstantiated. d’Estaing—one of the main authors of At the Helsinki summit in 1999 Tur- Europe’s constitution—bluntly de- key was officially recognized as a clared that Turkey’s integration in the candidate for EU accession. Even EU would mean the end of Europe.59 though the process was hard and pain- While it is true that Turkey still needs ful, this summer Turkey finally con- to undergo certain democratic reforms, formed and implemented reforms that d’Estaing remarks go much further. lifted all language and cultural restric- One can see the obvious ethnocen- tions imposed on Kurds. Nevertheless, trism at work here. It is precisely this Turkey’s prospects of admission, pun- Eurocentrism that Edward Said criti- dits admit, are still distant. A couple of cized in his Orienatlism.60 The cul- arguments have been raised as to the tural incompatibility evoked is just reasons why Turkey will not be al- another name for the “us vs. them” lowed in the EU. One is the on-going categorization that we already encoun- suppression of Kurdish rights; other— tered with the Balkans. Similar to the the size and the influence of the Turk- Balkan discourse, all representations ish army. Yet another, the overwhelm- of Turkey are tainted by the language, ing advantage in ministerial votes and culture, institutions and political am- in representatives Turkey will have in bience of the representer. This is a the European Parliament. However, perfect description of d’Estaing’s as- Poland’s potential to block decisions sertions that “[Turkey has] a different has not raised so much alarm. Let’s culture, a different approach, and a not forget, however, that Poland is one different way of life. It is not a Euro- of the strongholds of Catholicism in pean country.” Obviously, Malta is. Europe. The center of gravity might as Moreover, the latter stressed that those well turn east to the countries of the in support of Turkey’s candidacy were Soviet bloc. Real displeasure for lead- “the adversaries of the European Un- ing forces in Europe, however, comes ion.”61 This viewpoint was supported only when a Muslim country has some by another big figure in the history of power to block “important” decisions. the EU—Helmut Schmidt.62 Schmidt What many people leave unsaid, how- ever, is the perception of Turkey as “the Other”—echoing the perception 59President of France (1974-81), deputy finance of the Balkans. The heart of the matter minister (1959-62), and finance minister (1962- 66), D'Estaing serves in the European is not migration, not agriculture, nor Parliament (1989-93, 1997-). In 2001 he was overpopulation. The question is some- appointed president of the Convention on the thing else—an often-recurring pattern Future of Europe, which is charged with in “European” behavior that works drafting a new constitution for the European Union. against Turkey, just as much as it 60 Edward Said. Orientalism. New York: works against the Balkan Slavs. Pantheon Books, 1978. In this regard, examining some of the 61 D’Estaing’s comments are accessed at comments the Founding Fathers of the http://www.dawn.com/2002/11/09/int1.htm 62 A former Federal German Chancellor, EU have made will be curious and Schmidt was one of the founders of the may throw light on the sentiments in committee supporting the European Monetary Union, the European Economic Union together
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emphasized that Turkey’s admission the decadent, effete, depraved, and to the EU “would open the door for weak societies of “the East,” domi- similarly plausible full memberships nated by the Ottoman Empire. Both of other Muslim nations in Africa and images, although forged in the eight- the Middle East.”63 Schmidt went so eenth century, have persisted into the far as to note that: current one, and for many they con- Thanks to the church and the crusades, tinue to define Turkey as outside the most Europeans since the Middle scope of European culture.”65 Ages have grown up with a hostile re- This argument is often touched upon jection of Islam. And from the Islamic in discussions but is seldom given any side admonitions for religious toler- consideration. Rather, it gives way to ance occur with scarcity. Islam lacks a more convenient rationale. It is true the developmental influences of the that the party now elected in Turkey renaissance, the enlightenment and the has Islamic roots. It should be noted, separation of spiritual and political however, that the AK (Justice and De- authority, which are so decisive for velopment) Party attempts to do any- European culture. 64 thing to satisfy European demands and Such comments are ignorant of the has embarked to differentiate between complexities of Islam. They are also in politics and Islam, claiming that the tune with the profound discomfort as- latter should be regarded as a personal sociated with Turkey’s prospects of and rather intimate matter. AK becoming the largest Muslim minority leader—Recep Tayip Erdogan—has in the EU. Furthermore, the Pope de- announced EU accession as Turkey’s mands that “the decisive contribution number one priority. AK’s liberal Is- of Christianity and Christian vision to lam doctrine aims to diminish the Is- the history and culture of Europe” be lamic agenda and to align with the explicitly mentioned in the constitu- West. All this was aimed at the West. tion of Europe. If the EU is thus de- Europeans, however, did not get the fined in Christian terms, it is no won- message, or, rather, did not want to. der that Mr. Schmidt perceives a po- The Kurdish question has come to tential threat in the plausible member- raise a lot of discussions. Often criti- ship of Muslim countries, as if this cized for its domestic policies in this would create a clash between Islam respect, Turkey has been labeled a and Christendom. The similarities non-democratic country and has been with the rhetoric on the Balkan coun- duly excluded from the European tries (Turkey is not considered Balkan club. But exactly how democratic are by European standards) are striking. the European states. In fact, they read- European elites long defined them- ily surrender their democratic ideals selves in contrast to what they saw as when confronted by a threat that can- not be tackled in a “democratic” man- with Giscard D’estaing in 1986, and the creation ner. Britain’s policy regarding North- of the European Central Bank. ern Ireland is a fitting example. Tur- 63 For more information, see “Is Turkey Ready key has endured harsh criticism for the for Europe?” in Foreign Affairs—May/June, 2003. p. 97. 64 For more information, see Paul Kieffer. “Who’s Afraid From Turkey” at 65 Edward Said. Orientalism. New York: http://www.ucg.org/wnp/wnp0302/turkey.htm Pantheon Books, 1978,p. 98.
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treatment of the Kurdish issue. But in fits of the union, Turkey ended up fact, the provisions of the Prevention with having no voice in EU’s foreign of Terrorism Act in Britain, Ronnie trade policies. The Cold War was an Marguiles—a specialist on Turkish opportunity that Turkey seized and politics—argues, are precisely as dra- became a NATO member. Now that conian as [were] those of the “Strug- Turkey is not a means for attaining gle Against Terrorism Law” in Tur- some military or other aim, it is not key.66 Marguiles goes on to explain clear how long this accession process the difference of casualties in the big- will take. ger terrain challenges that Irish repub- With this paper I attempted to increase licans face. “Faced with a commensu- the awareness of the inadequacies of rate threat, the British state would re- discourses of any type and the Balkan spond no less ruthlessly and undemo- one in particular. The concept “The cratically.” Balkans” may have been a geographi- Turkey has already abolished the capi- cal designation; presently, however, it tal punishment and has lifted the re- signifies the existence of a non- strictions on the use of the Kurdish geographical referent. Any attempt to language. Once those reforms were come up with a rigid definition of the passed, their “actual enactment” came essential Balkan specimen is bound to to be questioned by Europeans. It is be loaded with certain ideological as- only logical to ask who has the legiti- sumptions and biases. Balkan’s pre- macy, and what is more, the objectiv- sent and future have been long ity, to judge for the “actual enactment” searched for in record books and his- of those reforms. Thus, the matter of tories centuries ago. All this points to actual enactment becomes a conven- the need for more dynamism and ob- ient justification for “feet dragging” jectivity in scholarship exploring the on the side of the EU. Double stan- region. dards become obvious considering The Balkans have often been depicted that many nations that do not adhere to as a meeting point between Europe the Copenhagen criteria were invited. and Asia where Islam and Christianity Not to mention that even France and meet. Therefore, the Balkans are con- Germany fail some of the fiscal re- sidered the perfect place for their rec- quirements. Turkey gained an associ- onciliation. The Balkans, therefore ate membership in 1963 and a candi- have the potential to refute “clash of date status in 1979. In a way, Turkey civilization theories.” Thus, rather has already lost its economic sover- than stress and emphasize dichoto- eignty by opening its boarders and ex- mies, while pretending to be treating posing its producers to international Balkan states fairly, European leaders competition. Turkey’s decision to should discern and seize this opportu- forge a Customs Union agreement nity. with the EU in 1995 has been harshly criticized domestically. Thus, along with the economic burdens and bene-
66 Ronnie Marguiles. “Turkey and the European Union” in Middle East Report. April-June 1996.
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